De Ocampo vs.
NLRC
Posted: April 15, 2015 in case digests, labor relations, laborlaw, school
Tags: De Ocampo vs. NLRC 0
G.R. No. 101539
September 4, 1992
Facts: Cecile de Ocampo and the other petitioners are employees of the Baliwag Mahogany
Corporation. They are either officers or members of the Baliwag Mahogany Corporation
Union-CFW, the existing collective bargaining agent of the rank and file employees in the
company.
In 1988, the company and the union entered into a CBA containing, among other things,
provisions on conversion into cash of unused vacation and sick leaves; grievance machinery
procedure; and the right of the company to schedule work on Sundays and holidays.
In November, 1989, the union made several requests from the company.The company ruled
to allow payment of unused vacation and sick leaves for the period of 1987-1988 but
disallowed cash conversion of the 1988-1989 unused leaves.
The company suspended 20 employees for a period of 3 days because of failure to render
overtime work. On the same day, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of ULP
particularly the violation of the CBA provisions on non-payment of unused leaves and illegal
dismissal of seven (7) employees.
Later on, the company issued a notice of termination to three employees or union members
including Cecile de Ocampo allegedly to effect cost reduction and redundancy. The members
of the union conducted a picket at the main gate of the company. On the same day, the
company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for injunction against the
union.
During the election of union officers, Cecile de Ocampo was elected as president.
During the conciliation meeting held at NCMB, the issue pertaining to the legality of the
termination of three union members was raised by the union. But both parties agreed to
discuss it separately.
The union requested for the presence of a NCMB representative during a strike vote held by
the union. The strike vote resulted in favor of the strike. The union staged a strike.
Afterwards, the company filed a petition to assume jurisdiction with the DOLE. The
company also filed an amended petition, praying among other things, that the strike staged by
the union be declared illegal, there being no genuine strikeable issue and the violation of the
no-strike clause of the existing CBA between the parties.
The Secretary of Labor in an order, certified the entire labor dispute to the respondent
Commission for compulsory arbitration and directed all striking workers including the
dismissed employees to return to work and the management to accept them back.
The sheriff, with the assistance of the policemen removed the barricades and opened the
main gate of the company.
Criminal complaints for illegal assembly, grave threats, and grave coercion werefiled against
the petitioners.
The union, through its President Cecile de Ocampo, requested the Regional Director of
DOLE, to intervene in the existing dispute with management.
The respondent Commission rendered a decision declaring the strikes staged illegal.
Issue: Whether or not there is a legal basis for declaring the loss of employment status by
petitioners on account of the strike in respondent Company.
Held: Yes. The Solicitor General claims that it is undisputed that the union resorted to illegal
acts during the strike arguing that private respondent’s personnel manager specifically
identified the union officers and members who committed the prohibited acts and actively
participated therein.
Ratio: The law on the matter is Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, to wit:
Article 264. (a) Prohibited activities. (a) ––
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status…
The Solicitor General maintains that the illegality of the strike likewise stems from the failure
of the petitioners to honor the certification order and heed the return-to-work order issued by
the Secretary of Labor.
Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners defied the return-to-work order of
the Secretary of Labor. Hence, the termination of theservices of the individual petitioners is
justified on this ground alone.
Dispositive: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the resolution of the
respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED.
Rizal Cement Workers vs. Madrigal GR. No. L-19767, April 30, 1964
Facts:
The 21 union members of Rizal Cement Workers’ Union filed a complaint against the
respondent Rizal Cement Co. Inc, for Unfair labor practice on the ground of discrimination.
De Leon, the warehouseman, of Bodega Tanque (complainants’ workplace) was informed by
the manager of Binangonan that a previous strike in the Respondent’s branch, hence, to
takeprecautionary measures in protecting the properties of the company stored at the Bodega
Tanque because of the strikers caused damage to the factory in Binangonan and sabotage
might occur. He was advised by the manager to request the members of the Union to stay
meanwhile outside the premises of the Bodega Tanque and prohibited the 21 union members
to enter the gate. Only those non members of said Union are allowed to enter and work. The
Union, through their Vice President, wrote a letter to the respondent alleging the latter’s
discrimination acts. The respondent replied that a sabotage might be occur because of the
previous strike held by their Union. After the complaining workers were not allowed to work,
respondent hired substitutes in order that the work in Bodega Tanque, may not be paralyzed.
The Union picket line in front of where the Offices of the respondent companies located.
Issue:
WON there was an Unfair Labor Practice on the part of the Management on the ground
of Discrimination?
Held:
The court was resorted to as a defensive weapon or dictated by economic necessity and,
consequently, did not constitute an unfair labor practice. I'ts refusal to all complainants to
work and requirement that the latter stay out of the premises in the meantime (perhaps while
the strike was still going on at the factory) was borne out of the Company's justified
apprehension and fear that sabotage might be committed in the warehouse where the
products machinery and spare parts were stored, as has been the case in Binangonan. It has
never been shown that the act of the Company was intended to induce the complainants to
renounce their union-membership or as a deterrent for non-members to affiliate therewith,
nor as a retaliatory measure for activities in the union or in furtherance of the cause of the
union.
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE
M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU
Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members
of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board
of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of
1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was
hired as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the
Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a
result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on
collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the
parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on
the matter of salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor
in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the
notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the
Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to
each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the
office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
7. The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the
strike or in the fairness of the Management.
Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31,
1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines xxx succeeded
in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries
to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some
picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as
evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City
Fiscal’s Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our
decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for
long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there
are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report
for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to
obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the
Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three
cases involved “slight physical injuries” against one striker and “light coercion” against two
others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well
as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or
else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to
work on June 2, 1958.
* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the
fiscal’s office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission
to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the
ground that they committed “acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,” without
however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were
ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2,
1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in
number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal
notices given to them.
CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under
Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering
with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending
out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently,
by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the
strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP
HELD: YES
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day
and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining
through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective
bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the
union as the employees’ bargaining representative.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes
unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they
tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are
entitled free from the employer’s molestation.
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the strikers with
“comfortable cots,” “free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for “work
performed in excess of eight hours,” and “arrangements” for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-
busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they
are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations;
respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions; respondents,
thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-
strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to
the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two
meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of
the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers; respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which
were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these
criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first
instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and
peaceful use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of
persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies’ buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents
scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it,
on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even
after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the
criminal charges filed against them.
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents
delegated the power to readmit to a committee.
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker
was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As
earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but
when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances,
the respondents still refused to take them back.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
G.R. No. L-87672 October 13, 1989
WISE AND CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU AND HONORABLE BIENVENIDO
G. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as voluntary Arbitrator, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The center of controversy in this petition is whether the grant by management of profit
sharing benefits to its non-union member employees is discriminatory against its workers
who are union members.
The facts are undisputed. On April 3,1987 the management issued a memorandum circular
introducing a profit sharing scheme for its managers and supervisors the initial distribution of
which was to take effect March 31, 1988.
On July 3,1987 the respondent union wrote petitioner through its president asking for
participation in this scheme. This was denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere
strictly to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
In the meantime, talks were underway for early negotiation by the parties of the CBA which
was due to expire on April 30, 1988. The negotiation thus begun earlier than the freedom
period. On November 11, 1987 petitioner wrote respondent union advising the latter that they
were prepared to consider including the employees covered by the CBA in the profit sharing
scheme beginning the year 1987 provided that the ongoing negotiations were concluded prior
to December 1987. However, the collective bargaining negotiations reached a deadlock on
the issue of the scope of the bargaining unit. Conciliation efforts to settle the dispute on 29
March 1988 were made but no settlement was reached.
On March 30, 1988, petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to managers and
supervisors but also to all other rank and file employees not covered by the CBA. This
caused the respondent union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner was guilty of
unfair labor practice because the union members were discriminated against in the grant of
the profit sharing benefits. Consequently, management refused to proceed with the CBA
negotiations unless the last notice of strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone
discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was concluded. After a series of
conciliation conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration.
After the parties submitted their position papers, a rejoinder and reply, on March 20,1989 the
voluntary arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the
1987 profit sharing scheme to the members of respondent union.1 Hence, this petition
wherein petitioner alleged the following grounds in support thereof —
I discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. This flows from the established rule that
THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE
ORDERED THE EXTENSION OF PROFIT SHARING BENEFITS TO THOSE
EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CBA DESPITE PATENT LACK OF FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR IN THAT-
1. DISCRIMINATION PER SE IS NOT UNLAWFUL ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
EMPLOYEES ARE NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED.
2. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE CBA HAVE THE FORCE
AND EFFECT OF A LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES. PRIVATE RESPONDENT,
THEREFORE CANNOT DEMAND, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, WHAT IS NOT
STIPULATED IN THE CBA.
3. THE ACT OF THE UNION IN NEGOTIATING FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE
PROFIT SHARING BENEFIT IN THE PRESENT CBA IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
THAT THEY WERE NOT ENTITLED TO IT IN 1987.
II
THE HONORABLE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE
MADE THE CLEARLY BASELESS CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER WAS
MOTIVATED BY ITS DESIRE TO DEFEAT OR OTHERWISE PREJUDICE THE BASIC
RIGHTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES. 2
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from May 1, 1985 to April
30,1988 it was agreed that the "bargaining unit" covered by the CBA "consists of all regular
or permanent employees, below the rank of assistant supervisor, 3 Also expressly excluded
from the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are all regular rank and file employees in the
office of the president, vice-president, and the other offices of the company — personnel
office, security office, corporate affairs office, accounting and treasurer department . 4
It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the "bargaining unit" and who do not
derive benefits from the CBA that the profit sharing privilege was extended by petitioner.
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the union
employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. 5 Indeed, discrimination
per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are
not similarly situated.
Respondent union can not claim that there is grave abuse of discretion by the petitioner in
extending the benefits of profit sharing to the non-union employees as they are two (2)
groups not similarly situated. These non-union employees are not covered by the CBA. They
do not derive and enjoy the benefits under the CBA.
The contention of the respondent union that the grant to the non-union employees of the
profit sharing benefits was made at a time when there was a deadlock in the CBA negotiation
so that apparently the motive thereby was to discourage such non-union employees from
joining the union is not borne by the record. Petitioner denies this accusation and instead
points out that inspite of this benefit extended to them, some non-union workers actually
joined the respondent union thereafter.
Respondent union also decries that no less than the president of the petitioner agreed to
include its members in the coverage of the 1987 profit sharing benefit provided that they
would agree to an earlier negotiation for the renewal of the CBA which expired in 1988. Be
this as it may, since there was actually a deadlock in the negotiation and it was not resolved
and consummated on the period expected, private respondent can not now claim that
petitioner has a duty to extend the profit sharing benefit to the union members.
The Court holds that it is the prerogative of management to regulate, according to its
labor law does not authorize the of the employer in the conduct of its business. 6 such
management prerogative may be availed of without fear of any liability so long as it is
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers' interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or valid agreement
and are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of
malice or spite.7
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the "bargaining
unit" falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have been done in good
faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the CBA
where the employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who
are not. In the case of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and
conditions of the CBA contract which constitute the law between the contracting
parties.8 Both the employer and the union members are bound by such agreement.
However, the court serves notice that it will not hesitate to strike down any act of the
employer that tends to be discriminatory against union members. It is only because of the
peculiar circumstances of this case showing there is no such intention that this court ruled
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the award of respondent Voluntary Arbitrator
dated March 20,1989 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE being null and void, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-18704 January 31, 1963
OCEANIC AIR PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and OCEANIC AIR PRODUCTS
INCORPORATED EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-18705 January 31, 1963
OCEANIC AIR PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
OCEANIC AIR PRODUCTS INCORPORATED EMPLOYEES UNION and HON.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Bernardo S. Chan, Ricardo Paras and Eliseo P. Legaspi for petitioner.
Salvador M. Salas for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
These are two (2) appeals — one (L-18704) by the Oceanic Air Products, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as respondent company, and another (L-18705) by the Oceanic Products
Employees Union, hereinafter referred to as respondent union — from a decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations, in favor of the Oceanic Air Products Incorporated Employees
Union, hereafter referred to as complainant union. The dispositive part of said decision reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the management of
respondent company is hereby ordered:
1. To cease and desist from practicing unfair labor practices against its employees;.
2. To disestablish respondent union;
3. To reinstate Jorge de Guia, Nemesio de Guia, Leon Acebar, Bonifacio Balignasay, Cosme
Laureano, Salvador Gajudo and Domingo Nanong to their former or equivalent positions,
without prejudice to all benefits accruing in their favor during the period of their illegal
dismissal;
4. To pay them their back wages from the date of the dismissal until they are actually
reinstated; and
5. To post a copy of this decision in a conspicuous place of the factory and remain posted
therein for 60 days from the date of receipt of said decision.
The pertinent facts and the issues involved are set forth in said decision, from which we
quote:
Complainant union was organized on April 25, 1958 and registered in the Department of
labor on May 5, 1958, while respondent union was organized on May 2, 1958 and registered
in the said office on June 16, 1958. On June 12, 1958, complainant union sent by registered
mail a letter (Exh. 'B-2') to the president of respondent company containing several demands
for the improvement of the working conditions of the employees of said company.
Management did not answer said letter of complainant union. On July 3, 1958, after Mr. So
Han Suy, the production manager, received another copy of the letter of demands of
complainant union, Mr. Narciso Chan, the president of respondent company dismissed Jorge
de Guia, president of complainant union; Cosme Laureano, vice-president; Domingo
Nanong, secretary-treasurer; Nemesio de Guia, board member; Bonifacio Baligasay, board
member, Leon Acebar and Salvador Gajudo, members of said union. The other officers,
Maximo Benedicto, auditor, Federico Pineda and Adelaido Zaragoza disaffiliated from
complainant union and joined respondent union.
In their answers, respondent union denied the material allegations of the prosecutor's
complaint, while respondent company also denied the material allegations of said complaint,
and averred that both Leon Acebar and Salvador Gajudo would have been dismissed a long
time ago for laziness, insubordination and sleeping while on duty but were given all the
chances to reform but continued to do so; that respondent company admitted the dismissal by
its president Narciso Chan on July 3, 1958 of Jorge de Guia, Bonifacio Balignasay, Cosme
Laureano, Domingo Nanong, Nemesio de Guia, Salvador Gajudo and Leon Acebar because
the firm was losing, besides the fact that their services were unsatisfactory; that two months
before July 3, 1958 they were given warnings to reform themselves and at the same time to
look for other places to go as the firm was losing and at the time of their dismissal one month
separation pay was offered to each and every one of them.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
The issues to be resolved by the Court are:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the officers and members of complainant union was due to
their union affiliation and/or union activities or for a just cause.
2. Whether or not respondent union is a company dominated or assisted union.
The lower court decided these issues in the affirmative. Upon subsequent denial of a
reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, appellants interposed the present appeals, in
which they jointly reiterate that said issues should be resolved in the negative.
With respect to the first issue, the lower court had the following to say:
... the Court finds that respondent company incurred losses in 1956, 1957 and 1958; that Mr.
Narcisco Chan, the president of respondent company, dismissed on July 3, 1958 Jorge de
Guia, president of complainant union; Cosme Laureano, vice-president: Domingo Nanong,
secretary-treasurer; Nemesio de Guia, Board member: Bonifacio Balignasay, board member;
Leon Acebar and Salvador Gajudo, members of said union after its organization and after it
had presented a letter of demands to the company for the improvement of the working
conditions of the employees therein. Respondent company contends that the seven
complainants mentioned above were dismissed by management because the company was
losing in 1956, 1957 and 1958, besides the fact that said persons were lazy and disrespectful
to their superiors. Losses suffered by the company may serve as a ground for temporarily
dismissing or laying off its employees. To dismiss its employees especially the officers and
members of complainant union who are militant and dynamic after the organization of the
same is something that smacks of unfair labor practice. In labor parlance that is union-
busting. If respondent company dismissed said complainants before the organization of
complainant union, there would have been neither misgivings nor suspicion as to its ulterior
motives. But when its management dismissed said complainants after the organization of
their union and after they had sent a letter of demands for the improvement of the working
conditions of the employees of the company, that is the legendary last straw that broke the
camel's back. In fine, respondent company is guilty of union-busting.
We are fully in agreement with this conclusion. Suffice it to add, in this connection, that
appellants have not satisfactorily explained why — if the dismissal of Jorge de Guia, Cosme
Laureano, Nemesio de Guia, Bonifacio Balignasay, Leon Acebar and Salvador Gajudo, was
due to considerations of economy, owing to the losses allegedly sustained by respondent
company since 1956 — the reduction of personnel was not effected until July 3, 1968, after
receipt of the demands, made by complainant union, for the improvement of the working
conditions of the employees of said company; why the latter had chosen the ranking officers
(the president, the vice-president, the secretary-treasurer and a board member) and members
of complainant union as the employees to be adversely affected by the cut of personnel; and
why the company had spared from the operation thereof precisely the former auditor and two
(2) former members of the board of directors of said complainant union, who had quit the
same and joined respondent union. Although respondent company would have us believe that
Leon Acebar and Salvador Gajudo had been dismissed for laziness, insubordination and
sleeping while on duty, we note that they were not dismissed until after the aforementioned
demand by complainant union, and that one Francisco Angco, who had been caught sleeping
with the aforementioned employees, but had subsequently resigned from complainant union
and joined respondent union, was not dismissed by respondent company. Considering that
the issue under consideration depends largely upon the degree of credence and weight given The Department of Labor's Conciliation Service held several hearings on the union's
to the testimonial evidence introduced by both parties, which the lower court is in a better demands and strike notice, but the company still refused.
position than we are to determine, the aforementioned conclusions of the lower court should On April 25, 1960, the company dismissed Besana and Rodiel after they figured, on the same
not be disturbed. day, in a fight with two other employees, within the premises and during working hours.
As regards the second issue, the record shows: that said Francisco Angco joined respondent Alleging unfair labor practice, NLU, on behalf of VIBEMWU, as well as of Besana and
union because So Han Suy, treasurer and, seemingly, production manager of respondent Rodiel, filed on May 6, 1960 a complaint against the company in the Court of Industrial
company, had forced him to sign therefore a blank form, presumably an application for Relations. The company answered it on May 23, 1,960. It stated that the dismissal of Besana
admission in respondent union, under pain of dismissal if he did not do so; that Nemesio de and Rodiel was due to violation of a company rule that penalizes "Inciting or provoking a
Guia had also been asked by So Han Suy to sign a similar form; that So Han Suy had urged fight or fighting during working hours or on company premises".
Angco to go, on June 8, 1958 to the Ceresco Restaurant, where Angco found, among others, The Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, after trying the case, rendered a
So Han Suy, Ng Pong Guan, manager of respondent company, its counsel Attys. Bernardo decision on March 3, 1962 in favor of the complainant union. An unfair labor practice,
Chan and Eliseo P. Legaspi, and Lope de la Cruz, president of respondent union, and the according to said decision, was committed by the company in dismissing Besana and Rodiel
latter's officers were elected; that Narciso Chan, president of respondent company, likewise due to their union activities. The dispositive portion reads:
bade Jorge de Guia to attend said meeting at the Ceresco Restaurant; that no member of This Court finds substantial evidence to sustain the charge against respondent Company in
respondent union had been dismissed by respondent company despite its alleged violation of Section 4(a), paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act, and, therefore,
retrenchment policy; and that, after the dismissal of the aforementioned officers and orders respondent Company, its official and/or agents to:
members of the complainant union, respondent company had engaged the services of several (1) Cease and desist from interfering, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of
laborers. These facts, taken in relation to those adverted to above, in connection with the first their rights guaranteed by Section 3 of the Act;
issue, are sufficient to justify the conclusion of the lower court to the effect that respondent (2) Cease and desist from discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of
union is company dominated. employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners, membership in any labor organization;
Oceanic Air Products, Inc. and Oceanic Air Products Employees Union. It is so ordered. (3) Reinstate Fulgencio Besana and Felicisimo Rodiel to their former or equivalent positions
in respondent Company with backwages from the time of their dismissal on April 25, 1960,
G.R. No. L-19997 May 19, 1965 up to the time of their actual reinstatement and with the rights and privileges formerly
VISAYAN BICYCLE, MANUFACTURING CO., INC., petitioner, appertaining thereto, including seniority;
vs. To facilitate the proper payment of backwages due them, the Chief of the Examining
NATIONAL LABOR UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL Division of this Court and or his duly designated assistant is hereby directed to examine the
RELATIONS respondents. payrolls, daily time records and other pertinent documents relative to complainants Besana's
Mascardo, Mintu and Lazaro Law Offices for petitioner. and Rodiel's services with respondent Company, and to submit a corresponding report for
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Labor Union. further disposition.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. SO ORDERED.
BENGZON, J.P., J.: After receipt of copy of the decision on March 13, 1962, the company filed on March 15,
On November 3, 1958, workers in the Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co., Inc. formed the 1962 a motion for reconsideration. It contained no argument but reserved the "right" to file
Visayan Bicycle Employees and Workers Union (VIBEMWU). Pedro Evangelista was its supporting memorandum within ten days from March 18, 1962. A motion, however, was
president. On November 14, 1958, VIBEMWU and the company signed a collective filed on March 27, 1962, requesting for 15-day extension of time to file the memorandum.
bargaining agreement. Among other things it provided for union security, checkoff, wage Adhering to a "no extension" policy thereon, the Court of Industrial Relations en
increases, fifteen days vacation leave and fifteen days sick leave. banc denied, on March 28, 1962, the aforesaid motion for extension to file memorandum.
On February 21, 1959, Pedro Evangelista was again elected president, for 1959. Felicisimo Accordingly, on April 6, 1962, it further denied the motion for reconsideration.
Rodiel was elected board member. Following its receipt on July 6, 1962 of the last resolution, the company filed this petition for
For the year 1960 VIBEMWU, on December 12, 1959, re-elected Pedro Evangelista review on July 16, 1962.
president and elected Fulgencio Besana and Felicisimo Rodiel, vice-president and secretary Petitioner has raised two issues: First, did the Court of Industrial Relations abuse its
respectively. discretion in denying the motion for extension of time to file memorandum in support of the
On February 27, 1960, through its executive board headed by Besana, acting as president, motion for reconsideration? Second, did the company's dismissal of Besana and Rodiel
VIBEMWU affiliated with the National Labor Union (NLU). Subsequently, on March 4, constitute unfair labor practice?
1960, the Constitution and By-laws of VIBEMWU were amended. On March 9, 1960, The first issue has already been settled. The denial by the Court of Industrial Relations of a
another election was held and Besana was chosen president thereby replacing Evangelista. motion to extend the 10-day period to file arguments in support of a motion for
On March 17, 1960, the national secretary of NLU, by a letter, informed the company of reconsideration, pursuant to its standing rule against such extension, does not constitute
VIBEMWU'S affiliation to NLU, and demanded enforcement of the collective bargaining abuse of discretion. 1
agreement. The company, however, did not accede to the demand. Consequently, on April 5, Regarding the second issue, the record shows that on April 25, 1960, Besana and Rodiel were
1960, VIBEMWU filed a notice to strike.1äwphï1.ñët provoked by Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia into a pre-arranged fight pursuant to a
strategy of the company designed to provide an appparently lawful cause for their dismissal.
Reyes and Pacia were hired only within that week. 2Besana and Rodiel were not shown to
have previously figured in similar incidents before or to have violated company rules and
regulations in their many years with the company.. 3 The company did not investigate the
incident, and its manager, Co Hing, admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was a
"hard-headed leader of the union". It was this manager who had warned VIBEMWU'S
officers responsible for the affiliation that if they will not withdraw VIBEMWU from
theNLU, he would take " steps in order to dismiss them from work."
The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations to the foregoing effect are supported by
substantial evidence. No reason obtains to alter the conclusion that Besana and Rodiel were
in reality dismissed because of their union activities and not because of their violation of a
company rule against fights in the premises or during working hours. Furthermore, the so-
called violation of company rules having been brought about by the company itself, thru the
recent employment of Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia whoprovoked the fight as above
indicated, the same cannot be regarded as a ground to punish the aforementioned employees.
Such being the case, the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel constituted unfair labor practice
under Section 4(a) (1) and (4) of Republic Act 875:
SEC.4. Unfair Labor Practices. —
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
in Section three;4
xxx xxx xxx
(4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: ... .
Rothenberg has this to say:
... it can be established that the true and basic inspiration for the employer's act is derived
from the employee's union affiliations or activities, the assignment by the employer or
another reason, whatever its semblance of validity, is unavailing. Thus, it has been held that
the facts disclosed that the employer's acts in discharging employees were actually prompted
by the employers's improper interest in the affected employee's improper interest in the
affected employee's union affiliations and activities, even though the employer urged that his
acts were predicated on economic necessity, desire to give employment to more needy
persons, lack of work, cessation of operations, refusal to work overtime, refusal of non-union
employees to work with union employees, seasonal lay-off, libelous remarks against
management, violation of company rules. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 400-401;
emphasis supplied.)
Since the only reason or basis for Besana and Rodiel's dismissal was in fact their actuation as
officers of VIBEMWU, the dismissal is clearly discriminatory.
It is this inconsiderate act of power that makes a subordinate a rebel; it is this malicious tactic
that forces labor to dislike management; this unjustifiable conduct that creates a gap between
management and labor; and this attitude that makes the laborer hate the officials of the
company to the detriment of all efforts to harmonize management and labor for the benefit of
both as envisioned by the Industrial Peace Act. So plain from the record is the bad faith that
attended the company's deliberate and calculated act of unfair labor practice that we find in
the present appeal an obvious attempt to delay and carry on a pretense which this Court can
ill afford to let go without stern disapproval.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolutions appealed from are hereby affirmed, with treble
costs against petitioner. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY WORKERS
INDEPENDENT UNION (NLU) vs. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR &
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-18364, Feb 28, 1963.
FACTS:
October 23, 1958, Apolonio San Jose’s brother, Francisco San Jose, who is also a regular
worker of the respondent and a member of the complainant union, filed a charge for ULP
against herein respondent, which case is still pending.
Subsequent to the filing of the said charge, the respondent by its manager Chue Yiong,
summoned and advised union president Lazaro Peralta that if Francisco San Jose will not
withdraw his charge against the company, the company will also dismiss his brother
Apolonio San Jose, to which the union president replied that should not be the attitude of the
company because Apolonio has nothing to do with his brother’s case.
On January 24, 1959, respondent did dismiss Apolonio San Jose without just and valid cause
and in gross violation of the operative CBA between the complainant union and respondent
corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of a relative of an employee who filed an action against the employer
is an ULP.
RULING:
YES. Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, provides that :
“(a) It shall be ULP for an employer:
… (5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under
this Act.”
Although the cited law pertains to the specific employee who filed a case or given a
testimony against the employer, it should be construed in line with the spirit and purpose of
said Section 4 and of the legislation of which it forms part — namely, to assure absolute
freedom of the employees and laborers to establish labor organizations and unions, as well as
to prefer charges before the proper organs of the Government for violations of our labor laws.
If the dismissal of an employee due to the filing by him of said charges would be and is an
undue restraint upon said freedom, the dismissal of his brother owing to the non-withdrawal
of the charges of the former, would be and constitute as much a restraint upon the same
freedom. In fact, it may be greater and more effective restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant
may be willing to risk the hazards of a possible and even probable retaliatory action by the
employer in the form of a dismissal or another discriminatory act against him personally,
considering that nobody is perfect, that everybody commits mistakes and that there is always
a possibility that the employer may find in the records of any employee, particularly if he has
long been in the service, some act or omission constituting a fault or negligence which may
be an excuse for such dismissal or discrimination. Yet, such complainant may not withstand
the pressure that would result if his brother or another member of his immediate family were
threatened with such action unless the charges in question were withdrawn.
What is prohibited to be done directly shall not be allowed to be accomplished indirectly.
Thus in the Matter of Quidnick Dye Works Inc. and Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers
and Bleachers of America (2 NLRB 963) it was held that the dismissal of a laborer on
account of union activities of his brother constituted an ULP.
The discharge of relatives of an employee who has himself been discriminately discharged,
for no other reason than the relation, is itself a discriminatory discharge, in violation of the
Act. An illustration is Memphis Furniture Co. (3 NLRB 26 [1937]), “where the evidence
indicated that the sole reason for the dismissal of a female employee was that she was the
wife of an employee who has been discharged. It was held that the discharge under the
circumstances was discriminatory and a violation of the Act, even though discharged female
employee was not herself a member of any union. The respondent thus made union
membership and activities a bar to the employment not only of the union member himself but
of members of his family as well. A more effective mode of discouraging of union affiliation
could hardly be found then the knowledge that such activities put not merely the union
member’s employment but that of those closely related to him in jeopardy.“
In addition to violating Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, the discharge of Apolonio
San Jose is, therefore, an ULP.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. Respondent is also guilty of
ULP.
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JOSE BALDO, SANGILO-ITOGON WORKERS UNION and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Reyes & Cabato for petitioner.
Benjamin C. Rillera for respondents Jose Baldo and Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union.
Vidal C. Magbanua for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in
Case No. 50-ULP-PANG. finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practices and ordering
it to reinstate respondent Jose Baldo to his former work with back wages.
In a complaint dated November 18, 1958, an Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial
Relations charged the herein petitioner-employer, Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., and Claude
Fertig its General Superintendent, with having committed unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 4(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 875. The complaint
substantially alleged that A. Manaois and Jose Baldo, employees of herein petitioner, were
dismissed by said petitioner on June 9, 1957 and March 5, 1958, respectively, because of
their membership with the herein respondent Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union and for having
testified against the petitioner in a certification election case involving the employees of the
petitioner (Case No. 3-MC-PANG). The complaint prayed that an order be issued against the
herein petitioner to cease and desist from the labor practices complained of and that the
complaining employees, A. Manaois and Jose Baldo be reinstated to their former positions in
the mining company without loss of employee benefits and with back wages from the date of
their respective dismissal until the date of their actual reinstatement.
The petitioner herein (respondent below), in its answer to the complaint, admitted the fact of
the dismissal of the two complaining employees, but alleged that the complaining employees
were dismissed for just and lawful causes, namely, "inefficiency, utter disregard and
violation of safety rules and regulations established and enforced by the respondent for the
protection of the lives of the employees and properties of the respondent company, utter
disregard of the company property and poor attendance records."
After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, on October 5, 1960, rendered a decision,
finding that the charge of unfair labor practice as far as it concerned the complaining
employee A. Manaois was not proved and that the dismissal of said employee was just and
legal; but as far as the other complaining employee Jose Baldo was concerned, the charge of
unfair labor practice was proved and that the dismissal of said employee was unjust and
illegal. The Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo
to his former work with back wages from April 7, 1958, when he was promised re-
instatement, up to the day of his actual re-employment.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision with the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc, but said Court, on October 27, 1960, denied the petition for
reconsideration. The petitioner has appealed from the decision, and from the order denying
the motion for reconsideration, of the Court of Industrial Relations affecting only the case of
Jose Baldo. No appeal has been filed regarding the case of A. Manaois.
We have examined the records carefully, and we find that the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations is supported by substantial evidence. We are quoting hereunder pertinent
portions of the decision of the lower court which embody its factual findings:
From the evidence of record, the following facts are clear. Baldo started working as miner in
the respondent company sometime in 1954. He worked continuously therein until February 4,
1958 when he was given a "30-day notice of termination of employment" to the effect that
his services will not be needed by the respondent company after March 5, 1958 (Exh. "4").
Baldo refused to acknowledge receipt of said notice when Mowry, mine's superintendent of
the company, asked him to sign the same. It appears that Baldo was on 15 days vacation
leave with pay immediately prior to his being served his separation notice (Exh. "C").
The complainant's evidence tended to prove that Baldo was dismissed by the company
because of his membership in the complainant Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, a legitimate
labor organization; and, for having testified for the said union in Case No. 3-MC-PANG a
certification proceeding involving the employees of the respondent company. Baldo failed to
obtain a reinstatement therein.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undeniable that Baldo's testimony in Case No. 3-MC-PANG of this Court on April 7,
1958, was favorable to the complainant Sangilo-Itogon Workers' Union of which he was a
member and in some way adverse to the interests of the company. The testimonies of
complainant's witnesses are clear that during the hearing of the certification case in Itogon,
Gelladoga, plant engineer and former labor relations officer of the respondent company,
asked Baldo not to testify therein are the promise that he will be reinstated. Admittedly, the
case of Baldo's separation from the respondent company which was pending consideration at
that time with the grievance committee of the union and management was immediately
"dropped" after Baldo testified in the certification case "because he (Baldo) brought his case
to a rival union of the Itogon Labor Union." It becomes obvious that Baldo's case was not
considered further by the grievance committee because of his testimony against the company
in the certification proceeding. An examination of the alleged offense imputed on Baldo
previous to his dismissal and which are relied upon by the respondent company (Exhibits
"1", "2" and "3") shows that they were not so serious as to warrant his immediate and
permanent dismissal. Under the circumstances it is safe to conclude that Gelladoga who is a
Supervisor within the meaning of the Act, really promised to reinstate Baldo to his former
work in the company should he desist from testifying in that certification case mentioned
above.
Considering everything, we are convinced that because of Baldo's refusal to accede to the
demand of his employer not to testify in the certification proceeding mentioned above, his
Case was "dropped" by the grievance committee of the union and management, and
consequently, he failed to be reinstated in the company.
The petitioner, in this appeal, maintains that it was the Itogon Labor Union that dropped the
case of Baldo regarding the 30-day notice of separation because Baldo brought his case to a
rival union of the Itogon Labor Union, so that the petitioner should not be charged with
unfair labor practice. This contention of the petitioner has no merit.
The evidence shows that Baldo had joined the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, the rival union
of the Itogon Labor Union that had a collective bargaining contract with the petitioner, and
that Baldo's membership in the Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union was known to the
management of the herein petitioner; that at the time that Baldo was given the 30-day notice
of separation from the service there was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations a
certification election case which involved the employees of the petitioner, and the
certification case was precisely brought about upon petition by the Sangilo-Itogon Workers
Union; that when Baldo was given said notice of separation from the service he brought his
case to the grievance committee of the Itogon Labor Union and the management of the
petitioner — said committee being composed of representatives of the Itogon Labor Union
and the management of the petitioner — with a view to securing his reinstatement; that the
grievance committee withheld action on the case of Baldo; that the case of Baldo was
pending before the grievance committee when he was asked by Mansueto Gelladoga plant
engineer and former labor relations officer of the petitioner (he was also former Vice-
President of the Itogon Labor Union), not to testify in the hearing of the certification election
case so that be would be reinstated to his job; that in spite of Gelladoga's request Baldo
testified at the healing of the certification election case on April 7,1958, and Baldo's
testimony was adverse to the petitioner; and that after Baldo had thus testified his case was
dropped by the grievance committee, and he was never reinstated. Considering that Baldo's
case was pending before the grievance committee when he was asked by Gelladoga not to
testify, and soon after he had testified adversely to the petitioner his case was dropped by the
grievance committee, the conclusion is inescapable that the management of the petitioner
herein had much to do with the dropping of Baldo's case, and because of the dropping of that
case the petitioner never reinstated Baldo to his work. This conclusion is bolstered further by
the fact that the petitioner herein had opposed the petition for certification election. The
lower court found that Baldo had not committed any serious offense as would warrant his
immediate and permanent dismissal. On the other hand, the evidence shows that when Baldo
was given that notice of separation from the service he had already joined the Sangilo-Itogon
Workers Union. There is evidence too that Claude Fertig, the General Superintendent of the
petitioner, was at that time acting as adviser of the Itogon Labor Union, the rival Union of the
Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioner had
committed unfair labor practices as contemplated in sub-paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of sub-section
(a) of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 875 (Henares & Sons vs. National Labor Union, G. R.
No. L-17535, December 28, 1961; National Fastener Corporation of the Philippines vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, etc. G.R. No. L-15834, January 20, 1961).
The petitioner, in this appeal, also contends that the Court of Industrial Relations had gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the reinstatement of Jose Baldo with back wages. The
petitioner points out that it should not be made to pay back wages during the time that this
case had been pending. This contention is also without merit. When an employer commits
unfair labor practices he should be made to shoulder all the consequences of his unfair acts.
The matter of granting back wages or backpay to an employee that is reinstated is
discretionary with the Court of Industrial Relations (Section 5 [c], Republic Act No. 875).
This question had already been settled in a line of decisions rendered by this Court (United
Employees Welfare Ass'n. vs. Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys, G. R. No. 10327, Sept. 30, 1958;
Union of Philippine Education Co. Employees vs. Philippine Education Co., 91 Phil. 93, 95).
We are satisfied that under the circumstances as shown by the records of the present case the
Court of Industrial Relations had not abused the exercise of its discretion when it ordered the
grant of back wages to respondent Baldo from the date he was promised reinstatement to the
day of his actual reinstatement.
G.R. No. L-52169 June 30, 1980
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG VIA MARE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, VIA MARE CATERING SERVICES and FOOD
SPECIALTIES, INC., and GLENDA R. BARRETO respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not respondent Director Carmelo C.
Noriel of the Bureau of Labor Relations had been divested of his jurisdiction to settle a labor
dispute between the petitioner and the Via Mare Catering Services and Food Specialties, Inc.
Respondent director ruled that he had lost jurisdiction in view of the corporation's application
to terminate the employment of some of the petitioner's members with the Regional Director
of the National Capital Region. At this juncture, we can readily say that the respondent
director had not been divested of his jurisdiction and we have yet to see a more shabby
treatment of workers than that accorded by the corporation to its employees in this case.
The facts are well-stated in the comment of the Solicitor General:
On October 13, 1979, petitioner Samahang Manggagawa Ng Via Mare (SAMAVIM), a duly
organized labor union, requested respondent corporation, Via Mare Catering Services and
Food Specialties, Inc., to enter into a collective bargaining agreement therewith submitting
proposals (Petition pp. 1-2).
Thereafter, petitioner twice reiterated its request to al respondents to negotiate a cove
bargaining a respondent corporation allegedly terminated four (4) of petition's members
(Petition, p. 2).
On November 19, 1979, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Ministry of labor c that
respondent corporation neither assented nor refused to bargain collectively and that t
corporation harassed petitioner's union members (Petition, p. 2; ANNEX "A").
The Bureau of Labor Relations, of which respondent Honorable Carmelo C. Noriel is
Director, assumed injunction over the labor dispute and through Med-Arbiter Roberto
Landas, summoned petitioner and respondent corporation to a conference/hearing on
November 20, 1979. At the scheduled conference/hearing before Med-Arbiter Landas, the
parties arrived at the following agreement (Petition, p. 3; ANNEX "B")
Representative of management appeared and manifested that he will meet with counsel of the
union tomorrow, 21 November 1979 at Via Mare at 8:00 a.m. to discuss when will (sic) top
management will be available to discuss the terms and conditions of employment.
Counsel of management assured the union that Via Mare Catering Services and Food
Specialties, Inc., will negotiate with the union. (Emphasis supplied)
On November 21, 1979, petitioner and respondent corporation entered into the following
"Preliminary Agreement" (Petition, p. 3; ANNEX "C")
1. That they would meet on November 24, 1979, at 5:00 p.m., at Via Mare for the purpose of
informing and determining from either party the CBA panelist and the schedule of
negotiation;
2. That the initial negotiation shall be held, at the very earliest November 27, 1979 or
November 28, 1979;
On November 24, 1979, petitioner and respondent corporation entered into the following
'Initial Agreement' (Petition, p. 4; ANNEX "D")
1. That management recognizes the fact that SAMAVIM (i.e., petitioner) is duly registered
Union in the establishments and accepts the fact of their constitution;
2. That management panelist to the negotiation would be made known to the Union on
November 27, 1979;
3. That after the panelist, Union and Management shall have met, which at the earliest shall
be on November 28, 1979, and there shall negotiation on the proposed CBA be started;
Petitioner and respondent corporation met on November 27, 1979. But on that date,
respondent corporation refused to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement as they had
previously committed themselves. On November 28, 1979, therefore, petitioner's members
staged a walk-out, duly informing the Bureau of Labor Relations thereof (Petition, pp. 4-5, ART. 253. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.— The duty to bargain collectively means
ANNEX "E"). the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
On November 29, 1979, respondent Noriel issued the following Return-To-Work Order good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with to wages, hours, of work and all
(Petition, P. 5; ANNEX "F"). other terms and conditions of employment including for adjusting any grievance or question
All striking workers of the Via Mare Catering Services & Food Specialties, Inc., are hereby a under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements and
ordered to return to work immediately and to desist from striking whether the strike is for executing requested by either party, but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a
cause or otherwise. The Management is likewise ordered to allow all workers to return to proposal or to make any concession.
work under the same terms and conditions prevent previous to the work stoppage. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "Under the circumstances, the application for
This order shall be without prejudice to whatever action any party might take under existing clearance filed by respondent corporation relative -to the members of petitioner-union who
law, decree, rules and regulation. were dismissed, is highly suspect as a means to frustrate the intention of respondent
Petitioner and respondent corporation were also ordered by Med-Arbiter Victorians Calaycay corporation not to bargain collectively with petitioner. By this strategem, the membership of
to appear before the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 3, 1979. In the meantime, petitioner union would be depleted, thus assuring its defeat in the event of a consent or
petitioner's members returned to work (Petition, p. 6). certification election. In this light, said application for clearance cannot be used to defeat the
On December 3. 1979, before the Bureau of Labor Relations, petitioner and respondent jurisdiction of respondent Director Noriel.
corporation entered into an agreement (Petition, p. 5; ANNEX "G") which provided among Moreover, the only question before Director Noriel is whether or not the petitioner is the
other things, the following: exclusive bargain representative of the employees working for the respondent corporation in
1. There will be a consent election; respect of which both the petitioner and the respondent corporation agreed to hold a consent
xxx xxx xxx or certification election including in the voting those employees who had been dismissed by
6. That the parties will meet on December 17, 1979 to determine the eligible voters and date the corporation conformably to the statement of the corporation's counsel during the hearing
of election. before Us on January 9, 1980. Upon the other hand, the issue before Regional Director
However, on December 4, 1979, respondent corporation through their General Manager, Estrella is whether or not the termination of he employment of some of the petitioner's
respondent Glenda R. Barreto terminated seventy three (73) union member after having member is justified. The two questions are unrelated and can be resolved independently of
allowed them to work for one day, without prior from the Ministry of Labor, and employed each other especially since it had been stated as aforesaid that even the dismissed employees
other persons to rep the terminated union members (Petition, pp. 5-6). could take part in the certification election.
On December 4, 1979, petitions filed a motion to cite the private respondents in contempt for WHEREFORE, respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel is hereby ordered to proceed with the
alleged violation of respondent Noriel's Return-To-Work Order, alleged union-busting holding of the certification election as had been agreed between the petitioner and the
activities, and alleged bad faith in dealing with petite (Petition, p. 6; ANNEX "H"). respondent corporation. Costs against the private respondents.
Pursuant to a summon, petitioner and respondent corporation appeared before Med-Arbiter SO ORDERED.
Victorians Calaycay on December 5, 1979. On that date, respondent corporation, through
counsel stated that the terminated employees will be reinstated and that the date of their re-
acceptance will be known at the hearing which was set on December 7, 1979 (Petition, p. 6).
Respondent corporation's counsel did not appear at the hearing on December 7, 1979, thus
prompting petitioner to ask for the resolution of its motion to declare private respondent in
contempt. Respondent Noriel was, however, at that time in Hongkong upon his to the
Philippines, he allegedly refused to act on the motion on the ground that he had lost j on over
the labor dispute with the filing on the part of respondent corporation of an application to
dear the tion of seventy-three (73) of petitioner's members. According to respondent Noriel
jurisdiction over the case now file with the Honorable Director Francisco Estrella, Regional
IV, National Capital Region, who takes cognizance of such applications (Petition, p. 7).
Petitioner further alleges that on or about November 27, 1979, respondent corporation filed a
'Petition For Certification Elections' before the Bureau of Labor Relations, which petition
was d as LRC-M-515-79, but remains unserved on petitioner (Petition, p. 7).
From the foregoing narration it is dear that the private respondents did not comply with their
duty to bargain collectively with the petitioner as provided in Articles 252 and 253 of the
Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended), namely:
Art 252. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence collective bargaining agreements.— In
the absence of an agreement Or other voluntary arrangement improving for a more
expeditious manner of collective bargaining , it shall be the duty of the employer and the
representatives of the employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of
this Code.