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Denis O Brien

Empedocles: A Synopsis

l. Empedocles, Plato, Plotinus

Empedocles was an unusual gure in his life as in his philosophy. We may,

or may not, believe the story relayed by Diogenes Laertius (VIII 73), that he
appeared in public dressed in royal purple, a Delphie crown on his owing
locks and accompanied by a retinue of sen/ants. But we know, from his
own words (fr. l 12, 7-12), that, as he passed from city to city, he was fol-
lowed by >>men and women, in their tens of thousands, some of them desir-
ing oracles, others anxious to hear the word that would cure them of their
diseases<<. The amboyant lifestyle was matched by ideas that would have
been, at the time, no less unconventional. For Empedocles not only ex-
pounded, in considerable detail, an account of cosmic change designed to
rival the theories of his predecessors, notably Parmenides and Anaxagoras;
he also spoke of life after death in a way that was totally at odds with the
traditional view of the underworld to be found in the Iliad and the Odyssey.
Men and women, he told his followers, are so many daimones, who will
nd true happiness only when they are no longer incamated in the bodies in
which they now nd themselves and when they are able therefore to retum
to the company of the gods from which pollution and bloodshed have
caused them to be exiled.
So otherworldly a conception of human nature was admittedly not pecu-
liar to Empedocles. Verses inscribed on thin leaves of gold recovered from
graves in Southem Italy and Crete, of the fourth century and later, also por-
tray man’s origin as >>heavenly<< and speak of a bliss that lies beyond the
grave.‘ Related beliefs had very probably already surfaced a hundred years
or so earlier, at the time that Empedocles was writing. But, with the possi-
ble exception of Pythagoras, none of Empedocles’ predecessors had sought
to include such ideas in their account of the origin and workings of the 3

cosmos. I

However, Empedocles was soon to nd a powerful ally. Plato’s dia-

logues, from the Phaedo onwards, also display concem with belief in a
world other than that of our everyday experience, a world to which we can

' The most recent edition of the >gold leaves< is that by Carratelli 2001. I retum to the parallel
with Empedocles’ ideas in a forthcoming article »Empédocle: vie et aprés-vie<<.
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 3 l7

hope to return after death, when we have been freed from the
connes of
the body. Plato’s inuence was long-lived. An immortal
soul and the exis-
tence of a world other than the world of sense are recurring features in the
ontology,
writings of the Middle Platonists. Combined with a radically new
his Neo-
those same ideas gure largely in the philosophy of Plotinus and
platonic successors, who frequently appeal to Empedocles
in their struggle
against the materialism of the Epicureans and against what
they see as the
fantasies and the blasphemies of Christians and Gnostics alike.
But posthumous fame among the Neoplatonists was to prove a mixed
blessing. Empedocles’ position as guarantor of the antiquity
and therefore,
so it was assumed, the authenticity of Neoplatonic ideas has happily en-
unknown to us. At the
sured the quotation of verses that would otherwise be
same time, the ideological use to which quotations
from Empedocles were
the account of
put by philosophers of late Antiquity has wrought havoc with
Empedocles to be found in many modem histories of philosophy. For mod-
they are the
ern writers have frequently been unable to recognize for
what
Platonic and Neoplatonic accretions that have been added to
quotations
from Empedocles by philosophers who sought to present as all of a piece
ideas taken from the poems of Empedocles, from the dialogues of Plato and
from the Enneads of Plotinus.
That syncretistic view of the philosophies of Empedocles, Plato and Plot-
inus is of no little interest for the student of Neoplatonism. But
it is a trav-
esty of the truth, and should have no place in any critical study of the his-
tory of philosophy. The modern scholar can certainly not afford to neglect
the testimony of late Platonic and Neoplatonic writers. But, in drawing
on
later authors for his attempted reconstruction of Empedocles’ philosophy,
the historian needs to be constantly alert to the anachronism rampant in
the
writings of Syrianus, Asclepius, Simplicius and others, who constantly seek
to present Empedocles’ philosophy as in essentials no different from
their
own.

2. Chronology: Parmenides and Anaxagoras

In order to recover, so far as we can, the ideas that were put forward by the
Empedocles of history, as distinct from ideas that were associated with his
name by Platonic and Neoplatonic writers of Antiquity, we shall do well to
Start by attempting to establish the dating of Empedocles, in relation
both to
his near contemporary Anaxagoras and to their inuential predecessor,
Palmenides.

v
X‘

O
318 Denis O’Brien

Many of the dates attached to the lives of the early philosophers by 1)iO_
genes Laertius and other doxographers have only a slender claim to our be_
lief, since they have clearly been arrived at by relating a person’s akme,
arbitrarily xed at the age of forty years, to some well-known event such as
Xerxes’ invasion of Greece or the founding of Thurii. There are however
one or two exceptions, dates that seem to have been arrived at by sgme
other means and that are attested by authors whom we may hope are worthy
of trust. One such is Thrasyllus, a personal friend of the emperor Tiberius,
Thrasyllus was both an astrologer, whom we may hope therefore to have
been well-informed in the matter of years and birthdays, and the editor of
Democritus’ voluminous writings. Democritus himself attempted to trans-
mit at least one precise date to posterity, since he records composing his
work Mikros diakosmos 730 years after the fall of Troy. It is hardly De-
mocritus’ fault if his attempt has failed of its purpose. There were many
datings current in antiquity for the fall of Troy, and we have no means of
knowing which dating was the one that Democritus held to. Thrasyllus
however may have known. Whether relying in part on that information, or
whether perhaps drawing on other indications derived from Democritus’
writings, he tells us that Democritus was bom in the third year of the 77th
Olympiad and that he was just one year older than Socrates (making De-
mocritus, therefore, a >presocratic< by the skin of his teeth). The date of
Socrates’ death is well established as the spring of our 399 BC. At his trial
(Apol. l7 d 2-3) Socrates gave his age as 70 years >>or more<< (the manu-
scripts record both possibilities). If Socrates was in his 70th year in the
spring of 399 BC, he would have been bom in 469/8 BC, which is indeed
just one year later than the Olympiad year recorded by Thrasyllus, which
corresponds to our 470/69 BC.
From the dates of Socrates and Democritus, we may hope to work back
to the dates of Parmenides and Anaxagoras. In Plato’s dialogue of that
name, Parmenides is said to have been »about 65 years old<< at the time of
his meeting with Socrates, who was then >>very young<< (Parm. 127 b 1 - c
5). The meeting itself is no doubt ctitious and would have been known to
be so by readers of the time. On the other hand, the relative ages of the two
philosophers would have had to be plausible for the dramatic setting of the
dialogue to have point. To count as >>very young<< Socrates can hardly have
been older than _20, and might have been no more than, say, fifteen. The
meeting would therefore have been placed, dramatically, some time in the
years leading up to 450. If Pannenides was 65 years old at the time, he
would have therefore been born some time before 515 BC.
By what we can only hope is a curious coincidence, Democritus is re-
corded as saying that he was >>young in the old age of Anaxagoras<<. We can
therefore make a similar calculation to the calculation made for the birth Of
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 3 19

Pa1'n1enid6S. If Democritus was distinct from Plato’s »very

>>young<< (as
yQung<< in his account of Socrates)
up to the age of 25 or 30 years, and if
Anaxagoras was »old<< at anything from the age of 60 onwards, then the gap
would have been of 30 years or more. With Democritus bom in 470/69 BC,
We may therefore place Anaxagoras birth some time around the tum of the
i 9

century, a decade or so after that of Parmenides?

3. Chronology: Empedocles

And so we come to Empedocles, and to a famous conundrum in the history

of Empedoclean scholarship. In the Metaphysics (I 3, 983 b 6 - 984 a 18),
Aristotle lists the attempts that his predecessors had made to identify the
material cause, what Aristotle himself calls the elements. In the course of
his survey, Aristotle compares the rival theories of Empedocles and
Anaxagoras with the remark (984 a ll-13) that >>in age<< Anaxagoras was
»earlier<< than Empedocles (proteros), but that »in his works<< he was
»later<< or »inferior<< (hysteros).
If our dating so far has been correct, we may therefore infer that Empe-
docles, the younger of the two, was bom some time after the tum of the
century. But we are left with the ambiguity in Aristotle’s use of hysteros, a
word which has two distinct uses, literal (»later<<) and evaluative (>>infe-
rior<<). Does Aristotle mean that Anaxagoras was >>earlier<< in his age and
»later<< in his writings? Altematively, does he mean that Anaxagoras was
>>earlier<< in age but >>inferior<< in his works?
Generations of scholars have opted for what might seem the simpler of
the two meanings. The two uses of hysteros, literal (>>later<<) and evaluative
(>>inferior<<), are matched by two uses of proteros, which may again be used
either literally (>>earlier<<) or evaluatively (>>superior<<). In Aristotle’s text,
the addition >>in age<< shows that proteros is here used literally. In that case,
so it is thought, hysteros must also have, in the same sentence, its literal
meaning. Anaxagoras was bom before Empedocles (proteros), but wrote

2 For scrutiny of Thrasyllus’ dating of Socrates and Democritus, recorded in Diogenes, Vitae

IX 41, see O’Brien 1994, where I pay particular attention to the difference between cardinal and
ordinal numbers in stating someone’s age. If, as not infrequently in the ancient world, the two
°Xpressions are used synonymously, then, at the time of his death, Socrates would have been both
70 years old and in his 70“ year. In quoting from Diogenes (ibid.) Democritus’ statement that he
Was »young in the old age of Anaxagoras<<, I have discounted the remark which follows, that the
difference was 40 years. Although of course, in itself, a perfectly possible gure, 40 years has the
"I18 Of a doxographical addition, since it would make Democritus’ birth coincide all too neatly
With Anaxagoras’ akme.

i‘
0
 320 Denis O’Brien

after him (hysteros). To combine a literal meaning for proteros (>>earlier<<)

with an evaluative meaning for hysteros (»inferior<<), so it is thought, would
be too contorted a fonn of expression for what in Aristotle’s text is, after
all, hardly more than an aside. In the vast majority of histories of Greek phi-
losophy (as in Diels’ monumental Fragmente der Vorsokratiker),
Anaxagoras is therefore placed after Empedocles (Anaxagoras was »ear-
lier<< in age and >>later<< in his works), and his ideas are not infrequently pre-
sented as an advance upon, and even as criticism of, those of his predeces_
sor.
But that interpretation is mistaken. Disconcerting it may seem to have a
literal meaning of proteros followed, in the same sentence, by an evaluative
meaning of hysteros, but that is what Aristotle intended. For even closer to
Aristotle’s heart than the theory of the elements was the question of a mov-
ing cause. And on that question Aristotle writes without ambiguity.
Anaxagoras, so Aristotle tells us, in the continuation of the same passage
from the Metaphysics (I 3, 984 b 15-20), was the rst to introduce a cause
of movement separate from the object moved. He did so, >>appearing as a
sane man among those who, before him, spoke at random<<. Empedocles
cannot possibly be included among those, who, >>before<< Anaxagoras,
»spoke at random<<. For Aristotle not infrequently acknowledges Empedo-
cles’ use of a moving cause. At the beginning of book eight of the Physics
(Vlll 1, 252 a 10-22), he even reckons Empedocles’ account of movement
and rest as superior to that of Anaxagoras. The conclusion cannot be
doubted. Aristotle thinks of Empedocles as writing later than Anaxagoras
when it is question of a moving cause. Unless we are to tax Aristotle with
inconsistency, he must therefore imply that Anaxagoras put forward his
theory of the elements before that of Empedocles.
When he introduces Anaxagoras’ theory of the elements in the Meta-
physics, Aristotle does therefore intend hysreros to have an evaluative
meaning. Anaxagoras was older than Empedocles, with the implication that
he wrote before him. But in his theory of the elements he was >>inferior<<.
Aristotle’s judgement is hardly surprising. Empedocles’ choice of >>four
elements<< was adopted, not only by Plato, but by Aristotle himself.
Anaxagoras’ near-contemporary theory, which diverged from that of Em-
pedocles, was necessarily therefore, in Aristotle’s eyes, >>inferior<<.
I conclude that, chronologically, our examination of Empedocles’ phl-
losophy can be placed on a fairly rm footing. Parmenides was born some
time before 515 BC. Anaxagoras was born a decade or so later. Emped0C1¢5
was younger than Anaxagoras, and also wrote after him. For the historian of
philosophy, it is that nal detail which is crucial. In reading the fragments
of Empedocles, we have to bear in mind the distinct possibility that, since
Empedocles wrote after Anaxagoras, he already knew of AI13.X3.gOraS
.|

Empedocles: A Synopsis 321

work. We must therefore bear in mind the

further possibility that he writes
— with an eye to criticism
as he does — for such is the way of philosophers
of his predecessor?

4. Anaxagoras’ >>homoiomeries<<

In the light of that conclusion, let us return to

the theory of the elements,
i
and let us start with Anaxagoras.
all the many
Anaxagoras claimed as what Aristotle will call >>elements<<
simple things that make up the objects in the
world we see around us: wood,
bone and hair, as opposed to a
for example, as opposed to trees, or blood,
human head. To distinguish Anaxagoras’ elements
from the objects made
a word which
up from the elements, Aristotle calls them »homoiomeries<<,
to designate a body that,
he has probably coined himself and which
he uses
when divided, produces parts similar to each other
and to the whole. If you
cut a tree into pieces, you will not produce so many
little trees, whereas if
you cut up a piece of wood into smaller and smaller pieces
they will still all
nomenclature, is >>homoiomer-
be wood. Wood, therefore, in Aristotle’s
ous<<. blood, bone and hair are all >>homoiomerous<< bodies,
Similarly,
whereas a human head is not.
works
As an initial guide to Anaxagoras’ theory, Aristotle’s terminology
to include trees or
well enough. Anaxagoras’ elements were not intended
bodies that make
faces, but they did include all the many »homoiomerous<<
we around us. However, despite
up the plants and animals that see
>>homoiomerous<< by
Anaxagoras’ elements being constantly described as
authors writing after Aristotle, the use of the Aristotelian tag is seriously
misleading as soon as we consider Anaxagoras’ theory in more detail. For
Anaxagoras does not at all believe, as Aristotle will do, that any piece of
wood is, so to speak, wood >>through and through<<, or that any drop of
blood is blood and nothing more. On the contrary, the striking and at first
Sight impossibly paradoxical feature of Anaxagoras’ theory is
that >>in
everything there is a portion of everything<< (fr. l2). In any piece of wood,
I10 matter how small, will be found tiny pieces of all the
other >>homoiomer-
ies<<, including blood. Vice versa, in any droplet of blood, no matter
how
Small, will tiny portions of all other >>homoiomeries<<, including
be found
in
“/00d. Anaxagoras’ elements are therefore not at all >>homoiomerous<<
ls"
Y.

be found in a pair
A more throughgoing account of Empedocles’ relation to Anaxagoras will
°f articles, >>The relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles<< and »Derived light and eclipses in the
h C@nt11ry<<.

Lo-I
 322 Denis O’Brien

Aristotle’s sense of the word, since, for Aristotle, blood contains O

nly I

blood, while wood (once it has been formed from the elements) is made
up i
wholly and entirely of wood.
The reason for Anaxagoras’ adopting the extraordinary theory that he
does is almost certainly that it was intended as an escape from Parmenides,
arguments against the reality of change. Parrnenides had claimed that noth~
ing could come into being and that nothing could pass away, that >>being<< is
therefore one and immutable, and that all change, including specically
change of place and change of colour, was no more than a >>name<< that, in
their ignorance of tme >>being<<, mortals have given to all the many chang-
ing things that they think to see and feel around them (cf fr. 8, 38-41)_
Anaxagoras’ theory of the elements can plausibly be seen as designed to
explain the appearance of change, while retaining the principle that what
>>is<< always has been and always will be. So it is that none of the Simple

things (none of the >>homoiomeries<<) that we see around us ever comes into
being or passes away. Ifthey appear to do so, it is only because we see and
feel only >>what there is most of<< (cf fr. 12). In any piece of bread
(Anaxagoras’ own example, recorded by Simplicius) we see and taste only
bread, because bread is what there is >>most of<<. But, following the principle
that >>in everything there is a part of everything<<, the bread also contains,
invisible to the human eye and imperceptible to human taste, a part of
everything else, including therefore the blood, bone and hair that the bread
will seem to change into once we have eaten it.
Change therefore is explained by a change in the proportion of ingredi-
ents, and not because any new thing has come into being nor because there
is anything that has passed away. Bread can be broken down into what no
longer appears as bread, simply because there has been a change of propor-
tion. The tiny and at one time invisible pieces of bone or blood that were
hidden in the bread join together, when we feed on bread, so that they come
to be seen as bone or blood. But the principle remains: in what is seen, after
ingestion, as blood and bone there are still present tiny pieces of everything
else, including pieces of bread. If, after ingestion, blood and bone alone are
visible, it is because, in the body that has been nourished from bread and in
what therefore we now see as blood and bone, there is a greater prop0rti0I1
of blood and bone than of bread or of any of the other elements, all Of
which are nonetheless still present, though now invisible to us.‘
0

4 Aristotle calls Anaxagoras’ elements >>homoiomeries<< at De gen. er corr. I 1, 314 a 18 2%

and not infrequently elsewhere. For Aristotle’s own distinction between >>homoiomerous<<l;11’:z
»anhomoiomerous<< bodies, see Meteor. IV 10, 388 a l3-20 (examples) and De part. amm: ,

647 b 17-20 (the different results when you divide a body of either kind). The account I SW? °
Anaxagoras’ theory follows closely fragments l to 12 in DK ll 32-9, taken, with one exc6P"°n’
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 323

5. Empedocles’ four >>roots<<

We can only speculate that Anaxagoras’ theory of »homoiomeries<< was

designed to circumvent Parmenides’ denial of change, highly probable
though that speculation may be. When we tum to Empedocles, we are on
rmer ground. For Empedocles refers to Parmenides, even if not by name.
In the course of his poem, Pannenides, or rather the goddess whose words
Parmenides claims to be recording, speaks of >>the deceitful ordering of my
words<< (fr. 8, 52). The goddess’ warning comes, appropriately, at the mo-
ment when she tums aside from her proof of one, immutable >>being<<, in
order to embark upon her account of the world of change and movement.
When Empedocles embarks upon his account of change and movement, he
bids his disciple listen to »the unfolding of a tale that is not deceitfu1<< (fr.
17, 26). The verbal echo (»deceitful<<, »not deceitful<<) is so close that we
can be reasonably sure it is deliberate. Empedocles is claiming to substitute
an account that is not »deceitful<< for one which its author had claimed,
paradoxically, was >>deceitful<<. Parmenides had said that >>coming-into-
being and passing-away<<, »changing place and altering bright colour<<, were
no more than a >>name<< (cf fr. 8, 38-41). Empedocles will aim to show that
cosmic change is more than a >>name<<.
But Empedocles will not therefore claim that all the many changes that
we see around us contravene Parmenides’ principle that nothing can come
into being and that nothing can pass away. For, like Anaxagoras, Empedo-
cles will distinguish the many complex objects that we see around us from
the elements that they are made out of. All the complex objects that fumish
the world, plants and animals alike, do indeed have only a limited span of
life, but not so the elements or »roots<< from which they are made, and
which, for Empedocles, are four in number: earth, air, re and water?
From those four elements alone, by their mixture and by their separation,
are produced the many things that do indeed, contrary to what Parmenides
had claimed, »change their place and alter their bright colour<<. Very possi-

from Simplicius’ commentaries on the Physics and the De caelo. The examples of wood and bread
are included in the long summary that Simplicius gives of Anaxagoras’ theory at Phys. 460, 4 -
461, 9 (quoted in part as DK 59 A 45). Bone and blood are the examples Lucretius uses to illus-
trate Anaxagoras’ theory, De rer. nat. I 835-8. Hair appears in a verbatim quotation (fr. 10). Read-
ers who seek amplication of my brief remarks on Parmenides, here and in what follows, may care
I0 consult O’Brien 1987.
5 For the elements as >>r0ots<<, see fr. 6, where earth, air, re and water are presented under the
alibi of four divine names (Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis). The precise correlation of name and
element was debated in the ancient world, and has long been a matter of controversy in modem
Ilmes. The most recent attempt at solving the conundrum will be found in an extensive study by
Picot 2000.
 324 Denis O’Brien

bly with an ey,eto Parmenides’ choice of change of colour as an example of

the »deceitfu1 ordering<< of his words, Empedocles appeals to Change of
colour as proof or illustration of his own theory. By mixing colours, paint-
ers produce a vast array of different appearances; so too, the mixture of
Empedocles’ elements produces all the many things that make up the world
around us, >>trees and men and women, beasts and birds and sh that fegd
on water<< (fr. 23; cf fr. 21, l0-l 1).

6. Empedocles’ criticism of Anaxagoras

Empedocles’ choice of only four >>elements<< Aristotle sees as a distinct ad-

vantage over the indenite multiplicity of Anaxagoras’ >>homoiomeries<<.
The reason for the preference expressed in the Metaphysics is spelt out in
the Physics (I 4-6). Anaxagoras’ claim that >>in everything there is a part of
everything<< would lead to an impossible regress in the search for smaller
and smaller >>parts<<. >>Better therefore<<, Aristotle concludes (I 4, 188 a l7-
18), >>to take, as Empedocles does, elements that are fewer and limited in
number.<< >>Better it is<<, he repeats two chapters later (I 6, 189 a 15-17), to
start, as Empedocles does, >>from elements that are limited rather than from
elements that are unlimited.<< From elements limited in number »Empedo-
cles reckons he can produce all the results that Anaxagoras arrives at start-
ing from elements that are unlimited<<. Aristotle’s praise of Empedocles is
of course covert praise for himself, since four elements (the same four that
Empedocles had chosen) are a salient feature of Aristotle’s own physical
theory. Aristotle sees Anaxagoras’ theory as >>inferior<< to that of Empedo-
cles because, on this‘ point as on others, he has read the history of ideas as
so many steps on the way to the truth that is embodied in his own theory.
It is therefore all the more important for the modern historian not to re-
peat unthinkingly the Aristotelian perspective, and not to take Empedocles’
theory of the elements as motivated merely by a desire for economy (four
elements as opposed to an indenite multiplicity). For, thanks to our study
of the relative chronology of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, we can see that,
in all likelihood, such was not, or not only, Empedocles’ own motivation.
When Empedocles speaks of his four elements, he repeats the refrain (cf fr-
l7, 34-5): >>F or these are themselves, but, running through one another, they
become different things at different times, and endlessly always the same.<<
>>Running through one another<< may be taken as a graphic description Of
the elements mixing with one another. But what does it mean to say that the
elements >>are themselves<< or >>are themselves alone<< (the two connotations
7
325
Empedocles: A Synopsis

has chosen)? Taken in isolation from

attach to the expression Empedocles
be mysterious in the extreme.
their historical context, those words would
in the light of Anaxagoras’ theory,
How can anything not >>be itself<<? Read
meaning.
Empedocles’ words at once have point, and of it
If we attempt to isolate any object in Anaxagoras’ world and to say
a piece of wood or a drop
that it >>is itself<<, we cannot do s0. Consider again
theory, do exist. They are not
of blood. Wood and blood, in Anaxagoras’
a mixture of some, or all, of the
simply, as for Empedocles, the result of
four elements. But even so, of any drop
of blood or of any piece of wood in
or that it is »itself
Anaxagoras’ theory, we cannot say that it is >>itself<<
alone<<, precisely because >>in
everything there is a part of everything<<.
blood, is not >>itself<<, in so far as it
Blood, taken as any particular drop of
does not exist »on its own<<. It is
always mixed with parts, not only of some
is never only blood. Any single
other things, but of everything else. Blood
is, at the same time, everything else.
drop of blood, as well as being blood,
many things made up from the
Contrast Empedocles’ theory. Of all the
beasts and birds and sh that feed on
elements, >>trees and men and women,
water<< (cf. fr. 21, l0-l l), we cannot
say that they »are themselves<< or that
they >>are alone<<. For all such things contain
within them the elements from
which they have been formed, and into
which they will one day be dis-
solved. But of Empedocles’ >>roots<<, his
four elements, we are able to say
alone<<, for they are not made up
that they >>are themselves<< or >>themselves
within itself any part of any
from anything else, nor does each one contain
not therefore differ from
of the others. Empedocles’ >>elements<< do
in number (no more than four
Anaxagoras’ only in being drastically fewer
as opposed to an indefinite multiplicity).
They differ also in the kind of
thing that they are. Empedocles’ >>roots<< are
simple in a way that Anaxago-
elements is >>itself
ras’ »homoiomeries<< never can be. Each of Empedocles’
alone<<.
set out to circumvent Par-
Empedocles, as very likely Anaxagoras, has
menides’ denial of change by distinguishing the
many objects that we see
and feel around us from their constituents, things
that never come into being
and never pass away. But Empedocles’ theory
of elemental change was in
all probability not designed solely as a more
economical version of
chosen to present it. Empe-
Anaxagoras’ theory, which is how Aristotle has
the identity of the elements.
docles’ concern was, at least in part, with
Empedocles has set out to distance himself
from Anaxagoras, not only by
 326 - Denis O’Brien

reducing the number of unchangeable constituents, but no less by establish.

ing each of the unchangeable >>roots<< as existing >>by itself<<, >>on its
own<<.°

7. Rest and movement, Love and Strife

Aristotle’s evidence is, again, both essential to an understanding of Emp¢_

docles’ system, and yet potentially misleading, when we tum to the
que5_
tion of a >>moving cause<<. As already noted, Aristotle acclaims Anaxagorag
as the rst philosopher to introduce a cause of movement distinct
from the
object moved. When therefore he also presents Empedocles’ two
divine
powers, Love and Strife, as a pair of >>moving causes<<, as he does,
for ex-
ample, in the opening chapter of the De generatione et corruprione
(I 1, 314
a 17), it is clear that he considers Empedocles as a successor
of Anaxagoras.
So far, so good. But is it true that Anaxagoras’ >>moving cause<< and
Empe-
docles’ Love and Strife are, all three, in the same sense, causes of move-
ment? To nd the answer to that question, we need to consider the elaborate
comparison and contrast that Aristotle draws between Anaxagoras
and
Empedocles at the beginning of the last book of the Physics, by way
of
preparation for his own theory of an unmoved mover.
Aristotle is here concemed with the opposition, on a cosmic scale, be-
tween rest and movement (Phys. VIII l, 250 b 23 - 251 a 8 and 252 a 5-32).
Anaxagoras, he tells us, thought that all things were at rest for an indenite
period in the past, before the intervention of a cosmic mind, which set
things in movement and so brought into being the world we know now, a
world that will continue for an indenite period of time in the future.
Empedocles’ scheme was more complex. Rest and movement, in Empedo-

6 The general thesis ofthis section is argued for in

greater detail in an article provisionally enti-
tled »Anaxagore et Empédocle: le paradoxe des h0mae0méres<<, to appear shortly
in a collection Of
articles to be published under the auspices ofthe Centre Léon Robin (Paris).
8 By attempting to deal so summarily with
so complex a question I realize that I am casting
hostages to fortune. To simplify matters, I have made no attempt to deal here
with Simplicius’
evidence (which, exceptionally, contradicts that of Aristotle), nor with Simplicius’
quotation Of
Eudemus (which conmis the interpretation I have given of Aristotle’s passage).
See Simplici11$,
Phys. I125, 15-22 and 1183, 28 - I184, 4 (= Eudemus, fr. 110 Wehrli). For a fuller treatment, t11¢
reader will need to consult O'Brien 1969, pp. 4-45. I have also left aside here consideration Of
some ofthe newly found verses in the Strasbourg papyrus, col. a (II) 9-19, which
the editors talk‘?
as conrmation of Plutarch’s claim that, when the elements have been
fully separated, the)’ are
moving. See Martin and Primavesi 1999, pp. 135-7 (text), pp. 196-223 (commentary), and pP- 72'
4 (comparison with Plutarch’s De facie). Some of the misunderstandings that bedevil modern
attempts at reconstructing Empedocles’ theory I have attempted to clear away in O’Brien 1995, PP-
405-29.

raé-.-<._=.-.3»,-e;=,....._I.....-_..._.
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 327

cles’ philosophy, succeed each other in

turn. There is, so Aristotle tells us
the one out of many or
(250 b 26-9), movement »whenever Love makes
is rest in the times be-
whenever Strife makes many out of one, while there
enough. But when Aristotle
1ween<<. So much may seem straightforward
a 5-10), he writes
repeats Empedocles’ theory, a couple of pages
later (252
but >>for the time
of there being rest, not >>in the times between<< (plural),
the ambi-
between“ (singular). The shift from plural to singular highlights
at both termini (when Love has
guity. Does Aristotle mean that there is rest
one from many, and when
completed the process of making the elements
many from one) or
Strife has completed the process of making the elements
at only one tenninus, and if so, which?
Commentators both ancient and modem have taken
Aristotle to mean
that the elements were at rest at both termini.
But that cannot be so. Plu-
tarch, in his long and leamed treatise On the face
of the man in the moon
(De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet), compares
Empedocles’ elements,
when they have been fully separated (and therefore
when Strife has com-
one<<), with the precos-
pleted his task of making the elements »many from
d 4 - 53 b 5). In doing
mic elements that Plato writes of in the Timaeus (52
so, he makes it clear that, for Empedocles
as for Plato, the elements, at that
have been only
time, were moving (12, 926 D - 927 A). There can therefore
a single period of rest in each >cycle<. The
elements are at rest when they
have been made into one by Love. At all other times
they are many and
separated by
moving, including the time when they have been totally
Strife.“

8. >>Equal times<<

Once the succession of rest and movement has been clearly

delineated, we
are able to give full force to the remark with which Aristotle concludes his
criticism (Phys. Vlll 1, 252 a l9-32). Empedocles’ altemation of rest and
movement Aristotle counts as an improvement on Anaxagoras’ belief
that
rest which has lasted for an indeterminate length of time in the past
should
be followed, at some arbitrary moment, by movement that will continue for
an indenite length of time in the future. But Empedocles’ theory,
though
an improvement on that of Anaxagoras, is still grievously at fault.
For what
is the cause of alternation? Aristotle allows that an inductive argument
scale, of
might be constructed to show that Love is cause, on a cosmic
things joining together and that Strife, similarly, is cause of separation. But
What higher cause is there to regulate the endless succession
of rest and

I
I
 328 ' Denis O’Brien :1" w.
,,.i.
pi
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movement? Empedocles, so Aristotle writes, has failed to address himself

to that question. He has failed to explain why there should be, >>in addition
equal intervals of time<< (252 a 31-2). In the context of Aristotle’s argument:
A
the >>equal intervals of time<< are almost certainly equal intervals of rest and
tl
movement.
sz
>>Equal times<< cast a wholly new light on the roles of Love and Strife.
When Aristotle writes, at the beginning of his criticism, that Empedocles’
vv
elements are at rest >>in the times between<< or >>for the time between<<, we
2
are not to envisage the time of rest as a stage that is merely transitional. The
tl
period when the elements have been made into one by Love and are at rest
l(
is equal in length to the whole time of movement, both the movement by
d
which Strife makes the elements into many from one and the movement by
, tl
which Love makes the elements into one from many. Is Love then cause of Sl
rest or cause of movement? When Love has succeeded in making the ele-
vs
ments one from many, she induces rest, not movement, and the period of
rest lasts for as long as the whole period of movement, whether movement
S
dominated by Strife or movement dominated by Love.
7
We may grant therefore that Love is cause of movement, as Aristotle
ii
says she is, in so far as she >>rnoves<< the elements when she seeks to undo
tl
the work of Strife and to bring back the elements, from being many, to be- v
ing one. But Love and Strife are not therefore, as Aristotle’s language
ft
would lead us to suppose, simply a pair of >>moving causes<<. On the con- 1 V
trary, the life of the world is divided into equal periods of rest and of ll
movement, which are also equal periods of unity and of plurality. Strife is
active when the elements are many and moving. But when the elements are f
one and at rest they are controlled exclusively by Love. Love therefore is
E
primarily cause of rest, and only secondarily a cause of movement.
Once again the modem historian must be wary of simply repeating the
Aristotelian perspective. Anaxagoras had introduced a cause of movement.
But Empedocles does not simply follow suit. Empedocles provides a cause
both of movement and of rest. Strife is cause of multiplicity and of move-
ment. Love is cause, primarily, of unity and of rest?

9 Again, l have to forego here a detailed study of Aristotle’s argument. See O’Brien
1969, pp-
55-76 (on Aristotle’s >>equal times<<), and 76-80 (on the role of Love and Strife). A pair Of scholia
relating to Empedocles has been recently brought to light from a 12"‘ century manuscript of Aris-

i—-ii
totle by Rashed 2001, pp. 142-5. Further scholia of the same manuscript are published by Rashed,
»La chronologie du systeme d’Empédocle<<. These scholia purport to give precise times for some .4!

at least of the stages in Empedocles’ >cycle<. Unfortunately, the question is too complex to be
summarised here. My own interpretation of the scholia (different from that proposed by Rashed)
will be given in a forthcoming publication, provisionally entitled >>New scholia on Empedocles<<.

|
?'*
329
Empedocles: A Synopsis

9. The cosmic >cyc1e<

and testimonia enables us to

ll in
A judicious combination of fragments and the many, which is at the
succession of the one
the detail of the endless
same time an endless succession
of rest and of movement.
a time
are one and at rest is necessarily
The time when the elements 1183,
it has disappeared. Simplicius (Phys.
when the cosmos as we know where we hear
28 '- 1184, 4) quotes from
Eudemus (fr. 110 Wehrli) a verse
Love, »there are no
been made into one by
that, when the elements have verse was used to
limbs<< (fr. 27, 1). A parallel
longer seen the sun’s swift Strife. At
have been fully separated by
describe the time when the elements face of the
»there is not descried the shining
that time, so we hear (fr. 26a), because covered
sun, nor the shaggy might
of earth [>>shaggy<<, presumably (De
Those verses are quoted by Plutarch
with plants and trees] nor sea<<. of
the state of the world at the moment
facie 12, 926 E), when he compares
of the precosmic elements in Plato’s
Strife’s triumph with the condition therefore alike
and the activity of Strife are
Timaeus. The activity of Love
of the cosmos as we see it today. But
there
in leading to the disappearance of rest,
period ruled by Love is a time
the similarity ends. The non-cosmic which leads away
period of movement
which lasts for as long as the whole period
back to the one. The non-cosmic
from the one and which leads length is
is a time of movement, whose
which results from Strife’s activity
in no way comparable to the time
of rest under Love.”
(De gen. er corr. I1 6, 334 a 5-7),
Our own world, we hear from Aristotle
to make the elements many from
one.
falls in the period when Strife seeks
describe the reappearance of
sun, land
Scattered fragments and testimonia that had been
upon the non-cosmic unity
and sea when Strife breaks in origins of animal life
brought about by Love. Other fragments recount the
disrupt
when Strife first intervenes to
from which we are descended. Thus creatures
the rule of Love there sprout up
from the earth »whole-natured<<
apart to fomi the men and women
(cf fr. 62, 4-5), which will later be split

to be quoted here in full.

and testimonia are again too numerous
'0 References to fragments The twin descriptions of a
dealt with extensively in O’Brien 1969, pp. 196-236.
The evidence is
- 1184, 4, quoting Eudemus), and by
(Phys. 1183, 28
non-cosmic period, recorded by Simplicius This cannot be cor-
by DK as a single fragment (fr.
27).
Plutarch (Defacie, 12, 926 E), are given quotation to a time of rest and
explicitly attributes his
rect, since Simplicius (quoting Eudemus) his quotation to a time of move-
less specifically, attaches
unity under Love, while Plutarch, no separate numbering to the two
of total separation caused by Strife. Hence my giving a
ment and
for the verses recorded by Simplicius).
by Plutarch, fr. 27
fragments (fr. 26a for the verses quoted by Simplicius and by Plutarch (the sun has
readings given
Hence too my retaining the divergent For the distinction between
a >>shining face<< in Plutarch).
>>Swift limbs<< in Simplicius’ quotation,
1969, pp. 149-54.
the two fragments, see O’Brien
 T-

330 - Denis O’Brien

who inhabit our present cosmos. But the life we know today is not the nal
stage in Empedocles’ zoogonical sequence. As Strife pursues his work of
separation, men and women as they are now will be torn into separate
limbs, condemned to wander »each of them apart along the breakers of
life’s shore<< (fr. 20, 5).
When our world has nally disintegrated, following Strife’s triumph in
producing the non-cosmic state of the world described by Plutarch, Love
intervenes to make the elements one from many. As she does so, Similar
fonns of animal life to those that had occurred during the time of Strife’s
increasing power make their appearance, but in the reverse order. Love’s
zoogony starts therefore from separate animal parts that are formed inside
the earth. At rst, these are joined together in monstrous combinations,
creatures >>with shambling gait and countless hands<< (fr. 60), a cow’s head
on a human body or a human head on the body of a cow (fr. 61). But, as the
power of Love increases, the combinations become more harmonious, so
that there are formed again men and women, to be followed perhaps by a
reappearance of the >>whole-natured<< creatures that had inaugurated the op-
posite zoogony of increasing Strife.“
And so the tale ofthe cosmic >cycle< is complete. The life of the world is
an endless series of equal and successive times of rest and movement that
are also equal and successive times of unity and plurality. The time of plu-
rality and movement is divided between movement from one to many,
dominated by Strife, and a retum movement from many to one, dominated
by Love. Both movement dominated by Strife and movement dominated by
Love produce a world of living creatures, including men and women,
formed either from the division of »whole-natured<< creatures, when the
elements are increasingly drawn apart by Strife, or from the increasingly
harmonious combination of separate animal parts, when Love leads the
elements back from being many to being one. The transition from a zo-
ogony of increasing Strife to a zoogony of increasing Love is marked by a
time when the world, as we know it, has disappeared, not however because
the elements have been brought to unity and rest by Love, but on the con-

H The >>whole-natured<< creatures (>>whole<< because they were not yet divided into male and
female) appear in verses, fr. 62, that were taken, so Simplicius tells us (Phys. 381, 29), from the
second book of the Physika. The formation of bones, one of the animal parts that appeared at ll"?
beginning of Love’s zoogony (Aristotle, De caelo III 2, 300 b 25-31), was described in verses, fr-
96, that we learn, again from Simplicius (Phys. 300, 20), were taken from the rst book of the
same poem. The reader should therefore be warned that, here again, Diehls’ arrangement of the
i
fragments cannot be correct. DK fr. 96 (taken, according to Simplicius, from book one) came
before DK fr. 62 (taken, according to Simplicius, from book two). Indeed, from Simplicius’ plac-
ing of the two fragments, we can probably infer that the two zoogonies were placed in different
books. Love’s zoogony, from which fr. 96 may well have been taken, appeared in book 0116-
Strife’s zoogony, to which fr. 62 belongs, did not appear until book two.
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 331

trary because Strife has reduced the elements to a state of movement and
Separation such that the familiar features of our cosmos are no longer to be
seen.

10. >>A broad oath<< and >>honours<<

Can Aristotle be right when he complains, in the Physics, that this elaborate
system was left unexplained? In looking for a cause that would determine
>>equal intervals<< of rest and movement, Aristotle has clearly failed to find,
in Empedocles’ verses, any anticipation of his own >>unmoved mover<<. But
did Empedocles then give no account of how or why it is that Love and
Strife rule the elements in tum?
Aristotle’s silence in the Physics might well lead us to despair of finding
an answer to that question. But, ironically enough, it, is Aristotle himself
who provides the answer, in verses he has quoted when he repeats his criti-
cism of Empedocles in the Metaphysics. In the Metaphysics (II 4, 1000 b 9-
17) as in the Physics (VIII l, 252 a 5-10), Aristotle complains that Empedo-
cles speaks of change from rest to movement as though it were simply in
the >>nature<< of things to be so, as though such change were inevitable (or
>>necessary<<). However, in the Metaphysics, to prove his point, he quotes a
sequence of three verses which describe the moment when Strife brings to
an end the period of rest induced by Love (fr. 30): >>When Strife grew great
in his limbs and leapt forward to seize his honours, when the time is coming
to an end that has been xed in exchange for them [sc. the honours of
Strife] by a broad oath ...<<
The historian can only wince. Hardly more than a hundred years have
elapsed between Empedocles’ writing those verses and Aristotle’s quotation
of them in the Metaphysics. Yet, in that relatively short lapse of time, a
whole world of thought has been so lost to view that Aristotle can no longer
recognize, in talk of >>honours<< and >>a broad oath<<, what Empedocles him-
self saw as an appropriate explanation of why it is that a period of cosmic
rest should be succeeded by a period of movement. Love and Strife for
Empedocles are living beings. The »honours<< due to each have been deter-
mined by >>a broad oath<<. The oath has xed a time for the honours of
Love, a time that is coming to an end and that has been given in exchange
for the honours of Strife that are now about to begin. Strife therefore leaps
forward to seize his honours as soon as the time that he has been con-
strained to yield to Love has reached its term
 -1

it
332 Denis O’Brien J

The author ‘of the words Aristotle has quoted clearly thinks that he is giv_
ing an adequate explanation of how and why it is that Strife takes over from
Love and of how and why it is that rest therefore gives way to movement.
But Aristotle can no longer take such motifs seriously. In a cosmic context,
a >>broad oath<< and >>honours<< no longer have meaning
for someone who
looks to nd in Empedocles’ philosophy a cause comparable to an entity
whose thought is of thought itself and which is cause of movement,
Whilg
itself unmoved.
And yet, in the very verses which Aristotle quotes to illustrate the ab-
sence of a cause, we very probably see an allusion to,
possibly even the
source of, Aristotle’s remark on >>equal times<< in the Physics. In the verses
quoted, a time that is coming to an end has been xed >>in exchange<< for a
to an end is a
second time that is about to begin. The time that is coming
time of rest. The time that is about to begin will be a time of movement.
What then is the rate of exchange? The simplest answer will be that the two
times are equal.
If that is so, then Aristotle will have correctly recorded Empedocles’ the-
ory, even if, here as on the question of the four elements and of the
moving
cause, he has sought to nd in Empedocles’ history
of cosmic change an
found
anticipation of his own theories and on this occasion, therefore, has
an and >>honours<< are too little
Empedocles wanting, simply because >>oath<<

amenable to reformulation in terms of his own ideas of what might consti-

chary of adopt-
tute causation. Once again, therefore, the historian must be
ing Aristotle’s perspective, even while drawing on Aristotle for his recon-
struction of what it was that Empedocles had to say.

1 1. >>Daimones<<

Our tolerance of motifs that Aristotle has disregarded will again

be put to

the test when we discover that an >>oath<< or >>oaths<< do

not appear only in
on the parallel
the verses quoted in the Metaphysics. In his commentary
14-16) the three verses
passage of the Physics, Simplicius repeats (1184,
which
that Aristotle had quoted in the Metaphysics (with a slight variation,
may well indicate that he has taken ‘them from his own exemplar
of the
verses are preceded by a coup-
poem). In Simplicius’ commentary, the three
let where we are told (fr. 115, 1-2) of a >>decree of the gods, sealed by broad
oaths<<.
from
Very fortunately, the whole, or at least a large part, of the sequence
which Simplicius’ couplet has been taken is quoted by Hippolytus. A Ro-
, 1-.

i
333
.‘1§’>

Empedocles: A Synopsis

man Christian of the late second and early third century, heavily embroiled
in the religious and personal controversies of his day, Hippolytus writes at
some length of Empedocles in the course of a monumental compilation
known to us as the Refutatio omnium haeresium. The verses Hippolytus has
quoted, apparently from the same sequence as Simplicius’ >>broad oaths<<
(Ref. VII 29-31), do not, in any immediately obvious way, deal with cosmic
rest and movement. They have to do instead with daimones, who have been
cast forth from the company of »the blessed ones<< and condemned to wan-
der, for thirty thousand seasons, >>treading in tum the bitter paths of life<<,
tossed from sky (or >>aether<<) to sea and from sea to land, from land »to the
rays of the shining sun<< and from the sun to >>whirling pools of aether<<
(with »aether<< therefore the rst and the last item in the list, indicating that
the list of elements is complete). The sequence of verses ends (fr. 115, 13-
14) with a dramatic revelation of the poet’s own self. >>Of these [sc. dai-
mones] I too am now one, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, trusting to
raging Strife.<<
As the context in Hippolytus makes clear, the wanderings of the daimon
through >>the bitter paths of life<< are none other than successive transmigra-
tions, when, as Empedocles tells us, speaking again of his own self (fr.
117): >>There was already a time when I was born as a boy and a girl, a bush
and a bird, and a voiceless fish from the sea.<< Other fragments, very proba-
bly from the same context, point to the fearful consequence. Since the same
daimon may appear in a human or a non-human form, there is the horrify-
ing possibility that, in killing and eating animals, a father may all unwit-
tingly kill and eat his own dear son, a son his father, children their own
mother (cf. fr. 137).
Who then, or what, is the daimon who appears so dramatically in the se-
quence of verses quoted by Hippolytus and whose unseen presence threat-
ens us with the most horrendous of all possible crimes, that of killing and
eating one’s own children or one’s own parents? On the answer to that
question there hangs a decision of some importance for the reconstruction
of Empedocles’ philosophy.”

'2 For the account that follows of the nature of Empedocles’ daimones, see O’Brien 1969,
pp.
328-36, summarised in O’Brien 1995, pp. 442-3. Gemelli Marciano 2001 writes at length against
my interpretation, but her objections turn not so much on any detailed analysis of the texts as on
I116 ground (see especially her introductory remarks, pp. 206-7) that I have sought to make
of Em-
pedocles a >philosopher< instead of seeing in him a prophet and a wonder worker. But that distinc-
Iion (drawn from Kingsley 1995) is absurdly anachronistic. Modem philosophers, it is true, do not
usually claim publicly to be a god (whatever their private opinion may be on the matter) nor do
they claim to be able to raise people from the dead. Empedocles made both claims (fr. 1 ll and fr.
112). But we do not have to suppose, as Gemelli Marciano apparently does, that he cannot
therefore have been a >philosopher<. (See the concluding remarks to my review (1998) of
b=
Kingsley.)
 334
Denis O’Brien

12. The two poems

i
Diogenes Laertius, in his Life
(VIII 77), explicitly attributes two
Empedocles. The one has a poems to
conventional title On nature
is no doubt the same as (Peri physeos), and
the poem that Simplicius
Physics<< (ta Physika). quotes simply as >>the
The other has the more unusual
(Katharmoz). Lengthy quotations title of Purication;
are ascribed to both poems.
our fragment 17 Simplicius The verses of
(Phys. 157, 27) tells us were
book of the Physika. A couple taken from
of pages after his account of the the rst
daimon, Hippolytus looks wandering
back to the verses he has quoted
fers to them (Ref VII 30, and clearly re-
3-4) as having been taken from
When he has listed the four the Katharmoi.“
elements and Love and Strife,
Simplicius tells us came from in verses that
the Physika, Empedocles carefully
tently adds that, >>in addition and insis-
to these, there is nothing else
being, nor anything that ceases that comes into
to be<< (fr. 17, 30). The preceding
no mention of daimones. list makes
The question of the identity
therefore also a question on of the daimon is
the relation of the two poems.
in Hippolytus’ quotation from Do the daimones
the Katharmoi still form part
phy of the Peri physeos? If of the philoso-
they do, how are they related
and the four elements, which to Love and Strife
in the Peri physeos make
tents of the universe? up the entire con-
The >>bitter paths of life<<
in the verses Hippolytus has
aether, land and sea) are quoted (sun and
easily identied as manifestations
ments or >>roots<< to be found of the four ele-
in the Peri physeos (re and air,
ter). Strife also appears, in earth and wa-
the concluding verses of the
who has somehow won the fragment, as a being
>>trust<< or allegiance
the verses that Hippolytus of the exiled daimon. In
has quoted from the Katha/-moi,
there is therefore

'3 For the division between

the two poems, see O’Brien
For fuller discussion of the 1981, pp. 4-13, and 1995, pp.
evidence from Hippolytus, 431-6.
panier 2004 argues at length see O’Brien 2001, esp.
in favour of a single poem, pp. 89-126. Tre-
take the measure of the evidence but his account is vitiated by
in Hippolytus, whose reference his failure to
in a two-line argument (p. to the Katharmoi, so he impli6S
10), is worthless, since, so
monly ascribed to the Peri physeos. he alleges, it takes in verses,
fr. 110, com-
But Hippolytus does not include
Kalharmoi. Trépanier has failed fr. l l0 in his reference to tl16
to follow the sequence of
Hippolytus’ reference to the Katharmoi ideas in the text of the Refutalio.
occurs in Ref Vll 30, 3-4, ( l)
the content of verses that and looks back specically I0
had been quoted, in the preceding
23). (2) It is not until the chapter chapter, from fr. I 15 (Ref VII
following the reference to the Kalharmoi, 29, 14-
that Hippolytus turns to make therefore Ref VII 31,
use of the verses Trépanier
cically to the quotation of fr. 110 refers to (Ref VII 31, 2 looks
at Ref VII 29, 25-6). S0 back sp6-
most think Trépanier had not blatant is the error that one might al-
taken note of the evidence
(i.e. after reading my pages in Hippolytus until it was almost
in Aevum antiquum 2001, see too late
two-line argument (p. 10), drawing Trépanier’s Preface, p. XII), and
on a remark by Primavesi
that hi5
tiquum, p. 10 n. 24), was the in the same volume (Aevum an-
desperate reaction of a drowning
man clutching at a straw.
=*.‘£
:~;;2
#5
Empedocles: A Synopsis 335
as t

only one entity from the list of beings given in the Peri physeos who has not
and the
been named, and that is Love. In her place we have the »gods<<
»blessed ones<< who appear in the opening verses
of the fragment, and the
voice that, in the penultimate verse, speaks to us in the rst person,
the >>I<<
that is Empedocles’ own self, identied as one of the exiled
daimones.
Who then is the daimon that Empedocles has identied with his own
are the same.
self? There is one obvious answer. Love and the daimones
The daimon that is Empedocles’ own self is a part or a portion
of Love,
with Strife, but able to return,
contaminated in this life by its association
from
after thirty thousand seasons, to the company of the »blessed ones<<

whom he has been exiled and who are themselves, again, so many manifes-
tations of the cosmic god of Love familiar to us from the Peri physeos.“

13. Empedocles’ >intelligible world<

The conclusion that the same beings inhabit the two poems brings us within
shouting distance of the Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretation of Empe-
docles.
Immediately preceding his account of Empedocles’ wandering daimon,
drawn, so he tells us, from the Katharmoi, Hippolytus quotes a galaxy of
verses, some at least of which almost certainly came from the Peri physeos.
In summarising Empedocles’ philosophy, Hippolytus happily draws on
both sets of quotations. Empedocles’ daimones, Hippolytus tells his readers,
are so many souls. The >>blessed ones<< whose company they have had
to
forego are the inhabitants of the intelligible world, which Hippolytus identi-
es as the >>one<< that has been formed by Love. The world of plurality and
movement, made up from the four elements, is by contrast the world that
we inhabit, brought into being by the action of Strife, whom Hippolytus
equates with the evil demiurge of his adversary, the heresiarch Marcion.
Marcion’s alleged plagiarism of Empedocles is a feature peculiar to Hip-
polytus’ Refutation. Otherwise, Hippolytus’ account (which he has very

'4 To speak ofa or >portion< of Love may seem incongruous to the modern reader. It will
>part<
perhaps appear less so if we appreciate that the cosmic force of Love is no mere personication
of
the »friendly thoughts<< and the >>harmonious deeds<< by which, so Empedocles tells us (fr. 17, 23-
4), we may recognize her presence. The Love who seeks to wrest control of
the elements from
Strife is a being in her own right, extended in space (cf fr. 17, 20) and moving from place to place
in
in the universe (cf fr. 35). When therefore we hear of the Love who is »recognized as embedded
may be taken quite literally, as referring to
mortal limbs<< (cf fr. 17, 22), Empedocles’ expression
the presence >>in mortal limbs<< ofthe Love (or a >part< of the Love) that is at work in the cosmos at
large,
 336 Denis O’Brien i

likely taken over wholesale from some unacknowledged source) is the

f0re_
runner of the interpretation of Empedocles that, in the centuries
to follow
will be taken for granted by writers in the Neoplatonic tradition. The
alter:
nation of the one and the many becomes an image of the soul’s
descent
from and retum to an intelligible world that coexists with the world l
of 1

sense. The One from which the intelligible world has drawn 3

its being is
identied with Necessity (fr. 115, 1) or even, paradoxically, with Time
(cf
fr. 30).”
Admittedly, Empedocles was not the only presocratic philosopher
to re- 4

ceive such treatment. Parinenides and Anaxagoras were also pressed

into
service. Parmenides’ one being was taken either as a description
of Intellect \

or even (discounting the word >>being<<) as a description of the

supreme
principle (the One >>beyond being<<). The opening words of Anaxagoras’
treatise, >>all things together<<, words which in their original context
referred
to the precosmic universe before the intervention of mind, were
thought so
apposite as a description of the Neoplatonic conception of the one-in-many
of the world of forms that the tag homou panta, with or without Anaxago-
ras’ name attached, came to be used quite regularly in place of the
technical
expression /cosmos n0etos."’
However, Empedocles’ one had a special claim to the attention of
Plato-
nists and Neoplatonists alike. For Empedocles’ one was alive.
When the
four elements have been made into one by Love, and when Strife has
been
excluded, they form a Sphere, >>rejoicing<<, so Empedocles tells us
(fr. 27,
4), in its »joyful solitude<<. Simplicius informs us (Phys. 1124, 1) that
Em-
pedocles even called the Sphere a >>god<<, and some pages later (1 184,
2-4)
he quotes from Eudemus a verse which proves the point (fr.
31). The
characterisation of the one or the Sphere as a living being, joyful and di-
vine, marks a crucial difference between Empedocles on the one
hand,
Parrnenides and Anaxagoras on the other. In the extensive extracts
that

'5 For a brief account of the Neoplatonic interpretation

of Empedocles, see O’Brien 1969, PP-
28-9 and 99-101. A more detailed account is included in O’Brien 1981,
pp. 73-90 and 101-7. The
altemation of the one and the many as a gure of the soul’s descent from
and retum to the intelli-
gible world may be found in Asclepius (Mel. 197, 17-21). Syrianus (Mel.
43, 16-28) takes Emp¢-
docles’ Time as equivalent to the One, relying on the allusion to time
in fr. 30, 2. Simplicius
(Phys. 197, 9-13) apparently allocates the same role to Necessity,
taking comfort from the allusiv
to necessity in fr. 15, 1. (These are only sample quotations.)
1

'6 Plotinus identies Parmenides’ >>being<< with Intellect (Enn.

v 1 [10] s, 14-23), and speci-
cally distinguishes it from the One that, so he claims, is recognized in the second
half of Plat0'5
Parmenides (1'bid., 23-7). Simplicius, writing some three hundred years
later, is more indulge!"-
He allows (Phys. 147, 15-16) that Parrnenides may have glimpsed >>the
ineffable cause Of 3“
things<< (i.e. the One). Plotinus’ use of Anaxagoras’ tag homou
panta as a description of the intel- '

ligible world is given over a dozen references in Sleeman and P0l1et’s index
to the Enneads, 5-"-
6,105 (col. 741, 16-20).
V
z

Empedocles: A Synopsis 337

SimpliCiLlS has recorded from the rst part of Parmenides’ poem, there is no
indication that Parmenides’ one »being<< is alive. Still less is there any indi-
cation that it »rejoices<<. Nor is there any indication, in the fragments of
Anaxagoras, that his >>homoiomeries<<, in their precosmic state, before the
intervention of mind, were anything other than lifeless. Empedocles’
Sphere, living and »rejoicing<<, is therefore in all likelihood an innovation,
and one which would have particularly appealed to a Neoplatonic reader-
ship, for Whom the forms of the intelligible world are so many living intel-
lects.
The Neoplatonic interpretation of Empedocles remains nonetheless a
snare and an illusion for the unwary. Empedocles’ Sphere cannot be identi-
fled with an intelligible world of the kind that, later in the Greek world, will
be familiar to Platonists and Neoplatonists. A Platonic or Neoplatonic >in-
telligible world< is not extended in space and is without beginning or end in
time. Not so Empedocles’ Sphere, which is both extended in space and lim-
ited in its temporal duration, in so far as successive manifestations of the
Sphere exist only in alternation with the >>many<<." .

14. Plato’s >>dream<<

The reason for the difference is a simple, but fundamental one. What later
philosophers choose to see as Empedocles’ intelligible world (the Sphere or
the one) is, for Empedocles himself, none other than the stuff of this present
world, for so long as it has been freed from the presence of Strife and made
into one by Love.“

'7In writing ofthe Neoplatonic interpretation of Empedocles as a >>snare and an illusion for the
unwary<<, I have particularly in mind the blatantly Neoplatonising interpretation of Empedocles
adopted by Bollack, not only in his multi-volume edition ofthe Peri physeos (1965-1969), but no
less in his recent slim edition of the Katharmoi (2003). To take only one example: Bollack wrote
initially of the Sphere as >>hors du temps<< (1965-1969, tome 1, p. 115) and even now writes of the
Sphere as an >>état de stabilité en dehors du temps<< (2003, p. 18), despite the explicit mention of
>>the time that is coming to an end<< in fr. 30, 2. The context provided by Aristotle’s quotation of
the verses in question (Met. ll 4, 1000 b 9-17) leaves no doubt that >>the time that is coming to an
end<< is none other than the life of the Sphere. Empedocles has therefore himself assigned a »time<<

(fl 30, 2) to the »état de stabilité<< that Bollack would have us believe is »outside time<< (>>en de-
hors du temps<<). For my earlier criticisms of Bollack’s Neoplatonising interpretation, see O’Brien
1969, pp. 160-3.
lg In writing of the elements, when they have been made into one by Love, as >>freed from the
Presence of Strife<<, do not of course mean that Strife has ceased to exist, only that he no longer
1

has any place among the elements. When Love intervenes to make the elements one from many,
She does so by driving Strife to >>the outermost limits of the circle<< (fr. 35, 10). When at last she
has succeeded in making the elements into one, we are therefore to visualize Strife as lying outside

?1WT\.\',”“‘
 2

338 Denis O’Brien

To see quite how and why this should be so, we may take our cue from
Plato. In the Timaeus (51 e 6 - 52 d 1), Plato writes of the >>dream<< which
would have us believe that >>everything that there is has to be in some place
and to take up a certain space, and that what is neither on earth nor some-
where in the heavens is nothing<<. Only by rousing ourselves from this
dream, so Plato wams us, shall we be able to recognize the existence of
what is >>unbom and imperishab1e<<, >>invisible and in every other way im_
perceptible<<, words which, in the context, are intended as an allusion to
Plato’s own theory of forms.
The presocratic philosophers have not awoken from Plato’s dream, if we
are to judge from Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, none of whom
appears to have any conception of a reality that is not extended in space.
Parmenides, admittedly, says only that his one, motionless being is >>1ike the
bulk of a well-rounded sphere<< (fr. 8, 43). But in the next verse, syntacti-
cally independent of the verse preceding, he writes of >>being<< as >>equa1ly
extended from the centre in all directions<< (with no qualifying >>1ike<<).
Anaxagoras’ mind Aristotle sees as distinct from the elements. So indeed it
is, since, alone among all the many things that exist, mind is not >>mixed
with anything<< and exists >>alone, itself by itself<< (fr. 12). But mind still has
its >>p1ace<< in this world, since, in the next sentence but one, Anaxagoras
writes of cosmic mind as >>the nest of all things, and the purest<<. Nor is
Empedocles an exception. Love and Strife are invisible to the human eye.
Empedocles, speaking of Love, tells his pupil Pausanias (fr. 17, 21): >>Don’t
sit there goggle-eyed, see her with the mind.<< Nonetheless Love and Strife
move from place to place (as recounted in fr. 35), while of Love Empedo-
cles writes specically that she is >>equa1 in length and breadth<< (fr. 17, 20).
Hence the radical difference between Plato or Plotinus and the philoso-
phers of the 6"“ and 5th centuries before our era. Plato’s forms and Plotinus’
intelligible world, precisely because they are not extended in space, can and
do exist contemporaneously with the world that we perceive by the senses.
Not so Parmenides’ one, changeless being, which, by being extended in
space, literally leaves no room for a world of plurality and movement. The
many things that we think to see and feel around us are therefore, according
to Parmenides, so many >>non-beings<< (cf fr. 7, 1), while the changes that
they appear to undergo, change of place and change of colour, are no more
than a >>name<< (fr. 8, 38-41). A similar consideration applies to Empedo-
cles’ opposition between the one and the many. Since it is made from the
same >>roots<< as all the many things that we see and feel around us, th

the Sphere — biding his time, until he can again leap forward to seize the honours that are his (Cf
fr. 30). The view that follows of Empedocles’ >cycle< is put forward in greater detail in O’Brien
1969, pp. 237-51 (chapter 10).
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 339
.<>i

time as the world in

{ .,

sphere, one and motionless, cannot exist at the same

it exists today the very
which we nd ourselves today. For in the world as

same elements from which the Sphere has been

(and will be) made are
many and moving.
with the
For the Sphere to have been an >intelligible world<, coexistent
the distinction
world of sense, Empedocles would have had to anticipate
as Plato will do, that to
made in the Timaeus. He would have had to believe,
»be<< is not necessarily to »be in some
place and to take up a certain space<<
what is not >>in
(52 b 3-5). He would then have been able to distinguish
space<< (for Plato, the
some place<< and what does not >>take up a certain
and which do
forms) froni all the many things that are >>in some place<<
of the sensible world). Without that
>>tal<e up a certain space<< (the objects
distinction and therefore before Plato’s innovation, recognition
of what later
Platonists will hold to be an intelligible world, coexistent
with the world of
sense, is impossible.
The anachronism in the Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic
interpretation
to
of Empedocles is therefore no mere trivial error. Were that interpretation
be true, we should have to rewrite the whole history
of philosophy up to and
including Plato.
.

15. Empedocles and Parmenides

Despite its obvious anachronism, does the Neoplatonic

interpretation of
Empedocles perhaps nonetheless have something to tell us‘?
The history of
philosophy cannot be written in the same way as the history of
events. For
the history of ideas cannot be understood only sequentially.
To understand
earlier ideas, the historian of philosophy needs to take account of ideas that
will be voiced later. So it is with Empedocles’ >cycle<. To see Empedocles’
only has
philosophy of cosmic alternation in perspective, the historian not
already been
to look back to Parmenides and Anaxagoras (to what has

said); paradoxically, he has also to look forward to Plato (and

therefore to
what has not yet been said).
may be
Thus if we look back to Parmenides, Empedocles’ >cyclic< theory
seen as an attempt to replace Parmenides’ >>deceitful<< account
of the visible
world (fr. 8, 52) with an account that is >>not deceitful<< (fr 17, 26). Empe-
docles’ Sphere, one and motionless, can hardly not recall Parmenides’
>>be-

ing<<, which is also >>one<< (fr. 8, 6) and is also >>motionless<<

(fr. 8, 26). But
the difference is no less striking. Unlike Parmenides’ one being,
Empedo-
cles’ Sphere is not without beginning and end in time. The world that we

"4.
-s~.2
 '

346 Denis O’Brien

see and feel around us is therefore no longer, for Empedocles, illusory. Bgth
the one and the many do exist. But they exist in succession. It is because
they exist in succession that the reality of the >>one<< no longer, as for Par-
menides, excludes the reality of the >>many<<.
Nonetheless, despite their differences, Parmenides and Empedocles share
a common cast of thought, in so far as Empedocles’ Sphere, like Par-
menides’ one being, is extended in space. The spatial extension of EmpedQ_
cles’ Sphere as of Parmenides’ one being may be seen, retrospectively, as
stemming from the assumption that Plato will remark upon in the Timaeus,
whereby >>to be<< is necessarily >>to be in some place and to take up a certain
spacea.
The assumption casts a quite different light on Empedocles’ use of a >cy-
cle< in his attempt to maintain the reality of both the one and the many.
Empedocles’ Sphere, unlike the forms of Plato or the living intellects of
Plotinus, does not belong to a different order of reality from the world of
sense. The one (or the Sphere) and the many are different states of the same
four >>roots<< and of the two divine powers. Whether arranged as one or as
many, the four roots and the two divine powers occupy the whole of space.
Their appearing as one and as many is therefore conditional upon their do-
ing so at different and successive times.
Hence the paradox. Empedocles’ >cyclic< theory is both an innovation in
relation to Parmenides and a witness to the underlying assumption that
Empedocles shares with Parmenides, an assumption which makes it impos-
sible for the one and the many to coexist.

16. Empedocles and Anaxagoras

Empedocles’ reaction to Anaxagoras is also relevant to the >cycle<, but has

to do more with tactics than with strategy.
Like Empedocles’ »roots<<, Anaxagoras’ >>homoiomeries<< exist in differ-
ent and successive states. An indiscriminate mixture, before the intervention
of mind, is followed by a separation at least sufficient to produce, within the
objects that we see around us, a preponderance of one »homoiomery<<, or Of
a group of »homoiomeries<<, over all others. On the other hand, in Anaxago-
ras’ universe there is no movement of retum. For the process of separation
set in motion by mind can never be taken to its term. However much thef
may be, in any single object, of any one of the >>homoiomeries<<, there Will
nonetheless always be present, in however minuscule a proportion,
imperceptible traces of all the other >>homoiomeries<<.
 Empedocles: A Synopsis 341

Empedocles’ conception of the »roots<< is wholly different. Each one

of
Empedocles’ elements is »only itself<<. When the force of separation that is

Strife has completed its work, each of the four elements will therefore
nd
all others. The difference be-
itself in a state of total separation from the
may there-
tween Empedocles’ >>roots<< and Anaxagoras’ »homoiomeries<<
fore be seen as directly related to the needs of the >cycle<.
In Empedocles’
world, as distinct from that of Anaxagoras, the process of separation is
brought to a tenn. It is only once the total separation of the elements has
to start again, leading
been realized that the work of reunication is able
nally to a state where the elements, without ceasing to exist, are nonethe-
less fully mingled, held together as one by the power of Love, who has ex-
cluded from the mixture the principle of separation that is
Strife.
The existence of two principles, of mixture and of separation, is therefore
not at all the duplication, still less the redundancy, that Aristotle’s
presenta-
tion of Love and Strife as a pair of >>moving causes<< might make it appear.
Nor is the difference between Empedocles’ theory of the elements and
that
of Anaxagoras difference only, or even primarily, of number-. It is because
a
Empedocles’ roots are the kind of things they are that Love and Strife
are

able to bring to a term the mixture and the separation of the

elements, so

ensuring an endless altemation of the one and the many.

l7. »Free from human cares<<

The role of Love as of Strife is not, however, limited to producing an end-

less succession of the one and the many, with intervening worlds of
increas-
ing Love and of increasing Strife. At one point in the Metaphysics, Aristotle
remarks that, if you follow up what Empedocles really means, and not what
he >>lispingly<< says, you will nd that >>Love is cause of good things
and
Strife of evil<< (I 4, 985 a 4-7). Aristotle’s remark is recognition of an aspect
of Empedocles’ philosophy wholly absent (unless our sources deceive us)
from the preoccupations of Parmenides or of Anaxagoras. A generation be-
fore Socrates interrogated his fellow-citizens in the streets of Athens, and
some fifty years before Plato started to record, or to invent, his Socratic dia-
logues, Empedocles has sought to describe human life in terms of good and
evil and to make that distinction part of his philosophy.
How has he done so‘? If, as suggested earlier, we ourselves, as daimones,
are parts or pieces of Love, then the move from one to many, and the retum
from many to one, is perhaps part of our human — and daimonic — destiny.
Scattered throughout the cosmos when Strife has made the elements many
 T

342 Denis O’Brien

from one, the daimones, our own selves, will nonetheless be reassembled
in
the unity of the Sphere when Love has once again succeeded in making
the
elements one from many.
The identication of the one or the Sphere, as described in the Peri p/1y_
seos, with the world from which the daimon has been exiled, as
recounted
in the Katharmoi, is of course a salient feature of the Platonic and Neopla-
tonic interpretation of Empedocles. Can so syncretistic a view of the
two
poems survive, once it has been divested of its Platonic trappings and
once
the Sphere is therefore no longer identied with an intelligible world
co-
existing with the world of sense? Perhaps so. For Empedocles’ Sphere
is
not at all the changeless and seemingly lifeless one being of Parmenides,
nor is it at all an inert non-cosmic unity comparable to Anaxagoras’ pre-
cosmic universe. Empedocles’ Sphere is, instead, a divine and living being,
the embodiment of Love who rejoices in the absence of her rival.
It was
perhaps the cyclic retum of the living and joyful Sphere which enabled
Empedocles to hold out to his followers the hope and the assurance
that
they will one day rejoin the company of the blessed ones (cf fr. 115, 6),
and
will again, one day, be admitted to the hearth and the table of the immortals,
>>free from human cares<< (fr. 147).”

'9 Acknowledgement: I am most grateful to Jean-Claude Picot for critical

comment on an ear-
lier version of my contribution to this volume.