There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction: first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the

words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed;

VERBA LEGIS

If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and express a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; and

SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW

When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to
absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature
in

THIRD, ut magis valeat quam pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law
controls its letter.7

G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949

WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as Collector of
Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping
Administration, respondents: PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, intervenor.

Tañada, Pelaez & Teehankee, Pandatun, Arches & Sayo, and De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for respondents.
Roxas, Picazo & Mejia for intervenor.
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Miguel Cuenco and Nicolas Belmonte as amici curiae.

MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from cancelling the registration
certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from rescinding the sale of three
vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine
Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed between
them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The Philippine Shipowners' Association was later allowed to intervene and it filed its answer against the
petitioner.

The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen, and this Court holds that
he is one.

Article IV of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William Chiongbian, was elected to
and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis. This fact is sufficiently
established by the evidence submitted to this Court; by the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation cited in
Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown
and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.

it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein petitioner, having
been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by
virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then
a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having
become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our
jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV, Constitution) is strictly
personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this contention they offer two principal
arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by the Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino
citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its
framers. Secondly, it is argued that the original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase — "and their
descendants," — which was deleted from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to
be strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his descendants.

With regard to the first argument, it may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the
full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document. They adopted said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in
subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would
have so clearly stated.

The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere deletion of the phrase — "and their
descendants," — is not determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because the learned framers of our
Constitution considered it superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by
subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail
over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.

Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine Shipping Administration on
the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino, is
without merit. Such was not a deliberate misrepresentation but an error. which any person not versed in the law is
prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and
not by birth.

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby granted and respondent
Customs officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner's vessels and respondent
Philippine Administration is hereby enjoined from rescinding the sale of the three vessels made to petitioner. No costs.
It is ordered.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted for the issuance of the writ.

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein
expressed.
2)“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims,
safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of
the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the extent and therein
stated…The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the
will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law
or take any action “not prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the Constitution.
3)“A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute
unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to
avoid a constitutional question whenever this is possible.

5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the supreme
court, that is why it is CALLED “CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to consideration, and if the
construction is contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to great weight. In
addition, Long acquiescence in such an announced construction so strengthens it that it should not be changed
unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.

A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.

A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be followed.

A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the legislature" for its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of
a statute is challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional.
Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the
ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a
general rule, "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse
impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from the express limitations of the
Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and
palpable to justify the court’s holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.

9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established. “The fact that many things of a
diverse nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not
objectionable, if what is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and
natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient. “[I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency
of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature
unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis of a particular act must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we must
look to both the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge
the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a
hypothetical situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of facts can be
reasonably conceived that would support it." But where the statute creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or
religion) or where it affects a fundamental constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the
"strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may
revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial
law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
“militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.
 Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act – Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.

9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant

abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he

executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is

void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a

resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place

where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately

preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of

votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and

vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution

for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required

to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for

non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,

domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a

resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The

domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,

an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to

the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for

purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If

the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified

as an absentee voter.
 2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the

intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation

of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To

interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to

usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential

and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in

no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS

1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the parties are to be
deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is begun, unless the amended statute shows a
clear intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is guided by the fundamental principles of statutory
construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute is always construed to operate
prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to future cases unless
there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new provision, which shows that
the new law was intended to have a retrospective effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against
a retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation
unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive
effect will be given to a statute only when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear,
explicit, and unequivocal terms.

G.R. No. 79543.

October 16, 1996

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old
hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence
and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side
of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo admitted
involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely ,Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack
Miravalles (who turned out to be adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30,
1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero.
Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should favour him as an
accused.

Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect and petitioner’s
extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence.

RULING:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who is not a
habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

ORDINARY MEANING

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases used in statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which is supported by the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be generally understood.

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have their usual and ordinary
meaning.

2) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a statute with "a view toward
harmonizing it with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must
give it its ordinary meaning.

Parts of a Supreme Court Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:

1. Statement of the case;

2. Statement of facts;
3. Issues or assignment of errors;
4. Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and finally,
 5. Dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an
epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the
case. In some cases — particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific,
technical or otherwise rare subject matters — a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the
specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the important principles
applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring
philosophy of law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first instance, this part states
whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is
a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge — quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information
— and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition
for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.

In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and
the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a
crime different from or graver than that charged.

Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of
the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea
of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further
consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be
useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query — whether or not
they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the
records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case
was decided by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts

There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge
summarizes — without comment — the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the
synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is
summarized according to the judges best light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the
judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions are. Finally, through a combination of objective and
subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of the
facts.

In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of
fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most
criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the
evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the
facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions should be explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and
legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions
of the former. Conversely, the lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in
a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve
questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by
the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of
facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factual antecedents should
be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that
the parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds
no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.

3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief,
may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the
ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the
appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may be restated in
clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for
substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal
cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are
errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors
that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly
raised.

4. The Courts Ruling

This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case
may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several
issues, each one of them should be separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the
parties should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better
to resolve the former preliminarily.

5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty
imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an
acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held
for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report,
within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted
or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties
should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative
contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should
be terminated by according the proper relief. The proper relief usually depends upon what the parties seek in their
pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in
the decision. Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not
necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the
decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct.
Stare Decisis

Principle of Stare Decisis

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final

decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed

settled and closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary

for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil

Code.[51]

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the

United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this

legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm.” The doctrine

started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule

to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its

application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal

authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle or principles

necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”

The doctrine migrated to theUnited States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According

toHamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent “arbitrary discretion in the courts.”Madisonagreed but
stressed that “x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.”

Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that

would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a deep internal conflict between the

concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that

the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.”

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy’s observation although stare decisis developed

its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as

vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the

same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis,
has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in

stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory

stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare

decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations
still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.

The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the

discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable

Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have

said about it.” In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice

Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other

federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by

the Congress itself.” This stance reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited

resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it

promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare

decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands

of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are

stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in

192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate

but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public

transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.” Thus, by

freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of

inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order

to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain

provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first

ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing

during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should

be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and

changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the

prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned

Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would

lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine

whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned

doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule

of significant application or justification.[53]

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not

be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was

also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained

that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted.

It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have

to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in

accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to

wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging

the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of

constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[16]

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts
are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as

anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another concern is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court

consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence,

a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual

challenging it.[17]

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and

taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice ofdirect allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and

the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious

constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds.Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow

be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of

public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords “ripeness” to the present controversy.

Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice

concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely

involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds

possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against

erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been

committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed

committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation

and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists adefinite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the

Court.

Anent locus standi, “the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement.[18] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of

the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court

so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”[19] In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the

general public, asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is

affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.”[20] Thus,

taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money

is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law.[21] Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the

mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’
suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of

Public Works[23] is authority in support of the petitioner:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied.]

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The

ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,

warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

x x x."

CASE LAW DOCTRINE/ LAW OF THE CASE

We start our consideration by re-stating the petitioners basic position: the RTC decision has become final because of
Pantangcos clearly erroneous remedy; this final decision is now the law of the case between the parties.
The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question
on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the question settled by the
appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means that whatever
is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.1

Based on this definition, the petitioners' heavy reliance on the law of the case doctrine is clearly misplaced.
No opinion has been made in a former appeal that can be considered the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties thereafter. There is no remanded case to which a previous ruling on appeal applies.

Rather than the law of the case doctrine, the petitioners may actually be invoking the binding effect of what
they view as a final RTC decision on the theory that the RTC decision already determined the rights of the parties with
finality and binding effect. This is the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, defined and
explained as follows:
 Res Judicata : a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the
same parties.

3. What is the ratio decidendi of a case? What is the difference between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta?
ANSWER
The ratio decidendi (the reason for deciding) is the legal reasoning upon which the decision in a particular case is
based and may be used by judges in future cases when confronted with similar facts. Unlike the ratio decidendi, the
obiter dicta (singular obiter dictum) are observations made by the judge on a matter of law. The obiter dicta are not
essential for the decision, and are therefore not part of the binding precedent established by the case, but may be
persuasive.

Law of the case vs res judicata

The doctrine of law of the case" is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It relates
entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The doctrine
of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may
include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general
proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016 ]

PATRICK A. CARONAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,"
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's
identity and falsely representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar
Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio[2] R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the
older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976.[3] Both of them
completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 1993[4] and
respondent in 1991.[5] Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a
degree in Business Administration in 1997.[6] He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.[7] In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has
two (2) daughters.[8] Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store
Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.[9]

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM),
where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992. [10] In 1993, he
was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved
to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.[11] Since then, respondent never went back to
school to earn a college degree.[12]

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a law
school in Nueva Vizcaya.[13] Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St.
Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.[14] Complainant
brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.[15]

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City.[16] Nevertheless,
complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.[17]

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the
head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving
respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."[18] Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and
asked to identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from
the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4)
records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."[19] Complainant later learned that
the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and
estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.[20]
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant
took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is
Richard A. Caronan.[21] However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices
requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him
to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.[22] On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him
that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.[23]
Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent
tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.[24]
Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.[25]

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear
for his own safety and security.[26] He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually
forced him to resign from his job at PSC.[27] Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.[28]

In his Answer,[29] respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-
2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed[30] the administrative case[31] filed by Agtarap against him, and which
case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.[32] Moreover, according to him,
complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman.[33]

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.[34] Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.[35] On such date, however, both parties
again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order[36] directing them to file their respective
position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.[37]

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his
Report and Recommendation,[38] finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name,
identity, and academic records.[39] He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and
did not present any proof to prove his identity.[40] On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."[41]
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.[42] However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A.
Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.[43]

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."[44] These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.[45] Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained
the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.[46] He also
recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of
the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions
against respondent.[47]

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,[48] adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the
Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.[49] Respondent himself also
stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.[50] This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick
A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.[51] Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in
the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."[52] Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous
documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the
University of Makati bearing his photograph;[53] (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;[54] and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.[55]

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish,
history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a
year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.[56] Clearly, respondent has not
completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a
law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records
renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
to be granted to everyone who demands it.[57] Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.[58] In
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,[59] the Court explained the essence of good
moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed
the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually
caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is
essential in those who would be lawyers.[61] This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.[62]

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of
several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where
one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.[63]

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or
REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts
of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.