Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MSI D2021
Summary: Cash Energy, Inc., et al sought to recover clean-up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) from defendant corporations (Defendants).
Doctrine: A complaint alleging environmental claims has a high specificity of pleading requirement.
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff Cash Energy, Inc., et al (to be referred collectively as “Cash Energy”) owned a lot in Massachusetts. It constructed a
condominium building on said lot.
Over a period of years, defendant corporations engaged in the storage and transfer of chemical solvents on a site adjacent
to Cash Energy’s lot. As a result, Cash Energy filed a complaint against defendant corporations to recover cleanup costs under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Cash Energy also sued four individuals (Weiner was one of them) who were officers of the defendant corporations; Cash
Energy alleged that these individuals participated in and exercised control over the activities of defendant corporations.
Cash Energy’s complaint contains the following allegations:
o Count 8: That defendants (both corporate and individual) violated Section 11 of the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act (MCPE)
o Other counts: (not specifically provided in text) That defendants violated CERCLA and common law
Defendant corporations filed their MTD. The four individual defendants also filed their respective MTDs. Cash Energy opposed
such motion.
Issue Ratio
Is there a high On the topic of claims against individuals vis-à-vis claims against corporations:
specificity
The governing standard has been stated in this way: "What is required is some showing of direct
requirement for
personal involvement by the corporate officer in some decision or action which is causally related to
environmental
plaintiff's injury." It may be sufficient that "the record indicates an issue of fact concerning [the
claim?
officer's] possible involvement in matters that might have caused the plaintiff's injury," or concerning
whether the officer is "the guiding spirit" in the tortious affair. Nonetheless, a problem remains as to
Is CERCLA yet
what level of specificity of allegations of involvement and causation is required to survive a motion
another area
to dismiss.
where a high
o CERCLA and other analogous statutes have established bases for legal responsibility that are
standard of
beyond the standards of trespass and negligence as provided in common law.
particularity will
o As to MCPE, the Court stated that the said state statute conforms to the CERCLA which is a
be required?
federal law.
Both CERCLA and MCPE apply to the current "owner and operator" of the site, and Cash Energy
YES
attempts to place the individual defendants in this category. The meaning of "owner and operator" is
in dispute. A number of courts have held that the crucial characteristic identifying a person or entity as
coming within the phrase "owner and operator" is the "authority to control the handling and disposal
of hazardous substances. Many of the court opinions to say that the mere ability to exercise control
will suffice, because the object of the inquiry is whether the individuals had the capacity to prevent the
harm. Other courts, however, have held that "more than mere ability to exercise control" is required
to support the conclusion that a party is liable. However, this Court decided not to rule on this dispute
in the definition as the same is not indispensable in the current issue of specificity of pleading.
the plaintiffs give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the plaintiff[s'] claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests." And the generous policy of amendment mandated by Rule 15 further promotes the aim
that disputes be decided on the merits.
Other relevant Federal Rules provisions that the Court mentioned:
o First, Rule 9(b) explicitly recognizes an exception for allegations of fraud and mistake, where
a higher standard of particularity is required.
o Second, Rule 8(f), stating that all pleadings shall be construed so as to do "substantial justice,"
may be read as requiring judges to exercise some degree of discretion rather than invariably
applying the general rule of notice pleading.
o (most relevant to the topic) Third, the Rules provide for a "motion for more definite
statement" as a formal method of challenging a pleading that is "so vague or ambiguous that
a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." This Rule authorizes
the court, upon failure to obey its order for a more definite statement, to "strike the pleading
to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just."
More often, a court concluding that a complaint fails particularity requirements
either:
(1) enters an interlocutory order dismissing the complaint, but allowing
leave to amend within a specified time, or
(2) allows leave to amend and defers ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Either type of order has an effect closely analogous to that of an order pursuant to
Rule 12(e) that unless a more definite statement is filed within a specific time a
further appropriate order will be entered. If a complaint were stricken because of
non-compliance with an order for more definite statement, dismissal would be an
obvious possibility.
There is a danger that this tendency will be carried too far. The First Circuit's decision in New England
Data Services, Inc. v. Becher explicitly takes account of the need to strike a balance among the
conflicting interests at stake. A specificity standard for pleading must protect against the misuse of
frivolous claims without excluding claimants who lack access to the most cogent evidence that would
support their claims but nonetheless can allege a reasonable basis for believing that it exists.
o In some instances, a person is unable to allege with specificity precisely because the relevant
evidence is in the exclusive possession of the opponent, who will not disclose except under
the compulsion of court sanctioned discovery processes.
o The First Circuit has observed: "Where there are multiple defendants ... and where the plaintiff
was not directly involved in the alleged transaction, the burden on the plaintiff to know exactly
[the factual basis of an alleged claim] ... is not realistic."
o In the context of RICO mail and wire fraud, the First Circuit concluded that courts should refrain
from automatic dismissal of inadequate complaints and should instead decide as to whether
a sufficient factual basis to warrant the allowance of discovery has been alleged.
With the foregoing, the question “Is there a high specificity requirement for environmental claim?” is
answered in the affirmative.
In summary, the Court said that it is necessary to impose a high specificity requirement in
environmental claims because of (1) possible severe liability in case an individual is found guilty of
environmental violations and (2) expensive litigations costs. However, this should not be an absolute
rule, but should be tempered by conditions as in New England Data Services. (The Court’s statement is
duplicated below.)
o Although an analogy to fraud is strained, CERCLA involves many of the circumstances that have
led courts to invoke higher standards of specificity in other contexts. The consequences of
individual liability for an environmental violation may be severe.
o Even more relevant to the present issue is the fact that defending against a non-meritorious
claim even one that upon reasonable inquiry could be determined to be patently non-
meritorious can be very expensive. The cost of establishing that a claim lacks merit is more
likely to be subject to reasonable controls if some standard of specificity of pleading is
enforced.
o I conclude that it is a reasonable prediction that higher courts, including the First Circuit, will
extend specificity of pleading requirements to CERCLA cases, with appropriate subsidiary
conditions such as were fashioned in New England Data Services.
RULING
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 7) is granted with regard to Count VIII of the Verified Complaint.
(2) The claims against individual defendant in Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and IX will be dismissed unless, on or before July 31, 1991,
plaintiffs file an amended complaint that pleads at least an outline or summary of the factual basis for the claims rather than mere
conclusions.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
NOTES