Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2 (2017) 196–213
brill.com/hima
Dhruv Jain
York Centre for Asian Research, York University, Toronto
dhruvj@gmail.com
Abstract
Keywords
Maia Ramnath, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global
Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2011
A Necessary Corrective
The orthodox account thus fails to fully realise the positive impact of the
Ghadar party through: 1) their capacity to bring together a number of different
influences, ideologies and movements under a common platform; 2) the spread
of revolutionary propaganda in India from 1913 to 1920, at a time in which no
group in India was capable of doing the same; and 3) the laying down the
foundations by roving groups of Ghadarites going from village to village, all of
which would become vital for the next phase of the revolutionary movement.3
The Ghadar movement and party were predominately based in the Indian
diaspora. The majority of migrants were not politically conscious and had
moved to North America for personal advancement.4 However, Indian
students, like their working-class counterparts, found their opportunities
limited due to the racism that they experienced, which resulted in a sizeable
minority developing seditious ideas of their own that were cultivated by the
to-be Ghadarites.5 The struggle against racism and deportation, combined with
an ideological newspaper, allowed the Hindustan Association in Vancouver,
an organisational precursor to the Ghadar party, to spread the ideas of anti-
British anti-colonialism.6 Other efforts to form similar organisations were
started in Seattle, Portland and Astoria. In particular the Indian Independence
League formed in Portland and Astoria would serve as seeds for the future
Ghadar party.7 However, it ought to be noted that the relationship between
anti-racist/anti-immigrant and anti-colonial activities always remained
tenuous, especially as some put a greater emphasis on either aspect of the
relationship; this became evident in Portland where the organisation became
more enmeshed in anti-racist/anti-immigrant activism, rather than the anti-
colonial movement that became identified with the increasingly California-
based Ghadar movement.8 In 1913, these organisations coalesced to form
the Pacific Coast Hindi Association.9 However, reminiscent of debates that
generally existed in the revolutionary socialist movement, the question of
organisation was raised. The problem was condensed thusly: ‘who were
the real Ghadarites? Har Dayal’s use of the word in the first issue referred
expansively to all of India’s patriotic revolutionaries to date, encompassing all
the Bengalis, all the Punjabis, and the activists in London and Paris circles.
Yet at the same time he was stressing the need to form a party in the more
specific sense’.10 Thus, one ought to speak of both a Ghadar movement and the
Ghadar party. The Ghadarites, as a whole, were thus not centrally organised,
with an organisational headquarters, but rather a decentralised network of
militants held together by the newspaper based out of San Francisco that
served as an ideological headquarters.11 This ideological unity was limited
inasmuch as numerous Ghadarites shared a number of other ideological
commitments including Hindu nationalism, Marxism and pan-Islamism.12
‘Yet,’ Ramnath argues, ‘the links were causal and contingent, and though many
observers and historians have tended to dismiss Ghadar’s political orientation
13 Ibid.
14 Ramnath 2011a, p. 7.
15 Ramnath 2011a, p. 37.
16 Ramnath 2011a, p. 39.
17 Ramnath 2011a, p. 44.
18 Ramnath 2011a, p. 50.
since 1907.28 However, once again things did not work out as planned. First
of all, Har Dayal’s group was unable to work with already established pan-
Islamist organisations in the country, who regarded his English newspaper as
simply Hindu nationalist propaganda with occasional and tokenistic attempts
to appeal to Muslims.29 Second, the strong Hindu revivalist underpinnings of
Har Dayal’s politics made his attempts to organise Muslims unpopular.30 Third,
despite Turkish government support for the project, they remained suspicious
of Har Dayal’s efforts to organise anti-British rebellions, and were unable to
overcome existing ethnic/regional/national divisions.31 As Ramnath notes,
‘In other words, true Pan-Islamic unity was a mirage beyond the power of any
propaganda to embody.’ In subsequent years, the BIC would try several more
times, including the colourfully named ‘Silk Letters Plot’ and the Singapore
mutiny, to make this pan-Islamic unity a reality to no avail.32 However, a far
more significant aspect of these attempts was that they served as the historical
background for the Muhajirin. In 1917, the Bolshevik government called on
Muslims, as such, around the world, but in particular in the Central Asia/
Transcaucasus region, to play their respective role in the world revolution
in ‘struggle against Western imperialism, especially as manifest in its most
advanced form, British capitalism’.33 This strategy included the military and
political training of cadres from Asian backgrounds as an irregular ancillary
force of the Red Army.34 Muslims inspired by the Khilafatist movement had
been travelling to Afghanistan to join the Provisional Government of India since
1915, since they had come to consider India to be Dar-al-Harab, or under infidel
rule, and thus chose to quit India.35 ‘They might be content simply to dwell
elsewhere within the Dar-al-Islam, but they might also feel morally obligated to
fight: whether to defend the sultan-caliph’s realm or to launch rebellion against
British rule in India directly.’36 A small group of these Muhajirin ‘were courted by
the Red Army and attacked by the Turkmen counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘were
persuaded to transfer their revolutionary zeal from the caliph in Istanbul to the
revolutionary regime in Moscow.’37 Initially trained in political and military
Ramnath in this regard does not take into account how the failure of the
Ghadar mutiny demonstrated that the basic underlying conditions which
had necessitated the Ghadar party had changed. Har Dayal wrote in Bande
Mataram in 1910, three years prior to the formation of Ghadar, ‘We must …
try to strengthen all groups of workers outside India. The centre of gravity
of political work has been shifted from Calcutta, Poona, and Lahore to Paris,
Geneva, Berlin, London and New York.’53 Future leaders of the CPI such as
S.A. Dange and Muzaffar Ahmad had yet to become communists and remained
nationalists with radical inclinations.54 It was only in 1922 that S.A. Dange
would form the first domestic socialist newspaper under the influence of Roy’s
émigré-produced newspaper and publications.55 Furthermore, working-class
and revolutionary movements were growing across India, and in 1920 the All-
India Trade Union Congress was formed.56 The centre of gravity had shifted
once again to Madras, Kolkata, Bombay and Kanpur.57 These developments
also paralleled a political shift. Ramnath notes that
Rattan Singh attributed to lack of experience) and (b) failure to link the
vanguard insurrection movement with the masses.58
Ramnath, defending the Ghadar party’s own historical record against the
Ghadarites’ own retrospection and summation, states that the latter were
not correct in their analysis as, 1) ‘conspiratorial action was necessary only
when repression made open organising impossible’ and 2) there had been
no failure in developing mass organisations, whilst admitting that they had
failed to build a revolutionary organisation within India.59 Regardless, Ghadar
party members who remained politically active, especially in Left politics,
regarded their earlier political work to be symptomatic of political immaturity.
They advocated a shift from an emphasis on rebellion alone to political work
amongst workers and peasants. This shift is apparent in Ramnath’s retelling
of the passing of the torch from Santokh Singh to Sohan Singh Josh. In the
encounter between Singh and Josh, Singh tells Josh to ‘go cautiously’, which
Josh took to mean that he needed to ‘patiently organise the workers and
peasants to fight their struggles … do not indulge in bombastic slogans.’60
Ramnath’s contradictory argument is clear, for example, when she posits that
Kirti’s articles, which argued that Bolshevik land distribution policies under
the NEP were a model for the distribution of land and power in India, were
in fact evidence of a ‘more politically decentralised and economically mixed
social vision [that] makes Ghadar-Kirti communism quite legible as the
ideological kin of a Makhnovian libertarian socialism.’61 It cannot be disputed
that the different communist groups around India, including Kirti which
has been formed by former Ghadarites, all had their own understandings of
the significance of the Comintern and its ideology; however, this reflected
a debate within the communist movement in India and was not evidence
of the Ghadarites being completely apart from the CPI. The Ghadarites, in
effect, paralleled Lih’s argument that ‘[in] each of the various clashes over
these issues within Russian Social Democracy, Lenin can be easily located.
He is always on the side making the most confident assumptions about the
empirical possibility of a mass underground Social-Democratic movement.’62
The Ghadarites similarly supported those elements that emphasised the
possibility of mass underground armed movements, whether it be the Red
Ideological Hodgepodge
It is this very odd proviso that plagues Ramnath’s book throughout. It is difficult
to imagine an attempt to reconstruct an antiauthoritarian history of India
that does not take into consideration the central problems of contemporary
Indian politics: 1) Hindu revivalism and far-right Hindu nationalism; 2) caste
politics; and 3) the politics of gender. Indeed, Decolonizing Anarchism can be
regarded as dangerously naive. Furthermore, Ramnath does little to discuss
the contradictory nature of the different movements and people that she
would deem as antiauthoritarian. It would be difficult to proceed biography
by biography; however, it will suffice to analyse the case of V.D. Sarvarkar,
M.K. Gandhi, and her scattered comments on Dalit movements.
Ramnath wants to pull apart anarchism from the far right inasmuch as they
are commonly found associated with one another in the Indian ‘mainline
Left’ imaginary.72 However, Ramnath does irrevocable damage to her own
argument through the inclusion in her history of the founder of the far-right
Hindu-nationalist movement, V.D. Sarvarkar. Ramnath begins her history of
antiauthoritarian anti-colonialism with the émigré revolutionary nationalist
circles in Paris, London etc. This is unsurprising given Ramnath’s earlier
research; however, what is surprising is Ramnath’s attention to Sarvarkar. It is
indeed true that Sarvarkar, for a brief period, was centrally involved in circles
that agitated for and provided the means for the ‘propaganda of the deed’.
Sarvarkar did indeed send twenty revolvers to India upon hearing of the arrest
of his brother by the British for seditious activities.73 And as Ramnath points
out, Sarvarkar’s arrest and calls for his release did become a cause célèbre for
émigré revolutionary nationalists.74 However, Ramnath is aware of Sarvarkar’s
role in Indian politics and concludes the chapter by explaining that, ‘Sarvarkar
became a founding hero of the Hindu far Right, while other Abhinava Bharat
members like Har Dayal … became leaders of the dissident Left. From that
crossroads, this is the path we take now.’75 The inclusion of Sarvarkar in
any history of the Left, authoritarian and antiauthoritarian, cannot but be
controversial. Sumit Sarkar, the prominent Marxist historian, for example,
discusses these very same activities, but does not conflate these activities
with an antiauthoritarian movement.76 The few years that Sarvarkar spent
in circles that advocated propaganda of the deed is quickly overshadowed
by his lifelong role as the father of the Hindu far-right, thus one cannot but
be perturbed by Ramnath’s inclusion of him. Furthermore, this crossroads
is not as simple as Ramnath suggests, inasmuch as Hindu revivalist politics
is repeatedly mentioned without comment. For example, when Ramnath
provides a biographical sketch of Har Dayal, she mentions that ‘[biographer]
Emily Brown suggests that Har Dayal was having trouble squaring his more
overtly Hindu ideals with Cama and Rana’s focus on international socialism.’77
Ramnath defending Har Dayal claims that, ‘Har Dayal’s new “religion” was a
self-consciously modernist and unmistakably anarchist vision.’78 Ramnath
unfortunately seems to have forgotten her own chapter in Haj and Utopia
where she discusses how Har Dayal’s attempts to organise Muslim soldiers in
Turkey was rebuffed because of what was perceived as Hindu nationalism.
This inattention to the problem of Hindu revivalism becomes more shocking
in Ramnath’s discussion of Gandhi and the ‘romantic countermodernists’.
Ramnath chastises the ‘traditional Left’ in India because its
Ramnath, on the other hand, unburdened from the concerns of the traditional
Left argues for the ‘possibility of conceptually straddling the line’.80 Ramnath
thus provides an anarchist interpretation of Gandhi. Whilst acknowledging
that Gandhi’s
Ramnath proceeds to provide snippets from Hind Swaraj to make her case for
an anarchist Gandhi, but completely overlooks Gandhi’s actions and provides
no defence to the traditional Left’s arguments against Gandhi. Ramnath thus
willingly overlooks Gandhi’s Hindu revivalism, his caste-based understanding
of India and his pro-business outlook, in favour of an idealised version of Gandhi
who emphasises village panchayats.82 Ramnath thus relies on Surendranath
Karr’s utopic vision of village republics, decentralised, unburdened by caste
etc.,83 again completely overlooking the very real caste-based nature of the
village republics and panchayats.84 In fact, India has achieved Gandhi’s real
dream. Arundhati Roy writes, ‘As Mahatma Gandhi desired, the rich man has
been left in possession of his (as well as everybody else’s) wealth. Chaturvarna
[the caste system] reigns unchallenged’.85
Unfortunately the generosity afforded to Sarvarkar, Har Dayal and Gandhi
is not afforded to those truly on the margins of Indian society: Dalits and
Dalit movements. Ramnath uncharitably writes, ‘Dalit movements weren’t
necessarily antiauthoritarian, although some were indeed radically egalitarian.
(Some weren’t even that, seeking not an end to the hierarchy but a better rung
on the latter for a particular group.)’86 Adding injury to insult, Ramnath writes
that ‘the Dalit movement tended to lack ideological content’.87 Ramnath
delivers the coup de grâce when she concludes that Dalit movements, ‘did not
necessarily see themselves as part of anti-colonial struggle’ and proceeds to
argue that ‘Ambedkar and his followers were more apt to be British loyalists,
blaming Gandhi and the INC for the discrimination, exclusion, and brutality
they routinely faced’.88 Surely an antiauthoritarian historian ought be
sensitive enough to not collapse a wide range of Dalit movements, ranging
in their politics, into an undifferentiated whole characterised only by British
loyalism and a lack of ideological content. Rather than deploying an anarchist
reading of Ambedkar that would have explored Ambedkar’s realisation that
independence from British rule meant little without the end of caste-rule,
Ramnath adopts a nationalist position that marginalises the very real grievances
of Dalits. Furthermore, missing is any mention of Dalit Marxist theorists and
organisations, or other attempts to address the caste perspective from an
‘antiauthoritarian’ standpoint, and the lone mention of the Dalit Panthers is
dismissively fleeting.89 Rather than trace an antiauthoritarian radical genealogy,
beautifully explored in Anand Patwardhan’s documentary Jai Bhim Comrade,
Ramnath ungenerously pivots, without explanation, to the 1980 Mandal
commission, as if it were the culmination of Dalit emancipatory demands.
While Ramnath is justified in claiming that Arundhati Roy’s ‘commitments
are intersectional, antiauthoritarian, nonhierarchical, and framed mainly in
connection with a principle of social ecology’, she is incorrect in suggesting that
this ‘social ecology’ is a ‘selected synthesis of Gandhian and socialist thought’.90
Rather, Roy has quite explicitly and controversially exposed Gandhi, in favour
of Ambedkar.91 Unfortunately, Ramnath does not do the same and, in doing so,
fails to explore a forgotten possibility: Babu Mangoo Ram, a Dalit Ghadarite.
Ramnath then juxtaposes the Dalit movement to that of the Adivasis, pitting
two marginalised communities against one another, rather than seeking to
understand the complex relationship between these movements. Whereas the
Dalits fail to muster the necessary anti-colonial spirit that Ramnath is after,
‘[on] the other hand, the contemporary Adivasi narrative of resistance clearly
evokes the dynamics of colonization. This is particularly true in the regions
of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh – the mineral-rich, heavily forested areas in
the center of India, carved out of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in 2000 – where
Adivasis are the bulk of the population.’92 Although Ramnath is correct to
show the parallels between contemporary neoliberal land acquisition and
British colonialism, she makes two unfounded assumptions: 1) that Advivasis
and Adivasi movements can be spoken of as a homogenous whole through
her invocation of ‘the’ Adivasis; and 2) Adivasi politics do not share, in the
main, any of the same tendencies that she accuses Dalit movements of being
characterised by. In sum, Ramnath unintentionally reproduces many romantic
stereotypes about Adivasi societies and movements.
Ramnath’s Haj to Utopia is an important contribution to the existing
literature of not only Indian diasporic radicalism and communism, but also
North American and European. In particular it allows for a reconsideration
of the early history of communism in India. It demonstrates that the Ghadar
movement was deeply influential on a number of different movements that
would come to compose the communist movement, and would animate a
genealogy of a particular trend of communism in India that would emphasis
active attempts of rebellion. Ramnath, however, overstates the uniqueness of
the Ghadar movement and party through her emphasis on their differences
with the Communist Party of India, especially as they are not borne out
through her own account. Ramnath’s affinity for the Ghadar party derives
from their particular mode of politics that emphasises action over coherent
ideology; however, while the Ghadar party developed past this mode, Ramnath
seeks to ossify it. This results in her ambitious, but failed, attempt to create an
antiauthoritarian anti-colonial history of India. Ramnath’s desire to demarcate
her account from that of the traditional Left results in her making strange allies
with the Hindu revivalist and nationalist movements. Furthermore, Ramnath
makes a number of sweeping comments about diverse movements which
betray the ideological confusion at the heart of her decolonised anarchism,
and puts into question her understanding of the basic concerns that confront
antiauthoritarian movements in India and the world today.
References