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People vs Fidel Fortuno

GR Nos. L-48519-22 June 12, 1942

J. Paras

FACTS:
Defendant-appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila upon appeal
from the Municipal Court, of four separate offenses of estafa and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment in G.R. No. 48519 for two months and one day, arresto mayor, and in each of the
other three cases for three months and eleven days, arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended
parties respectively in the sums of P140, P94.50 P83.50 and P189, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
However, it appears that appellant was sentenced by this Court to undergo imprisonment
in five cases. The most severe penalty imposed upon the appellant is from four months and twenty
days to one year, eight months and twenty-one days, and the sum total of his several penalties
does not exceed threefold the length of time corresponding to the maximum limit thereof.

ISSUE:
WON the three-fold rule is applicable in the case of the appellant.

RULING:
No. With respect to the most severe penalty, and the sum total of his several penalties does not
exceed threefold the length of time corresponding to the maximum limit thereof, we cannot for the
present make the pronouncement that article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 217, is applicable. However, in anticipation, we may state that, if in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law the appellant should be entitled to be released
on parole after service of the minimum limit of the aforesaid indeterminate penalty (from four
months and twenty days to one year, eight months and twenty-one days), or of a greater period
below the maximum limit threefold the length of which is less than the sum total of all the penalties
imposed upon him, his aggregate prison term would be reduced to not more than three times
period thus served
Judgments appealed from will be, as the same are hereby, affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
People vs. Tibon
G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010

Facts:
Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived
together as husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert
(Reguel). They lived together with Tibon’s parents and siblings on the third floor of a rented house.
Gina went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody.
After some time, Tibon heard from her sister who was also working abroad that Gina was having
an affair with another man. After the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting
his two children.

On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother and his
siblings (Zernan and Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw him with the two children who
appeared to be lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies. When Tibon realized that his mother
and siblings had seen the children lying on the floor he stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen
knife and jumped out of the window of their house. At the hospital, accused-appellant survived
and was treated however, the children could no longer be revived.

When Gina heard about the incident, she went home immediately and confronted Tibon at the
hospital where he was confined. He confessed to stabbing their children and begged her for
forgiveness.

In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he
could not recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could
not remember being taken to the hospital. He said that he was only informed by his siblings that
he had killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window of their house.

Issue:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity applies to the accused-appellant’s case?

Ruling:
No. Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval” is exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.
Testimony or proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with
the commission of the offense.

The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable
for such refers to his condition to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately before or
during the commission of the crimes.

Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the revelation that his wife was having an
affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity.

The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this case. Under Article 264 Parricide is
committed when: (i) a person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii) the deceased
is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon was found guilty by this Court
with the punishment of reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Mostasesa
G.R. No. L-5684 January 22, 1954

Labrador, J.

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of coercion and were sentenced by the Court of
Appeals, as follows:

. . . the penalty is increased to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, and that appellant should also be
sentenced either to return the articles in question to the complainant or to indemnify him in the sum of
P632, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The case was returned to the Court of First Instance for the execution of the above sentence with the
court issuing an order of execution for P600.00. The provincial sheriff levied upon certain real properties
of the accused Paulino Dumagat to secure the payment thereof, notwithstanding the fact that in
compliance with the judgment, the accused had delivered to him (the sheriff) two bales of tobacco. So
the accused presented a motion in court praying that the order of execution be set aside the order. Against
this order of denial, the accused have prosecuted this appeal citing article 1953 of the Civil Code, the
obligation of one who receives money or fungible thing, in the instant case claimed by the appellant, the
tobacco, is to return to the creditor the same amount of the thing owed of the same kind or species and
quality.

ISSUE:

WON the contention of the accused is tenable.

RULING:

NO. The civil liability of the accused-appellants, in the case at bar, is not governed by the Civil Code, as
contended, but by articles 100-111 of the Revised Penal Code. In accordance therewith, the sentence is
for the return of the very thing taken, restitution, and if this can not be done, for the payment of P600 in
lieu thereof, reparation. This amount represents the value of the two bales of tobacco taken, at the time
of the taking, and this value was fixed by the court presumably in accordance with the evidence adduced
during the trial.

Reparation may not be made by the delivery of a similar thing (same amount, kind or species and quality),
because the value of the thing taken may have decreased since the offended party was deprived thereof.
Reparation, therefore, should consist of the price of the thing taken, as fixed by the court (article 106,
Revised Penal Code).

the judgment of the Court of Appeals ordering restitution, or the payment of the value of the property
taken, is now final and executory and can no longer be subject to modification.

The appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs against accused-appellants.


JOSEFA VARELA vs. JOSEPHINE FINNICK
G.R. No. L-3890. January 2, 1908

Torres, J.

FACTS:

[Some time during the months of November and December, 1905, Nicolasa Pascual received
from Josefa Varela several jewels to be sold on commission, with the express obligation on the
part of the former to pay to the latter the proceeds of the sale of said jewels, or to return them if
unsold.

Nicolasa Pascual, however, far from complying with her duty, pawned the said jewels at various
dates during said months, as appears from the pawn tickets issued by the owner of H.J. Finnick’s
pawnshop, where the jewels had been pledged; that jewels were thus misappropriated, and the
amount of the loan granted thereon embezzled, to the prejudice of Josefa Varela.] WALAY
LABOT PERO PWEDE RAPOD KANI GAMITON SA FACTS TAPOS SUMPAY LANG DAYON
BELOW

Nicolasa Pascual , in a separate criminal action, was found guilty of estafa for failure to comply
with her obligations to Josefa Valera. She was sentenced to the penalty of one year and eleven
months of prision correccional, to make restitution of the jewels misappropriated or to pay the
value thereof, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment;
said judgment became final and the accused is now undergoing the penalty imposed upon her.

On the 22d of September, 1906, the representative of Josefa Varela claimed, in writing, the return
of the jewels above referred to, which were the subject matter of said prosecution, and separate
proceedings having been instituted, the manager of the property of the late Finnick was made a
party thereto.

In response, the manager denied all that had been alleged by the latter, and, although admitting
that the jewels had been pledged at the pawnshop of the late Finnick, further denied that they
were the subject of estafa or any other crime committed by Nicolasa Pascual. The manager further
asked that the request of Josefa Varela be dismissed with costs.

ISSUE:
WON appellant is entitled of restitution in the present case.

RULING:
Yes.

Article 17 of the Penal Code provides that —

"Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable."
The exception contained in paragraph 3 of said article is not applicable to the present case
because a pawnshop does not enjoy the privilege established by article 464 of the Civil Code.
The owner of the loan office of Finnick Brothers, notwithstanding the fact that he acted in good
faith, did not acquire the jewels at a public sale; it is not a question of public property, securities,
or other such effects, the transfer, sale, or disposal of which is subject to the provisions of the
Code of Commerce. Neither does a pawnshop enjoy the privilege granted to a Monte de Piedad;
therefore, Josefa Varela, who lost said jewels and was deprived of the same in consequence of
a crime, is entitled to the recovery thereof from the pawnshop of Finnick Brothers, where they
were pledged; the latter can not lawfully refuse to comply with the provisions of article 120 of the
Penal Code, as it is a question of jewels which have been misappropriated by the commission of
the crime of estafa, and the execution of the sentence which orders the restitution of the jewels
can not be avoided because of the good faith.

Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 464, the owner has an absolute right to
recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them, in accordance with the
judgment entered in the aforesaid cause for estafa, wherein, the accused having been found
guilty, the right of Josefa Varela to recover the jewels in question is expressly acknowledged.