CASE DIGEST: GALLANOSA V.

ARCANGEL (83 SCRA 676)

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Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676

AQUINO, J.:

Nature of the Case:

In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to annul the orders
of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17, 1968, wherein he reconsidered his order of January
10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his
will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to
spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew up
under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protégé
Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered
by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted
the will to probate.

The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of
partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging
that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that they be
declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res
judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the
will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will” alleging fraud and deceit.
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of
Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to
the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case
which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res
judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the
will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not

even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in
rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case,
which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It
constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of
the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot
apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the

period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.

Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754

CASTRO, J.:

On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special
Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate
was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria
Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition
was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed
with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s legally
adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that
the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,
thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed
as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of
Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into
believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents as the latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her.
The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana”
(compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for
the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she could
not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a
false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.
HELD:

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code,
the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other
considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely
favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give
the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews
and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert
the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was
done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be
allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the
decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to
her will must be in order.

Acain v. IAC (1987)

Facts:

On May 1984, ConstantinoAcain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late NemesioAcain and for the issuance to Acain of
letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acainand his siblings were
instituted as heirs.The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents.

Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-
deceases Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed.

After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopted
daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is
merely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied.

After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private
respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio.

HisMR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of IAC’s decision.

Issues:

1. Whether private respondents have been preterited.No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.

2. Whether Acainhas legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.

**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority.No.

Ratio/Held:

1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no
preterition, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said forFernandez. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither
can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the Fernandez.The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will.

2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate.
Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having
resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs,Acain is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased and must then be dismissed.

**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, is
not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even
before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.

The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.

The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.
GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his widow,

MarcelleSemoron de Ramirez, a French woman; his two grandnephews Roberto and
Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance. According to the will ½ shall go to Marcelle in
full ownership plus usufruct of the 1/3 of the whole estate; the grandsons shall have the
½ of the whole estate; and a usufruct in favour of Wanda.

ISSUE:

Is the partition according to the will valid?

RULING:

No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to give Marcelle more
than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.As to the usufruct in favour of Wanda,
the Court upheld its validity. The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for devise of a
piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct in favour of Wanda
because a usufruct does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting
of title to aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons but the
usufruct of the second half shall go to Wanda.

BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ

Facts:

1. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur was survived by her husband,
Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B.
Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon.

2. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's
notarial will which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she
was the owner of the southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the
absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c)
that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV). In paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he
was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as my properties ) should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth
in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal
assets.

3. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay,
Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

4. Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr., wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that
he was interested in its probate.

5. Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's
will he waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six
children.In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner
indicated in her will.

6. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
conformation of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. Lower court denied the opposition and reset
for hearing the probate of the will. Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower
court's order. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that
motion. Lower court denied it in its order.

7. David O. Monta ñ a, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his
counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate
of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding. Monta ñ a in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. In another motion of
the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

8. Lower court acting on the motions of Atty. Monta ñ a, assumed that the issuance of a
notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the
view of Attys. Monta ñ a and Guyo that the will was void.Dismissed the petition for the
probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the
issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing. The notice
to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao
Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
9. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
asked for the reconsideration of the lower court ’ s Ground: that Atty. Monta ñ a had no
authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Withdrawal of the petition for
the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder
to him that their mother's will was very sacred to them.
10. Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. LC:
denied the motion in its order. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own
independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Monta ñ a's arguments.

Issue: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. Held:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of
February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding.

Ratio: 1. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed
to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.
a. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. b. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. 2. But the
probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding. a. notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June
18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate. 3. General Rule: the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had
not been made a. Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the
intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries b. The statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern
half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof,
her share was inchoate and proindiviso c. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the
entire will. It may be disregarded. 4. The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire
conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights
and his one-half conjugal share). a. She did not assign the whole estate to one or more
children as envisaged in article 1080. b. Hence, she had no right to require that the
legitimes be paid in cash. c. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a
period of twenty years. 5. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights
and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership a. But insofar as said renunciation
partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate,
it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. b.
A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected. 6. In the instant case there is
no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the
manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. a. It is true that she could dispose of by will
only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. 7.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights. a. Remember this: Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that the
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious. b. As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be
followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs.
Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546). c. c. The law has a tender regard
for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is
better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 327, 341).

August 17, 1934

G.R. No. 40445
In re estate of the deceased LeonardaMacam y Capili.
NICOLASA MACAM, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUANA GATMAITAN, oppositor-appellant.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case comprises two appeals, one taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam and the other
by the oppositor Juana Gatmaitan, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the neglect or abandonment by the interested parties of their claims during the
proceedings for the probate of the will, and it appearing that the was already become final and it
appearing that the order allowing the will has already become final and executory, the court is of
the opinion that it is now too late to consider the so-called codicil as well as the instrument from
which Juana Gatmaitan derives her alleged right.

Wherefore, the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as the opposition thereto filed
by Juana Gatmaitan is dismissed, without prejudice to whatever right the latter may have in an
appropriate proceeding before the committee on claims and appraisal, in accordance with law. So
ordered.

In support of her appeal, the petitioner NicolasaMacam assigns the following alleged errors
as having been committed by the trial court in said decision, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the parties have abandoned their respective claims during
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
2. The lower court erred in declaring that it was already too late to raise the question as to the legal
efficacy of the codicil executed by the deceased.
3. The lower court erred in dismissing the petition for the probate of the codicil before any of the
parties had presented evidence pertinent to the matter.

The oppositor Juana Gatmaitan, in turn, assigns the following alleged errors as having been
committed by the court a quo in said decision, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that in order for Juana Gatmaitan to preserve her rights, so far
as to oppose the probate of the codicil, it was her duty to oppose to the probate of the will; and,
having opposed the probate only of the codicil, she could no longer avail herself of the document in
her favor, so as to affect the testamentary dispositions of the deceased LeonardaMacam.
2. The lower court erred in dismissing the opposition of Juana Gatmaitan to the probate of the
alleged codicil.

The appellants assignments of error, considered together, raise the following questions of
law:
1. Is the probate of a will by final judgment prior to that of a codicil thereof bar to the probate of
said codicil?
2. Does the failure to the file opposition to the probate of a will constitute a bar to the presentation
of the codicil for probate?

The following pertinent facts, which are disclosed by the pleadings, are necessary for the
resolution of the questions raised in this appeal.

On March 27, 1933, NicolasaMacam filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacana petition
for the probate of the will dated July 12, 1932, and of the codicil thereof dated February 17, 1933,
executed by LeonardaMacam who died on March 18, 1933, in the municipality of Calumpit, of said
Province of Bulacan, and for her appointment as executrix without bond.

When the petition was called for hearing on April 24, 1933, in the absence of the judge, the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, upon instructions of said judge to proceed to take the
evidence in the absence of any opposition, took the evidence relative to the probate of the will, no
opposition to the same having been filed.Inasmuch as Juana Gatmaitan filed opposition to the
probate of the codicil, said clerk deemed himself unauthorized to take the evidence relative thereto
and refrained from so doing.

The will and the evidence for its probate having been submitted to the court the vacation
Judge Hon. M. Rosauro, on April 28, 1933, entered an order allowing said will and appointing the
petitioner NicolasaMacam as executrix.

On July 6, 1933, after notice to the parties, the codicil was called for hearing, opposition
having been filed by Juana Gatmaitan, one of the legatees instituted in the will which had already
been allowed by final and executory judgment. After hearing counsel for the respective parties,
Judge Francisco Enage, then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entered the order
the dispositive part of which has been quoted at the beginning of this decision.
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 625. Allowance necessary, and conclusive as to execution.—No will shall pass either the real or
personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Interpreting the above legal provisions as regards the scope of the allowance of a will, this court, in
numerous decisions, has laid down the doctrine that the probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator, but not as to the validity of its
provisions, and in probate proceedings the courts are without jurisdiction to determine questions
concerning the validity of the provisions of the will. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil.,
426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436;Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21
Phil., 180; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105.)

A codicil is a written instrument wherein one declares his last will, in order to take from or
add something to the will, or clarify the provisions thereof. (Spanish Cyclopedia of Law, vol. 5, page
918.)
A codicil has been defined as some addition to or qualification of one's last will and testament. (28
R. C. L., 197.)
The exercise of the right to make a will, as a voluntary act, implies the right to revoke, and article
737 of the Civil Code expressly provides that wills are essentially revocable, provided that the
partial or total revocation is made with the formalities required for making it, in accordance with
the provisions of article 738 of the same Code.
The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has
become final and executory is not a bar to the presentation and probate of a codicil, provided it
complies with all the necessary formalities for executing a will required by section 614 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1934.

It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together, as the codicil may be
concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been
allowed; and they may be presented and probated one after the other (40 Cyc., 1228), since the
purpose of the probate proceedings is merely to determine whether or not the will and the codicil
meet all the statutory requirements for their extrinsic validity, leaving the validity of their
provisions for further consideration.

The appeal taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam is, therefore, well founded and the
court a quo erred in flatly, denying her petition for the probate of the codicil on the erroneous
ground that said codicil should have been presented at the same time as the will.

With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellant Juana Gatmaitan, the fact that she
failed to file opposition to the probate of the will does not prevent her from filing opposition to the
probate of the codicil thereof, inasmuch as the will may satisfy all the external requisites necessary
for its validity, but the codicil may, at the time of its execution, not be in conformity therewith. If the
testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will, and the will was
executed in accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition to its probate would not lie.
On the contrary, if at the time of the execution of the codicil the testator lacked some of the
subjective requisites legally capacitating him to execute the same, or all the statutory requirements
were not complied with in the execution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.

The court a quo, therefore, erred in dismissing the opposition filed by the oppositor-
appellant Juana Gatmaitan to the probate of the codicil of the will of the deceased LeonardaMacam.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the fact that a will has
been probated and the order allowing the same has become final and executory is not a bar to the
presentation and probate of a codicil, although its existence was known at the time of the probate of
the will; (2) that the failure of the oppositor to the probate of a codicil to file opposition to the
probate of the will, having knowledge of such proceedings, does not constitute an abandonment of a
right, nor does it deprive her of the right to oppose the probate of said codicil.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and it is ordered that the petition for the
probate of the codicil filed by the petitioner NicolasaMacam, as well as the opposition to said
probate filed by the oppositor Juana Gatmaitan, be reinstated, without special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.