D.

Basic Principles Used in Statutory Construction

1. Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est

- is a Latin maxim which means that “A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”
- It is a rule of statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted from being
enumerated in a statute, it must be held or considered to have been omitted intentionally.

Mun. of Nueva Era v. Mun. of Marcos

Facts: The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) to a certain extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City,
Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte
about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos
Norte.

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized
as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. In the virtue of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916 united these rancherias and created
the township of Nueva Era. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June
22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the
Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-
Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River
which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the
boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the
boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or
only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said
resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But
Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. In view
of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into
two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and
contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory
but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion of
Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos
were within Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged
that since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an
indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by
Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era. Nueva
Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos,
the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its decision.
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of
Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating
Marcos.

Issues: Whether or not, CA erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is
not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual
and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao
(Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Niño,
and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.

Held: No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute
enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by
implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.
Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in
a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is
bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos.
Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. Where
there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. Despite the omission
of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said
law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of
Nueva Era is within its territory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Manantan
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second
 motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The
lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in
the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits.

RATIO:

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render
ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to
exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the
alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously
applied.

2. Constitutional Avoidance
- the Supreme Court should avoid ruling on constitutional issues, and resolve the cases before
them on other (usually statutory) grounds.

PACU v. Secretary of Education

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought
to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a
permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
 discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that
the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to
the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to
censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

3. Expressium facit cessare tacitum

- is a legal maxim that means “what is expressed makes what is implied silent.” This form of
construction is used while interpreting statutes, contracts and deeds. When a matter is
clearly provided in a document, the clear and precise meaning is to be adopted. The implied
meaning need not be adopted when a clear meaning is provided.

Canet v. Decena
Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Julieta Decena was the
mayor therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to operate a
cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled “An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality
of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof.”
This ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but she denied it because the said
ordinance does not contain rules and regulations as well as a separability clause. The council
then decided to shelf the ordinance indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayor’s permit for the operation of his cockpit. Decena denied
Canet’s application on the ground that under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Section 447
(a) (3) (v)), the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is
vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there
was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued
Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998 resolution allowing
him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which generally provide
for the issuance of a mayor’s permit for the operation of businesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance
which would empower her to do so.

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor’s permit would not only be a violation of the
explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an
undue encroachment on Decena’s administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution
allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an ordinance allowing the
operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax ordinances Canet mentioned contain
general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions
prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl
activities.

Malinias v. Comelec
An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers
accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code
provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the
imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties.

FACTS: Petitioners Sario Malinias and Roy Pilando were candidates for governor and
congress representatives respectively during the May 15, 1998 elections in Mountain Province.
Petitioners filed a complaint with COMELEC against private respondents Governor
Dominguez, and Provincial Director Corpuz and Police Chief Tangilag for alleged violations
of: Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 and, Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881, respectively.
Petitioners alleged that on May 15, 1998, an illegal police checkpoint set-up at Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc
Provincial Capitol Building for the canvassing of votes. They likewise alleged that the Provincial
Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the
exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez. To
support their claims, their supporters executed so-called “mass affidavits” Private respondents
submitted counter-affidavit stating that the checkpoint was not a sole case and that it was set-
up to enforce COMELEC’s gun ban and that no group will disrupt the canvass proceedings which
happened several times in the past. After investigation was conducted, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed the case against the private respondents for lack of probable cause.
 ISSUE: Can COMELEC prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Sections 25 of
RA 6646 and232 of B.P. Blg. 881?

RULING: No. The alleged violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of B.P.
Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under
Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. The COMELEC and
private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the
election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While
Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to
enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally
punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Though not a
criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the
imposition of administrative penalties. Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private
respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a
non-criminal act. “It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

4. Last Antecedent Rule

- A doctrine of interpretation by which a court finds that qualifying words or phrases refer to
the language immediately preceding the qualifier, unless common sense shows that it was
meant to apply to something more distant or less obvious.
- For example, in the phrase "the commercial vehicular license shall not apply to boats,
tractors, and trucks under three tons, " the qualifier "under three tons" applies only to
trucks and not to boats or tractors.

PLDT Co. v. The Public Service Commission

CASTRO, J., concurring:

The resolution penned by Chief Justice Makalintal compels my concurrence. I fully agree (1) that
the fees imposed by Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act, as amended by Republic Act 3792,
are supervision and/or regulation fees, and not taxes; (2) that they are exactly what the
provision says they are; (3) that therefore the nature and amount of such fees must be
reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or regulation; and (4) that to base the
computation of the fees on the value of the properties and equipment of the petitioners, with
or without depreciation, would be to ignore altogether the requirement of such reasonable
relation.

I wish to add my views on the matter, of legal hermeneutics, which to me is likewise a vital
determinant of the issue at bar.

Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act, as amended by Republic Act, 3792, reads as follows:
(e) For annual reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the Commission in the
supervision of other public services and/or in the regulation or fixing of their rates, twenty
centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction thereof, of the capital stock subscribed or paid,
if no shares have been issued, of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment,
whichever is higher.

The basic issue is whether the added phrase, "or of the property and equipment, whichever is
higher," was intended as an alternative only to the immediately antecedent phrase, "of the
capital invested," or also to the previous one, namely "of the capital stock subscribed or paid."

The relevant and pertinent Congressional records do not at all provide any indication of the
meaning intended by the lawmaking body.

The task may, however, be simplified by supplying the words which obviously were deliberately
omitted and merely indicated by means of a comma between the phrase, "or if no shares have
been issued," and the clause, "of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment,
whichever is higher." The omitted words thus supplied, the provision would read as follows:

(e) For annual reimbursement of expenses incurred by the Commission in the supervision
of other public services and/or in the regulation or fixing of their rates, twenty centavos for each
one hundred pesos or fraction thereof, of the capital stock subscribed or paid, or if no shares
have been issued, twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or a fraction thereof, of the
capital invested, or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher.

Viewed from this perspective, the meaning of the provision, as intended by the lawmaking body,
becomes unmistakable, which is, to make the alternative basis of computation (property and
equipment)applicable exclusively to the case or situation to which it obviously relates, namely,
"if no shares have been issued."

The rule that a qualifying or relative word or clause, such as "which," "said," and "such," is to be
construed as applying to the words, phrase or clause next preceding or, as is frequently stated,
to the next preceding antecedent, and not as extending to or including others more remote,
unless a contrary intention appears (Crawford, Sec. 193, p 331), may be applied in the present
case. This rule is known as the doctrine of last antecedent, which is both a rule of grammar and
a rule of law (Wood vs. Baldwin, 10 N.Y. S. 195).

In fine, the basis for the computation of the fees collectible from stock corporations for
supervision and/or regulation is "twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction
thereof, of the capital stock subscribed or paid." If no shares have been issued, as in the case of
non-stock corporations, the basis for the computation of the fees collectible for supervision
and/or regulation is "twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction thereof .... of the
capital invested, or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher."
5. Intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency v. NLRC
Facts:
AISA is a private corporation engaged in providing security services and the Don
MarianoMarcos State University is their client. The private respondents were as security guards
by ASIAfor DMMSU. Five months after, private respondents filed a complaint against AISA and
thenincluded DMMSU for non compliance with the current minimum wage order. The
agreement was that they will be paid 1,200php every month but was only paid 900php as their
monthly salary. AISA made representations for an increase in the contract rates to make up for
the mandated minimum wage rates. DMMSU replied that it cannot grant said
request due to budgetary constraints. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding AISA and
DMMSU solidary liable and ordering them to pay each of the complainant Php41,459.51
representing salary differential from Feb 16, 1990-Sept 30, 1991. NLRC affirmed this decision.
Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC. The judgment against
DMMSU is finaland executor since no motion for certiorari was filed while AISA filed a motion to
the SC.AISA’s arguments:- They argue that the payment of wage increases under the current
minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU citing Section 6 of RA 6727 which
states that “In case of contracts for construction projects and security...the prescribed increases
in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the principals or clients...” (see p.656 and
p.657 for full text)- Articles 106, 107 and 109 generally refer to the failure of the contract or sub-
contractor to pay wages in accordance with the labor code with a mandate that failure to pay
such wages would make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable.- AISA insists
that the matter involved in this case hinges on WAGE DIFFERENTIALS or WAGE INCREASES NOT
WAGES IN GENERAL as provided by the Labor Code. NLRC:- Cited Articles 106, 107 and 109 of
the Labor Code.- 106: ...In the event the contractor or sub contractor fails to pay
the pages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or sub-contractor...(see p. 657 and p.658)- 107: the
provisions shall apply to any person, partnership, corporation, which not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task , job or
project.- 108: every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor
orsub-contractor for any violation of any provision of this Code.

SC Held: Wage orders cannot be waived since it is mandatory and statutory. AISA cannot escape
liability since the law provides for a joint and solidary liability of the principal
(DMMSU) and the contractor (AISA).Section 6 of RA 6727 merely provides that in the case of
wage increase resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall
be joint and several. Same goes with the liability attached in Articles 106, 107 and 109 which
refer to the standard minimum wage.

The NLRC decision is AFFIRMED. No grave abuse of discretion on their part. The Petition is
DISMISSED. Statutory Construction:Cardinal Rule: In interpreting the meaning and scope of term
used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of
the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of
 the statute as whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. AISA only
referred to Sec 6 of RA6727 and some parts of Articles 106, 107 and 109 failing to see the bigger
picture re: Wage Differentials, Wage increases and WAGES IN GENERAL. Considering bits and
pieces instead of the statute as a whole.

Serana v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to
serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before
the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not
a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her
office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is
not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.

Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while
the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her
position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.

6. Mens Legislatoris or Mischief Rule

- It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained.
Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore
Facts:

Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.
Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the
sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute (the Company furnishes their
transportation), and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week. At the
time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his
death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow, Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta, was
not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and
wife for the past three months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in the hospital where the deceased was
hospitalized up to his death. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her
minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's
fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident
as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

Held:
Yes. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18
years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually
dependent upon the deceased are
considered dependents.

Ratio:
It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at
the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of
the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the
words the Act employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born
for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions
specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's
womb. Time and time again, we have stressed that where
the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.
What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance
different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not
inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.
7. Pari Materia Rule
- laws of the same matter and on the same subject must be construed with reference to each
other. The intent behind applying this principle is to promote uniformity and predictability in
the law.

City of Naga v. Agna

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. vs. City of
Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year
following its approval and requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts
sought for in their complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present controversy
as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and City Treasurer
of the City of Naga, respectively.

On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the
graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4
of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant
to said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross
sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:

Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;

Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and

Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.

On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a
claim for refund of the following amounts, together with interests thereon from the date of
payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81,
representing the difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of
the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They alleged that under existing
law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not
take effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its
approval, or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the
quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be refunded to them
by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private
respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084),
seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective only in the year following the year of its
approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust,
oppressive and arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the
sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained of were paid and
to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further
prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.

In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not
"compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that
the said ordinance was published in accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act
No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its
passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the City of Naga is
authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish the collection of sales taxes in
the most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that the collection of
taxes can be enjoined, the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for by the private respondents is
untenable; that petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and
Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively, are not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality of the
provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against them, in such amount
as the court may determine.

During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the
pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the
following stipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted
Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga," which
ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25, 1970; that the
ordinance was duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board;
that private respondents voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but
that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.

On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360,
series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year following the date of its approval,
that is, in 1971 and required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they
paid their taxes to the City of Naga: To Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna,
P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from the filing of the
complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees
and the costs of the proceedings.

Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the
quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others,
provides that "Each approved ordinance * * * shall take effect and be enforced on and after the
10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance * * *". They contend
that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15,
1970[2] and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970[3] but
it was not acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14
of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following its
passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that it
shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360
was deemed approved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10
days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval[4] the
ordinance is deemed approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City
Mayor with his veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same
was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25, 1970, or on July 6, 1970.
On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further
contend that even under Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)[5] which
expressly provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage
unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise", Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on
June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City of
Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the
date the ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it shall
take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners to support their
stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of its approval, it is Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because it is the provision
that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it
is deemed to have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga)
in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.

On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and
enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:

"Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license. A municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December of any year after the next succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created by
any ordinance enacted during the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent
quarter."

They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which
changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise
and sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax
on their gross sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the
next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971.

Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became
enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there
really such a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section
2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances,
namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in existence
and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license
tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the
15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year. This means that the ordinance
enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a municipal license tax already
in existence will have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of the
provision is to enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought
about by the new ordinance. This is different from the second type of a municipal ordinance
where an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to
be effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter. We do not find any such distinction
between an ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in existence and an
ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act) which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.

Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9
which reads:

"Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed and modified
accordingly."
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a statute will
not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that
effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is
evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise itself the
sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new statute should be construed
in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should
be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation * * *.[6] It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject
matter enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in
pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or
thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object.[7] When
statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because all enactments of the same legislature on the same subject
matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary
or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is
supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its
new act with reference thereto.[8] Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted
the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes
unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.[9] In
construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with
the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that
effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old
relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter
expression of the legislative will.[10] Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of
reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by applying the first clause of Section
2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an
ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the
problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.

In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales tax on
gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3
of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their gross sales an ordinance which
definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly
it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval
or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded of the taxes they have paid to the
petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the
corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

[1] Section 14, R.A. 305, as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of Naga City, provides:

*********

Each approved ordinance, resolution or motion shall be sealed with the seal of the Board, signed
by the presiding officer and the secretary of the Board and recorded in a book for the purpose
and shall, on the day following its passage, be posted by the secretary at the main entrance to
the City Hall, and shall take effect and be in force on and after the tenth day following its
passage, unless otherwise stated in said ordinance, resolution or motion or vetoed by the Mayor
as hereinafter provided." (Italics supplied)

*********

[2] Stipulation of Facts.

[3] Stipulation of Facts.

[4] "Sec. 14 (RA 305) Method of transacting business by the Board Veto Authentication and
publication of ordinance.

*** *** ***

* * * Within ten days after the receipt of the ordinance, resolution, or motion, the Mayor shall
return it with his approval or veto. If he does not return it within that time it shall be deemed to
be approved, if he returns it with his veto, his reasons therefor in writing shall accompany it. It
may then be again enacted by the affirmative vetoes of six members of the Board and again
forwarded to the Mayor for his approval, and if within ten days after his receipt he does not
again return it with his veto, it shall be deemed to be approved. If within said time he again
returns it with his veto, it shall be forwarded forthwith to the Secretary of the Interior for his
approval or disapproval, which shall be final." (italics supplied.)

[5] Sec. 2, Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, provides:

Section 2. (Republic Act No. 2264). Taxation Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority
to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business *
* *.

*** *** ***

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance
shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, that the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to
suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after its passage,
if, in his opinion the tax or fees therein levied, or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory, and when the said secretary exercises this authority the effectivity or such
ordinance shall be suspended.

Tan Co v. Civil Register of Manila

FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19,
1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND
LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine
citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took
an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for
correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds:

a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant;

**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children

b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;

c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;
 d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of
their Father Co Boon Peng.

HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of
their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the
ff. material allegations in their petition:

1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;

2) They were born in the Philippines;

3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

8. Plain Meaning Rule

- The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.
Republic v. Lacap
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,
with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and
damages filed by Lacap against RP
•
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two
other contractors were pre-qualified
•
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter
undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
•
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and found
it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
•
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to
Lacap’s license as contractor having expired
•
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the
Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor
after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void
such a contract
•
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20
1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no
payment was issued
•
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against
petitioner before the RTC.14
•
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not
appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
•
Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an
Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
•
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
•
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to payLacap
for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the
suit
•
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
RULING
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not
exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly
provides:“
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes
charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without
first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall
present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or
any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired
or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than
five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or
impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without
prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Rural Bank of San Miguel vs. Monetary Board

It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power.
The action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may nonetheless be
 subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to be in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts: Monetary Board (MB), the governing board of respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), issued Resolution No. 105 prohibiting RBSM from doing business in the Philippines,
placing it under receivership and designating respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) as receiver on the basis of the comptrollership reports of the banks
supervising head. To assist its impaired liquidity and operations, the RBSM was granted
emergency loans on different occasions in the aggregate amount of P375. As early as November
18, 1998, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) advised RBSM that it will terminate the clearing of
RBSM’s checks in view of the latter’s frequent clearing losses and continuing failure to replenish
its Special Clearing Demand Deposit with LBP. The BSP interceded with LBP not to terminate the
clearing arrangement of RBSM to protect the interests of RBSM’s depositors and creditors. On
the basis of reports prepared by PDIC stating that RBSM could not resume business with
sufficient assurance of protecting the interest of its depositors, creditors and the general public,
the MB passed Resolution No. 966 directing PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of RBSM under
Section 30 of RA 7653.

Issue: Whether or not the Monetary Board can unilaterally close a bank without prior hearing

Held: No. It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police
power. The action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may
nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to be in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This case essentially boils down to one core issue: whether Section 30 of RA 7653 (also known as
the New Central Bank Act) and applicable jurisprudence require a current and complete
examination of the bank before it can be closed and placed under receivership. The actions of
the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari
on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be
filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10)
days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership,
liquidation or conservatorship.

9. Ratio Legis or Golden Rule

- the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. The reason of the law is the soul of the law.
Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo
DOCTRINE:
Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter
thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and
vital purpose of the statute.

FACTS:
Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27,
1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner
of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in
Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, Policarpio sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other
parcels of land for P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging
that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the
respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by Policarpio in
their favor.

In Case L-25327, Policarpio sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and Hilario
Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed
of sale for the same price of P750.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

The Igmidio and others have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No
90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption
prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted
on August 8, 1963) was given by Policarpio to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of
sale executed by Policarpio-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and
provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the
non-execution by Policarpio-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform
Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the
vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of
the deed of sale. Or, is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to
share tenants?

HELD:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after
its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's
proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share
tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by
fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in
 the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or
otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will
of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.'
(Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be
construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the
law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the
act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.

Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court
to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Policarpio Hidalgo for
redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made.

ISSUE:
Was the agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition?

HELD:
The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of
redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and
not “shares tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or
coequal.

The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy.
It was error of the agrarian court to state that “the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in
this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even after the enactment of the Land
Reform Code.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory construction
that, it will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court,
that would defeat and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and
intent. Finally, under the established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy
and labor legislation, it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as
against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker.

10. Rule Against Surplasage

A statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders a word superfluous. Thus, any
construction of a statute that does not give meaning to every word implicates the rule against
Surplusage

There is a presumption that the legislature put every word in the statute for a reason. First,
every word must be given meaning. Second, different words in the same statute, particularly
those in a list, cannot mean precisely the same thing.
 However, the exceptions are that courts may reject words as Surplusage if the words are
completely meaningless or inconsistent with the legislature’s intention as plainly expressed in
the statute.
Surplusage - excessive or nonessential matter especially : matter contained in a pleading that is
unnecessary or irrelevant.

11. Rule of Lenity

- The rule of lenity (also called the rule of strict construction) is a principle of criminal
statutory interpretation that requires a court to apply any unclear or ambiguous law in the
manner most favorable to the defendant.
People vs. Temporada
Facts:
Accused-appellant Beth Temporada was convicted of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment,
or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and five (5) counts of estafa under
Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie Baby Robles, Bernadette Miranda,
Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the
Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment,
for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz
Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused and
appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred
business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all the
requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances and
medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and received from
them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. 57,600.00; b) from
Dennis Dimaano P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle
P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover
the amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused
and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City
Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and
appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as
amended, and the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

RTC Judgment:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth Temporada
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as
principal of the offenses charged and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal
recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum for
the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one
day of prision mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis
Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum for the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.

The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants actual damages as
follows:

1. Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr. P57,600.00 (Criminal Case No. 02-208372)

2. Dennis T. Dimaano 66,520.00
3. Evelyn V. Estacio 88,520.00
4. Soledad B. Atte 66,520.00
5. Luz T. Minkay 69,520.00

CA Judgment:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-208373, 02-
208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum;
and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
all other respects.

ISSUE/S:
a. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
and five (5) counts of estafa.
b. Whether or not the indeterminate penalties imposed for the five (5) counts of estafa
were proper.

RULING:
a. Appellant is guilty.
The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable
participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of
complainants.
Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the same.
Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
RPC.
The same evidence proving appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established
her liability for estafa.
b. In one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable
interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe penalty was adopted.
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21
days of prisin mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as maximum for each of the
aforesaid three estafa cases.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and
21 days of reclusin temporal as maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

12. Spirit of the Law vs. Letter of the Law

The letter of the law versus the spirit of the law is an idiomatic antithesis. When one obeys the
letter of the law but not the spirit, one is obeying the literal interpretation of the words (the
"letter") of the law, but not necessarily the intent of those who wrote the law. Conversely, when
one obeys the spirit of the law but not the letter, one is doing what the authors of the law
intended, though not necessarily adhering to the literal wording.
Facts:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, escaped. The
judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest.
Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia
under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme
Court on certiorari and mandamus.

Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.

Held:
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecution, the
accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is
unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of
which could in
the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the
defendant's escape.
The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain stages of the
trial which as a
result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at
large.

As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such
escape thus operated to the
fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as
long as he had
not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19,
which now allows
trial in absentia,

Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly
eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of
the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may
now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses
who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a
waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will
not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The
same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping,
placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Doctrine:
their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and
the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from
continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of
their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed
themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law.

Alonzo vs. IAC

 FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the
name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of
absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of
such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-
fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed
the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground
that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales.
Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-
heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing
was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during
the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in
1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the
letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.

13. Stare Decisis

- is a Latin term. It means 'to stand by things decided.' ... The doctrine of stare decisis means
that courts look to past, similar issues to guide their decisions. The past decisions are known
as precedent. Precedent is a legal principle or rule that is created by a court decision.

FACTS:
Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on August 25, 1981. its contract
with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco Filipino has continued to
occupy the premises even after the expiration of the lease. On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon
Banco Filipino the following terms and conditions: that the bank should pay P70,050.00 as
monthly rental retroactive as of September 1, 1992, with a rental escalation of 10% per year;
and advance deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00. Banco
Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents. Banco Filipino denied having
executed the lease contract providing for a term of eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract
with Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on August 25, 1981.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the eleven-year lease contract superseded the twenty-year lease contract.
HELD:
The eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive Vice-
President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the contract; (2) the
records of the notary public who notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do
not include the said document; and (3) the said contract was never submitted to the Central
Bank as required by the latter’s rules and regulations. It is not the eleven (11)-year lease
contract but the twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between
petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-
year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the
possession of the subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not violate
the other terms and conditions thereof. The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was
further reinforced on June 20, 2000 when the First Division of this Court rendered a Decision in
G.R. No. 137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:

“In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we have no option but
to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by petitioner.
It is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the
facts are substantially the same. ‘Stare decisis et non quieta movere.”

That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the subject property is
different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals. Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. Considering the above rulings, the term of the lease in the
present case is also twenty (20) years.

JRA PHIL. Vs. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have
no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.1 We
ruled then, as we rule now, that failure to print the word "zero-rated" in the invoices/receipts is
fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input value-added tax (VAT) on zero-rated sales.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
January 15, 2007 Decision2 and the March 16, 2007

Resolution3 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and
wholesale export of jackets, pants, trousers, overalls, shirts, polo shirts, ladies’ wear, dresses
and other wearing apparel.4 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT
taxpayer5 and as an Ecozone Export Enterprise with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA).6

On separate dates, petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 54 of the BIR,
Trece Martires City, applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated
sales for the taxable quarters of 2000 in the total amount of ₱8,228,276.34, broken down as
follows:

1st quarter ₱ 2,369,060.97

2nd quarter 2,528,126.02

3rd quarter 1,918,015.38

4th quarter 1,413,073.977

The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner
was constrained to file a petition before the CTA.

Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals

On April 16, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Review8 with the CTA for the refund/credit of
the same input VAT which was docketed as CTA Case No.

6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.

In his Answer,9 respondent interposed the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:

4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative routinary

investigation/examination by the Bureau;

5. Being allegedly registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority as an export
enterprise, petitioner’s business is not subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 in
relation to Section 109 (q) of the Tax Code. Hence, it is not entitled to tax credit of input taxes
pursuant to Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95;

6. The amount of ₱8,228,276.34 being claimed by petitioner as alleged unutilized VAT input
taxes for the year 2000 was not properly documented;

7. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund,
and failure to [do so] is fatal to the claim for refund/ credit;

8. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204 (c) and 229 of
the Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax refund/credit;

9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the nature
of exemption from taxation.10

After trial, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision11 denying petitioner’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales due to the failure of petitioner to
indicate its Taxpayer’s Identification Number-VAT (TIN-V) and the word "zero-rated" on its
invoices.12 Thus, the fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and,
accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 to which respondent
filed an Opposition.15 Petitioner, in turn, tendered a Reply.16

The Second Division of the CTA, however, stood firm on its Decision and denied petitioner’s
Motion for lack of merit in a Resolution17 dated October 5, 2005. This prompted petitioner to
elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc.18

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

On January 15, 2007, the CTA En Banc denied the petition, reiterating that failure to comply with
invoicing requirements results in the denial of a claim for refund.19 Hence, it disposed of the
petition as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision
dated June 30, 2005 and Resolution dated October 5, 2005 of Second Division of the Court of
Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No. 6454 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.20
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice Acosta) concurred with the findings of the
majority that there was failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the invoicing
requirements;21 he dissented, however, to the outright denial of petitioner’s claim since there
are other pieces of evidence proving petitioner’s transactions and VAT status.22

Petitioner sought reconsideration23 of the Decision but the CTA En Banc

denied the same in a Resolution24 dated March 16, 2007. Presiding Justice Acosta maintained
his dissent.

Issue

Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print the word "zero-
rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated
sales.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner submits that:

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER

THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:

A. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO NOT REQUIRE THAT
INVOICES AND/OR RECEIPTS ISSUED BY A VAT-REGISTERED TAXPAYER, SUCH AS THE
PETITIONER, SHOULD BE IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD "ZERO-RATED."

B. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX CODE AND THE REQUIREMENT
THAT THE WORDS "ZERO-RATED" BE IMPRINTED ON THE SALES INVOICES/OFFICIAL RECEIPTS
UNDER REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 ARE NOT EVIDENTIARY RULES AND THE ABSENCE
THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A TAXPAYER’S CLAIM FOR REFUND.

C. RESPONDENT’S REGULATIONS ARE INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT IMPLEMENT THE 1997
TAX CODE BUT INSTEAD, [EXCEED] THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW.

D. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT UNEQUIVOCALLY PROVED

PETITIONER’S ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.

E. NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF

PETITIONER TO IMPRINT THE WORD "ZERO-RATED" ON ITS INVOICES. PETITIONER’S CLIENTS
FOR ITS ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS CANNOT UNDULY BENEFIT FROM ITS "OMISSION"
CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATIONS [that] ARE NOT
COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT SYSTEM.
F. IN CIVIL CASE[S], SUCH AS CLAIMS FOR REFUND, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED. MOREOVER, A MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WILL
SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF A CLAIM.25

Respondent’s Arguments

Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which are strictly construed
against the claimant, respondent seeks the affirmance of the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CTA En Banc. 26 He insists that the denial of petitioner’s claim for tax credit/refund is
justified because it failed to comply with the invoicing requirements under Section 4.108-127 of
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT

The question of whether the absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal
to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT is not novel. This has been squarely resolved in
Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita
Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.28 In
that case, we sustained the denial of petitioner’s claim for tax credit/refund for non-compliance
with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word "zero rated" to
be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales. We explained that:

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and services. The tax rate in
this case is set at zero. When applied to the tax base or the selling price of the goods or services
sold, such zero rate results in no tax chargeable against the foreign buyer or customer. But,
although the seller in such transactions charges no output tax, he can claim a refund of the VAT
that his suppliers charged him. The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating, which allows him to
recover the input taxes he paid relating to the export sales, making him internationally
competitive.

For the effective zero rating of such transactions, however, the taxpayer has to be VAT-
registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. x x x

xxxx

Petitioner Panasonic points out, however, that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of
the word "zero-rated," the Secretary of Finance unduly expanded, amended, and modified by a
mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95) the letter and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the
1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337. Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which
applied to its payments – specifically Sections 113 and 237 – required the VAT-registered
taxpayer’s receipts or invoices to indicate only the following information:

(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his taxpayer’s
identification number (TIN);

(2) The total amount which the purchaser [paid] or is obligated to pay to the seller with the
indication that such amount includes the value-added tax;

(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the goods or properties or
nature of the service; and

(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayer's identification number (TIN) of the
purchaser, customer or client.

Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the inclusion of the
word "zero-rated" for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices. The BIR incorporated
this requirement only after the enactment of R.A. 9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that did not
yet exist at the time it issued its invoices.

But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e., from April 1998
to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, otherwise known as the
Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which the Secretary of Finance issued on December
9, 1995 and [which] took effect on January 1, 1996.1avvphil It already required the printing of
the word "zero-rated" on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When R.A. 9337 amended the
1997 NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a part of the tax
code. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding force of such
regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the enactment of that law.

Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of
Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree 1158) for the efficient
enforcement of the tax code and of course its amendments. The requirement is reasonable and
is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. As
aptly explained by the CTA’s First Division, the appearance of the word "zero-rated" on the face
of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their
purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT
is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect.

Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate sales that are
subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. Unable to submit the
proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been unable to substantiate its claim for refund.29
 Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioner’s claim for credit/ refund of input VAT
for the taxable quarters of 2000 must be denied. Failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the
invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 15, 2007 and
the Resolution dated March 16, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.

14. Verba Legis

- The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.

PAGCOR vs. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction Inc.,

Facts:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No. 7903 was enacted into law, to which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among
other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others,
tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;

In the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority approved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the present petition for
Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.

Issue: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate of authorizing a private company, PEJI,
to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.

Held:
No. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST
from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the
operation of any games of chance.

The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are
clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion,
or enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than
skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value."

The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from
construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Using the
literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude" games of chance" and "gambling"
does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the
legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate the same to
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.

C. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS

FACTS:

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed
as JDRC No. 6211.
On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69
(RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T.
BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code
with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007 declaring as final and executory
On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari under rule 65
entitled “Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos” reversed the
January 16, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration
as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of
Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicable in this case since the
marriage of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating
that “coverage of A.M. 02-11-10-SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988”.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family
Code” in A.M. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its
scope.

RATIONALE:

In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads
that:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Phillipines.

The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became effective
on August 3, 1988. The Court therefore cannot apply merit to the petitioner’s interpretation
stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the phrase “under the Family Code” when the
Rule took effectivity.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation, only application. It must therefore be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-meaning rule” or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention”. Additionally,
there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a status there
should be no departure.”