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NATIVIDAD FIGURACION, et al. v. SPOUSES.

CRESENCIANO AND AMELITA LIBI


G.R. No. 155688, November 28, 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.)

Galileo Figuracion was the owner of Lot No. 899-D-2 situated in Cebu City. Cebu City expropriated Lot No.
899-D-2, consisting of 474 sq. m. and turned the same into a portion of N. Escario Street, connecting the Capitol
Building to Gorordo Avenue and U.P. Junior College. Cebu City paid and was issued TCT No. 49454. In Resolution
No. 330, the Cebu City Sangguniang Panlungsod approved the reconveyance to Isagani Figuracion, successor-in-interest of
Galileo Figuracion, of an unused portion of Lot No. 899-D-2, designated as Lot No. 899-D-2-A. Cebu City Mayor
Tomas Osmena executed in favor of Isagani a deed of sale over the subject lot. A TCT was issued in the name of
Isagani for the said lot.

It appearing that Sps. Libi had been using the subject lot, and refused to vacate it despite demand. Figuracion et
al., as successors-in-interest of Isagani Figuracion, filed against respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer. The
MTC declared petitioners entitled to possession of the subject lot and was affirmed by the RTC. Sps. Libi filed a
complaint for easement, be granted a right of way over the subject lot and later shifted to a different cause of action
which is the annulment of the said resolutions, the deed of sale in favor of Isagani, and the TCT. Cebu City defended
the reconveyance to Isagani Figuracion of the subject lot considering that it was not utilized in the construction of N.
Escario Street and had long been vacant.

ISSUE:

When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use is abandoned, does
the land so expropriated return to its former owner?

HELD:

NO. As a general rule, local roads used for public service are considered public property under the absolute
control of Congress; hence, local governments have no authority to control or regulate their use. However, under
Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, Congress delegated to political subdivisions some control of
local roads. Moreover, through the Revised Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857), Congress specifically
delegated to said political subdivision the following authority to regulate its city streets.

It depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a
municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a
public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of
course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory
provisions to the contrary. Many other similar examples might be given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree
of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property
of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not
have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.

In the present case, there exists no doubt that Cebu City repudiated its right to use the subject lot for other
public purpose; and instead, recognized the right of the former owner or his successor-in-interest to repurchase the
same. In exercise of its discretion to declare a city street or part thereof abandoned, the Cebu City council unanimously
issued Resolutions No. 330 and No. 2345, declaring the subject lot vacant and available for conveyance. Sps. Libi
acknowledge that the subject lot was not included in the construction of Escario Street.
FAVIS v. CITY OF BAGUIO

FACTS.
Antonio Favis owned a lot. His means of egress and ingress from his residence to a public street was donated by
Assumption Convent Inc. to the City of Baguio for road purposes. Adjacent there to is lot 25 which is leased to Shell
by the City where a service station is constructed. By virtue of a City Resolution, Lot “B” consisting of 100sqm was
also leased to Shell, whereby a bigger gasoline station be constructed by the latter.
Favis protested the lease because it reduced the width of Lapu-lapu Street, thus (1) his entrance and exit to and from his
property has become very difficult; (2) it became impossible for his big trucks and trailers to turn around; (3) it made
the area around it very dangerous in case of fire; and (4) it has caused perpetual danger, annoyance, irreparable loss and
damage not only to the public in general but especially to Favis himself. In response, the City approved Resolution 215-
61, converting the remaining 5 m.-width portion of Lapu-lapu street into an alley.
Unsatisfied with the City's response, Favis commenced suit to annul the lease contract for the reasons mentioned above
and also because of the following: 1) the power to close streets should be effected thru an ordinance and not thru a
resolution; 2) the City failed to give notice to owners of contiguous properties whose rights might be affected; and 3)
the city council of Baguio and municipal bodies in general, have no inherent right to vacate or withdraw a street from
public use, either in whole or in part, thus there must be a specific grant by the legislative body to the city or
municipality concerned.

ISSUE. WON a municipal corporation such as the City of Baguio has the right to a street for public use.

HELD.
YES. The court ruled that the city is empowered to close a city street as embodied in Section 2558 of the Baguio
Charter, thus: “To provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening, closing up… in whole or in
part... upon public or private property. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a
property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case
the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in from those
sustained by kind and not merely in degree, the public generally.”
There was not private right that has been invaded. No special damage or damages will incur by reason of the closing of
a portion of Lapu-lapu street at its dead-end. His property does not about that street. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

***Ulep Notes
Favis contentions are unmeritorious. Reasons:
1) The embattled resolutions are just as good as ordinances. The objection is only of forms, not of substance.
2) Notice is not needed because the City Charter requires notice only when the ordinance in question also calls for an
assessment regarding a project to be implemented. In this case, no assessment was called for and was in fact, not
necessary.
3) While Favis is correct that municipal bodies have no inherent right to close a public street, still the City Charter does
authorize Baguio City to close public roads in its discretion absent a plain case of abuse, or fraud or collision.
Faithfulness in public trust is presumed. Public interest is served thru 1) savings from cost of road maintenance; and 2)
gaining by the City of some income thru leasing.
4) Favis' private rights were not invaded. Lapu-lapu street does not abut his parcel of land. The general rule is that one
whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation
of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be
such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closed section.
But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained
special damages differing in from those sustained by kind, and not merely in degree, the public generally.
BRUNO S. CABRERA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PROVINCE OF
CATANDUANES, VICENTE M. ALBERTO, ENCARNACION TORRES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78673, March 18, 1991, FIRST DIVISION, CRUZ, J.

Facts.
On September 19, 1969, the Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 1581. Petitioner filed on
December 29, 1978, a complaint with the CFI of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of
Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a
public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of
man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of the
northern portion of the said road.

The CFI held that the land in question was not a declared public road but a mere "passageway" or "short-cut,"
nevertheless sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact Resolution No. 158 under existing law. Appeal was
taken to the respondent court, which found that the road was a public road and not a trail but just the same also upheld
Resolution 158. It declared:

“Pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the approval or direction of the
Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case the road
was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes, the closure,
nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself. However, while it could do so, the provincial
government of Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246
of the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on this.”

Petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road
in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. He maintains that the public road was
owned by the province in its governmental capacity and, without a prior order of closure, could not be the subject of
barter. Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board. CA found the closure
valid but the petitioners should be compensated due to the prejudice caused by the closure of the road.

Issue. WON the provincial board can validly close the road and if so, the petitioner be compensated for being
prejudiced by such closure.

Held
Yes, the closure is as plain as day except that the petitioner, with the blindness of those who will not see,
refuses to acknowledge it, the Court has little patience with such puerile arguments. The authority of the provincial
board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic
Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code2. Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might
be lawfully used or conveyed.

1
Providing as follows: RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this province to traffic
effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District
Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Honorable Provincial Governor be, as he is hereby authorized to sign for and in behalf of the province of
Catanduanes, the pertinent Deed of Exchange and or other documents pertaining thereto
2Section 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. - With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any
municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
Furthermore, the petitioner should not be compensated for there was no prejudice caused. The lower court found the
petitioner's allegation of injury and prejudice to be without basis because he had "easy access anyway to the national
road, for in fact the vehicles used by the Court and the parties during the ocular inspection easily passed and used it,
reaching beyond plaintiff's house." However, the Court of Appeals ruled that he "was prejudiced by the closure of the
road which formerly fronted his house. He and his family were undoubtedly inconvenienced by the loss of access to
their place of residence for which we believe they should be compensated."
As held in the case of Favis the general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street
has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general
system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even
though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner
must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree,
from those sustained by the public generally. Following the doctrine, the petitioner is not entitled to damages because
the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire
community (Damnum absque injuria).
DACANAY, PETITIONER VS. ASISTIO, et. al., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
Way back in January 5, 1979, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) enacted MMC Ordinance 79-02,
which allowed a certain city and municipal public streets and roads to be sites for many vendors applied for licenses to
conduct such activities in said streets.
On December 20, 1987, the RTC of Caloocan City ruled that the streets were of public dominion and ordered
the demolition of said stalls. But Mayor Martinez, who had advocated the demolition of the said stalls, has been
replaced by Mayor Asistio. Mayor Asistio did not carry out the order of the RTC, for humanitarian reasons. Francisco
Dacanay, a concerned citizen and a resident along Heroes del ’96 street, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Mayor, thru the City Engineer, to remove the stalls.

ISSUE. WON properties for public use may be leased for private individuals

RULING.
NO. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are sought to
be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts.
420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the
City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through
contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending
area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city
streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to
use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As
early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had
more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.
Macasiano vs. Diokno

Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,
Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to
MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990. On August 8, 1990,
respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain &
manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the
treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag
ordering the destruction of the flea market. Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction.
The trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issue: WON the ordinance issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease & use of public
streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:
No. The ordinance or resolution authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for a flea
market is invalid. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,
Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are
deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality
has the authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be
considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the
conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought
about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market
along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving
the problem of congestion. Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of
the members of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will
enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the
inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that
which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. VS. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES

The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The City
Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, the City Council of Cebu
passed a resolution authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot
was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and through the Acting City Mayor, he executed a deed of
absolute sale to the herein petitioner.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to
be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside
the commerce of man.

Issue: Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of
Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned?

Held: Yes.
The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:
"Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision. of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City
Council shall have the following legislative powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(34) x x x; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully
used or conveyed."

From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case
of Favis vs. City of Baguio, where the power of the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or
withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this Court said:
"5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead
end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the
power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or
not a certain property is still necessary for public use. "
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance."
ANIANO A. ALBON v BAYANI F. FERNANDO, CITY MAYOR OF MARIKINA
G.R. NO. 148357, June 30, 2006, SECOND DIVISION, (CORONA, J.)

Petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
59. He claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to use government equipment and property,
and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the
existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because
Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use public
resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional proscription
against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160[5] and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further alleged that there was no appropriation for the project.

Trial court denied petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction because of PD 1818 and Supreme Court Circular No. 68-94 which prohibited courts from issuing a TRO or
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project of the government. It ruled that the
City of Marikina was authorized to carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its inherent police power. Petitioner
moved for MR but was denied. CA affirmed the RTC and MR was denied. Hence, this petition on certiorari.

ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) validly use public funds to undertake the widening, repair and
improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision?

HELD:

Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare
clause of RA 7160.[8] With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and
property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied
for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local
government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes.[25] In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[26] the
Court laid down the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to
which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion.[27]Incidental advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public money.

Moreover, the implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide that it is the registered owner
or developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and
open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU. The owner or developer shall be deemed
relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a certificate of completion
and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU.[31] Therefore, the use of LGU funds
for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335 of
RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to
efficiently and effectively provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended
primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and "which are funded out of municipal funds." It particularly
refers to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities."

Applying the rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase "similar facilities" refers to or includes infrastructure facilities
like sidewalks owned by the LGU. Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government funds.

Clearly, the question of ownership of the open spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision is material to the determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation and disbursement made by
the City of Marikina. Similarly significant is the character of the direct object of the expenditure, that is, the sidewalks.
Whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks or has already donated
them to the City of Marikina, and whether the public has full and unimpeded access to the roads and sidewalks of
Marikina Greenheights Subdivision, are factual matters. There is a need for the prior resolution of these issues before
the validity of the challenged appropriation and expenditure can be determined.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City for
the reception of evidence to determine (1) whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision or has donated them to the City of Marikina and (2) whether the public
has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and sidewalks of the subdivision. The Marikina City Regional
Trial Court is directed to decide the case with dispatch.
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION INC. v. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,
BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY
G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No.
98-096 entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to
Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic." The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), filed a petition
claiming that the implementation of the resolution would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected
homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes"; that the subdivision is a place that the
homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public
places"; and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that
the opening of the gates of the subdivision would not in any manner ease the traffic congestion in the area, and that
there were alternative routes available. NSVHAI submitted an amended petition, wherein it claimed that the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject roads").
NSVHAI likewise argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because
under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an act.

ISSUE:

Should the Sangguniang Barangay pass an ordinance instead of a resolution to open the subject roads?

HELD:

NO. NSVHAI dared to question the barangay's ownership over the subject roads when it should have been the
one to adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy. NSVHAI did not submit an iota of proof
to support its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that
belonged to the Municipality of Parañaque and were already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to
the subdivision's homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans that would pass through the gates that they
themselves had built. It is NSVHAI's authority to put up the road blocks in the first place that becomes highly
questionable absent any proof of ownership.

The LGU's power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the LGC, Section 21 which
states “An LGU may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or
square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute
for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided."

As stated in the CA’s ruling “Contrary, however, to NSVHAI's position, the above-quoted provision, which
requires the passage of an ordinance by an LGU to effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the
instant case since the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow
and Aster Streets - have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles already issued in the name
of, the City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964. This fact has not even been denied by NSVHAI in the
proceedings below nor in the present recourse. Having been already donated or turned over to Parañaque, the road lots
in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and
hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of NSVHAI. Accordingly, the NSVHAI was not in the lawful exercise
of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic for the
use of the general public. Consequently, BSV Sangguniang Barangay's act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the
implementation of which is sought to be restrained by NSVHAI, had for its purpose not the opening of a private road
but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the NSVHAI to cause the opening of a public road which
should rightfully be open for use to the general public.”

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