ruling of a court of competent jurisdiction.
In the event Florentino does not obtain clear title, this court reserves jurisdiction to reapportion
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194077 December 3, 2014
FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
EDNA C. SEE, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Factual findings of lower courts are generally deemed conclusive and binding upon this court.1 In any event, "even if the procurement of title
was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value."2
This petition originated from two civil complaints involving the sale of a parcel of land in favor of respondent Edna C. See (Edna). Before us is
a petition for review3 assailing the Court of Appeals’ (a) May 19, 2010 decision affirming in toto the trial court's July 9, 2008 decision granting
Edna possession and ownership over the land upon finding her to be a buyer in good faith and for value, and (b) August 25, 2010 resolution
denying reconsideration.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution, as well as the trial court’s decision.4 They pray that this
court render its decision as follows:
(a) The Deed of Sale between Edna See and Carmelita Leong is hereby declared null and void. The Register [of] Deeds for the City of Manila is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. 231105 in the name of Edna See and reinstating TCT No. 175628;
(b) Confirming the right of Elena Leong and those people claiming right under her, to the possession over the subject property; [and]
(c) Defendants Carmelita Leong and Edna See are declared to be jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiff, Florentino Leong[,] the sum of
Php50,000.00 as moral damages;the sum of Php50,000.00 a[s] Attorney’s Fees; and the cost of suit.5
The spouses Florentino Leong (Florentino) and Carmelita Leong (Carmelita) used to own the property located at No. 539–41 Z.P. De Guzman
Street, Quiapo, Manila.6
Petitioner Elena Leong (Elena) is Florentino's sister-in-law.7 She had stayed with her in-laws on the property rental-free for over two decades
until the building they lived in was razed by fire.8 They then constructed makeshift houses, and the rental-free arrangement continued.9
Florentino and Carmelita immigrated to the United States and eventually had their marriage dissolved in Illinois.10 A provision in their
marital settlement agreement states that"Florentino shall convey and quitclaim all of his right, title and interest in and to 540 De Guzman
Street, Manila, Philippines . . . to Carmelita."11
The Court of Appeals found that "[a]pparently intercalated in the lower margin of page 12 of the instrument was a long-hand scribbling of a
proviso, purporting to be a footnote remark":12 Neither party shall evict or charge rent to relatives of the parties, or convey title, until it has
been established that Florentino has clear title to the Malabon property. Clear title to be established by the attorneys for the parties or the
the properties or their values to effect a 50-50 division of the value of the 2 remaining Philippine properties.13
On November 14, 1996,14 Carmelita sold the land to Edna.15 In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale,
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a waiver of interest notarized on March 11, 1996 in Illinois.16 In this waiver,
Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to the land.17 Consequently, the land’s title, covered by TCT No. 231105,
was transferred to Edna's name.18
Edna was aware of the Leong relatives staying in the makeshift houses on the land.19 Carmelita assured her that her nieces and nephews
would move out, but demands to vacate were unheeded.20
On April 1, 1997,21 Edna filed a complaint22 for recovery of possession against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong ex-spouses.23
The complaint alleged that in 1995 after the fire had razed the building on the land, Elena erected makeshift houses on the land without
Carmelita’s knowledge or consent.24
In response, Elena alleged the title’s legal infirmity for lack of Florentino's conformity to its sale.25 She argued that Carmelita's
noncompliance with the proviso in the property agreement — that the Quiapo property "may not be alienated without Florentino first
obtaining a clean title over the Malabon property"26 — annulled the transfer to Edna.
On April 23, 1997, Florentino filed a complaint27 for declaration of nullity of contract, title, and damages against Carmelita Leong, Edna C.
See, and the Manila Register of Deeds, alleging that the sale was without his consent.28 The two cases were consolidated.
The Regional Trial Court, in its decision29 dated July 9,2008, ruled in favor of Edna: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
(a) Defendant Edna See is granted possession and ownership over the subject property;
(b) Defendants Elena Leong and all other persons are directed to vacate the premises at 539–541 Guzman Street, Quiapo, Manila; [and]
(c) Defendant Carmelita Leong is ordered to pay plaintiff, Florentino Leong his one-half (1/2) or 2Million with interest thereon at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of conveyance on November 12, 1996, up to the finality of this Decision; the sum of PhP 50,000.00 as moral
damages; the sum of PhP 50,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and, the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.30
The Court of Appeals, in its decision31 dated May 19, 2010, affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.32 It likewise denied reconsideration.
Thus, this petition for review was filed.
Petitioners contend that the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles does not apply when fraud exists, and respondent was a buyer in bad
faith.33 Respondent knew at the time of the purchase that Elena had actual possession of the property, thus, she should have made inquiries
on their right to the property.34
Petitioners argue the conjugal nature of the property, evidenced by the title in the names of Florentino and Carmelita Leong, and the waiver
relied upon by respondent.35 They cite Articles 336 and 1537 of the Civil Code, and Articles 8738 and 13439 of the Family Code, to support
their contention that respondent should have demanded Florentino’s consent to the sale.40 Petitioners submit that Florentino’s waiver is
void since donations between spouses are void.41
Petitioners argue that respondent should bear the loss42 of her negligence in purchasing the property without Florentino’s consent.43 They
cite at length Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr.44 to support their argument that respondent failed to exercise the required due diligence in the
purchase of the property.45 Consequently, petitioners submit that the lower courts erred in ruling that respondent was entitled to
possession of the property.46
Respondent counters that only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, and petitioners raise purely factual
questions.47
In any event, the lower courts correctly found that respondent is a purchaser in good faith for value who exercised the necessary diligence in
purchasing the property.48
First, good faith is presumed, and petitioners did not substantiate their bold allegation of fraud.49 Second, respondent did notrely on the
clean title alone precisely because of the possession by third parties, thus, she also relied on Florentino’s waiver of interest.50 Respondent
even verified the authenticity of the title at the Manila Register of Deeds with her father and Carmelita.51 These further inquiries prove
respondent’s good faith.52
Respondent submits that petitioners’ invocation of the Civil Code provisions misleads this court.53 Philippine laws cannot govern Florentino
who was already an American citizen when he executed the waiver of interest, obtained a divorce, and signed a marital settlement
agreement with Carmelita on July 8, 1994.54 The waiver was also a consequence of the separation of properties and not in the nature of a
donation between spouses.55
Lastly, respondent argues that "between possessors who are not owners and a buyer in good faith and for value,it is clear in this case that
the Respondent Edna See, the buyer in good faith, has the greater right to possession over the subject property."56
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent Edna C. See is a buyer in good faith and for value.
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
The Torrens system was adopted to "obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further."57
One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the certificate of title when dealing with registered property.58 Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 known as the Property Registration Decree recognizes innocent purchasers in good faith for value and their right to rely on
a clean title:
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of
record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an
innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the
delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canalor lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other
law or regulations on agrarian reform.59 (Emphasis supplied)
An innocent purchaser for value refers to someone who "buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest in it, and who paysa full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s claim."60
One claiming to be an innocent purchaser for value has the burden of proving such status.61
The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social interest embedded in the legal concept granting
indefeasibility of titles. Between the third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar with the history and status of the titled
property. Consequently, an owner would incur less costs to discover alleged invalidities relating to the property compared to a third party.
Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in transactions, and achieve a less optimal
welfare level for the entire society.62
Both lower courts found respondent to be an innocent purchaser in good faith for value.63 The trial court discussed:
By her overt acts, Edna See with her father verified the authenticity of Carmelita’s land title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There was no
annotation on the same thus deemed a clean title (page 19, TSN, 12 January 2005). Also, she relied on the duly executed and notarized
Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and Certificate of Authentication issued by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines
for Illinois in support to the Waiver of Interest incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her by Carmelita (Exhibit 2).
Examination of the assailed Certificate of Authority shows that it is valid and regular on its face. It contains a notarial seal. . . .
. . . . The assailed Certificate of Authority is a notarized document and therefore, presumed to be validand duly executed. Thus, Edna See’s
reliance on the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized Certificate of Authority presented by Carmelita is sufficient evidence of
good faith. . . .64
A determination of whether a party is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value involves a factual issue beyond the ambit of a
petition for review on certiorari.65
Generally, factual findings of lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon this court.66 No cogent reason exists to overturn the
findings of both lower courts.
Petitioners raise that "actual possession of the property by a person other than the vendor should put the purchaser in inquiry and absen[t]
such inquiry[,] he cannot be regarded as a bona fide purchaser against such possessors."67
As discussed by the Court of Appeals, respondent did conduct further inquiry by relying not only on the certificate of title, but also on
Florentino’s waiver.68
Petitioners submit that respondent bought the property knowing that Florentino and Carmelita were married.69 They then invoke Civil Code
and Family Code provisions on the nature of conjugal properties and the prohibition against donations between spouses.70
Respondent counters that Florentino and Carmelita were already American citizens when they executed the marital settlement
agreement.71 She even presented before the trial court Florentino’s special power of attorney executed on March 25, 1997 to prove
Florentino’s citizenship.72
The trial court disregarded petitioners’ argument on the applicability of our civil laws on the validity of the sale since it already deemed
respondent to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.73 The trial court added that since "[respondent] parted witha
substantial amount of ₱4 Million, equity dictates that she shall have possession of the property[,] [n]onetheless, Florentino Leong shall get
his one-half share of the purchase price."74
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals discussed that Florentino was estopped from questioning the transfer of the property since he
already waived all his rights, title, and interests over the same.75 The court also found that the intercalated proviso in the marital settlement
agreement violated the mutuality of contracts principle.76
The question of whether Florentino and Carmelita were already American citizens at the time of the property’s sale to Edna — thus no longer
covered by our laws relating to family rights and duties77 — involves a factual question outside the ambit of a petition for review on
certiorari. In any event, respondent exerted due diligence when she ascertained the authenticity of the documents attached to the deed of
sale such as the marital settlement agreement with Florentino’s waiver of interest over the property. She did not rely solely on the title. She
even went to the Registry of Deeds to verify the authenticity of the title.78 These further inquiries were consider[ed by the lower courts in
finding respondent to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
Lastly, an allegation of fraud must be substantiated. Rule 8, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. – In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity.Malice intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally. (Emphasis supplied)
In petitioners’ memorandum before this court, they mentioned the rule of fraud as an exception to the indefeasibility of title principle, but
failed to substantiate their allegation by immediately concluding as follows:
Petitioners beg to disagree with the ruling of the Honorable Trial Court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 Respondent Edna See is
not a buyer in good faith. The ruling that every person can rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and that the buyer need not go
beyond the four corners of the title to determine the condition of the property is not absolute and admits of exception. As held in the case of
Remegia Feliciano vs. Sps. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 162593, 2006 Sep 26 the principle of indefeasibilty of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud
attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. As such, a title issued based on void documents may
be annulled.79 (Emphasis in the original removed)

Even assuming the procurement of title was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, "such defective title may still be the source of a
completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value."80

Respondent, an innocent purchaser ingood faith and for value with title in her name, has a better right to the property than Elena. Elena’s
possession was neither adverse to nor in the concept of owner.81

Article 428 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 428. The owner has the right toenjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. The owner has also
a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing inorder to recover it.82

Thus, respondent had every right to pursue her claims as she did.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 92289 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80687 April 10, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO M. UMALI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 23, Trece Martires
City, REMEDIOS MICLAT, JUAN C. PULIDO, ROSALINA NAVAL, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversion of a parcel of land on the ground that the original sale thereof from the government was tainted with fraud
because based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio. The present holders of the property claiming to be innocent purchasers for value
and not privy to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot lie against them.
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square meters. 1 It was originally purchased on installment from the
government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and
Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922.2 Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. 3 In 1971 these three assignees
purportedly signed a joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance of
a certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full payment. 4 On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said
affiants. 5 Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the register of deeds of
Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval. 6
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985, the registered owners of the land, following several transfers, were
Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394. 7
They were named as defendants and asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff
claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they could not have signed the joint
affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) was based. 8
In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the joint affidavit and said they had all acquired the property in good faith
and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata. 9 For her part, Miclat moved to
dismiss the complaint, contending that the government had no cause of action against her because there was no allegation that she had
violated the plaintiff's right, that the government was not the real party-in-interest because the subject land was already covered by the
Torrens system, and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches. 10
The respondent court, in its order dated October 2, 1987, granted the motion. 11 The petitioner, contesting this order, now insists that it has
a valid cause of action and that it is not barred by either prescription or res judicata.
The Court will observe at the outset that the joint affidavit is indeed a forgery. Apart from the fact that two of the supposed affiants were
already dead at the time they were supposed to have signed the sworn statement, even the most cursory examination of the document will
show that the three signatures affixed thereto were written by one and the same hand. 12 There is no doubt about it. It is indeed difficult to
understand how such an obvious forgery could have deceived the people in the Bureau of Lands who processed the papers of this case and
made possible the fraudulent transfer of the land.
But given such deception, would the sale itself be considered null and void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles
derived therefrom also ineffectual ab initio?
We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint 13 filed by the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy
to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never
questioned in that pleading. Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and renders
the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.
The rulings on this provision are indeed as numerous as they are consistent:
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg. Act), every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of
a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and
enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing against the
land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the
whole world, including the government. 14
xxx xxx xxx
A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of Sec. 39 of the Land Registration Act. 15
xxx xxx xxx
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 16
The decision in Piñero v. Director of Lands 17 is not applicable to the present proceeding because the lands involved in that case had not yet
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the Pineros. The action for reversion was filed by the
government against them as the original transferees of the properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents issued
by the government pursuant to which the corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by the
government as a ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly to the Pineros, who could not plead the status of innocent
purchasers for value.
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after
several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint affidavit,
but that is a bare and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would still not prove any collusion between him and the private
respondents. The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress of Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon her
the alleged sins of her father.
The Solicitor General also argues that Remedios is an extension of the juridical personality of her father and so cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser for value because she is charged with knowledge of her father's deceit. Such conclusion has no basis in fact or law.
Moreover, there is evidence that Remedios did not merely inherit the land but actually purchased it for valuable consideration and without
knowledge of its original defect. The agreement to subdivide, 18 which she presented to show that she had acquired the land for valuable
confederation, is more acceptable than the conjectures of the petitioner. It is also consonant with the presumption of good faith.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents, the government has no more control or
jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends — as if it made any difference — of the Friar
Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the
date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies even to the government.
The pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as follows:
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. 19
 Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
This should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus:

Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest, the Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land Registration Act.

The petitioner claims that it is not barred by the statute of limitations because the original transfer of the land was null and void ab initio and
did not give rise to any legal right. The land therefore continued to be part of the public domain and the action for this reversion could be
filed at any time. The answer to that is the statement made by the Court in Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez 20 that "even if
respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent and the original certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would
not revert back to the State," precisely because it has become private land. Moreover, the petitioner errs in arguing that the original transfer
was null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable. The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not
been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As the Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. 21

A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of
the public domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the present case does not belong to such category, OCT No. 282-A
would be merely voidable or reviewable (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113): (1) upon proof of actual fraud; (2)
although valid and effective, until annulled or reviewed in a direct proceeding therefor (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590), not collaterally
(Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259, 262; Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184; Henderson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624,630; Samonte vs.
Sambilon, 107 Phil. 198,200); (3) within the statutory period therefor (Sec. 38, Act 496; Velasco vs. Gochuico 33 Phil. 363; Delos Reyes vs.
Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Snyder vs. Provincial Fiscal, 42 Phil. 761, 764; Reyes vs. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791; Clemente vs. Lukban, 53 Phil. 931;
Sugayan vs. Solis, 56 Phil. 276, 279; Heirs of Lichauco vs. Director of Lands, 70 Phil. 69); (4) after which, the title would be conclusive against
the whole world, including the Government (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 596; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; J. M. Tuason vs.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615).

And as we declared in Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: 22

. . . Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes
private property over which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year
from the date of issuance thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the action for the annulment of the certificate of title issued upon the land grant can
no longer be entertained. (Emphasis supplied).

It is worth observing here that in two earlier cases, the private respondents were challenged by the heirs of Matilde Cenizal Arguson but both
were dismissed and the titles of the registered owners were confirmed by the trial court. 23 This decision was later sustained by this Court.
24 While this is not to say that the present petition is barred by res judicata, as the government was not a party in these cases, it does
suggest that the issue it wants to rake up now has long been settled. It should not be the subject of further judicial inquiry, especially at this
late hour. Litigation must stop at some point instead of dragging on interminably.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on
the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive if
not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles
issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. As in this case.

We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition
thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole world, including the government.
Republic of the Philippines
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO,
ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO
S. GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO
Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration
Commission, Quezon City, Metro Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those involved in the
case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran,1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio
Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's
son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of
Teodoro Y. Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The
lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots
among themselves.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August
1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and directed the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5
August 1981.
On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-
92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended
that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no
opposition was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be
implemented because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order
dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees.4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge
on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6
On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among others, thus—
In resumé, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision he
rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period
after entry of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113).
When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown that
homestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot be faulted because land already granted by homestead
patent can no longer be the subject of another registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987.8 Hence, this recourse.
Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge
had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original
Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August
1981 and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law of
the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion
Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as against petitioners herein.
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision
having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order
to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that
section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the
decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration.9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it.10
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a quo before its decision became
final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if
haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de
Villa: 11
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title
and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions
of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the
decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree
can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration
Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes
final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation
and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary
and cadastral land registration proceedings ." 13
The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra, where it was
decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the lots in question, were
not public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered
by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision states:

With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion that such certificates are sufficient to
prevent the title to such portion from going to appellants aforesaid, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the respective
homesteaders held adverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the evidence, and the said appellants
failed to object to that possession in time. (Emphasis supplied)

Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered that the lots respectively claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion
M. Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the exclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... .
(Emphasis supplied.) 14

The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in the
years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the
subject lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a
Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15

The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of
Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34
and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents'
Memorandum. 16

Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders may still vindicate
their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely,
the same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially
settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the
Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff
and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey
the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof." 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142549 March 9, 2010
FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred
Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over
three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican."1 What we have before us now is touted as "one
of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history."2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular
petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such
applicability must be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that
has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a
Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal,
and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of
Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as
Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this
Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals,4 reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3,
1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-
Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court,
and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated October 21, 1997
and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in
proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners for the following lots, namely:
xxxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because
they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to
direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1)
the 1st Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-119 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement
dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ
Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and
not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued
LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following:
xxxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the
Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and
Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy
Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings
showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing
"certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact
it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the
TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had
previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had
in fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No. 994.11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." We
quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that
OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if
not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land
mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to
prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land
registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No.
994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in the
names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the
proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to
duplication of certificates of title covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme
Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the
title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer certificates of title
emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title
pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and
it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a
mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country
and people at large."12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this
Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice
has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land." According to petitioner,
respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No. 994."
Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set
aside the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect.14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated
October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and
that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of the highest degree."15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424
cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, other than this action."
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee
created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way
alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time
the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.17
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties
being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could
not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of
Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to
several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the
investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate.
According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the
involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its
agencies who may appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that may
directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached
agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the
courts affecting the Maysilo Estate."18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation
was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the
Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those
that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee’s report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st
Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only
with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as well.
He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or
supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18,
1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that time.
Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to
petitioner’s counsel to present petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard
satisfies the requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of
a trial where petitioner’s claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it
is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As
it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her
claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.20
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of
public respondents’ failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the proceedings
in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondents affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief
prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondent’s active participation. 22
Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court,
petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a
judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate
were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had
rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the respondents.
Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last
preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such
manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs
awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had
caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and executory. Petitioner
likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions
within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed
their Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the
property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate
share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with
intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result
of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names.25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo
Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad
Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz,
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de
la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiño,
Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y Patiño, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales,
Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their
respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF
HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation into English consisting of
forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-
enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration
of the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the
resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the
questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from
the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not
unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty;
hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.27 It
is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise
of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents’ refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have
sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted
by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.30
(Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in
cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case,
which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC
Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of
those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register
of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st
Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to
grant petitioner’s request.31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the
finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case
clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution33 in the same case dated March 31, 2009
(the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have
been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and
conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court34 which have held that there are two existing OCT No. The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the
994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, petition for lack of merit.
was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked
by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or SO ORDERED.
otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only
one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on
the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.35

Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the
following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:

First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on
3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot
be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the
Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they
refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.

Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in
regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the
conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting
the same as or similar to that at bar.36 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court
constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:

Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether
these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x
The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the
same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not,
in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial
scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

xxxx

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.37

Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions
as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No.
994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded
that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."

In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several
attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a Republic of the Philippines
vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of SUPREME COURT
the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the Manila
very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149122 July 27, 2007
HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the decision1 dated January 31, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 38630, as reiterated in its resolution of March 22, 2001, denying the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The assailed CA decision affirmed [and dismissed the appeal taken by the petitioners from] an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, which ordered the cancellation of petitioners’ Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2574
and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the mass of the public domain, in a suit thereat commenced for the purpose by respondent
Republic of the Philippines, originally against the spouses Gregorio Venturanza and Mary Edwards-Venturanza, predecessors-in-interest of
the herein petitioners.
The petition traces its beginning from a complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
in the RTC of Iriga City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. IR-122 and raffled to Branch 37 thereof, against the Venturanza couple for the
cancellation of their TCT No. 2574, covering a vast track of land with a combined area of 23,944, 635 square meters located at Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
Reviewed, the records unfold the following facts and antecedents:
The title in question – TCT No. 2574 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur – was issued sometime in 1959 in the name of Gregorio
Venturanza, married to Mary Edwards-Venturanza. The memorandum of registration shows that TCT No. 2574 was derived from TCT No. RT-
40 (140), which is a reconstituted title issued to one Florencio Mora who sold the property therein described to Gregorio Venturanza in 1956
for ₱107,730.00. The same memorandum of registration, however, does not show when the land covered by TCT No. 2574 was originally
registered and the other data were merely noted as (NA).
In 1964, GregorioVenturanza and the then Abaca Development Board entered into an agreement for purchase and sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 2574, whereby the former agreed to convey the property to the latter, subject to the approval of the document of sale by
the concerned government office. The final sale, however, did not materialize.
Meanwhile, it appears that in the course of the parties’ negotiation for the sale of the property covered by the title in question, the
government’s negotiation committee assigned a deputy clerk of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to verify the true copies of TCT No.
2574 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.
Per verification, it was found out that Venturanzas’ TCT No. 2574, was derived from TCT No. RT-40 (140) in the name of one Florencio Mora
(Mora) which covers Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan RS-383-D containing a combined area of 23,944,635 square meters or 2,394 hectares, situated in
the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur.
In turn, TCT No. RT-40 (140) appears to have been reconstituted from TCT No. 140 which was issued to one Sebastian Moll on June 7, 1928.
TCT No. 140, on the other hand, appears to be a transfer from Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 3480 issued to one Casimiro Natividad.
Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the land subject of LRC No. 3480, originally registered on July 28, 1911, covered a parcel of
land consisting of only 451 square meters and situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur.
In the report submitted by the LRC deputy clerk, the latter made a finding that the Venturanzas’ TCT No. 2574, a direct transfer from TCT No.
RT-40 (140) which was, in turn, derived from TCT No. 140, covers only a parcel of land with an area of 451 square meters and not 23,944,635
square meters or 2,394 hectares which practically comprise the entire Municipality of Buhi.
Such was the state of things when, sometime in 1965, in the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Camarines Sur, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG, filed a complaint for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2574 and the Reversion of the Land
Described Therein to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereat originally docketed as Civil Case No. 5973, the complaint eventually became
Civil Case No. IR-122 which was raffled to Branch 37 of the court.
On April 8, 1992, the trial court came out with its decision2 ordering the annulment and cancellation of the Venturanzas’ TCT No. 2574 and
the reversion of the land covered thereby to the mass of the public domain. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the defendants ordering the
annulment of TCT No. 2574 in the name of Gregorio Venturanza, ordering the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to cancel said title, and
reverting the land covered by the questioned title, except that which may have already been alienated by the proper authorities and lawfully
passed to private ownership, to the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines, with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the suit in favor of the Republic, the trial court principally anchored its judgment on the ground that the reconstituted title issued
in the name of Florencio Mora could have been fraudulently secured, hence, does not legally exist. The court further ruled that since the
reconstituted title issued to Florencio Mora is a nullity, then the order for its reconstitution did not attain finality and therefore may be
attacked anytime.
Therefrom, the Venturanzas went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 38630, arguing that Mora’s reconstituted title from where their TCT
No. 2574 was derived is already indefeasible on the ground that upon the lapse of one (1) year, the decision granting reconstitution of Mora’s
title becomes final. The Venturanzas also claimed that they are protected by law as buyers in good faith. Lastly, they argued that the
Republic’s action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land described therein to the mass of public domain was
already barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R, entitled, Florencio Mora v. Venancio Infante, et al., which granted the
petition for reconstitution of Mora’s TCT No. RT-40 (140).
In the herein assailed decision dated January 31, 2001, the CA affirmed that of the trial court. With their motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the CA in its resolution3 of May 22, 2001, petitioners as successors-in-interest of the spouses Venturanza are now with this
Court via the present recourse raising the same issues already passed upon by the appellate court.
We DENY.
Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Mora’s reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140) is already
indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year after the CA granted its reconstitution in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Citing the second
paragraph of Section 31 of P.D. No. 15294 which reads:
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name
in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "to all whom it may concern",
petitioners contend that the two courts below were without authority to annul TCT No. 2574 issued in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.
Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is,
petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within
the operation of said law. As correctly pointed out by the CA to which we are in full accord:
xxx the Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been within the operation of the
Land Registration Act because of the irregularities attending the issuance of the reconstituted title. As found by the trial court:
TCT No. RT-40 (140) supposedly reconstituted from TCT no. 140 in the name of Florencio Mora consists of 2,394 hectares supposedly
situated in Buhi, Camarines Sur. It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed only in 11 days, which according to Engr. Antonio
Rodriguez was quite impossible considering the rugged terrain and the mountainous features of the area. Moreover, it covers timberland.
Significantly, from the exhibits presented by the plaintiff it can be seen that the resurvey plan (Exh. A) shows that the survey of Lot Nos. 1, 2
and 3 was based on TCT No. 140 and it covered an area of 23,944,635 square meters and appeared to have been surveyed on January 20, to
January 31, 1953 or a period of 11 days. Exh. "B" shows that the area supposedly covered by TCT 2574 is within the timberland, Project 12,
Block B, L.C. 646 and Project 19, Block ALC 761, Exh. "C", the official map of Legaspi City shows that the land covered by TCT 140, which was
issued on the basis of the resurvey (Exh. "A") is a land situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, while the land covered by TCT No. 40 (140) is a vast
tract of land in Buhi, Camarines Sur; that it further appears that the lots covered by TCT No. 40 (140) were supposedly registered in GRLO Sp.
Proceedings No. 112 with an area of 23,944,635 square meters but records of the LRC revealed that GRLO records No. 112 refers to a land
registration case in Iloilo, and not in Camarines Sur. Exh "D" also shows that Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of
title covering a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur, and that plan RS-383-D (without the suffix capital letter D) involving Lots 1
and 2 situated in the Municipality of Calawag, Quezon, was the subject of Land Registration Case No. 322, GRLO Record No. 13804 with
Maximina Zepeda as applicant.

The stench of anomaly became at once pervading when we consider the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The land practically covers the
Municipality of Buhi and are being claimed and possessed by claimants, who appeared as intervenors in this case. The Venturanzas never
materially and physically occupied the property because there are actual occupants and possessors. The Venturanzas only asserted
ownership over the property in papers but not in physical possession.5

As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora’s TCT No. RT-40 (140) over
the land which has never been originally registered. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:

The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived its existence from RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which was
a reconstituted title based on TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation. The records of the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was
registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the OCT number or LRC Record Number. 6

Corollarily, petitioners’ argument that the Republic’s action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered
thereby to the State is barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R has no leg to stand on.

Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora’s title over the property which has
never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the Republic’s action
because there was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.

The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora’s evidence in Special Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by him for
the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26.
The questions of ownership and whether or not the property or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were never put at issue
in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora’s TCT No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners’ TCT No. 2574
were derived, nor the non-registrability of the timberland included in the area in question which constitute Republic’s cause of action against
the herein petitioners, were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R.

Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.

Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora’s reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from where petitioners’TCT No. 2574 was
derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that
ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.

What makes petitioners’ cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is
part timberland,7 a finding not even once disputed by petitioners. It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not
have been registered in the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution,
timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated.8 A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain
is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found.9 Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers
property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the
hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.10 1avvphi1

All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA, affirming that of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.