The Carvaka Theory of Pramanas: A Restatement Pradeep P. Gokhale Philosophy East and West, Vol. 43, No. 4. (Oct., 1993), pp. 675-682. Stable URL hitp:/flinks.jstor-org/sic?sici=003 1-822 1% 281993 10%2943%3A4%3C675%3ATCTOPA%3E2.0,.CO%3B2-4 Philosophy East and West is currently published by University of Hawaii Press. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www jstor.orgyjoumals/uhp hm. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ Fri Sep 29 11:06:18 2006THE CARVAKA THEORY OF PRAMANAS: ‘A RESTATEMENT The Carvaka, or Lokayata, system of philosophy has been treated either ‘asa permanent parvapaksa, an obviously weak position that is vulnerable to all sorts of objections, or, contrarly, as an obviously strong position because of its down-to-earth approach to the world and to life. Both these treatments seem to be unfair to the system. The former is so because it neglects the fact that the Carvaka system has often been presented in two forms: as a naive position’ and as a sophisticated one, where the sophisticated one may not be so vulnerable as the naive. And the latter, strong, treatment is unfair because it does not take seriously the need for a rational restatement and reconstruction of the system so that it can resist the various objections raised by rival systems. It is precisely this task of restatement and reconstruction of the CCarvaka system that | want to begin in this essay, at however rudimentary a level. For the sake of brevity, I will concentrate here on the Carvaka theory of pramanas. We find two prima facie incompatible views as representing the Carvaka theory of pramaias: (1) Pratyaksa is the only praména. (2) Pratyaksaiis the major pramana, but anumana of a certain kind is, also praman Now while trying to restate the Carvaka theory of praménas in the light of the two views above, we are likely to face a dilemma. f we accept the first view as the authentic Carvaka view, then we will be justified in doing so because at least we are not mixing up the Carvaka view with the view of any other system of Indian philosophy, but at the same time what we present as the authentic Carvaka view will easily be vulnerable to objections from rival systems. On the other hand, if we accept the second view as the authentic Carvaka view, then that view will not so easily be vulnerable to objections—but then it may be difficult to distin- ‘guish this view from the view of others, such as Vaidesikas and Buddhists, who also accept pratyaksa and anumana as the only praménas. My attempt in this eassy will be to restate and reconstruct the Carvaka view of pramanas in such a way that the dilemma might be ‘overcome. It can be done, | think, in the following way. We find two senses in which the word Pramdna is used in ancient Indian philosophical literature (According to one usage, pramana is a means or instrument or source of true cognition. But in this sense, praména need not necessarily yield true cognition. What is a means of true cognition may also function occasionally as a means of false cognition. Let us call this sense the instrumental sense of ‘pramana’ Pradeep P. Gokhale Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Poona Philosophy East & West Volume 43, Number 4 ‘October 1993 675-682 ©1993 by University of Hawaii Press 675Philosophy East & West 676 (2) According to the other usage, pramdna means an authoritative means of knowledge or an authority. In this sense pramana is that means ‘or source of knowledge which always yields true cognition and true cognition alone. Consequently pramana can serve as a justifying ground for knowledge. Let us call this second sense the authoritative sense of ‘pramana’ The Carvaka approach to pramanas can be restated in the light of the distinction above, as follows: (a) Pratyaksa is the only pramana in the authoritative sense. (b) A certain kind of anuména is also pramana, but only in the instru- mental sense. Let me attempt to substantiate this briefly. Pratyaksa is a means of immediate cognition. We can be certain about our cognition of the object which is immediately given to us. Anumdna and the other pramanas on the other hand are the means to mediate cognition. We cannot be Certain about the truth of the cognition that they yield. Therefore, per- ception is the only pramdna in the authoritative sense. This defense of pratvaksa as the only authentic source of knowledge needs further qualification. Pratyaksa has been classified into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka (which roughly mean nonjudgmental and judgmental, respectively) by Buddhists and others. Of these two, nonjudgmental perception is truly the source of immediate cognition. One cannot be as certain about judgmental perception as one can be about nonjudg- mental perception. Thus the Carvaka defense of pratyaksa as the only pramana in the authoritative sense) has to be qualified and revised in the light of the distinction between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. Now when the Carvakas deny pramana-hood to anumana,itsin this strong sense, the authoritative sense, and not in the weaker or instru- mental sense of the term pramdna, In the weaker sense, anumédna of a certain kind also is pramana. But then the next question is: which kind of anumdina is pramaga according to the Carvakas, although in the weaker sense of the term pramana? Here two different proposals are suggested by the Carvakas. We will consider each one, separately. |. First Proposal: Empirically testable Anumana Is Pramana Jayantabhatta, in his Nyayamaiijari refers to the view that anumdna is of two kinds: utpannapratiti and utpadyapratiti, The inference of fire from smoke belongs to the former kind. The inference of transcendent entities ike God belongs to the latter. Hence the former kind of anumdna is acceptable as pramana, but the latter is not. Jayantabhatta attributes this view to what he calls more educated (susiksitatara) Carvakas.* Now what is this distinction? Utpannapratiti means that which is experienced in the past, and utpadyapratiti means that which is yet to be experienced. Although these are supposed to characterize anumédna,