Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc

The impact of the Internet on a television-based

society
*
John Havick
School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA

Abstract

This study investigates some of the broad societal impacts of the Internet by using the
conceptual categories and theoretical understanding developed by communications scholars.
The properties and functions of both television and the Internet are examined and compared,
identifying features of the Internet that distinguish it from television. The impact of the Internet
is examined by considering the adjustments that a television-dominated culture must make in
a society that includes Internet communications. The investigation finds that the Internet will
modify television communications by (1) reducing the anonymity of people and their com-
munications, (2) increasing the storage of and access to information, and (3) affording any
individual the possibility of controlling the recovery and dissemination of communications.
The Internet expands individual freedom and capability to communicate, which in turn results
in greater news gathering and interpretative communication among the masses of individuals.
Because the Internet is substantially different from television, the impact of the Internet on a
television-dominated culture will be massive. Increased specialization, fragmentation, individ-
ualization, and decentralization of societal activity will cause stress to social, economic, and
political institutions. Eventually society will adjust to the new communications culture, but it
will be a substantially different society from that dominated by television.  2000 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Internet; McLuhan; Communications theory; Internet impact; Internet and societal change;
Media impact; Television and the Internet; Internet properties and functions

* Tel.: +1-404-894-6830.
E-mail address: john.havick@pubpolicy.gatech.edu (J. Havick).

0160-791X/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 1 6 0 - 7 9 1 X ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 0 8 - 7
274 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

1. Introduction

During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the large number of com-
munications advances confirms that society has entered the
communications/information age [1,2]. A major component of this new era is the
Internet. The Internet is comprised of thousands of computer networks all connected
electronically with “backbone” telecommunications hardware, such as telephone
links, fiber optics, and satellites [3 (p. 222), 4 (p. 9), 5 (p. 406)]. While the full force
of Internet activity is not clear, numerous Internet applications in the beginning stages
do seem viable, such as selling books, airline tickets, automobiles, and other products
[3,5,6]. This commercial Internet activity is a departure from traditional information
and storefront businesses and signals the beginning of new patterns and practices.
The effects of the Internet beyond these visible activities are less clear [7 (p. 37)].
Other, more nebulous, impacts are likely to be labeled unintended, secondary, or
unanticipated consequences, yet they are still important. As Bollier notes in an Aspen
Institute Conference report, “greater attention should be paid to the unintended conse-
quences …” [7 (p. 33)] for these consequences represent a great unknown. Almost
as little is known today about the possible impact of the Internet as was known about
the impact of television when it was introduced.
This article investigates the Internet’s impacts by taking as a guide the work of
scholars who have developed analytic categories and theories to understand past
communications technologies and the results that follow when new communications
technologies are introduced into a society [8]. For example, the invention of the
printing press did more than simply put out of business the monastic enterprise of
copying manuscripts. “Print created individualism and nationalism in the sixteenth
century” [9 (p. 34)]. A new mass communication device has the most powerful
effects when its properties and functional performance are substantially different
than the existing communication mediums. Since the Internet is considered a new
communications medium, it is relevant to consider the results that occur when this
new medium, with different properties and functional capabilities, confronts a society
underpinned by the old medium, television.
The likely future impacts of the Internet are examined here in the following inves-
tigatory steps:

1. a comparison of the properties of the Internet to those of television;

2. a consideration of the functional performance of the Internet and television;
3. an examination of the impact of the Internet on a television society; and
4. a conclusion.

2. Properties of television and the Internet

Three television networks dominated American culture from the mid-1950s to the
1980s, reaching a peak during the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning in the 1970s and
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 275

building during the 1980s and 1990s, the dominance of the three television networks
was eroded when the US government relaxed restrictions on cable television, and
cable began offering similar, but greater quantities of programming than that offered
by the networks. By the 1990s, it became clear that greater changes were underway
than simply conventional network television augmented by cable television, satel-
lites, and VCRs [10]. Also underway was a transition to a new media environment —
one in which the Internet plays a prominent role [3 (pp. 14, 17), 10].
The properties of mass media include: (1) size of the audience, (2) heterogeneity
of the audience, (3) anonymity of the audience, (4) speed of transmission, (5) the
transitory nature of the information, (6) public availability of the message, and (7)
whether the communicator is an organization or an individual [11]. Variations in the
amount and nature of these properties provide distinguishing characteristics and sig-
nals for anticipating a medium’s unique impact. Examining the differences between
the properties of television and those of the Internet provides clues regarding the
impact of the newer medium.

2.1. Size of audience

When network television dominated public attention, Americans watched tele-

vision about 5 h a day, and the network television audience share was about 90%.
Even in the 1990s when the network share of the television audience declined to
below 60%, a particular network program could attract an audience of over 80 million
people. By the 1990s, however, network television no longer dominated the public’s
attention [3 (p. 17), 12 (p. 53)].
The growth of Internet use has been phenomenal. From 1995 to 1998, according
to Nielsen Media Research, the number of people who said they used the Internet
increased by 340%. This means that by mid-1998 about 70.5 million adults, roughly
35% of the population, were using the Internet [13,14]. Inteco, a Connecticut-based
media research company, reported that in September 1997, 61 million people had
accessed the Internet in the prior 30 days. In May 1998, this figure had jumped to
78 million adults, and by early 1999, 108 million adults, or 55%, had accessed the
Internet in the prior 30 days. Inteco estimates that 76 million adults, or 37% of
households, have Internet access from their homes [15]. At present, Internet usage
remains less than television usage. Nielsen Media research found that in March 1999
the average user spent 7.5 h on the Internet per month [16]. This compares to the
5 h a day that Americans watch television.
For several reasons the Internet may never achieve an audience as large as the
television audience of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

앫 The first reason is financial. The Internet requires an investment in equipment,

such as a personal computer, a modem, and a server connection. These costs,
although still a factor, will be less limiting in the future because Internet access
will become more available through upgraded cable television technology.
앫 Another reason is the skill required to use the Internet. People need to have a
level of comfort using the technology.
276 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

앫 An important component of Internet value to a user depends on the user’s literacy-

based interests. This is somewhat analogous to the finding that newspapers do
not attract as large a percentage of people as television, in part because television
is not literacy-based. While not all Internet activity is literacy-based, an important
aspect of the Internet is literacy-based.
앫 Also limiting Internet use is the absence of the “Seinfeld” application, or popular
programming that attracts millions of people on a regular basis. Even in the 1990s
when audiences declined, popular network programs still attracted a large audi-
ence. One notable instance (suggesting a much larger Internet audience may be
possible) involved public interest in the Starr Report, the official document con-
cerning the misdeeds of President Clinton. When the report was turned over to
Congress and was posted on the Web, many media sources, such as CNN, quickly
copied the entire report and posted it on their own Web sites. Millions of users
flocked to Web sites that offered the entire 455-page report [17].

At least in terms of news information, the Internet’s role with the Starr Report sug-
gests a potential pattern. Print, radio, and television will use the Internet as a source
and conduit with which to inform their audiences. Thus, it is likely that, as was done
with the Starr Report, television reporters will read directly from a screen linked to
Internet information, and the television audience will see the Internet information as
the news is reported. Internet use will continue to grow, and rather than supplanting
television, the Internet will operate jointly or in an integrated manner with television.
The Internet will have a large “audience” or number of users, but it probably will
not achieve the 5-h-a-day massive audience that television has achieved.

2.2. Heterogeneity of audience

Television audiences tend to be a diverse, heterogeneous cross-section of society

that encompasses all classes and types of people. For example, people who earn less
than US$30,000 a year watch 52.9 h of television a week; people making more than
US$60,000 watch 46.2 h a week [18 (p. 411)]. Thus, while there are differences of
usage across demographic subsets, there is still an extraordinarily high level of
exposure to television among most subsets of the public. It is the case that all
groups — rich or poor, men or women, black or white — watch television.
Use of the Internet has a class bias that suggests there is less heterogeneity than
with network television audiences. Internet users tend to be more affluent and more
educated than non-users. Inteco, for example, reports that 37% of all households are
equipped for Internet communications, but 57% of those households with incomes
over US$50,000 a year are equipped for Internet communications [15]. It is likely
that in the future, the Internet class bias will diminish because access through cable
systems will be less costly, and Internet access in the workplace and public facilities
will continue to expand. Nevertheless, Internet use could be limited for the same
reason that newspapers did not attract as large an audience as television: literacy
and intellectual interests attract to the Internet people with greater education and
income. Eventually, some of the group differences in Internet use will diminish, but
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 277

it seems likely these differences will not be eliminated totally, and the Internet will
serve the interests of fewer subgroups of society.

2.3. Anonymity

Information that is available on television is highly public. The organizational

complexity of television networks may cause ambiguity regarding responsibility for
the content transmitted, but ultimately it is possible to determine responsibility. How-
ever, identifying the individuals receiving a television message is more difficult
because citizen viewing habits are private. The broadcasting signal is distributed for
any citizen to receive anonymously.
The degree of anonymity on the Internet is deceptive. Messages may have an
appearance of point-to-point communication, giving users an impression of privacy
and remoteness, but in fact the Internet only affords limited privacy [19]. Messages
on the Internet are easily copied and remailed to large address banks of other Internet
users. Users’ visits to Web sites can be detected and recorded. Computer hackers
have penetrated databases and sites on the Internet to obtain confidential information.
Most experts caution users to assume that what they do and say on the Internet will
not remain private. An example of the deceptiveness of this anonymity involved a
man who admitted to a support group on the Internet that he was responsible for
the death of his five-year-old daughter. He was subsequently reported to authorities
by a member of the group [20]. Although people feel that their communications are
private, the Internet offers users much less anonymity than television.

2.4. Speed of transmission

Television broadcasting is capable of rapidly relaying information to a large and

diverse audience. After the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan, most
Americans knew within a few hours [21]. Television news also provides immediate
coverage of most events and it offers the audience a more close-up view than if they
were there.
The speed of Internet message transmission, like television, is almost instan-
taneous. There are, however, factors that can either speed up or slow down the
reception of Internet information. For example, a delay might occur because a mess-
age is in a queue to be delivered later, or because the receiver is away from the
receiving device. Likewise, the near-instantaneous television broadcast signal may
not result in immediate delivery of messages if the television is not turned on or if
the viewers are not watching what is transmitted. On balance, the public’s focus on
television is so pervasive and extensive that one must conclude that although both
the Internet and television distribute information rapidly, urgent information reaches
the entire public somewhat sooner with television than with the Internet.

2.5. Transitory nature of the information

The storage and retrieval of information offers a clear distinction between the
Internet and television. Programming on television often reappears in syndication
278 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

and viewers may watch the reruns for decades. This is less the case with political
news and commentary programs in which statements, comments, or raised eyebrows
are largely evanescent and are not replayed or rebutted. Transcripts and archives
may exist for such programs, but what is said is rarely brought back for challenge.
These television messages are fleeting and transitory, and reruns are not available
on demand.
On the Internet, users may retrieve or communicate information 24 h a day [22].
Information is recalled more easily than with television programming. Sullivan-
Trainor writes: “As its simplest form, cyberspace is a storehouse of our … infor-
mation … transforming our everyday transactions, ideas, and writing into electronic
form so that they can be recalled at will” [23 (p. 230)]. Moreover, Internet infor-
mation is easily copied and sent on to other people. Rather than being transitory,
Internet information is difficult to stop, retract, or erase because it is likely to be
stored in countless computers.

2.6. Public availability of the message

Broadcasting is indeed a public communications medium. The message and pro-

gramming are broadcast to anyone with a receiver (television set), and there is at
least one television in almost every household. The information on television is avail-
able to viewers by the turn of a switch or the click of a remote control device.
The Internet offers a different type of information availability than does television
broadcasting. Internet users may obtain information at any time, and they have access
to a greater amount and variety of information than that found on television. The
disadvantage to this ready availability of information is that there is a host of objec-
tionable information: pornography, libelous material, and inaccurate material, and it
is difficult to restrict or filter such information. This remarkable access to information
is also the great advantage of Internet communication. Sullivan-Trainor writes that
the Internet “can make us more capable, knowledgeable people. Our personal affairs
will be better documented and more accessible. We will be able to get instant infor-
mation and answers, about society’s issues, about events, and about other people”
[23 (p. 230)]. The caveat on Sullivan-Trainor’s optimism is that the entire public
must have access to the Internet and be aware that all the information is not accurate.
The Internet is a qualitative and quantitative advance over television in the avail-
ability of information.

2.7. Communicator is an organization or an individual

Television network broadcasting in the United States is, for the most part, conduc-
ted by organizations, usually with substantial economic resources [24]. Broadcasting
requires expensive equipment, programming that costs millions of dollars, and a
license from the Federal Communications Commission. Once these hurdles are
cleared, the communications organizations have considerable control over the pro-
gramming they provide the public, although broadcasters still must comply with a
variety of government regulations.
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 279

Information on the Internet is sent out by both organizations and individuals. Part
of the uniqueness of the Internet is that an individual can share information with
other people. There is little investment required and limited government regulation.
Individuals using the Internet may bypass newspapers, television, and other organiza-
tions to circulate information. In the past, journalists could judge particular infor-
mation unworthy and the story was not reported. Today, if one Internet user believes
a story is worthy of attention, the information has a chance to find an audience. The
Internet makes it more difficult to suppress information.
Consumer purchases on the Internet also illustrate the role of individuals. The
Internet customer is remote and has no tactile relationship with Internet businesses
[7 (p. 29)]. The customer chooses to visit particular sites on the Internet and consume
certain products and/or information, unlike the television environment where the
viewer is largely at the mercy of the producers’ choice of content. The Internet puts
the individual in control.

3. Functions: television and the Internet

Next I consider television and the Internet according to how each performs the
following functions: (1) surveillance and newsgathering, (2) interpretation and edi-
torializing, (3) enforcement of norms, and (4) diversion and entertainment [11 (p.
236)]. Because communications devices vary in their functional performance, differ-
ences in the functional performance of television and the Internet offer further insight
into the impact of the Internet.

3.1. Surveillance and newsgathering

During the 1960s, television dramatically increased its reporting and news cover-
age. Network news was extended from 15 to 30 min, and news departments expanded
to do special hour-long programming. Network television news had regional corre-
spondents who traveled to remote areas from the regional bases. Reports from the
regional locations developed a composite picture of the nation. In addition, Amer-
icans began to see more news about more details of national government. As network
television news developed, most of the public became reliant on the networks for
information.
The Internet offers a different type of surveillance and newsgathering than does
television. Each Internet user is a potential reporter or transmitter of information.
One person privy to information can relay the information quickly to others. As
users receive the information and relay it to still more users and Internet sites, it is
almost certain that any important public news will become known. This is in contrast
to television or newspapers in which the owners and operators act as gatekeepers
and choose what information should be released.
The Internet turns every user into a potential reporter or newscaster as well as
receiver of massive amounts of information. The Internet has expanded society’s
newsgathering capability in a way that does not duplicate traditional television. It
280 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

offers a new dimension of newsgathering and surveillance of the societal environ-

ment.

3.2. Interpretation and editorializing

Television not only expanded news coverage, but it also increased the amount of
interpretation and editorializing. Interpretative messages on television occurred when
news anchors and similar people, perhaps inadvertently, revealed their feelings with
a tone of voice, a raised eyebrow, or a few words. Still other interpretation occurred
during specific segments of news programs assigned for comments, such as “Meet
the Press” and “Face the Nation”. While network television attempts to be balanced
and unbiased, the result is that it has expanded the amount of interpretation and
viewpoint available to the public.
The Internet, operating almost unfettered, offers users even more opportunity than
television networks to find interpretative material. Subject only to legal action for
things such as child pornography or libel, the Internet contains a wide range of views,
attitudes, and beliefs. There are few program managers, editors, or media executives
passing judgment about the truth or merit of Internet information. To a large extent,
individuals may say and do as they please.

3.3. Enforcement of norms

Television’s enforcement of societal norms occurs inadvertently. In the course of

reporting news, television reveals problems, wrongdoing, and a variety of public
behavior. Viewers react to this television information, particularly the pictures, with
approval or disapproval. During the 1960s, the entire nation witnessed the harsh
mistreatment of blacks in the South, and the vivid television coverage aroused sup-
port for basic black civil rights. Television lacks authority to enforce norms, but
what it does is expose wrong-doing and societal problems which in turn may mobil-
ize public opinion.
The Internet possesses a freedom of activity and thought that minimizes norm
enforcement. In fact, the Internet offers a habitat for views and activities that differ
from conventional views and behaviors. Yet, because individuals are communicating
with each other in large numbers, the sheer amount of dialogue among individuals
may reveal matters that result in some level of enforcement. For example, if users
learn of a murder, this information could be relayed to the authorities for investi-
gation [20].

3.4. Entertainment

A major reason network television attracts a large mass audience is because it is

primarily entertainment. From television’s early years, viewers were drawn to watch-
ing Milton Berle, Howdy Doody, and other entertainment-oriented programming.
Indeed, television has done such a good job of entertaining the public in their homes
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 281

that Robert Putnam concludes it is responsible for the atrophy of social organizations
such as bowling leagues [25].
On the other hand, people use the Internet for many reasons. In addition to enter-
tainment, users have less frivolous needs, such as shopping, health, information, and
communication. The Internet is less an entertainment medium than is television.

4. Communications environment and the coming of the Internet

Marshall McLuhan considered the impacts of a new communication technology

on society [9]. Although McLuhan’s work is widely known, his ideas are not without
controversy [26–31]. For example, Boulding, in a review of McLuhan’s writing,
gives a mixed verdict. Boulding writes “one is tempted to put the whole review into
the form of a comic strip …” [32]. Boulding goes on to say that “there is a new
idea almost on every page … It is perhaps typical of very creative minds that they
hit very large nails not quite on the head” (pp. 58, 64).
This article employs McLuhan cautiously, aware of the debate and criticism of
his work. It is certainly the case that McLuhan’s writings and ideas were not entirely
accurate, and his inaccuracies were compounded by the unfortunate labels of his
concepts, such as “hot and cold media” that is discussed below. Yet, it is my position
that some of his ideas have merit and that familiarity with his concepts and frame-
work facilitates a focus for this analysis. Indeed, it is important to test theories and
ideas, and so it remains to be seen if McLuhan’s ideas are useful for prediction.
With these caveats in mind, I here briefly review those of McLuhan’s ideas that are
most relevant to this paper.
First, according to McLuhan, the type of media has impacts independent of the
content of the message. He observes that “… the ‘content’ of a medium is the juicy
piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of the mind” [9 (p. 32)].
Second, McLuhan contends that media are “hot” or “cold”. Hot media supply
considerable information for a single sense, leaving little for the recipient of a mess-
age to imagine; cool media offer less information, requiring the recipient to speculate
about the details of the sensory message. McLuhan writes, “A photograph is, visu-
ally, ‘high definition’. A cartoon is ‘low definition’” [9 (p. 36)]. Print is a hot medium
because a great deal of information is usually present on a page. Television is cool
because a conventional television screen (when McLuhan wrote) did not supply the
clarity, dimensionality, or size of a film (a hot medium).
The third McLuhan insight is that a medium’s impact, particularly a new medium,
depends on the nature of the current media culture. For example, he says a tribal
culture is upset by the introduction of a hot media, such as radio or print. McLuhan
labels cultures similarly to his categorization of media [9 (p. 40)], and he defines a
print-based culture as hot. He goes on to say that “It makes all the difference whether
a hot medium is used in a hot or a cool culture”. A hot media technology introduced
in a cool tribal culture tends to disrupt the traditional social ties, and it establishes
new patterns of behavior and relationships. He writes that “… high definition engen-
ders specialism and fragmentation in living … Specialist technologies detribalize”
282 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

(p. 37, 38). According to McLuhan, it is also the case that a literacy-based culture,
such as the United States in mid-twentieth century, would be disrupted by a cool
medium, such as television (p. 43). McLuhan notes that “Print gave intensity and
uniform precision … [while television provides] uniqueness and diversity” (p. 276).

4.1. The Internet and McLuhan

Can McLuhan’s work help forecast the impact of the Internet? One question to
resolve is whether the Internet is hot or cold. In some respects, the Internet, as viewed
through a television-like screen, is a bit of both television and print. Aspects of the
Internet, particularly in an icon and windows environment, do not rely on print.
Nevertheless, the screen is rich with detail and offers information that extends what
one might find in a book or on a printed page of information. The Internet screen
is not ambiguous and does not leave much to the imagination. The Internet is, in
McLuhan’s terms, hot.
A second concern is whether the television-oriented culture of the US is hot or
cold. McLuhan categorized television as a cold or cool medium. Clearly, other media,
such as radio and print, survived and coexist with television. Nevertheless, for several
decades, television, dominated by the networks, was the major mass communications
device. By the last decade of the twentieth century it is clear that a transition of
media is underway, and a substantial part of this transition involves the Internet.
This analysis focuses on the impact of the Internet upon a largely television-domi-
nated society.

4.2. From television to Internet

What will be the impacts of the hot Internet upon the cool television culture?
Contemporary observers, such as Siros and Forget, conclude that it is “… likely that
the cards will be reshuffled and distributed according to a completely new pattern”
[33 (p. 15)]. Freeman and Soete believe,

The scope of the institutional change needed is still under-estimated. It will

involve changes … in the pattern of industrial relations and worker participation;
in working arrangements; in the pattern of consumer demand; in the conceptual
framework of economists, accountants and government, and social, political and
legislative priorities [34].

McLuhan’s theory indicates that with the coming of a hot new communication
device to a cool media-dominated culture, there will be disruption of existing
relationships and increased specialization, fragmentation, individualism, decentraliz-
ation, and stress on political and economic structures.

4.2.1. Specialization and fragmentation

According to McLuhan, the culture of the television era reversed some of the
specialization and fragmentation associated with print culture [9 (p. 280)]. Television
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 283

tended to homogenize aspects of society. The Internet, because it is a hot medium

encountering a cool media environment, is likely to encourage specialization and
fragmentation in the society; there are signs that McLuhan’s conceptualization pre-
dicts correctly. Jonscher reports on the increased specialization in the economic sec-
tor [35]. The Internet encourages concentration on narrow topics and the acquisition
of specialized knowledge and skills. Indeed, the Internet facilitates the exclusion of
what each individual might consider extraneous information. This is entirely different
from the network television era when viewers elected to watch television and then
they viewed whatever programming came on the screen.

4.2.2. Individualism and decentralization

The hot Internet medium causes a style of behavior that is less group-oriented.
Bollier reports that “People feel a greater need to define and differentiate themselves
from the greater mass of society” [7 (p. 29)]. In particular, the Internet makes it
possible for individuals to singlehandedly sit at a terminal and draw on the resources
of what in eras past might have required teams of researchers and assistants. Not
only are individuals more autonomous when gathering information and
accomplishing tasks, but irrespective of their position or stature, individuals may
send their information, opinions, and requests to other people. Dizard observes that
individuals may “… bypass the whole range of commercial information and enter-
tainment providers” [3 (p. 195)].
McLuhan believes electronic communication has tended to decentralize because
its speed has made distance less a factor in societal structure [9 (pp. 20, 47)]. The
Internet continues that trend of decentralization, reducing distances between people,
regions, and organizations. Bill Frezza’s recent observation agrees with McLuhan:
“Networked computers and the torrent of information they carry are inherently
decentralized … The [Internet] will subvert the centralized economic and social con-
trol mechanisms …” [3 (p. 196), 36].
The relative ease with which individuals of any rank, status, geographic location,
or office may contact each other clearly loosens some of the bonds of elite hier-
archical control. This loss of control could be compensated for by the capacity of
elites to monitor user Internet activity and communicate rapidly down through the
hierarchy they control [37]. This is particularly the case in a business setting in
which the organization controls the communication network and usually has a legal
right to monitor such activity. Piore observes that Internet-style communication in
business permits the decentralization of production but enhances the centralization
of power [38]. On balance it seems, however, that the Internet decentralizes activity
and empowers individuals.

4.2.3. Societal structures

The Internet also promotes isolation and feelings of alienation. Although the Inter-
net provides a type of contact and interaction with society, the interaction occurs
among people who are sitting in isolation. Within the Internet environment people
do not eat lunch together, drink coffee together, or engage in tactile activities. Initial
investigations of how such Internet communication might affect people suggests that
284 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

many Internet users are more alienated from society. One recent study says of users:
“They’re using it socially, they’re enjoying it socially, yet [the Internet] seems to be
associated with symptoms of social isolation, such as depression and loneliness” [39].
McLuhan believes that hot media are not easily used for entertainment by a cool
culture. The Internet seems to be a place where entertainment applications do not
dominate. If the Internet is a medium that is less oriented to entertainment than
television, McLuhan’s ideas indicate that this will promote a greater emphasis on
economic, political, and social activities. Thus, the hot Internet medium, already
projected to cause societal upheaval will stimulate activity in matters that are
important to society.
Political structures will feel the full force of Internet communication. Direct com-
munication will break down intermediary institutions, such as election and political
parties, and will erode the functioning of elected government officials. Fragmen-
tation, decentralization, and upheaval will unravel the political process as it has been
known for the last 200 years. The government and political processes will struggle
with the increased speed of communication and the individual’s ability to monitor,
communicate, and mobilize opposition [40]. The deliberative processes of politics
will be severely strained in the new environment, threatening the vitality of govern-
ment.

5. Conclusion

The Internet is not simply a slight revision of television-era communications, or

as Arthur Bushkin said, “… not just a change in scale or speed, it’s a qualitative
change” [19 (p. 50)]. Although the Internet may, even in its full flowering, serve a
somewhat narrower segment of society than television, it will attract a sufficiently
large proportion of the public to be important. The Internet will not be important
simply because millions of people use it; rather, its effect will be its distinctive
contribution to the communications environment. The Internet gives individuals the
capability to control the production, storage, and dissemination of information. In
short, Internet properties are sufficiently different from those of television to predict
that Internet impact will be substantial.
There are large differences between the properties and functional capabilities of
television and the Internet. As the Internet becomes more important, society will have
the capability to acquire and communicate news and information as never before. In
addition, because of the freedom of individuals to communicate, the Internet encour-
ages interpretation and editorializing. It promotes like-minded individuals to co-
locate and communicate with each other in ways that will have both positive and
negative results for society. On the negative side, isolated and fringe extremists will
be able to locate other people, hundreds of miles away, who also have malevolent
views and goals. The Internet, because it is less based on entertainment than is
television, will bring more focus and activity to political and social matters. As the
level of activity increases, society will be less tranquil and more agitated and threat-
ened by the turmoil. Even more ominous for the stability of the political process is
 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287 285

the Internet’s ability to assist people who have narrow interests, extreme interests,
and fringe interests.
The impact of the Internet will occur at several levels, causing major changes. In
the future, greater amounts of business, commerce, work-related interactions, and
information exchange will occur on the Internet. At a first level of impact, the Internet
will facilitate changes, such as the way products are purchased by consumers, the
physical location of people as they conduct their daily work, the informal rules of
politics that determine the style and activities of officials and government, and
important sharing of information in many areas, such as medicine.
As significant to the activities and lives of people as these changes will be, even
more consequential will be changes at the societal level. Society and its institutions
will undergo dislocation, upheaval, stress, and change. The Internet will encourage
societal activity that causes decentralization, specialization, and separation from the
tactile aspects of social interaction. Old patterns, social ties, and expectations of
behavior will give way, producing increased societal dislocation and stress.
The Internet will not duplicate or displace television, but the Internet will operate
as another dimension of communication, much as television, film, radio, and print
media eventually evolved to be distinctive contributors to the media mix. Even now,
suggestions abound as to how the Internet might fit the communications milieu. In
the political arena, information too speculative or current to be digested by print or
television journalists is likely to appear on the Internet. Journalists will use Internet
information as a beginning point for their research, or to speed up the distribution
of information to the public. Television viewers will see seasoned reporters live on
the air next to a computer monitor screen much the same as what occurred with the
coverage of the Starr Report about President Bill Clinton.
Just as it was impossible to prohibit the use of television, it is equally impossible
now to put the Internet genie back in the bottle. However, since some of these
impacts can be anticipated, officials may be able to soften the Internet’s impacts.
The Internet will eventually blend in with other communications devices in the
environment. Rather than obliterating existing media and communications devices,
the Internet will share with other media the hours of the day the public devotes to
communication. Much as television and print borrow from and share with each
other — particularly television borrowing from print news — the Internet will
become another source for other media.
Indeed, even the different media technologies will themselves blend together and
be accessible to each other. The Internet will have little trouble maintaining a market
share of the public’s attention because it represents a type of communication that
does not duplicate what is done by television, print, and most other media. Eventu-
ally, society will adjust to the new communication culture, but the new culture will
be substantially different from the television-era culture.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Carol Brim and Anthony J. Wiener for their comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
286 J. Havick / Technology in Society 22 (2000) 273–287

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John Havick is an Associate Professor at Georgia Institute of Technology, with teaching and research in the
areas of telecommunications, public policy, American politics, and quantitative analysis. He is editor of the
book “Communications policy and the political process” and author of “American democracy in transition: a
communications revolution”. He has studied program evaluation at the National Evaluation Research Institute,
and he has studied Analytic Democratic Theory at Harvard University.