CASE DIGEST LIGON-CONSING

1. People vs Ligon

Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor.
He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell
down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.

Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability

Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.

Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be
established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and applying
the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and
omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.

People vs. Ligon

It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

In the case at bar, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability
of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of testimonies of both prosecution and the defense witnesses at
the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that
Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage
done.

2. Rufo Mauricio Construction vs. IAC

The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction (rendered against him by the
lower court) became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment
imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for
here, no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as
innocent) but from a quasi-delict, as in this case. The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his
driver (unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the
selection and supervision of his driver).

FACTS:

Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the RTC of Legaspi with homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence
because he had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven the Izusu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction. The
vehicle hit the Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum and directly caused his untimely death. Cabiliza filed a
Notice of Appeal but his appeal did not pursue because he died. A notice of death was filed by his counsel and on the same
notice, Atty. Beltran manifested Rufo Mauricio’s intention to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as
employer who is subsidiarily liable. The lower court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him as appeallant
for the civil aspect of the case. On motion of the heirs of the victim, the court ordered a writ of execution. However, the writ
was returned unsatisfied because Cabiliza was found insolvent as manifested by the Certificate of Insolvency issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The victim’s widow filed a motion for the Issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to be
enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co. This was granted by the lower
court and which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, Rufo filed an appeal to SC.

ISSUE:

W/N, the dismissal of criminal case against the accused wipes out not only the employee’s primarily civil liability but also the
employer’s subsidiary liability;

W/N, the petitioner can be condemned to pay the damages without the opportunity to examine the witness;

RULING:

No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction( which became final and
executory ) extinguished his criminal liability to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines , but not
his civil liability should the liability or obligation aris e (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused not
having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-deli ct (See Arts. 2176 and
2177, Civil Code), as in this case. The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless
said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his driver).

Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the
purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and the amount
of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to
present in his defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the
purpose adverted to hereinabove.

3. CHUA V CA

Chua vs. CA and Hao G.R. No. 150793 November 19, 2004

Facts: PR Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioner for committing acts of
falsification by falsifying the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors by causing it to appear in
said Minutes that LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said
accused fully well knew that said Lydia Hao was never present during the meeting.

Petitioner alleges that respondent Lydia Hao has no the authority to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no
Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit. For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the
concept of a derivative suit.

Issue: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA
No. 99-94846?

Held: Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23, where a corporation is an injured party, its
power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative
suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the
officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the
suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest.

A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the
suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation
has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the
corporation.

In the Criminal Case, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose
subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, SRC is an offended party. Hence, SRC has a cause of
action. And the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action.

However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action against petitioner. Private
respondent was the one who instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the
corporation. This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit
to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint
that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who
may wish to join him in the suit. It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is
the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must
be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring
subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as
party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.

In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the
benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of
a derivative suit.

Chua vs. CA

Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable.
When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called
the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the
criminal action.

III.CONCURRENCE OF CAUSES OF ACTION

A. MEANING
1. FEBTC V. CA G.R.NO 108164

Facts:

Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later
on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank
expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.

On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for
review.

There is merit in this appeal.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are
also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:

The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that
might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only
where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether
a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim
is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by
itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

2. SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. V. TANGCO

FACTS:

On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch in Quezon City to renew
her time deposit. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside of her
residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology Bank to deposit the firearm for safekeeping, suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. Evangeline’s husband, Lauro,
together with his six minor children filed with the RTC of QC a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their
right to file a separate civil action on the said criminal case. Pajarillo was subsequently convicted of homicide in 19 January
2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the decision with modification on the penalty on 31 July 2000. On 14 January 1998,
respondents filed with the RTC of Marikina City a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline
and against Safeguard Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage committed by its security guard. The respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of Lauro Tangco et. al. ordering Pajarillo and Safeguard Security agency
Inc. ,jointly and severally, to pay: a. ₱157,430.00 as actual damages; b. ₱50,000 as death indemnity; c. ₱1million pesos as
moral damages; d. ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages; e. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.

The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense; giving no weight to his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around
the area prior to the incident given that Pajarillo had not made any such reports to the head office and the police authorities.
Pajarillo should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care in ascertaining the matter instead of shooting her instantly.
The RTC likewise found Safeguard to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to show
that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by simply showing that it required its guards to attend trainings and
seminars which is not the supervision as contemplated under the law. It includes the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.

The CA modified that decision of the RTC saying that Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is only subsidiarily liable. A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed and denied by the CA, hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline

2. Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

RATIO:

1. Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline as upheld by both the RTC and CA in separate decisions. The SC
affirms these decisions since based on the evidence presented, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claims that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously which Pajarillo mistook as a bank robbery which led him
to draw his service firearm and shot Evangeline.

2. Yes, Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to the respondents. The nature
of the respondents’ cause of action is determined in the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. In the complaint,
the respondents are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their indirect responsibility for the injury
caused by Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176. Thus, the civil action filed by respondents was
not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi delict which is a separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the
quasi-delict committed by Pajarillo and is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. The Court agrees with the RTC’s finding that Safeguard had exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo
since records show that he underwent psychological and neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course for security
guards, as well as police and NBI clearances. However, Safeguard was not diligent in providing trainings, classroom instructions
and continuous evaluation of the security guard’s performance. Thus, the SC affirms with modification that the civil liability of
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is solidary and primary under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

B. CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO UNDER ART 100 RPC

1. DIONISIO V .ALYENDIA
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the
concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." ( mckee v iac 211 scra 536)

2. andamo v.iac 191 scra 204

FACTS:

Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors

and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad

Andamo's land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered

the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to

destruction

July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action

February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages

CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal

Case

spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a

quasi-delict

ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety

HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE

 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

 (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff

 (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond

 (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages

incurred by the plaintiff

 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant

case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained

and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation

 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides

that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC

UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which

require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of

others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so

constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can

withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or

a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.


Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil

liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or

omission of the defendant.


 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the

clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the

result of the latter

C.INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITIES

Article 31 of the civil code, intentional torts under artciles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the civil
code; article 33 of the civil code.

SANTOS V PIZARRO, G.R.NO 151452

Facts:Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiplehomicide and multiple physical injuries
due to the vehicle collision between Viron Transit busdriven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However the municipal circuit trial
court was no pronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages to the respondents pursuant to
their reservation to file a separate civil action citing Sibayans judgment conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron
Transit. The petitioners opposed and contends that the motion to dismiss that be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminal
action is the prescription and therefore it is within the period since it was just barely two (2)years had elapse.The complaint
was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it
prescribes four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners filed a reconsideration that the complaint
is not based on quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten(10) years upon
the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was denied by the trial court based on
quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities
therefore it prescribes already.On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it was dismissed the
same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It also denies the petitioners motion for and the petitioners failed to allege that
the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal. Petitioners insist
that it should been forced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on
the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction. Private
respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176
and 2180of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no
reservation tof ile a separate civil case was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed the
adverse order of the trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the private respondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of
their arguments. Hence this petition.

Issues:Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer?

Held:The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liability of the employer. Because the
Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should not have dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the
merits, this does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil waives the other civil actions but
this is merely an avoidance of multiple suits. The action for damages based on quasi- delict should be considered waived no
occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondets as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.

A. ICL from Law (art.31)

B. ICL from Intentional torts I (Art 32)

VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE, G.R. NO 141309

FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos per pack.”Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying“Champion,” “Hope,”and“More”
(all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus,
when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted
merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which,
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law
(the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and
not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been
rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer,
and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an
evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

C. ICL from Intentional Torts II (art.34)

D.ICL from Quasi-Delicts (art.2176)

E. ICL in cases of Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art.33)

1. CARANDANG V. SANTIAGO 97 PHIL. 94

G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

LABRADOR, J.

Facts:

The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago
suspending the civil case filed by the petitioner against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to await the result of a
criminal case filed by said petitioner against the defendants.

In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. The
court anchored its decision on the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the defendants
were charged with frustrated homicide and not for physical injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the court of first instance is correct.

Ruling:

No. The supreme court in its ruling decided in favor of the appellant, the term physical injuries just like the words defamation
and fraud mentioned in the aforementioned article were used in its generic sense. It does not pertain to the “physical
injury” stated in the Revised Penal Code, since the defendant in his attempt to kill the plaintiff caused him bodily injury the
court deemed it proper for the plaintiff to invoke article 33 of the Civil Code.

2. CONSING V PEOPLE, G.R. NO 161075