ARTICLE X.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress
SECTION 1. TERRITORIAL & POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 79956,
January 26, 1990
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September
13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA)
and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands
through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful
means, such as political negotiations. A subsequent joint
agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to: Par. 2. Work together
in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras. Par. 3.
Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the
study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive
Order. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220
was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and
of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was
then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera
Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that
by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of
from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue: WON E.O 220 is constitutional
Held: YES. E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the
President saw it fit to provide forsome measures to
address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed
and the autonomous region created. At this time, the
President was still exercising legislative powers as the
First Congress had not yet convened.
Section 2. Local Autonomy
Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391,
February 28, 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the
Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that
there shall be no session in November as his presence
was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the
Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be
declared null and void and be it declared that he was still
the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on a question
which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because its resolution
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction
over the autonomous governments or regions. What is
the extent of self-government given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII
Held: We hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions
were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region
XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in
accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner
called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid
recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground
of good faith.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was
left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan,
peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and
the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director
Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as
PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This
appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM.
Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before
the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both
dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that
the appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order
No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a
PBO who was not expressly nominated by the provincial
governor
Held: This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local
autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power
over local governments to "general supervision . . . as
may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more
marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25
provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly,
set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to
the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Drilon v. Lim – 235 SCRA 135 [1994]
Facts: The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four
oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC
as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.
(Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure
to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are
advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no lessthan
on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also
emphasized that every court, including this Court, is
charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before
declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by them to be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally approved. To doubtis to sustain. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20,
1994
Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.,
renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project.
Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on
the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree
No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority
to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.
Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are
valid.
Held: CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances
should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments
are merely agents of the National Government. Local
Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by
Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869
authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be
amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
Judge Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan
City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and
representation and transportation allowance (RATA)
were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court.
Besides that, petitioner also received a monthly
allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality
of Naujan starting 1984.
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved a resolution increasing petitioner judge’s
monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase
of P656) starting May 1993. This supplemental budget
was approved by the municipal government (the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) and was
also likewise approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro.
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop
the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to
petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of
the amounts previously paid to the latter. She reasoned
that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to
petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was
already receiving from the Supreme Court. Petitioner
judge appealed the matter to COA Regional Director
Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of
Provincial Auditor Dalisay.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its Municipal Judge,
in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
Held: RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal
governments may grant allowances to judges as long as
their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No.
53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting
allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1)
also granted by the national government or (2) similar to
the allowances granted by the national government,
violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. As already stated, a circular must conform
to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or
amend it. Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting
allowances similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53
practically prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to
judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their statutory power
to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the
statutory power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges
and being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is
hereby declared null and void.
Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR No.
138810, September 29, 2004
Facts: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a
CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to
charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates
shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner
increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00
per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote
petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner
then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a
petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate
the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in the
Philippines.
Issue: WON a local government unit (LGU) may regulate
the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within
its territorial jurisdiction
Held: The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of
the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises
regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of
other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe
regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public
properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical
realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions- allow an LGU a certain degree
of regulation over CATV operators.
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the
general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.
210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the
well-recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of
existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation
policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning
CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power
of the NTC.
CREBA VS SECRETARY OF DAR
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October
1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands
to Non-Agricultural Uses, which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion.
The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural
lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units
(LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled
Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending
and updating the previous rules on land use conversion.
Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to
wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and
fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural
use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those
reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent
laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such
uses.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-
02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and
calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural
lands for real estate development, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on
15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion
applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an
actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn,
aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and
illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not
only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the
whole nation.
ISSUE:
WON DAR AO NO. 01-02, as amended violates the
Local Autonomy of Local Government Units.
HELD:
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-
awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June
1988 is specious. As explained in Department of Justice
Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it is true that the DARs
express power over land use conversion provided for
under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to
cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have,
after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only
instances that the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in Republic Act No.
6657 which every landowner may use to evade
compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should
logically follow, therefore, from the said departments
express duty and function to execute and enforce the
said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a
residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988
should first be cleared by the DAR.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2
separate but related petitions of running candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the
validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec
8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8.
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for
Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters
set by such a call is constitutional.
HELD:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional
Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore,
specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are
deemed as constitutional.
SECTION 3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
GARCIA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the
1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into
a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No.
1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings.
COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to
comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local
Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal
defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in
passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send
notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right
of elected local public officials belonging to the political
minority to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-
mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities
and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No
significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at
the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the
province concerned. Considering their number, the
greater probability is that no one political party can
control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides
that the only ground to recall a locally elected public
official is loss of confidence of the people. The members
of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people.
By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be
premised on mere differences in political party affiliation.
Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system
for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to
the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly
then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to the
minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the
initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall
assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences.
We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its
proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of
all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene
in session and in a public place. Needless to state,
compliance with these requirements is necessary,
otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which
can be given due course by the COMELEC.
MALONZO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-
026, dated November 18, 1996, of the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) calling for an
Election for the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo O.
Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held
on May 8, 1995, winning over former Mayor Macario
Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's
office as Mayor was put to serious question when on July
7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang
Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan
chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan,
met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the
approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No.
01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo,
and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against
him.
Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No.
01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate
action. In response, Mayor Malonzo filed a Petition with
the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that the
recall process was deficient in form and substance, and
therefore, illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the
petition devoid of merit and declared the recall
proceedings to be in order.
ISSUE:
WON the validity of the institution and proceedings of the
recall, putting to fore the propriety of the service of
notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the
issuance of the questioned Resolution is constitutional.
HELD:
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices
sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not
disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC
based on its own assessments and duly supported by
gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more
so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the
validity of the same.
Moreover, to order the COMELEC to repeat the process
of determining the notices' propriety would be sanctioning
a recycling of administrative functions, entailing added
cost and waste of effort.
The Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the present petition,
for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent
Commission on Elections to GIVE DUE COURSE to PRA
Resolution No. 01-96 is AFFIRMED. The Commission on
Elections is ORDERED to set the date of the Election on
Recall in the city of Caloocan, which date shall not be
later than thirty days after receipt of notice of this
Resolution, which is immediately executory.
MALONZO VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
A supplemental budget was passed by the councilors
upon three readings held on the same day. They were
charged with misconduct.
HELD:
There is no law prohibiting the holding of the three
readings of a proposed ordinance in one session day.
SECTION 4. SUPERVISION BY THE PRESIDENT
GANZON VS CA
FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-
day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to
bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders.
Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on
various charges on abuse of authority and grave
misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as
the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.
HELD:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as
existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did
not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed
her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the
power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere.
But in those cases in which the law gave him the power,
the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty
in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President,
through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of
suspension, which is not a remote possibility, Mayor
Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend
the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
JOSON VS TORRES
FACTS:
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with
the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated
September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents
alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a
scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall;
petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall
and uttered threatening words at them; close behind
petitioner were several men with long and short firearms
who encircled the area. Private respondents claim that
this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a
pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that
the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million
from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts
were intended to harass them into approving this loan;
that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum and
the proposed legislative measure was not considered;
that private respondents opposed the loan because the
province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of
more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial
budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the
province could not afford to contract another obligation;
that petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private
respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and
independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and
that the presence of his private army posed grave danger
to private respondents' lives and safety. Private
respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of
petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial
treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the
proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the
province.
ISSUE:
WON the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo
Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva
Ecija is constitutional.
HELD:
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
local officials are governed by the Local Government
Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative
Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and
Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative
Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of
Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent
Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila." In all matters not provided in A.O.
No. 23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code
of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.
An administrative complaint against an erring elective
official must be verified and filed with the proper
government office. A complaint against an elective
provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of
the President. A complaint against an elective municipal
official must be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
while that of a barangay official must be filed before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
The Motion for the Conduct of Formal Investigation, for
lack of merit, is DENIED.
DRILON V LIM
Facts: In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of
Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of
Justice of the power of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein
conferring on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments.
Issue: Whether or not Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is unconstitutional for allowing the
Secretary of Justice to pass a judgement on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances.
Disposition: Reversed the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of
the Local Government Code unconstitutional.
Held: No, Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
not unconstitutional.
Main point: The Secretary of Justice does not thereby
dictate what should be but merely ensures that the
ordinance is accordance with the law.
BITO-ONON V. FERNANDEZ
Facts: Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the
position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23,
1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was
proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest
with the Board of Election Supervisors, but was decided
against Quejano, so he filed a petition for review in RTC.
Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review
the decisions rendered by the BES (Board of Election
Supervisors ) in any post proclamation electoral protest in
connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election
of officers and directors. Onon claimed that the
Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11,
1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing
for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the
regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for
being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its
issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an
exercise of control over the Ligas internal organization.
Issue: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 97-193
of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for
Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts
in a post proclamation electoral protest is
unconstitutional.
Disposition: The instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated June 22,
1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Review filed by the private respondent docketed as SPL.
PROC. NO. 1056 is DISMISSED.
Held: YES! Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the
DILG is unconstitutional. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control,
which the President does not have over the LIGA.
Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code
limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance by
local government units of such issuances. To monitor
means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with
the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local
governments, which is limited to checking whether the
local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as per statutory enactments
Main point: The act of DILG secretary of amending and
modifying the guidelines promulgated by the National
Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA was not a power of
supervision but rather a power of control.
NATIONAL LIGA v PAREDES
Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer
and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in
giving remedy to alleged violations made by the
incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their
elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter,
modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes
undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since
the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision.
Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises general
supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different
leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267
providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of
the DILG.
Issue: Whether or not DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the
President has power of control over the Liga ng mga
Barangay.
Disposition: the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG
Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are
declared VOID for being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that
the President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local government, which exclude the
power of control. As the entity exercising supervision
over the Liga
Main point: the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it
that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such
rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or
replace the same.
SJS V. ATIENZA
Facts: In this original petition for mandamus, petitioners
Social Justice Society (SJS), seek to compel respondent
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Respondent’s
defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been
superseded by the MOU (Memorandum of
Understanding ) and the resolutions by DOE. However,
he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU
are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter
has not amended the former. He insists that the
ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and
that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from
enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the
MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation
Issue: Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.
Disposition: The petition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the
City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
Held: Yes! The objective of the ordinance is to protect the
residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that
will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed
PROVINCE OF NEGROS V. COA
Facts: Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, and
Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care
Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000
representing the insurance premiums of its officials and
employees. The total premium amount was paid on 25
January 1996. On 23 January 1997, after a post-audit
investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of
Suspension No. 97-001-1015 suspending the premium
payment because of lack of approval from the Office of
the President (OP) as provided under Administrative
Order No. 1036 (AO 103) dated 14 January 1994. The
Provincial Auditor explained that the premium payment
for health care benefits violated Republic Act No. 6758
(RA 6758), otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law.
Issue: Whether or not the additional disbursement for the
hospitalization and health care insurance needs the
approval of the President to become valid.
Disposition: Granted the petition. We REVERSE AND
SET ASIDE Decision No. 2006-044 dated 14 July 2006
and Decision No. 2008-010 dated 30 January 2008 of the
Commission on Audit.
Held: No! The petitioner is a Local Government unit and
only subject to the supervision of the President. Hence
does not need the approval of the latter in order for the
disbursements be valid.
Main point: Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the
President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4,
Article X of the Constitution. The President’s authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits in the present case does not need the
approval of the President to be valid.
SECTION 5. TAXATION POWER OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
LTO v CITY OF BUTUAN
"1987 Constitution, Article X, Section 5: Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments."
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan,
on 16 August 1992, passed SP Ordinance No.916-92
entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of
Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance
of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing
Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes."
The ordinance provided for, among other things, the
payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of
tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle,
and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving
thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions
of the national government that, indeed, has been
transferred to local government units is the franchising
authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it
asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor
vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to
drive such vehicles.
Issue: Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was
given to LGU's.
Disposition: The assailed decision which enjoins the
Land Transportation Office from requiring the due
registration of tricycles and a license for the driving
thereof is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Held: No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the
Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over
Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to
the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated
powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and regulatory
powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions
of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles
and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
Main point: Even though LGU has the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges, they cannot perform duties that are within the
jurisdiction of other administrative agencies.
LINO v PANO
Facts: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony
Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for
the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to
open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz
in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said
denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a
result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In
the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for
the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for
the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling
or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On
February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco
Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
Issue: Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is
valid
Disposition: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
Held: As a policy statement expressing the local
government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid.
Main point: This is part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of
the national government’s. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress.
PETRON V. MAYOR
Facts: Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant in Navotas
Fishport Complex. Through the said depot, it sells diesel
fuels to the vessels used in commercial fishing in and
around Manila Bay. Later, Petron received a letter from
the office of Mayor Tiangco assessing it for business
taxes in the amount of 6.2M covering 1997-2001
pursuant to the Navotas Revenue Code. A protest was
filed by Petron arguing that under the IRR of the NIRC, it
is exempt from local business tax. Also, an opinion was
rendered by the Bureau of Local Government Finance
providing for that sales of petroleum fuels are NOT
subject to local taxation. Letter protest was denied and
final demand to pay was sent to Petron. Petron filed a
complaint for cancellation of assessment with TRO
before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint
Issue: Whether or not a local government unit is
empowered under the Local Government Code (the
LGC) to impose business taxes on persons or entities
engaged in the sale of petroleum products.
Disposition: The Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City in Civil Case No.
3380-MN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the subject
assessment for deficiency taxes on petitioner is ordered
CANCELLED.
Held: No! While local government units are authorized to
burden all such other class of goods with taxes, fees and
charges, excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is
imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes
with respect to petroleum products.
Main point: The power of local government to tax is
liberally interpreted in its favor against the state, but
strictly construed against the local government in favor of
tax payer.
YAMANE V. BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM
Facts: Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati holds
respondent, in a Notice of Assessment, liable to pay the
correct business taxes, fees and charges totaling to
P1.6M in which the respondents protested contending
that condominium does not fall under the definition of a
business, thus, they are not liable for such taxes.
Issue: Whether or not the City Treasurer of Makati may
collect business taxes on condominium corporations
Disposition: The petition is DENIED.
Held: No! Accordingly, and with significant degree of
comfort, we hold that condominium corporations are
generally exempt from local business taxation under the
LGC, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to
declare otherwise.
Main point: Local government cannot impose taxes which
are against the rules under the Local Government Code.
PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM V. MUNICIPALITY OF
PILILLA
Facts: Petitioner PPC contends that: (a) Provincial
Circular No. 2673 declared as contrary to national
economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the
manufacture of petroleum products as they are already
subject to specific tax under the National Internal
Revenue Code; (b) the above declaration covers not only
old tax ordinances but new ones, as well as those which
may be enacted in the future; (c) both Provincial Circulars
(PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective, hence, unless
and until revoked, any effort on the part of the respondent
to collect the suspended tax on business from the
petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (d)
Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local
taxes on petroleum products.
Issue: whether or not petitioner PPC whose oil products
are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to
pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees, considering
Provincial Circular No. 6-77; and mayor's permit and
sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal, based on Municipal Ordinance No. 1.
Disposition: With the MODIFICATION that business
taxes accruing PRIOR to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC
(because the same have prescribed) and that storage
fees are not also to be paid by PPC (for the storage tanks
are owned by PPC and not by the municipality, and
therefore cannot be a charge for service by the
municipality), the assailed DECISION is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Held: Yes! The Municipality of Pililla can therefore
enforce the collection of the tax on business of petitioner
PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had
accrued prior to 1976
Main Point: The local governments to raise revenues
cannot be limited by administrative order. Only the
Congress may define such limit.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL V. CA
Facts: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a
business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the
sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan
granted the permit but he attached various special
conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent
upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local
optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only).
Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and
operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged
for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then
assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local
optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in
assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the
same and that the imposition of the special conditions is
a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions
were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function
hence the permit is actually a contract.
Issue: Whether or not the special conditions attached by
the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.
Disposition: The petition is GRANTED; the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995
REVERSED; and the respondent City Mayor is hereby
ordered to reissue petitioner’s business permit in
accordance with law and with this disposition. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Held: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to
operate its business and not to practice optometry (the
latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of
Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra
vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid
exercise of police power.
Main point: Though the mayor can definitely impose
conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such
conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions
are ultra vires.
PLDT V. CITY OF DAVAO
Facts: Petitioner PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three
percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The franchise tax was
paid in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings
thereof pursuant to R.A. No. 7082 amending its charter,
Act. No. 3436. The exemption from all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof was subsequently
withdrawn by R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991), which at the same time gave local government
units the power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on
the basis of income received or earned by them within
their territorial jurisdiction. The Local Government Code
(LGC) took effect on January 1, 1992.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim for tax
exemption in spite of being subsequently withdrawn by
the Local Government code of 1991.
Disposition: The motion for reconsideration is DENIED
and this denial is final.
Held: NO! The fact is that after petitioners tax exemption
by R.A. No. 7082 had been withdrawn by the LGC, no
amendment to re-enact its previous tax exemption has
been made by Congress. Considering that the taxing
power of local government units under R.A. No. 7160 is
clear and is ordained by the Constitution, petitioner has
the heavy burden of justifying its claim by a clear grant of
exemption.
Main point: Tax exemptions should be granted only by
clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of
language too plain to be mistaken. They cannot be
extended by mere implication or inference.
JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION V.
LIM
Facts: Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given
to Subic SEZ consist principally of exemption from tariff
or customs duties, national and local taxes of business
entities therein, free market and trade of specified goods
or properties, liberalized banking and finance (paragraph
f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors.Yet,
apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also makes
available to the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in other
laws such as the privilege of export processing zone-
based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw
materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions;
tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and
other incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987; and the applicability to the subject zone of rules
governing foreign investments in the Philippines
Issue: Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by
providing for national and local tax exemption within and
granting other economic incentives to the John Hay
Special Economic Zone
Disposition: The second sentence of Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and
effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from
implementing the aforesaid void provision. Proclamation
No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid
and effective.

Held: No! This Court then declares that the grant by
Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other
privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative
of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still
dwell on petitioners claim that the same grant violates the
equal protection guarantee.
Main Point: The power to tax of local government may
not be negated by executive order through a grant of
exemption absent of a statute granting such exemption.
MANILA ELECTRIC V. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA
Facts: MERALCO was granted a franchise by several
municipal councils and the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power
service in the Laguna. Upon enactment of Local
Government Code, the provincial government issued
ordinance imposing franchise tax. MERALCO paid under
protest and later claims for refund because of the
duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No. 551. This was denied
by the governor (Joey Lina) relying on a more recent law
(LGC). MERALCO filed with the RTC a complaint for
refund, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of franchise tax
under the provincial ordinance is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.
Disposition: The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
No costs.
Held: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment
clause for the same must yield to the inherent power of
the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and
constitutional.
Main point: The local government code can validly issue
a franchise tax as provided by Art X, Sec 5 of the 1987
Constitution.
BATANGAS POWER V. BATANGAS CITY
Facts: On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a
certificate of registration to BPC as a pioneer enterprise
entitled to a tax holiday of 6 years. On October 12, 1998,
Batangas City sent a letter to BPC demanding payment
of business taxes & penalties. BPC refused to pay citing
its tax exemption as a pioneer enterprise for 6 years
under Sec.133(g) of the LGC. The city’s tax claim was
modified and it demanded payment of business taxes for
the years 1998-1999. BPC still refused to pay the tax,
insisting that the 6-year tax holiday commenced from the
date of its commercial operation on July 16, 1993, not
from the date of its BOI registration in September 1992.
In the alternative, BPC asserted that the city should
collect the taxes from NPC since the latter assumed
responsibility for their payment under the BOT
Agreement. The NPC intervened that while it admitted
assumption of the BPC’s tax obligations under the BOT
Agreement, it refused to pay BPC’s business tax as it
allegedly constituted an indirect tax on NPC which is a
tax-exempt corporation under its Charter.BPC filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the Makati RTC against
Batangas City & NPC alleging that under the BOT
Agreement, NPC is responsible for the payment of such
taxes but since it is exempt from such, both the BPC and
NPC aren’t liable for its payment.
Issue: Whether NPC’s tax exemption privileges under its
Charter were withdrawn by Sec.193 of the LGC.
Disposition: the petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.
Held: Yes! When NPC assumed tax liabilities of the BPC
under their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which
removed NPC’s tax exemption privileges had already
been in effect for 6 months. Thus, while the BPC remains
to be the entity doing business in the city, it is the NPC
that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the
provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement & the 1991
LGC
Main point: The power to tax is no longer exclusively
vested on Congress; local legislative bodies are now
given authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges
pursuant to Art.X, Sec.5 of the 1987 Constitution. The
LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by
the LGUs. It widens the tax base of LGUs to include
taxes which were prohibited by previous laws.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS V. CITY OF DAVAO
Facts: On February 18, 2002, Smart filed a special civil
action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations
under the Tax Code of the City of Davao, particularly
Section 1, Article 10 thereof, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or
other special law, there is hereby imposed a tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of seventy-five
percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the
income or receipts realized within the territorial
jurisdiction of Davao City.
Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao City is
exempt from payment of franchise tax to the City, on the
following grounds: (a) the issuance of its franchise under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294[5] subsequent to R.A. No.
7160 shows the clear legislative intent to exempt it from
the provisions of R.A. 7160;[6] (b) Section 137 of R.A.
No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing
at the time of its effectivity and not to future exemptions;
(c) the power of the City of Davao to impose a franchise
tax is subject to statutory limitations such as the in lieu of
all taxes clause found in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; and
(d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao
would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts.
Issue: Whether or not Smart is liable to pay the franchise
tax imposed by the City of Davao.
Disposition: The instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.
Held: Yes!.The doubt must be resolved in favor of the
City of Davao. The in lieu of all taxes clause applies only
to national internal revenue taxes and not to local taxes.
Main point: Tax exemptions are never presumed and are
strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. They can only be given force
when the grant is clear and categorical power if the
intention of the legislature is open to doubt, then the
intention of the legislature must be resolved in favor of
the State.
SECTION 6. SHARE IN NATIONAL TAXES
PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
Facts: President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372
(Adoption of Economic Measures in Government for
Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government
departments and agencies, including state universities
and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will replace total
expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items. Section 4
also provided that pending assessment by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10%
of the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld. President Estrada
issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the
IRA to be withheld.
Issue: Whether or not withholding a part of LGUs IRA is
valid.
Disposition: the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and
their successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED
from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and
43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and
December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units
are concerned.
Held: No. Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with
local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy.
Main point: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Facts: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48
establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.The Oversight Committee under
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed
Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-
003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6,
1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects
eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other requirements to
the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves
notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas,
Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in
the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000,
and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Issue: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe
the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
Disposition: The petition is GRANTED. The assailed
provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999,
2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Held: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
“withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and
must be struck down.
Main point: Congress may amend any of the provisions
of the LGC but only through a separate law and not
through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER V. ZAMORA
Facts: In the year 2000, the GAA appropriated PhP
111,778,000,000.00 of IRA as programmed fund. It
appropriated a separate amount of P10B of IRA under
the classification of unprogrammed fund, the latter
amount to be released only upon th occurrence of the
conditions stated in the GAA.
Issue: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal
autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.
Disposition: the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV
Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are
hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart
a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part
of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
Held: Yes! Article X Section 6 of the Constitution
provides: “LGUs shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.” While automatic release implies that
the just share should be released to them as a matter of
course, withholding its release pending an event
contravened the constitutional mandate.
Main point: Article X Section 6 of the Constitution enjoins
the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing his duty.
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC
Facts: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission During the 12th Congress,4
Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
sion on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
Cityhood Laws.
Issue: Whether or not Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution
Disposition: we GRANT the petitions and declare
UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely:
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436,
and 9491.
Held: Yes! Cityhood law prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government
units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all
other criteria being equal, should not receive the same
share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of
P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population
and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, must be strictly followed because
such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in
determining the "just share" of local government units in
national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the
income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the
Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution.
Main point: Sec 6 allows Congress to determine the just
share of local government in the national taxes. Uniform
and non-discriminatory criteria must not prescribed in the
Local Government code.
SECTION 8. TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
BORJA v. COMELEC
FACTS: This case is all about the scope of constitutional
provision of barring elective official, with the exception of
barangay elective officials from serving more than three
consecutive terms. The private respondent, Capco Jr.
was elected as the Vice Mayor of Pateros then on
September 2, 1989 he became mayor by operation of law
upon death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja and then he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years to
which he was re-elected as a mayor for another term of
three years. Petitioner Borja who was also a candidate
during the election, sought the disqualification of Capco
on the ground that the latter had served for more than
three consecutive term making him ineligible to serve for
another term.
ISSUE: WON a vice mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of
the term is considered to have served a term in that office
for the purpose of the three-term limit?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: No, the vice mayor can only become a mayor
by operation of law when the latter had resigned, died or
is removed from the office. Hence, his service in the
office as the Mayor by operation of law should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
MAIN POINT: Article 10, Section 8 teaches us that no
elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. Hence, in the
above case he cannot be disqualified to run for mayor
because he did not exceed the three term limit when he
took the office of the Mayor by operation of law.
LONZANIDA v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected
and had already served two consecutive terms as the
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. On the next election,
he ran for mayor and was then proclaimed but it was
contested by his opponent (Alvez) to which the Court
ruled in favor of the latter thereby directing Lonzanida to
vacate the office and his opponent assumed the office for
the remaining term. On the next election, Lonzanida then
ran for mayor and won the election but his opponent
(Muli) contested that Lonzanida cannot run for office
because he had already served for three consecutive
terms.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office
as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full
term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials?
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED.
RULING: First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections his assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by
reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength
of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only
a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the
final outcome of the election protest.Petitioner Lonzanida
did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly
elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served
the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
MAIN POINT: In sum, the petitioner was not the duly
elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to
March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the
COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run
in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be
set aside.
ISSUE: WON he had already served for three
consecutive terms?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: No, the respondent here just served for two
consecutive terms. He lost his bid during the second
election but due to the recall of the said election he took
the office of the elected mayor. Hence, it does not result
to Talaga served for three consecutive terms.
MAIN POINT: Private respondent was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly
two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections.

ADORMEO v. COMELEC SOCRATES v COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner and Private Respondent were the only FACTS: Hagedorn had been elected and served as
candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy for mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive
mayor of Lucena City Private Respondent (Ramon terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-
Talaga) was the incumbent mayor and he was then re- 2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
elected during that election and had served for another principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same
full term. In the election of 1998, private respondent lost mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
the election to one Bernard Tagarao and during the recall which Socrates ran and eventually won.
election, he again then won and served the remaining However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
term of Tagarao. The petitioner (Adormeo) then now proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run
seeks for the disqualification of Talaga on the next for the former’s unexpired term as mayor.
preceding election due to the ground that he had already Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the
exceeded the three consecutive term limit provided in three-term limit rule.
Article 10, Section 8.
ISSUE: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the
three-term limit rule?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
HELD: After three consecutive terms, an elective official
cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term; the
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the same
office following the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms;
and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service. Hence,
Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over
his closest opponent, Socrates.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution prohibits is an immediate
re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the
re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third
term.
LATASA v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor
of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners
third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a
component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A
plebiscite was conducted and ratified RA8798 coverting
the Municipality of Digos as City of Digos. This act
mandated the end of term of the then elected mayor and
as pursuant to it he is now mandated to serve in holdover
capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. On the next
election in the City of Digos, the respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy to which the petitioner sought for
its disqualification because the said mayor had already
served the three-consecutive term limit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as
candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created
City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: No, the petitioner cannot run for office of the
mayor because had had already exceeded the three-
consecutive term limit. True, the new city acquired a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean that the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city
mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
MAIN POINT: The conversion of a municipality into a city
does not create a new corporate existence. Hence, if an
elective official has already served for three-consecutive
terms and a conversion of the municipality to city took
effect he cannot run for the city contesting that the city
now acquires a new corporate existence. Hence, a
person who had served for three-terms cannot run for
office on the fourth term because it will be a violation in
Article 10, Section 8.
DAVID v COMELEC
FACTS: This case involves two (2) consolidated petitions
filed by David and Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter.
David, Brgy. Chairman from Kalookan and president of
Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, sought to prohibit the
holding of barangay elections scheduled on the second
Monday of May 1997. On the other hand, Liga ng mga
Barangay QC Chapter sought judicial review to declare
as unconstitutional certain laws including Sec 43 of the
LGC, COMELEC resolutions, and budget appropriations
for elections, which all essentially limited the term of
barangay officials to three (3) years.
ISSUE: WON the three-year term not repugnant to
Constitution?
DISPOSITION: The petitions are DENIED.
RULING: The Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay
officials. It merely left the determination of such term to
the law making body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmaker’s full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that
every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality or a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied)
breach of the Constitution. To strike down a law as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the
statute permits. The petitioners have miserably failed to
discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution
thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a
three-year term for such officers.
RIVERA v COMELEC
FACTS: Petioners, filed with the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to
cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that he was elected and had served three
previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They
alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor
of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to
June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30,
2004 (third term), but he served the second term from
July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer" because of the following
reasons: a. He was not validly elected for the second
term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation as mayor was
declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and b.
He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in
an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15,
1999.
ISSUE: WON the respondent can run for office of the
mayor contesting that he did not exceeded the three-
consecutive term limit as provided by the Constitution?
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED.
RULING: Here, respondent Morales was elected for the
term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He
was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by
petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor.
Hence, Respondent Moraes cannot run again for office
because he had already exceeded the three-consecutive
term limit because during electoral protest filed by his
opponent he was able to serve for a full term thereby
fulfilling the three term limit as provided in our
Constitution.
MAIN POINT: Even though. The mayor’s proclamation
was declared void by the COMELEC as longs as he was
able to serve his full term is tantamount to one term. The
case at bar, Respondent Morales were able to serve his
three consecutive term thereby he is now barred to run
for office for the fourth term.
MONTEBON v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent
Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor
of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14,
2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On
April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates4 for
municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that
respondent had been elected and served three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from
running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it
would be his fourth consecutive term. The respondent
admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that
the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was
interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as
vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not
disqualified from vying for the position of municipal
councilor in the 2007 elections.
ISSUE: WON he is deemed to have fully served his
second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-
mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: No, succession in term of office does not make
that the officer who has succeeded the previous officer
by operation of law constitutes a full term to the
successor. Hence, the respondent here is still eligible to
run for office because his succession on the office of
vice-mayor is not counted to his three term consecutive
limit.
MAIN POINT: Succession of office by operation of law
does not constitute an addition of one term to the three
term consecutive limit.
ONG v ALEGRE
FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Stanley
Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. Alegre
filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Francis.
ISSUE: WON Francis’ assumption of office as Mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in
the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: For Francis, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the
RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest
Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre)
who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was
the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and
legal use and value, having been promulgated after the
term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner
in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected
mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof
from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule.
MAIN POINT: The assumption of office constitutes a one
full term.
LACEDA v LIMENA
FACTS: Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private
respondent Randy L. Limena were candidates for
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 23,
2007, Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or
declaration as an ineligible candidate against Laceda
before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had
already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan
for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus
prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section
2 of Republic Act No. 916.
ISSUE: WON the conversion of the municipality of
Sorsogon into city creates a new corporate existence and
that the candidate who had served for three consecutive
terms can run for office by virtue of the conversion of the
city?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DENIED.
RULING: In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act
No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon converted into a
city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon
City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the
purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of
the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of
Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as
before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the barangay are the same. They are the same group of
voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay
for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held
power and authority as their Punong Barangay.
Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's
term.
MAIN POINT: The conversion of a municipality into a city
does not create a new corporate existence. Hence, if an
elective official has already served for three-consecutive
terms and a conversion of the municipality to city took
effect he cannot run for the city contesting that the city
now acquires a new corporate existence. Hence, a
person who had served for three-terms cannot run for
office on the fourth term because it will be a violation in
Article 10, Section 8.
DIZON v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as
the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully
served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same
position and same municipality. Petitioner argues that
respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for
the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under
Section 43 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Under the said provision, no local elective official is
allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms for the same position. Respondent, on the other
hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run
as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga
because he was not elected for the said position in the
1998 elections. He avers that the Commission en banc in
SPA Case No. A-04-058, entitled Atty. Venancio Q.
Rivera III and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor
Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City declaring Anthony D. Dee as
the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the
1998 elections.
ISSUE: WON respondent Morales did not violate the 3-yr
term limit when he ran and won as Mayor of the
Mabalacat, Pampanga?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DISMISSED.
RULING: The respondents harp on the delay in resolving
the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and
resultantly extended the petitioner’s incumbency in an
office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that
such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is
neither specific allegation nor proof that the delay was
due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong
his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not
without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of
the election protest while it was pending before the
regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of
the regional trial court’s decision declaring the position of
mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC.
MAIN POINT: Such delay which is not here shown to
have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to
prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his
right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
ALDOVINO v COMELEC
FACTS: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was
elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced.This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his
office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for
a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160.
ISSUE: WON preventive suspension of an elected local
official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule?
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED and
NULLIFIED the assailed COMELEC rulings.
RULING: Preventive suspension, because it is imposed
by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on
the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect
sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act
that became the basis of the charge against him. From
this perspective, preventive suspension does not have
the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of
renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves
the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive
suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary,
and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the
title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that
they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
MAIN POINT: Preventive suspension, by its nature, does
not involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall
disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term.
Bolos v. Comelec – 581 scra 786 [2009]
Facts:
Petitioner bolos was elected as the punong barangay of
barangay biking, dauis, bohol for 3 consecutive terms
(1994, 1997, 2002). In may 2004, during his incumbency,
he ran for municipal councilor of dauis and won. He
assumed office on july 1, 2004 leaving his post as
punong barangay. After serving his term as a councilor
he filed his candidacy for the position of punong
barangay in the october 29, 2007 barangay and
sangguniang kabataan elections. Cinconiegue, then
incumbent punong barangay and also a candidate for the
same office, filed a petition for disqualification on the
ground that bolos jr. Has already served the maximum
limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and
hold the position in accordance with sec. 8, article x of
the constitution. Cinconiegue contended that bolos’
relinquishment of the position of punong barangay in july
2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed
that it was his personal decision to run as municipal
councilor in the may 14, 2004 national and local
elections.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the
office of punong barangay by bolos when he assumed
the post of municipal councilor so that he is deemed to
have served for three consecutive terms.
Held:
Yes. The three-term limit for elective official is contained
in sec. 8, article x of the constitution. The court agrees
with the comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the
office of punong barangay of biking, dauis, bohol, as a
consequence of his assumption to office as sangguniang
bayan member of dauis, bohol, on july 1, 2004, is a
voluntary renunciation.
Main point:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term.
Aldovino v. Comelec – 609 scra 234 [2009]
Facts:
Lucena city councilor wilfredo f. Asilo was elected to the
said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007. In september 2005, during his
third term of office, the sandiganbayan issued an order of
90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the court, and asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007.
His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on
the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term
constitutional limit.
Issue:
Won the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term
limitation rule of comelec?
Ruling:
No. The candidacy of lucena city councilor wilfredo f.
Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of art. X, sec. 8
of the constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on
him, the sc granted the petition of simon b. Aldovino,
danilo b. Faller, and ferdinand n. Talabong seeking
asilo’s disqualification. “preventive suspension, by its
nature, does not involve an effective interruption of
service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the court.
It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat
“more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the
constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit
as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
Main point:
Preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under the constitution and the local government code
(ra 7160).
Datu michel abas kida v. Senate of the philippines, gr
196271, february 2012 (reconsideration; holdover
provision in ra 9054 unconstitutional as congress in
passing ra 10153 has made clear)
Facts
Pursuant to ra no. 9333, the next armm regional elections
should have been held on august 8, 2011. Comelec had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices
to be elected. But on june 30, 2011, ra no. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next armm regular elections to
may 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions
filed directly with the supreme court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of ra no. 10153.
Issue:
Is the grant [to the president] of the power to appoint oics
constitutional?
Ruling
Yes, the grant [to the president] of the power to appoint
oics in the armm is constitutional [during the oral
arguments, the court identified the three options open to
congress in order to resolve the problem on who should
sit as armm officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the armm to remain in
office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special
elections in the armm, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) authorize the president to
appoint oics, [their respective terms to last also until
those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume
office.] [the supreme court] dismissed the petitions and
upheld the constitutionality of ra no. 10153 in toto.]
Main point:
Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the
terms of office of the incumbent armm officials we rule
out the [hold over] option since it violates section 8,
article x of the constitution.
Section 9. Sectoral representatives
Supangan jr. V. Santos, gr no. 84662, august 24, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner supanganwas elected kb chairman of mabini,
pangasinan and was elected kb provincial federation
president of the province of pangasinan. Petitioner was
appointed by president marcos as member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan of pangasinan representing
the youth sector. Respondent domantay presented a
letter written by respondent secretary santos advising the
body that respondent domantay has been named as
member thereof to replace supangan. Petitioner
contends that sec. Santos hand no authority in appointing
domantay as the latter is not qualified.
Issue:
Whether or not the the appointment of domantay by the
sec santos, replacing supangan is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Supangan, having all the qualifications, was
appointed by the president to his position. Domantay, not
having the qualifications, who was appointed by sec.
Santos is not valid.
Main point:
President is the one who makes appointments for
sectoral representatives. Sec. Of local government can
only inform the sectoral representatives their
appointments

Tan v. Comelec, 142 scra 727 (1986)
Facts:
Bp 885, an act creating a new province in the island of
negros to be known as the province of negros del norte
was enacted. Pursuant to and in implementation of this
law, the comelec scheduled a plebiscite in january 3,
1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for prohibition
and contending that the b.p. Blg. 885 is unconstitutional.
Because:1.the voters of the parent province of negros
occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of negros del norte, were not included
in the plebiscite.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscite conducted pursuant to bp
885 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No, the court held that where a portion of an existing
province was being lopped off to form a new province,
both the mother province and the proposed new province
should participate in the plebiscite for the mother
province will also be affected because its boundaries is
substantially altered.
Main point:
A plebiscite for creating a new province should include
the participation of the residents of the mother province
for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional
requirements. When the law says the “plebiscite shall be
conducted in areas affected” this means that residents of
the political entity who stand to be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the
right to participate in said plebiscite.
Tobias v. Abalos – 239 scra 106 [1994] (metes and
bounds)
Facts:
Mandaluyong and san juan were one legislative district
until the passage of the ra 7675 with title an act
converting the municipality of mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the city of mandaluyong."
same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by
the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and
residents of mandaluyong. With a plebiscite held on april
10, 1994, people of mandaluyong voted to for the the
conversion of mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city
ratifying ra 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
Won ra 7675 is in violation of article vi, sections 5(1) and
(4) as to the number of members of the congress to 250
and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
No. As to article vi sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise
provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the
legislature to increase the number of the members of the
congress. Article vi sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was
the congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning
the legislative district. In view of the foregoing facts, the
petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Main point:
The inhabitants of san juan, which used to be part of the
congressional district together w/ mandaluyong, were
properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion
of mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the
matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. • petitioners’ argument that the subject
law has resulted in “gerrymandering,” which is the
practice of creating legislative districts to favour a
particular candidate or party is not worth of credence.
Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former san
juan/mandaluyong district, having consistently won in
both localities. By dividing san juan/mandaluyong, rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, w/c
development could hardly be considered as favourable to
him.
Mun. Of jimenez v. Judge baz – 265 scra 182
[1996](de jure corporation)
Facts:
The municipality of sinacaban was created by e.o. 258 by
then pres. Elpidio quirino, pursuant to sec. 68 of the
revised administrative code of 1917. By virtue of
municipal council resolution no. 171, sinacaban laid claim
to a portion of barrio tabo-o and to barrios macabayao,
adorable, sinara, baja, and sinara alto, based on the
technical dedcription in e.o. No. 258. The claim was filed
with the provincial board of misamis occidental against
the municipality of jimenez. While conceding that the
disputed area is part of sinacaban, the municipality of
jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction
on the basis of an agreement it had with the municipality
of sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by
the provincial board of misamis occidental in its
resolution no. 77 dated february 18, 1950, fixed the
common boundary of sinacaban and jimenez. The
provincial board denied the motion of jimenez seeking
reconsideration. On march 20, 1990, jimenez filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
rtc of oroquieta city, branch 14 against sinacaban, the
province of misamis occidental and its provincial board,
the commission on audit, the departments of local
government, budget and management, and the executive
secretary.
Issues:
Whether r.a. 7160, sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not
conforming to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation
of new municipalities.
Held:
Yes. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite
requirement since it attained de facto status at the time
the 1987 constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only
to new municipalities created for the first time under the
constitution – it cannot be applied to municipalities
created before.
Main point:
Where a municipality created as such by executive order
is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. A
municipality has been conferred the status of at least a
de facto municipal corporation where its legal existence
has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and
officially. • the plebiscite requirement for the creation of
municipalities applies only to new municipalities created
for the first time under the constitution.
Cawaling v. Comelec – gr146319, october 26, 2001
Facts:
Petitions challenging the constitutionality of republic act
no. 8806 which created the city of sorsogon and the
validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.on
august 16, 2000, former president joseph e. Estrada
signed into law r.a. No. 8806, an act creating the city of
sorsogon by merging the municipalities of bacon and
sorsogon in the province of sorsogon, and appropriating
funds therefor.[1] pursuant to section 10, article x of the
constitution,[2] the commission on elections (comelec),
on december 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the
municipalities of bacon and sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification. On december 17, 2000, the
plebiscite city board of canvassers (pcbc) proclaimed[3]
the creation of the city of sorsogon as having been
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite.[4] invoking his right as a resident and
taxpayer of the former municipality of sorsorgon,
benjamin e. Cawaling, jr. Filed on january 2, 2001 the
present petition for certiorari (g.r. No. 146319) seeking
the annulment of the plebiscite
Issue:
Won the creation of sorsogon city by merging two
municipalities violates section 450(a) of the local
government code of 1991 (in relation to section 10, article
x of the constitution) which requires that only a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of
sorsogon city through r.a. No. 8806 complied with the
criteria set by the code as to income, population and land
area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He
contends that under section 450(a) of the code, a
component city may be created only by converting a
municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging
two municipalities, as what r.a. No. 8806 has done. This
contention is devoid of merit.
Main point:
Main Point:
The phrase “a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city” is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
• the creation of an entirely new local government unit
through a division or merger of existing local government
units is recognizes under the constitution, provided that
such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the code.
League of cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, gr
176951, nov. 29, 2008
Facts:
During the 12th congress, congress enacted into law ra
9009 amending section 450 of the local government code
by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from p20 million to
p100 million to restrain the ³mad rush´ of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
internal revenue allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment,
a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in
congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th congress. During the 12 th
Issue:
Won they should be exempted from following r.a. 9009.
Held:
No, the cityhood laws violate both the constitution and
the equal protection clause section 10, article x of the
1987 constitution provides “no province, city,
municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.” (emphasis supplied) the
constitution is clear. The creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the local
government code and not in any other law. There is only
one local government code. The constitution requires
congress to stipulate in the local government code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot
write such criteria in any other law, like the cityhood laws.
Main point:
The classification must apply equally to all members of
the same class. Limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while
the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded
the exemption provision found in the cityhood laws, even
if it were written in section 450 of the local government
code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.
Sema v. Comelec, 558 scra 700
Facts:
A law (ra 9054) was passed amending armm’s organic
act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law,
the armm regional assembly created shariff kabunsuan
(muslim mindanao autonomy act 201) which comprised
of the municipalities of the 1st district of maguindanao
with the exception of cotabato city. For the purposes of
the 2007 elections, comelec initially stated that the 1st
district is now only made of cotabato city (because
ofmma 201). But it later amended this stating that status
quo should be retained however just for the purposes of
the elections, the first district should be called shariff
kabunsuan with cotabato city – this is also while awaiting
a decisive declaration from congress as to cotabato’s
status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was
a congressional candidate for the legislative district of s.
Kabunsuan with cotabato (1st district). Later, sema was
contending that cotabato city should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting. Comelec maintained that the
legislative district is still there and that regardless of s.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
Issue:
Whether or not ra 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or
not armm can create validly lgus.
Held:
Ra 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local
government units is governed by section 10, article x of
the constitution, which provides: sec. 10. No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the
four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the local government code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the
constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
Main point:
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the
hor. Note further that in order to have a legislative district,
there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato city did not meet the population requirement so
sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, armm
cannot validly create the province of s. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can
never be legally possible because the creation of
legislative districts is vested solely in congress. At most,
what armm can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
Camid v. Office of the president, gr no. 161414,
january 17, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari arguing the existence of
municipality of andong in lanao del sur. This decision
have noted the earlier decision of pelaez where the
executive orders of former president macapagal creating
33 municipalities of lanao del sur was considered null
and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers.
Among the annulled executive orders is eo107 creating
andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as
resident of andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer).
Camid contends/argues the following: (1) municipality of
andong evolved into a fullblown municipality (since there
is a complete set of officials appointed to handle
essential tasksand services, it has its own high school,
bureau of post, decs office, etc. (2) 17 barangays with
chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups
recognizing andong and also the cenro and denr
certification of land area and population of andong. In the
certification of dilg, there is an enumeration of existing
municipalities including 18 0f the33 municipalities
invalidated in pelaez case. Camid finds this as an abuse
of discretion and unequal treatment for andong. Likewise,
camid insists the continuing of eo 107, arguing that in
municipality of san narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the court
affirmed in making san andres a de facto municipal
corporation. San andres was created through an
executive order. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the municipality of andong be recognized
as a de facto municipal corporation
Held:
Should the case of andong be treated same as the case
of san andres? No, for the following reasons:(1) there are
facts found in the san andres case that are not present in
the case at bar: (1) the executive order creating san
andres was not invalidated in pelaez case, (2) the
municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned
and (3) the municipality was classified as a fifth class
municipality and was included in the legislative district in
the house of representatives apportionment.(2) andong
did not meet the requisites set by lgc of 1991 sec.442 (d)
regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It
says: municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this code shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this code
shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.(3) the failure to appropriate funds for
andong and the absence of elections in the municipality
are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the state does not
recognize the existence of the municipality.(4) the
ordinance appended in the 1987 constitution (which
apportioned seats for the house of reps to the different
legislative districts in the philippines, enumerates the
various municipalities encompassed in the various
districts) did not include andong. The dilg certification and
the ordinance in the1987 constitution validates them. The
fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the
legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to
accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of
andong. Sc dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Main point:
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it
is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption
or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. The certification has no power or it does not
bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality.
Navarro v. Executive secretary, gr no. 180050,
february 10, 2010
Facts:
This is petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of
court seeking to nullify republic act (r.a.) No. 9355,
otherwise known as an act creating the province of
dinagat islands, for being unconstitutional. When the
dinagat islands was proclaimed a new province on
december 3, 2006, it had an official population of only
106,951 based on the 2000 census of population
conducted by the national statistics office (nso). Clearly
the population is short of the statutory requirement of
250,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the land area of the
province failed to comply with the statutory requirement
of 2,000 square kilometers. Petitioners allege that the
creation of the dinagat islands as a new province, if
uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of congress.
Issue: whether or not republic act no. 9355, complied
with the constitution and statutory requirements of the
local government code of 1991.
Ruling: the court ruled that ra 9355 is declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the province of
dinagat islands and the election of the officials thereof
are declared null and void. The provision in article 9 (2) of
the rules and regulations implementing the local
government code of 1991 stating, "the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared null
and void.
Main point:
It is undisputed that r.a. No. 9355 complied with the
income requirement specified by the local government
code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land
area or population requirement.
Sec. 11 METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent
was apprised that the perimeter separating the
subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against
petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter
wall.
ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed
with police power.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED
HELD: The powers given by R.A. No. 7924 were limited
to “formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
and instillation of a system of administration.” The law
contains no grant of general police powers nor legislative
power.
The MMDA is not the metropolitan political unit
contemplated in Section 11. Rather it is an administrative
agency of the government and as such it does not
possess police power. Hence, when there is a traffic law
or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to which legislative powers have been
delegated empowering the MMDA to confiscate or
suspend licenses of erring drivers, it may perform such
acts. Without such law, however, the MMDA has no such
power.
MMDA V. GARIN
FACTS: The issue arose from an incident involving the
respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a
traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver’s
license was confiscated for parking illegally along
Gandara Street Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s validity, the
respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver’s
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court. Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed
the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, contending that, in the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No.
7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive
erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore
unlimited – fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
ISSUE: WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924
could validly exercise police power
Disposition: Petition was DISMISSED
HELD: Section 5 of R.A. No. 7924 enumerates the
“Functions and Powers of the MMDA.” The contested
clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall “install
and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose, and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-
moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers’ licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws
and regulations, the provisions of R.A. No. 4136 and P.D.
No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding,” and that “for
this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws
and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of LGU, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations
to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may
impose.”
GANCAYCO v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON
CITY
FACTS: In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought
a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956,
Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904
requiring the construction of arcades for commercial
buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears
emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was
passed by the city council, there was yet no building code
passed by the national legislature. The ordinance
covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Decades
after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to
clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they
sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging
that a portion of his building violated the National Building
Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a
petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City. The RTC
rendered its decision in favor of Justice Gancayco.
MMDA appealed with the CA.
ISSUE: WON the MMDA legally demolished the property
of Justice Gancayco
Disposition: The Decision of the Court of Appeals was
AFFIRMED
HELD: There was no valid delegation of powers to the
MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City
Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the
acts of the former. In its answer, the city government
stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA
only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon
City.
MAIN POINT: Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own
and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the
portion of Justice Gancaycos building.
SECTION 12. HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES,
COMPONENT CITIES
ABELLA v. COMELEC
FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella
was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from
running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of
candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she
was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband
who was earlier disqualified from running for the same
office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However,
when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal
was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she
was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second
highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as
governor of Kananga, Leyte.
ISSUE: WON the candidate who got the second highest
vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate
for such position was disqualified
DISPOSITION: Instant petitions are DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the 2nd division of the COMELEC
and the questioned Resolution en banc of the
Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. The TRO is lifted.
Costs against petitioner.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that
SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and
was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact
remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the
province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered
as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province
voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes.
The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate.
MAIN POINT: The Court does not find any reason to
reverse and set aside the questioned decision and
resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion.
SECTION 14. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS
& OTHER SIMILAR BODIES
PIMENTEL v. OCHOA
FACTS: In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty
reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries.2 Dubbed “Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino,” it was
pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and
Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of Lopez
Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga
Region; and the cities of Pasay and Caloocan3 upon the
release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the
Department of Budget and Management. Petitioner
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio
Tadeo, incumbent President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and
Nelson Alcantara, incumbent Barangay Captain of
Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges before
the Court the disbursement of public funds and the
implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have
encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.
ISSUE: WON the P21 Billion CCTP Budget Allocation
under the DSWD in the GAA FY 2011 violates ART. II,
Sec. 25 & ART. X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code of
1991
DISPOSITION: Petition was DISMISSED
HELD: A complete relinquishment of central government
powers on
the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The
national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and
implementation of national development programs
especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
SEC. 15 PURPOSE, AND HOW MANY AUTONOMOUS
REGIONS
DISOMANGKOP v. SECRETARY OF DPWH
FACTS: petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of
Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he was the
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the
First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del
Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an
Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees
also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in
Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and
responsibility of supervising and implementing all public
works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in
Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119
and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First
Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under
R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and
responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM.
As the two offices have apparently been endowed with
functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that
petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of
their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their
material and substantial interests will definitely be
prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A.
8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can
legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments
subject of the instant case.
ISSUE: WON the respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion
DISPOSITION: The petition insofar as it seeks the writs
of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
HELD: YES. Without doubt, respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999
despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in
place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which
has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic
Acts.
MAIN POINT: Without doubt, respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999
despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in
place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which
has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic
Acts.
ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No.
10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization
of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the
ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the
second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national
and local elections. The law as well granted the President
the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the
Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-
Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
and subsequently, the respondents filed their own Motion
for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention. The Court granted their motion.
ISSUE: WON the requirement of a plebiscite apply only
in he creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
DISPOSITION: Consolidated petitions were DISMISSED
assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153 for lack of merit
HELD: Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states
that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which
provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in
the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,
questions on the extent of the matters requiring
ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the
obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required for every statutory amendment.
MAIN POINT: The date of the ARMM elections does not
fall under any of the matters that the Constitution
specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be
construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act
that would require compliance with these requirements.
SECTION 16. GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE
PRESIDENT
AMPATUAN v. HON. RONALDO PUNO

FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the
gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Under
AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision
of the ARMM. The petitioners claimed that the
President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s
autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the
Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want
Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
DISPOSITION: Petition was DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is
a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same.
MAIN POINT: Petitioners failed to show that the
declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well
as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had
no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too
KULAYAN v. TAN
FACTS: Three members from the International
Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Governor
Tan then issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009,
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Slulu.
Petitioners Jamar Kulayan et.al. claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus
null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, which grants the President sole
authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE: WON a governor can exercise the calling-out
powers of a President

DISPOSITION: The instant petition was GRANTED. The
said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: NO, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power
to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In
issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
MAIN POINT: Petitioners failed to show that the
declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well
as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had
no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
SECTION 17. POWERS NOT VESTED TO THE ARMM
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
HELD:
FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic
act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset
the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections
to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with
the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE: WON the 1987 Constitution mandate the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM
elections.
YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state
that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of
the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and
local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
and for all the following elections.
DISPOSITION: We DENY with FINALITY the motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 10153
SECTIONS 18 and 19. ORGANIC ACT FOR
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
ABBAS v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734
unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the
Constitution on the autonomous region which make the
creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of
the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II,
section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here
is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting
favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute,
such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable
votes were obtained.
ISSUE: WON R.A. or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution
DISPOSITION: Petitions were DISMISSED due to lack of
merit
HELD: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,
the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces
and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The
provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not
attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
It may be that even if an autonomous region is created,
not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734
shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will
therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.

MAIN POINT: It will readily be seen that the creation of
the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the
total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the
votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same
phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” It is thus
clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in
all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
ORDILLO v. COMELEC
FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results
of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region
was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the
Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-
mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990,
issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act
for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare
the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The
petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such Region.
HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that
“region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other
units because of their common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.
MAIN POINT: it can be gleaned that Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set
of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area.
BADUA VS CBA 194 SCRA 101 (1991)
FACTS:
Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm
land from which they were forcibly ejected through the
decision of the Cordillera Bodong. David Quema owns
the parcels of land evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997
and 4998. The parcels of land were purchased from Dr.
Erotida Valera. Twenty-two (22) years later, he was able
to redeem the parcels of land through payment of 10,000
to the vendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Quema was
prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua. Prompted
by such turn of events, David Quema filed a case in the
Baranggay Council but failed to have the dispute settled.
A judge advised Quema to file his case in the provincial
courts. However, Quema did not, and filed it in the tribal
court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from
the tribe, spouses Badua filed a petition for special relief,
that the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration be clarified. The Baduas also allege that
they were denied due process and that the tribal court
has NO jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor
the respondent are members of the Maeng tribe. The
respondents contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over
the case since the tribal court is NOT a part of the judicial
system.
ISSUE:
Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case
Disposition: PETITION GRANTED.
HELD:
Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial
system which consists of the Supreme Court and the
lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess
judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels
created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are
advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal
objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and
persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
It can be enforced only through the local city or
municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon
transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration
award upon expiration of the period to annul or
repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions
of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as
provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside, in
and through the regular courts today.
ATITIW VS ZAMORA 471 SCRA 329

FACTS:
By virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino
she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the
congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic
act for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was
cast but was not approve by the people. The court
declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until
properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15,
2000, President Estrada signed the General
Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes
the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270
to extend the implementation of the winding up of
operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O
328
Atitiw et al, filed a declaratory relief as taxpayers and
officers and members of the various units of the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). They seek,
among others, the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of
the Special Provisions of Republic Act No. 8760,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 2000, directing that the appropriation for the
CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the
separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials
and employees.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a
rider and as such is unconstitutional.
DISPOSITION:
DENIED
HELD:
The creation of autonomous regions does not signify
the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that
of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines." Under the 1987
Constitution, the creation of the autonomous regions
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.
CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION VS COA GR No.
82217, Jan. 29, 1990
FACTS:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September
13, 1986, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA)
and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands
through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful
means, such as political negotiations.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was
drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of
the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was
then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera
Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and theCity of Baguio. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that
by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of
her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
DISPOSITION:
DISMISSED
HELD:
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to
the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in
the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and
special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art.
X, sec. 18]
PANDI VS CA GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as
Secretary of the Department of Health of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, issued a
Memorandum designating petitioner Dr. Lampa I. Pandi
who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary,
as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
In the same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr.
Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City. About a month after
Pandi's appointment, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor
Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating
Dr. Amer A. Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City
challenging the Memorandum transferring him to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging
that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as
provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur. Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction,
claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-
Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The Court of
Appeals held that Saber is the lawfully designated
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, that
Lanao del Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power
and authority to appoint the provincial health officer under
Section 478 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160). Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the appointment of Saber is valid at that time
DISPOSITION:
PETITION GRANTED
HELD:
The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even
designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health
office. The Court of Appeals' reliance on Section 478 of
the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan's
authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of
the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he
appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for
provincial, city and municipal governments," is not a grant
of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health
officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to
appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In
short, the appointment of local health officers, being
essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on
the part of those vested by law with the power to appoint
them. Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU
Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989.
SEMA VS COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008
FACTS:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces
under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of
Maguindanao.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting
the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act
201. In an answer to Cotabato City’s query, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 “maintaining
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of
Maguindanao. However, in preparation for the May 14,
2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative
district in question as “Shariff Kabunsan Province
with Cotabato City”.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of
“Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that
office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled
to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art.
VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is
constitutional.
DISPOSITION:
We declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MAIN POINT:
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act,
did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to
create legislative districts. Organic acts of autonomous
regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
"[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, . . . ."
The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (R.A. 9054)
itself states that the ARMM Government is established
"within the framework of the Constitution". This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates
that the ARMM "shall be created . . . within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines".
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-
AD
DISPOSITION:
MOTION TO DISMISS, DENIED.
MAIN POINT:
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot
be reconciled with the present constitution and laws
“shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive
compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework.” The president’s authority is limited
to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the
need to amend therein.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA VS SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES February 2012
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic
act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset
the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections
to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the
Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
Does the appointment power granted to the President
exceed the President's supervisory powers over
autonomous regions?
DISPOSITION:
DENY WITH FINALITY THE MOTION
MAIN POINT:
Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution provides that “the creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.” The Supreme Court
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act– require ratification
through a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners’
underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides
with the people, it disagrees that this legal reality
necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement
for all amendments to RA No. 9054
FROM SIR BADDIRI: means that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the organic Act Constitutionally-essential to
creation of autonomous regions – i.e. , those aspects
specially mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for the Organic Act – require ratification
through a plebiscite)
SECTION 20. LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - (5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala (6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
Lumpur, Malaysia. (7) Educational policies;
Invoking the right to information on matters of public (8) Preservation and development of the cultural
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to heritage; and
disclose and furnish them the complete and official (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation the region. (Underscoring supplied)
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
GRP from signing the same. amendment that would expand the above-quoted
provision. The mere passage of new legislation
ISSUE: pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said
Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and constitutional provision would not suffice, since any
MILF is constitutional new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found
in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other
DISPOSITION: provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE
with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
MAIN POINT: paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which
The MOA-AD, moreover, would states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic
not comply with Article X, Section cooperation and trade relations with foreign
20 of the Constitution countries: provided, however, that such relationships
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous and understandings do not include aggression
regions as follows: against the Government of the Republic of the
SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject Philippines . . . ." Under our constitutional system, it
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, is only the President who has that power.
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over: SECTION 21. PRESERVATION F PEACE AND ORDER
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues; ARTICLE XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; OFFICERS
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
SECTION 1. PUBLIC OFFICE
HIPOLITO VS MERGAS– 195 SCRA 6 [1991]
FACTS:
Mergas, a deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, Manila was charged by herein complainant
Marisol C. Hipolito, an applicant for a small scale mining
permit, on January 4, 1990 in the Office of the
Prosecutor, Province of Tarlac, with acts allegedly
amounting to the crime of swindling or estafa.
On January 18, 1990, a copy of an affidavit-complaint,
dated January 4, 1990, charging herein respondent with
grave misconduct and involving the same facts subject of
the aforesaid criminal case, together with its
corresponding attachments, was received in the Office of
the Court Administrator.
In a resolution of April 30, 1990 in I.S. No. 90-010 of the
office of the aforesaid provincial prosecutor, the charge
for estafa was dismissed on the theory that the evidence
shows that there was no unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence on the part of respondent, and the issue of
falsification was not ruled upon since no evidence
proving the same was submitted for proper appreciation
and consideration.
ISSUE:
WON the acts of respondent deputy sheriff are improper
and not conducive to the best interest of the service.
DISPOSITION:
RESPONDENT SUSPENDED
MAIN POINT:
Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity. This yardstick has
been imprinted in the 1973 Constitution, thus: "Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people." 9 This is reiterated more
emphatically in the 1987 Constitution.
BORNASAL JR., VS MONTES – 280 SCRA 181 [1997]
FACTS:
In a letter complaint dated April 3, 1996, complainant
Bornasal, Clerk of Court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC
Valenzuela, charged respondent deputy sheriff Montes
with certain unauthorized acts relative to a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage filed
before the complainant's office. The letter-complaint
alleged that respondent issued notice of sheriff's sale
without authority from the complainant and inspite of the
fact that said petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was
already withdrawn. Moreover, the notice was signed by
respondent purportedly for and in behalf of the
complainant.
ISSUE:
WON the Montes constituted grave abuse of authority
and gross misconduct
DISPOSITION:
SHERRIF MONTES SUSPENDED

MAIN POINT:
Sheriffs and deputy-sheriffs, as officers of the Court and,
therefore, agents of the law, must discharge their duties
with due care and utmost diligence because in serving
the court's writs and processes and in implementing the
orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the efficiency of the enforcement process of the
administration of justice.
It is beyond question that the administration of justice is a
sacred task so that respondent deputy sheriff, by the very
nature of his duties and responsibilities, should have
borne in mind that his unauthorized acts were violative of
the norms of public accountability, hence, contributory to
the diminishing image of the people's faith in the
Judiciary.
ALMARIO VS RESUS– AM NO. P941076, [November
22, 1999]
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint filed on 25 August 1994,
complainant judge charged Clerk of Court Jameswell
Resus and Stenographic Reporter Nora Saclolo of his
court with gross misconduct. According to complainant,
respondent Saclolo prepared a transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN) of an ex-parte hearing held in the morning of
22 March 1994 in the office of respondent Resus wherein
depositions of Mrs. Trinidad Enriquez, applicant in LRC
Cases Nos. NC-453 to 458, had been taken.
Complainant could not, however, believe that such
proceeding would have taken place because it was only
on 15 August 1994 that the applicant moved for the
taking of deposition on the ground that she was no longer
physically fit to travel long distance trips. In a
Supplemental Complaint, complainant judge also
charged both respondents with falsification of the TSN in
GLRO Case No. 8340 by making it appear that a hearing
in the case was held on 8 June 1994.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
DISPOSITION:
DISMISSED
MAIN POINT:
Time and again this Court has stressed that all those
involved in the dispensation of justice from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach. Their conduct or behavior must, at all times, be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as
to let them free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary. As the administration of justice is a sacred task,
this Court condemns and cannot countenance any act or
omission on the part of court personnel that would violate
the norm of public accountability and diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.
JUAN VS PEOPLE , GR 132378, January 18, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Rogelio Juan, Barangay Chairman and Pedro
de Jesus, Delfin Carreon, and Antonio Galguerra,
Barangay Kagawads, of Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City, were separately accused before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of using barangay
property for election campaign purposes and other
partisan activities during their incumbency as barangay
officials, in violation of Section 261-(o) of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order
directing the suspension of petitioners from office for sixty
(60) days. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
In their petition, petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the
RTC contending that the authority to hear the cases is
vested by RA 7691 in the first-level courts. In addition,
they claimed that their cases are not subject to Section
13 of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which mandates the preventive suspension of indicted
public officials. They also assailed the trial court's order
of suspension due to alleged procedural lapses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners' unlawful and unauthorized use of
government property constitute fraud against the
government.
DISPOSITION:
DENIED
MAIN POINT:
Unlawful and unauthorized use of government property
by incumbent public officers constitutes fraud. Thus, the
provision on preventive suspension in the Anti-Graft Law
applies to such officers even if the alleged violations are
primarily considered as election offenses.
RE: AWOL OF ANTONIO MAKALINTAL, AM 99-11-06-
SC, FEBRUARY 15, 2000
FACTS:
The records reveal that Mr. Macalintal filed applications
for leave which were not signed by his immediate
supervisor. He was, thus, considered absent without
official leave (AWOL). Accordingly, on October 13, 1999,
Clerk of Court En Banc Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno issued
a memorandum informing Mr. Antonio B. Macalintal of
the dates of his unauthorized absences and directing him
to explain why he should not be dismissed from the
service for habitual absences without official leave. In his
answer dated October 21, 1999, Mr. Antonio B.
Macalintal admitted having incurred absences. He
explained that he was suffering from illness and financial
difficulties. He averred that his family’s finances went
awry because he granted a loan of P150,000 to his wife’s
niece. The loan remained unpaid, and he had to borrow
money from his relatives to be able to pay for the
matriculation and allowances of his children as well as for
the continuous medication of his wife.
ISSUE:
WON habitual absenteeism causes inefficiency in the
public service.
HELD:
The Court hereby finds Mr. Antonio B. Macalintal,
Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court, guilty of
malfeasance in office, for unauthorized habitual
absenteeism, and orders his SUSPENSION for six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay, commencing upon
notice of this resolution.
MAIN POINT:
By his habitual absenteeism, Mr. Malicantal has caused
inefficiency in the public service. Any act, which falls
short of the exacting standards for public office,
especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Public
office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
ESTRELLA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, petitioner was appointed as Municipal
Cashier in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, with a bond in the amount of P28,000
Per Audit Assignment Order No. LGAD 86-1 dated
January 28, 1986 issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA), Regional Office XII; he was audited of his cash
and accounts for the period from March 18 to 24, 1986
only. For reasons unknown, the cash and accounts of the
petitioner were not audited for the period from July 1,
1975, the date of his appointment, up to March 17, 1986.
Based on the official receipts for the period from
February 7, 1986 to March 18, 1986 submitted by the
petitioner during the audit examination, petitioner
apparently had daily collections amounting to
P247,753.28. Under office rules, petitioner was supposed
to turn over the collections to Municipal Treasurer Jose
B. Galvez, but he failed to do so since Galvez was then
on leave of absence. As a recourse, petitioner should
have deposited his collections with the depository bank of
the municipality but he likewise neglected to do.
ISSUE:
WON The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not holding
that the Cash Examination Report dated March 18, 1986
(Exhibit B for the prosecution) on the basis of which
petitioner was said to have allegedly incurred shortage in
the amount of P218,349.99 is palpably wrong therefore
invoking reasonable doubt accused should be freed of
criminal culpability.
HELD:
The Court finds Nicanor E. Estrella guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
malversation penalized under Par. 4, Article 217, Revised
Penal Code.
MAIN POINT:
To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the
prosecution has only to prove that the accused received
public funds or property and that he could not account for
them or did not have them in his possession and could
not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance for
the same. An accountable public officer may be
convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is
that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not
been able to explain satisfactory.
MALBAS VS BLANCO

FACTS:
In a sworn complaint dated August 26, 1996,
complainants accused Sheriff Nicanor B. Blanco and two
other unidentified sheriffs of the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City, Rizal of violation of the Constitution (Article
III, Section 1) and of acting beyond their authority in
connection with the implementation of a writ of
demolition.
On August 8, 1996, Sheriff Paulo M. Gatlabayan sent a
notice to vacate to Hospisia H. Jovillanos and other
occupants of the land by virtue of the writ of demolition.
Previously however, on February 13, 1996, complainants
sent a letter to Sheriff Gatlabayan informing him that they
were not the defendants in Civil Case No. 93-3208 (Civil
Case No. 1189 in MTC) but in Civil Case No. 93-2819
(Civil Case No. 1174 in MTC). The latter case was the
subject of a petition pending with the Court of Appeals.
On August 13, 1996, at about 9:45 a. m., respondent
sheriffs arrived at Sitio Sagingan, Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal with about thirty (30) armed men and more
than a hundred civilians.
Complainants brought to the attention of the respondents
that not all residents of the subject property were
defendants in Civil Case No. 1189, and if respondents
would demolish the improvements within the area, those
belonging to the complainants should not be included.
Further, complainants informed respondents that they
were defendants in Civil Case No. 1174, which was
pending with the Supreme Court.
Despite this, respondent sheriffs demolished all the
houses in the area including the houses of the
complainants. As a result, complainants belongings were
destroyed, stolen or lost. And since respondents
continued to demolish the houses despite the heavy
rains, complainant’s children suffered from various form
of illnesses.
ISSUE:
WON the sheriffs were guilty of grave misconduct and
gross abuse of authority
HELD:
The Court finds respondents Nicanor B. Blanco and
Paulo M. Gatlabayan, both sheriffs of the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo Rizal, guilty of grave misconduct and
gross abuse of authority, and hereby DISMISSES them
from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except
earned leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or office of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MAIN POINT:
The failure of sheriffs to verify complainants’ allegation
that they were not parties to the case in which the writ of
execution was issued manifests blatant irresponsibility,
for which they must be meted with the appropriate
penalty – by their acts, the sheriffs committed grave
misconduct, oppression, and conducted themselves in a
manner highly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. A sheriff must know what is inherently right and
wrong and is bound to act with prudence and caution.
MANAOIS VS LEMEO

FACTS:
This is a verified letter-complaint filed by SPO4 Domingo
B. Manaois, charging Judge Lavezares C. Leomo,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), San Marcelino-
Castillejos, Zambales, with grave misconduct, acts
constituting obstruction of justice, and abuse of authority.
Complainant alleged that he is a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned as the Chief of
the Traffic Management Office in Olongapo City.
Sometime in August, 1998, his office received a bench
warrant of arrest dated August 12, 1998 against one
Rowena C. Corpuz, accused in Criminal Case No. 97-
0390 for estafa then pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 253, Las Pias City. On August 25, 1998, at
about 9:30 A.M., Rowena appeared at his office inquiring
about a motor vehicle clearance. Remembering her
name as the subject of the warrant of arrest, he asked if
she has a pending case in the said court. She answered
in the affirmative. Thereupon, he showed her a copy of
the warrant and declared that she is under arrest.
Immediately, she rushed out of the office and
approached her companion who happened to be Judge
Lavezares C. Leomo, herein respondent, waiting inside a
car. She returned, accompanied by respondent, to
complainant’s office. Respondent then confronted
complainant, asking why Rowena should be arrested.
When complainant explained that being an officer of the
law it is his duty to enforce the warrant of arrest,
respondent grabbed Rowena’s hand and both left
hurriedly. At around 4:00 P.M. of that day, respondent
phoned complainant, informing him that he (respondent)
has turned over Rowena to the PNP at Castillejos,
Zambales and that he would notify the presiding judge of
the RTC, Branch 253, Las Pias City accordingly. Later,
complainant learned that respondent has been extending
special treatment to Rowena because the two are very
special friends.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
sufficient enough to be dismissed from service
HELD:
Judge LAVEZARES C. LEOMO is found GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT and of violating Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and is DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding
the accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
MAIN POINT: The Code of Judicial Conduct directs a
judge to refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of any litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
RE: GIDEON ALIBANG, AM 2003-11-SC JUNE 15,
2004
FACTS:
The Memorandum dated March 30, 20041 of Atty. Eden
T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, recommending administrative
sanction upon Gideon M. Alibang, Building and Ground
Maintenance Head B of the Hall of Justice, Davao City,
who incurred habitual tardiness during the first semester
of 2003.
On April 14, 2003, the Leave Division of this Court, in its
Report of Tardiness, informed Atty. Candelaria that
Alibang committed tardiness 13 times in January 2003
and 11 times in February 2003. Forthwith, Atty.
Candelaria required him to explain in writing within five
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him.
ISSUE:
WON Gideon M. Alibang is guilty of habitual tardiness
HELD:
Gideon M. Alibang, Building and Ground Maintenance
Head B of the Halls of Justice, Davao City is hereby
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely.
MAIN POINT:
An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he
incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, 10
times a month for at least 2 months in a semester or at
least 2 consecutive months during the year.
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents
from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335
(Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this
petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their
best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners
also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers, for it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
ISSUE:
W/N the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President
HELD:
The petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section
12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of
the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the
provisions remain in and effect.
MAIN POINT:
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law. Revenue targets are based on the original
estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the
BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by
the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress. Thus, the determination of
revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as
it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact,
it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving
government personnel.
SALUMBIDES VS OMB
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Salumbides, Jr. (Salumbides) and
Glenda Araña (Glenda) challenge the October 11, 2007
Decision and the December 13, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96889 affirming the
Office of the Ombudsman's decision finding them guilty of
Simple Neglect of Duty.
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed in July 2001 as
Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal
Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon.
Towards the end of 2001, Mayor Vicente Salumbides III
(the mayor) saw the urgent need to construct a two-
classroom building with fence (the projects) for the
Tagkawayan Municipal High School2 (TMHS) since the
public school in the poblacion area would no longer admit
high school freshmen starting school year 2002-2003. On
how to solve the classroom shortage, the mayor
consulted Salumbides who suggested that the
construction of the two-classroom building be charged to
the account of the Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses/ Repair and Maintenance of Facilities
(MOOE/RMF) and implemented "by administration," as
had been done in a previous classroom building project
of the former mayor.
ISSUE:
WON Salumbides is guilty of simple neglect of duty
HELD:
In a 15-page decision penned by Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, the Court En Banc affirmed the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, finding petitioners Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides,
Jr. and Glenda Araña, Municipal Legal Officer
Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively,
of Tagkawayan, Quezon, guilty of simple neglect of duty.
The Court, however, modified their penalty from
suspension from office from six to three months only.
The Court ruled that the doctrine of condonation cannot
to be extended to reappointed coterminous employees
like petitioners as in their case, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement
of the electorate. “Moreover, the unwarranted expansion
of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent
as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants,
particularly local government, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse
of the bureaucracy,” added the Court.
MAIN POINT:
Doctrine of Condonation Does Not Extend to Appointive
Officials.
SECTION 2. OFFICERS SUBJECT TO REMOVAL BY
IMPEACHMENT
OMBUDSMAN VS CA
FACTS:
Pua, a Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Cebu, filed a
complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas, alleging that Villamor, Municipal Mayor; Bebelia
C. Bontia (Bontia), Municipal Treasurer; and respondent
Dinah C. Barriga (Barriga), Municipal Accountant, all
public officials of Carmen, Cebu, entered into several
irregular and anomalous transactions in their official
capacity. These transactions pertained to the handling of
the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the
Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. Villamor
and Barriga denied Pua's allegations.
Subsequently, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found
Barriga guilty of misconduct and she was suspended
from service for 6 months. The case had become moot
and academic with respect to Villamor and Bontia
because Villamor was no longer the incumbent mayor of
Carmen, Cebu and Bontia had already been dismissed
from government service.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in nullifying the orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman to the municipal mayor of Carmen, Cebu for
the immediate implementation of the penalty of
suspension from service of respondent Barriga even
though the case was pending on appeal.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
MAIN POINT:
The impeachable officers are the President of the
Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The list is exclusive
and may not be increased or reduced by legislative
enactment.
SECTION 3. PROCEDURE FOR IMPEACHMENT

IN RE GONZALES, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
FACTS:
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He
forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter
was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an
anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring
to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him
(Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the
per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges
made by Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit.
In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why
he should not be held administratively liable for making
serious accusations against Fernan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred
during his term of office
HELD:
The court is not saying that the members and other
constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability.
What the court is merely saying is that there is a
fundamental procedural requirement that must be
observed before such liability ma be determined. A
member of the SC must first be removed from office, via
the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only
may he be held liable either criminally or administratively
(that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in
appropriate proceedings.
MAIN POINT:
A public officer whose membership of the Philippine Bar
is a qualification for the office held by him and removable
only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment
during his membership; nor can he be charged criminally
before the Sandiganbayan or any other Court where the
penalty is removal.
MARCOLETA V. BRAWNER
FACTS:
A Complaint for disbarment was filed by Atty. Rodante D.
Marcoleta (complainant) against respondents
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra (Borra) and
Romeo A. Brawner (Brawner) of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) charging them with violating Canons
1 (1.01, 1.02 and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and 3.06)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 4, 5, 6 and
17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Additionally,
complainant charges respondents of violating Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
ISSUE:
WON Canon 3 of the new code of judicial conduct for the
Philippine judiciary applicable to officers of COMELEC
exercising quasi-judicial duties
HELD:
The complaint for disbarment against now deceased
Comelec Commissioner Romeo Brawner is DISMISSED
for being moot. That against Commissioner Resurreccion
Borra is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MAIN POINT:
The rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of
the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being
impeached.
The chairman and members of the Commission shall be
subject to the canons of judicial ethics in the discharge of
their functions. It bears emphasis that the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applies only
to courts of law, of which the Comelec is not, hence,
sanctions pertaining to violations thereof are made
exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the
judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the Comelec
chairman and members, who have their own codes of
conduct to steer
ROMULO V YNIGUEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all
members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan
Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The
Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further consideration and
disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in
the complaint attached. It then submitted its report, which
was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasan’s
power of impeachment
HELD:
No. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the
Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the
Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have
been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the
power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel
the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for
by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body
of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes
irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government had acted.
MAIN POINT:
The Supreme Court cannot compel the Batasan to
conduct an impeachment trial. The Batasan can always
modify its own rules. They do not have the force of law
but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the
orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings before
the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not
substantive. They may be waived or disregarded by the
Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no
concern.
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House
of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superceding
the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed
the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and
three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23
October 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all
the Members of the House of Representatives. Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings
HELD:
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings, which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001,
are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT:
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3(5) says,
“No impeachment proceedings shall initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year”,
it means that no second verified complain may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. “To initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint. Once an impeachment complain has
been initiated, another impeachment complain may not
be filed against the same official within a period of one
year.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
Facts: After the sharp descent from power of Chavit
Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for
resignation filled the air and former allies and members of
the President’s administration started resigning one by
one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of
the House to the Senate. The impeachment trial formally
opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power
of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos
rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters
– one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other
signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to
Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. Thereafter,
Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.
Issue: WON resigned as President
Disposition: Petition dismissed
Held: The Court used a “Totality Test” as an
“authoritative window” to ascertain petitioner Estrada’s
state of mind on this issue. On reading the then
Executive Secretary Angara’s diary published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner
impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a
candidate in the proposed snap elections, 2) he did not
object to Senator Pimentel’s “dignified exit” proposal, and
3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week left
to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually
calls his “resignation letter”, Erap 1) acknowledged
GMA’s oath-taking as President, 2) he did not mention
any intent on re-assuming his position as President.
Main point:
> Judgment in impeachment cases shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to
law.
> The impeachment proceedings were closed only after
the petitioner had resigned from presidency, thereby
rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By
resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than
consented to the termination of the impeachment case
against him, for he brought about the termination of the
impeachment proceedings.
GUTIERREZ V COMMITTEE OF JUSTICE

Facts: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House
Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two
impeachment complaints against the petitioner,
simultaneously referred to the House Committee on
Justice, sufficient in form and substance on grounds that
she was denied due process and that the said resolutions
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings for impeachable officers.
Issue: Whether or not the simultaneous complaints
violate the one-year bar rule?
Disposition: Petition dismissed
Held: Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the
Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must
be a “verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee.
Main point: Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate”
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which
must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint
moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on
the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice.
Section 4. Sandiganbayan
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN(creation of
Sandiganbayan)
Facts: Petitioner was accuse of estafa before the
sandiganbayan. The former then contests the
constitutionality of the said court on the ground that it
removes the right of an appeal because only the
Supreme Court can review its decision, and only on
certiorara
Issue: WON the creation of Sandiganbayan violates
equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned
Disposition: Petition Dismissed
Held: The claim that PD 1606 deprives the petitioner of
the equal protection of the law is hardly convincing
considering that the Decree is based on a valid
classification. The Constitution provides for the creation
of a special court, known as Sandiganbayan, and the rule
is settled that the general guarantees of the Bills of
Rights, among which are the due process and equal
protection clauses, must give way to specific provisions,
such as the provision on the creation of the
Sandiganbayan.
Main point: Sandiganbayan is not a constitutional body,
but a statutory creation. Sandiganbayan decree does not
dilute the right to appeal even if no intermediate appeal to
the Court of Appeals is prescribed therein. According to
its unique procedures, the accused is given by the
Sandiganbayan enough chances(3-vote requirement) to
obtain substantial justice.
LECAROS V SANDIGANBAYAN (crimes in relation to
public office)
Facts: Petitioner was charged of grave coercion before
the Sandiganbayan. He then moved to quash the
complaint on the ground the respondent court has no
jurisdiction because the complaint was not a graft and
corrupt practice.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction regarding
this case?
Disposition: Petition Denied
Held: Yes, It was held, citing Art 13 Sec 5 of the
Constitution that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction as a
special
court over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers.
Main point: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under
the constitution is not only over criminal or civil cases
involving grant and corruption, but also to other crimes
committed by them in relation to their office.
CUNANAN V ARCEO (averment of the nature of the
crime committed)
Facts: Cunanan, a member of the Philippine National
Police fired a warning shot in a fight outside his office
which resulted to the death of a person. It was brought to
the RTC.
Issue: WON RTC has a jurisdiction regarding this case?
Disposition: Petition Dismissed
Held: The Court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
try this case and that any decision it may render thereon
would be null and void. in applying in this case, Cunanan
is charged falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga had no jurisdiction over that
offense.
Main point: Sandiganbayan has exclusive and sole
jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials
where the penalty imposed is prision correcional or
higher or a fine of P6,000 or higher.
BALMADRID V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Maximo Binos and Teodulo Alcantara were
Superintendent and Cashier, respectively of the
government-owned Catanduanes Agricultural and
Industrial College (CAIC) located at Panganiban,
Catanduanes. On the other hand, petitioners-spouses
Jesus and Mila Balmadrid were suppliers of school and
construction materials, whose company Ecbal
Enterprises is located in Virac, Catanduanes. Binos and
Alcantara were personally indebted to Mila in the total
amount of P9,200.00. They told petitioners that they
could pay them in the shortest possible time only if they
would cooperate in a scheme through which funds of
CAIC would be withdrawn to pay the debt. So, they
issued 4 checks of the CAIC payable to Mila Balmadrid,
in payment of ghost and/or fictitious deliveries of supplies
and materials purportedly for the use of said institution.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision and found Binos,
Alcantara and the petitioners-spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Binos and Alcantara failed to appeal
and were sentenced accordingly. Petitioners, on the
other hand filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners, being private persons,
were improperly charged and convicted without authority
of law and in clear violation of their constitutional right to
due process
Disposition: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The
appealed decision of respondent Sandiganbayan with
respect to petitioners is hereby AFFIRMED.
Held: Private persons may be charged together with
public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary
presentation of witnesses and exhibits against
conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues
involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private
person may be tried jointly with public officers, he may
also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the
present petitioners.
Mainpoint: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law. In case private individuals
are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees. It follows
therefore that if a private person may be tried jointly with
public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with
them.
AZARCON V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling
business. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
former’s premises A Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR
addressed to the Regional Director or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City
commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Ancla, a sub-
contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent
taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to
Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,transmit
and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned
by taxpayer Ancla. Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for
Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of
the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently,
however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from
Azarcon’s custody. For this reason, Azarcon was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property under Article 217
in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.
Disposition: The questioned Resolution and Decision of
the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction
Held: The court held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision
was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Mainpoint: The sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over a
private jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction. The Information does no charge petitioner
Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense under
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the
petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will
have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are.
Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the
truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to
take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular
election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of
law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority
to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it
power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s
power authorizing a private individual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a
public officer.
BINAY V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan a case against Binay for illegal use of
public funds and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices act. Petitioner contends that this is outside the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since RA 7975 grants
Sandiganbayan the jurisdiction over executive branch
officers classified as Grade 27 or higher. The petitioner’s
salary was grade 22
Issue: WON SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the
passage of RA 7975
Disposition: Petition is dismissed
Held: YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA
8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic
Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
andChapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code,where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1.
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 Under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are “local
officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher
Mainpoint: Municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
MAYOR LAYUS V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Petitioner, the elected mayor of the municipality of
Claveria, Province of Cagayan, was charged with estate
through falsification of public documents. Petitioner filed
a motion to quash the Information. The prosecution filed
with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite,which LAYUS opposed. The resolution of
said motion was held in abeyance in light of the May1998
elections and the prohibition under Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. Sandiganbayan eventually granted the
motion to suspend LAYUS.
Issue: WON SB has jurisdiction over mayor of 5th class
municipality
Disposition: Petition is dismissed
Held: YES, Sec. 13 of RA 2019 makes it mandatory for
the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officerwho has
been validly charged with a violation of RA 3019, as
amended, or Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code,
or any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds orproperty. This is based on the presumption that
unless the public officer is suspended, he mayfrustrate
his prosecution OR commit further acts of malfeasance
OR both.
Main point: Municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ABBOT V MAPAYO
Facts: Petitioner was charged of Malversation Thru
Falsification of Public Document. The case was
eventually transferred to the Regional Trial Court by
virtue of RA 7975. Petitioner claims that jurisdiction is
vested in the Court of Appeals to entertain the Petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition

Issue: WON SB has a jurisdiction over special civil
actions for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto.
Disposition: Dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with
Prohibition as well as its Resolution dated 14 May 1998
denying reconsideration is Affirmed.
Held: This Court held that the Sandiganbayan was a
court with only special and limited jurisdiction, hence,
could not exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto filed by
petitioner; thus it is settled that the authority to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law.
Mainpoint: The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise
in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: A group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against
then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It
was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
approved the application for legalization of the stay of
several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then
issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order
suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.
Disposition: Petition is dismissed
Held: The Court held that Republic Act No. 3019 does
not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Mainpoint: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order
the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Section 5. Ombudsman
BALUYOT V HOLGANZA
Facts: During a spot audit in 1977, the auditors from the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters
discovered a case shortage in the funds of its Bohol
chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Baluyot,
was held accountable and thereafter, respondent
Holganza as member of the board Bohol chapter, filed a
complaint with the Ofc. of the Ombudsman for
malversation. Upon recommendation of respondent
Militante, an administrative docket of dishonesty was also
opened against Baluyot. Petitioner contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private
voluntary organization.
Issue: Whether or not PNRC is a government owned or
controlled corporation or a private corporation.
Disposition: Petition is dismissed
Held: The court held that the Philippine National Red
Cross is a Government-owned and controlled corporation
Mainpoint: The test to determine if it is a GOCC is
whether it is created by its won charter for the exercise of
a public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law. Those with special charter are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and are compulsory members of the GSIS.
GARCIA v. OMBUDSMAN
Fact: In March 1995, petitioner availed and applied for
the program of National Development Company (NDC)
on early retirement of its personnel and those who
availed themselves were given tax exempt and it was
later approved, The private respondents (controller,
disbursing officer, assistant manager of NDC) deducted
withholding tax on the amount of provident fund benefit
given to petitioner corresponding to her share over and
above her personal contribution. The petitioner protested
the respondent’s action and requested to have a refund
claiming it was tax exempt. The respondent refused. The
petitioner filed to the ombudsman. But was later denied.
Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, against private respondents for deducting
withholding taxes on the amount of provident fund
benefits petitioner received over and above her personal
contribution.
Disposition: DENIES the petition; AFFIRMS to the
OMBUDSMAN
Held: Ombudsman acted correctly in dismissing
petitioner's complaint because private respondents had
not acted in bad faith or with gross negligence in
deducting withholding tax from petitioner's provident fund
benefits share over and above her personal contribution,
as they were guided by the opinion of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue at the time
Main point: The change of opinion, while favoring
petitioner, will not make private respondents act prior
thereto amount to bad faith as they relied on the
prevailing legal opinion on the issue. Hence, they could
not be held criminally liable therefor.
LAPID v. CA
Facts: A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging
petitioner Gov. Manuel M.Lapid and 5 other government
officials with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
allegedly having conspired between and among
themselves in demanding and collecting from various
quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control
slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand,
gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted
provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof
and without issuing receipts for its collection. The
Ombudsman decided and found the petitioner guilty form
is conduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1
year suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of
RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the
assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from
the premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet
been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of
prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the
respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the
assailed decision.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman’s Decision finding
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct &
imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without
pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Disposition: Motions for Reconsideration DENIED, Lack
of merit (by the OSG, Ombudsman)
Held: No, the decisions of the Ombudsman where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month
salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory. Under the
rules, which are promulgated by the rule-making power of
Ombudsman, the decision imposing a penalty of one
year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not
immediately executory.
Main point: A respondent who is found administratively
liable by the Office of the Ombudsman and is slapped
with a penalty of suspension of more than one month
from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. But although a respondent is given the right to
appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the
execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
TIROL v. CA
Facts: The petitioner entered into a contract when he was
the DECS Regional Director of Region VIII with Fairchild
Marketing and Construction in the total amount of
P80,000. The Teachers and Employees Union filed a
complaint for the various overcharged school equipment,
COA investigated the transaction and found that there
was malversation of public funds. A negotiated contract
happened instead of a competitive public bidding,
Petitioner's main alleged is that the Requisition and Issue
Voucher (RIV) and check were previously reviewed by
his subordinates before he approved and signed them.
But the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rejected
petitioner's defense because had he carefully scrutinized
the documents he would have discovered that the
purchases were made without competitive public bidding.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, prompting
petitioner to file the instant petition, seeking reversal of
the Ombudsman's assailed Resolution and Order. The
Solicitor General contends that there was a conspiracy of
silence and inaction and because of that petitioner was
guilty of negligence. He further asseverates that it is
beyond the ambit of the Court's authority to review the
power of the Ombudsman in prosecuting and dismissing
a complaint filed before it.
Issue: whether or not the case at the bar can file to the
higher court.
Disposition: petition for certiorari in this case is hereby
DENIED, Resolution of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.
Held: Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has been declared
unconstitutional for increasing appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court without its advice and consent. Also,
there is no right of appeal available since the Section
mentions only appeals from all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Ombudsman.
Main point: If said provision had not been declared
unconstitutional, it still does not grant a right of appeal to
parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases,as in fact said Section
mentions only appeals from "all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
MAMBURAO v. DESIERTO
Facts: Mamburao, Inc, applied for a loan in Landbank
(balagtas branch) in order to finance the construction of a
restaurant in Bocaue Bulacan. An appraisal for the
collateral loan happened and was followed with re-
appraisal which lead to the withdrawal of the load due to
a shouting instance. Few months after, they reapply for a
loan in the same bank but now in Bocaue branch, but
was later denied because of the balagtas branch
manager whom they had a shouting incidence before.
Petitioners filed a complaint against the branch manager,
it was dismissed.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
of discretion when he dismissed the criminal charges
against private respondents.
Disposition: instant petition DISMISSED.
Held: The ombudsman’s decision was not made in grave
abuse of its discretion. Rules of Criminal Procedure
defines preliminary investigation as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime cognizable by the RTC has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial. Under RA. 6770the Ombudsman has the
power to investigate and conduct preliminary
investigations. Absent any grave abuse of discretion
tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s supervision and control over the
preliminary investigation conducted by him. In fact, the
Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint
outright without going through a preliminary investigation
Main point: OMB is given wide discretion to determine
whether, given a set of facts and circumstances, a
criminal information should be filed in court. The OMB
has the power to dismiss a complaint outright for being
completely without merit.
CARANDANG v. DESIERTO, 639 SCRA 293
Facts: Radio Philippines Network (RPN), a private
corporation registered with the SEC. Benedicto,
(stockholder) entered into a compromise agreement with
the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) whereby he ceded to the government his shares
of stock in RPN with an outstanding capital of 72.4%
(which was later discovered to be only 32.4%).Meanwhile
Carandang (president) as a general manager and chief
operating officer of RPN. He was charged with grave
misconduct before the Ombudsman on the ground of
him, as general manager of RPN, entered into contract
with AF Broadcasting, Inc. despite his being an
incorporator, director and stockholder of this said
corporation; that he help financial and material interest in
a contract that had required the approval of his office;
and that the transaction is prohibited under Section 7 (a)
and Section 9 of RA No. 6713, thereby rendering him
administratively liable for grave misconduct. Carandang
sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against him on the ground that the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn
renders Carandang subject to the administrative authority
of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Disposition: Grant the petitions, Dismiss the
administrative charge for grave misconduct.
Held: No. RPN is not a GOCC. The law defines what
GOCC are. Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is
a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly
chartered by a special law, or if organized under the
general corporation law is owned or controlled by the
government directly or indirectly through a parent
corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at
least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its
outstanding voting capital stock.. Due to the inability to
resolve the issue regarding the actual shares owned by
the PCGG, the conclusion that the government held
majority shares finds no factual or legal basis. Hence,
Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority
of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Main point: the ombudsman and sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over admin cases involving grave misconduct
committed by employees of government-owned or
controlled corporation.
LACSON V. ES
Facts: Petitioners Theron V. Lacson, Jaime R. Millan and
Bernardo T. Viray were non-presidential appointees
andcareer service officials of respondent Philippine
Estates Authority. Sulficio O. Tagud filed a complaint-
affidavitwith the Office of the Ombudsman accusing
petitioners for overpricing, by P600 million the contract
for theconstruction of the President Diosdado
Macapagal Boulevard.The Ombudsman proceeded
with theinvestigation of both the criminal and the
administrative aspects of the case. The
Presidential Anti-GraftCommission (PAGC) requested
the Ombudsman for authority to conduct
administrative disciplinaryproceedings against the
petitioners. The basic complaint has not been further
docketed as an administrativecase. Thus, the same did
not preclude the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an
administrative complaintagainst the concerned PEA
officials. A formal complaint was filed by the Investigation
Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA,
including petitioners.PAGC issued a resolution
recommending the dismissal of petitioners with the
imposition of the corresponding accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government. The President approved
the recommendation. Millan and Viray, together with
Manuel R. Beriña, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration.
This motion was not acted upon.Aggrieved, they filed
their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
with the CA. The CA dismissedthe consolidated petitions
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman should conduct the
investigation on the charge of overpricing of the project
against petitioners
Disposition: the instant petition is DENIED
Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
similarly authorized agencies. Petitioners argue that
because they are not presidential appointees, it is only
the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them. In this
regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has
repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officials is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies ofthe government in relation to the
offense charged. Therefore, with respect to petitioners,
the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct
an investigation concerning administrative charges
against them with other agencies. At any rate, this
issue is already moot and academic, as the
Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of
petitioners. It appears therefrom that the
Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case
against the petitioners because the charges had already
been passed upon by PAGC
Main point: The power of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officials is
not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government in relation to the
offense charged.
QUARTO v. MARCELO, 658 SCRA 580
Facts: The DPWH Secretary created a committee to
investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service
vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct
the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that
from March to December 2001, several emergency
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of
DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid
by the government, did not actually take place, resulting
in government losses of approximately P143 million for
this ten-month period alone. The committee then filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging
the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and
employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals
who purportedly benefitted from the anomalous
transactions. The Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several information charging the said
DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa
through falsification of official/commercial documents and
violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other
hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request
for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to
grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses
Disposition: Dismissed
Held: Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the
Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or
proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or
under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives." In the exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the
degree of participation of those involved or the lack
thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters
are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the
petitioner has failed to establish in this case.
Main point: Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel
the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it
cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercise.
Section 6: APPOINTMENTS
Ombudsman v. CSC, GR No. 162215, July 20, 2007
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman, thus, filed a
petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify CSC
Opinion No. 44, s. 2004. The Office of the Ombudsman
asserts that its specific, exclusive and discretionary
constitutional and statutory power as an independent
constitutional body to administer and supervise its own
officials and personnel, including the authority to
administer competitive examinations and prescribe
reasonable qualification standards for its own officials,
cannot be curtailed by the general power of the CSC to
administer the civil service system.
Issue: Whether or not the Director II positions in the
Central Administrative Service and the Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman
are covered by the Career Executive Service.
Disposition: the petition is hereby GRANTED
Held: No. the responsibility for the establishment,
administration and maintenance of qualification
standards lies with the concerned department or agency,
the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department
or agency with respect to these qualification standards
and approving them. The CSC cannot substitute its own
standards for those of the department or agency,
especially in a case like this in which an independent
constitutional body is involved.
Main point: Ombudsman has the authority to determine
and establish the qualifications, duties, functions and
responsibilities of the various directorate and allied
service of the office. This must be so if the constitutional
intent is to remain meaningful and significant.
Section 7: TANODBAYAN AS SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan – 146 SCRA 137 [1986]
Facts: Quimpo filed a complaint with the TanodBayan
charging Dimaano and Remo, manager and analyst of
Petrophil with violation of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay
Quimpo’s fees as a supervisor. The TB dismissed the
complaint, however on the ground that his jurisdiction
extended only to government owned corporations
organized under a special laws. Petrolphil is a
corporation, organized under the General Corporation
code, it was acquired by the government to carry out its
oil and gasoline program. Quimpo filed a certiorari,
questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB
confessed the judgement
Issue: WON PetrolPhil is a GOCC? Whose employees’
falls within the jurisdiction purview of the Tanodbayan for
the purpose of Anti- Graft and Corruption practices act.
Disposition: judgment is hereby rendered SETTING
ASIDE the Tanodbayan Decision
Held: Yes. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. PetrolPhil
is not a GOCC. It is now funded and owned by the
government as in fact. It was acquired to perform
functions related to governmental programs and policies
on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent
adjunct to perform essential government related
functions.
Main point: TanodBayan has jurisdiction over all
Government owned firm regardless of how organized.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the
province of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court, seeking to restrain the Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with
the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases against
him on the ground that said cases were filed by said
Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority,
since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on
February 2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the
present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority
to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also
prayed that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from
conducting preliminary investigations with the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: WON the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) have
the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.
Disposition: GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by
petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan
Held: No. In as much as the aforementioned duty is given
to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987.
From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
Main point: The Office of the Ombudsman is a new
creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from
the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607
although concededly some of the powers of the two
offices are Identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor
cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position
of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.
Acop v. Ombudsman, GR No. 120422, September 27,
1995
Facts: In this case, government agencies, NCR
Command, Traffic Management Command (TMC)
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC),
Presidential Central Police District Command (CPDC)
and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) were
accused of summary killing 11 members of the “kuratong
baleleng” gang by S/PO delos Reyes of Central
Intelligence Commission. He stated that there was no
“shootout” but a “summary killing instead”. The complaint
went up to the Office of the Ombudsman of the Military.
The Ombudsman addressed the PNP concerned to
submit an “After Operations Report” to the Panel of
Investigators, also created by the Ombudsman. The
panel recommended for a preliminary investigation on a
list of officers presented by the PNP. In effect, the
Ombudsman ordered the officers listed to submit their
counter affidavit.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman has Jurisdiction over the
case in the first place instead of the Tanodbayan.
Disposition: DENIED for want of merit, the decision is
immediately executory.
Held: The Ombudsman has jurisdiction as stated in Sec.
31 of Ra 6770 (it states that the word “cases” includes
“non-military cases”), and the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction on preliminary Investigation as stated in A.O.
no. 7 sec.2. Thus, there is no abuse discretion on the
part of the Ombudsman
Main point: “The Office of the OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
MILITARY has jurisdiction on the Preliminary
investigation of the cases even if it concerns NON-
MILITARY personnel (police men for example), even
though Preliminary investigation was first deduced that it
was solely under the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan”
DELEOSO v. Domingo
Facts
By petition for certiorari and prohibition Governor Amor
D. Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop respondent Manuel
C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, from
conducting a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him of multiple murder v. Governor Amor
Deloso," on the grounds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l
The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the
murder charge against the petitioner for its jurisdiction is
confined to the investigation only of acts or omissions
that are connected with the performance of his duties as
governor; and
For the same reason, the Tanodbayan (Special
Prosecutor) has no jurisdiction to prosecute the murder
case against the petitioner.ibrary
Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly
committed by the petitioner as provincial governor
Ruling: Yes as protector of the people, the office of the
Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and to "investigate
Main Point The Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its
jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor
and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the
duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and
terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers
and prerogativesor it is in the investigation of the latter
where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest
investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is
greatest.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
ALMONETE V. VASQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned
citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with
copies furnished several government offices, including
the Office of the Ombudsman..
ISSUE: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the
petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers
RULING: YES. The plantilla and other personnel records
are relevant to his investigation. protectors of the people"
and as such they are required by it "to act promptly on
complaints in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or
MAIN POINT: the Ombudsman can act only "in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law" and that because the complaint in
this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an
appropriate one.
CAMANAG V. HON. GERERRO
FACTS
the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) issued
the Table of Results of those who failed the May, 1993
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure
Examinations. On Page 11 thereof, Sequence No. 493,
petitioner Olivia B. Camanag was listed as having failed
with a general average of 50.00% on December 15,
1993, petitioner in accomplishing her Personal Data
sheet (CSC form No. 212) as employee of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) indicated under question No. 18
that she passed the May, 1993 Board Examinations with
a rating of 75.42%. Petition for Certiorari to declare as
null and void, for allegedly having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion, the Resolution by respondent
Assistant City Prosecutor Nestor D. Gonzales and
approved by respondent City Prosecutor Jesus F.
Guerrero
ISSUE: "WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 15 AND 17 OF
REPUBLIC ACT 6770 WHICH EMPOWERS THE
OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATIONS OF MATTERS AND/OR REFERRED
TO IT IS (SIC) NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING: Petitioner has not shown that her case falls
within any of the recognized exceptions. Perforce, her
prayer for injunction to restrain the criminal actions
against her must be denied.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Petition is
DENIED.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770)
insofar as it empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation and to directly
undertake criminal prosecutions on three grounds: (1)
such grant of powers to the Office of the Ombudsman
has no constitutional basis and runs directly counter to
the intent of the framers of the Constitution; (2) it violates
the principle of separation of powers; and (3) it is in direct
contravention of Article XI, Section 7 of the Constitution.
BUENASADA VS. FLAVIER
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Principally, the petition seeks to
nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7,
1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners,
Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C.
Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey
Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora
C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply
Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health.
The petition also asks for an order directing the
Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary
investigation of the charges against petitioner
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power
to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman,
RULING: petition is DISMISSED
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
MAIN POINT
The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants
the Ombudsman power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, and that the status in question is procedural
MACALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the
Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head
of the Loans Administration and Insurance Section of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation, a
government-controlled corporation, and hence, a public
officer, while in the performance of his official functions,
taking advantage of his position, committing the offense
in relation to his office, and conspiring and confederating
with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the
owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceit defraud
the Philippine National Construction Corporation.
Petitioner was charged with estafa in the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is
a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended. Ombudsman act
Ruling: SC help that the petitioner as an employee of
PNCC is not a public employee since PNCC has no
original charter.
MAIN POINT: OMB can only investigate public officials
and employees.
BIR v OMBUDSMAN
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman received
information from an informer-for-reward that tax refunds
have been anomalously granted to Distillera Limtuaco &
Co., Inc. and La Tondeña Distilleries, Inc. Upon receipt
of the information, Soquilon recommended to then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez that the “case” be
docketed and subsequently assigned to him for
investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman violated due process in
issuing subpoena without first giving BIR the summary of
complaint and requiring it to submit a written reply
RULING: Yes. It is clear from the initial comments of the
graft investigator that based on the information, he
undoubtedly found reasonable grounds to investigate
further. In fact, he recommended that the “case” be
docketed immediately and assigned to him for a “full-
blown fact-finding investigation.”
MAIN POINT: The law clearly provides that if there is a
reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator
of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the
respondent public officer or employee with a summary of
the complaint and require him to submit a written answer
within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof
LAUREL V. DESIERTO
FACTS; President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive
Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said Committee and
renamed it as the "National Centennial Commission."
Appointed to chair was Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon
C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. Later in
1999, investigation was conducted by an independent
committed due to allegations of graft and corruption
against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The
committee recommended the filing of charges by the
Ombudsman upon which the Office of the Ombudsman
took cognizance of the case. LaureL then questioned the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition,
saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation
ISSUE: Whether or not the OMBUDSMAN has the
jurisdiction over the case
RULING. Yes. Since the NCC is an office performing
executive functions since one of its mandate is to
implement national policies. Moreover, the said office
was established by virtue of an executive order.
MAIN POINT: The law defines such primary jurisdiction
as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valera
FACTS:
Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo He is in charge of the Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group. the Office of the
Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint dated July
28, 2003 filed by then Director Eduardo S. Matillano of
the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG). In the said sworn
complaint, Director Matillano charged respondent Valera
with criminal offenses involving violation of various
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[2] the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines. A Special
Prosecutor placing respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera, Deputy
Commissioner, Office of the Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs, under preventive
suspension for a period of six months without pay.
ISSUE Whether or not Special prosecutor can order a
preventive suspension in connection with administrative
case
RULING: petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had
no authority to issue the March 17, 2004 Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six
months without pay
MAIN POINT
Special prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may act only under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Sec
24 of RA 6770 grants the power to preventively suspend
only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.
Perez v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer
of San Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They“willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1
computer unit costing P120,000acquisition by personal
canvass,” violating Sec. 362 and 367 of the LGC. No
public biddingoccurred and no Committee of Awards was
constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and
Juanita gave MobilLink Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center
undue advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, showing evident bad faith and gross,
inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in
the original information, so it was recommended by the
Special Prosecutor that the information be amended to
show the manner of the commission of the offense,
based on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original
information. The amended information was admitted. The
petitioners challenge this, saying that the Sandiganbayan
committed GAD in accepting the amended information,
which had no approval from the Ombudsman,
amounting to denial of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor has the power to file informations without
delegation from the Ombudsman
RULING: The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to
"study whether the accused, assuming arguendo that
there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to theseller of the subject
computer” and “submit your recommendation soonest.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman may delegate powers to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, but such delegation
must be shown by clear intent. This is because while the
Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan.
CALINGIN V. DESIERTO
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio P. Calingin is a former mayor
of Claveria, Misamis Oriental. During his incumbency, the
municipality undertook a low-cost housing project. The
Commission on Audit of Region X conducted a special
audit of the housing project for calendar years 1995 and
1996. The members of the COA Special Audit Team
executed a Joint Affidavit embodying their findings for the
purpose of filing criminal charges against Calingin and
other public officials. Graft Investigation Officer of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
recommended the filing of criminal charges against the
petitioner and co-accused for violation of Section 3(e)
and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices, Special Prosecutor Norberto B.
Ruiz recommended the dismissal of all the cases against
all the accused for lack of probable cause.
ISSUES:Whether respondent Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion by disapproving the
recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
to dismiss all the charges against herein petitioner and
his co-accused.
RULING No. The Ombudsman did not act with grave
abuse of discretion.
MAIN POINT Verily the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is but a mere subordinate of the Ombudsman and is
subject to his supervision and control. the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
Lazatin v. Desierto
Facts:
Petitioner Lazatin was charged with Illegal Use of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code. The complaint alleged that there
were irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development
Fund for the calendar year 1996. Thus, petitioner Lazatin,
with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to
convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and
recommending the filing against herein petitioners of
fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public
Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman;
hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against
herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their
respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation.
Subsequently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
submitted to the Ombudsman (OSP) its Resolution3
dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the
dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the
Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. The
OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the
trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27,
2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Recommendation, thereby disapproving the OSP
Resolution
Issue:
Whether or not that the Ombudsman had no authority to
overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases
against petitioners?
Held.
No. The Ombudsman has the authority to overturn the
OSP’s Resolution dismissing the cases against
petitioner. OSP is "merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and
ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively
suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.
Main point:
OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman
Section 12 Prompt Action on Complain
Laurel v. Desierto
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee
which was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence
and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress."Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said
Committee and renamed it as the "National Centennial
Commission." Appointed to chair was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal
and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.
Vice President Laurel by virtue of his chairmanship also
became the chairman of EXPOCORP, a corporation
organized to undertake the Freedom Ring Project in
relation to the centennial celebration. Later in 1999,
investigation was conducted by an independent
committed due to allegations of graft and corruption
against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The
committee recommended the filing of charges by the
Ombudsman upon which the Office of the Ombudsman
took cognizance of the case. Laurel then questioned the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition,
saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation,
(2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a
public officer as defined in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Vice President
Laurel are correct.
Held: No. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate
any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a
public officer or employee of the government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. However,
is NCC a public office? Yes, it is because it exercises
executive functions by implementing the policies set forth
in the Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage,
thus satisfying an important element of public office: the
delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that
Laurel is a public officer. That he did not receive
compensation is of no consequence. A salary is a usual
but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of
the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere
incident and forms no part of the office.
Main Point:
Ombudsman has the power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public
officer or employee of the government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
Almonte v Vasquez
Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service
Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were
legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the
anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office.
They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They
claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners
by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents
relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.
Held:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is
based upon public interest of such paramount importance
as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of
a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's
function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited
to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to determine the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for privilege resting on other
considerations.
Mainpoint: Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the
purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is
filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive
prosecution as much as securing the State from useless
and expensive trials.
Uy v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman received information from
an informer-for-reward that tax refunds have been
anomalously granted to Distillera Limtuaco & Co., Inc.
and La Tondeña Distilleries, Inc. Upon receipt of the
information, Soquilon recommended to then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez that the “case” be docketed and
subsequently assigned to him for investigation.
Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman could validly exercise its
power to investigate only when there exists an
appropriate case and subject to the limitations provided
by law
Held:
No. The 1987 Constitution enjoins that the “Ombudsman
and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.” There is no
requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman
could wield its investigative power. Even when the
complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the
Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
Main point:
All cases involving any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the
government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, the Ombudsman has the power
to investigate.
Raro v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate
Secretary of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO). As such, petitioner was the Acting Manager of
the Special Projects Department that was in charge of
the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL)
Abaño, a resident of Daet, Camarines Norte, as
Provincial Manager of the experimental STL in said
province, alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as PCSO
Corporate Secretary, "personally and directly intervened
in the operation of said lottery to his financial benefit and
advantage" by committing the following acts:
(1) Causing the employment of members of his family in
the experimental STL project that was under his
supervision, in violation of Section 3 (d) of the Anti-Graft
Law;
(2) Deciding on the dismissal of certain lottery employees
and in bad faith driving Abaño "to sever from the
management of lottery" which at that time was grossing
about P250,000.00 daily under a "profit-sharing"
agreement, thus causing Abaño "damage and injury" in
the amount of P1,300,000.00, in violation of Section 3 (e)
of the Anti-Graft Law; and
(3) Regularly demanding from Abaño amounts totaling
more than P100,000.00 as his share in the experimental
lottery, in violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law
Overall Ombudsman Jose G. Colayco, endorsed the
complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation and
conducted a investigation, however It took the NBI 2
years to complete its report.
Petitioner subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion for the reinvestigation of the Resolution of the
Ombudsman alleging that the "prejudicial and indecent
delay in the preliminary investigation" violated his rights
to due process of law and to speedy disposition of the
case because while the complaint was filed on May 20,
1988, the information against him was filed more than
four (4) years later.
Issue:
whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation erroneously and irregularly.
Held:
No. Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which
was in force and effect when Abaño filed the complaint
against petitioner, provides: "Sec. 12. The Ombudsman
and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof."
Main point:
Ombudsman shall act to act promptly on complaints
brought before him. But such duty should not be
mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense
of thoroughness and correctness.
Bautista v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
An anonymous, unverified and unsigned letter-complaint
dated 20 November 1996 allegedly prepared by the
Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and the Good
Government Employees of Davao del Sur initiated this
case. It was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao charging petitioner Franklin P. Bautista,
incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del
Sur, for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The letter-complaint alleged, among
others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred
and ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal
government for political considerations and that the
payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to
the peace and order fund despite meager savings of the
municipality.
Issue
Whether or not Ombudsman can act promptly to an
anonymous, unverified and unsigned letter-complaint
against public officials?
Held.
Yes. The Ombudsman shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Mainpoint:
In any form or manner of complaints that is against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, The
Ombudsman shall act promptly.
ROXAS v. VASQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil were Chairman
and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990,
the PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of sixty
five (65) units of fire trucks. Accordingly, the public
bidding was held on September 14, 1990.
The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in
the bidding, awarding and purchase of the sixty five fire
trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael
Alunan III to file a complaint on February 12, 1993 for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Ombudsman.
Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil,filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion be
granted and the charge against the movants be
dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de
Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the
recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not that the ombudsman acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding, on
reinvestigation of the petitioner and charging them for
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt practices
Held:
No. this Courts consistent policy has been to maintain
non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman
of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This
observed policy is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutor powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well.
Main point:
The office of the ombudsman was granted to act
promptly in complains filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the government or any
other subdivision, agency or instrumentality.
Karaan v. Ombudsman
Facts:
On 14 February 1994, petitioner wrote then Senator
Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to "the
present number and membership" or "the clique of six" in
the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines ("Islamic Bank").
Petitioner claimed that "the clique of six" granted a loan
of P250,000 to Compressed Air Machineries &
Equipment Corporation ("CAMEC") without a valid
collateral. Petitioner also claimed that the "clique of six"
approved the real estate mortgage on CAMEC’s loan
without requiring the cancellation of a prior subsisting
mortgage and without securing the written consent of the
first mortgagee in violation of law. Thus, petitioner
asserts that the "clique of six" is liable for entering into a
contract which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government, which is punishable under RA
3019.On 22 February 1994, Senator Maceda endorsed
petitioner’s letter to the Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez for appropriate investigation.
public respondent Raul R. Arnau ("Arnau"), Head of the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
("EPIB"), required respondents who were incumbent
members of the Islamic Bank’s Board of Directors
("Bank’s Board") to comment on the complaint. That
Respondents maintain that they were not yet even
members of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Bank
when the CAMEC transaction came about in 1986
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation. Petitioner denied that he was the officer-
in-charge of the Islamic Bank’s Makati Branch
responsible for screening loan applications in 1986 and
he contends that Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
dismissing his complaints..
Issue:
whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
Held:
No. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 12.
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.
Main point:
The Ombudsman has the "sole power to investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."12 The consistent
policy of the Court is not to interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers.
People v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the
Office of the Ombudsman, two separate informations[1]
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed
with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against
Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged
anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in
his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of
the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong
Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused
damage and prejudice to the government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the
informations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the
respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. According to the Sandiganbayan
Issue:
Whether the ombudsman has a jurisdiction over this
case?
Held:
Yes , Article XI Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the governments
prosecutory arm against persons charged with graft and
corruption), includes officers and employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations, likewise
without any distinction.
Mainpoint:
The Ombudsman has Jurisdiction over cases involving
public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Laxina v Ombusdman
Facts:
The instant petition seeks the review of the 24 April 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
66412, affirming the 2 July 2001 Memorandum Order and
the 1 August 2001 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
in OMB-ADM-00-0350, imposing upon petitioner the
penalty of dismissal from office with forfeiture of material
benefits pursuant to Sec. 25 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770.
Petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was Barangay Chairman
of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. On 15 December
1998, Evangeline Ursal (Ursal), Barangay Clerk of
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, filed with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for attempted rape
against petitioner. Petitioner was subsequently charged
with sexual harassment before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.
Petitioner sought the review of the Ombudsmans
Memorandum Order before the CA, arguing that the
Office of the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over
the administrative complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not that the Office of the Ombudsman did not
have jurisdiction over the administrative complaint?
Held:
Yes, the office of ombudsman has jurisdiction over this
case and shall act promptly. It was ruled that the
ombudsman shall not deprive of its constitutional
mandate to give justice to the victims of oppressive acts
of public officials and to protect the citizenry from illegal
acts or omissions of any government official.
Mainpoint:
The Ombudsman shall not deprive of its constitutional
mandate to give justice to the victims of oppressive acts
of public officials and to protect the citizenry from illegal
acts or omissions of any government official
Gemma P. Cabait v. Commission on Audit
Facts:
On September 4, 2001, the Philippine Star News, a local
newspaper in Cebu City, reported that employees of the
LTO in Jagna, Bohol, are shortchanging the government
by tampering with their income reports.4 Accordingly,
Regional Director Ildefonso T. Deloria of the Commission
on Audit (COA) directed State Auditors Teodocio D.
Cabalit and Emmanuel L. Coloma of the Provincial
Revenue Audit Group to conduct a fact-finding
investigation. A widespread tampering of official receipts
of Motor Vehicle Registration during the years 1998,
1999, 2000 and 2001 was then discovered by the
investigators. According to the investigators, a total of
106 receipts were tampered. The scheme was done by
detaching the Plate Release and Owner’s copy from the
set of official receipts then typing thereon the correct
details corresponding to the vehicle registered, the
owner’s name and address, and the correct amount of
registration fees.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered
judgment finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for
tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they
collected lesser amounts than they actually collected.
That it is hereby resolved that the following respondents
be found guilty of the administrative infraction of
dishonesty and accordingly be meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Issue:
Whether the office of ombudsman can impose
administrative liability mandatorily?
Held:
Yes. It was ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to
determine and impose administrative liability is not
merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.
Main point:
The Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory.
Gonzalez III v OP
Facts:
These two petitions have been consolidated not because
they stem from the same factual milieu but because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the
President's exercise of the power to remove from office
herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to
which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition
for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order or status quo order) which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the Decision1 dated March 31,
2011 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III,
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on
the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo
order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the
undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-
Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to
alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement
(PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F.
Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary
Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the President
in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case
initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
giving the President the power to dismiss a Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not granting the President the Power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman will diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman?
Held:
No. Granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office does not diminish its
independence. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional
mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing
more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the
appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the
independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated
to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government
Main point:
Constitution had declared the creation of the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman
and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the
people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government.
SECTION 13. POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES
Cruz v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: GSIS filed two separate criminal complaints
against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public
official who used to be the President and General
Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President of the
Manila Hotel, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The first complaint against
petitioner was filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor while the second, which involved the same
set of facts, was filed with the Presidential Commission
on Good Government but which was later endorsed to
the Office of the Ombudsman. The information filed
against Roman Cruz charging him with estafa through
falsification of public documents and for which he stands
to be tried before respondent court alleges.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Office of
the Ombudsman is not exercising quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative powers because "it does not act as a court"
when it conducts preliminary investigation of cases falling
under its jurisdiction.Petitioner contends that respondent
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents committed a
grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: No. The Ombudsman here is not conducting
anew another investigation but is merely determining the
propriety and correctness of the recommendation given
by the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable
cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings
of fact of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact
of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the
latter’s report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman
can very well make his own findings of fact. The
Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature
Main Point: The findings of fact by the office of the
ombudsman is supported by evidence, hence it is
conclusive
Disposition: Petition Denied

Maceda v. Vasquez
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge BonifacioSanz Maceda.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has
falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been submitted for
decision for a period of 90 days have been determined
and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth
and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by
the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts
Ruling: Yes. A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by the Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Main Point: Where a criminal complaint against a judge
or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: On September 16, 1992, two informations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner, being
then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and
the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance
Section of the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled
corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan, charging
them with estafa through falsification of official
documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of
mercantile documents. Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charges.H owever, during the
initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner
moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him
since he is not a public officer because the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
petitioner
Ruling: No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
him. The PNCC has no original charter as it was
incorporated under the general law on corporations, it
follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. The
only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over a private individual is when the complaint charges
him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public officer who has been charged with a crime within
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
Main Point: The ombudsman can investigate only officers
of government owned corporations with original charter.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Garcia v. Miro
Facts: City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman
Special Prosecution Officer Jesus Rodrigo Tagaan for
violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of his having
entered into a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of
asphalt batching plant for three years. The joint affidavits
of State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada alleged that
petitioner entered into the contract without available
funds appropriated to cover the expenditure in violation of
Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State Audit Code
of the Phil.; that petitioner exceeded the authority granted
him by the Sangguniang Panlungsod; and that the
contract is manifestly disadvantageous to the City. Note
however that thereafter, Special Prosecution Officer
Tagaan resigned from his office and his name was
withdrawn as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a
counter-affidavit, Garcia filed with the Supreme Court a
petition to prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting the
preliminary investigation on the ground that there is no
sufficient complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed
against Garcia is sufficient in form or manner.
Ruling: Yes, for purposes of initiating a preliminary
investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
complaint in any form or manner is sufficient. The
Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government. The Office of
the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory
and prosecutory agencies of the government because
those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay,
or dismiss investigations against them.
Main Point: “In any form or manner” It was held that the
fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on
the basis of any anonymous letter does not violate the
equal protection clause. For purposes of initiating
preliminary investigation before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a complaint “in any form or manner” is
sufficient.
Disposition: Petition Denied
Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Facts: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military
personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan, II. Senator Honasan appeared with
counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the
imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
which should be handled by the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. Senator Honasan
then filed a petition for certiorari against the DOJ Panel
and its members, CIDG-PNP-
P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon
V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the
ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Issue: Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular
no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize
the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
Ruling: No. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation for complaints filed with it because the
DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of
the government and investigate the commission of
crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the
Revised Administrative Code which had been held not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even
a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do
so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may
assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.
Main Point: The power to investigate or conduct a
preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may
be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City
Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular
capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Samson v. OMB
Facts: Petitioner Moises S. Samson, on behalf of
unidentified complainants, charged private respondents
Dr. Leonito L. Catarroja and Norma Sanchez, Chiefs of
the Quezon City Health Sanitation and Food and Drugs
Divisions, respectively, with violation of paragraphs (b),
(e) and (h) of Section 3 of RA 301. The public
respondent, in its August 1994 order, approved by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa on September 9, 1994,
denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of
the joint resolution. Hence, this petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent for
dismissing OMB-0-93-0920, a supposedly prima facie
graft case against private respondents.
Issue: Whether the public respondent committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed joint resolution and
order.
Ruling: No, public respondent did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner failed to present any proof
that there was probable cause to hold private
respondents liable under any of the aforestated
provisions. If the Ombudsman, using professional
judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such finding, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the courts will be hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings by the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it.
Main Point: The Office of the Ombudsman has a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure
and improper influence.
Disposition: Petition Denied for lack of merit
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutors, Office
of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse Belicena, Andutan,
Jacob, Legarda, Reyes, Campos, Diaz, Roman and
Corpuz of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Sixty-one (61) similar
Informations were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
against some fifty (50) public officials and private
individuals relating to the issuance of tax credit
certificates. The Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, avers that the delay in
the submission to the Sandiganbayan of its report on its
reinvestigation was caused by the pendency of the other
cases of equal, if not of more importance, not to mention
the filing of twenty-two (22) other motions for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation by the other
accused in the said cases. It asserts that the more than
one-year delay is not capricious, much less, intolerably
capricious. It also contends that the oral dismissal of the
cases by Justice Narciso S. Nario was too drastic, as it
deprived the respondent of its right to prosecute the
cases and prove the guilt of the petitioners beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of discretion in issuing assailed resolutions.
Ruling: No. There was an undue and inordinate delay in
the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor, and, consequently, the
submission of his report thereon. Despite the lapse of
more than one year, he failed to comply with the Orders
of the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that a
reinvestigation is summary in nature, and merely involves
a reexamination and re-evaluation of the evidence
already submitted by the complainant and the accused,
as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led
to the filing of the Informations after the requisite
preliminary investigation. The Prosecutor should have
expedited the reinvestigation not only because he was
ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a report within
sixty (60) days, but also because he is bound to do so
under Section XIII, Article XI of the Constitution.
Main Point: the delay in this case disregarded the
Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal liability of
government officers or employees in every case where
the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service to the people. The fact that up to this time no trial
has been set, apparently due to the inability of the
Ombudsman to complete the reinvestigation is a
distressing indictment of the criminal justice system,
particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars
Disposition: Petition Denied
Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman
Facts: In February 1989, private respondents Rosauro
Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners
before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of
RA 3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused
petitioners of using their positions in PAL to secure a
contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation
engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they
were shareholders. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the
Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL
was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers,
hence, outside the application of RA 3019. The Deputy
Ombudsman denied petitioners' omnibus motion to
dismiss.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman's jurisdiction only covers
GOCCs with original charters and these do not include
PAL.
Ruling: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs
with original charters. This being so, it can only
investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the
officials/employees of government corporations.
Therefore, although the government later on acquired the
controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter
did not have an "original charter" and its
officers/employees could not be investigated and/or
prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
Main Point: The ombudsman can investigate only officers
of government owned corporations with original charter.
PAL, even when still owned by the government, did not
have original charter.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Ombudsman v Estadarte
Facts: On August 17, 1998, People’s Graftwatch, through
its Chairman, Dr. Patricio Y. Tan, referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate investigation, a
complaint of the Faculty Club and Department Heads of
the Ramon Torres National High school against Heidi
Estadarte, the school principal. The complaint consisted
of 33 allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal
handling of school funds, irregular financial transactions,
perjury and abuse of authority.
Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over public school officers.
Ruling: No. The Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over public school officers. Such cases must
first go to a committee appointed by the Secretary of
Education. Considering that the respondent is a public
school teacher who is covered by the provisions of RA
4670, the Magna Carta for Public Schools, the DECS-
Region IV is in better position to decide in this matter.
Main Point: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
disciplinary cases involving public school teachers has
been modified by Section 9 of R.A. 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which says that such cases must first go to a committee
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Disposition: Petition Denied
Ombudsman v Lucero
Facts: Petitioner Farida T. Lucero was appointed as
Clerk II of the LTO, was reassigned by virtue of a
Memorandum, to assist the Regional Cashier in
collecting and receiving miscellaneous fees/revenues. At
the request of the OIC-Regional Director Porferio I.
Mendoza of the LTO, COA conducted an audit in the
cash section of the operations division of the LTO,
revealed petitioner to have issued sixty-nine altered
miscellaneous receipts. Ombudsman (Visayas) found the
petitioner guilty of dishonesty. On appeal, the appellate
court upheld the finding of the Ombudsman but declared
that the Ombudsman has no authority to order
petitioner’s dismissal from the service.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman is empowered to order
the removal of public officials or employees in
administrative cases.
Ruling: Yes, the ombudsman is empowered to order the
removal of public officials or employees in administrative
cases. The office of the ombudsman is empowered not
merely to recommend but to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.
Main Point: The Ombudsman Act authorizes the
Ombudsman to impose penalties in administrative cases.
Disposition: Petition Granted
BALBASTRO V JUNIO
FACTS: Ten former students of Iloilo City National High
school filed criminal and administrative cases against
Corazon C. Balbastro, Principal III (petitioner) et. al, for
Falsification of Public Documents, Falsification by Public
Officer or Employee and Malversation of Public
Funds. Respondents claim that the said school officials
prepared and used several Daily Wage Payrolls where it
was made to appear that they (respondents) worked on
several undertaking for P120 a day. The truth however
was that they were never hired by the school, neither did
they sign and receive the amounts stated in the subject
payrolls. The petitioner denied the charges against her
and as the head of the school, she signed documents
that were already prepared by the accounting department
and which were merely presented to her for signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) rendered its
Decision thus:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, and finding them
guilty of Dishonesty for making it appear in the above-
mentioned payrolls that the complainants had received
the amount indicated therein opposite their names,
respondents Corazon C. Balbastro, Rudy
T. Carbonera and Gilda C. Gulmatico are hereby meted
the penalty of Dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties. Lydia E. Ocate, on the other hand,
is hereby Suspended for one month without salary and
other benefits for being inefficient and incompetent in the
performance of her duties as Acting Disbursing Officer.
Petitioner now comes before this Court arguing that the
dismissal of her petition by the CA upheld, in effect, the
decision of the Ombudsman which was null and void
since the Ombudsman does not have the authority to
directly discipline her; that the powers and authority of
the Ombudsman are limited by the 1987 Constitution,
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 cannot go higher than
the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it by petitioner.
DISPOSITION: The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
RULING: The answer is no. In this case, the
Ombudsman found petitioner, together
with Gulmatico and Carbonera, guilty of dishonesty for
using payrolls in the names of private complainants in
order to hide irregularities of the cash advances made by
the school through Ocate. It also found Ocate liable,
although for a lesser offense, as her culpability stems
from following the orders of her superiors. Appeals from
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the Office
of the Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 43
which prescribes the manner of appeal from quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Ombudsman, was
formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as
appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This finding is well supported by
the records as the complaints filed by respondents before
the Ombudsman clearly stated in bold letters that they
were instituting criminal and administrative cases against
petitioner and the other school officials concerned. The
orders issued by the Ombudsman directing petitioner to
file her counter-affidavit to the complaints against her
also contained criminal as well as administrative case
numbers. Petitioners allegations on this matter therefore
have no basis. It is settled that the Office of Ombudsman
has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.
MAIN POINT: The Office of Ombudsman has the power
to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority.
Ombudsman v. CA
Facts: Respondent was the Local Treasury Operations
Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office in Bacolod City.
COA conducted an examination of respondent’s cash
and account discovered a shortage of P265,450. Upon
demand, respondent failed to produce the missing
amount. Respondent alleged that the shortage was due
to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk I
Baja. Baja was impleaded in the case before the
Ombudsman Visayas. The court charged Magbanua
guily of Gross Neglect of Duty and for Violations of
Reasonable office rules and regulations and Baja guilty
of dishonesty. The CA ruled that respondent was an
accountable officer. Baja was merely assigned to "take
charge of the listing of payrolls and vouchers to be
included in the respective cash advances of disbursing
officers." However, the CA ruled that while petitioner’s
findings were correct, petitioner has no power to impose
directly sanctions against government officials and
employees who are subject of its investigation.
Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to impose directly administrative penalties on
public officials or employees
Ruling: Yes. CA erred in ruling that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no power to impose directly
administrative penalties on public officials or employees.
Under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to
impose directly administrative penalty on public officials
or employees.
Main Point: The Office of the Ombudsman is intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Sangguniang Barangay v. Punong Barangay
Facts: Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don
Mariano Marcos, Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, was
administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and
Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner then
filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended
Administrative Complaint against Martinez for
Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sandiganbayan
placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60
days. It then rendered its Decision which imposed
upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.The
Decision was conveyed to Municipal Mayor Bagasao for
its implementation. He issued a Memorandum, stating
that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to
order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the
Decision remains valid until reversed and must be
executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the
indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of
appeal had not yet lapsed.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may
remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office.
Ruling: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to
do so. Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
granted to the “disciplining authority” the power to
remove elective officials, a power which the law itself
granted only to the proper courts.
Main Point: Sandiganbayan may not remove a local
elective from office. According to the Local Government
Code, elective officials may be dismissed only by the
proper court. “Where the disciplining authority is given
only the power to suspend and not the power to remove,
it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove.”
Disposition: Petition Denied
Perez v Sandiganbayan
Facts: Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of
San Miguel, Pangasinan respectively. They “willfully,
unlawfully, criminally caused the purchased of 1
computer costing P120,000 acquisition by personal
canvass”, violating Section 362 and 367 of LGC. No
public bidding occurred and no committee of awards was
constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and
Juanita gave Mobil Link Enterprises/ Starlet Sales Center
undue advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, showing evident bad faith and gross,
inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in the
information, so it was recommended by the Special
Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the
manner the commission of the offenses, based on the
Ombudsman margin notes in the original information.
Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor has the power to file informations without
delegation from the Ombudsman.
Ruling: No, the office of the Special Prosecutor has no
power to file informations without delegation from the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the power to file
informations, as well as the power to delegate his
powers. All that is delegated to the Special Prosecutor is
the discretional authority to review and modify the Deputy
Ombudsman –authorized information, but without
departing from the basic resolution.
Main point: The Special Prosecutor may not file an
information without authority from the Ombudsman.
Republic Act No. 6770, by conferring upon the
Ombudsman the power to prosecute, likewise grants to
the Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of
information,. A delegated authority to prosecute was also
given to the Deputy Ombudsman, but no such delegation
exists to the Special Prosecutor. Nor is there an implied
delegation. The Special Prosecutor prosecutes only
when authorized by the Ombudsman.
Disposition: Instant petition for certiorari is granted
Buencamino v CA
Facts: Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, petitioner, is the
incumbent mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, while
Constantino Pascual, private respondent, is the president
of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, a
company engaged in the mining of marble blocks. Private
respondent filed with the Office of the Ombudsman,
public respondent, an administrative complaint against
petitioner for grave misconduct, abuse of authority, acts
unbecoming of a public officer, and violation of RA No.
3019. The Office of the Ombudsman declared petitioner
administratively liable for abuse of authority and
suspended him from office for a period of six (6) months
without pay. Petitioner alleged therein that in denying his
application for a preliminary injunction, the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion.
Issue: Whether CA committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners applications for injunctive
relief.
Ruling: No, CA did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion. Decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately
executory even pending appeal. Orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases imposing the penalties of public
censure, reprimand or suspension of not more than one
month or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall
be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory.
In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed
is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to
appeal.
Main Point: The Ombudsman has been conferred rule
making power to govern procedures under it
Disposition: Petition Denied. Costs against petitioner
Medina v COA
Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA) audited the cash
and accounts handled by Lorna Medina (Medina) as
Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite
and the audit team, headed by Eufrocina Mawak,
discovered a total cash shortage of P4,080,631.36.
Medina was ordered to restitute the shortage but she
failed to comply. COA filed an administrative case with
the Deputy Ombudsman charging Medina with grave
misconduct and dishonesty. Deputy Ombudsman Victor
C. Fernandez approved the recommendation of the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner
from service; the decision noted Medina's supposed
failure to file a counter-affidavit and position paper
despite due notice. Medina filed an urgent motion stating
that she complied with the directive to file a counter-
affidavit and position paper and prayed that the decision
be reversed based on her defenses. Medina filed a
motion for reconsideration. Fernandez denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Medina is deprived of her right to due
process when her request for a formal investigation was
denied by the Ombudsman?
Ruling: No. The denial of Medina's request for a formal
investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to
due process. Sec. 48(2) and Sec. 48(3) of the
Administrative Code cited by Medina in support of her
theory that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply
only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service
Commission .As this is an administrative complaint filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, it is the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which shall
govern; thus, in ruling that the prerogative to elect a
formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not
to petitioner, Fernandez was only applying such
procedure.
Main Point: One who is answering an administrative
complaint filed before the Ombudsman may not appeal to
the procedural rules under the Civil Service Commission.
Disposition: Instant petition for certiorari is granted
VILLAS NOR V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The herein petitioners are presently facing
criminal charges before the 5th division of Sandiganbayan
for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless
imprudence and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019. They were also charged administratively with gross
negligence, gross misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the service in connection with the Manor
Hotel inferno. In two separate orders, they were
preventively suspended for a period of 6 months. During
the pendency of the criminal case, private respondent
filed a motion for suspension pendente lite of petitioners.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution
suspending them pendente lite.
ISSUE: WON the public respondent acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension pendent lite
of herein petitioners despite the fact that they already had
been previously suspended administratively on the same
facts and circumstances.
RULING: No. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion. It is well-settled that Section 13 of
RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to
suspend any public official against whom a valid
information charging violation of the that law, Book II,
Title 7 pf RPC or any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property is filed. Thus, the
suspension against the petitioners must be upheld.
MAIN POINT: A preventive suspension will only last 90
days, not the entire duration of the criminal case like
petitioners seem to think. Indeed, it would be
constitutionally proscribed if the suspension were to be of
an indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of
time. The Court has thus laid down the rule that
preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum
period of 90 days, in connection with the PD No. 807,
now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
DISPOSITION: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
OMBUDSMAN V. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: The Ombudsman in Visayas received a
complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson
Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. The sangguniang
bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-
mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint against
Rodriguez. Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case
filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the
allegations in the complaint were without factual basis
and did not constitute any violation of law. He also filed a
motion to dismiss the case filed in the Ombudsman
alleging that the sangguniang bayan had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Ombudsman
found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression. It
imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to
hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service
eligibilities. On appeal, the CA set aside for lack of
jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and directed
the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on
the administrative case. Hence, this petition for review of
the CA decision.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the
case
RULING: Yes. In administrative cases involving the
concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first,
and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint
was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman
opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion
of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
MAINPOINT: When herein complainants first filed the
complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already
vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be
transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a
subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.
DISPOSITION: Petition was granted. CA decision was
set aside.
OMBUDSMAN V. ESTENDARTE
FACTS: The herein petitioner filed a petition for review of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
respondent guilty of grave misconduct. The CA held that
the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it took over the case after it issued a memorandum
considering the case closed and terminated and after
jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special
Investigating Committee. This case involves a complaint
consisted of 33 allegations including illegal handling of
school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and
abuse of authority of the Faculty Club and Department
Heads of Ramon Torres National High School against
their school principal, Estendarte.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has full and
complete administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over
public school teachers.
RULING: No. It was the DepEd Investgating Committee
created pursuant to Republic Act 4670 which had
jurisdiction to try public school teachers.
MAIN POINT: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
disciplinary cases involving public school teachers has
been modified by Section 9 of RA 4670, otherwise known
as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which
says that such cases must first go to a committee
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
DISPOSITION: The petition is DENIED. The decision of
the CA is AFFIRMED.
SALVADOR V. MAPA
FACTS: Petitioner, Salvador who is the consultant of the
Fact-Finding Committee filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3
(e) and (g) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices against the respondents, Mapa et al. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the offenses of its criminal complaint have
prescribed
RULING: No. It is well-nigh impossible for the State to
have known the violations of RA 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made because the public
officials concerned connived or conspired with the
beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period
should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
MAIN POINT: Since the Ombudsman erroneously
dismissed the complaint on ground of prescription and
respondent’s respective defences were never passed
upon during the preliminary investigation, the complaint
should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper
evaluation of its merit
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED.
OMBUDSMAN V. MASING
FACTS: Respondents, Masing, former principal of the
Davao City Integrated Special School, and Jocelyn
Tayacta, an office clerk in the same school, were
administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees,
failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public
funds. Respondents file a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
them, alleging that it the DECS which has the jurisdiction
over them pursuant to “The Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers”. The motion was denied and
respondent, Masing was dismissed from servive while
Tayactac was suspended for 6 months. On appeal, CA
reversed. The Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration
which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may directly discipline
public school teachers and employees
RULING: Yes. Article XI, Sec 13 of the same Constitution
delineates the powers, functions, and duties of the
Constitution of the Ombudsman. The enumeration of
these powers is non-exclusive. Consequently, Congress
enacted RA 6770 giving the Office such other powers
that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by
the Constitution. In fine, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in
accord with the constitutional deliberations.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution and RA 6770 is intended to play a more
active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. He is vested with the broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
DISPOSITION: The petition is granted. The assailed
decision of CA is reversed and set aside.
MEDINA V. COA
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the decision and resolution of the
CA affirming the order issued by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman finding the herein petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. Such charge arose from the
administrative case filed by the COA to the Office of the
Ombudsman which was due to Medina’s failure to
comply to the order of the COA to resitute the cash
shortage of around 4M pesos discovered during the
auditing of cash and accounts handled by Medina.
ISSUE: WON Medina was entitled to a formal
investigation
RULING: No. The provisions in the Administrative Code
cited by the petitioner in support of her theory that she is
entitled to a formal investigation apply only to
administrative cases filed before the Civil Service
Commission.
MAIN POINT: One who is answering an administrative
complaint filed before the Ombudsman may not appeal to
the procedural rules under the Civil Service Commission.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED.
BORJA V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Borja, in his capacity as General Manager of
San Pablo Water District, was charged with violation of
Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act before the RTC.
He filed a motion to suspend arraignment alleging that
the pending case entitled Feliciano v COA, which
involves the issue of whether local water districts are
private or government-owned or controlled corporations,
should be resolved first because such issue is a
prejudicial question, which resolution determines whether
or not the criminal actions against him may proceed. The
trial court denied his petition and so he filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which likewise, dismissed such
petition after noting that local water districts are GOCCs.
Borja sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that there was no
prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the
proceedings of the graft cases.
RULING: No. Borja’s contention that a prejudicial
question exists in his case is devoid of any legal basis,
considering that it had been settled, long before the
Feliciano case, that local water districts are GOCCs, and
not private corporations.
MAIN POINT: Being a public officer, Borja can certainly
be indicted for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
DISPOSITION: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed decision of CA is affirmed.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND IMPOSITION OF
PENALTIES
BUENASEDA V. FLAVIER (when to suspension)
FACTS: The private respondents filed an administrative
complaint with the Ombudsman against the petitioner for
the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the
preventive suspension of the petitioners who were
employees of the national center for mental health. The
respondent argued that the preventive suspension laid by
the Ombudsman under Sec 24 of RA 6770 is
contemplated in by Sec 13 (8) if Art XI of the 1987
Constitution, while the petitioners contended that the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of the
Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of the officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office. This
petition seeks to nullify the order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend the government officials working in
other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending
the investigation of administrative complaints.
RULING: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to
suspend employees of the said institution may it be
punitive or preventive suspension. Sec 13 (3) of the
Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense,
as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases,
while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the
power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges. This statute is
procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy
and efficient investigation on cases filed against the
officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.
MAIN POINT: In order for the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he
may need to suspend the respondent. Such need for
preventive suspension arises from the danger of
tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of
the respondent, intimidation of the respondent, etc.
DISPOSITION: Petition was dismissed.
HAGAD V. GOZO-DADOLE (nature)
FACTS: Criminal and administrative complaints were
filed against Mayor Oano, Vice-Mayor Canete and Mayol
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman by Mandaue
City councillors Dionson and Barcede. They allegedly
altered and falsified an ordinance by increasing the
allocated appropriation from P3.4M to P7M without
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
Deputy Ombudsman Hagad ordered the accused to
submit their counter-affidavits while complainants moved
for the preventive suspension of respondent officials.
Officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear, and decide the administrative
case since under Section 63 of the LGC, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against
local officials and to effect their preventive suspension
had now been vested with the Office of the President.
The petition seeks to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued against petitioner by respondent trial
court and to prohibit said court from further proceeding
with RTC Case No. MFE-14.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner committed grave abuse of
discretion in causing the issuance of preventive
suspension order without any hearing.
RULING: No. The records reveal that petitioner issued
the order of preventive suspension after the filing of the
respondent officials of their opposition in the motion for
preventive suspension and by Mayor Oano of his
memorandum in compliance with the directive of the
petitioner. Not being in the nature of a penalty, a
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official
under investigation after charges are brought and even
before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a
preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of
guilt or innocence.
MAIN POINT: Not being in the nature of a penalty, a
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official
under investigation after charges are brought and even
before the charges are heard.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. The questioned writ of
preliminary injunction is ANNULED and SET ASIDE
VASQUEZ V. HOBILLA-ALINIO (not in relation to
duties)
FACTS: Seeking justice for the killing of her husband and
her father-in-law, Corazon Odelmo appeared before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and filed a complaint
for murder against respondents, Mayor Mondia et al. The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman recommended the
filing of an information for double murder against all of
them before the Sandiganbayan. Upon review, the OSP
found that 2 separate crimes of murder were committed
but the commission thereof was not in relation to the
performance of the duties of the respondents and so was
recommended to the RTC which was approved by the
Ombudsman. The private respondents filed a motion to
quash the information positing that the Ombudsman has
no authority to file the information since the crime was
not committed by the accused in relation to their office.
RTC granted the motion and hence this petition for relief
imputing grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction
to respondent Judge in granting the motion to quash the
information.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to
investigate a crime committed by a public official not
related to the performance of his duties.
RULING: Yes. The clause “any illegal act or omission of
any public official” in Section 15 of RA 6770 is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal
act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the
act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.
MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman may
investigate any illegal act or omission of the public
officials or employees whether such is related to the
performance of one’s official duty or not.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted.
OMBUDSMAN V. CA and ARMILLA
FACTS: Joan and Thomas Corominas and Maria
Corominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
criminal complaint in violation of Other Forms of
Trespass of RPC against DENR employees, who
allegedly conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by
the Corominas family without seeking permission from
the latter or their representative. Ombudsman rendered a
decision finding that the DENR employees are guilty of
simple misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. On appeal, CA set aside the
Ombudsman’s decision declaring that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no power to impose the penalty of
suspension.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has power to
impose penalty for suspension.
RULING: Yes. The Court rejected the argument that the
power of the Ombudsman is only advisory or
recommendatory in nature. In connection with their
administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and
his deputies are expressly given the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees
facing administrative charges in accordance with Section
24 of RA 6770.
MAIN POINT: the Ombudsman and his deputies are
expressly given the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges in
accordance with Section 24 of RA 6770.
DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. OMB Decision is
REINSTATED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V MADRIAGA
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging
Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary
School and Ana Bernardo, canteen manager of the same
school, with violation of rules set out on the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. They were found guilty of the offense
charged and were meted out the penalty of 6 months
imprisonment. On appeal, the CA declared that the 6-
month suspension meted out by the Office of the
Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo is merely
recommendatory to the Department of Education. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to impose administrative sanctions over public
officials.
RULING: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to impose administrative sanctions over public
officials. Art XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
grants the Ombudsman the administrative power to direct
the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. The Court
notes that such proviso qualifies the order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the
case at bar. That the refusal, without cause, of any officer
to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory with the bounds of
law.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman’s authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith
is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the
bounds of the law.
DISPOSITION: The challenged CA Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ESTARIJA V RANADA
FACTS: Respondent Ranada, filed an administrative
complaint against petitioner Estarija for Gross
Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, petitioner Estarija was the Harbor Master of
the Philippines Ports Authority, Port of Davao, Sasa
Davao City. The complaint alleged that Estarija, issues
the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in
the Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging
from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of
berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from
the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6,
1998, in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities
of Estarija, the association reported Estarijas activities to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On August 6,
1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of
the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to
entrap Estarija. Estarija claimed that dismissal was
unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have
direct and immediate power to remove government
officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not
removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative
authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic
Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act
of 1989, is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of
the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided
for in the Constitution.
ISSUES: Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly
remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials
unconstitutional?
DISPOSITION: The petition is DENIED.
RULING: The Constitution does not restrict the powers of
the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law
that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman.
Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically
Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman
such powers to sanction erring officials and employees,
except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. The
powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also
effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No.
6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary.
MAIN POINT: The powers of the Ombudsman are not
merely recommendatory, his office was given teeth to
render this constitutional body not merely functional but
also effective and has the constitutional power to directly
remove from government service an erring public official
than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
OMB V LUCERO
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Clerk II of the LTO,
Regional Office No. VII. The OIC Director of the LTO
requested COA to conduct an audit in the Cash Section
of the Operations Division of their office in order to
determine the extent of malversation of funds just
discovered. After such auditing, the petitioner had 69
altered miscellaneous receipts. Thereafter, an
administrative case for dishonesty was being filed against
the petitioner in the Office of the Ombudsman then the
decision finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty. The
petitioner filed her counter-affidavit denying the charges.
She sought reconsideration of the decision and she
petitioned that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
power to directly dismiss her from the service.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman is empowered to order
the removal of public officials or employees in
administrative cases.
DISPOSITION: The petition is GRANTED. Lucero’s guilt
for dishonesty is AFFIRMED.
RULING: The legislative history of Republic Act
No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found
to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office
of the Ombudsman to be an activist watchman,
not merely a passive one. The Ombudsman
departs from the classical Ombudsman model
whose function is merely to receive and process
the peoples complaints against corrupt and
abusive government personnel. The Ombudsman,
as protector of the people, is armed with the power
to prosecute erring public officers and employees,
giving him an active role in the enforcement of
laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature has
vested him with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions.
MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault.
Balbastro v. Junio
OMB V CA 527 SCRA 798
FACTS: Respondent was the Local Treasury Operations
Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office in Bacolod City.
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
examination of respondent’s cash and account. The
examination disclosed a shortage of P265,450. Upon
demand, respondent failed to produce the missing
amount. Respondent alleged that the shortage was due
to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk I
Monina Baja (Baja). Respondent alleged that Baja, acting
as Paymaster, received payroll funds for distribution to
specific offices. Baja was impleaded in the case before
the Ombudsman Visayas. Baja denied that respondent
designated her as Paymaster. She also denied that she
received the payroll funds. Respondent and Baja failed
to appear during the preliminary conference conducted
on 26 July 1999. Despite their non-appearance, they
were given time to submit their respective Memoranda or
Position Papers before the case was considered
submitted for decision. The Ombudsman found
respondent guilty of Neglect of Duty and Baja guilty of
Dishonesty. Now the respondent petitioner, petitioned in
the CA that the Ombudsman has no power to impose
directly sanction against government officials and
employees who are subject of its investigation.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to impose directly administrative penalties on
public officials or employees.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED in favor of the
Ombudsman.
RULING: The powers of the Ombudsman are found in
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states in part
that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other powers
or performs such functions or duties as may be provided
by law." Sections 15, 21, and 25 of Republic Act No.
6770 (RA 6770), otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989.The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government. The Court similarly upholds
the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be
at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary
authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
MAIN POINT: Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman
has the power to impose directly administrative penalty
on public officials or employees. Hence, the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner has no power to
impose directly administrative penalties on public officials
or employees.

COA v. CA
OMB V SANTIAGO
FACTS: June 2000 Respondent Santiago, a barangay
chairman, received a calamity fund for his barangay
amounting to P44, 053.00. In October 2000, all the
barangay kagawad of the respondent’s barangay filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an
administrative complaint for technical malversation,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act,
dishonesty, grave misconduct unbecoming of a public
officer against respondent.
On May 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared
respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissed him from the service.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman has the power to
dismiss erring government officials or employees.
DISPOSITION: Petitioner’s petition GRANTED.
RULING: (SAME RULING WITH THE CASE OF
ESTARIJA V RANADA)
At any rate, the power of the Ombudsman to directly
remove an erring public official has been jurisprudentially
settled. In Estarija v. Ranada, we ruled: The powers of
the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His
office was given teeth to render this constitutional body
not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of Congress
and the Judiciary.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of Congress
and the Judiciary. And the power of the Ombudsman are
not merely recommendatory.
GOVENCIONG V CA
FACTS: Dr. Gobenciong was the Administrative Officer
IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center, a public
hospital. In 1996, the hospital planned to buy a
hemoanalyzer/particle counter. A public bidding was
being held and a purchase order was issued. The
equipment appeared to have been delivered but it turned
out that the said equipment was never actually delivered.
Dr. Pena, head of the hospital’s lab unit, filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gobenciong with Falsification of
Public Document and Misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether the disciplinary power of the
Ombudsman is merely recommendatory,
RULING: No. The refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee, which is a ground
for disciplinary action is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law. By stating that the Ombudsman “recommends” the
action to be taken against an erring officer or employee,
the provisions of the Constitution and in RA 6670
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed
through the proper officer.
MAIN POINT: Ombudsman has power to ensure
compliance with imposition of penalties pursuant to his
administrative disciplinary authority.
MAROHOMSALIC V COLE
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo J. Marohomsalic was
employed as Special Land Investigator I of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(PENRO-DENR) in Koronadal City. Respondent
Reynaldo D. Cole had a pending land dispute case in the
PENRO-DENR in Koronadal City. Sometime in February
2001, he went to said office to inquire on the status of his
case. He met Marohomsalic and asked him for
assistance . Marohomsalic, asserted that on March 8,
2001, Cole gave him cash purportedly to cover the
expenses for photocopying the documents needed in the
case. On the other hand, Cole claimed (and the
Ombudsman affirmed) that Marohomsalic
demanded P15,000 to secure the reversal of the
PENRO-DENR decision against him (Cole). Cole sought
the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to
entrap Marohomsalic. On March 8, 2001, Marohomsalic
was caught in flagrante delicto receiving bribe money
ofP2,700 from Cole. An administrative complaint for
grave misconduct was filed against Marohomsalic in the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. After evaluating the
respective allegations of the parties, the Ombudsman
found Marohomsalic guilty and dismissed him from the
service. An order dated April 28, 2004 for the immediate
implementation of Marohomsalic's dismissal was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not his right to due process was
violated both the Ombudsman and the CA.
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.
RULING: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
disciplinary cases against government employees is
vested by no less than Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. Part of such disciplinary authority in
administrative cases is the power to investigate and
prosecute, in accordance with the requirements laid
down by law. One such requirement is that substantial
evidence must always support any
finding. Administrative complaint cognizable by the
Ombudsman is an act or omission contrary to law or
regulations like grave misconduct. It is characterized by
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule. Corruption as
an element of grave misconduct includes the act of an
official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to
the rights of others.
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman has the power to order
the dismissal of a public officer. RA 6770, which provides
for the functional and structural organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman, was passed by Congress to
deliberately endow the Ombudsman with the power to
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office. Moreover, Congress granted the Ombudsman
broad powers to implement his own actions.
OMB V LISONDRA
FACTS: Complainant Mayor Munoz of La Paz, Agusan
del Sur, before the OMB. Complainant alleged that on 5
December 2000, the Municipality of La
Paz, Agusan del Sur, paid to Ronwood Construction
Supply the amount of P300,000.00 as payment for the
delivery of 2,400 bags of Portland cement intended to be
used for the concreting of Morgadez Street. However,
complainant, upon investigation of why the said project
remained unfinished and incomplete, discovered from
Municipal Supply Officer (MSO) Teresita G. Sergio and
Municipal Planning Development Officer
(MPDO) Lalineth A. Lisondra that there was actually no
delivery of 2,400 bags of Portland cement. . After the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant
and the counter-affidavits of the respondents, the OMB
found that the respondents are guilty as charged. The
OMB then issued an order dismissing them from service.
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which modified the judgment of the OMB stating that the
OMB has no power to dismiss them immediately because
the thing which should have been done is to submit the
findings of the OMB to the Office of the Mayor.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
held that OMB has no power to impose penalty on public
officers.
DISPOSITION: Petition Granted.
RULING: The OMB is a constitutionally created office.
The mandate of the OMB is expressed in Section 12,
Article XI of the Constitution: Sec. 12. The Ombudsman
and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof. Republic Act No.
6770 provides for the functional and structural
organization of the OMB. In passing Republic Act No.
6770, Congress deliberately endowed the OMB with the
power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office. The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770
thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be
at fault.
MAIN POINT: The administrative penalty to be imposed
on an erring public officer or employee is not merely
recommendatory. The OMB has the power to directly
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary, found to be at fault, within the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority as provided in the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770, as well as
jurisprudence. This power gives the said constitutional
office teeth to render it not merely functional, but also
effective.
MIRO V ABUGAN
FACTS: On October 18 1998, Jerry Tan owner of a L-
300 van parked his van at the back of the Cebu City’s
Doctors Hospital. When he went back, he could no longer
find his vehicle. He reported the matter to the PNP-TMO
headed by Labiano. Further investigation conducted by
the NBI, shows that on October 20 1998, in just 2 days,
after the vehicle was lost, the LTO issued a new CR
covering the same vehicle still in the name of Jerry Tan
but some of the motor numbers was changed from the
original. It was made to appear that, Jerry Tan sold the
subject vehicle to Cristina Labiano. During the
investigation, the NBI requested to respondent Abugan,
LTO registrar, to produce supporting registration of the
said vehicle but he could not produce the same. Also he
denied the knowledge of the issuance of the CR. Later
the NBI filed a complaint against the respondent,
falsification of public/official document.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman is imbued
with the power to directly impose administrative sanctions
on erring government officials.
DISPOSITION: Petition Granted.
RULING: Accordingly, we rule that the penalty of
dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all his
benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold
public office, was correctly imposed on respondent
Cleto Abugan by petitioners, Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas Primo C. Miro and Graft
Investigation Officers Virginia Palanca Santiago
and Charina Navarro-Quijano. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except officials
who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of the Congress, and the Judiciary.
MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of
removal. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also
effective. Thus, we hold that under RA 6770 and the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the power to
directly remove from government service an erring public
official.
CESA V OMB
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman suspended Cebu
City Treasurer Eustaquio B. Cesa for six months without
pay for tolerating illegal practices relative to the granting
of cash advances to paymasters. The Ombudsman
impleaded Cesa and other city officials. Affirming the
audit team's report, graft investigators concluded that the
city officials' failure to observe relevant laws and rules
governing the grant, utilization and liquidation of cash
advances facilitated, promoted, and encouraged the
defalcation of public funds. The irregularities could not
have happened without the officials' acts and omissions,
as they failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent losses of funds and efficiently
supervise the paymasters. On August 16, 2001, the
Ombudsman found Cesa and the other city officials guilty
of neglect of duty and meted to them the penalty of six
months suspension without pay.
ISSUES: WHETHER THE POWER OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TO MOTU PROPRIO CONDUCT
INVESTIGATIONS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 13,
ARTICLE XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND IN
SECTION 15 [1] OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACT (RA 6770)
EFFECTIVELY DISPENSES WITH PETITIONER'S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS AND TO
BE SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND
NATURE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.
RULING/MAIN POINT: The 1987 Constitution states that
the Ombudsman has the power to recommend the
suspension of erring government officials and ensure
compliance therewith, which means that the
recommendation is not merely advisory but
mandatory. Under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an
erring public official other than a member of Congress
and the Judiciary. The framers of our Constitution
intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of
political influences and vested with powers that are not
merely persuasive in character. The lawmakers
envisioned the Ombudsman to be an "activist
watchman," not merely a passive one.
OMB v. De Sahagun
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed with the
Ombudsman against Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) of the Intramuros Administration, composed of
respondent Merceditas de Sahagun, as Chairman with
respondent Manuela T. Waquiz and Dominador C.
Ferrer, Jr. as members for violation of Section 3 (a) and
(c) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 302 and grave misconduct, conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross
violation of Rules and Regulations pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue: whether the Ombudsman only has
recommendatory, not punitive, powers against erring
government officials and employees.
Disposition: Petition Granted
Ruling: Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo held that
there was substantial evidence to hold respondents
administratively liable since the contracts awarded to
Brand Asia, Ltd. failed to go through the required
procedure for public bidding under Executive Order
No. 301 dated July 26, 1987. Respondents and Ferrer
were found guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissed from service.
Main Point: The authority of the Ombudsman to
determine the administrative liability
of a public official or employee, and to direct and compel
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed is likewise settled.
The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also
effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No.
6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official other
than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
OMB v. Samaniego
Facts: This is a resolution of the second motion for
partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman to our decision dated September 11, 2008,
particularly our pronouncement with respect to the stay of
the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency of
an appeal:
Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that
the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to
stay the execution of the joint decision against him.
Respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the
execution of the decision against him) was therefore a
superfluity. The execution of petitioner’s joint decision
against respondent should be stayed during the
pendency.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman’s Decision imposing the
penalty of suspension for one year immediately executor
pending appeal
Disposition: the second motion for partial
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED
Ruling: An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal.
The Decision of the Ombudsman is immediately
executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the
fling of the appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.
Main Point: Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution
authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate
its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections
18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide
that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions and
duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest
of justice may require.
For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay
the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-
making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will
render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Boncalon V. OMB
FACTS: Petition Remia F. Boncalon (A Cashier IV at
Bago City Negros Occidental Treasurers office) was fond
guilt of dishonesty and imposing on her the penalty of
dismissal from service and perpetual disqualification to
hold office under sec. 23 Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rule
of the Civil Service Commission.
Boncalon contended that: THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING
PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL
BENEFITS AND PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD PUBLIC
OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE OMBUDSMAN
HAS NO POWER TO DISMISS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the power to
dismiss Public official and employees.
Disposition: Petition was Dismissed, Finding her
guilty of Dishonesty and dismissing her from the
government service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold
public office, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Main Point: the Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring public official,
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary,
within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary
authority as provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, and Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770.
OMB v. Beltran
Facts: On February 26, 2001, Nilo V. Germedia
(Germedia), Clerk III of the Tricycle Regulatory Office
(TRO), City of Paraaque, filed a letter-complaint against
Fernando J. Beltran (Beltran), Benjamin G. Barrameda
(Barrameda), and Rolando Fererra (Fererra), all of the
TRO, City of Paraaque, for alleged graft and corruption
based on the following grounds:
1) Non-remittance of TRO Drivers ID The office of the Ombudsman renders judgment finding
collection to the Treasurers Office of the respondent, Guilty of Grave Misconduct, for which the
Paraaque City since October 1999 penalty of Dismissal form the service with cancellation of
amounting to more or less Five eligibility, Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits and Perpetual
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php Disqualification for Re-employment in the Government
500,000.00); Service is hereby imposed pursuant to Section 10, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation to Section 25
2) Non-remittance of Operators of Republic Act 6770.
Certification for LTO purposes to ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority
the Treasurers Office of Paraaque to directly dismiss the respondent from the
City since December 1999 government service.
amounting to more or less Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php Disposition: Petition is Denied
500,000.00); Ruling: the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government
3) Non-remittance of penalty service, more particularly from his position in the
payments charged to apprehended BID.
tricycle drivers;

4) Using the TRO as extension of an Main point: Under Section 13, subparagraph (3),
insurance company; of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of
5) Violation the public official or employee found to be at fault,
of Paraaque City Ordinance No. to the public official concerned.
135 by issuing Certification for LTO
purposes instead of
Franchise/MTOP (Motorized OMBUDSMAN V. APOLONIO
Tricycle Operators Permit); and
FACTS: Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of
6) Grave abuse of discretion/authority the National Book Development Board (NBDB) from
by threatening employees with 1996 to August 26, 2002. As NBDB's executive officer,
termination. Dr. Apolonio supervised NBDB's Secretariat and
managed its day-to-day affairs.
In December 2000, NBDB's Governing Board approved
the conduct of a Team Building Seminar Workshop for its
officers and employees. The workshop was scheduled to
be a two-day event, to be held on December 20-21, 2000
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB
Consultant, filed a complaint for grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service for the unauthorized purchase and
disbursement of the gift cheques during the seminar
against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the
Ombudsman.
Dr. Apolonio contends that the Ombudsman does not
possess the power to directly impose the penalty of
removal against a public official. In reaching this
conclusion, the CA cited Section 13 (3), Article XI of the
Constitution which shows that the Ombudsman only
possesses recommendatory functions in the removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution of
erring government officials and employees.
Also, Section 21 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989
contradicts the above provision.
ISSUE: Does the Ombudsman have the power to directly
impose the penalty of removal from office against public
officials?
DISPOSITION: PARTIALLY GRANT the Office of the
Ombudsman's petition for review on certiorari.
Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio were found GUILTY of SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT.
Ruling: the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the
right to impose administrative penalties on erring public
officials. That the Constitution merely indicated a
"recommendatory" power in the text of Section 13 (3),
Article XI of the Constitution did not deprive Congress of
its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman
powers beyond those stated
MAIN POINT: The Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose administrative case penalties, including removal
from office.
JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL CASES
Natividad v. Felix
Facts: The Petitioner (Mayor. Arnulfo Natividad) was
under a preliminary investigation by the trial court (Hon.
Augusto Felix) and the Provincial prosecutor of Tarlac
about a criminal complaint of murder. Requiring the
petitioner to submit a counter- affidavit.
Petitioner moved to remand his case for preliminary
investigation with motion to quash warrant alleging that
there was no preliminary investigation and contending
that and not the Provincial Prosecutor who had
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioner vigorously contended that the proper court
which had jurisdiction over the case was the
Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation against the petitioner
not the trial court
Disposition: The petition is Dismissed for lack of Merit
Ruling: The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction, since an
act or omission by a public official must be related to his
office.
In the case at bar, The Philippine National Police (PNP),
responding to a letter dated July 19, 1993 written by Mrs.
Lourdes Aquino, wife of deceased Severino L. Aquino,
requested the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate
petitioner, the Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac, for the
death of Severino Aquino at the Ramos Police Station on
the night of February 20, 1989. Consequently, a
subpoena was issued requiring petitioner to submit a
counter-affidavit.
Main Point: The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee applies only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ
This case requires us to determine the extent to which
the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors
for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions
under which he may do so.
Fact: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the
Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file
a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct,
insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her
and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect
contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of
the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed
under preventive suspension. This is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside
the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two
proceedings.
Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in
the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo.
DisposItion: The petition Dismissed
Ruling: The office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the
investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by
a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected
with, or arise from, the performance of his official
duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute.
Main Point: In the existence of his power, the
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for
assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770) provides:
PRESIDENTIAL V. DESIERTO (UNDER Sec. 15)
Facts:
On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S.
Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant,
executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that
among the loan accounts referred by the Assets
Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation,
report and recommendation are those of the following
corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and
Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining
Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and
Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were
used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate
complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against
herein private respondents for alleged violation of the
provisions of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein
respondents, except the other two loans.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints without
first requiring respondents to submit their counter-
affidavits and petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such
dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner
further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman
feels that petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the
Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to
clarify said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in
accordance with due process.
ISSUE: WON the imprescriptibility of the state to
recovery of ill-gotten wealth may apply in criminal cases.
WON the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint
based on the period for prescription or extinguishment of
a violation of anti-graft and corruption
Ruling: the Court finds nothing erroneous in the
Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three complaints
and of issuing a single order for their dismissal
considering that, with the exception of the complaint
regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River
which was separately discussed by the Ombudsman on
their merits, the dismissal of all the other complaints was
based on a common ground, which is prescription
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for
the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was ten years.
Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982
increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. The
provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution,
which provides for the imprescriptibility of the right of the
State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil
actions and not to criminal cases.
Main Point: The recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall not be
barred by “prescription”. Also it only applies to civil action,
not to criminal cases.
FACT-FINDING DISTINGUISHED FROM
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
RARO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Deputy Ombudsman referred the complaint
against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act to the NBI for investigation. The
NBI recommended the prosecution of the case.
Petitioner argued that by referring the complaint to the
NBI, the office of the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to
conduct preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation erroneously and irregularly.
Disposition: Petition is Dismissed
Ruling: The Office of the Ombudsman did not delegate
the conduct of the preliminary investigation to the NBI.
What was delegated was only the fact-finding function,
preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be
conducted by the Ombudsman.
Main Point: Sec. 13(2) allows to direct cases for
investigation to other officers. Besides what was referred
to the NBI was Fact finding; preliminary investigation
would still be conducted by the Ombudsman.
SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACT: Edward Serapio was a member of the board of
trustees and the legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. This Foundation was establish to help
provide educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim students.
Donations came pouring in from various institution,
organization and that of Chavit SIngson. However, on the
latter part of 200, Chavit accused then Pres. Estrada and
his chorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng
as protector, beneficiary and recipient. The Ombudsman
took necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the
case of plunder before the Sandigan Bayan.
ISSUE: WON THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIOS URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD
TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND
MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF
PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT
FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO
DISPOSITION: the petitions are DISMISSED. The
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said
petitions are AFFIRMED
Ruling: the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in
finding probable cause against petitioner for
plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation
of the charges against him in the amended
Information. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman
that probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-
accused for the crime of plunder.
Main Point: The Ombudsman has the power to
investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on
any Ombudsman Case may be exercised by an
investigator or prosecutor of the Office or the
Ombudsman, or by any provincial or city prosecutor
or their assistance, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutor.
SEC. 15. Right to Recover Properties Unlawfully
Acquire
Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: In the present case, the Second Amended
Complaint contains sufficient allegations to implicate
Gregorio S. Licaros in an alleged conspiracy to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth. The contentions that his
acts were done in good faith, or by the Monetary Board
are matters of defence that cannot abate the Complaint
upon a motion to dismiss.
Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioners predecessor-in-interest,
served as governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines
from 1970 to 1980, during the incumbency of then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. He died on August 3,
1983.
The Sandiganbayan also brushed aside the claim of
petitioners that the action against Licaros had already
prescribed. It pointed to Section 15 of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, which mandated that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches
or estoppel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Amended Complaint
is barred by prescription and laches.
Disposition: The petitioner hereby DISMISSED
Ruling: The intendment of the foregoing constitutional
provision -- exempting actions to recover ill-gotten wealth
from the operation of the general rules of prescription --
presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances
and the primordial state interests involved in cases of
such nature.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that any action
involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties
against Licaros or his transferees, may not be deemed to
have prescribed. The language of the Constitution, the
law and the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal.
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions
denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Motion to Dismiss.
Main Point: The right of the state to recover ill-gotten
wealth shall not be barred by prescription and Laches.
Art. XI sec. 15
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans vs. OMB Desierto G.R. No. 135715
Facts: Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO) applied
for a guarantee Loan Accommodation with the National
Investment and Development Corporation.
When MINCOCOs mortgage liens were about to be
foreclosed by the government banks due its outstanding
obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum
dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos (President Marcos) marginal note, disallowing
the foreclosure of MINCOCOs properties. The
government banks were not able to recover any amount
from MINCOCO and President Marcos marginal note
was construed by the NIDC to have effectively released
MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its financial
liabilities.
The Above transaction was only discovered in 1992 after
then President. Ramos , in an effort to recover the Ill-
gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos.
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover
behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; and,
assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore
is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should
be counted from the time of discovery of behest loans or
sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted.
ISSUE: WON the right of the state to recover ill-gotten
state can be apply criminally
Ruling: no, The Ombudsman, in his Comment,
countered that his office has the discretionary power
during preliminary investigation to determine the
sufficiency of evidence for indictment; that it is beyond
the ambit of the Court to review this exercise of
discretion; that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution applies only to civil suits and not to criminal
proceedings; and, that the crime under which the
respondents herein were charged had already
prescribed.
Main Point: The provisions of Sec. 15 art. XI of the
Constitution applies on to Civil action for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.
Section 18. Allegiance of Public Officers
CAASI V. CA
Facts: Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988.
Hisdisqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi
on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
USA and not of Bolinao.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he
denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. He argued that he obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit
his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in
all previouselections, including the plebiscite on February
2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
ISSUE: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the
holder is a permanent resident of the United States,
(2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as
a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior
to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Disposition: The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel
as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled.
Ruling: (1) Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status
and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession
of a green card attesting to such status areconclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the United
States.
(2) The waiver of his green card should be manifested by
some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing
his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
elective office."
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks
to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for
he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not
"during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an

immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run
for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws

Main Point: The mere filing of certificate of candidacy is

not required waiver. It must be a special act done before
filing a certificate of candidacy.