Charan Lal Sahu Vs.

Union of India:
1990 AIR 1480

Background:

under Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution? Union Carbide (India) Limited
(UCIL), which was a subsidiary of the New York based Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)
owned a plant in Bhopal to manufacture pesticides. A highly toxic gas, Methyl Isocyanate
(MIC) was used in the process and there was a massive leak from the storage tank on the
night between 2nd and 3rd December 1984, which resulted in death of approximately 3000
people and injuries to thousands of others.
The tragedy was followed by large number of suits being filed against the companies in both
India and the United States. With regard to this, the Government took a major step by
enacting the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 with the object to
“confer powers on the Central Government to assure that claims arising out of, or connected
with, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster are dealt with speedily, effectively, equitably and to the
best advantage of the claimants and for matters incidental thereto.”1 Section 3 of the Act
empowered the Central Government to file suits on behalf of the victims exclusively, hence,
taking away the rights of affected to file suits on their own. Though it was specifically
mentioned that in case of suits that were already filed before the enactment of the aforesaid
Act, the Central Government shall represent the victims or act in addition to them with the
permission of the Court. Hence the writ.

Issues:
The following core issues that came up, were,
1)Whether or not the Act was in accordance with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed
2)Whether or not the Act was in accordance with the Principles of Natural Justice?
2.1) Whether being a joint tort feasor, the Union on India had any locus standi to compromise
on behalf of the victims as it itself had permitted the establishment of such factories without
necessary safeguards?
2.2) Whether or not the victims and their legal heirs were given opportunity to be heard?
2.3) Whether or not, due to conflict on interests, the Central Government was acting as a
judge in its own cause?
3) Whether or not the Central Government is legislatively competent to destroy/
demand the citizens to surrender their rights in guise of g

1 Preamble of the “ Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster ( Processing of Claims) Act, 1985”
Whether or not the Act was in accordance with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed
under Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution?

The contention of the petitioners was that the Act infringed on their individual rights to legal
remedy against the UCC and UCIL for the consequences of carrying out dangerous and
hazardous activities in India. It was argued that the “one could not take away the right of a
person, the liberty of a person, to institute proceedings for his own benefit and for his
protection.”2 Sections 3,4 and 11 of the aforesaid Act were contented to be in violation of
Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution because the procedure that was established
under these Sections deprived the just and legitimate rights of the victims to assert and obtain
their just dues and therefore such rights cannot be destroyed because under law, victims have
a right to ventilate their rights. Another argument in this regard was “that it has been asserted
by the Government that the Act was passed pursuant to Entry 13 of the List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. It was therefore submitted that to the extent it was a law
relating to civil procedure, it sets up a different procedure for the Bhopal gas victims and
denies to them equality before law, violating Article 14 of the Constitution….” Attention was
also drawn to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in support of their
argument.
The Government argued that there were various reasons to enact the Act and some of them
were- “ the plight of the impoverished, the urgency of the victims need, the presence of the
foreign contingency lawyers, the procedure of settlement in USA in mass action, the strength
of the foreign multinationals, the nature of injuries and damages.”3 Further, it was argued by
the Government that the Preamble to the Constitution of India, read with the Directive
Principles, Articles 38, 39 and 39A of enjoins the State to take up responsibility. The taking
up of this responsibility has been derived directly from the doctrine of “parens patriae.”
“Parens Patriae” means the “father of the country” and it is the inherent power and authority
of a legislature to provide protection to the person and property of persons non suijuris, such
as minor insane or incompetent persons. The judges agreed that the “victims cannot be
considered to be any match to the multinational companies or the government with whom in
the conditions that the victims or their representatives were after the disaster physically,
mentally, financially, economically and also because of the position of litigation would have
to contend and in such a situation of predicament, the victims could be legitimately be
considered to be disabled”4 and therefore the power was vested in the Central Government.
Further it was ruled that the Act in question had been passed in recognition of the right of the
sovereign to act as a parens patriae. The judges ruled that “it is necessary for the State to
ensure the Fundamental Rights in conjunction with the Directive Principles of State Policy to
effectively discharge its obligations and for this purpose if necessary, to deprive some rights
and privileges of the individual victims or their heirs to protect their rights better and secure
these further.”

2 Para. 33
3 Para. 99
4 Para. 100
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995, 1028. Ct, 3260 in
this connection. There it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States of America that
Commonwealth of Puerto have standing to sue as parens patriae to enjoin apple growers'
discrimination against Puerto Rico migrant farm workers. This case illustrates in some aspect
the scope of 'parens patriae'. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia, as parens patriae for Puerto Rican migrant
farm workers, and against Virginia apple growers, to enjoin discrimination against Puerto
Ricans in favour of Jamaican workers in violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act, and the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The District Court dis- missed the action on the ground that
the Commonwealth lacked standing to sue, but the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit
reversed it. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In the opinion by White,
J. joined by Burger, Chief Justice and Brennan, Marshall, Blackman, Rennquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor, JJ., it was held that Puerto Rico had a claim to represent its quasi sovereign
interests in federal court at least which was as strong as that of any State, and that it
had parens patriae standing to sue to secure its residents from the harmful effects of
discrimination and to obtain full and equal participation in the federal employment
service scheme established pursu- ant to the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration
and Nation- ality Act of 1952. Justice White referred to the meaning of the expression
"parens patriae". According to Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition 1979, page 1003, it
means literally 'parent of the country' and refers traditionally to the role of the State as
a sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability.

Justice White held that in order to maintain an action, in parens patriae, the state must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular parties, i.e. the State must be more
than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.

Again an instructive insight can be obtained from the observations of Justice Holmes of the
American Supreme Court in the case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US 230, 51
L.Ed. 1038, 27 S Ct 618, which was a case involving air pollution in Georgia caused by the
discharge of noxious gases from the defendant's plant in Tennessee. Justice Holmes described
the State's interest as follows: "This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might
have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it remains the final power.
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible
to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not
renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining
quasi-sovereign interests"

The Court in Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty [1962] 3 SCR 786
emphasized that the constitutional validity of the statute would have to be determined on the
basis of its provisions and on the ambit of its operation as reasonably construed. It has to be
borne in mind that if upon so judged it passes the test of reasonableness, then the possibility
of the powers conferred being improperly used is no ground for pronouncing the law itself
invalid.
Whether or not the Act was in accordance with the Principles of Natural Justice?

1. Whether being a joint tort feasor, the Union on India had any locus standi to
compromise on behalf of the victims as it itself had permitted the establishment of such
factories without necessary safeguards?
The contention of the Government was that it only represented the victims as a party and
did not adjudicate between the victims and the UCC and hence the rights of the victims
were adjudicated by the Court only. It was later stated that such a representation of the
victims by the Government cannot be considered to be bad anywhere and hence there was
no scope of violation of any principle of natural justice. The Government contended that it
was acting on behalf of the victims because the Doctrine of Necessity applied in the
present case. The Court agreed with the Attorney General and referring to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, in which it is stated that,” even if all the members of a tribunal
competent to determine a matter were subject to disqualification, they might be authorized
and obliged to hear that matter, by virtue of the operation of the common law doctrine of
necessity”5 ruled that even if the Central Government might somewhere be liable in a case
of this nature, it would be proper that it should be able and authorized to represent the
victims because only the Government is capable of representing the victims (has locus
standi) in such a peculiar case and the doctrine of necessity would apply and the
principles of natural justice are not violated.
The Court also referred to the case of J. Mohapatra vs. State of Orrisa6. In this case, there
was dispute as to selection of books meant for Government libraries. The selection was
done on basis of recommendations by a Committee and there were allegations that the
Committee had members who recommended their own books. The Court dwelling into the
Doctrine of Bias, commented on its exception in the following way: “An adjudicator, who
is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter which he has
to decide, may be required to adjudicate if there is no other person who is competent or
authorized to adjudicate or if a quorum cannot be formed without him or if no other
competent tribunal can be constituted. In such cases, the principal of natural justice
would have to give way to necessity for otherwise there would be no means of deciding
the matter and the machinery of justice or administration would break down.”7

5 Para 105
6 1984 4 SCC 103
7 Para. 4 (1)- J. Mohapatra vs. State of Orrisa, 1984 4 SCC 103
Whether or not the victims and their legal heirs were given opportunity to be heard?

One of the basic principles of Natural Justice is that people affected by an action or inaction
should have a Right to be Heard. In this case, the petitioners contended that they were not
given any right to be heard as the Central Government took control to represent all the
victims together. Even by doing so they could have got their say if the Court notified them
about the due proceedings, settlement agreement through newspapers, television, radio or any
other adequate sources. The CJ Sabyasachi Mukherji remarked in the present case,” The
general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be
that where a statue does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but comtemplates a
post decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original on merits than such a
statue would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule as the pre decisional
stage. If the statue conferring the power is silent with regard to giving of pre decisional
hearing to the person affected, the administrative decision after post decisional hearing was
good.”8
Reference to the case of Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India 9 were her passport was
impounded by the authorities without giving her any prior notice or opportunity to be heard.
The legal question was “ can a post decisional hearing mitigate the injustice caused by the
lack of pre decisional hearing. All the Judges agreed that it was a clear violation of the
Doctrine of audi alteram partem and hence the Court decided to give a post decisional
hearing to her.”10
Finally, the Court ruled that some say was actually given to the victims by Section 4 of the
aforesaid Act to represent themselves before the Court before it comes to any conclusion in
respect of any settlement. It was because of the mass tort action and the magnitude and nature
of this case that it was near to impossible to hear each and every concerned.

8 Para 8
9 AIR 1978 SC 597
10 SP Sathe, Administrative Law, 7th Ed., Pg. 236
Whether or not, due to conflict on interests, the Central Government was acting as a
judge in its own cause?

It was contended by the Petitioners that the Central Government owns 22% shares in UCIL
and hence there is a conflict of interest between the victims and hence on that ground the
latter is disentitled to represent the former in their battle against UCIL and UCC which would
make the government a judge in its own cause, thus breaching this principle of natural justice.
The Court on this aspect, ruled that” These are statutory independent organisations namely
UTI and LIC who own 20-22% share in UCIL. The Government has certain amount of say in
LIC and UTI and hence there is no conflict on interests in real sense of matter with respect to
the given case. Secondly, in such a critical situation, only the Central Government can
pursue and effectively represent the victims.”11
Therefore the Court ruled that the Doctrine of Necessity would over ride the possible
violation of the principles of natural justice that no one should be a judge in his own cause.
Thus it can be seen that the Court applied to Doctrine of Necessity in its widest scope in this
case. It seemed that Court in this case was in agreement to an extent that the principles of
natural justice would be violated due to the enactment of the Act but the sheer magnitude and
complexity of the situation led the Court to make this exception to the Doctrine of Bias
applicable to this case. The Court found that it was only the Government which was capable
of leading, representing and taking forward the cause of the victims, even though it may be
denying them the right to be heard in some sense and would be a judge in its own cause in
some sense, but the situation called for the exception to be adopted.

Whether or not the Central Government is legislatively competent to destroy/ demand

the citizens to surrender their rights in guise of giving aid?

The victims contended that it is not permissible for the State to grant legal aid at the cost of
destroying rights that in here in citizens or by demanding the rights of the citizens to the
State. On interpretation of the Act it was noticed that Sections 3 and 4 gave exclusive power
to the Government to represent the victims and hence there is deprivation of victims right to
sue for the wrongs done to them which is uncanalised and unguided and the expression “due
regard” in Section 4 of the Act does not imply consent and hence it violates the rights of the
victims.
In response, the Central Government’s argument was that the Act was passed to give effect to
the Directive Principles as enshrined under Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The
Court ruled that the Central Government is legislatively competent in enacting such
provisions taking DPSP under Article 39 as a feasible defense for such competency .

11 Para 102
 CONCLUSION

This case has been a unique case in itself where the urgency of the situation and the lack of
legislations and administrative provisions led to the enactment of the Act in a haste and this
subsequent case where the Supreme Court “had” to interpret that the situation called for the
exceptions in Administrative Law to apply. The Judges also suggested various ways 12 in
which such future situations could be taken care of. “The Bhopal gas tragedy and the legal
response thereto have been the subject of great controversy. A review petition against the
above settlement award was filed before the Supreme Court in the Union Carbide Corpn. Vs
India. Objections were taken to the competence of the Supreme Court to withdraw criminal
prosecutions and pass such an order in the course of the hearing of appeals arising out of the
interlocutory orders in the suit. The Court, however, set aside the order quashing criminal
prosecutions and imposing an embargo on future prosecutions….”13

“To do a great right after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little

wrong”14

12 All the judges proposed a common fund that such companies, who will be engaging in dangerous
activities, would have to maintain for such calamities. This was in forceful submissions made by the
petitioners that big MNC’s from world over were exploiting the Third World by coming and indulging in
dangerous activities, for profit, with total disregard for human rights.
13 SP Sathe, Administrative Law, 7TH Ed., Pg. 603
14 Para 124