It is the general rule that it is immaterial purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and
no greater degree of care is required than by a sober
one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether
he is drunk or sober. (E. M. WRIGHT vs. MANILA
ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO)
The mother and her child had a perfect right
to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held.
There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to
run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No
one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child running and
falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother,
if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its
strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages. (TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA
ENVERSO, vs. J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN
ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD)
The proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man
in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.
Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if
it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
(AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.)
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross,
but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a
contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed
in case of death of a passenger attributable to the
fault (which is presumed4 ) of the common carrier.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or ill will.
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to
an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. (FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET. AL.)
Generally, liability for tort arises only
between parties not otherwise bound by a contract.
An academic institution, however, may be held liable
for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may
also be a tort. (KHRISTINE REGINO vs.
PANGASINAN COLLEGESOF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY)
The Court defined simple negligence,
penalized under what is now Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as "a mere lack of prevision in a
situation where either the threatened harm is
not immediate or the danger not openly visible." Put
in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the
offense of simple negligence is the failure to exercise
the diligence necessitated or called for the situation
which was not immediately life-destructive but which
culminated, in the present case, in the death of a
human being three (3) days later. Such failure to
exercise the necessary degree of care and diligence is
a negative ingredient of the offense charged. The rule
in such cases is that while the prosecution must prove
the negative ingredient of the offense, it needs only to
present the best evidence procurable under the
circumstances, in order to shift the burden of
disproving or countering the proof of the negative
ingredient to the accused, provided that such initial
evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis
the guilt of the accused. This rule is particularly
applicable where the negative ingredient of the
offense is of such a nature or character as, under the
circumstances, to be specially within the knowledge
or control of the accused. In the instant case, the
Court is bound to observe that the events which
occurred during the surgical procedure (including
whether or not Nubain had in fact been administered
as an anesthesia immediately before or during the
surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and
control of Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid. It was,
therefore, incumbent upon the two (2) accused to
overturn the prima facie case which the prosecution
had established, by reciting the measures which they
had actually taken to prevent or to counter the
obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta
which was evident right after surgery. This they
failed or refused to do so. (LEANDRO CARILLO,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,)
In medical negligence cases, also called
medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the
victim. But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2)
breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must
be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4)
elements must co-exist in order to find the physician
negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or
the improper performance of such duty, by the
attending physician when the patient is injured in
body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable
malpractice. Proof of such breach must likewise rest
upon the testimony of an expert witness that the
treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the
standard level of care, skill and diligence which
physicians in the same general neighborhood and in
the same general line of practice ordinarily possess
and exercise in like cases. (PETER PAUL PATRICK
LUCAS, FATIMA GLADYS LUCAS,
ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND GILLIAN LUCAS vs.
DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAÑO)
At the very least, the nature of crossed checks should
place a bank on notice that it should exercise more
caution or expend more than a cursory inquiry, to
ascertain whether the payee on the check has
authorized the holder to deposit the same in a
different account. It is well to remember that "[t]he
banking system has become an indispensable
institution in the modern world and plays a vital role
in the economic life of every civilized society.
Whether as mere passive entities for the safe-keeping
and saving of money or as active instruments of
business and commerce, banks have attained an [sic]
ubiquitous presence among the people, who have
come to regard them with respect and even gratitude
and, above all, trust and confidence. In this
connection, it is important that banks should guard
against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith
on its part. As repeatedly emphasized, since the
banking business is impressed with public interest,
the trust and confidence of the public in it is of
paramount importance. Consequently, the highest
degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of
integrity and performance are required of it.
(EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v.
SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. And
AUGUSTO L. PARDO)
. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of
Appeals and The Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where the bank’s
negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the
depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we
allocated the damages between the bank and the
depositor on a 60-40 ratio. (PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. F.F. CRUZ AND
CO., INC)
This was, said Court correctly held, a
mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its
equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus
had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid
check-up before it took to the road that morning.
Then again both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident.
Considering that the tire which exploded was not new
— petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo,"
or not so very worn out — the plea of caso
fortuito cannot be entertained. (LA MALLORCA and
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE
JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF
APPEALS)
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise.
Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy, and precedent.
The employer of a negligent employee is liable for
the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there
has been negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him, after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. (MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v.
SEBASTIAN M. BAKING)
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. (BATACLAN v. MEDINA)
According to the great weight of authority,
where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tort-feasor (PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER
LAGUNDA vs. CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN
MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS)
A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. (MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO)
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not
sufficient basis for an inference that such violation
was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has
happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute
will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
(MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA
FERNANDEZ)
For the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for
the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the
custody and control of the animal and is therefore the
one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
(MARGARITA AFIALDA v. BASILIO &
FRANCISCO HISOLE)
In the present case, the animal was in
custody and under the control of the caretaker, who
was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the
caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences. (MARGARITA
AFIALDA v. BASILIO & FRANCISCO
HISOLE)
Under the foregoing provision (Article 2184), if the
causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence.
The same rule applies where the owner is present,
unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued
for such a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in
his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present therein at the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.
The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act
his own. (J.H. CHAPMAN v. JAMES
UNDERWOOD)
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is
proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. (SOFIA
GUILLANG v. RODOLFO BEDANIA &
RODOLFO DE SILVA)
plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2) he
must further understand its nature; and (3) his choice
to incur it must be free and voluntary. According to
Prosser: "Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of
assumption of risk." (ABROGAR v. COSMOS
BOTTLING COMPANY AND
INTERGAMES, INC)

The vendor could likewise be liable

for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and an action based thereon may be brought by the
vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule,
bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the
liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may
also be a quasi-delict. (COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS & LYDIA GERONIMO)

A corollary rule is what is known in the law

as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." (HEDY GAN y YU v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

The doctrine of assumption of risk means

that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the
risk of injury that may result therefrom.76 It rests on
the fact that the person injured has consented to
relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct
toward him and to take his chance of injury from a
known risk, and whether the former has exercised
proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it
is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to
accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it
may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising
from the defendant's negligence, but one does not
ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he
does not know and appreciate. As a defense in
negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the
concurrence of three elements, namely: (1) the