MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

The Case. Robin Cario Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, petitioner, Vs. Court Of Appeals And People
Of The Philippines, respondents. G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.

Facts. High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla. Appellant voluntarily surrendered the item and a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine. PNP Chief Espino issued a Certification which stated that the three
firearms confiscated from appellant, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla.

Issue. Was the peitioner’s arrest illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken
in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.

Held. No. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that
did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

The Court ruled that Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner’s vehicle figured
in a hit and run – an offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who then sought
to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that “presence” does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he “hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds
at once to the scene.” As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud,
saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase
to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding
policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run)
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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in effecting petitioner’s arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact
the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch
as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect who
, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able
to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long
list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of – hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime – all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since
they had more than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has
been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b)
as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves
at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the
dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer’s personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident.
Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto aside from
his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed
him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived
such irregularities and defects.

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as
follows:
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence,

Seizure of evidence in “plain view”, the elements of which are:

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d). “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

Consented warrantless search, and customs search.

In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith
& Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and back
pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification
applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen
as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver’s seat. Thus
it has been held that:

“(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the
corpus delicti.”

“Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure
even without a warrant.”

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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was affected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers
in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This
satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the
arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search
is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

Doctrine Learned. In arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity
of the perpetrator. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the
officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor.
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

The Case. Land bank of the Philippines, petitioner, v. Ramon p. Jacinto, respondent. G.R. No.
154622, August 3, 2010.

Facts. The First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land
Bank in the aggregate amount of P400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement in August 22, 1997.
As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank
nine (9) postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCCs account at the Philippine
National Bank. before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter agreements
which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement where the Credit Line Agreement in
August 22, 1997 were changed/modified its terms of payment.

When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation under the terms of their restructured
agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured.
However, all the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason Payment Stopped or Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds. Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.

Land Bank filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office complaint against respondent for violation of
B.P. 22. However, Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-
agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the DOJ for review. The DOJ dismissed the appeal. However, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution holding
that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, reversed the Resolution of the DOJ
and reinstated the Resolution of Prosecutor De Joya dismissing the complaint. The CA ruled that novation
is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal
liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court
because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation.

Petitioner that the Restructuring Agreement did not release FWCC from its obligation with Land Bank. It
merely accommodated FWCCs sister company, RJ Ventures and Development Corporation. Whether
there was novation or not is also not determinative of respondent’s responsibility for violation of B.P. 22,
as the said special law punishes the act of issuing a worthless check and not the purpose for which the
check was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The CA failed to take judicial notice
of Section 86-B (4) [16] of Republic Act No. 7907 which excludes the proceeds of the checks from the
property of the insolvent FWCC.
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

Respondent counters that there was novation which occurred prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint against him and that if proven, it would affect his criminal liability and also averred that if the
CA would judicially confirm the existence of novation in the appeal of Civil Case before it, then it would
follow that the value represented by the subject checks has been extinguished. He argues that the
consideration or value of the subject checks have been modified or novated with the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. The payment of the obligation supposedly already depended on the terms and
conditions of the Restructuring Agreement and no longer on the respective maturity dates of the subject
checks as the value or consideration of the subject checks had been rendered inexistent by the subsequent
execution of the Restructuring Agreement. He maintains that the subject checks can no longer be the
basis of criminal liability since the obligation for which they were issued had already been novated or
abrogated.

Issues.

1) What are the elements and importance of prejudicial question in criminal cases?
2) Was the respondent guilty of violation B.P 22?

Held.

1) A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with
which said question is closely connected. Not every defense raised in a civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based
on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking
up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.

2) Yes. The Court held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. Section 1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. Thus, even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the
FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the
dishonored checks.

Doctrine learned. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact separate and distinct from the
crime but is so intimately related to it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. In case the
civil action was instituted ahead of the criminal action, the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found and before judgment is the merits upon commencement of the criminal action. The
rationale behind the prejudicial question rule is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
S 9:00 AM – 12:00 PM

The Case. Gian Paulo Villaflor, petitioner, vs. DINDO VIVAR Y GOZON, respondent. G.R. No.
134744. January 16, 2001.

Facts. An Information for slight physical injuries was filed against respondent for severely beating
the petitioner. When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they had
appeared at first, an Information for serious physical injuries, was filed against respondent. The earlier
charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn. At the same time, another Information for grave threats.

Respondent posted a cash bond of P6,000 for serious physical injuries. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit
as required by the trial court, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats. He contended
that the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries, should have
been absorbed by the latter. He concluded, the case for serious physical injuries should be dismissed, as
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the motion to quash filed by accused counsel
is denied.

Later, private respondent filed a motion for consideration before the RTC. The RTC agrees with the
contention of private respondent that the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner in the inferior court is a
prohibited pleading under Rules on Summary Procedure so that its denial is tenable. However, it would
appear that the criminal charges were filed without the preliminary investigation having been conducted
by the Prosecutors Office. Although preliminary investigation in cases triable by inferior courts is not a
matter of right, the provision of Sec. 51 par 3(a) of Republic Act 7926 entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Muntinlupa Into a Highly Urbanized City To Be Known as the City of Muntinlupa provides
that the city prosecutor shall conduct preliminary investigations of ALL crimes, even violations of city
ordinances. Since this procedure was not taken against accused, the order stands. Hence, this petition.

Issues.

1) Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases for serious physical
injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to conduct a preliminary
investigation?

2) Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered
a ground to quash the criminal informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed
against the accused-respondent?

Held.

1) NO. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A component part of due process in criminal
justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
MAGBUAL, FRIZIE JANE S.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the
full measure of their right to due process.

However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or
constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the
information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct
a preliminary investigation.

Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for serious physical
injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor had failed to conduct a
preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, we do not agree that a preliminary investigation was not conducted. In fact, a
preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was made by the assistant city prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City. The said Information was, however, amended when petitioner’s injuries turned
out to be more serious and did not heal within the period specified in the Revised Penal Code.
We believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by respondent. This is
because the change made by the public prosecutor was only a formal amendment.

The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, did not violate
the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; an
open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a
public trial. The Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple
and obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the original
Information. Moreover, if the original charge was related to the amended one, such that an
inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not
necessary.

2) NO. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the information.

Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the grounds on which an
accused can move to quash the complaint or information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the information does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged, except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (g) the criminal action or liability
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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has been extinguished; (h) the information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of
being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged.

Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of a preliminary

investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. Moreover, such motion is a prohibited pleading
under Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In the present case, the RTC
therefore erred in granting herein respondents Motion to Quash.

Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash
before arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or had failed to allege the grounds
therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds. In this case, he waived his right to file such
motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave threats.

Doctrine learned. The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his
plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
apparent on its face. It can only be granted if all the elements were presented.