1) BATACLAN v.
MEDINA removed and duly identified that of Juan
Facts:
 At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the
bus, operated by its owner defendant
Mariano Medina and driven by its regular
chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town
of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to
Pasay City, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right
side of the road and turned turtle.
 Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus but the three passengers seated
beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara
and the Visayan and the woman behind them
named Natalia Villanueva, could not get
out of the overturned bus. No evidence to
show that the freed passengers, including
the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside
the vehicle.
 After half an hour, came about ten men,
one of them carrying a lighted torch,
approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped
inside it.
 That same day, the charred bodies of the
four passengers inside the bus were
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and
in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in
the total amount of P87,150.
 After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000
to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to
Pasay City for sale and which was lost in
the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants
appealed the case to CA which endorsed the
case to SC.
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the
fire that burned the bus, including the 4
passengers left inside.
Held:
 The Court held that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus because
when the vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected.
 The coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most
 probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming
as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not
available.
 In other words, the coming of the men with
a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help.
 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also
in part be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through its driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least,
the driver should and must have known that
in the position in which the overturned
bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus.
 The leaked gasoline can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of
contract of transportation because the
Medina Transportation failed to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay
City. There was likewise negligence on the
part of the defendant, through his agent,
the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the
bus was speeding and that the driver
failed to changed the tires into new ones
as instructed by Mariano Medina.
 The driver had not been diligent and had
not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had
he changed the tires, specially those in
front, with new ones, as he had been
instructed to do, probably, despite his
speeding, the blow out would not have
occurred.
Ratio:
 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause
 which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result
therefrom.
2) NIKKO HOTEL v. REYES
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive
party was being held at the Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden. The party was being held for
a prominent Japanese national. The person in
charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also
the executive secretary of the hotel. Later
during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes
(popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was
not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim
first tried to find out who invited Reyes to
the party. When she ascertained that the host
celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim
approached Reyes and told the latter, in a
discreet voice, to finish his food and leave
the party. Reyes however made a scene and
began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was
called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden for damages. In his version, he said
that he was invited by another party guest,
Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he
was queuing to get his food, Lim approached
him and ordered him in a loud voice to leave
the party immediately. He told Lim he was
invited by Dr. Filart however when he was
calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored
him. Later, he was escorted out of the party
like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and
Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim
abused her right and that Reyes deserved to
be treated humanely and fairly. It is true
that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave
the party but she should have done it
respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse
of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version
of Lim more credible. She has been employed
by the hotel for more than 20 years at that
time. Her job requires her to be polite at
all times. It is very unlikely for her to
make a scene in the party she was managing.
That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that
even Reyes testified in court that when Lim
told him to leave, Lim did so very close to
him – so close that they could almost kiss.
This only proves that Lim intended that only
Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s
going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests
from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly
known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim,
as proven by evidence on record, did not
demean Reyes. They do not know each other
personally. She has no reason to treat him
wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself
is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever
damage he incurred upon himself. Under the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by
coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens
himself to the risk of being turned away, and
thus being embarrassed. The injury he
incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence
even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied
inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes
simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even
present any supporting evidence to support
any of his claims. Since he brought injury
upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can
be held liable for damages.
3) MARGARITA AFIALDA v. BASILIO HISOLE, ET.
AL
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the
carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March
1947, without any fault from Afialda or any
force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him
thereby causing his death. Afialda’s sister,
Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that
under the Civil Code, “The possessor of an
animal, or the one who uses the same, is
liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray
away. This liability shall cease only in
case, the damage should arise fromforce
majeure or from the fault of the person who
may have suffered it.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the
case at bar as owner of the carabao which
killed Afialda.
HELD: No. The law uses the term “possessor
and user of the animal”. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and
paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the
time of the goring, is the possessor and the
user of the carabao and therefore he is the
one who had custody and control of the animal
and was in a position to prevent the animal
from causing damage. It would have been
different had Afialda been a stranger.
Obviously, it was the caretaker’s business
to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances was one of the
risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences.
This action could have been more
appropriately raised in court under the
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
as the risk involve was one of occupational
hazards.
4) ALANO v. LOGMAO
Facts: At around 9:50pm of March 1, 1988,
Arnelito Logmao then 18 y/o, was brought to
the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in
Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
allegedly saw the former fall from the
overpass near the Farmer’s Market in Cubao,
Quezon City. The patient’s data sheet
identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso
of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong. However, the
clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F.
Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the
emergency room of EAMC, stated the patient
is Angelito Logmao. Dr. Cabrera reported that
Logmao was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was
conscious and coherent; that the skull x-ray
showed no fracture; that at around 4:30am of
March 2, 1988, Logmao developed generalized
seizures and was managed by the neuro-surgeon
resident on-duty; that the condition of
Logmao progressively deteriorated and he was
intubated and ambu-bagging support was
provided; that admission to the ICU and
mechanical ventilation support became
necessary, but there was no vacancy at the
ICU and all the ventilation units were being
used by other patients; that a resident
physician of NKTI, who was rotating at EAMC,
suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI;
and that after arrangements were made, Logamo
was transferred to NKTI at 10:10am. At the
NKTI, the name Angelito Logmao was recorded
as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately
attended to and given the necessary medical
treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives
around, Jennifer Misa, transplant
coordinator was asked to locate his family
by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr.
Enrique Ona, chairman of the Department of
Surgery, observed that severity of the brain
injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of
brain death. He requested the laboratory
section to conduct tissue typing and tissue
cross-matching examination, so that should
Lugmoso expire despite the necessary care and
medical management and he would be found to
be a suitable organ donor and his family
would consent to organ donation, the organs
thus donated could be detached and
transplanted promptly to any compatible
beneficiary. The identity of Lugmoso was
verified by Misa from EAMC and she was
furnished the patient’s data sheet. She then
contacted several radio and television
stations to request for air time for the
purpose of locating the family of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong who was
confined at NKTI with severe head injury
after allegedly falling from the Cubao
overpass, as well as police station no. 5
Eastern Police District. Lugmoso was
pronounced brain dead on March 3, 1988
7:00am. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed
that EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing
thereby confirming his brain death. He was
found to be a suitable donor of the heart,
kidneys, pancreas, and liver, and after the
extensive search, no relatives were found.
Dr. Ona then requested the removal of the
specific organs of Lugmoso from the herein
petitioners, Dr. Alano, the director of NKTI
who thereafter issued a memorandum stating
that only after the requirements of RA 349
as amended by PD 856 was complied, they can
remove the specified organs of Lugmoso.
Lugmoso’s remains was brought at La Funeraria
Oro. A press release made by NKTI announcing
a double organ transplant led to the findings
of the relatives of Lugmoso.
Issue: Whether or not the removal of
Lugmoso’s organs were valid.
Held: Yes. The internal organs of the
deceased were removed only after he had been
declared brain dead; thus the emotional pain
suffered by respondent due to the death of
her son cannot be in any way be attributed
to petitioner. Neither can the court find
evidence or second to show that respondent’s
emotional suffering at the sight of the
pitful state in which she found her son’s
lifeless body be categorically attributed to
petitioner’s conduct.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioners
employed reasonable means to disseminate
notifications intended to reach the
relatives of the deceased. The only question
that remains pertains to the sufficiency of
time allotted for notices to reach the
relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive
notice of her son’s death because the notices
did not properly state the name or identity
of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at
petitioner’s door. The trial and appellate
courts found that it was the EAMC, who
recorded the wrong information regarding the
deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could
not have obtained the information about his
name from the patient, because as found by
the lower courts, the deceased was already
unconscious by the time he was brought to
NKTI.
5) CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO
FACTS:
 On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the
morning, Mrs. Cortejo brought her 11-year
old son, Edmer, to the Emergency Room of
the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH)
because of difficulty in breathing, chest
pain, stomach pain, and fever. Thereafter,
she was referred and assigned to Dr.
 Casumpang, a pediatrician. At 5:30 in the
afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang,
upon examination using only a stethoscope,
confirmed the diagnosis of
Bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo
immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that
Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds
or cough but Dr. Casumpang merely told her
that her son's bloodpressure is just being
active and remarked that that's the usual
bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm.
 Dr. Casumpang next visited the following
day. Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr.
Casumpang's attention and stated that
Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as
well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs.
Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about
the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum.
Despite these pieces of information,
however, Dr. Casumpang simply nodded and
reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's
illness is bronchopneumonia.
 At around 11:30 in the morning of April
23, 1988, Edmer vomited phlegm with blood
streak prompting the Edmer's father to
request for a doctor. Later, Miranda, one
of the resident physicians of SJDH,
arrived. She claimed that although aware
that Edmer had vomited phlegm with blood
streak she failed to examine the blood
specimen. She then advised the respondent
to preserve the specimen for examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a check-
up on Edmer and found that Edmer had a
low-grade fever and rashes.
 At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again
vomited blood. Dr. Miranda then examined
Edmer's sputum with blood and noted that
he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could
be afflicted with dengue, Dr. Miranda
conducted a tourniquet test, which turned
out to be negative. Dr. Miranda then
called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and
told him about Edmer's condition. Upon
being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered
several procedures done. Dr. Miranda
advised Edmer's parents that the blood
test results showed that Edmer was
suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever.
Dr. Casumpang recommended Edmer’s
transfer to the ICU, but since the ICU was
then full, the respondent, insisted on
transferring his son to Makati Medical
Center.
 At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by
his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was
transferred to Makati Medical Center. Upon
examination, the attending physician
diagnosed Dengue Fever Stage IV that was
already in its irreversible stage. Edmer
died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24,
1988. His Death Certificate indicated the
cause of death as Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock/Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV.
 Believing that Edmer's death was caused by
the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of
his doctors, the respondent instituted an
action for damages against SJDH, and its
attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang and
Dr. Miranda.
 Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his
patient medical treatment and care to the
best of his abilities, and within the
proper standard of care required from
physicians under similar circumstances.
 Dr. Miranda argued that the function of
making the diagnosis and undertaking the
medical treatment devolved upon Dr.
Casumpang, the doctor assigned to Edmer.
Dr. Miranda also alleged that she
exercised prudence in performing her
duties as a physician, underscoring that
it was her professional intervention that
led to the correct diagnosis of Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever.
 SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims
liability by asserting that Dr. Casumpang
and Dr. Miranda are mere independent
contractors and consultants (not
employees) of the hospital; hence, Article
2180 of the Civil Code does not apply.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Casumpang had committed inexcusable
lack of precaution in diagnosing and in
treating the patient
2. W/N Miranda had committed inexcusable lack
of precaution in diagnosing and in
treating the patient
3. W/N Whether or not the petitioner hospital
is solidarity liable with the petitioner
doctors
4. W/N or not there is a causal connection
between the petitioners' negligent
act/omission and the patient's resulting
death
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, Casumpang was negligent.
 Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms
completely coincided with the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, we still find Dr.
Casumpang guilty of negligence. Wrong
diagnosis is not by itself medical
malpractice. Physicians are generally not
liable for damages resulting from a bona
fide error of judgment and from acting
according to acceptable medical practice
standards. Nonetheless, when the
physician's erroneous diagnosis was the
result of negligent conduct, it becomes an
evidence of medical malpractice.

 In the present case, evidence on record
established that in confirming the
diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr.
Casumpang selectively appreciated some
and not all of the symptoms presented, and
failed to promptly conduct the appropriate
tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr.
Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue
fever, which failure, especially when
reasonable prudence would have shown that
indications of dengue were evident and/or
foreseeable, constitutes negligence.
Apart from failing to promptly detect
dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to
promptly undertake the proper medical
management needed for this disease. Dr.
Casumpang failed to measure up to the
acceptable medical standards in
diagnosing and treating dengue fever.
 Dr. Casumpang's claim that he exercised
prudence and due diligence in handling
Edmer's case, sside from being self-
serving, is not supported by competent
evidence. He failed, as a medical
professional, to observe the most prudent
medical procedure under the circumstances
in diagnosing and treating Edmer.
3. Yes,
2. No, Dr. Miranda is not liable for negligence.
 We find that Dr. Miranda was not
independently negligent. Although she was
subject to the same standard of care
applicable to attending physicians, as a
resident physician, she merely operates as
a subordinate who usually refer to the
attending physician on the decision to be
made and on the action to be taken. We
also believe that a finding of negligence
should also depend on several competing
factors. In this case, before Dr. Miranda
attended to Edmer, Dr. Casumpang had
diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia.
There is also evidence supporting Dr.
Miranda's claim that she extended diligent
care to Edmer. In fact, when she
suspected, during Edmer's second episode
of bleeding, that Edmer could be suffering
from dengue, she wasted no time in
conducting the necessary tests, and
promptly notified Dr. Casumpang about the
incident. Indubitably, her medical
assistance led to the finding of dengue
fever. Dr. Miranda's error was merely an
honest mistake of judgment; hence, she
should not be held liable for medical
negligence.
causal connection between the
petitioners' negligence and the patient's
resulting death was established
  Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer
with dengue fever despite the presence of
its characteristic symptoms; and as a
consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he
also failed to promptly manage Edmer's
illness. Had he immediately conducted
confirmatory tests, and promptly
administered the proper care and
management needed for dengue fever, the
risk of complications or even death, could
have been substantially reduced. That
Edmer later died of Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever Stage IV, a severe and fatal form
of dengue fever, established the causal
link between Dr. Casumpang's negligence
and the injury. The element of causation
is successfully proven.
4. YES, SJDH is solidarily liable.
 As a rule, hospitals are not liable for
the negligence of its independent
contractors. However, it may be found
liable if the physician or independent
contractor acts as an ostensible agent of
the hospital. This exception is also known
as the doctrine of apparent authority.
 SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr.
Casumpang with apparent authority leading
the respondent to believe that he is an
employee or agent of the hospital. Based
on the records, the respondent relied on
SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to
care and treat his son Edmer. His
testimony during trial showed that he and
his wife did not know any doctors at SJDH;
they also did not know that Dr. Casumpang
was an independent contractor. They
brought their son to SJDH for diagnosis
because of their family doctor's referral.
The referral did not specifically point to
Dr. Casumpang or even to Dr. Miranda, but
to SJDH.
 Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang's
services on the reasonable belief that
such were being provided by SJDH or its
employees, agents, or servants. By
referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat
for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr.
Casumpang as a member of its medical
staff. SJDH cannot now disclaim liability
since there is no showing that Mrs.
Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should
have known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an
independent contractor of the hospital. In
this case, estoppel has already set in.
6) ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE v. MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF ILOILO
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold
storage plant. Nearby residents made
complaints regarding the smoke that the plant
emits saying that it was very injurious to
their health and comfort. The defendant made
investigations and later on passed a
resolution which demands that the
smokestacks of the said factory be elevated
or else the factory operations will be closed
or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for
injunction.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued
by the municipal council is sufficient to
label and abate the supposed nuisance in this
case?
RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances
per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all
circumstances. The latter are such only
because of the special circumstances and
conditions surrounding them. The former may
be abated even by private individuals however
the latter is different; it needs a
determination of the facts which is a
judicial function.
The question of nuisance can conclusively be
decided, for all legal uses, by the
established courts of law or equity alone,
and that the resolution of officers, or of
boards organized by force of municipal
charters, cannot, to any degree, control such
decision. City Council cannot, by a mere
resolution or motion, declare any particular
thing a nuisance which has not theretofore
been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.
In the present case it is certain that the
ice factory of the plaintiff is not a
nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
beneficial to the people and conducive to
their health and comfort. The resolution is
obviously not enough to abate the property
of the plaintiff.
7) SAN RAFAEL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF
MANILA
8) AYALA v. BARRETTO
9) CADIENTE v. MACAS
FACTS: Bithuel Macas while standing on the
shoulder of the road was bumped and run over by
a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca which
resulted to the amputation of both legs up to
the groins of the victim. Records showed that
the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of
Atty. Cadiente, who However, claimed that when
the accident happened, he was no longer the
owner of the Ford Fiera since he already sold
it to Engr. Jalipa on March 28, 1994. The
victim's father, filed a complaint for torts
and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente
before the RTC of Davao City. Cadiente later
filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa.
Jalipa, however, filed a fourth-party complaint
against Abubakar, to whom Jalipa allegedly sold
the vehicle on June 20, 1994.
The RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff
declarin Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr.
Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for
damages to the plaintiff for their own
negligence. The Court of Appeals denied their
appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence
on the part of the victim, hence not entitled
to recover damages.
2. Whether the petitioner and third-party
defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally
liable to the victim.
HELD:
1. NONE. Records show that when the accident
happened, the victim was standing on the
shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of
the highway. As noted the trial court, the
shoulde was intended for pedestrian use alone.
Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading
or unloading passengers may use the shoulder.
Running vehicles are not supposed to pass
through the said uncemented portion of the
highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case,
without so much as slowing down, took off from
the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably
swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped
and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was
just where he should be when the unfortunate
event transpired.
2. The registered owner of any vehicle, even
if he had already sold it to someone else, is
primarily responsible to the public for
whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause.
In the case of Villanueva v. Domingo, we
said that the policy behind vehicle
registration is the easy identification of the
owner who can be held responsible in case of
accident, damage or injury caused by the
vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or
prejudice a third party injured by one whose
identity cannot be secured. Therefore, since
the Ford Fiera was still registered in the
petitioner's name at the time when the
misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot
escape liability for the permanent injury it
caused the respondent, who had since stopped
schooling and is now forced to face life with
nary but two remaining limbs.
10) LEDESMA v. CA
Facts:
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to
graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the
president, herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of
the West Visayas College neglected his duty to Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a
inform the student on the result of a case student with honors and blatant disregard of
against the student which has, as its the student’s rights on the account of him being
punishment, the removal of awards or citations embarrassed shows neglect of duty without just
of the student. Said case was the extension of cause, rendering him liable for damages under
loans to students, which the president contends Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the
to be against the school rules and regulations, student and the student’s parents went through
and which the student innocently performed in a painful ordeal brought about by such neglect.
her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article
Leadership Club and in accordance to the 27 are but proper.
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the
belief that said constitution was presented and
approved by the president. The student appealed
to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools
after being denied for reconsideration by the
president, where upon investigation, it was
found out that the student acted in good faith
and that her awards be reinstituted. The
president, upon receiving said decision,
delayed action and even e-mailed the director
to reverse his decision. The student therefore
graduated as a plain student and without honors
and her award as Magna Cum Laude was only
entered on the scholastic records weeks after
the receipt by the president of the decision
and after the graduation.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable

for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.

Ruling: