1. GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL A. MESA, Petitioners, vs.OMBUDSMAN AND HON.

HERBERT BAUTISTA,
City Mayor, Quezon City, Respondents. G.R. No. 202303 June 4, 2014

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 15, 20121 and June
18, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA G.R. SP No. 121378, which dismissed for utter lack of merit the petition
to nullify or restrain the immediate implementation of the June 17, 2003 Joint Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-
ADM-0-01-0376 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, directing the dismissal from the service and one-year suspension of petitioners
Gerardo R. Villaseñor (Villaseñor) and Rodel A. Mesa (Mesa), respectively.

The Facts

The petitioners, along with several others, were administratively charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire tragedy that took
place on August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury to others. Petitioner Villaseñor was an electrical inspector from the
Electrical Division, and petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the Electrical Engineering Office, both of Quezon City.

In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).

In its Joint Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Investigating Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman ruled as follows:

1. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, Villaseñor was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross
neglect of duty for which he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
2. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, Mesa was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for which he
was meted the penalty of one year suspension without pay.

In its Memorandum,3 dated July 26, 2004, the Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision as regards the petitioners.

On December 13, 2004, Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions for reconsideration 4 of the Joint Decision.

In the Memorandum,5 dated March 2, 2006, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Mesa and those of the
other accused, and affirmed in toto the Joint Decision. Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, however, was not enumerated as
one of the pleadings resolved.6

On April 18, 2006, Mesa appealed to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 93891. Villaseñor made no appeal, his motion
for reconsideration before the Ombudsman being yet unresolved.

In the Order7 dated August 23, 2006, pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government to enforce
the Joint Decision immediately upon receipt of the order.

On September 20, 2011, Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for certiorari 8 before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
121378, assailing the August 23, 2006 Order of the Ombudsman ordering the immediate implementation of the Joint Decision
despite the pendency of Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s appeal. They prayed that the said order be annulled
and an injunction be issued to restrain its implementation.

In the assailed March 15, 2012 Resolution,9 the CA dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit. It held that the Ombudsman
decision was immediately executory pending appeal and would not be stayed by the filing of the appeal or issuance of an
injunctive relief.

In the assailed June 18, 2012 Resolution,10 the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issues And Arguments

Petitioner Villaseñor argues that his constitutional right of not to be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law,
was grossly violated by the Ombudsman when:

1. He was prevented from cross-examining complainant’s witnesses;

2. He failed to receive any copy of any order relative to the preliminary conference of the case; and
3. His dismissal from the service was ordered implemented while his motion for reconsideration remains unresolved.
He argues that the order of dismissal cannot be deemed executory as it has not yet attained finality on account of his unresolved
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Mesa, on the other hand, argues that the order of suspension against him should not have been implemented pending
his appeal with the CA, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure. He argues
that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, which took effect on September 7, 2003 and amended said Section 7, should not be
applied to his case because it was promulgated long after the rendition of the order of his suspension on June 17, 2003. Mesa
further argues that to apply the amendment to him will give it a retroactive effect which is prohibited under Article 4 of the Civil
Code.

Both petitioners aver that Ombudsman v. Samaniego, 11 the case relied upon by the CA, cannot be applied to their case because
the principal basis of the ruling was Section 7, as amended, which they insist is inapplicable to them.

The first two issues raised by petitioner Villaseñor do not relate to the assailed CA Resolutions, which ruled upon the Order of the
Ombudsman implementing the Joint Decision. They are, therefore, irrelevant to the present petition. The sole issue before the
Court now is, thus:

Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year can be implemented pending
resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner Mesa’s appeal before the
CA?

The Ruling of the Court

The petition must fail.

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, dated September 15,
2003, provides:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.– Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary,
the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer.[Emphases supplied]

From the above, it can be gleaned that the Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable or
appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2)
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one
month’s salary. Appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those which fall outside said enumeration, and may be appealed to
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the
motion for reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.

Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñor was ordered dismissed from the
service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory pending appeal.

The petitioners cannot argue that A.O. No. 17, which makes appealable decisions of the Ombudsman immediately executory,
cannot be applied to them. It is of no moment that A.O. No. 17 took effect on September 7, 2003, after the Joint Decision was
issued against Mesa and Villaseñor on June 17, 2003. Of note are the facts that the Joint Decision was approved by the
Ombudsman on November 26, 2004; the motions for reconsideration thereto were denied on March 2, 2006; and the Joint
Decision was ordered implemented on August 23, 2006, all after A.O. No. 17 had already become effective.

Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive effect. Rules regulating the procedure of courts,
however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus, applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. As a
general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence, retroactive application does not violate
any right of a person adversely affected.12
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied retroactively to
petitioners’ cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. No vested right is violated by the
application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is
on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office.13

The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was held that
such are immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive
writ.14 The petitioners argue that this particular case cannot be applied to them because it was based on Section 7, as amended
by A.O. No. 17,which cannot be applied to them retroactively. Their argument cannot be given credence. As already discussed,
Section 7 may be retroactively applied in the case of the petitioners.

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that petitioner Mesa’s appeal cannot stay the implementation of the order of suspension against him.

Petitioner Villaseñor argues that the Ombudsman erred in implementing the order of dismissal against him despite his pending
motion for reconsideration with the same office.

The records show that both petitioners duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration on December 13, 2004. In the March
2, 2006 Memorandum of the Ombudsman, Mesa’s motion for reconsideration, among others, was denied. Thus, he appealed to
the CA. A review of the said Memorandum reveals, however, that Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration was not enumerated 15 as
one of the pleadings submitted for resolution, and nowhere was his liability discussed or even mentioned therein. It is, therefore,
apparent that Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration was never resolved by the Ombudsman, for which reason he has been
unable to file an appeal with the CA.

Nonetheless, Villaseñor’s pending motion for reconsideration cannot stop his order of dismissal from being executory.
Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006, of the Office of the Ombudsman, provides in part:

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules of Procedure" provides that: "A
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course."

In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to implement all Ombudsman
decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases, immediately upon receipt thereof by their respective offices.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the
immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.

x x x [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course" under Section 7. As already explained, no vested right of Villaseñor would be violated as he
would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the event that
he wins his eventual appeal.

The Ombudsman did not, therefore, err in implementing the orders of suspension of one year and dismissal from the service
against the petitioners.

The Court notes, however, that under Section 8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, the Hearing Officer shall decide a motion for reconsideration within S days from the date of submission
for resolution. Petitioner Villaseñor filed his motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2004, on the same day as petitioner
Mesa, whose motion was duly resolved. Whether by oversight or negligence, a period nearly I 0 years has elapsed without action
on Villase11or's motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman is called upon to be more vigilant in carrying out its
functions and in complying with the periods laid clown in the law.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 15, 2012 and June 18, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R.
SP No. 121378 are AFFIRMED. The Office of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to resolve the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner Gerardo R. ViIlaseñor in OMB-A DM-0-01-03 76 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390 with immediate dispatch. SO ORDERED.
 2. REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOEL AGUSTIN, Petitioners, vs.LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO
represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA, Respondents. G.R. No. 204964 October 15, 2014

Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or its predecessors
prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the coverage of the compulsory acquisition program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
However, there has to be substantial evidence to prove that lands sought to be exempted fall within the non-agricultural classification.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated September 28, 2012 and resolution3 dated November
29, 2012 of the Court of Appeals. These orders reinstated the order 4 dated February 19, 2004 of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Roberto M. Pagdanganan approving petitioner’s application for exemption.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, classifying areas in Barangay
Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land. 5

Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda Torres del Rosario (del Rosario) allegedly requested the City Zoning Administrator to exempt from
the zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City.6 The land is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11809 withan area of 164.7605 hectares.7 The request was allegedly approved on March 7,
1980 by Engineer Roque L. Dungca, Angeles City Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator, and the lots were allegedly reclassified
as non-agricultural or industrial lots.8

On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted.

On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an application for exemption with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage.9

On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Secretary Pagdanganan) issued an order granting
the application for exemption. Citing Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands
classified as non agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage. 10

On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu (Espiritu), filed a motion for reconsideration 11 of the
order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 705,
Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution No. 3300, Series of 2001, the land holdings were classified as agricultural, not
industrial.12 They argued that as per certifications by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated June 1, 2001, May 28, 2001, and
November 24, 2003, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the
area into other land uses.13

The motion was given due course by the Department of Agrarian Reform, this time headed by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman
(Secretary Pangandaman). Hence, on June 15, 2006, then Secretary Pangandaman issued an order 14 granting the motion for
reconsideration and revoking the earlier order of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan.

Del Rosario contended that this order was sent to her through Clarita Montgomery in Barangay Margot, Sapang Bato, Angeles City, and
not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City, which was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of
the order on January 26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order. 15 She then
filed her motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 15, 2006. The motion was dated February 9, 2007. 16

Acting on del Rosario’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman found that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board classified the landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988. 17Based on the ocular inspections conducted by
the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural and was planted with sugar cane
and corn.18 Accordingly, Secretary Pangandaman denied del Rosario’s motion in the order 19 dated March 3, 2008.

Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal20 before the Office of the President on March 27, 2008.

On May 7, 2009, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy
Executive Secretary Gaite), rendered the decision21 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her motion for reconsideration. 22 Citing Administrative Order No. 18, Series of
1987, and Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,23 the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Natividad G.
Dizon, denied the motion in the order24 dated July 14, 2009.

Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals arguing (1) that she was denied due process when the order
of Secretary Pangandaman was "erroneously sent to another address" 25 and (2) that the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary
Gaite was void since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months prior to the rendering of the
decision.26
On September 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition. The Court of Appeals stated that del Rosario was
indeed prevented from participating inthe proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary Pangandaman’s order when the notices were
sent to her other address on record.27 It also found that the decision issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since it
violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 07 May 2009, and the Order dated 15 June 2006
are hereby SET ASIDE. Perforce, with the nullity of the said Decision and Order, the Pagdanganan Order granting exemption to petitioner’s land is
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.29

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, 30 petitioners, namely Remigio Espiritu and Noel Agustin, now come before this court
via a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

In particular, petitioners argue that respondent was not denied due process as she was able to actively participate in the proceedings
before the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President. 31 They also argue that respondent was not able to present
proof that Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was not authorized tosign the decision and, hence, his action is presumed to have been
donein the regular performance of duty. 32

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in itsdecision. She argues that she
was deprived of due process when Secretary Pangandaman’s order was sent to the wrong address. She also argues that the Deputy
Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision was void since he had already been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two
months prior.33

The issue, therefore, before this court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the order of Secretary Pangandaman and the
decision of Deputy Secretary Gaite and reinstated the order of Secretary Pagdanganan.

This petition should be granted. Respondent was not deprived of due process

The Court of Appeals, in finding for respondent, stated that:

Since she was not notified, [del Rosario] was not able to participate in the proceedings leading to the issuance of the Pangandaman
Order. The absence of notice that resulted in the inability of [del Rosario] to be heard indubitably confirms her claim of lackof due process.
[Del Rosario] indeed was denied her day in the administrative proceedings below. And considering that [del Rosario] was not accorded
due process, the Pangandaman Order is void for lack ofjurisdiction. Hence, contrary to respondents’ submission, it could not attain
finality.34

The Court of Appeals, however, did not take into consideration that respondent was still able to file a motion for reconsideration of
Secretary Pangandaman’s order, albeit beyond the allowable period to file. In Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
06,35 Series of 2000:

RULE III Commencement, Investigation and Resolution of Cases

SECTION 21. Motion for Reconsideration. — In case any of the parties disagrees with the decision or resolution, the affected party may
file a written motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, furnishing a copy thereof tothe adverse party.
The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period to appeal.

Any party shall be allowed only one(1) motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the RD or approving authority shall rule on the said motion
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. In the event that the motion is denied, the adverse party has the right to perfect his appeal
within the remainder of the period to appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his
appeal.(Emphasis supplied) Despite being filed late, Secretary Pangandaman still gave due course to the motion and resolved it on its
merits. This is clear from his order dated March 3, 2008, which reads:

During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia
Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee recommended the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the
following grounds:

● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986
[sic]; and
● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found out that the area remained
agricultural. In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar cane and corn. 36 (Emphasis supplied)

While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a timelymotion for reconsideration of Secretary Pangandaman’s order, it
would be erroneous to conclude that she had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard. In Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Samson:37
. . . . In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process.In Casimiro v. Tandog, the Court held:

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s sideor the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is
no denial of procedural due process.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized toinclude the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive
notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with
the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. 38 (Emphasis supplied)

When respondent filed her motion for reconsideration assailing Secretary Pangandaman’s order, she was able to completely and
exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on the basis of the merits of her arguments and any other evidence
she was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side; hence, there was no deprivation of due
process.

It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her day in the administrative proceedings below."39Respondent was able
to actively participate not only in the proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform, but also on appeal to the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals.

Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and binding

Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict ofinterest in the conduct of their office.. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)

It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 16, 2009. 40 It is also alleged
that he has already lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009
since he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his tenure. This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was
presented as to when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position.

Assuming that Gaite’s appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de factoofficer at the time he rendered
the decision dated May 7, 2009.

In Funa v. Agra,41 a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as the acting Secretary of Justice and as
Solicitor General. This court, while ruling that the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice violated Article VII, Section
13 of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure in the Department of Justice:

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office,
and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color
of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was
his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates
from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on
petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the
prosecution of criminal cases.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.

With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity, thus:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption in [sic] rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be madein support of the presumption and in case
of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 43 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other than her allegation that Gaite had
already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is
conclusively presumed to have been rendered in the regular course of business.

Respondent’s landholdings were agricultural, not industrial

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, lands were classified into agricultural, residential, or industrial by law or by zoning
ordinances enacted by local government units. In Heirs of Luna v. Afable: 44

It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The
Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange,
prescribe, define, and apportion the land within itspolitical jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, butalso on the
future projection of needs. It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and municipal boards and councils approved an
ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power
granted tothem under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands
within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances. 45 (Emphasis
supplied) Republic Act No. 6657 became effective on June 15, 1988, and it covered all public and private lands, including lands of the
public domain suited for agriculture. 46 Upon its enactment, questions arose as to the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural. Then Agrarian Reform Secretary Florencio
B.Abad (Secretary Abad) was of the opinion that laws prior to Republic Act No. 6657 authorized the Department of Agrarian Reform,
together with the Department of Local Government and Community Development and the Human Settlements Commission, to allow or
disallow conversions. In response to Secretary Abad’s query, the Department of Justice issued Opinion No. 44 on March 16, 1990, written
by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.Drilon. The opinion, reproduced in full, states:

Sir:

This refers to your letter of the 13th instant stating your "position that prior to the passage of R.A. 6657, the Department of Agrarian
Reform had the authority to classify and declare which agricultural lands are suitable for non-agricultural purposes, and to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses."

In support of the foregoing view, you contend that under R.A. No. 3844, as amended, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
empowered to "determine and declare anagricultural land to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial orsome other urban purpose"
and to "convert agricultural land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes"; that P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815 "affirms
that the conversion of agricultural lands shall be allowed only upon previous authorization of the [DAR]; with respectto tenanted rice and
corn lands"; that a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 13, 1977 between the DAR, the Department of Local Government and
Community Development and the then Human Settlements Commission "further affirms the authority of the [DAR] to allow or disallow
conversion of agricultural lands"; that E.O. No. 129-A expressly invests the DAR with exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses'; and that while inthe final version of House Bill
400, Section 9 thereof provided that lands devoted to "residential, housing, commercial and industrial sites classified as such by the
municipal and city development councils as already approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, in their respective zoning
development plans" be exempted from the coverage of the Agrarian Reform program, this clause was deleted from Section 10 of the final
version of the consolidated bill stating the exemptions from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. We take it that
your query has been prompted by the study previously made by this Department for Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig Jr. and
Secretary Vicente Jayme (Memorandum dated February 14, 1990) which upheld the authority of the DAR to authorize conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). [I]t is your position that the authority of DAR to authorize such conversion existed even prior to June 15, 1988 or as early as
1963 under the Agricultural Land Reform Code(R.A. No. 3844; as amended).

It should be made clear at the outset that the aforementioned study of this Department was based on facts and issues arising from the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in
the CARP law to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses, because Section 65 only refers to
conversions effected after five years from date of the award, we opined that the authority of the DAR to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses applies only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity
of R.A.No. 6657, solely on the basis of our interpretation of DAR's mandate and the comprehensive coverage of the land reform program.
Thus, we said:

"Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, it is believed to be the
agrarian reform law's intention that any conversion ofa private agricultural land to non-agricultural uses should be cleared beforehand by
the DAR. True, the DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have,
after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the
land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the only instances
when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in the R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may use to evade
compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically follow from the said department's express duty and function to
execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should
first be cleared by the DAR."

It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and effective date of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR had likewise the authority,
to authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other uses, but always in coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No.
3344, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due
hearing, it is shown that the "landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes."

Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued to give teeth to the implementation of the
agrarian reform program decreed inP.D. No. 27, the DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands,
specifically those planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or tonon-agricultural uses, "subject to studies on zoning of the Human
Settlements Commissions" (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was, as you have correctly pointed
out, recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and Community Development
(DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two
agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to
any particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.

It is significant to mention thatin 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority to review and ratify land use plans
and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. 729
[1978]). This was followed by P.D.No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the
predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB][)] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use control
standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments, subdivision or estate
development projects of both the public and private sector and urban renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate
and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and infrastructure projects,
of national, regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates.

P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815, and the 1977 Memorandum of Agreement, abovementioned, cannot therefore, be construed
as sources of authority of the DAR; these issuances merely affirmed whatever power DAR had at the time oftheir adoption.

With respect to your observation that E.O. No. 129-A also empowered the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands
into non-agricultural uses as of July 22, 1987, it is our view that E.O. No. 129-A likewise did not provide a new source of power of DAR
with respect to conversion but it merely recognized and reaffirmed the existence of such power as granted under existing laws. This is
clearly inferrable from the following provision of E.O. No. 129-A to wit:

"Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the mandate of the Department, and in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the Department is hereby authorized to:

1) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land
uses as may be provided by law"

Anent the observation regarding the alleged deletion of residential, housing, commercial and industrial sites classifiedby the HLURB in the
final version of the CARP bill, we fail to see how this [sic] circumstances could substantiate your position that DAR's authority to reclassify
or approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses already existed prior to June 15, 1988. Surely, it is clear that the
alleged deletion was necessary to avoid a redundancy inthe CARP law whose coverage is expressly limited to "all public and private
agricultural lands" and "other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture" (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6657). Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657
defines "agricultural land" as that "devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."

Based on the foregoing premises, wereiterate the view that with respect to conversions ofagricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June
15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and the extensive coverage
of the agrarian reform program.47 (Emphasis supplied) Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 became the basis of subsequent issuances
by the Department of Agrarian Reform, stating in clear terms that parties need not seek prior conversion clearance from the Department
of Agrarian Reform for lands that were classified as non-agricultural prior to Republic Act No. 6657. The subsequent rulings are outlined in
Junio v. Secretary Garilao:48

Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO)No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that
conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657.
Designed to "streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO provided guidelines and
procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances.

Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12, Series of 1994, entitled "Consolidated and Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses." It provided that the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No.
6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs); and
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the
ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ
Opinion No. 44.49 (Citations omitted)
Accordingly, lands are consideredexempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 if the following requisites are present:

1. Lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit; and
2. The zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board before June 15, 1998.

In revoking the prior order of exemption, Secretary Pangandaman took note of the following considerations:

● The Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of
Angeles states that the City Planning and Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit (CPDO-ZAU) certifies that subject
property covered by TCT No. 11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified photocopy of Zoning Ordinance,
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office No. 3 (HLURB-
Region III) on 03 September 2001;
● Also, upon verification with HLURB-Region III, we were informed that as per copy of the approved Zoning Plan of 1978, the
subject properties were classified as agricultural. The said Zoning Plan of 1978 was approved under NCC Plan dated 24
September 1980; and
● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found that the area remained agricultural.
In fact, it is still dominantly planted withsugar cane and corn. 50 (Emphasis supplied)

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, Secretary Pangandaman also took into consideration the recommendations of the Center
for Land Use Policy, Planning, and Implementation Committee, thus:

During the 50th Special CLUPPI Committee-B Meeting, held on 18 December 2007, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Sylvia
Espirilla [sic] was deliberated upon and the Committee recommended the DENIAL of the Motion for Reconsideration based on the
following grounds:

● The certifications issued by the HLURB shows that the subject properties were classified as agricultural before 15 June 1986
[sic]; and
● Based on the ocular inspection conducted by the CLUPPI Inspection Team, it was found out that the area remained
agricultural.1âwphi1 In fact, it [is] still dominantly planted with sugar cane and corn. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Secretary Pangandaman also found that:

The certifications submitted by the [respondents] which is the Certification dated 18 November 2003, of Mr. David D. David, Planning
Officer IV and Zoning Administrator of the City of Angeles states that the City Planning Development Office, Zoning Administration Unit
(CPDOZAU) certifies that the subject properties covered by TCT No. T-11804 is classified as agricultural based on the certified photocopy
of Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance No. 13[,] Series of 1978 issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Regional Office No. 3
(HLURB-Region III) on 03 September 2001.

Such certification was corroborated bya certification issued by the HLURB Regional Director, Region III, Ms. Edithat [sic] Barrameda in its
certification dated 28 May 2001 and 24 November 2003. It was stated in the said certification that the subject landholding is within the
agricultural zone based on Comprehensive LandUse Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the City Council of Angeles City approved through
HLURB Resolution No. 705 dated 17 October 2001. Also a certification was issued by Director Barrameda on 01 June 2001, stating
therein that, "Duplicate copies of the Certification issued by this Board toMs. Lutgarda Torres on 18 December 1991 and 8 July 1998,
respectively are not among the files for safekeeping when she assumed as Regional Officer on 03 July 2000.["] 52 (Emphasis supplied)

These findings were sustained on appeal by the Office of the President, stating that:

[Respondents'] argument that the land has ceased to be agricultural by virtue of reclassification under Ordinance No. 13, series of 1978
cannot be sustained since the records of the case or the evidence presented thereto are bereft of any indication showing the same. In
fact, nowhere was it shown that a certified true copy of the said Ordinance was presented before this Office or the office a quo. 53

The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and finality by the courts as it is presumed that these
agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters under their jurisdiction. 54 Both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Office of the President found respondent's lands to be agricultural. We see no reason to disturb these findings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated September 28, 2012 and resolution dated November 29, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The order dated June 15, 2006 of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the decision dated May 7, 2009 of
the Office of the President are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
3. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR, Respondents. G.R. No. 199027 June 9, 2014

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to assail the Resolutions dated October
18, 20102 and August 25, 20113 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN, where the CA denied the OSG's
motion to be excused from filing for and on behalf of respondent Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur (Municipality
of Saguiran) the memorandum, or any other pleading that would be required by the appellate court relative to the appeal.

The Antecedents

The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for mandamus 4 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lanao del Sur by the former members of the Sangguniang Bayanof Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong, Amrosi
MacoteSamporna, Alanie L. Dalama, Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S. Rataban. Therein petitioners sought to compel the
Municipality of Saguiran to pay them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid terminal leave benefits under
Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999. 5 The
Municipality of Saguiran sought the trial court’s dismissal of the petition through its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim6 which was signed by Municipal Mayor Hadjah Rasmia B. Macabago and Municipal Treasurer Hadji Mautinter
Dimacaling.

On January 6, 2009, the RTC issued an Order7 dismissing the petition on the ground that the act being sought by therein
petitioners was not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary
process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. 8 It, nonetheless, directed the Municipality of Saguiran to
include in its general or special budget for the year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave benefits.

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s directive for the inclusion of the subject claims in the municipality’s budget, the Municipality of
Saguiran partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. On December 14, 2009, the appellate court issued a notice 9 requiring
the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a non-extendible period of 30 days.

The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required memorandum, explaining that it had not received any
document or pleading in connection with the case.10 It asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such documents within which
to file the required memorandum. On April 23, 2010, the OSG’s motion was denied by the CA on the ground that the relief sought
was not among the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. The OSG was instead given a non-extendible period of 90 days
from notice within which to file the memorandum.11 On August 5, 2010, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion 12 requesting to
be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. It
reasoned that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI(3)(i) of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

On October 18, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Resolution13 denying the OSG’s motion on the following basis:

The OSG alleges:

"The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), to this Honorable Court, respectfully manifests that it has no legal authority to
represent any of the respondent-appellants [sic] in the above-captioned case as its mandate is limited to the representation of ‘the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyer.’"

We are at a loss as to how the OSG views a local government unit then if it does not consider the same part of the Government of
the Philippines or an agency or instrumentality thereof; but to enlighten the said Office, the Supreme Court in Province of
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. held that a local government unit, in the performance of its political functions, is an
agency of the Republic and acts for the latter’s benefit. 14 (Citations omitted)

The OSG moved to reconsider, but this was denied by the CA via the Resolution 15 dated August 25, 2011.

The Present Petition

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari founded on the following ground:

THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN COMPELLING THE OSG TO REPRESENT THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL
SUR (A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT) IN ITS LAWSUIT.16
The OSG argues that the legal officer of a local government unit must represent it in its lawsuits, citing the provisions of the LGC
and jurisprudence which bar local government units from obtaining the services of a lawyer other than their designated legal
officers.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The OSG’s powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35,
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, which reads:

Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned
or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party;

xxxx

A cursory reading of this provision may create the impression that the OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code is
unqualified, and thus broad enough to include representation of a local government unit in any case filed by or against it, as local
government units, indisputably, form part of the Government of the Philippines. Towards a proper resolution of the pending issue,
however, the OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other statutes that pertain
to the same subject of representation in courts. As the Court explained in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia
Construction & Development Corporation:17

Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or
cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.18

On the matter of counsels’ representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves on the
issue.1âwphi1 Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court
actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government unit’s legal officer. Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the
LGC provides:

Article Eleven
The Legal Officer

Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties.

(a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government
concerned, of good moral character, and a member of the Philippine Bar. x x x.

The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the municipal
government.

(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the office of legal services and shall:

xxxx

(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:

(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official
thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to
represent the adverse party;

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government unit’s legal officer. It also
restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special
law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail
over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. The Court held in
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:19

The special act and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of
general application. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act
or provision.20 (Citations omitted)

Further, the Court ruled in Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation:21

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging
to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class
or to a particular portion or section of the state only.

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and
harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the
special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as
intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in
order to give its words any meaning at all.22(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Such ruling disregarded the provisions of the LGC
that vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the employment of a special
legal officer is expressly allowed by the law only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the
component city or municipality is adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality.

The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the required memorandum could not
have estopped it from later raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be
traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have validated an act that was beyond the scope of its authority.

It bears mentioning that notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSG's functions, the LGC is not
the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also provides limits to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez, 23 for example, the Court
ruled that the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a criminal case. This was necessary to
prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event that the OSG would become the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines
once a judgment of the public official's conviction was brought on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 18, 2010 and August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Legal Officer of the Municipal Government of Saguiran,
Lanao del Sur, or if there is none, the Provincial Attorney of the Province of Lanao del Sur, and not the Office of the Solicitor
General, has the duty to represent the local government unit as counsel in CA-G.R. SP No. 02816-MIN.

SO ORDERED.
 4. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs.PILILLA WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 190147 March 5, 2013

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 are the Decision1 dated July 28, 2009 and Resolution2dated
November 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106031 which annulled and set aside Resolution Nos.
0809423 and 0818464 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The factual background of this case is as follows:

Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous status under Resolution No. 12 issued on August 7,
1998 by the Board of Directors (BOD) of respondent Pililla Water District (PWD). His appointment was signed by the BOD Acting
Chairman and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal.5

On October 4, 2001, petitioner issued Resolution No. 0116246 amending and clarifying Section 12, Rule XIII of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as follows:

Section 12. a) No person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years can be appointed to any position in the
government, subject only to the exception provided under sub-section (b) hereof.

However, in meritorious cases, the Commission may allow the extension of service of a person who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, for a period of six (6) months only unless otherwise stated. Provided, that, such extension may be for a
maximum period of one (1) year for one who will complete the fifteen (15) years of service required under the GSIS Law.

A request for extension shall be made by the head of office and shall be filed with the Commission not later than three (3) months
prior to the date of the official/employee’s compulsory retirement.

Henceforth, the only basis for Heads of Offices to allow an employee to continue rendering service after his/her 65th birthday is a
Resolution of the Commission granting the request for extension. Absent such Resolution, the salaries of the said employee shall
be for the personal account of the responsible official.

xxxx

b) A person who has already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be appointed to a coterminous/primarily
confidential position in the government.

A person appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position who reaches the age of 65 years is considered automatically
extended in the service until the expiry date of his/her appointment or until his/her services are earlier terminated. (Emphasis
supplied)

On April 2, 2004, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 92867 was approved and signed into law, Section 2 of which provides:

SEC. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 23. The General Manager.–At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board shall appoint,
by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define [his] duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall not be removed
from office, except for cause and after due process." (Emphasis supplied)

On June 16, 2004, the BOD approved Resolution No. 19,8 Series of 2004, which reads:

EXTENSION OF SERVICES OF MR. PAULINO J. RAFANAN AS GENERAL MANAGER OF PILILLA WATER DISTRICT

WHEREAS, the General Manager, Mr. Paulino J. Rafanan, is reaching his age 65 this month of this year the Board, because of
his good and honest performance in faithfully carrying out the policies of the Board resulting in the success of the District’s
expansion program, unanimously agreed to retain his services as General Manager at least up to December 31, 2008 co-terminus
with the term of the Director last appointed after which period he may stay at the pleasure of the other Board.

THEREFORE, THE BOARD RESOLVED, AS IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the services of Mr. Paulino J. Rafanan as General
Manager of Pililla Water District is extended up to December 31, 2008 as a reward for his honest and efficient services to the
District.
In its Resolution No. 04-1271 dated November 23, 2004, petitioner denied the request of BOD Chairman Valentin E. Paz for the
extension of service of Rafanan and considered the latter "separated from the service at the close of office hours on June 25,
2004, his 65th birthday." Petitioner also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Chairman Paz under its Resolution No. 05-
0118 dated February 1, 2005.9

On April 8, 2005, the BOD issued Resolution No. 09, Series of 2005 reappointing Rafanan as General Manager on coterminous
status. Said reappointment was signed by Chairman Paz and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal.10A year later, the BOD
approved Resolution No. 20 declaring the appointment of General Manager Rafanan as permanent 11 but this resolution was not
implemented.

In a letter dated November 19, 2007, Pililla Mayor Leandro V. Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanan’s coterminous appointment as
defective and void ab initio considering that he was appointed to a career position despite having reached the compulsory
retirement age. Said letter-complaint was treated as an appeal from the appointment made by the BOD Chairman of respondent.

On May 19, 2008, petitioner issued Resolution No. 080942 invalidating the coterminous appointment issued to Rafanan as
General Manager on April 8, 2005 on the ground that it was made in violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286. Petitioner further
observed that the appointment was issued to circumvent the denial of the several requests for extension of service of Rafanan.
Rafanan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by petitioner under its Resolution No. 081846 dated September 26,
2008.

Respondent filed in the CA a petition for review with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Insisting that Rafanan’s coterminous appointment was based on
CSC Resolution No. 011624, respondent contended that petitioner cannot usurp the power of appointment and removal of the
appointing authority, and that petitioner failed to observe due process.

In the assailed Decision, the CA reversed the CSC and ruled that the position of General Manager in water districts remains
primarily confidential in nature and hence respondent’s BOD may validly appoint Rafanan to the said position even beyond the
compulsory retirement age.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied.

Hence, this petition submitting the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POSITION OF GENERAL MANAGER
OF A LOCAL WATER DISTRICT IS PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL IN NATURE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE APRIL 8, 2005 APPOINTMENT OF
RAFANAN IN A CO-TERMINOUS CAPACITY WAS VALID.12

Under Section 13, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws and CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on December 27, 1991, appointments in the civil service may either be of
permanent or temporary status. A permanent appointment is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law,
rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a temporary appointment may be extended to a person who
possesses all the requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility and for a limited period not exceeding
twelve months or until a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.

Section 14 of the same resolution provides for a coterminous appointment:

Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the
service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with
his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.

The co-terminous status may be further classified into the following:

(1) co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
 (2) co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority or at his pleasure;

(3) co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the
resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and

(4) co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.

For the purpose of coverage or membership with the GSIS, or their right to security of tenure, co-terminous appointees, except
those who are co-terminous with the appointing authority, shall be considered permanent. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, otherwise known as "The Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973" reads:

SEC. 23. Additional Officers.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a
majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation. Said
officers shall serve at the pleasure of the board. (Emphasis supplied)

The provision was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 76813:

SEC. 23. The General Manager.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by
a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of
the board. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Paloma v. Mora,14 we held that the nature of appointment of General Managers of Water Districts under Section 23
of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the "Administrative Code of 1987", that is, the General Manager serves at the pleasure of the BOD.

As mentioned, Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was already amended by R.A. No. 9286 which now provides that the General Manager
of a water district shall not be removed from office except for cause and after due process. Said law, however, cannot be
retroactively applied as to preclude the BOD from terminating its General Manager at the time the governing law was still P.D. No.
198, thus:

Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must, therefore, be
taken to be of prospective application. The general rule is that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against
its retroactive effect. Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested, the rule in
statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used.

First, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it should retroact to the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the
original law. Next, neither is it necessarily implied from Rep. Act No. 9286 that it or any of its provisions should apply retroactively.
Third, Rep. Act No. 9286 is a substantive amendment of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has changed the grounds for termination of
the General Manager of Water Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, "shall serve at the pleasure of the Board."
Under the new law, however, said General Manager shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process. To
apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such as the case at bar, will rob the respondents as members of the
Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D. No. 198 to terminate petitioner at their pleasure or
discretion. Stated otherwise, the new law can not be applied to make respondents accountable for actions which were valid under
the law prevailing at the time the questioned act was committed.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was terminated by the Board of Directors, the prevailing law was
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9286. 15 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In this case, respondent’s BOD reappointed Rafanan as General Manager on April 8, 2005 when R.A. No. 9286 was already in
force and the BOD no longer had the authority to terminate the General Manager at its pleasure or discretion.

Petitioner assails the CA in upholding the April 8, 2005 reappointment of Rafanan as General Manager on coterminous status,
arguing that the change of phraseology of Section 23 under R.A. No. 9286 ipso facto reclassified said position from non-career to
career position. Petitioner points out that it issued CSC Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2006 entitled "Considering the
Position of General Manager Under the Career Service and Prescribing the Guidelines and Qualification Standards for the said
Position Pursuant to R.A. No. 9286,"16 which applies to respondent under local water district Medium Category:
D (SG-24) - Medium

Education : Master’s degree

Experience : 4 years in position/s involving management and supervision

Training : 24 hours of training in management and supervision

Eligibility : Career Service (Professional)/Second Level Eligibility17

Respondent contends that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 is not in conflict with the coterminous appointment of
Rafanan since the latter can be removed for "loss of confidence," which is "cause" for removal. As to the above-cited CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2006, the same should be applied only to appointments made after its issuance, and not
to Rafanan who was already the incumbent General Manager before August 17, 2006. Respondent maintains that since the
General Manager of a water district holds a primarily confidential position, Rafanan can be appointed to or remain in said position
even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.

The threshold issue is whether under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 as amended by R.A. No. 9286, the position of General Manager
of a water district remains as primarily confidential.

In the 1950 case of De los Santos v. Mallare18 a position that is primarily confidential in nature is defined as follows:

x x x. These positions [policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions], involve the highest degree of
confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be
terminable at the will of the officer that makes them.

xxxx

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is
primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. x x x. 19 (Emphasis supplied)

From the above case the "proximity rule" was derived. A position is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a
primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and
unfettered communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters. 20 Moreover, in classifying a position as primarily
confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character. A position is not necessarily confidential
though the one in office may sometimes hold confidential matters or documents. 21

The case of Piñero v. Hechanova22 laid down the doctrine that it is the nature of the position that finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical and that executive pronouncements can be no more than
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. As reiterated in subsequent cases, such initial determination
through executive declaration or legislative fiat does not foreclose judicial review. 23

More recently, in Civil Service Commission v. Javier,24 we categorically declared that even petitioner’s classification of confidential
positions in the government is not binding on this Court:

At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining primarily confidential
positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential.

What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service positions, as well as jurisprudence which describe or give
examples of confidential positions in government.

Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as confidential already made by an
agency or branch of government?

Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil service made by the legislative
or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the petitioner. The Court is expected to make its own determination as
to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior
classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the other branches of government are merely considered initial and not
conclusive to the Court. Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government, such as the
petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all
justiciable controversies and disputes. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the proximity rule and considering the nature of the duties of the office of the Corporate Secretary of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), we held in the above-cited case that said position in the GSIS or any government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) for that matter, is a primarily confidential position.25

In holding that the position of General Manager of a water district is primarily confidential in nature, the CA said:

x x x we rule that the position of general manager remains primarily confidential in nature despite the amendment of Section 23 of
P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No. 9286, which gave the occupant of said position security of tenure, in that said officer could only be
removed from office for cause and after due process. The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its
confidential character. First, the general manager is directly appointed by the board of directors. Second, the general manager
directly reports to the board of directors. Third, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are determined by the board
of directors, which is a clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between him and the board. Fourth, the duties
and responsibilities of a general manager are not merely clerical and routinary in nature. His work involves policy and decision
making. Fifth, the compensation of the general manager is fixed by the board of directors. And last, the general manager is
directly accountable for his actions and omissions to the board of directors. Under this situation, the general manager is expected
to possess the highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to maintaining trust and confidence between him
and the board of directors. The loss of such trust or confidence could easily result in the termination of the general manager’s
services by the board of directors. To be sure, regardless of the security of tenure a general manager may now enjoy, his term
may still be ended by the board of directors based on the ground of "loss of confidence." 26 (Emphasis in the original)

We sustain the ruling of the CA.

We stress that a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and
appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship. 27 The tenure of a confidential employee
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the confidential employee may be
appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.28

Among those positions judicially determined as primarily confidential positions are the following: Chief Legal Counsel of the
Philippine National Bank; Confidential Agent of the Office of the Auditor, GSIS; Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan; Secretary to
the City Mayor; Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor; Secretary to the Board of a government
corporation; City Legal Counsel, City Legal Officer or City Attorney; Provincial Attorney; Private Secretary; and Board Secretary II
of the Philippine State College of Aeronautics. 29 The Court in these instances focused on the nature of the functions of the office
characterized by such "close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. 30

In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Section 24 in relation to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, reveals
the close proximity of the positions of the General Manager and BOD.

SEC. 24. Duties.–The duties of the General Manager and other officers shall be determined and specified from time to time by the
Board. The General Manager, who shall not be a director, shall have full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation
of water district facilities, with power and authority to appoint all personnel of the district: Provided, That the appointment of
personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to approval by the Board. (As amended by Sec.10, PD 768) (Emphasis
supplied)

While the BOD appoints by a majority vote the General Manager and specifies from time to time the duties he shall perform, it is
the General Manager who exercises full supervision and control of the maintenance and operation of water district facilities. The
BOD is confined to policy-making and prescribing a system of business administration and accounting for the water district
patterned upon and in conformity to the standards established by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and it is the
General Manager who implements the plans and policies approved by the BOD. And while the BOD may not engage in the
detailed management of the water district, it is empowered to delegate to such officers or agents designated by it any executive,
administrative or ministerial power,31 including entering into contracts under conditions and restrictions it may impose. Moreover,
though the General Manager is vested with the power to appoint all personnel of the water district, the appointment of personnel in
the supervisory level shall be subject to the approval of the BOD. It is likewise evident that the General Manager is directly
accountable to the BOD which has disciplinary jurisdiction over him. The foregoing working relationship of the General Manager
and BOD under the governing law of water districts clearly demands a high degree of trust and confidence between them. The CA
therefore correctly concluded that the position of General Manager is primarily confidential in nature.

Petitioner contends that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 in effect placed the position of General Manager of a water
district in the category of career service. It posits that this can be inferred from the removal of the sentence "Said officer shall
serve at the pleasure of the Board," and replaced it with the sentence "Said officer shall not be removed from office, except for
cause and after due process." Accordingly, petitioner said it issued CSC MC No. 13, Series of 2006 prescribing guidelines for the
implementation of the new law and qualification standards for the position of General Manager of a water district, whereby all
incumbent general managers who hold appointments under coterminous status upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 9286 were given
two years to meet all the requirements for permanent status.

Such interpretation is incorrect.

To our mind, the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9286 merely tempered the broad discretion of the BOD. In Paloma v.
Mora32 we noted the change brought about by the said law insofar as the grounds for terminating the General Manager of a water
district. Whereas previously the General Manager may be removed at the pleasure or discretion of the BOD even without prior
notice and due hearing, the amendatory law expressly demands that these be complied with. Such condition for the exercise of
the power of removal implements the fundamental right of due process guaranteed by the Constitution. In De los Santos v.
Mallare,33 the Court simply recognized as a necessity that confidential appointments be "terminable at the will" of the appointing
authority.

It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees
whose appointments are contractual and coterminous in nature. 34 Since the position of General Manager of a water district
remains a primarily confidential position whose term still expires upon loss of trust and confidence by the BOD provided that prior
notice and due hearing are observed, it cannot therefore be said that the phrase "shall not be removed except for cause and after
due process" converted such position into a permanent appointment. Significantly, loss of confidence may be predicated on other
causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing laws.

In Tanjay Water District v. Quinit, Jr.,35 we said:

Indeed, no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The phrase
"cause provided by law," however, includes "loss of confidence." It is an established rule that the tenure of those holding primarily
confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures.
Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence, in which case, their cessation from office involves no
removal but the expiration of their term of office.

The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and non-career service positions. Career positions are
characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or
based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.36

The Career Service shall include37:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff
of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the
Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations whether performing governmental or proprietary functions,
who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, non-career positions are defined by the Administrative Code of 1987 38 as follows:

SEC. 9. Non-Career Service. – The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

 (1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis supplied)

As can be gleaned, a coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of positions in the Civil
Service,39 its tenure being limited or specified by law, or coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or at the latter’s
pleasure. Under R.A. No. 9286 in relation to

Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,40 the coterminous appointment of the
General Manager of a water district is based on the majority vote of the BOD and whose continuity in the service is based on the
latter’s trust and confidence or co-existent with its tenure.

The term of office of the BOD members of water districts is fixed by P.D. No. 198 as follows:

SEC. 11. Term of Office. -- Of the five initial directors of each newly-formed district, two shall be appointed for a maximum term of
two years, two for a maximum term of four years, and one for a maximum term of six years. Terms of office of all directors in a
given district shall be such that the term of at least one director, but not more than two, shall expire on December 31 of each even-
numbered year. Regular terms of office after the initial terms shall be for six years commencing on January 1 of odd-numbered
years. Directors may be removed for cause only, subject to review and approval of the Administration. (As amended by Sec. 5,
P.D. No. 768.) (Emphasis supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing, the logical conclusion is that the General Manager of a water district who is appointed on
coterminous status may serve or hold office for a maximum of six years, which is the tenure of the appointing authority, subject to
reappointment for another six years unless sooner removed by the BOD for loss of trust and confidence, or for any cause provided
by law and with due process.1âwphi1

It may also be mentioned that under Section 3641 of P.D. No. 198, as amended, the L WUA is empowered to take over the
operation and management of a water district which has defaulted on its loan obligations to L WUA. As the bondholder or creditor,
and in fulfillment of its mandate to regulate water utilities in the country, LWUA may designate its employees or any person or
organization to assume all powers or policy-decision and the powers of management and administration to undertake all such
actions as may be necessary for the water district's efficient operation. This further reinforces the conclusion that the position of
General Manager of a water district is a non-career position.

In fine, since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confidential position, Rafanan was validly
reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005 under coterminous status despite having reached the
compulsory retirement age, which is allowed under Section 12 (b), Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as
amended by Resolution No. 011624 dated October 4, 2001.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated July 28, 2009 and Resolution dated November
9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106031 are AFFIRMED and UPHELD. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 5. DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, Petitioners, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000 November 27, 2013

This resolves the separate Motions for Reconsideration of petitioners, Dr. Roger R. Posadas and Dr. Rolando P. Dayco of the
Court's Decision dated July 17, 2013.

The Facts and the Case

To recall the facts culled from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of the Philippines
(UP) Diliman when on September 19, 1994 he formed a Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment Management and
Policy. The Task Force was to prepare the needed curricula for masteral and doctoral programs in "technology management,
innovation studies, science and technology and related areas." On June 6, 1995, acting on the Task Force's proposal, UP
established the U Technology Management Center (UP TMC) the members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of
Center Director. He declined the nomination, however, resulting in the designation of Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP
TMC Director.

Shortly after, Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of UP TMC. With the help of the Philippine
Institute of Development Studies/Policy, Training and Technical Assistance Facility and the National Economic Development
Authority, there came into being the Institutionalization of Management and Technology in the University of the Philippines in
Diliman (the TMC Project), funded at Dr. Posadas’ initiative by the Canadian International Development Agency.

Meantime, on October 5, 1995 Malacanang granted Dr. Posadas and fifteen other UP Diliman officials authority to attend the
foundation day of the state university in Fujian, China, from October 30 to November 6, 1995. Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally
designated Dr. Dayco, then UP Diliman Vice-Chancellor for Administration, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in his absence. On
November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as "Project Director of the TMC Project from
September 18, 1995 to September 17, 1996." In an undated letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the
project. The appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995 when the project began.

About a year later or on August 22, 1996 the Commission on Audit (COA) Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Suspension of
payments made to UP TMC personnel, including the second payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱36,000.00 for his services as TMC
Project’s Local Consultant. On August 23 the Resident Auditor further suspended payment of ₱30,000.00 honorarium per month
to Dr. Posadas as Project Director from September 18 to October 17, 1995.

On September 16, 1996, however, the UP Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the COA Resident Auditor, pointing out
that the amounts paid the TMC Project personnel "were legal, being in the nature of consultancy fees." The legal office also
"confirmed the authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as project director and consultant of
the TMC Project." Finding this explanation "acceptable," the COA Resident Auditor lifted his previous notices of suspension.

Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President Javier constituted an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and
decide the administrative complaint that he himself filed against Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco for grave misconduct and abuse of
authority. On August 18, 1998 the Tribunal recommended the dismissal of the two from the service. The UP Board of Regents
modified the penalty, however, to "forced resignation" with right to reapply after one year provided they publicly apologize. Still, the
UP General-Counsel filed with the Sandiganbayan the present criminal cases.

On June 28, 2005 the Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 and imposed on them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and one day as minimum and 12 years as
maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court also found them guilty of violation
of Section 7(b) of Republic Act 6713 and imposed on them the penalty of imprisonment for 5 years with the same disqualification.
They were further ordered to indemnify the government in the sum of ₱336,000.00. 1

In its decision of July 17, 2013, the Court affirmed the decisions of the Sandiganbayan in the two cases.

Discussion

1. The appointments were in good faith

The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of fraud.2

Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint the absent
Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those
appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
Chancellor.

All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and
regulations. The world of the academe is usually preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments
appear to have been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any immediate protest from those who could have had an interest in
the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor issued a notice of suspension covering payments out of
the Project to all UP personnel involved, including Dr. Posadas.

Still, in response to this notice, the UP Diliman Legal Office itself rendered a legal opinion that "confirmed the authority of Dr.
Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Not only this,
the COA Resident Auditor, who at first thought that the OIC Chancellor had no power to make the designations, later accepted the
Legal Office’s opinion and withdrew the Notices of Suspension of payment that he issued. All these indicate a need for the Court
to reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas acted in bad faith in the matter of those appointments.

2. Dr. Dayco chose the most qualified for the project

The next question is whether Dr. Dayco, believing in good faith that he had the authority to make the questioned designations,
acted with "manifest partiality" in choosing Dr. Posadas among all possible candidates as TMC Director and Consultant. The
answer is no.

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather
than another.3 Here, the prosecution presented no evidence whatsoever that others, more qualified than Dr. Posadas, deserve the
two related appointments. The fact is that he was the best qualified for the work:

First, Dr. Posadas originated the idea for the project and so he had every reason to want it to succeed.

Second, he worked hard to convince the relevant government offices to arrange funding for the project, proof that he was familiar
with the financial side of it as well.

Third, the members of the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Policy—his own peers—
nominated Dr. Posadas as Director of the UP Technology Management Center.

Fourth. The work fell within his area of expertise—technical management—ensuring professionalism in the execution of the
project.

In the world of the academe, that project was the equivalent of Dr. Posadas’ thesis. Thus, since he was a natural choice to head
the same, it beats the mind that such choice could be regarded as one prompted by "manifest partiality."

3. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind

The worst that could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the fact that, although Dr. Dayco may
have honestly believed that he had the authority to make those appointments, he was actually appointing his own superior, the
person who made him OIC Chancellor, however qualified he might be, to those enviable positions. But this should have been
treated as a mere administrative offense for:

First. No evidence was adduced to show that UP academic officials were prohibited from receiving compensation for work they
render outside the scope of their normal duties as administrators or faculty professors.

Second. COA disallowances of benefits given to government personnel for extra services rendered are normal occurrences in
government offices. They can hardly be regarded as cause for the filing of criminal charges of corruption against the authorities
that granted them and those who got paid.

Section 4 of the COA Revised Rules of Procedure merely provides for an order to return what was improperly paid. And, only if
the responsible parties refuse to do so, may the auditor then (a) recommend to COA that they be cited for contempt; (b) refer the
matter to the Solicitor General for the filing of the appropriate civil action; and (c) refer it to the Ombudsman for the appropriate
administrative or criminal action.4 Here, Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were not given the chance, before they were administratively
charged, to restore what amounts were paid since the Resident Director withdrew his notice of disallowance after considering the
view of the UP Diliman Legal Office.

If the Court does not grant petitioners’ motions for reconsideration, the common disallowances of benefits paid to government
personnel will heretofore be considered equivalent to criminal giving of "unwarranted advantage to a private party," an element of
graft and corruption. This is too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits that government employees
deserve the safer and better option.

Third. In other government offices, the case against Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas would have been treated as purely of an
administrative character. The problem in their case, however, is that other factors have muddled it. The evidence shows that prior
to the incident Dr. Posadas caused the administrative investigation of UP Library Administrative Officer Ofelia del Mundo for grave
abuse of authority, neglect of duty, and other wrong-doings. This prompted Professor Tabbada, the Acting UP TMC Director, to
resign his post in protest. In turn, Ms. Del Mundo instigated the UP President to go after Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco. Apparently,
the Office of the Ombudsman played into the intense mutual hatred and rivalry that enlarged what was a simple administrative
misstep.

Fourth. The fault of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas, who spent the best parts of their lives serving UP, does not warrant their going to
jail for nine to twelve years for what they did. They did not act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. Indeed, the UP Board of
Regents, the highest governing body of that institution and the most sensitive to any attack upon its revered portals, did not
believe that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas committed outright corruption. Indeed, it did not dismiss them from the service; it merely
ordered their forced resignation and the accessory penalties that went with it.

The Board did not also believe that the two deserved to be permanently expelled from UP.1âwphi1 It meted out to them what in
effect amounts to mere suspension for one year since the Board practically invited them to come back and teach again after one
year provided they render a public apology for their actions. The Board of Regents did not regard their offense so morally
detestable as to totally take away from them the privilege of teaching the young.

4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused "undue injury"
to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits."

This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be
capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on
flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. 5 The Court held in Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan6 that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It
must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.

Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱30 000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury
to the Government. The record shows, however, that the ₱247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed
was deducted from his terminal leave benefits. 7

The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of the appointments in
question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered "unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the
additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and to vacate their conviction on
the ground of failure of the State to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
6. A.M. No. P-12-3089 November 13, 2013 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3591-P)

HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES REPRESENTED BY PAUL JOHN TEVES ABAD ELSA C. AQUINO and FELIMON E.
FERNAN, Complainants, vs. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, Respondent.

Before the Court is the Complaint-Affidavit1 of complainants Heirs of Celestino Teves represented by Paul John Teves Abad),
Elsa C. Aquino, and Felimon E. Fernan, accusing respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court
OCC), Regional Trial Court RTC), Manila, of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the Court.

Complainants alleged that they are the successors-in-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two parcels of land, initially identified
as Lots 263 and 264 of the Sampaloc Townsite in Tanay, Rizal, distributed under the Department o Agrarian Reform DAR)
Resettlement Project. Lots 263 and 264 measured 965 square meters and 648 square meters, respectively, or 1,613 square
meters combined. The late Celestino Teves and complainants have been in possession of Lots 263 and 264 since 1960. Lots 263
and 264 are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been occupied by respondent and with an area of 838 square meters.
In May 2003, upon the approval of a new subdivision plan, Lots 263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot 190;
while Lot 268 was designated as Lot 189.2 Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was erroneously increased from 838 square
meters to 941 square meters. Respondent knew of this error but being dishonest, he concealed it from the DAR. Respondent was
eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-01182, pursuant to Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
00222161, for Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the basis of OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161),
respondent started to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 square meters of complainants’ Lot 190 (disputed area) by (a) altering
and installing concrete boundaries; (b) destroying the riprap and cyclone wires which served as boundary between respondent’s
Lot 189 and complainants’ Lot 190; (c) destroying the comfort room, dirty kitchen, warehouse, and trees in the disputed area; and
(d) constructing a concrete fence with steel gate around Lot 189 and the disputed area. Complainants were helpless in preventing
respondent from performing the aforementioned acts as respondent bragged that he is a Sheriff of the RTC of Manila and
threatened complainants with bodily harm.

Complainants had filed with the DAR Region IV-A a letter-complaint against respondent, docketed as Case No. A-0400-0168-09.
Complainants pointed out that Regional Director Antonio G. Evangelista (Evangelista) of DAR Region IV-A issued an Order dated
October 20, 2009, ruling in their favor. Pertinent portions of said Order read:

Per Memorandum dated May 19, 2009 of [Legal Officer (LO)] Cleufe S. Eder as noted by Atty. Raul I. Bautista, the [DAR
Provincial Office (DARPO)] Legal Division conducted an investigation/inspection on the subject lots on May 18, 2009 and the
following facts were established to wit:

xxxx

6. That based on that new survey in 2003, [Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)] with No. 00222161/OCT No.
M-01182 with an area of 941 square meters was awarded to Augusto Felicidario on October 2, 2005. Augusto Felicidario
conducted his own survey to determine the boundaries based on the issued CLOA. It appears that there was an area of
117 square meters from his original area of 838 square meters, however, the excess area of 117 square meters belong
to Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan and Heirs of Celestino Teves. Augusto Felicidario tainted with bad faith instead
proceed[ed] to get the excess area of 117 square meters and placed another mujon, other than the old mujon previously
placed during the 1965 survey of 838 square meters;

7. That CLOA/s for Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan and [Heirs] of Celestino Teves have not yet been issued to them. They
were not aware of the changes in their respective area of possession until in March 2009 when Augusto Felicidario
destroyed the riprap and the old cyclone wires which serves as the boundary of Elsa Aquino et al. with motive to forcibly
get the 117 square meters covering the portions of 54 square meters, 51 square meters, and 12 square meters from Elsa
Aquino et al.;

xxxx

In the same Memorandum, LO Cleufe S. Eder stated that the only basis of the claim of Augusto Felicidario over the portions of the
areas of Elsa Aquino and Felimon Fernan is that said portions appeared to be included in his CLOA, where in truth and in fact,
was not included in his actual area of possession and occupation. Evidently, Lot 189 (formerly Lot 268) is bounded by old
boundaries (muhon), riprap and cyclone wires erected since 1960’s or more that forty-five (45) years by complainants which is
only adjacent/adjoining to Lot 189 (Lot [268]) of Augusto Felicidario who incidentally been in the said premises for a long period of
time and fully aware that he possessed only 838 square meters as evidenced by the Lot Description Survey conducted in
December 1966. Complainants and Augusto Felicidario have been good neighbors, until the latter on March 29, 2009 received a
copy of TCT-CLOA in October 2005 awarding him 941 square meters per new subdivision survey in 2003. Thereafter, Augusto
Felicidario threatened to eject Elsa Aquino et al. purposely to acquire the portions of 51 square meters and 12 square meters
without a lawful order.
[Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)] Samuel S. Solomero concurred with the recommendation of DARPO-Legal Division
that the CLOA issued to Augusto Felicidario be cancelled/corrected to only 838 square meters as his actual area of possession
and further recommended that individual CLOAs be generated/issued in favor of Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan and Heirs of
Celestino Teves in accordance with their actual area of possession.

DAR Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1992, specifically paragraph IV, regarding the Modes of Disposition of Homelots,
provides that:

"Homelots in barangay sites and residential, commercial and industrial lots in townsites shall be disposed of by direct sale to
actual occupants occupying said homelots".

WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued:

1. DIRECTING the PARO to undertake the necessary steps to cause the correction of [the] area inscribed in OCT No. M-
01182 (CLOA No. 00222161) issued in the name of Augusto Felicidario from 941 square meters to 838 square meters;
and

2. DIRECTING the PARO and the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] to make the necessary steps for the
issuance of individual titles in the names of Elsa Aquino, Felimon Fernan and Heirs of Celestino Teves based on their
actual area of possession.3

The DAR Region IV-A Order dated October 20, 2009 in Case No. A-0400-0168-09 became final and executory as no motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal was filed.4

Respondent, in his Comment,5 denied complainants’ allegations. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the instant complaint
against him since the acts subject thereof are not related to his official functions as Deputy Sheriff and are not grounds for
administrative action. In addition, respondent explained that as a result of the re-survey conducted by the DAR Geodetic Engineer
in May 2003, the area of complainants’ Lot 190 was decreased to 210 square meters, while that of respondent’s Lot 189 was
increased to 941 square meters. Based on the 2003 re-survey, respondent was issued OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161)
for Lot 189. Respondent has been in continuous actual and physical possession of Lot 189 and religiously paying the real estate
tax thereon as they fall due. In 2009, respondent applied for and was granted a Fencing Permit by the Office of the Building
Official of Tanay. On the strength of the Fencing Permit and with the assistance of barangay officials, respondent proceeded to
place new fences or mujon/markers along the perimeter of Lot 189. Although respondent acknowledged the existence of the final
and executory Order dated October 20, 2009 of the DAR Region IV-A in Case No. A-0400-0168-09, adverse to his interest,
respondent maintained that he had been deprived of due process of law because he never received summons or notice relative to
said case, thus, he had already requested the Office of the President for a reinvestigation of the same. Respondent also
mentioned in his Comment that the PARO had already instituted a Petition for Correction of LOA No. 00222161/OCT No. M-01182
before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region IV-A, docketed as PARAD Case No. R-0409-0009 to 0010-10.

Respondent argued that the acts imputed by complainants against him were not related to the performance of his official duties
and were not in any manner related to a case in which complainants are parties or have legal interests. Besides, a cursory reading
of the allegations in the complaint will clearly show the absence of the requisites of corruption or a clear intent to violate the law or
a flagrant disregard of established rule; as well as the lack of evidence that respondent’s conduct in the exercise of his rights as a
private individual debased the public’s confidence in the courts. Respondent reiterated that he had no hand in the increase of his
total lot area after the new survey. Lastly, respondent averred that complainants, in filing the present complaint, was forum
shopping with the intention of purposely vexing, harassing, and intimidating respondent and thereby gain upper ground.
Complainants mean to escalate a private matter to the institution respondent is serving.

Complainants filed a Reply6 but raised no new matters.

On July 26, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report7 with the following recommendations:

In view of the foregoing, this Office respectfully submits for the consideration of the Honorable Court the following
recommendations:

1. the instant administrative complaint against Augusto J. Felicidario, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and

2. respondent be found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and be SUSPENDED for three
(3) months without pay.8

In a Resolution9 dated September 24, 2012, the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint against respondent as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for
resolution based on the pleadings filed. Respondent 10 and complainants11 submitted their respective Manifestations informing the
Court that they were already submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on record.

The Court partly diverges from the findings of the OCA. Respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct.

In Villordon v. Avila,12 the Court defined dishonesty as "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact[;]" and "a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."

It is true that respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land
area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, respondent’s actuations thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government agencies/officials.

Complainants and respondent had been awarded and occupying their respective properties under the DAR Resettlement Program
since 1966, yet, respondent did not express surprise and/or bafflement that the land area of his Lot 189 was significantly
increased from 838 square meters to 941 square meters after the 2003 re-survey. Honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, as
well as good faith and prudence, would have impelled respondent to bring the matter to the attention of complainants and the
DAR, and inquire and verify with the DAR his entitlement to the increased land area, especially when he was well-aware that
complainants had been in possession of the disputed area, and had, in fact, introduced substantial improvements thereon, for
almost four decades. Instead, respondent, undeniably benefitting from the increased land area of Lot 189, held his peace and
already proceeded to secure a certificate of title in his name for Lot 189, with a land area of 941 square meters. When respondent
was finally issued OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161), he invoked the same as justification for occupying the 117-square
meter disputed area, destroying complainants’ improvements thereon, and enclosing Lot 189 (inclusive of the disputed area)
within a concrete fence and steel gate. Whether or not an error was indeed committed by the DAR officials during the 2003 re-
survey, resulting in the increased land area of Lot 189, respondent evidently took advantage of complainants’ ignorance of the
situation in order to acquire OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161) with nary an opposition. It bears to stress that the final and
executory Order dated October 20, 2009 of the DAR Region IV-A in Case No. A-0400-0168-09 declared erroneous the increase in
land area of respondent’s Lot 189 after the 2003 re-survey and the PARO had already instituted proceedings before the DARAB
for the correction of respondent’s OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161). While respondent is seeking to have the final and
executory DAR Region IV-A Order set aside by the Office of the President, as things stand at present, the basis for respondent’s
legal title to the disputed area is doubtful, at best. Considering that the increase in land area of Lot 189 was due to the (erroneous)
result of the 2003 re-survey of the Sampaloc Townsite by the DAR; that respondent’s dishonesty was committed through his
silence and/or inaction, when the circumstances demanded otherwise, rather than his active and/or express misrepresentation to
the complainants and concerned public officials; and that respondent committed the dishonesty in his private life and not in the
course of performance of his official functions, the Court holds him guilty of only simple dishonesty.

Respondent’s deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In
addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is
expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of
the courts. It is difficult for the Court to believe that respondent is completely unaware that even as the registered owner of the real
property and with the barangay officials’ assistance, he cannot simply enter and take possession of the disputed area and destroy
complainants’ improvements thereon. He must first initiate an ejectment case against complainants before the appropriate court
and secure a court order and writ of possession.

The Civil Service law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, but the Court defined such an offense in

Ito v. De Vera13 as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. In Government Service Insurance
System v. Mayordomo,14 the Court further declared that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes
the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.

Respondent’s transgressions may not be related to his official duties and functions, but certainly reflect badly upon the entire
Judiciary. Respondent failed to live up to the high ethical standards demanded by the office he occupies. As the Court explained
in Marquez v. Clores-Ramos15:

It can not be overemphasized that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.
Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties
but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the Court’s good name and standing. This is because the
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and every one in the
court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. (Citations omitted.)
However, precisely because respondent was not acting in the performance of his official duties, he cannot be administratively
liable for misconduct, whether grave or simple. The survey of cases presented in Largo v. Court of Appeals16 is particularly
instructive:

[T]he administrative offense committed by petitioner is not "misconduct." To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.1âwphi1 In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., it was held that:

Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office
has a definite and well- understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance
of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all
times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties
of the office x x x More specifically, in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first
instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring ‘to a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer."

xxxx

In Salcedo v. Inting we also ruled – It is to be noted that the acts of the respondent judge complained of have no direct relation
with his official duties as City Judge. The misfeasance or malfeasance of a judge, to warrant disciplinary action must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of said judge.

In Milanes v. De Guzman, a mayor collared a person, shook him violently, and threatened to kill him in the course of a political
rally of the Nacionalista Party where said mayor was acting as the toastmaster. The Court held that the acts of the mayor cannot
come under the class of the administrative offense of misconduct, considering that as the toastmaster in a non-governmental rally,
he acted in his private capacity, for said function was not part of his duties as mayor. In Amosco v. Magro, the respondent Judge
was charged with grave misconduct for his alleged failure to pay the amount of ₱215.80 for the purchase of empty Burma sacks.
In dismissing the case, the Court sustained, among others, the argument of respondent Judge that the charge did not constitute
misconduct because it did not involve the discharge of his official duties. It was further held that misconduct in office has a definite
and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as
an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. So also, a Judge’s abandonment of, and failure to give
support to his family; and alleged sale of carnapped motor vehicles, do not fall within the species of misconduct, not being related
to the discharge of official functions. (Citations omitted.)

Now the Court considers the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

On November 18, 2011, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS). Under Rule 10, Section 46(E) of RRACCS, simple dishonesty is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense; six (6) months and one (1) day to one (10 year
for the second offense; and dismissal for the third offense. Rule 10, Section 46(B)(8) classifies conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service as a grave offense penalized by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. Rule 10, Section 50 additionally provides that if the civil servant is
found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge
and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.

Based on the foregoing rules, the Court shall apply the penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, it being
the more serious offense. The Court then considers for purposes of determining the proper penalty, respondent s simple
dishonesty as an aggravating circumstance; while respondent s 43 years in government service, 32 of which had been in the
judiciary, as mitigating circumstance. The Court likewise takes into account, for humanitarian reasons, that respondent is almost of
retirement age at 64 years. Consequently, the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day is appropriate
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, GUILTY of simple dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is suspended for a
period of six ( 6) months and one (1) day without pay, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 7. WINSTON F. GARCIA vs. MARIO I. MOLINA et. Al G.R. No. 157383 August 10, 2010

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity as President and General Manager
of the Government Service Insurance System, or GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina (Molina) and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In
G.R. No. 157383, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1]dated January 2, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2003 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No. 174137, petitioner assails the CA Decision [3] dated December 7, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated August
10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75973.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda [5] dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner
charging them with grave misconduct. Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts: 1) directly and
continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against the
management and the GSIS President and General Manager;
2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound; and
3) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his immediate superiors. [6] In addition to the charge for grave misconduct
for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving
his office without informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding petitioners
instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioners office. [7]

These acts, according to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of
the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the same Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to submit their verified
answer within seventy two (72) hours. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension
of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective immediately. [8] The following day, a committee was constituted to investigate the
charges against respondents.

In their Answer[9] dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was motivated
by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual and legal
basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge.

On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension
Order.[10] They contended that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct. Consistent with their
stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to
Transfer Investigation to This Commission.[11]

Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and required them to
appear at the scheduled hearing.[12]

Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve respondents motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case
from the GSIS to the CSC.

On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).[13] The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of
petitioners order directing the former to submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative case
filed against them. They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and
from taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.

On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision[14] in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY
RESTRAINED from hearing and investigating the administrative case against petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing
the same with the Civil Service Commission or any other agency of government as may be allowed for (sic) by law. SO
ORDERED.[15]

The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing fear, and thus agreed with respondents that the investigation be
made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to ensure that the hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising
the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS; AND IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM
HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS SOLELY
ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON NON
 FORUM SHOPPING IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND
INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDS APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND
WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT, DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED.[16]

In the meantime, on February 27, 2003, the CSC resolved respondents Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension and
Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission through Resolution No. 03-0278,[17] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:

1. The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having
become moot and academic.
2. The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to
continue the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against respondents-petitioners
Albert Velasco and Mario I. Molina.[18]

As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the CSC considered the issue moot and academic considering that
the period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to resume their specific functions. This notwithstanding, the CSC opted
to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum. Without making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against
respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a formal charge. [19]

On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to the CSC, the latter denied the same for lack of merit. The
Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not
mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be served. [20]

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. [21] The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 75973.

On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[22] in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The formal charges filed by the
President and General Manager of the GSIS against petitioners, and necessarily, the order of preventive
suspension emanating therefrom, are declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is hereby directed to pay
petitioners back salaries pertaining to the period during which they were unlawfully suspended. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[23]

The CA declared null and void respondents formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. In view
thereof, the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot
and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal charges. Consequently,
the CA found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive suspension.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

I.WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED THE REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD,
WERE IN FACT HEARD AND BEING HEARD, AND WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF
ADJUDICATION.

II.WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

III.WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS REQUIRED IN INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI, AS HERE.

IV.WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION, AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF
PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND, THEREAFTER,
BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES; THE GSIS HAVING ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS, TO
THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS.

V.WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE.

VI.WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND
VELASCO ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY LAW.

VII.WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY AND, THUS, MAY NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT
BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
 VIII.WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE
PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
IX.WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE.

X.WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF THE

GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL
BASIS.

XI.WHETHER RESPONDENTS OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM SHOPPING SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS

HONORABLE COURT.[24]

The petitions are without merit.

The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil
service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and
general terms and conditions of employment. [25] The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees.
In addition, Section 37 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. As for the GSIS, Section 45, Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise
known as the GSIS Act of 1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:

SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager. The President and General Manager of the
GSIS shall among others, execute and administer the policies and resolutions approved by the Board and direct and
supervise the administration and operations of the GSIS. The President and General Manager, subject to the approval
of the Board, shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause, in
accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their duties and qualifications to the end
that only competent persons may be employed.

By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. [26]

However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with
Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing a
formal charge against an erring employee, to wit:

First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint n eed not be
under oath.[27] Except when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at anytime with the Commission,
proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities. [28]

Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority
shall require the person complained of to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. [29]

Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the
complainant and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices. During said
investigation, the parties are given the opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person complained of to
submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver thereof. [30]

Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall submit
the investigation report and the complete records of the case to the disciplining authority.[31]

Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining
authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be dismissed. [32]

It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were the formal charges against them. These formal charges
contained brief statements of material or relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges within seventy two (72) hours from receipt
thereof, an advice that they had the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their
choice.[33]

It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner explained that no
such investigation was conducted because the CSC rules did not specifically provide that it is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a formal
charge. He likewise claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in indictments in flagranti as in this case.

We disagree.

Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and
void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining
authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
The use of the word shall quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the
procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is different
from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioners claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC
Rules. Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.

This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in the present case. To comply with such
requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents comments, petitioner would have properly
evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents,
leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases
stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal
charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case
against respondents.

To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act
complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We, therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process of law.
Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case. [34] The filing by
petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give
the respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab
initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.[35]

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack
of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.[36]

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not
exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. [37] In
particular, due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. [38]

Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it before the GSIS.

Again, we do not agree.

It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked.[39] Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in
their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents questioned the
validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges against them for lack of preliminary investigation. [40] There is, thus,
no waiver to speak of.

In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges issued by
the former without the latter knowing that there were pending administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice and
hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order. [41] However, considering that respondents were
preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is
likewise null and void.

Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of back salaries during the period of respondents
preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be
imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be awarded
their salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension.[42] In granting their back salaries, we are simply repairing the
damage that was unduly caused respondents, and unless we can turn back the hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to
them that which is physically feasible to do under the circumstances. [43] The principle of no work, no pay does not apply where the
employee himself was unlawfully forced out of job.[44]

In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is DISMISSED, for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
 8. THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM), petitioner, vs.
P/INSP. JOHN A. MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA GARCIA and SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 149999. August 12, 2005]

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 6 September 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals set aside the 3 July 1997 Resolution of Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II (PNP Chief
Sarmiento), the 3 March 2000 Decision and the 30 June 2000 Resolution, both of the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the
National Police Commission.

The Antecedent Facts

Very early in the morning of 2 March 1995, Nancy Gaspar (Gaspar) and Proclyn Pacay (Pacay) left the residence of Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) in Quezon City. Gaspar and Pacay were both minors and were later classified as
moderate or mild mental retardates by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Agnes Lucero (Lucero) found
Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to
Lucero stories of maltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles.
Around 4:00 a.m., Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Baler Police Station 2, Central Police District Command (CPDC),
Quezon City. At the police station, desk officer SPO1 Jaime Billedo (Billedo) recorded the girls complaint in the police blotter. On
Billedos instruction, SPO1 Roberto C. Cario (Cario) brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue Medical Center for the
requisite medical examination. Later, the two girls were returned to the police station where Cario interviewed them. Carios Initial
Investigation Report was reviewed and signed by SPO2 Eugene V. Almario (Almario) and approved by P/Insp. John A. Mamauag
(Mamauag). Later, SPO1 Vivian M. Felipe (Felipe) and SPO4 Erlinda L. Garcia (Garcia) escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the
DSWD. P/Insp. Roberto V. Ganias (Ganias) signed the Letter of Turnover to the DSWD.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal case for child abuse under
Republic Act No. 7610[3] against Judge Angeles. Another was an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge
Angeles against Ganias, Mamauag, Almario, Cario, Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as additional
respondent.
In her administrative complaint, Judge Angeles alleged:

1. On March 2, 1995, respondents Ganias, Almario and Mamauag submitted an Initial Investigation Report to the District
Director, CPDC, and respondent Ganias turned over a Report to the DSWD merely on the basis of a verbal report of
Agnes Lucero on Judge Reyes alleged maltreatment of Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay without getting the required
sworn statements of the two (2) girls and Agnes Lucero;

2. While the two girls were under police custody, respondents found in the possession of Pacay several items of jewelry and
clothing materials belonging to and stolen from complainant Judge Angeles. Complainants witnesses, Dr. Sagradia
Aldova, Oliva Angeles and Mary Ann Agustin requested the respondents to register in the police logbook the discovery
of the stolen articles but to no avail;

3. Despite the insistent request of said witnesses and subsequently of the complainant that a report for qualified theft be
entered in the police blotter, respondents maliciously refused to act upon the incident and conduct further investigation;

4. Respondents bad faith and highly irregular conduct in handling the maltreatment charge against complainant was also
manifested when respondents did not give her a chance to explain her side by not contacting her although her
residence is just a few houses away from the police station;

5. Even before she was informed of the accusations against her, the police leaked the baseless maltreatment case against
her as shown by the presence of so many people and members of the media as well as the Human Rights
Commission personnel at the police station;

6. The fact that no case has yet been filed against her shows that the whole event was maliciously manipulated by her
detractors to harass and malign complainant with the willing assistance of men in uniform. [4]

The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division (ILAD) of the CPDC investigated the administrative complaint. After its
investigation, the ILAD recommended the dismissal of the charges. In a Resolution [5] dated 10 April 1995, the CPDC District
Director approved the recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome of her complaint, Judge
Angeles moved for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief Sarmiento.
 The Ruling of the PNP Chief

In a Decision[6] dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondent[s] P/CINSP. ROBERTO GANIAS, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, and SPO1 Roberto
Cario guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service; P/INSP JOHN MAMAUAG and SPO2
Eugene Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for
Ninety (90) days with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence.[7]

Judge Angeles filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.[8] In a Resolution[9] dated 3 July 1997, PNP Chief Sarmiento
modified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the service of Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe (Mamauag, et
al.).
Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP Chief Sarmiento, PNP Inspector General
Jovencio Sales and Judge Angeles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101. In an Order [10] dated 25
November 1997, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and
for failure to show that respondents abused their discretion.
Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chiefs Resolution before the NAB.

The Ruling of the National Appellate Board

In a Decision,[11] dated 3 March 2000, the NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of merit. The NAB declared:

Appellants Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe, in seeking immediate judicial remedy by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition against appellee and the PNP dismissal authority even if they have not yet exhausted all administrative remedies
available to them had in fact defaulted in their right to exercise such later option by omission of their own doing. The right to
appeal is provided for by law and he who seeks to exercise that right must abide with the rules provided therefor.

The substantive rule regarding appeals from a decision of dismissal from the police service imposed by the Chief, PNP is found in
Section 45 of RA 6975, which provides in part, thus:

Section 45. Finality of Disciplinary Decision - Provided, further, that the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
involving dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

It was on a day certain between July 3 1997 (the date of the Resolution of dismissal) and July 18, 1997 (date of Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition) that Mamauag, et al. must have received a copy of aforesaid Resolution and from that same day,
they had ten (10) days within which to file their appeal before the NAB had they chosen to exhaust administrative remedies. But
they chose to avail of another remedy thereby effectively foreclosing their right of appeal to NAB in view of the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of P/Insp. John Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and
SPO1 Vivian Felipe is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[12]

Mamauag, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the NAB denied it in the NAB Resolution [13] of 30 June
2000. Thus, Mamauag, et al. sought relief from the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 6 September 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II dated 3 July 1997, having been
rendered in excess of his jurisdiction is hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void. Accordingly, the DECISION and RESOLUTION
made by the National Appellate Board dated 3 March 2000 and 30 June 2000, respectively, are also SET ASIDE for being null
and void. SO ORDERED.[14]

In finding for Mamauag, et al., the Court of Appeals explained:

First of all, the said provision expressly states that the disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory. Nowhere does the said provision grant any party to move for a reconsideration of any disciplinary action imposed as
the remedy provided thereunder is an appeal of either party of the decision to the National Appellate Board, if such involves a
demotion or dismissal of a member of the PNP. In fact, since the original decision only suspended petitioners Mamauag and
Almario from service and even exonerated Felipe and Garcia, the said decision is not even subject to any appeal. The said
decision clearly does not involve any demotion nor dismissal which could properly be appealed to the NAB.

Moreover, even under the assumption that a motion for reconsideration is allowed, the one filed by Judge Angeles should not
have merited any consideration from the PNP Chief. Judge Angeles did not have the personality to make such a motion.
While Sec. 45 of R.A. 6975 does not clearly provide who may appeal (or for that matter make any motion for reconsideration)
from the decision of the PNP Chief, the last clause mentions either party may appeal with the Secretary and by the doctrine of
necessary implication this extends to said decision of the PNP Chief.

It is elementary that in an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No private interest is involved in an
administrative case as the offense committed is against the government. As held by the Supreme Court in Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission:

As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so
that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness (GONZALO VS. D. RODA, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of Administrative Services
Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is merely a witness for the government in an administrative case. No
private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government. (Emphasis
supplied)

Obviously, Judge Angeles has no interest which would be directly and materially affected by the decision rendered by the PNP
Chief. Not being a proper party to the said case − as she is only a mere witness − then her motion should not have served as a
ground for the re-evaluation of the administrative case against the petitioners which resulted into a modification of the PNP Chiefs
earlier decision.

On this score, We find the latest ruling of the Supreme Court on this matter:

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil service Commission and held the respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the responden[t]
who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which
seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying this to the present case by analogy, had the original judgment been rendered in favor of the petitioners, it would be the
Philippine National Police which would be adversely affected and thus would be the proper party to appeal such a judgment.
Corollary to this, where the original judgment is adverse to the petitioners, it is they who could properly appeal the same. In either
case, the complainant Judge Angeles certainly has no legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the original decision
handed down by the PNP Chief.

In view of the foregoing, this Court can only rule, as We do now, that the appealed resolution (dated 3 July 1997) was made in
excess of the PNP Chiefs jurisdiction rendering it null and void. Hence, upon the basic legal precept that a void decision or
resolution can never attain finality, NAB should have ruled accordingly on the matter. Finding that it did not, the Courts remedial
power must perforce be exercised to rectify the matter before Us. [15] Hence, the NABs recourse to this Court.

The Issues The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the NAB, raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975[16] (RA 6975) allows the filing of a motion for reconsideration;
2. Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move for reconsideration, or
appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.

The Ruling of This Court: The petition has no merit.

Mamauag and Almario argue that the disciplinary action of 90-day suspension imposed on them in the 7 June 1996 Decision
of PNP Chief Sarmiento has become final and executory. Mamauag, et al. also argue that private complainant Judge Angeles has
no personality to move for partial reconsideration of the 7 June 1996 Decision of PNP Chief Sarmiento. Mamauag, et al. cite
Sections 43(e) and 45 of RA 6975 which provide:

SEC. 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). x x x

(e) Decisions. The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of
the copy of the decision.

xxx

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. - The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the
service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided,
further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, The regional or National Appellate Board, as the case
may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional
appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the
filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.

The Court of Appeals sustained Mamauag, et al.

Decisions Appealable Under RA 6975

Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory. Under Section 45, a disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the service.
If the disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action shall be final and executory
as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal
to a higher authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty. [17] If the decision exonerates the respondents or otherwise
dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no disciplinary action since no penalty is imposed. The provision that a
penalty less than demotion or dismissal from service is final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or exoneration
because they are not disciplinary actions. This gives rise to two crucial questions.
First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority dismissing the charges against a PNP
member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges against a PNP member is appealable, who can appeal the PNP or the
private complainant, or both?
Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy,[18] case law held that dismissal of the charges or exoneration of the respondents in
administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by the government. Thus, in Del Castillo v. Civil
Service Commission,[19] et al., the Court held:

Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides:

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office xxx (Italics supplied).

Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez v. CSC that: xxx xxx xxx

It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provision of law. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 318).

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil Service Law shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.

Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides: xxx xxx xxx

Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates:

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision xxx (italics supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)

The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is
filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is
not the respondent in the administrative case below.

Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city major, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce
judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month
against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty
of the charges files against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion for appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in Dacoycoy, the Court modified the rule in Del Castillo and earlier cases by allowing the Civil Service
Commission to appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings.
In Dacoycoy, the Court ruled:

At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse
decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy
may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent
official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner
therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency
tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent,
who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which
seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that the phrase
party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal
from office and not included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal. In
other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission;
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and
Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent decisions[20] of the Court affirmed Dacoycoy.

Dacoycoy allowed the Civil Service Commission to appeal dismissals of charges or exoneration of respondents in
administrative disciplinary proceedings. However, Dacoycoymaintained the rule that the private complainant is a mere
government witness without a right to appeal. [21] Thus, case law holding that the private complainant has no right to appeal the
decision of the disciplining authority remains good law. As explained by Justice Jose Melo in his concurring opinion in Floralde v.
Court of Appeals:[22]

However, in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA 425 [1999]), which incidentally is another ponencia of Mr. Justice
Pardo, the majority, with undersigned ponente dissenting, modified the above doctrine by allowing the CSC to appeal in cases
where the respondent is exonerated of the charges. Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court did not deviate from the doctrine
that the complainant, being a mere witness for the government, cannot appeal the decision rendered in the
administrative case. In Paredes, we declared that the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she
has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the CSC. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. No
private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 91 of RA 6975 provides that the Civil Service Law and its rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department. Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law also applies to
administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members. Even without Section 91, case law on the civil service necessarily
applies to PNP members who are embraced in the phrase civil service [23] under Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45
of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the
proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case
and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining
authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[24] decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service
Commission was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a
judge who should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an
advocate. Its mandated function is to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies, not to litigate.

In any event, a private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of either party who can appeal under Sections 43 and 45
of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party in interest. [25] In short, private
complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC
District Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-investigation filed by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in
substance an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge
Angeles appeal in the guise of a motion for re-investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP
Chief pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against Mamauag, et
al. stands and is now final and executory.
We note that, as found by PNP Chief Sarmiento in his earlier Decision of 7 June 1996, there is no evidence on record to hold
Garcia and Felipe liable for any misconduct. The 3 July 1997 Resolution of PNP Chief Sarmiento stated that Garcia and Felipe
were eye-witnesses to the criminal act of the theft of Judge Angeles jewelry. The same Resolution also held that Garcia and
Felipe were active participants in the cover-up (of the theft) contrary to the assertion that they merely brought minors Pacay and
Gaspar to the DSWD upon instructions of their superior.
The theft, however, happened at the house of Judge Angeles. Garcia and Felipe were indisputably not eyewitnesses to the
crime of theft, contrary to the finding of the PNP Chief. There is also no evidence on record of any act showing that Garcia and
Felipe participated in any cover-up of the theft. We quote the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997 explaining why there was no cover-up
of the alleged theft:

Appellants argue that after minors Pacay and Gaspar narrated and showed signs of their harrowing life under Judge Angeles, and
pursuant to standard police practice and the policy of the state to protect children against abuse, exploitation and discrimination
committed by persons having care and custody of them, appellant Cario decided with the approval of Chief Insp. Ganias to bring
said minors to the hospital for medico-legal examination. Thereafter, the minors were placed under the protective custody of the
DSWD in accordance with Executive Order No. 50, Series of 1986. For performing their duties pursuant to law and after tending to
the needs of said minors as mandated under Sec. 2 of RA 7610, and for refusing to enter in the police blotter a fictitious crime of
Qualified Theft and to turn over said minors to the custody of the complainant, appellants were unceremoniously suspended and
subjected to summary dismissal proceedings.

It would defy both logic and human nature that a mere SPO1 such as appellant Cario would refuse the rightful demands of
respectable emissaries of a well-known and feared RTC Judge whose reputation precedes her. There is no plausible reason,
therefore, for appellant to refuse entry of the alleged stolen jewelry in the blotter. They are more than aware that they are facing a
lawyer and judge who can make life miserable for them if they refuse to perform their duties enjoined by law. The truth of the
matter is that what was discovered was a coin purse/wallet of Nancy Gaspar placed inside the paper bag of Proclyn Pacay and
which yielded fancy jewelry items, a P20-peso bill and a wristwatch that according to Gaspar was given her by the private
complainant. It was Oliva Angeles and Dra. Sagrada who took with them the coin purse of Pacay. How the private complainant
produced the alleged stolen jewelry worth P26,820.25 is a matter which only they can explain.[26]

PNP Chief Sarmientos Decision of 7 June 1996 dismissed from the service Ganias, Billedo, and Cario, suspended for 90
days Mamauag and Almario, and exonerated Garcia and Felipe. All the respondents initially appealed the Decision to the NAB.
The NAB exonerated Ganias, Billedo and Cario and advised the PNP Chief to take note of our findings in the instant case and to
act thereon accordingly with respect to Judge Angeles pending motion for partial reconsideration involving Mamauag, et al. The
PNP Chief, however, issued his Resolution on 3 July 1997 dismissing from the service Mamauag, et al., twenty-six days before
the NAB Decision of 29 July 1997.
The NAB, which is a higher disciplining authority than the PNP Chief, found that the same grave misconduct charged against
all the respondents never happened. Thus, the NAB exonerated and reinstated Ganias, Billedo and Cario, whom the PNP Chief
dismissed from the service in his original Decision of 7 June 1996. The NAB decision became final and executory on 28 February
1998. Ironically, Mamauag and Almario, whom the PNP Chief originally meted out a lesser penalty of 90-day suspension but
subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have not been reinstated to their positions up to now. Garcia and
Felipe, whom the PNP Chief originally exonerated but subsequently dismissed on motion for partial reconsideration, have also not
been reinstated to their positions. And yet, as found by the NAB, the appellate disciplining authority superior to the PNP Chief, the
same offense of grave misconduct charged against all respondents, including Mamauag, et al., never happened.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 06 September 2001 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61711 with MODIFICATION. We REVERSE the 3 July 1997 Resolution of PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II and REINSTATE the
Resolution of 10 April 1995 of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against P/Insp. John A. Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4
Erlinda Garcia, and SPO1 Vivian Felipe, who are all entitled to back salaries and other benefits as provided under Section 48 [27] of Republic Act
No. 6975. SO ORDERED.
 9. LUSPO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 188487

Petitioners, the accused in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192, in this consolidated petition for review seek the reversal of
the January 19, 2009 decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019. Likewise assailed is the Sandiganbayans June 30, 2009 resolution[2] denying their motions for reconsideration.

The Facts

Acting on a report of the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding disbursement irregularities for combat, clothing, and individual
equipment (CCIE) in Regions VII and VIII, North Capital Command (CAPCOM), the Philippine National Police-General Headquarters
(PNP-GHQ), through the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), conducted an investigation of several officers of the PNP and of a private
individual.

The investigation report[3] disclosed that, on August 11, 1992, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC) issued two
(2) Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASAs), (001-500-138-92 SN 4361 and 001-500-139-92 SN 4362), each amounting to Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), purportedly for the purchase of CCIE for the North CAPCOM. The ASAs were approved FOR THE CHIEF [Director
General Cesar Nazareno (Nazareno)], PNP by Director Guillermo Domondon (Domondon), Chief Director of ODC, and signed for him by
Police Superintendent Van Luspo (Luspo), Chief, Fiscal Division, Budget and Fiscal Services of the ODC. The ASAs were issued without
an approved personnel program from the Directorate for Personnel. [4]

Upon receipt of the ASAs, P/Supt. Arturo Montano (Montano), Chief Comptroller, North CAPCOM, directed Police Chief
Inspector Salvador Duran, Sr. (Duran), Chief, Regional Finance Service Unit, North CAPCOM, to prepare and draw 100 checks
of P100,000.00 each, for a total of P10,000,000.00.

The checks were all dated August 12, 1992 and payable respectively to DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises,
and Triple 888 Enterprises, each to receive 25 checks. All enterprises were owned and operated by Margarita Tugaoen (Tugaoen), who
collected the proceeds of the checks from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Cubao Branch, on August 12, 13, and 14, 1992. [5]

In a sworn statement dated March 5, 1993 taken by Insp. Felicidad Ramos, a member of the investigating committee, Tugaoen
admitted that she did not deliver any CCIE in exchange for the P10 million worth of checks, because the amount was allegedly intended
as payment for the previously accumulated debts of the PNP. [6]

The nondelivery was confirmed by P/CInsp. Isaias Braga (Braga), Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and Rolando Flores,
Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM. Both declared that, while they received CCIE in 1992, the same came from the PNP
Logistics Command and not from Tugaoen, and that the value of the items they received was just P5,900,778.80 and had no relation at all
to the P10 million CCIE purchase under investigation. [7] Their statements were corroborated by P/Supt. Jesus Arceo, Chief of
the Supply Center of PNP Logistics Command. [8]

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the investigating team recommended that appropriate complaints be filed against Nazareno,
Domondon, Montano, Tugaoen, and Pedro Sistoza (Director Sistoza), Regional Director, North CAPCOM. No reasonable ground was
found to implicate Duran in the anomalous transaction, but he was still impleaded in the letter-complaint subsequently filed before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (OMB-AFP)[9] (now OMB-Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices [MOLEO]) because he was a cosignatory to the 100 checks.

Although the investigative report did not mention Luspos criminal or administrative liability, the OMB-AFP included him in the charge since
his signature appeared on the questioned ASAs.

Upon a finding that the abovementioned PNP officials and the private individual conspired to swiftly and surreptitiously execute
the ghost purchase of the CCIE, the OMB-AFP recommended the filing of the criminal information for 100 counts of Malversation of Public
Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against them. The OMB-AFP further found that the ASAs were charged against the
Personal Services Fund instead of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expense Fund without the approval of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM). They were released to the North CAPCOM without the corresponding requisition from the Directorate
for Logistics of the North CAPCOM as normally observed.[10]

On January 26, 1994, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) approved the resolution of the OMB-AFP, with the modification
that the proper offense to be charged was violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for only one (1) count. The OSP also
cleared Director Sistoza from any participation in the anomalous deal. [11] Thusly, the accusatory portion of the Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan reads:

That in or about August 1992, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named public officers, namely: Cesar P. Nazareno, being then the
Director General; Guillermo T. Domondon, Director for Comptrollership; Van D. Luspo, Chief, Fiscal Services and
Budget Division; Arturo H. Montano, Chief Comptroller, North Capcom and Salvador C. Duran, Sr., Chief, Regional
Finance Services Unit (RFSU), North Capcom, all of the Philippine National Police (PNP), while in the performance of
their respective official and administrative functions as such, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, together with private accused Margarita B. Tugaoen, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government (PNP), by causing the
preparation, issuance, release and payment, without supporting documents, of TEN MILLION PESOS
(P10,000,000.00) to DI-BEN TRADING, MT ENTERPRISES, J-MOS ENTERPRISES and TRIPLE 888
ENTERPRISES, all owned and operated by accused Margarita B. Tugaoen, purportedly for the purchase of combat,
 clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) for use of North Capcom personnel, to which no actual delivery of said CCIE
items were ever effected by accused supplier Margarita B. Tugaoen, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the latter
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine government in the total amount of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

After numerous postponements caused by supervening procedural incidents, Nazareno, Domondon, Luspo, Montano, and Tugaoen were
finally arraigned on October 12, 2001. They individually entered a not guilty plea. [13] Duran refused to make any plea during his
arraignment on October 26, 2001 hence, a not guilty plea was entered for him. [14]During pre-trial, all accused agreed to the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That except for accused Margarita Tugaoen, all the accused are public officers at the time stated in the
Information;

2. That on August 11, 1992, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership of the PNP, issued two (2)
Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASAs) in favor of the North CAPCOM in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
each, making a total of TEN MILLION [PESOS] (P10,000,000.00) for payment of Combat, Clothing, and Individual
Equipment (CCIE) of PNP personnel.[15]

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: 1) Evangeline Candia (Candia), Chief District Inspectorate of the
Western Police District, and a member of the committee formed by the PNP to investigate the CCIE anomaly; 2) Felicidad Ramos, also a
member of the PNP investigating committee and the one who took the sworn statement of Tugaoen during the investigation proceedings;
3) Romulo Tuscano, Supply Accountable Officer of the PNP; 4) Rafael Jayme, Acting Deputy Inspector General at the Office of the
Inspector General of the PNP at the time material in the Information; 5) Emmanuel Barcena, executive employee of the Philippine
Clearing House (PCH); 6) Atty. Ismael Andrew Pantua Isip, lawyer of UCPB; and 7) Ma. Cristina Sagritalo-Fortuna, Branch Operations
Officer of UCPB, Cubao Branch. [16]

The foregoing witnesses testimonies, together with documentary pieces of evidence marked as Exhibits A to H-4, sought to
establish that Nazareno, Domondon, Luspo, Duran, and Montano acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when they failed to
observe the logistic requirement of North CAPCOM prior to the preparation of the 2 ASAs; and that they violated GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8
issued on January 25, 1985 when they failed to make any budget proposal relative to the purchase of CCIE for North CAPCOM in 1992.
GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 mandates that the yearly funding requirement of combat clothing should be included in the budget proposals of
the concerned unit. [17]

The prosecution further endeavored to prove that the vouchers and related documents pertaining to the procurement of the P10
million worth of CCIE did not pass the office of Abelardo Madridejo, Chief Accountant, North CAPCOM.[18] State Auditor Erlinda Cargo of
the COA for PNP North CAPCOM also certified that, as of March 23, 1993, the direct payment voucher amounting to P10 million intended
for the purchase of CCIE was not liquidated because the records thereof were not forwarded to the COA. [19]

To substantiate the allegation in the Information that the checks were delivered to Tugaoen and that she received their value,
the prosecution submitted the sworn statements of Montano and Tugaoen, and the bank statement prepared by UCPB, Cubao Branch,
relative to the account of Tugaoen, reflecting the transactions on August 12, 13, and 14, 1992. [20]

In a sworn statement executed during the investigation conducted by PNP-GHQ, Montano declared that the checks relative to the P10-
million ASAs were delivered to Tugaoen who, in turn, acknowledged receipt thereof in her own sworn statement executed
before Candia during the investigations conducted by PNP. [21] Tugaoen likewise admitted that she did not deliver CCIE in exchange for
the value of the checks because they were intended to cover the previously accumulated debts of the PNP.[22]

On December 16, 2004, the accused filed, upon leave of court, [23] a Consolidated Motion for Demurrer to Evidence, [24] arguing in
the main the inadmissibility, under the best evidence rule, of the photocopies of the ASAs, the 100 checks, the original printout of the full
master list and detail list of the checks from the PHC, and the bank statement prepared by the UCPB, respectively docketed as Exhibits A
to A-1, C to C-27, C-28 to C-29c, H to H-4.

Claiming that the investigations conducted by the PNP were custodial in character and not merely administrative, the accused
argued that the sworn statements of Tugaoen (Exhibits D to D-5), Duran (Exhibits B to B-2), and Montano (Exhibits F-13 to F-13-C)
should not be admitted in evidence because they were not assisted by counsel when the same were elicited from them.

In its resolution dated May 13, 2005, [25] the Sandiganbayan denied the consolidated motion and ruled on the admissibility of the
challenged exhibits in this wise:

There have been several instances where the courts have accorded due credence to the admissibility of microfilm
copies or photostatic copies of microfilmed documents such as checks and other commercial documents relying on the
factual justification that these checks were microfilmed in the ordinary course of business and there is an ample
showing that they were accurate and [have] not been substantially altered. x x x.
Thus, if the witnesses presented attested to the fact that the checks are microfilmed in the ordinary course of business
and that the photostats have attained acceptable degree of accuracy, the same are no doubt admissible in evidence in
lieu of the original, not on the basis of the best evidence rule but because they may be considered as entries in the
usual or regular course of business. This Court may also want to take judicial notice of the fact that one of the reliable
means to preserve checks and other commercial papers and documents is by way of microfilm. x x x.

In his testimony, prosecution witness Emmanuel E. Barcena has sufficiently explained the procedure ordinarily
adopted by the Philippine Clearing House when it receives checks from its various clients. According to him, once the
Philippine Clearing House (PCH for brevity) receives the checks for processing and captures the same in a microfilm,
it generates a report called the Master List and the Detail List. The data are then eventually stored in a tape and are
 submitted to Citron (a service provider) to enable the latter to transfer the contents of the tape to a microfiche which
would then contain all the reports of the PCH. After the transfer of the contents of the tape from the tape or disc to
microfiche, Citron returns the microfiche to PCH for archive and future purposes. In case of a request from the banks
or from the courts for any data regarding past transactions involving checks received by PCH from its clients, the PCH
will have a basis where to get the reproduction of the print-out.

Being a disinterested witness for the Prosecution, and there being no proof of any personal motive on his part to
misrepresent the facts of the transactions, Barcena has made it clear, for the guidance and information of this Court,
the process or procedure his company adopts or undertakes when it receives checks for clearing from different banks.
As what he categorically stated, the microfilming of checks is just one of the regular or routinary functions being
performed by PCH. Hence, the reproductions or copies of the preserved checks it issues, obtained from its existing
records facility such as microfilms, may, therefore, be considered admissible in evidence. [26]

The court sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of Tugaoen, Duran, and Montano, explaining that the investigations
performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature because the accused gave their statements only as witnesses and
not as individuals implicated in an offense. This inference was further based on the observations that the investigating comm ittee also
took the sworn statements of several PNP personnel who were not included in the charge, and that Nazareno and Domondon, who were
not among those investigated, were criminally charged.
Trial then resumed for the presentation of evidence for the defense.

None of the accused took the witness stand. The defense did not dispute the events that transpired, but they stressed that they
did not commit any prohibited act. To debunk the case for the prosecution, Luspo and his co-accused Domondon presented Leonilo
Lapus Dalut (Dalut), Program and Budget Officer of the Directorate for Personnel, PNP, from 1989 until 1993.
Testifying for Luspo and Domondon, Dalut declared that Domondon, as the then Director for Comptrollership, was authorized to sign
ASAs for personal services fund which include CCIE - irrespective of amount and without any prior request from the Directorate for
Personnel. This was allegedly shown in the Delegation of Authority [27] and its corresponding Schedule of Delegation[28] issued by
Nazareno on March 20, 1992, pertinent portions of which state:

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority

TO: All Concerned x x x x

(2) In order to free the Chief, Philippine National Police of routine decisions so that he can devote his time to more
important functions and in order to prepare subordinate officers for greater responsibility so that police service will be
delivered more efficiently and effectively, specific authorities of the Chief, PNP are hereby delegated to the Deputy
Chief for Administration, Deputy Chief for Operations, The Chief of Directorial Staff, Directors of the Directorial Staff,
Regional Directors and Directors of Support Units as per attached tabulation.

(3) Generally, the delegate will sign for the Chief, PNP but he may sign in his own name when appropriate, depending
on the circumstances or nature of the communication. The name and signature of the delegate signing for C[/]PNP
shall be preceded by BY COMMAND OF DIRECTOR GENERAL NAZARENO or FOR THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, whichever is appropriate.

xxxx

POWER/FUNCTIONS APPROVING AUTHORITY REMARKS

COMPTROLLERSHIP AND FINANCE C. PNP DCA DCO TCDS DIR REGL DIR D. ADM
STAFF OPN
SPT UNITS
PNP Budget Proposal and Expenditures X
Working papers for the PBAC DC
C. Releases of allotment advices
1. Releases from Comd Reserve X
regardless of amount
2. Releases from Prog amount regardless
of amount
a. CMI X
b. Fixed Expenditures DC Upon
request of
Prog Dir
c. Program Directors Fund DC Upon
request of
Prog Dir
3. Releases for personnel services (01) DC
irrespective of amount

Dalut explained that DC refers to the Directorate for Comptrollership, and that the phrase Upon request of Prog Dir means that the
Directorate for Personnel requested the DC for the release of funds. But as clearly shown in the schedule of authority, request from the
Directorate for Personnel is not a prerequisite to the release of funds for personnel services 01, irrespective of amount. Dalut clarified that
it was not the practice of anyone at the Office of the Director for Personnel to prepare a program chargeable against personnel services
before the Director for Comptrollership could release ASAs for personnel services 01. [29]

Domondon and Luspo also adopted the December 15, 1998 Order of the OSP[30] and the OMBs June 9, 1999 Memorandum,[31] both
submitted in Criminal Case No. 20185 pending before the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case No. 20185 pertained to the charge of illegal
issuance of ASAs in favor of PNP Regional Command (RECOM) in Baguio, wherein Domondon was one of the co-accused. In that Order,
the OMB recommended that Domondon be dropped from the criminal charge upon the finding that there was no need for the DBMs prior
authority before the ODC could release funds for personnel services 01. In the Memorandum dated June 9, 1999, approved by former
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, OMBs legal counsel, Sylvia Hazel, made a finding that CCIE purchases could be charged against either
Personal Services Fund or Maintenance and Other Operating Expense Fund.

For their part, Montano and Tugaoen reiterated the inadmissibility of the latters sworn statements on the ground that a lawyer
did not assist her during the investigation proceedings. To buttress Montano and Tugaoens claim, P/Supt. Felicidad Ramos Guinto, a
member of the team that investigated the North CAPCOM CCIE anomaly, was put on the witness stand. She declared that Tugaoen
expressed her desire to be assisted by a counsel of her choice, however, there was no more time for her to retain one.[32]

Montano tendered a copy of the provisions of Section 307, Article 5, Title 5, Book III, Volume I of the Government and Auditing
Manual issued on January 2, 1992, to show that his acts were in accordance with the rules on expenditures as mandated in the
manual.[33]

Duran failed to formally offer evidence despite the opportunity given him by the Sandiganbayan. As such, he was declared to
have waived his right to do so in an Order dated July 13, 2007. [34]

The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan[35]

The anti-graft court found sufficient evidence inculpating Luspo, Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen for conspiring and confederating
with one another to deprive the government/PNP of P10 million, viz.:

Accused Luspo issued the two (2) ASAs (Exhibits A, A-1) without the authority from the Directorate for
Comptrollership nor from the Chief PNP. These ASAs eventually became the basis in the drawing of the one hundred
checks signed by accused Duran and Montano that effected the release of the funds intended for the purchase of
CCIE items to accused Tugaoen. These series of acts spelled nothing but conspiracy which showed their common
design in achieving their one common goal to the damage and prejudice of the government. [36]

Adopting the observations of the Ombudsman (AFP), the Sandiganbayan elaborated:

The swiftness of how the supposed transaction of CCIE items at North CAPCOM was consummated at a record time
of two (2) days from the issuance of the ASAs to the encashment of the checks which normally take weeks if not
months (with all programming/requisition, the bidding process, series of deliveries, and inherent red tapes) only
indicates signs of deep-rooted conspiracy, to wit: 1. issuance of ASA over and above the approved program of P6 M
for CY 1992 and the charging of the same to funds for personal services (100-10) even without the approval of the
DBM; 2. release of ASA to North CAPCOM even without the required programming or corresponding
requisition/request therefrom; 3. splitting the supposed payments into 100 checks at P100,000.00 each to go around
the rule that purchase order, vouchers and checks above P100,000.00 be signed by the Regional Director; and 4. the
purported documents for the supposed purchases did not go to the usual process of passing to the Chief Accountant
for recording/accounting, and the Regional Director for approval. [37]

The Information was dismissed as to Nazareno in a resolution dated March 20, 2007 on account of his death on December 8, 2005. Be
that as it may, the Sandiganbayan discussed his accountability and was found to be blameless. The court ruled that the prosecution failed
to substantiate by testimonial or documentary evidence Nazarenos direct or indirect participation in the anomalous CCIE transaction.
There was likewise no showing that he had the opportunity to scrutinize the documents related to the release of the questioned P10
million, and that his issuance of the Delegation of Authority preceded the release of the questioned ASAs by a considerable length of
time, so as to rule out any misgiving that the former was circulated in order to facilitate the irregular purchases. The Sandiganbayan
added that Nazarenos indictment was only due to command responsibility under the doctrine respondeat superior, which, however, does
not exist between police officers and their subordinates.

Domondon was also exonerated because, by virtue of the Delegation of Authority and Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno, he
(Domondon) was authorized to charge CCIE to personnel services 01 and to release funds therefor, irrespective of amount, without a
request program from the Directorate of Personnel. Thus, he could no longer be faulted if the checks were eventually released to
Tugaoen without the required supporting documents nor could he be held liable for the nondelivery of the CCIE. The Sandiganbayan took
judicial notice of its September 17, 1999 resolution in Criminal Case No. 20185, dropping Domondon from the criminal information upon
the finding that both the OSPs December 15, 1998 Order and the OMBs memorandum of June 9, 1999 negated Domondons culpability
for the crime charged.

Accordingly, the fallo of the January 19, 2009 decision of the Sandiganbayan reads :

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused VAN D. LUSPO, ARTURO H. MONTANO, SALVADOR C.
DURAN, SR. and MARGARITA D. TUGAOEN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years
as maximum, and to indemnify the Philippine National Police or the government jointly or severally in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php 10 Million).

Accused Luspo, Montano and Duran, Sr., being public officers, are henceforth perpetually disqualified from holding public office.

The guilt of accused, GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON, not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the
same charge. (The case against accused, Cesar P. Nazareno, has earlier been dismissed in a Resolution dated March 20, 2007 due to
his death). Accordingly, let the bond of accused Domondon posted for his provisional liberty be released to him, subject to the usual
accounting and auditing procedures of this Court.
The Hold Departure Order dated October 28, 2004, issued against accused Domondon is hereby lifted and set aside. SO ORDERED.[38]

Luspo,[39] Duran,[40] Montano and Tugaoen[41] separately moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied in a consolidated
Resolution dated June 30, 2009. [42]

On July 14, 2009 Luspo filed a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118487. Montano, Tugaoen and Duran followed suit on July 21,
2009. Montano and Tugaoens joint petition for certiorari was docketed as G.R. No. 188541, while Durans petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 188556. In our Resolution of August 19, 2009 [43] the three petitions were consolidated, assailing as they do similar Sandiganbayan
Decision and Resolution.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 188487, Luspo ascribes the following errors to the Sandiganbayan:

THE SANDIGANBAYANS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT PRESENTED EVIDENCE WHICH COULD OVERCOME THE PETITIONERS PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS JANUARY 19, 2009
DECISION.[44]

In G.R. No. 188541, Montano and Tugaoen raise the following grounds for their exoneration:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE
DUTY-BOUND TO PROVE THAT THERE WERE DELIVERIES OF CCIE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION THAT THERE WAS NO DELIVERY OF CCIE ITEMS, AND IN HOLDING THAT IT IS THE PETITIONERS DUTY TO
PROVE THAT THERE WERE DELIVERIES; AND IN SHIFTING ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AS
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION, AND IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED WILLFULLY SUPPRESSED THEIR TESTIMONIES BECAUSE
THOSE ARE ADVERSE TO THEM BY THEIR FAILURE TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND;

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN BASING ITS FINDING OF EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY AND ITS JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF SURMISES AND CONJECTURES BY ADOPTING AND RELYING UPON THE FINDINGS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT
EVERY DECISION OF A COURT SHALL STATE EXPRESSLY AND DISTINCTLY, THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT IS
BASED;

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED ON PETITIONERS ARE NOT
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SWORN STATEMENTS TAKEN BY THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS DURING INVESTIGATIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS, PARTICULARLY THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL;

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AND IN GIVING
THE MERE XEROX COPIES OF THE CHECKS WHICH WERE MERELY CONDITIONALLY MARKED, PROVATIVE (SIC) VALUE, AND
DESPITE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS COMMITMENT TO SUBMIT OR PHYSICALLY PRODUCE THE
ORIGINALS THEREOF;

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AND IN
BASING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR ON MERE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE, WHEN WHAT
IS MANDATORILY REQUIRED IS EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHES THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH LUSPO AND DURAN TO INDEMNIFY THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OR THE GOVERNMENT, IN
THE SUM OF P10,000,000.00, DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING WHO ACTUALLY APPROPRIATED THE ENTIRE SUM OR ANY
PART OF SAID AMOUNT.[45]

In G.R. No. 188556, Duran faults the Sandiganbayan in this manner:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT MERELY PERFORMING A MINISTERIAL
FUNCTION AND AS SUCH INCURS NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SUCH MINISTERIAL ACT

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE FINDINGS OF THE PNP INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE,
WHICH FOUND NO PROBABALE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING R.A.
NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.[46]

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners were found by the Sandiganbayan to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides, as follows:
 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,[47] we explained that there are two ways for a public official to violate this provision in the
performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In that case, we enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

There is no dispute that herein petitioners, except for Tugaoen, are all public officers at the time stated in the Information. On
the other hand, the indictment against Tugaoen, a private individual, is sanctioned by Section 1 of R.A. No. 3019, thus:

Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a
public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, which are manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. [48] Manifest partiality and evident bad faith connote that the crime is committed by dolo, while
gross inexcusable negligence indicates its commission through culpa.[49] In the recent Albert v. Sandiganbayan,[50] we reiterated the
definitions of such modalities, viz.:

There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
"Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. [51]

Evident bad faith and manifest partiality are imputed to Luspo, Duran, and Montano when they caused the preparation, issuance, release,
and payment of P10,000,000.00, without supporting documents, to DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises, and Triple 888
Enterprises, all owned and operated by Tugaoen.

Owing to the different functions discharged by petitioners, it is imperative to discuss their individual participation in the scheme that
siphoned P10 million from the PNP funds.

Luspo, the then Chief of the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the ODC, is indicted for having allegedly issued the ASAs without prior
authority from his superior, Domondon, Chief Directorate for Comptrollership. His issuance and signing thereof were allegedly made
without a prior program request from the Office of the Directorate for Personnel as mandated by the logistic requirements of the PNP.
Likewise, he supposedly violated GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 issued on January 25, 1985 when he failed to make any budget proposal
relative to the purchase of CCIE for North CAPCOM in 1992. He also allegedly charged the amount of the ASAs to Personal Services
Fund without a realignment authority from the DBM. These, according to the prosecution, are badges of evident bad faith and of manifest
partiality towards Tugaoen that led to a P10 million injury to the coffers of the PNP.

It bears emphasis that the charge against Luspos co-accused Domondon consisted of the same omissions. Both offered similar
documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence for their exoneration, but the same were appreciated only in Domondons favor. The
Sandiganbayan shelved Luspos claim that he was authorized by Domondon to sign the ASAs in the formers behalf, and tagged the same
as self-serving and unsubstantiated.

In its consolidated comment, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB through the OSP, harks back to the
Sandiganbayans conclusion and lobbies for its affirmation.

We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.

A perusal of the records at our and the Sandiganbayans wherewithal reveals the contrary and had the trial court expanded the
range of its probing, it would not have arrived at divergent conclusions regarding the two accused.

Generally, factual findings of the anti-graft court are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, except where: (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. [52]

The last instance attends in the instant case. Clear and unmistakable in the August 30, 1993 resolution of the OMB-AFP[53] is
the crucial detail that, on January 31, 1991, Domondon issued a Memorandum delegating to Luspo and a certain Supt. Reynold Os ia
(Osia) the authority to sign for him (Domondon) and on his behalf, allotments for personal services in the amount not exceeding Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), and in his absence, the amount of P20,000,000.00. This was, in fact, the hammer that drove the nail and
linked Domondon to the conspiracy theory advanced by the prosecution.

As previously mentioned, the Sandiganbayan absolved Domondon of any liability in the issuance of the ASAs by virtue of the
Delegation of Authority and Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno, authorizing him (Domondon) to charge CCIE to personnel
services 01, and to release funds therefor, irrespective of amount, without need for a prior request program from the Directorate of
Personnel. The Sandiganbayan also took judicial notice of the OMB Order dated December 15, 1998 and Memorandum dated June 9,
1999 of the OMBs legal counsel in Criminal Case No. 20191, stating that Domondon committed no prohibited act in authorizing the
issuance of the ASAs for RECOM since GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 allowed the charging of CCIE to either the Personal Services Fund or
Maintenance and Other Operating Expense Fund.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that these pieces of evidence debunked the prosecutions allegation that the ASAs were charged
against Personal Services Fund without the necessary realignment authority from the DBM. As such, the court negated Domondons
culpability for the crime charged. We see no reason to treat Luspo differently because the authority delegated by Nazareno to Domondon
inevitably passed down to the latters sub-delegate, Luspo.
The ensuing disquisitions should enlighten.

In general, national government agencies (NGAs), such as the PNP, receive their yearly budgetary allocation from the DBM
through an Advice of Allotment.[54] The amount represented therein is, in turn, distributed/sub-allocated by NGAs to their support units or
departments through the issuance of an ASA (also known as Sub-Allotment Advice). In the PNP, the power to sub-allocate the agencys
funds is vested by R.A. 6975 in the PNP Chief, viz.:

Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP Chief. The command and direction of the PNP
shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP who shall have the power to direct and control tactical as well as
strategic movements, deployment, placement, utilization of the PNP or any of its units and personnel, including its
equipment, facilities and other resources.[55] (Emphasis supplied.)

The law also empowers the PNP Chief to delegate his myriad duties and authority to his subordinates, with respect to the units
under their respective commands:

Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect
to the units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulation prescribed by the
Commission.[56]

This was observed through the organizational structure of the PNP. Administrative and operational support units were put in
place to assist the PNP Chief in the command and direction of the police force. One such unit is the ODC, which assists the PNP Chief
with the management of the financial resources of the PNP. Among the specific functions of this office are:[57]

 1. To coordinate with the Directorial Staff of the National Headquarters (NHQ)-PNP for the supervision and preparation
of different PNP projects and programs and for the integration of such projects and programs to the overall PNP program; and

2. To supervise and manage the preparation of the PNP budget estimates based on data submitted by Program Directors and to
justify the same before reviewing authorities.

Under the ODCs wing is the Fiscal Services and Budget Division, charged with the implementation of the plans, policies, rules,
and regulations governing disbursement and collection of funds for the PNP. [58]

In sum, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership assists the PNP Chief in determining how the PNP funds will be sub-allocated to
the regional commands and their support units. Any determination made would then be executed by the Fiscal Services and Budget
Division by issuing an ASA with Nazarenos signature as the chief financial director of the PNP, in favor of the appropriate command or
support unit.

Section 26 of R.A. No. 6975 also empowers the PNP Chief to issue implementing policies for the micromanagement of the entire
force, viz.:
The Chief of the PNP shall also have the power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions regarding
personnel, funds, properties, records, correspondence and such other matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the
functions, powers and duties of the Bureau. The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior officers
down to the rank of chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments: Provided, That the Chief of the
PNP shall serve a term of office not to exceed four (4) years: Provided, further, That in times of war or other national emergency declared
by Congress, the President may extend such term of office. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the exercise of such power, Nazareno issued a letter-directive on March 20, 1992, entitled Delegation of Authority, wherein he
delegated to his subordinate officers several of his customary authority, ranging from the approval or disapproval of projects to the signing
of correspondence and working papers in his behalf.
 Attached thereto is a tabulation of the delegatee-directors and the tasks entrusted to them. Pertinent to this controversy are
pages 12 to 23 of the tabulation, showing, among others:

POWER/FUNCTIONS APPROVING AUTHORITY REMARKS

COMPTROLLERSHIP C. PNP DCA DCO TCDS DIR REGL D. ADM As
AND FINANCE STAFF DIR OPN
SPT UNITS
testified to by
PNP Budget Proposal and X defense witness
Expenditures Dalut, DC referred
Working papers for the DC to Director for
PBAC
Comptrollership,
C. Releases of allotment
advices who, at that time,
1. Releases from Comd X was Domondon.
Reserve regardless of
amount Domondo
2. Releases from Prog
regardless of amount
n thereafter sub-
a. CMI X delegated such
b. Fixed Expenditures DC Upon request of authority to his
Prog Dir subordinates
c. Program Directors Fund DC Upon request of Luspo and Osia,
Prog Dir
3. Releases for personnel DC
through a
services (01) irrespective memorandum
of amount dated January 31,
1991. Relying on
the memorandum, Luspo signed ASA Nos. 001-500-138-92 SN 4361 and 001-500-139-92 SN 4362 on August 11, 1992, releasingP10
million from the Personal Services Fund in favor of North CAPCOM for the purchase of CCIE.

The OSP questions the validity of the sub-delegation, arguing that Domondon cannot further delegate an already delegated
task. The contention is untenable.

We reckon the kind of duties discharged by public officers.

Public officers exercise discretionary and/or ministerial duties. A duty is discretionary if the officer is allowed to determine how
and when it is to be performed and to decide this matter one way or the other and be right either way.[59] It is not susceptible to delegation
because it is imposed by law as such, and the public officer is expected to discharge it directly and not through the intervening mind of
another.[60]

On the other hand, a ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. [61] It connotes an
act wherein nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. [62] It is practically a mechanical act; [63] hence, what can be done by
the delegate may be sub-delegated by him to others.[64]

Based on the foregoing yardstick, was the task delegated by Nazareno to Domondon discretionary or ministerial?

A reading of the significant provisions of the Delegation of Authority discloses that the duty delegated to Domondon was merely
ministerial.
2. In order to free the Chief, Philippine National Police of routine decisions so that he can devote his
time to more important functions and in order to prepare subordinate officers for greater responsibility so that police
service will be delivered more efficiently and effectively, specific authorities of the Chief, PNP are hereby delegated
to the Deputy Chief for Administration, Deputy Chief for Operations, The Chief of Directorial Staff, Directors of the
Directorial Staff, Regional Directors and Directors of Support Units as per attached tabulation.

3. Generally, the delegate will sign for the Chief, PNP but he may sign in his own name when
appropriate, depending on the circumstances or nature of the communication. The name and signature of the
delegate signing for C. PNP shall be preceded by BY COMMAND OF DIRECTOR GENERAL NAZARENO or FOR
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, whichever is appropriate.

7. For the purpose of this Letter-Directive, the term authority shall be understood to mean authority to
sign for the C. PNP; the power to require and receive submission; the right to approve or disapprove; the right to give
final decisions; and the right to direct and to expect compliance. The authorities conferred/delegated in this Letter-
Directive are those of the C. PNP, and therefore authorities inherent to the function of the delegatee are not
covered by this publication. x x x

8. Decision/final actions on matters within the normal or inherent functions/authority of the

Directorial Staff, Service Staff, PNP Administrative and Operational Support Units and Regional Directors shall
be done at their respective levels. In this connection, the Directors of the Directorial Staff are reminded that
they are inherently vested with authority to determine the actions to be taken by the Command in their
specific fields of interest or responsibility.[65]

Based on these provisions of Nazarenos letter-directive, the phrase release funds for personnel services 01 should be
construed to mean that the duty delegated to Domondon was merely to sign ASAs in behalf of Nazareno to effect the release of funds.
 Nazareno could not have referred to the actual authority of directing when and to whom the funds would be released because
the same was already inherent in Domondons functions as the formers aide in administering the funds of the PNP.

As mentioned earlier, Domondon, as the Chief Director of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, assists the PNP
Chief in determining how the PNP funds would be sub-allocated to the regional commands and their support units. Any determination
made by Domondon and Nazareno would then be implemented by Luspo, as the head of Fiscal Services and Budget Division, by
preparing an ASA and then submitting the same to Nazareno for his signature. To shorten the process, Nazareno delegated the routine
act of affixing his signature to the ASA to his financial assistant, Domondon.

Verily then, the duty delegated by Nazareno to Domondon was the ministerial duty of signing ASAs to effect the release of
funds. Being merely ministerial, Domondon was allowed to sub-delegate, as he did sub-delegate, the task to his subordinate, Luspo. As
such, the signature affixed by Luspo to the ASAs had the same effect as if it was made by Nazareno himself.

Therefore, Luspo, in the same manner as Domondon, had satisfactorily adduced evidence of good faith to overturn and
repudiate the imputation of evident bad faith against him. He committed no prohibited act in signing and issuing the assailed ASAs
because there is ample documentary and testimonial evidence showing that:

(1) Luspo was duly authorized by Domondon to release personal services funds by signing ASAs in the latters behalf. Luspos
signature in the ASAs is attributable to Domondon who, in turn, was authorized by Nazareno to release funds for personnel services
through the issuance of an ASA.
(2) Contrary to the prosecutions contention, the issuance of ASAs by the ODC in favor of PNP regional commands did not have
to be preceded by a program request from the Office of the Directorate for Personnel as shown in the Delegation of Authority and its
Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno on March 20, 1992; and
(3) There is no need for the DBMs prior authority before the ODC can release funds for personnel services 01, under which
CCIE are categorized, as shown by GHQ Circular No. 8 dated October 24, 1985, issued by the then Acting Chief of the PNP, Fidel V.
Ramos (Ramos). The circular was the basis of the OMB in recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 20185 with respect to
Domondon. The accusations in Criminal Case No. 20185 against Domondon read: accused Domondon, in conspiracy with his co-
accused, without prior authority from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), released or caused to be released sums of
money for the purchase of Combat Clothing and Individual Equipment. The Sandiganbayan adopted the OMBs recommendation and
dropped Domondon as an accused in both cases, and took judicial notice of such ruling when it absolved Domondon from the charges in
Criminal Case No. 20192, subject of the instant petition.

In addition, the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual [66] classifies combat clothing under the category of personal
services fund.

The prosecution alleged that Luspo failed to observe the logistic requirements of North CAPCOM in 1992 when he signed and
issued the ASAs. To buttress this claim, Exhibits F-15 to F-16-E were submitted.

Exhibit F-15 is an undated Logistics Assessment, while Exhibit F-16 is a 6-page more detailed version dated January 4, 1993.
Both were prepared for the North CAPCOM by Braga, then Assistant Regional

Director, North CAPCOM. The assessment indicated that, in 1992, North CAPCOM received from PNP-GHQ, P2,067,123.00 in terms of
Allotment Advices, and P32,986,523.07 in terms of supplies and equipment. In particular, the acquired CCIE amounted to P5,900,778.80.
We do not see the relevance of these exhibits to the purpose for which they were offered.

The logistical assessment prepared by Braga is a year-end review of the financial and material allotments received by the
command. It is not an internal issuance or circular in the PNP that carries the obligatory force of duty. It is a mere report on the logistical
conditions of North CAPCOM. Evident bad faith connotes more than a mere violation of a report.

The prosecution further averred that the issuance and signing of the ASAs had no budgetary basis and justification, because the
purchase of CCIE was not included in North CAPCOMs budget proposal for 1992. GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8, issued on January 25, 1985,
directs that the yearly funding requirement for combat clothing should be included in budget proposals.

GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 was issued by Ramos on January 25, 1985 upon the order of the Minister of Defense. When the PNP
was created in 1991, it was intended to be civilian in character and free from any military influence. Verily, the 1985 issuance of an AFP-
Chief would no longer have any binding effect on the officials of PNP.

The finding of the Sandiganbayan that the ASAs were issued over and above the approved P6,000,000.00 CCIE budget for
calendar year 1992 was not supported by evidence on record. The prosecution did not present any document showing the PNP or
the North CAPCOMs budgetary program for 1992.

To repeat, bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. It is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of
an accused to do wrong or to cause damage. [67] There is nothing on record to show that Luspo was spurred by any corrupt motive or that
he received any material benefit when he signed the ASAs.

There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable bias or favor towards Tugaoen. The prosecution failed to show that it
was Luspos duty to search for, negotiate and contract with suppliers. The only deduction extant from the prosecutions evidence is that,
being then the Chief of the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, it was Luspos duty to
distribute the funds allocated to the PNP by the DBM by the issuance of an ASA in favor of the forces regional commands. Once the
funds were released from his custody through the ASAs, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon the recipients of the ASA to
see to it that the funds were legally and properly disbursed for the purpose for which they were released. He had no control over the
disbursement, and thus, he could not be blamed if the funds were eventually expended for unauthorized or illegal purposes.
Lastly, the prosecution cannot link Luspo as a conspirator to defraud the PNP/government on the strength merely of his signature, nor can
a valid assumption be made that he connived with Duran and Montano, who subsequently disbursed the ASAs.

Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proferred to indicate that the accused had taken part in, x x x
the planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government for, otherwise, any
careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been made
unwitting tools by the criminal minds really responsible for that irregularity. [68]

Again, Luspo committed no prohibited act; neither did he violate any law, rule, or internal order when he signed the ASAs. Logically, his
signature in the ASAs cannot be considered as an overt act in furtherance of one common design to defraud the government.

Given the above premises, the acquittal of Luspo is inevitable.

Unfortunately, the immediately preceding disquisition does not apply to Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen.

After receiving the ASAs, Montano instructed Duran to prepare and draw 100 checks for P100,000.00 each for four (4) payees,
DI-BEN Trading, MT Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises, and Triple 888 Enterprises, the supposed suppliers of the CCIE. The checks were
all dated August 12, 1992 and signed by both Montano and Duran. Montano thereafter released them to Tugaoen, the owner of the four
enterprises, without the required liquidating and supporting documents mandated by Section 4(6) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
which provides that claims against government funds shall be supported by complete documentation. In the succeeding days, Tugaoen
encashed the checks with UCPB, without delivering in exchange a single piece of CCIE for the uniformed personnel of North CAPCOM.

The Sandiganbayan found indications of bad faith and manifest partiality in Montanos and Durans actions. We agree.

The essential element of bad faith is evident in Montanos and Durans failure to prepare and submit the required documentation
ordinarily attendant to procurement transactions and government expenditures, as mandated by Section 4(6) of P.D. No. 1445, which
states that claims against government funds shall be supported by complete documentation.

Among these requirements are: certification of availability of funds from the commands chief accountant;[69] papers relating to
public bidding, like the advertisement for bids and certification of the result of the bidding; [70] purchase orders; delivery receipts; certificate
of availability of fund signed by the chief accountant and verified by the auditor; and disbursement and requisition vouchers.[71] Their
absence in the disbursement of P10 million is supported by evidence on record.

Abelardo F. Madridejo, Chief Accountant of North CAPCOM, in a Certification dated March 23, 1993, attested that the vouchers
and allied documents pertaining to the procurement of Combat, Clothing and Individual Equipment in the amount of P10,000,000.00 did
not pass [his] office for appropriate action. [72]

The PNP Chief Directorate for Material Services, P/Supt. Jesus Arceo, likewise declared that no document was submitted to the
PNP Logistics Services relative to the procurement of P10 million worth of CCIE for North CAPCOM.[73]

These statements were corroborated by State Auditor Erlinda Cargo of COA-PNP North CAPCOM when she stated that, as of
March 23, 1993, no records pertaining to the purchase of P10 million CCIE were forwarded to the COA.[74]

More significantly, the February 11, 1993 sworn statement of Braga declared that North CAPCOM did not officially receive
the P10,000,000.00 ASAs issued by the ODC, supposedly intended for the purchase of CCIE. As affirmed by Braga, North CAPCOM
received CCIE allocations worth only P5,900,778.80 in 1992, and the same were received in kind and not in the form of ASAs. [75]

Duran avers that his signing of the checks was a mere ministerial act in compliance with Montanos directives and upon reliance
on the latters assurance that their issuance was supported by appropriate documents.

The contention has no merit. The 100 checks were made payable to only 4 enterprises at 25 checks each. This should have
sounded alarm bells in the mind of any reasonably judicious accountable officer, such as Duran, to inquire into the veracity of the
transaction concerned. But he did not even bother to demand that the alleged supporting documents be forwarded to him, in conformity
with disbursement rules, to verify the legality or propriety of the claim.

Under Section 106 of P.D. No. 1445, an accountable officer who acts under the direction of a superior officer in paying out or
disposing of funds is not exempt from liability unless he notified the superior officer in writing of the illegality of the payment or disposition.
Duran made no such notification. Instead, he disregarded all disbursement, auditing, and accounting policies, effectively facilitating the
illegal transaction. He did not require the submission of a procurement contract, a certificate of requisition, or vouchers before drawing
and signing the checks. He merely mechanically affixed his signature when he was supposed to act with discernment. As the Chief of the
Regional Finance Service Unit of the North CAPCOM, he was an accountable officer and had control and supervision over the funds of
the command against which the checks were drawn.

To support his claim of good faith, Montano tendered a copy of the provisions of Section 307, Article 5, Title 5, Book III, Volume
I, of the Government and Auditing Manual issued on January 2, 1992, to show that he complied with the Rules on expenditures mandated
in the manual. The Rule actually compounds his guilt. We quote the text in full:

Sec. 307. Combat clothing of military personnel and members of para-military forces assigned or detailed
with combat units. - The issuance of combat clothing to personnel assigned to combat units shall be guided by the following:
 a. Military personnel assigned in combat units are issued authorized combat clothing in kind (GHQ Cir. 3, Feb. 17,
1988).
b. To be entitled to initial combat clothing and subsequent annual combat clothing, military personnel and members
of para-military forces must have completed at least six (6) consecutive months tour of duty with a unit engaged in actual
combat operations. This additional clothing shall not be granted more often than once every twelve (12) months. The
individual clothing record of the military personnel shall be the basis to determine whether the individual was issued this
combat clothing or not.
c. The unit commander shall attach a certification to the requisition and issue voucher (RIV), stating therein that the
military personnel and members of his unit were actually engaged in combat operations for not less than forty five (45) days
within the six (6)-month period for which combat clothing is claimed and have not received said clothing items during the
period covered.

To evade culpability, Montano should have presented a requisition and issue voucher to justify his disbursement
of P10,000,000.00 for the supposed purchase of CCIE. But this he did not do. He only advanced denials and roundabout alibis to
surmount the concrete evidence of the prosecution.

Indeed, there is ample evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that Duran and Montano were propelled by evident bad faith
in preparing and issuing 100 checks to facilitate a fictitious and fraudulent transaction and Tugaoen, in accepting the checks and receiving
their value without giving in exchange a single piece of CCIE.

Durans and Montanos palpable bias in favor of Tugaoen is shown by their failure to support and justify the checks issued to
Tugaoens enterprises with the obligatory paper trail relative to the conduct of public bidding or any procurement contract.

As aptly discerned by the Sandiganbayan, the acts of Duran, Montano and Tugaoen evince a bold and unabashed conspiracy
scheme to defraud the government of P10 million:

[T]he drawing of one hundred checks in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos each by [petitioners] Duran and
Montano, on that same day of August 12, 1992, eloquently bespeaks of splitting of payments, too glaring to be
ignored. These one hundred checks could have been consolidated into four (4) checks only considering that there
were only four (4) business establishments with which they claim to have transacted with. [76]

As defined in COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30, 1976, splitting, in its literal sense, means dividing or breaking up into
separate parts or portions, or an act resulting in fissure, rupture, or breach. Within the sphere of government procurement, splitting is
associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries, and payments. One form of splitting is the breaking up of payments which
consist in making two or more payments for one or more items involving one purchase order. Splitting is intended to do away with and
circumvent control measure, such as the reviewing authority of a superior official. In this case, the ASA of P10,000,000.00 was split by
Duran and Montano into 100 checks of P100,000.00 each to elude the reviewing authority of Director Sistoza.

The last essential element of the offense, damage or injury to the government, is amply substantiated by the certification
executed by Romulo Tuscano of the PNP Logistic Support Service, indicating that there is no available record regarding the delivery
of P10 million worth of CCIE for North CAPCOM in 1992.[77]

In fact, Tugaoen herself admitted that she did not deliver any CCIE in exchange for her receipt of P10 million. The admissibility
of such statement was exhaustively discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its May 13, 2005 resolution, and we adopt its findings therein.

At any rate, even if we were to hold that the investigation conducted by the PNP was custodial in nature, the improprieties that
Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and overwhelming evidence showing her and her co-conspirators guilt. Allegations of
impropriety committed during custodial investigation are material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of
conviction.[78] In the present case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and Tugaoen was not deduced solely from Tugaoens admission, but
from the confluence of evidence showing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the same vein, the issue on the admissibility of the photocopies of the ASAs, the 100 checks, the original printout of the full master list
and detail list of the checks from the PHC, and the bank statement prepared by UCPB [79] is of no moment.

Penal and Civil Liability For Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019

The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more
than fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. [80] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punishable
by a special law, as in the present case, an indeterminate penalty shall be imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum not less than the minimum prescribed therein. [81]

There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office.

Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen shall be solidarily liable for the restitution of the P10,000,00.00 that they defrauded from the funds of the
PNP. An offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is
sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of
the crime, which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature. [82]
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the conviction of Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192 is hereby AFFIRMED. The conviction of Van Luspo in Criminal Case No. 20192
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is hereby ACQUITTED. The bailbond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
Salvador Duran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen are further ORDERED to jointly and severally indemnify the Philippine
National Police of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). SO ORDERED.
 10. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GSIS vs VELASCO G.R. No. 170463

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 24 September 2004 Decision2 and the 7 October 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 19 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 03-108389. In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted
respondents Albert M. Velasco4 and Mario I. Molinas5 (respondents) petition for prohibition. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial
court denied petitioners Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Winston F. Garcias
(petitioners) motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive
suspension for 90 days.6 Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS
employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager,
petitioner Winston F. Garcia.7

In a letter dated 4 April 2003, respondent Mario I. Molina (respondent Molina) requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion
L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation of his step increment. 8 On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request
citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 (Resolution No. 372)9 issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS (petitioner GSIS
Board) which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the
supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion. 10 The pertinent provision of Resolution No. 372 provides:

A. Step Increment

xxxx

III. Specific Rules:

x x xx

3. The step increment adjustment of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be withheld until such time that
a decision on the case has been rendered. x x x x

Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306
(Resolution No. 306) approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees effective year 2002. 11 Respondents
request was again denied because of their pending administrative case.

On 27 August 2003, petitioner GSIS Board issued Board Resolution No. 197 (Resolution No. 197) approving the following policy
recommendations:

B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending administrative case

To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from the following during the
pendency of the case:

a) Promotion;

b) Step Increment;

c) Performance-Based Bonus; and

d) Other benefits and privileges.

On 14 November 2003, respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.12 Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No.
306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents
claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right
to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that he had already
earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions
were ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.13
On 24 November 2003, petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and opposition. 14 On 2 December 2003,
respondents filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. 15 On 5 December 2003, petitioners filed their reply.16

On 16 January 2004, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss and granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.17

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.18 In its 26 February 2004 Order, the trial court denied petitioners motion. 19

In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents petition for prohibition. The dispositive portion of the 24
September 2004 Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondents Board Resolution No. 197 of August 27, 2003 and No. 372 of
November 21, 2000 are hereby declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
made permanent. SO ORDERED.20

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial court denied petitioners motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of the petition because the territorial area referred to in
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but rather to the judicial region where
the office or agency is situated so that the prohibitive writ can be enforced.

On the merits of the case, the trial court ruled that respondents were entitled to all employee benefits as provided under the law
by reason of their employment. According to the trial court, to deny respondents these employee benefits for the reason alone that
they have pending administrative cases is unjustified since it would deprive them of what is legally due them without due process
of law, inflict punishment on them without hearing, and violate their right to be presumed innocent.

The trial court also found that the assailed resolutions were not registered with the UP Law Center, per certification of the Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).21Since they were not registered, the trial court declared that the assailed
resolutions have not become effective citing Sections 3 and 4, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. 22

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I. Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-108389 (Velasco, et al. vs. The Board of Trustees of GSIS,
et al., RTC-Manila, Branch 19) lies with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and not with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 19.

II. Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President and General Manager exercising quasi-
legislative and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

III. Whether internal rules and regulations need not require publication with the Office of the National [Administrative] Register for
their effectivity, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

IV Whether a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending administrative cases from the grant of step
increment and Christmas raffle benefits is unconstitutional.

V. Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition, and a writ of preliminary injunction
cannot be made permanent without a decision ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition. 23

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Petitioners argue that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), not the trial court, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 03-108389
because it involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Sec. 4. Where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from
further enforcing the said resolutions.24 Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents petition for
prohibition.

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be
prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in
Manila.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)25 provides:

SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power
herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts
of the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)

In line with this, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 326 defining the territorial jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts in the National Capital Judicial Region, as follows:

a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila over the City of Manila only.

b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City over Quezon City only.

c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City over Pasay City only.

xxxx

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be.27 It is also a personal action because it does not
affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.28 Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, 29 the petition could properly
be filed in the City of Manila.30 The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (1) In the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong,
Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros,
and Taguig, a writ of prohibition issued by the regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly,
the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and
the venue was properly laid before it.

Petitioners also argue that Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 need not be filed with the UP Law Center ONAR since they are, at
most, regulations which are merely internal in nature regulating only the personnel of the GSIS and not the public.

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general
or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and
regulations, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
Administrative agency and not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center.

Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002
Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed
resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or
filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Petitioners insist that petitioner GSIS Board has the power to issue the assailed resolutions. According to petitioners, it was within
the power of petitioner GSIS Board to disqualify respondents for step increment and from receiving GSIS benefits from the time
formal administrative charges were filed against them until the cases are resolved.

The Court notes that the trial court only declared Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void. The trial court made no ruling on Resolution
No. 306 and respondents did not appeal this matter. Therefore, we will limit our discussion to Resolution Nos. 197 and 372,
particularly to the effects of preventive suspension on the grant of step increment because this was what respondents raised
before the trial court.

First, entitlement to step increment depends on the rules relative to the grant of such benefit. In point are Section 1(b), Rule II and
Section 2, Rule III of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1990, which provide:

Rule II. Selection Criteria

Section 1. Step increments shall be granted to all deserving officials and employees x x x

(b) Length of Service For those who have rendered continuous satisfactory service in a particular position for at least
three (3) years.

Rule III. Step Increments

xxxx

Section 2. Length of Service A one (1) step increment shall be granted officials and employees for every three (3) years
of continuous satisfactory service in the position. Years of service in the position shall include the following:

(a) Those rendered before the position was reclassified to a position title with a lower or the same salary grade allocation;
and

(b) Those rendered before the incumbent was transferred to another position within the same agency or to another
agency without a change in position title and salary grade allocation.
 In the initial implementation of step increments in 1990, an incumbent shall be granted step increments equivalent to one
(1) step for every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in a given position occupied as of January 1, 1990.

A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at least three years of
continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent. 31 To determine whether service is
continuous, it is necessary to define what actual service is. 32 Actual service refers to the period of continuous service since the
appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with
pay.33

Second, while there are no specific rules on the effects of preventive suspension on step increment, we can refer to the CSC
rules and rulings on the effects of the penalty of suspension and approved vacation leaves without pay on the grant of step
increment for guidance.

Section 56(d), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

Section 56. Duration and effect of administrative penalties. - The following rules shall govern in the imposition of administrative
penalties: x x x

(d) The penalty of suspension shall result in the temporary cessation of work for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

Suspension of one day or more shall be considered a gap in the continuity of service. During the period of suspension,
respondent shall not be entitled to all money benefits including leave credits.

If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the continuity of his government service at the commencement
of the service of the said suspension. This is because a person under penalty of suspension is not rendering actual service. The
suspension will undoubtedly be considered a gap in the continuity of the service for purposes of the computation of the three year
period in the grant of step increment.34 However, this does not mean that the employee will only be entitled to the step increment
after completing another three years of continuous satisfactory service reckoned from the time the employee has fully served the
penalty of suspension.35 The CSC has taken this to mean that the computation of the three year period requirement will only be
extended by the number of days that the employee was under suspension. 36 In other words, the grant of step increment will only
be delayed by the same number of days that the employee was under suspension.

This is akin to the status of an employee who incurred vacation leave without pay for purposes of the grant of step
increment.37 Employees who were on approved vacation leave without pay enjoy the liberal application of the rule on the grant of
step increment under Section 60 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, which provides:

Section 60. Effect of vacation leave without pay on the grant of length of service step increment. - For purposes of
computing the length of service for the grant of step increment, approved vacation leave without pay for an aggregate of
fifteen (15) days shall not interrupt the continuity of the three-year service requirement for the grant of step increment.
However, if the total number of authorized vacation leave without pay included within the three-year period exceeds
fifteen (15) days, the grant of one-step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days that an official or
employee was absent without pay. (Emphasis supplied)

Third, on preventive suspension, Sections 51 and 52, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 provide:

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority
within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied)
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. 38 It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him.39 If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the
respondent will automatically be reinstated.

Therefore, on the matter of step increment, if an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like an employee on
approved vacation leave without pay,40 then it is only fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee who was
preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive suspension is not a penalty. If an employee is preventively
suspended, the employee is not rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government
service. Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time
of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The
grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or
employee was serving the preventive suspension.

Fourth, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This
means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is
considered innocent until the contrary is proven.41

In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days beginning on 23 May 2002. Their preventive
suspension ended on 21 August 2002. Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the
administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and, after serving the same number of days
of their suspension, entitled to the grant of step increment.

On a final note, social legislation like the circular on the grant of step increment, being remedial in character, should be liberally
construed and administered in favor of the persons to be benefited. The liberal approach aims to achieve humanitarian purposes
of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.42

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 24 September 2004 Decision and the 7 October
2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. 03-108389. We DECLARE the assailed provisions
on step increment in GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 VOID. We MODIFY the 24 September 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 and rule that GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197, 306 and 372 need not be filed with the
University of the Philippines Law Center. SO ORDERED.
 11. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011

Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks the reversal of
the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc., docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside
the decision of the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001,[3] finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all
non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998.[4] On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.[5]

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo,
Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia);
Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and
Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j)
of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[6] As government employees,
Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. [7]

The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to
Steel Asia, among others.[8]

During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred Forty-Two
Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos (P242,433,534.00).[9] The FFIB concluded that
Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan in their respective capacities irregularly approved the issuance of the TCCs to several
garment/textile companies and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer to Steel Asia.[10]

On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their counter-
affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.

Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed the case submitted for
resolution.

On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.[11] Having been separated from
the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual
disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government
owned and controlled agencies or corporations. [12]

After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,[13] Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA.

On July 28, 2004,[14] the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter should not have
considered the administrative complaints because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may not conduct
the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed
after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of; [15] and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutans forced resignation.[16]

THE PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the CA. It submits, first, that
contrary to the CAs findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year from their commission, [17] and second, that in
cases of capital administrative offenses, resignation or optional retirement cannot render administrative proceedings moot and
academic, since accessory penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be
imposed.[18]

The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing jurisprudence, the use of the word
may indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or permissive.[19] Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the administrative
complaint, as long as any of the circumstances under Section 20 is present. [20] In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to
examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an imposition of a one (1) year
prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally restricts its mandate. [21]

Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutans resignation from office does not render moot the administrative proceedings
lodged against him, even after his resignation.Relying on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular
No. 38,[22] the Ombudsman argues that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was
still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and
adjudication.[23] It is irrelevant that Andutan had already resigned from office when the administrative case was filed since he was
charged for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general
public.[24] Furthermore, even if Andutan had already resigned, there is a need to determine whether or not there remains penalties
capable of imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits. [25] Finally, the Ombudsman
reiterates that its findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence.

THE RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS

Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsmans petition.

First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive period; rather, the CA
merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the administrative complaint. According to Andutan, Section 20(5)
does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an
investigation where the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
of.[26] Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred the complaint to another government agency. [27] Further,
Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsmans interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan suggests that the phrase may not conduct the
necessary investigation means that the Ombudsman is prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section
20(5).[28]

Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer in the public service at
the time the case was commenced.[29] According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge Abiera[30] and similar cases cited by the
Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations against the respondents in those cases were commenced prior to
their resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had already resigned before the
administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation from office cannot be characterized as preemptive, i.e. made
under an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal charges [31] because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by
then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.

Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness of the administrative case
against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the officers fitness to remain in office, the principal penalty
imposable being either suspension or removal. [32] The Ombudsmans opinion - that accessory penalties may still be imposed - is
untenable since it is a fundamental legal principle that accessory follows the principal, and the former cannot exist independently of
the latter.[33]
Third, the Ombudsmans findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were not observed.
Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsmans findings lacked legal and factual bases.

ISSUES

Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:

I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year
after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsmans findings supported by substantial evidence?

THE COURTS RULING

We rule to deny the petition.

The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman

is not prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the
supposed act was committed.

The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by jurisprudence. [34] In Office of
the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,[35] the Court, speaking through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:

[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., A.M.
No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451
SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649
(2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In
disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in our government [Melchor
v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414
Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].

Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:

 SEC. 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:

xxxx

(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
(Emphasis supplied)

proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the complained act or omission.

In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that the period stated in
Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to
the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the
provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; National Federation of
Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].

In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court interpreted Section 20 (5) of
R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:

Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's
complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged
commission of the acts complained of.

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner
contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word
"shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it
is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint
even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine,
the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied)

The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative
phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word "not," becomes
prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not supported by
jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]

Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the
lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond
the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.

However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the Ombudsmans authority to
institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.

Andutans resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute

an administrative complaint against him.

Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no
longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.

The Ombudsman argued in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA that Andutans retirement from office does n ot
render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged with an offense he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the
Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its
jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.

The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38 for this proposition, viz.:

Section VI.

1. x x x

An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case but it
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to the
filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the
service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision refers to cases where the officers or employees were already
charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from service. [36] In this case, the CA noted that the administrative cases
were filed only after Andutan was retired, hence the Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the
cases.[37]

Challenging the CAs interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA limited the scope of the cited Civil Service Memorandum Circular
to the first sentence.[38] Further, according to the Ombudsman, the court a quo ignored the second statement in the said circular that
contemplates a situation where previous to the institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee
subject of the investigation has resigned. [39]

To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the
officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,[40] we held that:

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this
Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is
not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be
answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,[41] we held:

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427
SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No.
P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v.
Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76
SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533
(1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag,
353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and
underscoring supplied)

However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the Court found that the public
officials subject of the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed [42] or to pre-empt the
imminent filing of one.[43] Here, neither situation obtains.

The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since he knew for
certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him [44] is unfounded. First, Andutans resignation
was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while
the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles
to find reason in the Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.

What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the
administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the
case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.

Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of Section VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed
while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is not a bar to his administrative
investigation, prosecution and adjudication. [45] If we agree with this interpretation, any official even if he has been separated from the
service for a long time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is
inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence in
the government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned.[46] Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

The possibility of imposingaccessory penalties does not

negate the Ombudsmans lackof jurisdiction.

The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from the service is moot, there is an irresistible
justification to determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and
forfeiture of benefits.[47] Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is
not moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office.

We find several reasons that militate against this position.

 First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case moot and academic
because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,[48] indeed, we
held:

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation from
government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no
longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty
of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the
forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere availability of accessory penalties justifies
the continuation of an administrative case.This is a misplaced reading of the case and its ruling.

Esther S. Pagano who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet filed her certificate of candidacy for
councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer directed her to explain why no administrative case should be filed against her. The
directive arose from allegations that her accountabilities included a cash shortage of P1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy
under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto resigned from office, she was no longer under the administrative jurisdiction of her
superiors. Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint had become moot.

We rejected Paganos position on the principal ground that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. [49] Our position that accessory penalties are still imposable thereby negating
the mootness of the administrative complaint merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case
against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the administrative
complaint if Paganos filing of candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:

At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that
she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash shortage
of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the
administrative proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from
service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest when
she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as part of the
procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative case.[50] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in
filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.

Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of transcendental
[importance][51] and that preserving the inviolability of public office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public service of persons
who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office. [52] However, the State must perform this task within the
limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may
exercise administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil
service may still be the subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind
it.

Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations while in office, but had
already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to
civil, criminal and administrative liability.[53] Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who
has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged transgressions. In fact,
here, the Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the
penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest. [54]

CONCLUSION

Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what assumption of public
office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.

While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the
Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of
an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsmans factual findings.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsmans petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.