Using Paradox to Build Management and Organization Theories

Author(s): Marshall Scott Poole and Andrew H. van de Ven

Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 562-578
Published by: Academy of Management
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C Academy of Management Review, 1989, Vol. 14, No. 4, 562-578

Using Paradox to Build

Management and Organization Theories

MARSHALLSCOTT POOLE
ANDREWH. VAN DE VEN
University of Minnesota

Most contemporary theory construction methodologies attempt to

build internally consistent theories of limited scope. Relatively little
attention has been paid to the opportunities offered by tensions, op-
positions, and contradictions among explanations of the same phe-
nomenon. This essay attempts to spell out a set of theory-building
strategies to help researchers take advantage of theoretical tensions.
Such tensions can be regarded as paradoxes of social theory, and
four different modes of working with paradoxes can be distin-
guished: (1) accept the paradox and use it constructively; (2) clarify
levels of analysis; (3) temporally separate the two levels; and (4) in-
troduce new terms to resolve the paradox. These four modes of par-
adox resolution are illustrated by application to the action::structure
paradox in organizational theory.

Like most social scientists, organization and
management theorists are socialized to develop
internally consistent theories. The presence of
contrary or contradictory assumptions, explana-
tions, or conclusions is often viewed as an indi-
cator of poor theory building, and theorists are
encouraged to devote their efforts to carefully
defined and delimited analyses. The value of
rigor and coherence cannot be denied. How-
ever, these qualities are not sufficient to guar-
antee good theories. Ralph Waldo Emerson's
dictum, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds" must also be kept in mind. Social
science loses an important resource for theory
development if the incompatible or inconsistent
theses which inevitably arise in the study of or-
ganizations are ignored or are eliminated.
There is growing recognition that significant ad-
vances in management and organization theory
will require ways to address paradoxes inherent
in human beings and their social organizations
(Quinn & Cameron, 1988).
Because organizational theories attempt to
capture a multifaceted reality with a finite, in-
ternally consistent statement, they are essen-
tially incomplete. A good theory is, by definition,
a limited and fairly precise picture. It does not
attempt to cover everything and would fail to
meet the parsimony criterion if it did. Scope con-
ditions are one means of expressing the limita-
tions of theories. Less evident, but as effective, is
reliance on a limited, carefully prescribed set of
assumptions and explanatory principles. These
assumptions and explanations implicitly state
what is relevant and what is not. They deter-
mine the operative scope of a theory by speci-
fying what can be explained or understood and
what must be regarded as "not of interest for this

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 theory," or as irrelevant. Theories always con-
strain the theorist's field of vision; one of the can-
ons of good theory construction is to recognize
these limitations.
Additionally, researchers are adjured to per-
fect their theories and to test them. As they do
this, there is a tendency for the theory to domi-
nate researchers' thinking. The researcher must
focus on the theory, iron out its problems, work
out measurement techniques, test the theory
and revise it, and defend tests against criticism.
As a result, the theory tends to bind the re-
searcher's judgment. The researcher develops a
"trained incapacity" to appreciate aspects not
mentioned in her or his theory. As this progres-
sion toward consistency continues, the theory
becomes more and more "perfect," with less
and less correspondence to the multifaceted re-
ality it seeks to portray.
An alternative strategy for theory building
can be proposed: Look for theoretical tensions or
oppositions and use them to stimulate the devel-
opment of more encompassing theories. This
strategy requires an exploration of the tradition
of theoretical debate surrounding important is-
sues, an identification of alternative or opposing
theories or explanations, and discovery of ways
of relating, contraposing, or integrating them.
The result will be theories less susceptible to the
limitations of perspective which attend many
middle range theories.
This strategy is not a replacement for tradi-
tional, univocal theory building, but rather an
additional arrow for the theorist's quiver. The
researcher consciously and tenaciously pursues
theoretical inconsistencies, rather than dismiss-
ing them or resigning them to the "theoretical
disagreements" category. Rather than regard-
ing each theory as a self-encapsulating whole,
the theorist can play theories off against one an-
other, gaining insights from multiple perspec-
tives and comparative analysis. In this view,
theories are not statements of some ultimate
"truth"but rather are alternative cuts of a mul-
tifaceted reality. Alternative theories give par-
tial views, and the theorist's task is to sort them
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out and work out their relationships. Perrow
(1986) and Pfeffer (1982) have written excellent
studies in this spirit.
Contemporary theory construction methods
are biased toward consistency. Relatively little
attention has been paid to the resolution of ten-
sions or oppositions. This set of theory-building
strategies is proposed to help researchers come
to terms with theoretical tensions.
Paradox-a term with a long history in phil-
osophical and rhetorical studies-is one key to
understanding how to work with theoretical con-
tradictions and oppositions embedded in com-
plex traditions. This term has several layers of
meaning, each of which captures some of the
features which make theoretical paradoxes so
interesting and thought provoking.
In general parlance, many writers use the
term loosely, as an informal umbrella for inter-
esting and thought-provoking contradictions of
all sorts. In this sense, a paradox is something
which grabs our attention, a puzzle needing a
solution.
In rhetorical studies paradox designates a
trope which presents an opposition between two
accepted theses. For example, the Elizabethan
rhetorician Sherry wrote, "He always is an en-
emy to his own plans, yet he claims to be a
friend to other men's." Sherry thus questioned
the trustworthiness of this man by showing a
contradiction in his behaviors. The rhetorical
paradox is intended to cause the audience to re-
consider set opinions or to throw into contrast
taken-for-granted presumptions. Its impact
stems from its shock value.
In logic, paradox has a narrower, specialized
meaning. A logical paradox "consists of two
contrary or even contradictory propositions to
which we are led by apparently sound argu-
ments" (van Heigenoort, 1972, p. 45). Taken sin-
gly, each proposition is incontestable, but taken
together they seem to be inconsistent or incom-
patible. One famous logical paradox is the Liar,
first studied by the Megaric philosophers around
400 B. C. If someone says, "Ialways lie, " how are
we to understand this statement? It seems both
true and false. Such great and diverse thinkers
as Aristotle, Chrysippus, Russell, and Wittgen-
stein have proposed resolutions for the Liar's
Paradox (Neilson, 1967, p. 622; see also Van de
Ven & Poole, 1988). Much effort has been de-
voted to resolving or understanding paradoxes,
because they divulge inconsistencies in our
logic or assumptions. They present opportunities
to discover different assumptions, shift perspec-
tives, pose problems in fundamentally different
ways, and focus on different research questions.
All three levels of meaning inform this analy-
sis. We are interested in paradox in the lay
sense-in the interesting tensions, oppositions,
and contradictions between theories which cre-
ate conceptual difficulties. Because theory
building is a discursive enterprise, rhetorical
strategies of handling paradox effectively are a
central concern. Communication and rhetorical
studies have a long tradition of thought con-
cerned with the creation of knowledge through
discourse and with effective expression. Four
discursive strategies, which will be discussed,
are open to theorists interested in paradox. The
paradoxes in management are not, strictly
speaking, logical paradoxes. However, an un-
derstanding of paradoxes and ways to work
with them is greatly enriched by the philosoph-
ical tradition. By far the largest body of work on
paradoxes can be attributed to logicians, and
the philosophical treatment of paradoxes will be
used as a touchstone for this analysis.
Four general methods to address paradox in
management and organization theories are
suggested. These four methods for addressing
paradox are illustrated by applying them to the
action::structure paradox in organizational the-
ory.
Four Ways to Address Paradox
in Organization and
Management Theories
Organizational and management theories in-
volve a special type of paradox-social para-
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doxes. Many such paradoxes have been identi-
fied by Burrell and Morgan (1979), Pfeffer (1982),
Quinn and Cameron (1988), Smith and Berg
(1987), Van de Ven (1983), and Van de Ven and
Poole (1988). These paradoxes include: the diffi-
culty in reconciling the explanation of behavior
as a function of structural determination with the
equally strong claim that it is the product of pur-
posive action (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Van de
Ven & Poole, 1988); good arguments for two in-
compatible conceptualizations of organizational
climate-as an aggregation of individual cli-
mate perceptions or as a macrolevel system
property (Glick, 1985, 1988; James, Joyce, &
Slocum, 1988);the question of whether social or-
ganizations are fundamentally stable orders or
continuously changing emergents (Burrell &
Morgan, 1979; Pfeffer, 1982; Weick, 1979); and
the trade-off between the need to establish indi-
vidual identity in groups and the collective na-
ture of group action (Smith & Berg, 1987). Each
"side" of these tensions has been advocated or
emphasized by different theorists, but together
they form a tradition of theoretical discourse
which is potentially richer than either theory by
itself. The problem is how best to mine this rich
vein of insight.
This is not a trivial problem, as the example of
the stability::change tension illustrates. It is evi-
dent that organizations are admixtures of stabil-
ity and change: Organizations are relatively sta-
ble, enduring features of life, yet when we look
closely they do not appear stable at all. They are
continuously changing, continuously being pro-
duced and renewed by member activities. Nev-
ertheless, an argument can be made that stabil-
ity is primary; any change is observable only in
contrast to some stable state. Organizational
change also can be explained as aberrations
from the stable state, as sudden upheavals
which disrupt organizational stability. The in-
corporation of stability and continuous change
in the same theory poses a paradox, because
each is defined as the opposite of the other.
Hernes (1976) argued that adequate theories
must explain stability and change in the same
terms. Generally, however, organizational
theories have emphasized either stability or
change, slighting the other term. As Van de Ven
and Poole (1988) showed, most organizational
theorists have attempted to incorporate both sta-
bility and change, but as specific theories de-
velop and are refined, there seems to be pres-
sure to take one as the primary term and to sub-
ordinate the other. How can both faces of
organizations be encompassed in the same
framework?
Theorists can attempt to use these and other
tensions in several ways. They can identify in
which side of a tension their current work is an-
chored and then expand their perspective by
addressing criticisms lodged by the other side.
For example, researchers who assume a rela-
tively stable organizational backdrop for their
work might attempt to enlarge their theories by
taking into account the criticisms implied by
Weick's (1979) perspective. Alternatively, theo-
rists can start at the concrete level, identify
anomalies in their object of study, and locate
tensions that could account for these anomalies.
The organizational climate literature, for exam-
ple, is replete with inconsistent findings, which
may be traceable to inconsistent definitions of
climate as a psychological or organizational
construct, respectively. Once the tension has
been identified, it might be possible to move to-
ward some synthesis, or theorists can start with
abstract oppositions themselves and carry them
into a problem area. This is a case of theoretical
interests generating particular applications. A
good example is Allison's (1971) Essence of De-
cision, which contrasted three decision models
applied to the Cuban missile crisis.
Some examples of nonparadoxical situations
in theory building are also useful, because not
all inconsistencies are paradoxes. The tension
between empirical observation and theoretical
propositions is not a paradox, because valid em-
pirical observations can correct a theory. Nor
are most contradictions within a single theory
paradoxes; most often, these stem from faulty
reasoning and can be eliminated by correcting
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it. The types of paradoxes concerned with here
are tensions and oppositions between well-
founded, well-reasoned, and well-supported al-
ternative explanations of the same phenome-
non. When juxtaposed, they present a puzzle for
the theorist, because each side seems valid, yet
they are in some sense incompatible or hard to
reconcile.
As these examples show, paradoxes in social
theories are not strictly logical paradoxes. Social
scientific paradoxes tend to be looser: The op-
posing terms are often somewhat vague, and
instead of logical contradictions, tensions and
oppositions between incompatible positions
must be considered. Further, whereas logical
paradoxes exist in timeless, abstract thought, so-
cial paradoxes are about a real world, subject to
its temporal and spatial constraints. This opens
the possibility of dealing with social paradoxes
not only through logical resolutions, but through
taking into account the temporal or spatial na-
ture of the social world. Thus, methods of coping
with logical paradox must be transformed when
social scientific paradoxes are considered.
Four Methods for Working with Paradox
We propose four generic ways in which two
opposing theses, A and B, might be related: (1)
We can keep A and B separate and their con-
trasts appreciated; (2) We can situate A and B at
two different levels or locations in the social
world (e.g., micro and macro levels, respec-
tively); (3) We can separate A and B temporally
in the same location; or (4) We can find some
new perspective which eliminates the opposi-
tion between A and B. (The second and fourth
modes of paradox resolution were suggested
by Nielson, 1967.) Stated schematically, the
four relations correspond to opposition, spatial
separation, temporal separation, and synthesis,
respectively. They represent a logically ex-
haustive set of relationships opposing terms can
take in the social world. Each of the four meth-
ods represents a different way of transforming
our theories and ways of thinking.
Opposition: Accept the Paradox and Use
It Constructively
The first response is to accept the paradox and
learn to live with it. This response does not mean
that the paradox is ignored. Rather, the impli-
cations of the paradox are pursued actively and
used to stimulate theory development. A great
deal can be learned from juxtaposing contradic-
tory propositions and assumptions, even if they
are incompatible. Theorists may feel a strain to-
ward cognitive consistency, but that does not
mean that their theories must fit together neatly.
Paradoxes remind theorists of this inconsistency
and enable them to study the dialectic between
opposing levels and forces which are captured
in different theories.
However, living with paradox has its costs as
well. Usually, contrary perspectives are em-
braced by different researchers. This may pro-
duce specialized versions of the two theories
which retard the recognition of relationships
and generate diatribes between proponents of
the "correct" horn of a dilemma. Nor is it always
clear just what sort of relationship "tensions be-
tween opposing positions" constitute. This ambi-
guity can result in sloppy analysis. Notwith-
standing, to accept a paradox is a positive
stance. It is to acknowledge that theorists need
not be completely consistent; that seemingly op-
posed viewpoints can inform one another; that
models are, after all, just models, incapable of
fully capturing the "buzzing, booming confu-
sion," no matter how strongly logical arrogance
tries to convince theorists otherwise.
The remaining three strategies attempt to re-
solve paradox by spelling out the nature of the
tensions between contrary positions.
Spatial Separation: Clarify Levels of Analysis
The second response resolves paradoxes by
clarifying levels of reference and the connec-
tions among them. Level distinctions such as
part-whole, micro-macro, or individual-society
have proven extremely useful for social re-
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search. This approach assumes that one horn of
the paradox operates at one level of analysis
(e.g., macro), while the other horn operates at a
different level (micro). To utilize this strategy suc-
cessfully, it is necessary to specify as precisely
as possible how the levels interrelate.
Researchers who take this approach must
grapple with difficult and important theoretical
problems. Despite much research on the aggre-
gation of individual acts, attitudes, and prefer-
ences into social actions, climates, and choices
(e.g., Coleman, 1986), there is still no completely
satisfactory solution (Arrow, 1970). The same
can be said for other level distinctions. Given the
difficulty of spelling out interlevel relations,
many researchers have let them stand, while
advancing only partial and tentative solutions.
However, many insights have resulted from at-
tempts to sort out levels and their relationships.
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1968; Cicourel,
1971), Parsonian sociology, and exchange the-
ory (Blau, 1964) all involved efforts to distinguish
levels of analysis.
Of the same general type as the level distinc-
tion is spatial separation of paradoxical expla-
nations. One horn of the paradox is assumed to
operate in one physical or social locus, while the
other operates in a different locus. For example,
Explanation A might hold for the upper echelons
of an organization, while Explanation B holds
for line workers. Some treatments of motivation,
for instance, implicitly assume that top execu-
tives must be understood in different terms than
workers or lower-level management.
Temporal Separation: Take Time into Account
A third approach takes into account the role of
time. In this resolution, one horn of the paradox
is assumed to hold during one time period and
the other during a different time period. The two
contrary assumptions or processes exert sepa-
rate influence, and each may influence the
other through its prior action. Several types of
temporal relationships may exist among con-
trary forces:
 One side of the paradox may influence the con-
ditions under which the other will operate, as
in Reese and Overton's (1973)formulationof
cognitive development, in which behavioral
learning sets the stage for cognitive acquisi-
tions;
one side may create the conditions necessary
for the existence of the other, as in Smelser's
(1962)theory of collective action, in which in-
dividual activities may be the "precipitating
event" for collective beliefs to develop; and
there may also be mutual influence over time,
with swings between one side and the other,
as in Buckley's(1968)morphogenetic theory of
social systems.
The difficulty of achieving a clear temporal
separation of contrary assumptions, theories, or
processes remains to be solved. When does be-
havioral theory stop holding and cognitive the-
ory begin? At what point does individual moti-
vation leave off and collective action begin?
Most attempts at temporal resolution have
glossed over the issue of transition points and
focused instead on the periods of relatively pure
action on either side of the paradox.
Synthesis: Introduce New Terms to Resolve
the Paradox
The resolution of paradoxes by level distinc-
tions or temporal analysis leaves each set of as-
sumptions or processes basically intact. Both
sides of the paradox are assumed to be funda-
mentally sound, and the paradox is resolved by
separating them and specifying how one side
influences the other. However, it is also possible
that the paradox may stem from conceptual lim-
itations or flaws in theory or assumptions. To
overcome these limitations it is necessary to in-
troduce new concepts or a new perspective.
However, such advances are hard-won, and
many apparent resolutions may lead to dead
ends. When perspectives radically shift, theo-
rists may lose as well as gain. The new perspec-
tive may oversimplify some issues or ignore the
problems that originally gave rise to previous
positions. These risks are the price theorists pay
for theoretical advances.
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Combinations and Reflections
Although analytically distinct, the four ap-
proaches can be combined in practice. For ex-
ample, paradoxical terms may be related both
temporally and by level. Moreover, the first ap-
proach, which accepts paradox and tries to
work out its implications, can serve as a prelim-
inary step to the other three. By accepting par-
adoxes, the researcher undertakes to examine
his or her theories for hidden tensions and to
search for opposing or contrary positions. Once
identified, relationships among the positions
can be explored with the three remaining meth-
ods.
No matter which of the four responses are cho-
sen, working with paradoxes is challenging. It is
difficult to manage the dialectic between posi-
tions if theorists choose to live with paradoxes. If
theorists attempt to resolve paradoxes, they face
formidable obstacles. Nevertheless, the recogni-
tion of paradoxes forces theorists to ask different
questions and to come up with answers that
stretch the bounds of current thinking. The re-
sulting formulations are likely to be of interest
not just to organizational scholars, but more
widely as well.
In the next section, the four methods will be
applied to address the action::structure para-
dox. Historically, this paradox has presented a
major barrier to achieving a general theory of
action. Only one specific theory will be used to
exemplify each method, as, obviously, the four
methods are amenable to many other theories
which cannot be covered here.
Organizational Structure and Action
The Action::StructureParadox
Most theorists view organizations as social ac-
tion systems constructed by people who use
them as arenas in which to achieve their goals
and ambitions. Consequently, the central ob-
jects of study are the structural properties of a
social system, the purposive actions of people,
and the relationship of system and action. Indi-
viduals are viewed as purposeful and goal
directed, guided by interest or values, and by
the rewards and constraints which are both cre-
ated by individuals and imposed upon them by
the social environment. Individuals interact with
others to achieve their self- and other-regarding
interests. These interactions are structured by
social relationships consisting of interrelated
and recurrent patterns of social ordering. One
important source of social ordering is the orga-
nization itself, whose structural properties chan-
nel individual activity and shape members' per-
spectives and perceived options.
These statements are deceptively simple and
satisfying. However, within them contrary as-
sumptions regarding action and structure can
be discovered. Individuals are free, purposeful
actors, in control of their own behavior; yet, or-
ganizational or institutional structures constrain
action, even shaping individuals' desires and
purposes. Individual actors create and maintain
structures, but an organization is a powerful so-
cial institution with a life of its own.
Attempts to encompass these tensions in a sin-
gle, coherent theory often have gone awry. The
path of least resistance has been to emphasize
either system structure or individual action, and
many theories originally intended to deal with
both terms gradually move in this direction. For
example, Coleman (1986) describes how Par-
sons (1937) attempted to balance action and
structure in his early work. However, as he elab-
orated and defended his theory, Parsons (1951,
1964) increasingly emphasized the role of struc-
ture. Action was largely determined by struc-
ture in Parsons' later work (cf. Garfinkel, 1968;
Giddens, 1976).
Traditionally, action has been conceptualized
as a micro-level phenomenon, while social
structure has been construed at the macro level.
Historically, making the theoretical linkage be-
tween micro motives and actions of individuals
and the macro structure of social systems has
been an important concern of social theorists,
from Hobbes through Weber to Parsons, be-
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cause it connects the individual to society, links
"positive social theory and normative social
philosophy," and implies how action might
change society (Coleman, 1986, p. 1310).
This form of methodological individualism
continues to be a firmly entrenched assump-
tion in most theories of organization and man-
agement. Even those who take a more pessi-
mistic view that individuals are merely products
of their environments do not deny the role of
individual motives and actions. Accordingly,
the functioning of an organization as well as
the source of organizational change must be
grounded in the purposive actions of individu-
als.
The problem, however, is that social and or-
ganizational theorists have not been successful
in developing a theory of action which connects
individual interests with social structure (Cole-
man, 1986). In part, this is because of the diffi-
culty posed by the action::structure tension, as
Coleman's (1986) historical account suggests.
Parsons abandoned his attempt to ground social
theory in purposive action because he could not
make the link between intentions of persons with
macrosocial consequences. Parsons ushered in
a period of structural-functionalism by focusing
on the characteristics and equilibrium states of
requisite functions of social systems, "which had
no place for individuals (except as deviants from
norms) and no place for social change except by
theoretical fiat" (Coleman, 1986, p. 1311). By
showing the functional and dysfunctional sides
of social systems, Merton (1948) redirected atten-
tion to individuals' purposive actions. However,
ironically, his analysis ultimately removed the
individual from the equation, because he em-
phasized explaining a social system not by prox-
imate causes, but by its consequences. Homans
(1958) challenged Parsons most explicitly by in-
troducing purposive action, but never moved
beyond the social-psychological level of small
group analysis. The other major challenge to
functionalism, conflict theory, remained at the
collective level and thus failed to provide a the-
ory grounded in purposive action of individuals.
This whole series of great and influential theo-
ries is haunted by the difficulty of mediating ac-
tion and structural elements of social life.
To work with any paradox, it must first be un-
derstood. Three basic aspects are part of the ac-
tion::structure paradox. First, there is ambiguity
surrounding the genesis of action and structure.
Most theories of action view individual purpose
and action as the source of organizational struc-
ture: Organizations evolve from recurrent pat-
terns of individual interaction that gradually be-
come formalized (Blau, 1964). However, the
script is different for structuralists focusing on is-
sues of power and the way coordination is
achieved (Parsons, 1951). For these writers, ac-
tion is impossible without resources such as
authority, shared rules, and information
resources that stem from organizational struc-
ture. Explanations for coordinated action de-
pend on common goals and structural features
which facilitate coordination. Thus, action re-
quires structure, yet structure only exists
through action. While it is easy to assert the
common sense solution that action and structure
are reciprocals of each other, it has been difficult
to incorporate in an explicit theory.
A second aspect of this paradox derives from
contrary ontological assumptions about struc-
ture and action. Organizational structures are
generally assumed to be concrete and measur-
able. They seem to be tangible objects, because
their traces reside in organizational records,
rules, buildings, and outputs, and because
members treat them as objects. On the other
hand, action is more subjective and ephemeral.
To document actions it is necessary to identify
motives or purposes, and many scholars have
acknowledged the difficulties inherent in grasp-
ing the meaningful connections actors perceive
and the practical reasoning that precedes be-
havior (Mills, 1940; Weber, 1947; Parsons, 1951;
March, 1981). There is a tension here: Organi-
zational phenomena are studied in terms of con-
crete, measurable properties, yet they are best
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understood as a result of intersubjective pro-
cesses of intentionality and practical reasoning.
The third paradoxical aspect derives from
how action and structure enter into social scien-
tific explanations. Traditionally, structural em-
phasis has resulted in a deterministic explana-
tion. Organizational structure is conceptualized
and measured as variables (formalization, deci-
sion centralization, complexity), and research-
ers study how structure accounts for variance in
behavior (Hall, 1963; Hage & Aiken, 1967; Pugh,
1981). This approach leaves little room for pur-
posive action, because it emphasizes cause-
effect connections in which meaning is reduced
to variables measuring subjects' perceptions or
attitudes about the structure (Starbuck, 1981).
Explanations couched in terms of action theory
emphasize reconstructing the meaningful con-
nections underlying individual choices. This
reconstruction relies on interpretive methods.
Seldom can it be represented in variance-
explained terms, because each action ensues
through a process of contextually bound practi-
cal reasoning and choice making which is con-
text bound (Garfinkel, 1968; Lindblom, 1981).
To work with this paradox, the genetic, onto-
logical, and explanatory tensions must be ad-
dressed. Four methods for doing so have been
defined.
Resolving the Action::Structure
Paradox
Method 1: Accept the Paradox and Use
It Constructively
One way to address a paradox is to acknowl-
edge it and use it as a theory-building resource.
Burrell and Morgan (1979), Van de Ven and Ast-
ley (1981), and Pfeffer (1982) adopted this ap-
proach in their assessment of different organiza-
tion theories. They argued that many organiza-
tional problems can be pursued in a productive
way by keeping organizational theories distinct,
as opposed to collapsing them into a unified per-
spective. Considering the tensions and conflicts
among theories sensitizes researchers to critical
issues and divulges weak points in theories. In
addition, key dynamics can often be explained
and understood at one level of organization as a
result of processes occurring at another. Ques-
tions problematic for one theory can often be
addressed by another. Insights gained from one
position should supplement and balance those
from others.
For example, Van de Ven and Astley (1981)
and Astley and Van de Ven (1983) distinguished
between deterministic structural forms and vol-
untaristic personnel actions at macro and micro
levels of organizational analysis. As Figure 1 il-
lustrates, the action::structure tension can exist
at multiple levels of organizational analysis. As
an illustration of how Figure 1 might be used,
the insights that can be gained by considering
the tensions or oppositions inherent in (a) the
horizontal relationships between structure and
action, and (b) the vertical relationships be-
tween parts and wholes of structure or the self
versus collective orientations of personnel action
can be discussed.
Action-Structure Tensions. The tensions be-
tween action and structure can be identified by
moving along the x-axis for each pair of terms.
Interesting questions and problems turn on how
structural forms and personnel actions at each
level of analysis interrelate and produce con-
structive tensions.
For example, by considering this tension at
the individual level, theorists can discern the
systemic problems of selecting, socializing, and
controlling individuals for roles and positions in
the structure on the one hand, and on the other
hand, examining how the purposive actions of
people over time restructure and renegotiate
these roles and positions. At the group or de-
partmental level, there is the issue of how the
structural division and integration of labor and
resources among subunits both influence and
are influenced by the emergence of collective
norms, interaction patterns, conflict, and power
relations within and between groups. At the or-
ganizational level, consideration of the tension
reveals the problem of how system structure in-
fluences and reflects environmental shifts and
strategic choices of powerful individuals within
and outside the organization. Finally, at the
population or interorganizational level, ques-
tions are asked about the way organizational
niches or market structure are both the product
and constraint of collective working rules ar-
rived at through a series of political contests and
bargains among pluralistic interest groups.
These issues lead to useful insights because
they (1) admit to the existence of both determin-
istic and voluntaristic aspects of social systems;
(2) juxtapose these aspects by reciprocally relat-
ing structural forms and personnel actions at
comparable levels of analyses; and (3) focus on
how these relationships unfold over time in com-
plementary and contradictory ways (Van de
Ven & Astley, 1981).

Macro Level (Whole, Collec- industry/community structure industry/interorganizational

tive Orientation)
Micro Level (Part, Self Orien-
tation)
organization design
department/division
roles and positions
Structural Forms
collective action
board of directors executive
committee
task force management
committee
individual
Personnel Actions

Figure 1. Illustration of structural forms and personnel actions at micro to macro levels of orga-
nizations. This diagram is based on the discussion in Van de Ven and Astley (1981). A similar
diagram appeared in Van de Ven and Poole (1988).

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 Tensions in Part-Whole Relations. Consider-
ing the vertical relationships among micro and
macro dimensions in Figure 1 divulges the con-
flicts and tensions inherent in part-whole or self
versus collective frames of reference. Defining
tensions between these levels is useful, because
many problems and solutions apparent at one
level of organization manifest themselves in dif-
ferent and contradictory ways at other levels.
For example, relying on the concept of requi-
site variety, Weick (1979) argued that with in-
creasing environmental complexity, uncer-
tainty, and variety, the overall structure of the
organization must become more complex,
loosely coupled, decentralized, particularistic,
and anarchistic. At the same time the structure
of the individual parts or groups within the or-
ganization become more simple, tightly cou-
pled, hierarchical, universalistic, and cohesive.
The whole tries to become more adaptive, but
this results in the parts exhibiting characteristics
which lead to nonadaptiveness, narrowness,
and "group think." This unintended conse-
quence is the result of a basic principle of con-
tradictory part-whole relationships established
by Georg Simmel: "The elements of differenti-
ated social circles are undifferentiated, those of
undifferentiated ones are differentiated" (Blau
translation, 1964, p. 284).
Another part-whole contrast can also be dis-
covered: Many macro theories of order and con-
sensus include micro theories of conflict and co-
ercion, and vice versa. For example, structural-
functional theories have been attacked for their
inability to explain change because of the em-
phasis on order, consensus, and unity (Silver-
man, 1970). While this is true at the macro-
organizational level, it is only possible because
of coercion, domination, and control of disrup-
tive tendencies at the micro level. If this were not
so, there would be no need for rules, indoctri-
nation, socialization, and control mechanisms-
concepts which are central in structuralists'
views of organizations.
Much can be learned by explicitly accepting
the action::structure paradox at micro and
macro levels of organizational analysis. Orga-
nizations can be understood in terms of the ten-
sions between (1) personnel action and struc-
tural forms at each level of organizational anal-
ysis and (2) the forces of conflict, coercion, and
disruption at one level of organization, and
forces of consensus, unity, and integration at
another level-forces which can be seen as
both prerequisites and reciprocals of each other.
One of the most useful products of the first ap-
proach is discovery of underlying tensions and
inconsistencies, and a heightened awareness of
their potential.
Method 2: Clarify Connections between
Organizational Levels
A second way to address the action::structure
paradox is to distinguish levels of reference in
the contrary propositions and to spell out the
connections between them. Theories of social
action by Arrow (1970) and Coleman (1973, 1986)
are attempts to apply this method. Basically,
their approach assumes individuals can act, but
organizations cannot. They then attempt to
specify models by which individual actions can
combine to create collective outcomes. These
system-level outcomes may, in turn, impose
constraints on individual actions (Coleman,
1986). Coleman (1986) suggested that such a
model should consist of (a) a set of assumptions
about how the interests and goals of actors stand
in relation to one another vis-a-vis the collective
action system, and (b) a set of combinatorial
rules for merging individual actions into collec-
tive acts. (Potentially there could also be map-
ping rules that specify how collective structures'
"feedback" affects individual action.)
With regard to component (a) of the model,
Coleman (1986) discussed three types of interde-
pendent relationships among individual inter-
ests, which lead to different types of social orga-
nizations:
A pure market is a configurationin which there
are "independent actors, each with differing
private interests and goals and each with re-

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 sources that can aid others' realization of inter-
ests. The actions that purposive actors will en-
gage in when this configurationof interestsand
resources exists is social exchange, and when a
number of these exchange processes are inter-
dependent, we describe the whole set as a mar-
ket institution."(p. 1324)
A hierarchy is a set of relations "in which one
actor's actions are carried out under the control
of another and advance the other's interests."
The associated institutionis the formal organi-
zation or authority structure.(pp. 1324-1325)
A federation [our term] is a set of independent
actors linked by common interests. They are
connected by a constitutionembodying a set of
norms regarding rights and obligations. (p.
1326)
With regard to component (b), Arrow (1970),
Coleman (1973), and others have proposed sets
of mathematical or logical rules for combining
individual interests and actions into collective
action and macro-structural forms.
Coleman's theory is a promising develop-
ment, but several problems illustrate the difficul-
ties inherent in building multi-level theories.
First, his approach involves the restrictive as-
sumption that only individuals can have pur-
poses. Individuals are assumed to be the prime
motivational force behind any organizational
activity. This assumption leads to an overem-
phasis on the micro (action) to macro (structure)
relation, and an underemphasis on the macro to
micro relation. The approach devotes much at-
tention to combinatorial rules, but much less to
rules that show how structure influences action.
Second, Coleman's approach confounds the
action-structure dimension with the macro-
micro dimension. He only admits to purposive
action at the micro level and structural forms at
the macro level, but purposive action can also
exist at the macro level in collective decision-
making bodies or committees, and structural
forms are also present at the micro level in the
roles and positions individuals occupy. Thus, a
more complex scheme, like that illustrated in
Figure 1, might promote a better-rounded the-
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ory. Hernes (1976) provides a dynamic logic for
structure-action relationships between macro
and micro levels.
Third, Coleman's model tends to oversimplify
the actor. His model makes global assumptions
about the types of relations that hold among ac-
tors, which amounts to an ideal type of actor.
For example, Coleman's (1986) description of
market relations assumes that actors are inde-
pendent, have resources that can meet each
other's needs, and will form stable exchange re-
lationships. This ideal-type actor facilitates pre-
dictions about the outputs of social action pro-
cesses in the aggregate. Given the standard
model, there is no need to look at action per se;
theorists need merely to apply the ideal type,
given certain levels of inputs and contextual
constraints. Whether the model captures the
subtleties and many variations of action and ac-
tors is open to question.
In principle, an aggregated model with a non-
typal theory of action could be generated, but
this would result in multiple outcomes, and
therefore multiple ideal-type actors. This pro-
cess would make aggregation procedures very
complex, and the resulting models would be dif-
ficult to solve. Maintaining a balanced empha-
sis on both levels of analysis is a major chal-
lenge for this mode of theory building.
This approach can be used to discover as well
as resolve theoretical tensions. For any given
theory at one level of analysis, the researcher
can search for oppositions at different levels.
Once found, such oppositions can be used to
generate more encompassing theories.
Method 3: Use Time to Relate Structure
and Action
Time is a third resource for resolving the ac-
tion::structure paradox. Action and structure
can be related through an alternating temporal
order. Buckley's (1967; Archer, 1982) morphoge-
netic systems theory follows this strategy to ar-
ticulate a coherent relation between action and
structure. The theory of morphogenesis pro-
poses that action and structure influence each
other, but in alternating cycles over time. The
cycles are composed of three phases: (1) a pe-
riod in which pre-existing structures dominate
behavior; (2) a period when action begins to ar-
ticulate alternative arrangements, which sets
the stage for structural change; and (3) a period
of structural elaboration, in which changes in
structure are institutionalized. Then the cycle
can start over again.
Tushman and Romanelli's (1985) punctuated
equilibrium model of organizational evolution
follows a pattern similar to Buckley's theory.
They posit alternating cycles of convergence,
"which elaborate structures, systems, controls,
and resources toward increased coalignment,"
and reorientation, "periods of discontinuous
change where strategies, power, structure, and
systems are fundamentally transformed towards
a new basis of alignment" (p. 173). Convergence
seems to be predominantly influenced by struc-
ture, whereas reorientation is driven by purpo-
sive actions of executive leaders.
The key problems which must be resolved in
taking this approach relate to the boundaries
between temporal periods and to a tendency to-
ward structural bias. The problem of establish-
ing boundaries between periods is not a trivial
one. A crisis that upsets existing structural ar-
rangements presents a relatively clear bound-
ary. However, problems also can develop grad-
ually, and incremental adjustments can cumu-
late to produce qualitative change (Lindblom,
1981). When structural and action influences
shade together, the resulting approach is not
particularly informative, because it relies on
temporal sequencing.
In these models, structure is easier to portray
than action because structure is more easily ob-
served than individual motives and behavior.
As a consequence, these theories tend to reflect
a bias for structure. For example, Buckley ac-
corded much more space to an analysis of struc-
tures and their effects on action than vice versa.
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Action is not left out of this theory, but its oper-
ations remain opaque. Also, while processes of
organizational convergence and equilibrium
are richly described by Tushman and Romanelli
(1985) in the punctuated equilibrium model, the
punctuation process itself remains underdevel-
oped (Van de Ven & Poole, 1988). To be effective,
these theories have to perform a balancing act,
and close attention must be given to articulating
the relation between structure and action over
time.
Finally, while relations between structure and
action may be chronological, they may or may
not be causal. Tushman and Romanelli (1985)
posited that reorientations may result from inter-
nal inconsistencies during periods of conver-
gence, major changes in the environment, or
transformative leadership. Careful longitudinal
observations of specific cases are needed to in-
fer whether temporal relations between periods
might be causal. Further, prediction of future
changes, as opposed to explanation of past
changes, may be difficult with a punctuated
equilibrium model. Like its counterparts in biol-
ogy, the organizational punctuated equilibrium
model permits a wide variety of options which it
cannot precisely predict (though it does provide
predictions regarding how effective an organi-
zation will be, based on how it deals with con-
vergence and reorientation).
Temporal analysis can be used to uncover in-
teresting tensions as well. The researcher can
look for anomalies, points in time when the the-
ory does not seem to fit. In some cases this may
be fertile ground for the interplay of contrary
theories. Another tactic is to take a general the-
ory of temporal alternation, such as Buckley's,
and use it as an analytical lens to identify peri-
ods when one or the other horn of the dilemma
prevails.
Method 4: Advance a New Conception of the
Structure-ActionRelationship
A final attack on the action::structure paradox
involves developing a wholly new conception of
the action-structure relationship. This novel con-
ceptualization dissolves or supercedes the oppo-
sition. Giddens (1976, 1979, 1985) advanced a
theory of structuration that exemplifies such a
new approach. (See also, Berger and Luck-
mann, 1966; Barthes, 1979; Touraine, 1977; Ran-
son, Hinings, and Greenwood, 1980; Bartunek,
1984; Poole, Seibold, and McPhee, 1985, 1986;
Barley, 1986.) Structuration refers to the process
of production and reproduction of social systems
via members' application of rules and re-
sources. Implicit in this definition is a distinction
between system and structure. Structure refers
to the rules and resources people use in acting
and interacting. A system is the outcome of the
application of rules and resources, the observ-
able patterns of relations between people and
groups. For example, the status hierarchy of an
organization is a system. The structure underly-
ing this system includes rules, such as norms
of superior-subordinate interaction, and re-
sources, such as formal authority or superior
knowledge. The system exists because of its
structuring; members use rules and resources to
create and maintain status relationships, and
the hierarchical pattern can be explained by dif-
ferences in the rules and resources available to
different individuals.
The theory of structuration assumes structures
have a dual nature: They are both the medium
and outcome of action. Structures make action,
and hence the existence of social systems, pos-
sible. Nevertheless, structures only exist as they
are continuously produced and reproduced in
interaction. Thus, structure and action mutually
entail each other. Giddens' insight explains how
this entailment comes about and what its signif-
icance is.
In the terminology of Figure 1, Giddens intro-
duced a new intervening column between struc-
tural forms and personnel actions, which he
termed modalities of structuration. A modality of
structuration represents the individual actor's
appropriation of structure for use in a particular
action context. For example, in a conflict, a
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manager might use a union contract as a norm
to justify her claim that overtime should be given
to certain workers. In so doing, the individual,
according to her own motives and within the
limits of her interaction skills, is using the con-
tract as an institution in action. She is producing
and reproducing a mode of contractual interpre-
tation. Hence, institutions determine the struc-
tural features available for appropriation and
therefore limit the possible ways in which an
individual can act. However, the individual re-
shapes the institution as a particular modality of
structuration.
In drawing on structures, individuals repro-
duce the structures. The structures they draw on
more often become more important, whereas
those they use less decay. In addition, how peo-
ple use structures determines how they are re-
produced and whether they remain stable or
change. However, despite the central role indi-
viduals play in the production and reproduction
of structures, the complexity of social systems
means that people do not wholly control the pro-
cess. In complex systems, apparently straight-
forward actions by individuals trying to control
the system may lead to unintended conse-
quences.
Barley's (1986) study of CT technology imple-
mentation provides a good example of the mul-
tiple routes action may follow. In two similar
hospitals, with similar team compositions and
similar power distributions, the CT technology
led to quite different organizational structures.
In one case, the new technology led to a hierar-
chical structure dominated by physicians-
essentially a reproduction and reinforcing of sta-
tus quo relationships. In the other case, the CT
technology provided lower level participants
with a way to gain some control, resulting in a
flatter structure in which physicians and lab
technicians were more nearly equal in power.
In this latter case traditions were not preserved,
but rather the innovation altered system pro-
cesses.
As this case suggests, an account of the struc-
turation of stability and change in systems re-
quires researchers to focus on the effects of ac-
tion on structure, and the influences of structure
on action. This reciprocal relationship is medi-
ated by modalities of structuration. This raises a
new research question: What forces shape the
way people use institutions and structures avail-
able to them? If the actor feels driven or con-
strained by the structure, there would be simple
reproduction of the structure. If the actor per-
ceives that he or she is able to construct and
adapt the structure, instability and change may
result, if actors so choose and the system per-
mits it.
The second issue to consider is whether an
enacted social structure takes hold. As structur-
ation theory suggests, the reproduction of the
system and structure determine whether inno-
vations persist or are extinguished. For exam-
ple, it might be interesting to go back to Barley's
hospitals two years later to assess the persis-
tence of the structures he described. Were con-
ditions such that structures were reproduced?
In developing a structurational theory, the en-
tire configuration of the action system must be
considered, including the inclinations of individ-
uals, the constraints the system puts on them,
and the nature of the macrolevel process.
Hence, the theory of structuration cuts through
the action::structure paradox. It posits that struc-
ture and action coexist in a mutual process of
production and reproduction. Action draws on
structure; structure only exists in action; and
they connect in modalities of structuration.
In its very boldness, this fourth method of par-
adox resolution may present special problems
for theory construction. New concepts bring with
them unknown and uncertain entailments. Intro-
duction of the idea of structuration solves several
conceptual problems, but it may also introduce
other problems, such as the unclear conceptual
status of modalities of structuration (Poole, 1985).
New theories, advanced to correct problems in
extensively studied areas, may be difficult to
study in their own right. Archer (1982) criticized
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the theory of structuration on precisely these
grounds. She argued that separation of action
and structure permits them to be studied as sep-
arate features of social life; structuration, how-
ever, is not susceptible to empirical research,
because modalities are complex constructions
with obscure empirical references. Giddens
(1979) offered few recommendations for research
on structuration, beyond an artificial separation
of "the analysis of strategic action" from "the
analysis of social structure." Although proce-
dures have been developed for the study of
structuration, the book is not closed on this issue.
The fourth method of paradox resolution also
can be used to uncover paradoxes. If theoretical
tensions can be characterized, criteria for a new
construct can be defined. Conscious compari-
sons of existing theories can stimulate new
ideas.
Discussion
The complexity of organizations guarantees
that theories cannot give a complete represen-
tation. Nevertheless, in pursuit of an elusive
consistency, researchers may create self-
encapsulating theories which may freeze think-
ing. There is great potential to enliven current
theory and to develop new insights if theorists
search for and work with inconsistencies, con-
tradictions, and tensions in their theories, and in
the relationships between them.
Much of contemporary organizational theory
is still struggling to live with paradoxes. A con-
structive approach to living with paradox is to
adopt the first method, that is, to juxtapose and
compare how contrasting theories deal with the
same organizational problems. This strategy
requires theorists to engage in comparative
analysis of theories cast on both sides of the par-
adox and at different levels of analysis. In addi-
tion to generating insights from divergent per-
spectives, this approach helps the researcher
become aware of tensions and oppositions
which can be addressed by the other three
methods.
 If theorists attack a paradox by clarifying lev-
els of analysis, they are led to formulations
which specify how theories operating at differ-
ent levels or in different sectors of the organiza-
tion or society interrelate. This is exemplified by
Coleman's efforts to show how individual ac-
tions combine into collective structures. These
combinatorial models describe how structure
determines the impact individual actions have
on collective processes; they also specify how
structure limits individuals' options. To carry off
these models of linkages between action and
structure, assumptions about an ideal-type actor
had to be made. This move enabled Coleman to
characterize individual actions more or less uni-
formly, in such a way that they can serve as
inputs to the models that map one level onto
another. The hallmark of this approach is care-
ful specification of levels and of the way one
level maps onto another, and vice versa.
If temporal sequence is used to resolve a par-
adox, researchers must work out a formulation
with alternating cycles of two or more theoretical
explanations. It is especially important to dis-
cuss, as does Buckley (1968), how the transitions
between the various phases are accomplished.
Finally, if paradoxes are addressed by ad-
vancing new concepts or distinctions, a new
conception must be developed. This is exempli-
fied by the reconceptualization of the action-
structure relationship advanced by the theory of
structuration. When the concept of modality of
structuration is added, this approach attempts to
bridge action and structure and to show their
intimate connections. In this approach, any dis-
tinction between action and structure is for an-
alytical purposes only; retaining it as an as-
sumption about the nature of organizations un-
necessarily bifurcates a holistic phenomenon.
The theory tries to provide an analytical vocab-
ulary that would enable researchers to study ac-
tion and structure in a fundamentally new way.
There is no single best way to address para-
dox, and each of the four methods suggested
here has both benefits and costs. The objective
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has been to advance and advocate an addi-
tional level of theoretical reflection. Rather than
simply recognizing incompatible positions and
stopping, theorists should attempt to specify the
relationships among them. Sometimes this spec-
ification can lead to a creative integration that
greatly enhances understanding.
The four modes of paradox resolution can be
regarded as a set of topoi for theory develop-
ment. Topoi was the term used by classical
Greek thinkers to designate standard forms of
argument that served as models for the inven-
tion of arguments for specific cases. These four
modes of paradox resolution can serve as topoi
for the generation of organizational and man-
agement theories; they give us a range of theo-
retical possibilities to work with.
Although the focus has been on methods for
resolving or capitalizing on paradoxes, para-
doxes should not be "eliminated." Indeed,
rather than using paradoxes to build theory, re-
searchers can build theories about paradoxes,
which is what Smith and Berg (1987) have done.
Nor is it clear that researchers can ever avoid
paradoxes. One challenge is the possibility that
the resolution of one paradox may inadvertently
create another. The complexity and interdepen-
dence of individuals and organizations typically
exceed researchers' capabilities to describe or
explain them with coherent and consistent theo-
ries. Resolutions of paradox in one aspect of a
theory often create inconsistencies in another
part of the theory. Thus, it seems unlikely that
theorists can ever escape or resolve theoretical
paradoxes completely. It has been suggested
that at the heart of any theory that solves a par-
adox is another, different paradox, waiting to be
discovered. If this is true, there is one consola-
tion: Tackling the same old, well-known para-
doxes, researchers may uncover as yet un-
known ones that can move social inquiry in new
directions. This also raises the issue of whether
the world is consistent or whether it is actually
inherently paradoxical. The latter possibility is
intriguing, but it is a subject for another essay.
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Marshall Scott Poole is Associate Professor of Speech-

Communication in the College of Liberal Arts, Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
Andrew H. Van de Ven is 3M Professor of Human
Systems Management in the School of Management,
University of Minnesota.
An earlier version of this paper was presented in the
symposium on Theory Building in Organization and
Management Sciences at the Academy of Manage-
ment Conference in Anaheim, California, August,
1988. A related extension of the ideas presented here
is available in A. H. Van de Ven and M. S. Poole,
Paradoxical requirements for a theory of organiza-
tional change. In R. Quinn and K. Cameron (Eds.),
Paradox and transformation: Toward a theory of
change in organization and management (pp. 19-
63), Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988.
We would like to thank Robert D. McPhee and several
AMR reviewers for their constructive comments on an
earlier draft of this essay.

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