Merrit vs.

Govt of the Philippines

The facts of the case took place in the 1910’s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was
excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre
Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was
proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he
was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his
job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later
authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature
(An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The
lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay
the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government
officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government.
“The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers
or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”
REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO
G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-
appellants

Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of
the Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for
the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The
trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano
and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set
aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in
possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial court
ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of
Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to
allow them to present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano
filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion
was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked
by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but
must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is
not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court
just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an
action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is
not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself
fails to allege the existence of such consent.
UP vs. Dizon
GR 171182
August 23, 2012

FACTS:

 In 1990, UP contracted with Stern Builders (sobrang stern talaga!) to renovate

the CAS building in UPLB as well as build an extension thereof.
 Stern then submitted billing statements to UP but was only paid for the first and
second ones. The third one was not settled because of a COA disallowance.
 Soon thereafter, the disallowance was lifted but the third bill for the account of
UP remained outstanding which prompted Stern to sue for collection with
damages at RTC-QC.
 The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Stern the amount of approx. P16.35M
plus attorney’s fees and cost of suit. It also dismissed UP’s appeal being filed out
of time.
 The CA also dismissed UP’s appeal to the decision for not being filed within the
reglementary period.
 The RTC granted request for motion of execution and denied all remedies
submitted by UP and ultimately authorized the release of the garnished funds to
Stern. UP was served this order dated December 21, 2004 on January 3, 2005.
 UP then filed for a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jusridiction of
the RTC in issuing the assailed order committing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (GAODATLOEOF, or better yet GAOD
na lang!) in ruling that there was no more legal impediment for the release of the
garnished amount.
 Ultimately, decreeing that the decision for UP to pay Stern has become final and
executory, RTC-QC approved the release of the garnished amount in 2007.

ISSUES:

 WON the funds of UP were properly garnished to satisfy the judgment award;
and

HELD:

 No. The funds of UP is not properly garnished by the RTC.

o The execution of the money judgment against UP was within the primary
jurisdiction of the COA with express proviso in Sec. 26, PD 1445,
“examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims from or owing
to the government… its subdivisions, agencies, and intrumentalities…
 extending to all GOCCs, including subsidiaries… self-governing boards,
commissions, or agencies….” shall be under the authority and powers of
the Commission (COA).

o UP being a government instrumentality uses government funds, which is

maintained as a special trust fund with depository bank.

o The judges of RTC-QC should have exercised extreme caution and

prudence in dealing with motions for executions against government
funds. Despite the finality of the judgments, RTC should have directed
Stern to seek the approval of COA for disbursement rather than ordering
the release.
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA

Concepcion, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he
stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he
fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against
the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay
damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were
and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that
P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I.
COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal
and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the
proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids
for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US
two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William
I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners
herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the
projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against the US.

Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts
of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of
the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international
law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of
states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(juregestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of
economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into
business contracts.
FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954
FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the
vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission
tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The
Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.
Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his
original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from
the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter
refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ
of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession
thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale,
for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had
authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of
P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed
an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of
said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case
praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
may be foreclosed.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.

Discussions:
When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have
divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the
ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative
relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from
suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short,
by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defenses he might have against the state.

Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez

No. L-61744 June 25, 1984
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al." dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge
Oscar C. Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar
Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer. The court ordered the defendant
municipality to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals
collected from the tenants from 1970 up to and including 1975 plus interest thereon at
the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid. In addition to this, the defendant
municipality must pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php3,000.00 for attorney's fees and to
pay the cost of suit. Thereafter, the private respondents moved for issuance of the writ
of execution for the satisfaction of the said judgement, however, petitioner, on July 30,
1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's
property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said Motion was then
denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the writ of
execution still stands in full force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession
of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are
public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money
judgement in Civil Case No. 604-B.
HELD:
Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of
San Miguel and of Bulacan, are public funds which are exempt from execution as stated
under Presidential Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration",
Section 2, paragraph (a): No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Furthermore,
there must be an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan containing the
corresponding appropriation for the funds before any money of the municipality may be
paid out. Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent,
A municipal corporation is an example of an incorporated agency which has a charter of
its own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal
government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its
governmental functions. It can be held liable only if it has been proven that they were
acting in a proprietary function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of
P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of
garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such
order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that
its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation
required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The
RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter
affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. Issue: Whether
or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution. Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC
judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public
funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the
said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the
said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's
blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are
already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice.
Municipality of Makati Vs CA

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private

respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the
appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this
amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to
private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with
a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of
public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the
motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties
of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds
an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.
 MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and
to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations

of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

RULING

NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application

of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging
the same violation of an environmental law.
 M.H. Wylie v Rarang
G.R. No. 74135, May 28, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrativeofficer while petitioner Capt. Jame
s Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo
City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora Rarang was assigned as merchandise control
guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, in
his capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the publication of the so-called “Plan of
the Day” (POD) published daily by the US Naval Base Station. The POD
featured important announcements, necessary precautions and general matters of
interest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the “action line
inquiry” (NAVSTA ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the Office
of the Admin Asst intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on
matters they feel should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation. On
February 3, 1978, the POD under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and
mentioned a certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to her division and to the Office of
the Provost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that Auring was consuming and
appropriating for herself confiscated items like like cigarettes and foodstuffs. The PR was
the only one who was named “Auring” in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result
thereof, she was investigated by her superior. The PR commenced an ACTION FOR
DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US
Naval Base alleging that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation
and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and dismissed the suit
against the US Naval Base. The IAC (now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with
modifications as to the amount of damages awarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams) who
commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by
the principle of state immunity from suit. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to
the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and
torts?

HELD:

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted
ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan).It may be
argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as commanding
officer of the naval base was far removed in the chain of command from the offensive
publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for
everything which goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular case, the records
show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and
that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a
person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that, “Whoever by act or
omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7), Civil Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation.”Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the POD was a defamation
against the character and reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the
Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name “Auring” if
the article will be published. The petitioners, however, were
NEGLIGENTbecause under their direction, they issued thepublication without deleting
the said name. Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed
part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the PR. As a result of
petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, especially so, since the article was baseless and false. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused the
Private Respondent
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which
assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder,
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials
of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This
violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A
DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖
AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary
period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation
of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it
cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts:
Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India
enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with
selected panel members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah,
Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean’s representative.

Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that
was lifted from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed
to continue to with her oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with
condition to incorporate the suggestion made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not
sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should be submitted.
On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her
graduation pending the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent
submitted the supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained that
suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina and
did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting
that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were
later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina.
Private respondent was disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr.
Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and
further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz
attempts to exclude the private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to
the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for clarification of her
charges against panel members and accusations relating to her dissertation.
Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was allowed to graduate.
Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she
substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally
charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended for the withdrawal of her
doctorate degree.
Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and
recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private
respondent was informed of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90
instances or portions of thesis lifted from other sources with no proper acknowledgement.
After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the
recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its
actions to study further for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a
copy of findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting
was scheduled to discuss her answer.
Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for
withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the there were massive lifting from
published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of being guilty of
plagiarism.
 On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the
Board of Regents send a letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved by
majority to withdraw your doctorates degree.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She
alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and
without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to
restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and
P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered to restore her
doctorates degree.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and
ordering petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondent’s doctoral
degree cannot be recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual
property and to justice and equity.

Held/Ruling:

The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.

1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private
respondent was denied of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the
ambit of disciplinary powers of UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the
charges, the private respondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in
writing about the charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee.
She was asked to submit her explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also
discussed her case with the UP Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their
meetings. She was given the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to
refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student,
as the Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student that is in
question. The investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate because
there were many investigations conducted before the Board finally decided that she
should not have been allowed to graduate.

2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a
university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board
of Regents, subject to due process being followed, may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
 It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a
wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution
of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.