Right to Bail

80. ) USA vs. Purganan

Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition
of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his
provisional liberty.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.

Held:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
Right to Bail
81.) JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ,
G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing
must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such
hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In
parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended party just because he was married to the
deceased. In the interest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
sister of the victim may be deemed to be an "offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality
to challenge the void order of the trial court.

Facts:
After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife
of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended
and thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutors resolution [before] the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito Narciso moved for
reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ.
Failing before DOJ, the accused filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the
Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another
prosecutor.
The Prosecutor to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb
the findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for
arraignment and trial.
The accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso
to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the
same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00
It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the
hearings because no witness was available. Not obtaining any resolution on her
Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail‘ private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition.

Hence this case, Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and
after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue:
Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.
Whether the Respondent has a legal standing to file the petition.

Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution."
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua, he
argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not
strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a
finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing
had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court
found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the
Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to
receive and evaluate any evidence.
In Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a
hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion
and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.

Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the Petition

Petitioner attacks respondents legal standing to file the Petition for Certiorari before the appellate
court, maintaining that only the public prosecutor or the solicitor general may challenge the
assailed Order.
"In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the offended parties in
criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special
civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source
of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Right to Bail
82.) Defensor- Santiago vs. Vasquez

Facts: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed
an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that
she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the
arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the
announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed
a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered.
The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise
argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom
of speech.

Issues:

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any motion from
the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

Held:

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest
of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the court or was duly arrested, the court therebyacquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same isintended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court
upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she
expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of
(the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that
by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court.
Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction
of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed
therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the presiding court’s
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every
intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course
of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in takingjudicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan
to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the
case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for permission
to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position
to pass upon suchapplications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.(Defensor-
Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993)
Presumption of Innocence
83.) Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On September 30,1988 Elvira was Charge of malversation germinated from an audit conducted
on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a P26,404.26 cash
shortage was discovered on petitioner’s accountability. In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner
Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination
and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she admitted the fact of shortage in the
amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner Agullo, at all stages of the
criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge and categorically denied
having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own personal use or benefit.
With petitioner’s admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case For
its part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima
facie evidenceof conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira
Agullo; Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan,
Dagame, Leyte. Striking down the defense as “incredible and without basis,” the Sandiganbayan
rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of
public funds, ratiocinating principally that “no evidence has been presented linking the loss of
the government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance for
the crime of malversation.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of
petitioner’s guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and
defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent
proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of
malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single
centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Notably, the
Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in
the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s
evidence This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution clearly
cannot sustain a conviction “in an unprejudiced mind. “The constitutional presumption of
innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual
pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be
acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt.”
Presumption of Innocence
84.) People vs. Bato
Facts:The two accused were charged with murder. On January 15, 1990, the accused were
arraigned in the Waray dialect which they understood and spoke. Assisted by Counsel Benjamin
Pore, both pleaded not guilty.
Aside from the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination, the only other witness for
the prosecution was Ernesto Jr. who was only able to establish the following circumstances: (1)
that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) after two hours of drinking,
said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away; (3) the following
day, the body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab wounds, was recovered about
five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.
On the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial. They maintained that their
identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder is merely an afterthought,
necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. They presented as
witness Pfc. Benjamin Montanejos, who affirmed that the entry he made in the police blotter did
not mention the accused as suspects to the crime. He further testified that it was the barangay
captain who reported the incident to the police, contradicting the claim of Ernesto Jr. that he did
so.
After due trial, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding there was positive identification of the accused, a
violation of their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Ruling:
The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the
sole testimony of the son of the deceased. While it is true that in the absence of direct proof, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The circumstances proved must
be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at
the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. As a corollary to the
constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with his innocence.
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of what transpired during the interval of the acussed
tying the hands of the victim up to the time his body was discovered. The prosecution, in effect,
asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the accused must have killed the victim
during such interregnum.
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain
leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required to
overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the
weakness or even the absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is
accordingly vested on the prosecution.
The state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence, hence, the assailed Decision is reversed and set aside and Abraham Bato is acquitted
on reasonable doubt.
Presumption of Innocence
85. ) People vs. De Guzman
Facts:
Ronaldo de Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, punishable under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
Through a buy-bust operation, accused was arrested and brought to the police station.
At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation were turned
over to the police investigator who entered the incident in the police blotter. He then placed his
initials on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Confirmatory tests revealed that the substance in the packets
that appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu.
At the trial, appellant denied the charges against him. The trial court found De Guzman
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and such conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence necessary for the accused’s
conviction was duly established.

Ruling:

The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the burden to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. The
courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing.
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence
must prevail, and the court must acquit.
The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law enforcers and public
officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This guarantee of
the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his
fundamental rights. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of
the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very
corpus delicti of the crime.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from
showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty
verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.
In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the
seized items, and only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover,
there was no physical inventory made or photographs of the seized items taken under the
circumstances. There was also no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ,
and any elected official, were present during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the
reasons for these lapses. Thus, we find no justifiable ground for such non-compliance.
Readily apparent in the prosecution’s evidence, likewise, is a gaping hole in the chain of custody
of the seized illegal drugs. The length of time that lapsed from the seizure of the items from De
Guzman until they were given to the investigating officer for marking is too long to be
inconsequential. And it took yet more time before the same were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, and without any clear explanation on who had custody in the meantime. This
vacuum in the chain of custody of the seized items cannot simply be brushed aside.
These circumstances cast a strong shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the
evidence presented before the court.
Indeed, the prosecution’s failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from appellant is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Hence, Ronaldo de Guzman is acquitted of the crime charged.
Right to be Heard
87.) People vs. Rivera
Facts
Rolando Rivera was charged of willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously having
carnal knowledge of his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will and
without her consent.
During arraignment on September 30, 1997, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta
Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical examination of complainant.
The defense also presented its evidence and accused, his sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad
Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital were presented as witnesses.
Accused denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed against
him because his wife had a paramour and resented him because he hurt her. The defense
presented a letter to accused written by his wife, asking him to sign a document so that she could
attend to it before he got out of prison. The defense also offered as evidence a document,
designated as Waiver of Rights, signed by accused, in which he acknowledged that he was a
tenant of a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over the said
landholding to a certain Ponciano Miguel, a cousin of his wife. He said that he signed the
document because his wife’s relatives promised him that he would get out of prison after signing
the document. Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo, accused’s sister, who
testified that accused stayed in their house during the entire month of March, except in March 19,
1997. The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero
District Hospital, who identified a certification, dated April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that
Zaira Rivera was confined at that hospital from March 1 to March 2, 1997.
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the court failed to consider the evidence of the Accused and ruled with partiality
in violation of the accused’s right to be heard.

Ruling:
Accused pointed out that trial judge’s questions propounded to him during his cross-examination
was an indication of the latter’s partiality for the prosecution.
Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the
due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so that
his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. The trial
judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not
to establish his guilt. It is a judge’s prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth. It cannot
be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to
destroy the theory of one party. “Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and
the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which
might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he
may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the
ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony
may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party…”.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is
affirmed.
Right to be Heard
88.)People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Alcanzado, G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2004 Facts:
Facts:
Oscar Alcanzado was accused of Murder. On the early morning of June 17, 1998, the Barangay
Tanods of Bel-Air, while on duty, heard two (2) shots; when they investigated they found a dead
body of the victim with two (2) gunshot wounds inside the storeroom of TGIF American Bar
being guarded by the accused. The accused, who was the security guard of the TGIF, surrendered
his service firearm to policeman Bagon which was found to have spent two (2) spent shells. The
ballistic report states that the two (2) spent shells were fired from the gun surrendered by the
accused to policeman Bagon. During arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued. There was no eye-witness to the shooting incident. The RTC relied principally on
the admission of accused to the police officer that he shot the unknown victim when he
surrendered his service firearm. The prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998. Upon
motion of appellant, the RTC issued an Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to
file a demurrer to evidence. On November 19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence
which was opposed by the prosecution. The accused opted to file demurrer to evidence which
was denied by the Court, instead of testifying and could have explained what really happened
and why he surrendered his service firearm. On April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein
assailed decision convicting appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused without any admission on his part or
despite a broken chain of incriminating circumstances which constitutes a violation of the
accused’s constitutional right to be heard.

Ruling:
The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurrer
to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the
opportunity to present his evidence. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express
leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision that the
demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior
order denying appellant’s demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment.
Evidently, the trial court violated the provisions of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was
granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial
court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is
the fact that appellant’s counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this
Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness
and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of
the case for reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to
be heard on his defense has been violated.
Right to be Heard
86.) People vs. Magsi
Facts:
Eloy Magsi, Juan Ponce, Perfecto Arce, Gerardo Flores, Opring Olazo, Teodoro del Rosario and
Peter Doe where accused of attacking, assaulting and shooting Jesus Gallardo causing the latter’s
death.
On August 20, 1970, defendat-appellant was apprehended and was scheduled for arraignment.
Altogether, this case was set and rescheduled for six (6) times. Of the six hearing dates, accused
at two instances entered a qualified plea of guilty.
Recorded proceedings showed that de officio counsel Atty. Rivera and accused were hardly
afforded by the Court any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of
guilty resulted from the Court’s prodding rather than from accused's spontaneous volition. At the
second instance the Court knew accused's prior plea of guilty by alleged duress employed on him
by the other accused. Accused's allegation of duress prompted his lawyer to move for the
resetting of the case for the study and presentation of possible mitigating circumstances.
Subsequently, several resetting of the hearing of the case happened until October 19, 1970 when
Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready to enter an unqualified
plea of guilty and hearing was conducted that day.
Based on accused's plea of guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged
aggravating circumstances nor accused's evidence on duress, the Court rendered its decision the
next day finding the accused guilty of the offense charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not making an inquiry as to the extent of the force
applied by Eloy Magsi and his companions upon the accused Teodoro del Rosario, when they
ordered him to kill Jesus Gallardo, thus, not affording the accused the right to be heard.

Ruling:
In a long line of cases, the Court has long been commenting on the necessity for strict and
substantial compliance with every court’s obligation to an accused. Thus, “while there is no law
requiring it, yet in every case under the plea of guilty where the penalty may be death, it is
advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the defendant” and “the Court should be sure that the defendant fully understands
the nature of the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment to be
imposed before sentencing him...”.
In the case at bar, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first time, with its
bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of
the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be imposed on
him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the alleged
aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But these
considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor from the
defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused whether
he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case.
The conduct of the court a quo taken in the light of the foregoing decisions clearly established
the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the herein accused, who was convicted on an
improvident plea of guilty. The case is remanded to the Court a quo for rearrangement and
further proceedings.