NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br.

19,
BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED

G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM
SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.

Facts: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private respondent Bangpai shipping company
under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power barge of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed
a complaint for damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of the herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of evidence,
the petitioner presented as pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the court. Hoever, a motion to strike
out the evidence was filed before the court to which the court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records but
has to be attached to the documents for proper disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The petitioner aver
that such documents be admitted for the basic reason that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.
Issue: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within the purview of the electronic evidence
for the court be compelled to admit?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?

Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably
with "electronic data message".

On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished,
or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained
therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein,
such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies
are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is
burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent
must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and
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(c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to
establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we
find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not within the purview electronic document or
electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard an information manually written down to be regarded as electronic
message. The petitioner cannot aver now to submit the original copies of the documents since they were given enough time to
submit such but they refused to do so and insist that the photocopies be admitted instead.

The high court denied such petition.

SPOUSES PARAS vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVOLPMENT CORP

G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015

FACTS:

Lucia Paras was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction firm that
sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu.Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for
Supply of Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were allottedby Lucia as supplier to Kimwa.Kimwa was to pick
up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City at P240.00 per truckload.Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa
hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. However, after this Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates and allegedly transferred to the
concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement.

Spouses Paras sent demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses Paras filed a complaint for breach of
contract with damages against Kimwa.In its Answer,Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. It argued that the 40,000 cubic meters represented is only the maximum quantity that it could haul.Kimwa asserted that
the May 15, 1995 which was the expiration of the Special Permit of Lucia was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence
Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.

The RTC rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC's Decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred for basing its findings on the basis of evidence presented in violation of the parol evidence rule.
2. Whether or not Kimwa is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for Breach of Contract.

RULING:

(1) No.Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; (d) The existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agree.

There are2 things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the 4 exceptions
has been put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence
sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

In the present case petitioners pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the
Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its
Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This is , thus, an exceptional case allowing admission
of parol evidence.

Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put this in issue in their Complaint is how respondent
Kimwa felt it necessary to respond to it or address it in its Answer. Thus, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to
be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties' true
intent, may be admitted and considered.

(2) Yes. Petitioners have established that respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or
before May 15, 1995. Considering its admission that it did not haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is liable
to petitioners.
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 Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent Kimwa was well aware that a total of only
about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and that petitioner Lucia
Paras' operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995, when the Special Permit expires.

The condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from November 14, 1994 lends credence to
petitioners Spouses Paras' assertion that, in entering into the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so
because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit,
petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was transacting with that she could supply aggregates only
up to May 15, 1995 and that the other party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence,
for otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she would make beyond May 15, 1995 would
make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be rendered illusory.

G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO
ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

Facts: Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural lands of Lantap Property located
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and the Murong Property located at Brgy. Murong of the same town which were
subsequently foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) due to their failure to pay the loans in the said bank.
But a Deed of Sale was made on Feb. 26, 1985covering "TCT No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property) without description
as to the location of the subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or Brgy.Lantap.

TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property and TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued
for the Lantap Property in favor of RBBI. However, both TCTsdid not specifically state its location whether it is in Barangay Lantap
or Barangay Murong.

RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and DelaCruz covered by TCT No. T-
62836 (corresponds to Lantap Property) but described being located in Brgy. Murong.DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the purchase price to RBBI.

Nemi Fernandez, husband of ElenitaEspejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property while Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz were
the tenants of the Murong Property. No evidence that Espejos took possession of Murong Property nor demanded lease rentals from
petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.

Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong Property) was the subject of theirbuy-
back transaction.RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARAB’s decision because in using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section
3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale.
Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the
property that the respondents repurchased. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay
Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error.

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320 with the Supreme Court
but was denied. CA’s decision becomes final and executory. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed in the SC by Marquez and
Dela Cruz.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the said petition is proper when it raises factual issues.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts.
3. Whether or not Parol Evidence Rule can be applied in this case.

Ruling:
1. The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the CA’s rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual
intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that
is within the Court’s authority to review.Besides, even if it were a factual question,we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions
to the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best
Evidence Rule.

2. The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
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photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected
tampering with the document.
There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this case because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
documents for it is admitted by the parties that the Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’
VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject.The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties.
There’s an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true
intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.

3. The CA refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed
light on the actual intention of the contracting partiesin which itwould appear that what it actually applied was
the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.It excludes parol or extrinsic
evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument.

But even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar.First,respondents are not parties to the VLTs
executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that
parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be
invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does
not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.

Second, the instant casefalls under theexceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule because there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; and the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9.

It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties which necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties.

It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to
convey the Murong property to the petitioners.

Although the CA’s decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R.
No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against
RBBI unjust and inequitable.

The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and declared thatthe Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI covers the
Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the VLTs and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong property under TCT
No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties
in accordance with this decision.

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