INDIRA GANDHI MUTHO v.

PENGARAH JABATAN AGAMA

ISLAM PERAK & ORS AND OTHER
APPEALS
GROUP MEMBERS:

○ NUR AINA AFIQAH BINTI HALIM
○ NUR FARIHAN BINTI SEMSUDIN
○ AQMARUL AQIL BIN ISMAIL
○ MUHAMMAD NURHAKIM BIN ABDUL HALIM
TIMELINE OF THE CASE
 2009
○ MARCH 11
K Pathmanathan converts to Islam
○ MARCH 31
K Pathmanathan took her daughter away and leave his house
○ APRIL 2
K Pathmanathan converts his 3 children to Islam
○ APRIL 8
Muhd. Riduan gained temporary custody of his three children granted by shariah
court.
○ SEPT 29
Shariah court grants permanent custody to Muhd Riduan
2010
• MARCH 11
Ipoh High Court grants Indira full custody of three children

2013
• JULY 25
Ipoh High Court: - annuls conversion of three children
- unilateral child conversion is unconstitutional
 2014
○  MAY 30
-Annuls shariah court 2009’s custody order
-Orders Muhd Riduan arrested unless Prasana return by June 6
-Directs police to track down Prasana
○ JUNE 12
Orders police to find Prasana
○ JUNE 30
Indira files application to arrest her husband and find Prasana
2014
○ JULY 24
Court of Appeal to hear IGP & AGC’s bid:
- To intervene 2 child custody cases  including Indira’s
-To stay police execution of court’s orders
○ SEPTEMBER 10
Court of Appeal strikes out ex husband’s appeal against arrest warrant and recovery order
○ SEPTEMBER 12
Grants mandamus order compels IGP to arrest ex husband and return Prasana
○ SEPTEMBER 15
AG files appeals on behalf IGP against mandamus order
 2014
○ SEPTEMBER 17
Single COA judge grant ex-parte order to mandamus order
○ DECEMBER 17
In 2-1 judgement COA dismisses mandamus order that compels IGP to arrest ex
husband and return Prasana

2015
○ APRIL 22
-grants Indira leave to appeal against December 17 2014 dismissal mandamus order to
IGP
-Strikes out Muhd Riduan’s appeal against contempt order
2015
• DECEMBER 30
In 2-1 decision the COA upheld the unilateral child  conversion ruling:
- Civil court has no jurisdiction over  conversion to  Islam which is solely the Shariah court purview
-No orders made on eldest child who has  turn  18 and has the right to decides her religion

2016
• April 29
-Ipoh High Court should not have issued recovery order
-IGP can be exused for not enforcing order to find Prasana due to conflicting custody orders
-Restores order compelling IGP to arrest Muhd. Riduan over contempt of court
 Indira Gandhi Mutho
v
Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors

Judgement of the High Court
 Parties to the case
• The applicant; the wife, Indira Gandhi Mutho.
• st
1  respondent; Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak.
• 2nd respondent; Pendaftar Muallaf.
• 3rd respondent; Perak State Government.
• 4th respondent; Ministry of Education.
• th
5  respondent; Government of Malaysia.
• 6th respondent; the husband, Pathmanathan Krishtan
 Facts of the case
• The applicant married the 6th respondent in a civil marriage on 10 April 1993 and had
three children.
• Their marriage encountered difficulties and on 31 March 2009, the 6th respondent left
the applicant and forcibly taking the youngest child who was still then a nursing infant.
• The police informed the applicant that the 6th respondent had converted to Islam and
she sought for interim relief for custody of her children and to restrain the 6th
respondent from forcibly removing her children.
• Before the hearing of her application, she discovered that the 6th respondent and
her three children had been converted to Islam and that the 1st respondent had
registered the conversion.
• She also learnt that the Syariah High Court had given care,
control and custody of the three children to the 6th respondent.
• The applicant thus filed the instant application and obtained
leave, seeking for orders and reliefs quashing the Conversion
Certificates of her three children and restraining the 2nd
respondent from registering her three children as “Muslims” or
“Muallaf” pursuant to the Administration of the Religion of
Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.
 Issues in the case
• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
• Whether the conversion of the children without the consent of the non­converting
parent violates arts 8, 11 and 12 of the Federal Constitution.
• Whether the conversion of the children without the consent of the non­converting
parent and in the absence of the children before the converting authority violates
the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.
• Whether the conversion without the consent of the non­converting parent as well
as without hearing the children violates the principles of natural justice.
• Whether the conversion without the consent of the non­ converting parent and the
children violates international norms and conventions.
Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to hear case where a parents of a child
challenging the constitutionality and validity of the conversion of the children
of a civil marriage to Islam?
• High Court has the power to hear the case as the appellant is challenging the
constitutionality of the respondent in converting the children to Islam without her
consent.
• She is a non­Muslim, she cannot bring the case to Syariah Court even though the
issue is about converting to Islam as Syariah Court only hears matters involving
Muslims.
• The civil High Court would have jurisdiction since what the applicant was challenging
was the constitutionality of the respondents in converting the children to a civil
marriage to Islam as well as asserting her rights under the Fundamental Liberties
provisions in Part II of the FC as well as under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961.
• The High Court have residual or reserve powers to hear a complaint from any citizens
who claims that his or her constitutional rights or legal rights have been violated,
whether under Federal law or a State enactment.
• Art 121 (1A) of FC does not take away the powers of the civil High Court of matters
within the jurisdiction of Syariah Courts but if both the powers and parties come
within the purview and province of Syariah Courts then only the civil High Courts not
have the jurisdiction.
Whether the conversion of a child to civil marriage to Islam by a converted
parents without the consent of the non­converting parent violates Article 12 of
the Federal Constitution.

• Art 12 is rights in respect of education. Art 12(4) also covers the choice of the
religion of the minor as well not only to the purpose of a child receiving religious
education or participating in a religious ceremony. The “parent” who may convert
the minor child an not the maid, the teacher, the kadhi, the temple priest or the
pastor.
• “Conversion for any religion other than Islam: the consent of both parents are
required but that for conversion to Islam, only the consent of the converted
parent would suffice.”
• The word “parent” covers both the father and mother of the child. A situation
where conversion for any religion other than Islam the consent of both parents are
required but that for conversion to Islam, only the consent of the converted parent
would suffice.
• The non­converting parents is said to have no locus to challenge the validity of the
Certificate of Conversions which is final and binding and that once converted to
Islam no one can convert the minor child out of Islam.
Whether the conversion of a child to civil marriage to Islam by a converted
parents without the consent of the non­converting parent violates Article
8 of the Federal Constitution.

• The equal rights of guardianship of both parents to a civil marriage are

spelt out under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961. Equal rights in
upbringing education and religions.
• If by conversion, the converted parent can denude and deprive the non­
converting parent of his or her guardianship rights.
• The non­converting parent who is not a Muslim cannot contest the validity
of the child’s conversion to Islam and to be heard on matters of custody in
Syariah Court.
• Parliament could not have intended the non­converting parent to be
without his or her legal remedies and reliefs especially in a matter so
important as the conversion of the child.
• In Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray & Other Appeals
decided that art 8 of FC would no be violated in a conversion by the
converted parent of a minor child to Islam, the High Court would have to
defer to Subashini based on the doctrine of stare decisis, it may not be
ratio but only obiter.
Whether the conversion of a child to civil marriage to Islam by a converted parents
without the consent of the non­converting parent violates Article 11 of the Federal
Constitution.

• Art 11 of FC is inextricably tied up with art 5(1) of FC. Liberty would include
the freedom to bring one’s children to a place of worship or religious
instruction.
• A non­Muslim parent who not able to teach his or her children the tenets of
his or her faith would be to deprive that parent of his or her constitutional
rights not just under art 11 but also arts 5(1) and 3(1) of FC.
• In the case, the 6th respondent, and that of the other respondents in
authorising, affirming and confirming the conversion of the minor children to
Islam without the consent of the non­converting parent, in the person of the
applicant, was unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect.
• For the fact that every person has the right to profess and practice religion,
the respondent had acted unconstitutionally by converting his three children
to Islam without his wife’s consent as his wife did not convert.
Whether the conversion of a child to civil marriage to Islam by a
converted parents without the consent of the non­converting
parent and in the absence of the children before the converting
authority violates the administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak)
Enactment 2004.

• In the instant case, n order to convert religion, there must be

requirements and procedures to be followed. In this case, the
three children were not before the converting authority and as
such they could not have uttered the two clauses of affirmation
of faith, throwing the conclusiveness of the Certificate of
Conversion open to challenge.
• The said Certificate of Conversion to the Religion of Islam were
null and void and of no effect for non­compliance with s 96 of
the Perak Enactment.
Whether the conversion of a child to Islam by a converted parents without the
consent and hearing of the non­converting parent and the children violates
the principles of Natural Justice.

• Even if the consent of a single parent would suffice under s106(b) of the
Perak Enactment, there is nevertheless a need to give the non­converting
parent the right to be heard.
• Before converting, the non­converting parent must make known about the
conversion as she has the right according to natural justice. Not only that, the
said conversions are about her own children, thus she must know before
hand.
• The mother and the children had not been heard and the Certificate of
Conversion could not thus be sustained for breach of natural justice and
ought to be quashed.
Whether the conversion of a child to civil marriage to Islam by a converted parents
without the consent of the non­converting parent and the child violates
international norms and convention.

• Malaysia cannot ignore its commitments to the various conventions that it has
adopted as a member of the international community.
• It has amended its laws to more clearly reflect its commitments as where there
are two possible interpretations of the word “parent” in art 12(4) of FC.
• The interpretation that best promotes Malaysia’s commitment to international
norms and enhances basic human rights and human dignity is to be preferred.
• A particular interpretation makes the right of the equal rights of the mother with
the father where the guardianship is concerned under the GIA 1961, then an
interpretation that is consistent with international human rights principles must
be invoked to infuse life into it.
• The same would apply with equal force to the interpretation of ss 96 and 106 of
the Perak Enactment.
 Pronouncement

• The three certificates of conversion to the Religion of Islam issued by the 1st
respondent is quash based on the reasons given above.
• The said certificates are null and void and of no effect and all the three children to the
marriage have not been converted to Islam in accordance with the law.
 PATHMANATHAN KRISHNAN
V.
INDIRA GANDHI MUTHO & OTHER APPEALS

Judgement Of the Court of Appeal
 Facts of the case
• The three appeals were against the decision of the Judicial
Commissioner in the High Court in allowing the respondent’s
judicial review application to quash the three certificates of
conversion to Islam issued by the Registrar of Muallaf on behalf of
the Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak for the respondent’s
three children.
• The respondent’s husband (1 st appellant) had converted the
children without her knowledge after his conversion to Islam.
• The 1st appellant had obtained two Syariah Court orders for the
custody, of the three children based on the said certificates.
 Issues in the case
• Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to determine the issue of
conversion to the religion of islam
• Whether the conversion of the children contravened ss 96 and 106
of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment
2004.
• Whether a single parent had the right to convert a child or children
to the marriage without the consent of the other spouse.
• Whether the conversion of the children violated international
norms and conventions.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to determine the issue
of conversion to the religion of Islam.

• The determination of the validity of the conversion of any person to

religion of Islam was strictly a religious issue and fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.
• S 50(3)(b)(x) and (xi) of the Perak Enactment stated that the power
to declare the status of a Muslim person is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Syariah High Court. The order of the High Court
declaring that the conversion is null and void is a transgression of
the above said provision.
“(3) The Syariah High Court shall:
(b) In its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and
proceedings of all parties to the actions or proceedings are
Muslim and the actions and proceedings relate to:
(x) A declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim
(xi) a declaration that a deceased person was a Muslim or
otherwise at the time of his death “
• In the instant case, the JC had erred in his approach of dealing
with the subject matter before him as his lordship had decided
ob the constitutionality of the conversion process instead.
• Only the Syariah Court has exclusive jurisdiction, but not the
Majlis Agama Islam or officers is not a pivotal issue. The subject
matter of the suit is clearly outside the legal competency of the
High Court and the lack of remedy for the respondent cannot
ipso facto confer jurisdiction on the High Court.
• Therefore, the JC in exercising his judicial review powers should
do so with utmost care and circumspection, taking into
consideration the subject matter of the case.
Whether the conversion of the children contravened ss 96 and 106 of the
Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.

• The learned JC had overlooked and failed to consider the provision of s

101 of the Perak Enactment in declaring the certificate of conversion to
be null and void of no effect and further declaring that the three children
had not been converted to the religion of Islam.
• Under s 101(2) of the Perak Enactment, the certificates of conversion
were clearly declared to be conclusive proof of the facts stated in the
certificates.
• The Registrar’s action of issuing the certificates of conversion is an
administrative act and thus amenable to judicial review and in the
absence of any challenge to the said certificates remained good.
• The issuance of the “Perakuan Memeluk Islam” stating that the persons
named therein had been registered in the Register of Muallaf and the
issue and process of the conversion must have been done to the
satisfaction of the Registrar.
• The High Court had to accept the facts stated therein and it was
beyond the powers of the JC to question the same and it was
not the business of the JC to consider whether the provision of
ss 96 and 106 of the Perak Enactment had been violated as this
is not his jurisdiction.
• Thus, the pronouncements by the JC on the non­compliance of
ss 96 and 106 of the Perak Enactment was a misdirection.
Whether a single parent had the right to convert a child or
children to the marriage without the consent of the other spouse.

• The Federal Court in Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan

Thangathoray & Other Appeals held that art12(4) of the FC must
not be read as entrenching the right to choice of religion in both
parents.
• In instant appeal, the respondent not being able to teach her
children the tenets of her faith did not deprive of her
constitutional rights under art 11 of FC.
• Therefore, the JC had run foul of the Federal Court’s
pronouncement that art 12(4) of FC did not confer the right to
choice of religion of children under the age of 18 in both parents.
• The JC erred in finding that art 11 of the FC had been violated
resulting in the conversion of the children being unconstitutional,
illegal, null and void and of no effect.
Whether the conversion of the children violated international
norms and conventions .

• It is trite that international treaties do not form part of our

law , unless those provisions have been incorporated into
our laws.
• Therefore, for a treaty to be operative in Malaysia, the
Parliament must legislate.
• While the FC was not to be construed in any narrow or
pedantic sense, this did not mean that the court was at
liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the FC in the
interest of any legal or constitutional theory .
• The FC is supreme and the court was duty bound to give
effect to its terms.
 Pronouncement

• The High Court has erred in most of the judgment stated
• The three children are said to have converted into Islam and the matter falls within
jurisdiction of Syariah Court
 Indira Gandhi Mutho v
Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam
Perak & Ors And Other Appeals

JUDGMENT OF FEDERAL COURT
The appellant in the appeals, Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho is appealing
against the decision of the Court of Appeal dated 30 Nov 2015
allowing the appeals filed by the respondents
Whether the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the
actions of the Registrar of Muallafs or his delegate acting as
public authorities in exercising statutory powers vested by the
Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.

• The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that art
121(1A) does not overrule the general jurisdiction of the High
Courts, or enhance the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts.
• It was contended that the power of judicial review over the
administrative actions of public authorities lies within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts.
• The counsel emphasized that the jurisdiction of Syariah
Courts is confined to cases where all parties are Muslims, and
cannot be exercised over the non­Muslim appellant in this
case.
Respondents’ submissions ;
• Conversion to Islam is characterized as a strictly religious
matter. The Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak)
Enactment expressly confers jurisdiction upon the Syariah
Court to declare the status of a Muslim. Matters of Islamic
law are also specifically demarcated under Syariah Courts
jurisdiction pursuant to Ninth Schedule of the FC.
• Since the subject matter does not lie within the high court’s
jurisdiction, it was submitted that the high court cannot
exercise its power to review the actions of the Registrar of
Muallafs in present case.
• Section 25 and para 1 to the Schedule of the CJA 1964 and O
53 of the Rules of Court 2012 confer jurisdiction on the High
Courts to exercise supervisory powers. Syariah Courts are not
conferred with the power to review administrative decisions
of the authorities.
• Under art 121(1) of FC, judicial power is vested exclusively in
the civil High Courts.
• Judicial power may not be removed from High Courts and
may not be conferred upon bodies other than High Courts,
unless such bodies comply with the safeguards provided in
part XI of the Constitution to ensure their independence.
• The state must claim ownership over the subject matter that
fall within the jurisdiction of the syariah courts.
• The jurisdiction of the Syariah Court is limited by the;
I. It may not exercise the inherent judicial powers of the civil
courts including the power of judicial review.
II. It is confined to the person and subject matters listed in the
State List.
III. It must be provided for under the relevant state legislation.
• The appellant’s application is for judicial review of the
actions of the Registrar of Muallafs in issuing the certificates
of conversion, on the basis that the certificates were
inconsistent with the provisions in
I. The Perak Enactment
II. The Guardianship of Infants Act 1961
III. The Federal Constitution.
• The court hold that the High Court is seized with the
jurisdiction to exercise its supervisory power to decide on the
complaints made by the appellant against the administrative
act of the Registrar of Muallafs in issuing the certificates of
conversion of the appellant’s children to Islam.
• The appellant is a non­Muslim and so has no locus to appear
before the Syariah Court for the present application.
Whether Court of Appeal has erred in saying the matter shall fall
exclusively under Syariah Court’s jurisdiction

• It is evident from the marked differences in the establishment and constitution
of the civil and Syariah Courts that the two courts operate on a different footing
altogether. Thus the perception that both courts should exercise a mutually
reciprocal policy of non­interference may be somewhat misconceived and
premised on an erroneous understanding of the constitutional framework in
Malaysia.
• Clearly then, both cls (1) and (1A) of art 121 of the FC illustrate the respective
regimes in which each court operates. What they (cls (1) and (1A) art 121 of the
FC) illustrate is that, both the civil and syariah courts co­exist in their respective
spheres, even if they are dissimilar in the extent of their powers and jurisdiction,
in that the civil courts are possessed of powers, fundamental and intrinsic, as
outlined in the FC. In this, it is emphasised that, if the relief sought by a plaintiff
is in the nature of the “inherent powers” of the civil court (for example judicial
review) or if it involves constitutional issues or nterpretation of the law, then the
civil courts would be seized with jurisdiction to determine the issue. (paras 66­68 )
• Clause (1A) of art 121 of the FC recognises the power of the Syariah Courts when
it exercises its power within jurisdiction. Article 121(1A) must be interpreted
against the background of the foundational principles and other provisions in the
Constitution.
• Thus, judicial power cannot be vested in the Syariah Courts, because such courts
are not constituted as a “superior court” in accordance with the constitutional
provisions safeguarding the independence of judges in Part IX and judicial power
cannot be removed from the civil courts, because such powers are part of the
core or inherent jurisdiction of the civil courts.
• The present appeals arose from an application for judicial review of the
administrative actions of an executive body (the Registrar) in exercise of its
statutory powers (under the Perak Enactment). Regardless of the label that may
be applied to the subject matter, the power to review the lawfulness of
executive action rests solely with the civil courts.
• Article 121(1A) should not be dismembered and then interpreted literally and in
isolation of, but construed together with, art 121(1), for a construction
consistent with the smooth working of the system.
• Thus the amendment inserting cl (1A) in art 121 does not oust the jurisdiction of
the civil courts nor does it confer judicial power on the Syariah Courts.
• More importantly, Parliament does not have the power to make any
constitutional amendment to give such an effect; it would be invalid, if not
downright repugnant, to the notion of judicial power inherent in the basic
structure of the FC.
• The powers of judicial review and of constitutional or statutory interpretation
are pivotal constituents of the civil courts’ judicial power under art 121(1). Such
power is fundamentally inherent in their constitutional role as the bulwark
against unlawful legislation and executive action.
• As part of the basic structure of the constitution, it cannot be abrogated from
the civil courts or conferred upon the Syariah Courts, whether by constitutional
amendment, Act of Parliament or state legislation. (paras 86, 87, 88 & 100))
Whether a child of a marriage registered under the Law Reform
(Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 who has not attained the age of
eighteen years must comply with both ss 96(1) and 106(b) of the
administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004
before the Registrar of Muallafs or his delegate may register the
conversion to Islam of that child.

• Both sections (96 and 106) must be compiled with in order for a
valid certificate of Conversion to be issued for children of non­
Muslim marriages.
• Section 96 is a general provision for conversion into Islam.
• Subsection 106(b) is the specific provision applicable for the
conversion of persons under the age of 18, which the written
consent of the parent or guardian will suffice.
• On the facts, it was undisputed that the appellant’s children
were not present before the Registrar of Muallafs and did
not utter the two clauses of the Affirmation of Faith.
• The certificates of conversion were issued without consent of
the appellant thus contravening art 12(4) of the FC and ss5
and 11 of the GIA, which provide equal guardianship of
parents. The certificates of conversion are void and must be
set aside.
• The Registrar of Muallaf had no jurisdiction to issue the
certificates of conversion due to non­compliance of ss 96 and
106(b) of the Perak Enactment, namely the utterance of the
Affirmation of Faith and the consent of parent.
• The issuance of the certificates despite the non­fulfillment of
the mandatory statutory requirement is an act which the
Registrar had no power to do under the Enactment.
Whether the mother and the father (if both are still surviving) of a
child of a civil marriage must consent before a Certificate of
Conversion to Islam can be issued in respect of that child?

• The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the word
“parent” in art 12(4) should be read with the eleventh
Schedule of the Constitution, which provides for singular terms
to include the plural.
• Articles 3, 5, 8, and 11 were asserted to contain the right of a
mother to withhold her consent to a unilateral change in her
child’s religion.
• The counsel also referred to ss 5 and 11 of GIA, which provided
for equal guardianship rights between parents.
• The words “ibu atau bapa” in s 106(b) of the Perak Enactment
should be read to require both parents’ consent for the
conversion of a child.
• The respondent assert the right of one single parent to
convert a child. Common points were raised by the learned
counsel for the respondents; art 12(4) uses the word
“parent” in a singular sense, and has been interpreted by the
Federal Court in number of cases.
• The pertinent provision of Eleventh Schedule, read together
with art 160(1), provides that in interpreting the constitution:
“Contsruction of singular or plural”
Words in the singular include the plural, and words in the plural
include to singular.
• Applying the guide to interpretation to art 12(4), the position
is fairly clear: the singular word “parent” includes the plural
“parents”. The religion of the minor child is to be decided by
his parent or parents as the case may be.
• The custody was granted to the appellant by the High Court.
Hence, it is the appellant who exercises the dominant
influence in their lives. To allow the other spouse to
unilaterally convert the children without consent of the
appellant would amount to a serious interference with the
lifestyle of the new family unit.
• Under GIA, both parents have equal rights in relation to the
custody and upbringing of the infant children and the wishes
of both are to be taken into consideration. The conversion of
the husband to Islam doesn’t affect the legal position in GIA.
• To conclude, the consent of both appellant and her husband
are required before a Certificate of Conversion to Islam can
be issued in respect of the children.
 Pronouncement

• The Court of Appeal has erred in stating the matters fall solely within jurisdiction of
Syariah Courts as the matters involved the judicial power of courts and Article 121(1A)
does not take away the judicial powers of Civil Courts.
• The conversion of child would require both parent’s consent and as Appellant has
acquired custody of the child in High Court, the husband must comply.