3.

TAN TI vs. JUAN ALEVAR, ET AL.

(G.R. No. L-8228 January 16, 1914)

FACTS

Tan Ti, Tin Uco, and Tiu Tiao et al., petitioners in this three (3) consolidated case, each owned a
retail store in Dagupan. The Court of First Instance of Manila issued execution on the effects of one Lim
Kok Tiu, and ordered notices of garnishment to be served on each of the above-named petitioners.
These notices were forwarded to the sheriff of Pangasinan. It appears that the sheriff himself was not
in his office when the notices were received and they were attended to by his deputy, Lopez. Lopez
delivered the notices to another deputy sheriff, Zulueta, for service. Zulueta, instead of merely serving
the notices, informed each of the present petitioners that unless they submitted their respective bonds
in the sum of P15,000, he would close their stores. The respective owners asked for time to go to Manila
to secure bondsmen, which was granted them.

The three petitioners consulted their lawyers in, who informed them that the sheriff had no right
to close their stores upon garnishment process. The three plaintiffs returned to Dagupan and notified
deputies Lopez and Zulueta accordingly, but the latter went ahead and closed the stores on November
13, 1911, placing guards at each one.

Notwithstanding the fact that the contents of the notices which the sheriff's deputies had served
on the owners of these stores clearly showed that they were not writs of attachment, and the further
instructions from the counsel for the plaintiff in that civil case to the same effect, the deputy sheriffs
refused to raise the attachment.

The owners of the stores thereupon filed the complaints in the present civil actions. The lower
court ruled in favor to the petitioners and awarded damages. The expenses of both trips to consult
lawyers in Manila should be allowed, and this item of damages is therefore approved. Loss of profits
from sales for the time the store was closed was based upon the record of sales made by the plaintiff
during the months of October, November, and December, 1911. The figures were as follows: October
P1,517.54; November, P924,19; and December, P1,651.54.

ISSUE

Whether or not the award of counsel fees regarded as a proper element of damages.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that the award of counsel fees in suits should not be regarded as a
proper element of damages.

Sound public policy demands that counsel fees in suits of the character of the one under
consideration should not be regarded as a proper element of damages, even where they are capable of
being apportioned so as to show the amount incurred for the release of the necessary in the prosecution
of the suit for damages. It is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel
the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide the door
of temptations to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions, and to
apportion them arbitrarily between those pertaining properly to one branch of the case from the other.

Therefore, the judgments appealed from are modified as follows: Damages in Tan Ti's case are
reduced to P227.50; in Tiu Uco's case, to P460.50; and in the case of Tiu Tiao et al., to P987. The award
of counsel fee is deleted as element of damages.
4.
SOLOMON BOYSAW and ALFREDO M. YULO, JR vs.
INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, INC., LOPE SARREAL, SR., and MANUEL NIETO, JR
(G.R. No. L-22590, March 20, 1987)

FACTS

On May 1, 1961, Solomon Boysaw and his then Manager, Willie Ketchum, signed with Interphil
Promotions, Inc. represented by Lope Sarreal, Sr., a contract to engage Gabriel "Flash" Elorde in a
boxing contest for the junior lightweight championship of the world.

It was stipulated that the bout would be held at the Rizal Memorial Stadium in Manila on
September 30, 1961 or not later than thirty [30] days thereafter should a postponement be mutually
agreed upon, and that Boysaw would not, prior to the date of the boxing contest, engage in any other
such contest without the written consent of Interphil Promotions, Inc.

The managerial rights over Boysaw was assigned and eventually reassigned to Alfredo Yulo, Jr.
without the consent of Interphil in violation of their contract. When informed of the change, Interphil
referred the matter to the Games and Amusement Board culminating to a decision by the board to
approve a new date for the match. Yulo protested against the new date even when another proposed
date was within the 30-day allowable postponements.

While an Elorde-Boysaw fight was eventually staged, the fight contemplated in the May 1, 1961
boxing contract never materialized.

As a result of the foregoing occurrences, Boysaw and Yulo, Jr. sued Interphil, Sarreal, Sr. and
Manuel Nieto, Jr. in the CFI of Rizal [Quezon City Branch] for damages allegedly occasioned by the
refusal of Interphil and Sarreal, to honor their commitments under the boxing contract of May 1,1961.

The lower court rendered its judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint, the plaintiffs moved
for a new trial. The motion was denied, hence, this appeal taken directly to this Court by reason of the
amount involved.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent Interphil Promotions is liable for damages for fight
postponement which cause delay.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Interphil Promotions is not liable for damages. The
fight postponement by Interphil is valid.

Under Art 1170 of the Civil Code, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the terms thereof, are liable for
damages.

On the validity of the fight postponement, the violations of the terms of the original contract by
petitioner vested the respondents with the right to rescind and repudiate such contract altogether. That
they sought to seek an adjustment of one particular covenant of the contract, is under the
circumstances, within the respondent’s rights.

Evidence established that the contract was violated by Boysaw when, without the approval or consent
of Interphil, he fought a boxing match in Las Vegas. Another violation was the assignment and transfer
of the managerial rights over Boysaw without the knowledge or consent of Interphil.
5
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs CA
and SPOUSES MINERVA TIMAN and FLORES TIMAN (G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991)

FACTS

Private respondents-spouses Minerva Timan and Flores Timan sent a telegram of condolence to
their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario Midoranda, at Trinidad, Calbayog City, through petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI, hereinafter) at Cubao, Quezon City, to convey their
deepest sympathy for the recent death of the mother-in-law of Hilario Midoranda4 to wit:

MR. & MRS. HILARIO MIDORANDA

TRINIDAD, CALBAYOG CITY

MAY GOD GIVE YOU COURAGE AND STRENGTH TO BEAR YOUR LOSS. OUR DEEPEST
SYMPATHY TO YOU AND MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY.

MINER & FLORY.5

The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However,
the condolence message as communicated and delivered to the addressees was typewritten on a
"Happy Birthday" card and placed inside a "Christmasgram" envelope. Believing that the transmittal
to the addressees of the aforesaid telegram in such manner was done intentionally and with gross
breach of contract resulting to ridicule, contempt, and humiliation of the private respondents and the
addressees, including their friends and relatives, the spouses Timan demanded an explanation.
Unsatisfied with RCPI's explanations in its letters, dated March 9 and April 20, 1983, the Timans filed
a complaint for damages.6

One of RCPI's main arguments is that it still correctly transmitted the text of the telegram and was
received by the addressees on time despite the fact that there was "error" in the social form and
envelope used.10 RCPI asserts that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or
damage on private respondents

Issue

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY ACTUAL

AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,848.05.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY MORAL

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,000.00.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY EXEMPLARY

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING PETITIONER TO PAY ATTORNEYS

FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,000.00 PLUS COSTS OF SUIT.8

Ruling
 The Supreme Court fully agreed with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's
conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the
public, is engaged in a business affected with public interest.

Furthermore, It is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to convey a

message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of condolence" because it
tenders sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that
message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts
of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense, they depict
a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ridicule the deceased's loved ones and destroy the
atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed.

Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send his
message in the ordinary form or in a social form.The sender pays a higher amount for the social
telegram than for one in the ordinary form. It is clear, therefore, that when RCPI typed the private
respondents' message of condolence in a birthday card and delivered the same in a colorful
Christmasgram envelope, it committed a breach of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse that
it had run out of social condolence cards and envelopes is flimsy and unacceptable. It could not have
been faulted had it delivered the message in the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the
cost to the private respondents. But by transmitting it unfittingly—through other special forms clearly,
albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy and happiness and thanksgiving—RCPI only
exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the addressees and the senders. It bears stress that this botchery
exposed not only the petitioner's gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard for the
sentiments of its clientele, which tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable
for damages.

It is not surprising that when the Timans' telegraphic message reached their cousin, it became
the joke of the Midorandas' friends, relatives, and associates who thought, and rightly so, that the
unpardonable mix-up was a mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the senders' cousin. Thus it
was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment and
distress to respondent Minerva Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for three days.

The petitioner argues that "a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the actual proof that damages had been suffered
and evidence of the actual amount.16 In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal relation of the
illness suffered by Mr. Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But that is a question of fact.
The findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court concur in favor of the private
respondents. We are bound by such findings—that is the general rule well-established by a long line
of cases. Nothing has been shown to convince us to justify the relaxation of this rule in the petitioner's
favor. On the contrary, these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.

Anent the award of moral and exemplary damages assigned as errors, the findings of the
respondent court are persuasive.

RCPI's argument that it can not be held liable for exemplary damages, being penal or punitive
in character,18 is without merit. We have so held in many cases, and oddly, quite a number of them
likewise involved the herein petitioner as the transgressor.

The Supreme Court elaborated that in contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be
awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. There was gross negligence on the part of RCPI personnel in transmitting the wrong
telegram, of which RCPI must be held liable. Gross carelessness or negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against the petitioner.

6
EDGARDO CARIAGA, ET AL. v. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, and MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY, [G.R. No. L-11037. December 29, 1960]

FACTS OF THE CASE

Bus No. 133 of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company — hereinafter referred to as the LTB — driven
by Alfredo Moncada, left its station at Azcarraga St., Manila for Lilio, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga,
a fourth-year medical student of the University of Santo Tomas, as one of it passengers.

As the bus reached that part of the población of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway
crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force
that the first six wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and front part of the body of the bus were
wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers, Edgardo among them, were
severely injured. Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital.

June 20 of the same year when he was taken to the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left
that clinic on October 14 to be transferred to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where he stayed
up to November 15. On this last date he was taken back to the De los Santos Clinic where he stayed
until January 15, 1953. He was unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident: at the De los
Santos Clinic Dr. Gustilo removed the fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain
and at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo performed another operation to cover a big
hole on the right frontal part of the head with a tantalum plate.

The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical and miscellaneousexpenses incurred
from June 18, 1952 to April 1953. From January 15, 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed
in a private house and the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily
during his convalescence, having spent in this connection the total sum of P775.30 in addition to the
amount already referred to.

Edgardo Cariaga, filed a case to recover from the LTB and the MRR Co., the total sum of
P312,000.00 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and for his parents, the sum of
P18,000.00 in the same concepts. The LTB disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the
negligence of it s co-defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not providing a crossing bar at the
point where the national highway crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the corresponding
cross-claim against the latter company to recover the total sum of P18,194.75 representing the expenses
paid to Edgardo Cariaga. The Manila Railroad Company, in turn, denied liability upon the complaint
and cross-claim, alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident.

The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and,
as a result, rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay Edgardo Cariaga the sum of P10,490.00 as
compensatory damages, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and dismissing
the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company. From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB
appealed.

The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only P10,490. as compensatory
damages to Edgardo; in not awarding them actual and moral damages, and in not sentencing appellant
LTB to pay attorney’s fees.

On the other hand, the LTB’s principal contention in this appeal is that the trial court should
have held that the collision was due to the fault of both the locomotive driver and the bus driver and
erred, as a consequence, in not holding the Manila Railroad Company liable upon the cross-claim filed
against it.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding only P10,490. as compensatory damages to
Edgardo;
2. In not awarding them actual and moral damages and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay
attorney’s fees.
3. Whether of not that the trial court should have held that the collision was due to the fault of
both the locomotive driver and the bus driver and erred, as a consequence, in not holding
the Manila Railroad Company liable upon the cross-claim filed against it.

RULING

1. Yes.
As a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless
condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.

Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga
consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within
this category. But the court opines that at that time he was already a fourth-year student in
medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic record may not be first it is,
nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the course and
would have passed the board test in due time regards the income that he could possibly earn
as a medical practitioner.
Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore, this Court is of the opinion, and
so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased
to P25,000.00

2. Yes.
Plaintiffs’ claim for moral damages cannot also be granted. Article 2219 of the Civil Code
enumerated the instances when moral damages may be covered and the case under
consideration does not fall under any one of them. The present action cannot come under a
quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such because of the pre-existing contractual
relations between the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Edgardo Cariaga. Neither could
defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company be held liable to pay moral damages to Edgardo
Cariaga under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage
because said defendant did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith.
Defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company.

3. Yes.
The Supreme Court after considering the evidence presented by both parties the lower
court expressly found that while the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing,
the engineer sounded two long and two short whistles and upon reaching a point about 100
meters from the highway, he sounded a long whistle which lasted up to the time the train
was about to cross it. The bus proceeded on its way without slackening its speed and it
bumped against the train engine, causing the first six wheels of the latter to be derailed.
In addition, The claim made by the plaintiffs parents for actual and compensatory
damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is
concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage to which said
spouses were not a party.
7
PRISCILLA L. TAN vs. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., . [G.R. No. 135802. March 3, 2000]

FACTS

Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 29 in Chicago, U. S. A. bound for
the Philippines, with a stop-over at Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). Upon their arrival, petitioner and her companion Connie Tan found that their
baggages were missing. They returned to the airport in the evening of the following day and they were
informed that their baggages might still be in another plane in Tokyo, Japan. they recovered their
baggages and discovered that some of its contents were destroyed and soiled.

Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great damage" because of
Northwest's failure to inform them in advance that their baggages would not be loaded on the same
flight they boarded and because of their delayed arrival, they demanded from Northwest Airlines
compensation for the damages they suffered. petitioner sent demand letter to Northwest Airlines, but
the latter did not respond. Hence, the filing of the case with the regional trial court. the trial court
rendered decision finding respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. liable for damages for actual damages;
moral damages; exemplary damages; attorney’s fees and cost.

Respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. appealed from the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals
contending that the court a quo erred in finding it guilty of breach of contract of carriage and of willful
misconduct and awarded damages which had no basis in fact or were otherwise excessive.

Court of Appeals promulgated its decision partially granting the appeal by deleting the award of moral
and exemplary damages and reducing the attorney's fees

ISSUE:

The issue is whether respondent is liable for moral and exemplary damages for willful misconduct and
breach of the contract of air carriage.

RULING:

The petition is without merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of
willful misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there must be a showing that the acts complained
of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It
must be evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct."[7]

Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed that
they were motivated by malice or bad faith in loading her baggages on another plane. Due to weight
and balance restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent airline had to transport the baggages on a
different flight, but with the same expected date and time of arrival in the Philippines.

Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent did not act in bad faith.[9]

"Bad faith does not simply connnote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive
or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud."[10]

"Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that
case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages."[11]
8
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO vs. APOLONIO BUSTOS (G.R. No. L-25913 February 29, 1969)

Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with the crime
of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the petitioners. The trial court found
Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion
or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners, who were represented in the case by a private prosecutor,
in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is
entitled from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six
(26) years as a public school teacher

Both respondent and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate,
court acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder,
that the portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be
ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate
and exemplary damages."

on appeal, Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying the decision of the trial court Aside from
the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise
of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages, AND attorney's fees and expresses of litigation

RULING:

In the criminal action for death by crime, as murder, homicide, and homicide through reckless
imprudence it is the duty of the Fiscal, unless the heirs reserve their right to file a separate civil action,
to demand payment, for the benefit of the heirs of the deceased, of the damages ordained in Article
2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code.

exemplary damages in the amount to be determined by the court to be paid to the heirs of the deceased
in case of the presence of one or more aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime.

Where a private prosecutor, hired by the heirs of the deceased, intervenes in the criminal action, as in
the case at bar, the heirs may also demand and recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. This is just. From the provision of Article 2208(9) of the Civil Code which allows recovery of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in case of a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime, it does not follow that the converse is true. Whether the heirs recover the civil liability
through a private prosecutor in criminal action or through counsel in a separate civil action, they are
entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. What is important is not in what action the civil
liability is recovered, but the fact that in either action the heirs have paid attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.

The award of moral damages to the surviving spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and
ascendants of the deceased, should be made to each of them individually and in varying amounts
depending upon proof of mental anguish and the depth or intensity of the same. Where it is shown
that one or some did not suffer mental anguish or could not have suffered the same, no award of moral
damages should be made to him or to them.

We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We hold that, on the
basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as moral damages
and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased awarded
in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to the indemnity for death fixed
also by said court at P6,000.00. This amount of P6,000.00 We cannot increase to P12,000.00, as allowed
in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent cases, because in the instant suit, neither party has
appealed in relation thereto. This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as
to specific portions of the civil indemnity to be paid by the respondent. It would have been different if
the whole criminal case were up for our review because then, even without any appeal on the part of
the offended party, We could have still increased the said liability of the accused, here-in respondent.
(See Mercado v. Lira, supra.)

10
11.

G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI). petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents.

FACTS:

Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former.

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded his feelings,
caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other people have come
to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private
joke between the sending and receiving operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for
plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory.

The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would logically
think that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P40,
000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was negligent and failed
to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy
of the telegram is filed among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication; however
reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00

ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding Atty's. fees.

HELD:

Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration. The action for damages was filed in the lower
court directly against respondent corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the
provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As
well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages.
Every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered
into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately.
There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted,
without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As
a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in
receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not
liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general
public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy.

In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances
surrounding the injury.
12.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP., VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., and VICENTE
DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

FACTS:
In 1992, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, through its vice president Charo Santos-Concio,
requested Viva Production, Inc. to allow ABS-CBN to air at least 14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant
to this request, a meeting was held between Viva’s representative (Vicente Del Rosario) and ABS-CBN’s
Eugenio Lopez (General Manager) and Santos-Concio was held on April 2, 1992. During the meeting
Del Rosario proposed a film package which will allow ABS-CBN to air 104 Viva films for P60 million.
Later, Santos-Concio, in a letter to Del Rosario, proposed a counterproposal of 53 films (including the
14 films initially requested) for P35 million. Del Rosario presented the counter offer to Viva’s Board of
Directors but the Board rejected the counter offer. Several negotiations were subsequently made but on
April 29, 1992, Viva made an agreement with Republic Broadcasting Corporation (referred to as RBS –
or GMA 7) which gave exclusive rights to RBS to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially
requested by ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific performance against Viva as it alleged that there is
already a perfected contract between Viva and ABS-CBN in the April 2, 1992 meeting. Lopez testified
that Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and he (Lopez) even put the agreement in a napkin
which was signed and given to Del Rosario. ABS-CBN also filed an injunction against RBS to enjoin the
latter from airing the films. The injunction was granted. RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer for
moral damages as it claimed that its reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows that
they promised to their viewers. RBS relied on the ruling in People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber
vs PNB which states that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation”. The trial court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court

ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation, like RBS, is entitled to an award of moral damages upon grounds
of debased reputation.

HELD:
No.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be
experienced only by one having a nervous system. No moral damages can be awarded to a juridical
person. The statement in the case of People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB is a mere obiter
dictum hence it is not binding as jurisprudence.
13.
Estate of the Deceased MR. AND MRS. FLORENCIO P. BUAN, represented by BIENVENIDO P.
BUAN and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS, co-administrators, doing business under the name and style
of PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLO CAMAGANACAN, respondent.

FACTS: In the night of December 14, 1954, Priscillo Camaganacan, a pay passenger bound for Grace
Park, Caloocan, Rizal, took at San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 79 belonging to the
Estate of Mr. and Mrs. Florencio P. Buan, of which defendants are the administrators. In Malolos,
Bulacan, the bus tried to overtake a La Mallorca bus. The two buses ran a race. As it overtook the La
Mallorca bus in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and while driven at a fast clip, the Philippine Rabbit bus ran smack
into a Delbros trailer travelling in the opposite direction. As a result, Priscillo Camaganacan suffered a
fracture of the right wrist, a crushing injury on the second finger of the left hand, a lacerated wound
on the right leg. Brought to the Malolos Provincial Hospital, he was on the next day — December 15,
1954 — transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Mandaluyong. Discharged on January 22,
1955, he received further treatment until April 15, 1955. His hospital expenses were paid by defendants.

Priscillo Camaganacan started suit for damages. The judgment ordered defendants to pay
plaintiff P2,680.00 as actual damages, plus P2,000.00 as attorneys' fees, or a total of P4,680.00, and the
costs. Not satisfied with the judgment of CA, the defendant elevated the case to SC. ISSUE: Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in sentencing the herein petitioners to pay the herein respondent the
sum of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees.

HELD: The SC held that the text of the decision should state the reason why attorneys' fees are being
awarded, otherwise, the award is disallowed, however, the trial court did not state in its decision why
it was awarding attorney's fees against the defendants therein.

The very opening paragraph of Article 2208 reveals that the award of attorneys' fees remains
exceptional in our law, and it is up to the court to make an express finding of the facts that bring the
case within the execution and justify the grant of counsel fees:

ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs can not be recovered, except..xxx

In the present case, for the award of P2,680.00 in actual damages the appealed decisions awards
no less than P2,000.00 in counsel fees, which is hardly reasonable. Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion in the award of attorneys' fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code demands a factual,
legal, or equitable justification upon the basis of which the court exercises its discretion. Without such
justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, as basis being improperly left to speculation
and conjecture. The decision under review is modified by deleting therefrom the award of attorney's
fees.
14

15
16
Quiroz vs. Tan Guinlay 5 Phil 675

Fact:

The plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of 10,217.75 pesos, the value of goods sold
by him to the defendant, and the sum of 64,984.89 pesos, as damages caused to plaintiff by the failure
of the defendant to pay for the goods at the time agreed upon. The defendant in his answer denied all
the allegations of the complaint, and further, alleged the pendency of another action for the same cause;
a counterclaim to the amount of 40,000 pesos, for damages suffered by the defendant by reason of an
attachment wrongfully secured by the plaintiff in 1893; and a further counterclaim for damages caused
by reason a prosecution for estafa instituted against him maliciously by the plaintiff.

The court below ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the value of the goods sold and
delivered to the defendant, with interest thereon. He sustained the first counterclaim of the defendant,
and assessed the damages suffered by the defendant by reason of the attachment referred to in the
answer, at 6,347.75 pesos. The other defenses and counterclaims of the defendant the court held not to
have been proven, and final judgment was entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for 10,000
pesos and costs. Both parties have appealed from the judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the Plaintiff’s claim for damages may prosper?

Held:

No. Damages may be recovered when the obligation is to do something other than the payment
of money, but when the obligation which the defendant has failed to perform consists only in the
payment of money the rule of damages is that laid down by article 1108 of the Civil Code, which is as
follows: Should the obligation consist in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor should be in
default, the indemnity for losses and damages, should there not be a stipulation to the contrary, shall
consist in the payment of the interest agreed upon, and should there be no agreement, in that of the
legal interest. Until another rate is fixed by the Government interest at the rate of six per cent annum
shall be considered as legal. And the only damages which the plaintiff can recover in this case for the
nonpayment of the debt are those declared in this article. The result of an examination of the whole
case is that from the sum of 10,217.75 pesos, the value of the goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff
to the defendant, there should be deducted the sum of 2,235.95 pesos, on account of the bill of exchange
hereinbefore referred to. The defendant is not entitled to recover any damages on account of the
attachment of the goods procured by the plaintiff, for which he was allowed by the court below 6,347.75
pesos. The plaintiff therefore, is entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of 7,981.80
pesos, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 1st day of January, 1894, until the
amount is paid, and the costs of this suit.
17
G.R. No. L-11744 May 28, 1958 PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, represented in this case by her
attorney-in-fact, CARLOS RODRIGUEZ,petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, ET AL.,
respondents. Mariano C. Omeña for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for the respondent Auditor General. REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: This is a case where the property in question was occupied and utilized from May 1, 1949 to
October 8, 1949, by the Artillery Firing Group of the Philippine Ground Force, Armed Forces of the
Philippines. On July 27, 1950 forwarded to petitioner for her signature a quitclaim agreement whereby
she was to be paid the amount of P15,067.31 representing “complete payment of rentals for the entire
period of occupancy from 1 May 1948 to 8 October 1949 at the rate of P6.00 per hectare per month”,
with the understanding that upon payment of said amount, “the Armed Forces of the Philippines is
released from all claims which you may have against it for the occupancy of the land upon payment of
the above-mentioned rentals”. A new quitclaim agreement of exactly the same tenor as the first was on
April 4, 1951, prepared and signed by petitioner, through her attorney-in-fact, and again returned to
the Office of the Chief of Engineers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at Camp Murphy, but before
it could be signed by Lt. Col. Littaua of the Philippine Service Command in representation of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Armed Forces of the Philippines was reorganized and the Philippine
Service Command abolished.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Auditor General is right in making a decision on denying the payment for
the balance of the back rental of the land they used which belongs to Pilar.

HELD: No, he is not right because the land that they used is a private property which belongs to Pilar
and they supposed to pay a monthly rental on it which he must approved the payment. For the above
reasons, we hold that petitioner is entitled to, and should be paid, the balance of her claim against the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P8,067.31. She cannot, however, recover interests on this
amount from May 1, 1948, as prayed for by her. The rule is that a debtor is considered to incur in delay
only from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands the fulfillment of the obligation
(Art. 1169, New Civil Code), and it is only from the time of delay that interest is recoverable (Art. 2209,
supra). There being no evidence showing that petitioner made demands upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for the payment of the balance of her claim prior to her filing thereof with the Auditor
General on June 26, 1956, she must be considered to have made demand for its payment only on this
date. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to the payment of interests only from June 26, 1956. The decision
appealed from is reversed, and the Auditor General is ordered to approve payment for petitioner the
amount of P8,067.31, with legal interests thereon from June 26, 1956 until full payment. Cost de oficio.
So ordered.
18
19.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY INC. V. HON. JOSE FLORES AND
CONCORDIA G. NAVALTA GR NO. L-47180 MAY 18 1980 97 SCRA 811

FACTS

Respondent Judge Flores rendered a judgment in favor of the Respondent Navalta asking Petitioner
Phil-Am Accident Insurance Company Inc. to pay the former the amount of P75,000.00 with legal
interest from Oct. 1968, as attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit. Petitioner paid respondent the
principal amount with legal interest at 6% per annum from Oct 1968 to Apr. 30 1978 (in accordance
with Art. 2209 of the CC which provides: “If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money,
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary,
shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest,
which is six per cent per annum.") This appears to be the basis for the awarding interest at the legal
rate from Oct. 1968, although the debt was judicially demanded only on July 6 1970) and attorney’s fees
and the cost of the suit. Later on, Respondent advised the petitioner that payment was not in fun
satisfaction of the judgment because he has to pay compound interest or additional sum of P10, 375.77.
The respondent secured a writ if execution upon the refusal of the petitioner to pay the additional sum
claimed; which was affirmed by the Judge. Hence this review.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner is obligated to pay compound interest under the judgment.

HELD

The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment which was sought to be executed ordered
the payment of simple "legal interest" only. It said nothing about the payment of compound interest.
Accordingly, when the respondent judge ordered the payment of compound interest he went beyond
the confines of his own judgment which had been affirmed by the Co.
20.
LEONCIA D. AGUIRRE, LUIS D. AGUIRRE, JR., and AURELIA LUNINGNING AGUIRRE,
vs.
VICENTA AGUIRRE, FELIPE AGUIRRE, ANDREA AGUIRRE, CARIDAD AGUIRRE, SOCORRO
AGUIRRE, SEVERINO AGUIRRE as substitute for his deceased father DOMINADOR AGUIRRE,
CRISTETA LAMAHANG, LUIS L. AGUIRRE, JR., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This litigation started in the Court of First Instance of Batangas as an action for partition and
damages among the surviving descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin of the
properties left by said spouses. The trial court rendered judgment for petitioners who were plaintiffs
there but made no award of damages.

With respect to plaintiffs-appellants' claim for damages, the same was denied by the trial court
on the ground of insufficiency of existence; this is an error as this was supported by sufficient proof
introduced by them during trial by their testimony. The damages of P1,000.00 annually represents the
value of the rice, corn, mangoes, copras, salt and others, to which the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled
but were unable to receive by reason of the unjustified acts of the defendants-appellees. The lands
subject of this suit are unsurveyed lands, which according to the pertinent tax declarations contained
an area of 500 hectares. Portions of these lands in the names of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez
are coconut lands. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo, Batangas, consists of around 3,000 fruit
bearing coconut trees and the ricelands are cultivated by around 50 families, residing at the place as
permanent tenants.

Due to the wrongful acts of the defendants and intervenors, the plaintiffs were forced to litigate
to protect their rights, incurring additional actual damages in the form of attorney's fees, expert witness
fees and miscellaneous expenses. CA ordered to award the following damages: attorney's fees —
P5,000.00; actual damages-P1,000,00; moral damages — P2.000.00; exemplary damages — P1,000.00;
and fees for expert witness — P500.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages awarded by CA is correct.

HELD: The SC found merit on the contention of the petitioners assigning error of the failure of the
Court of Appeals to sentence defendants to pay them interests and costs. They are entitled to interest
at the legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial court. ART. 2213 of the Civil Code provides
that Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty.

Anent the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts
granted to them as a result of the rise in the rate of dollar exchange of the peso, the court considered
opinion that the facts extant in the record do not provide sufficient legal basis therefor. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed with the modification that the amount of actual damages awarded
petitioners should be P1,000 annually from 1955 and the respondents shall pay interest on all the
amounts adjudged against them at the legal rate from the date of the judgment of the trial court.