I. WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW AND WHO RESOLVES DISPUTES?

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

1. A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article VIII, Sections 1-16

2. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article VIII, Sections 1, 4(2), 5(2), 5(5)

B. CASE LIST:

1. Origin of Judicial Review

• Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 l. ed. 60 (1803)
Statement of the Facts:

Towards the end of his presidency, John Adams appointed William Marbury as Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia. After assuming office, President Thomas Jefferson ordered
James Madison not to finalize Marbury’s appointment. Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, Marbury brought an action against Madison in the United States Supreme Court requesting
the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to force delivery of the appointment.

Procedural History:

Marbury directly approached the Supreme Court to compel Madison, Jefferson’s Secretary of
State, to deliver the commission to Marbury.

Issues and Holdings:

Does Marbury hold a right to his judicial appointment? Yes

Is Marbury entitled to a remedy under U.S. law? Yes
Is Marbury entitled to a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789? No
Judgment:

Chief Justice John Marshall denied issuing a writ of mandamus.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

The United States Supreme Court has the authority to review both the legislative acts of congress
and laws to determine if they comply with the Constitution.

Reasoning:

Justice Marshall held that although Marbury was entitled to his commission, the United States
Supreme Court could not hear the case because it lacked original jurisdiction.
Marbury was lawfully appointed as Justice of the Peace through the president’s (Adams) signing
of Marbury’s commission and Senate confirmation.
Under federal law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy. Whether or not Marbury may receive a
remedy is contingent upon whether the appointment made Marbury an agent of the president or
assigned a duty by law. If appointed as a political agent of the president, Marbury is not entitled to
a remedy. However, if Marbury was deprived of the ability to carry out a duty assigned to him by
 law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy. Here, Adams gave legal title to the office of Justice of the
Peace to Marbury for the length of the appointment. Madison interfered with Marbury’s legal title
when he refused to finalize Marbury’s appointment. As a result, Marbury is entitled to a remedy.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction
to provide the remedy of a writ of mandamus is unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act of 1789
permits the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction over causes of actions for writs of
mandamus. The problem is the provision directly conflicts with the Constitution, specifically Article
III. Article III serves as a limitation on the types of cases the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over. Cases not within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction may fall under the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In short, Section 13 of The Act is unconstitutional since it attempts
to expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

• Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara
filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest
filed by Ynsua.

2. Requisites of Judicial Review

• PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955);
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought
to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a
permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that
 the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our
system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of
Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the
law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted
to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal
discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship.
The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools
• Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678 (1972).
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec.
3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to
belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute,
Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution,
which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must
first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent
province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
 mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it
might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
• People v. Vera, Phil. 58, 89 (1937).
Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial,
he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The
Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the
act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila
because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered
by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection
of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes
undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power
of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as
in pardon.

Issues:

Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of
equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
 Rulings:

The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may
be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund
to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In
such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter.
This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy
the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it
is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of
the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the
obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards

3. Actual Controversy
• Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of
the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
 Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

• Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, Esperon et. al., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

• Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346 (1911)

Facts of the case
An Act of Congress in 1902 alloted land to Cherokee Indians, including David Muskrat and Henry Dick.
Congress passed acts in 1904 and 1906 that limited the rights that Indians on the land could exercise
over it. Some Cherokees already on the land contended that this act had the potential to
unconstitutionally deprive them of their property. Congress passed an act in 1907 granting federal courts
the jurisdiction to hear cases from Indians contesting the constitutionality of the 1904 and 1906 acts.
Under this act, Muskrat and Dick filed suit in the Court of Claims and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question
Can Congress authorize matters for judicial review that are not "cases" or "controversies"?

Conclusion
No. Justice William R. Day delivered the opinion for a 7-0 court. The Court ruled that Congress could not
create jurisdiction for judicial review of a specific matter by way of legislation. This is because "the right to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional could only be exercised when a proper case between
opposing parties was submitted for judicial determination." The Constitution granted the judiciary the
power to decide "cases" and "controversies," but did not grant a "general veto power...upon the legislation
of Congress."
• Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, 16 June 2009.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress,” convening the Congress into a
Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII,
which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that
the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the
amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate
and the House of Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of Congress” without distinction as to which institution of
Congress they belong to).

Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No. 1109.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may interpret petitioners’
moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they
cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases
involving constitutional disputes.

The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing
with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-
or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,”
lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States,
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold
aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally
treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to
review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In
the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to
the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross
abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this
Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is
no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit
for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being
sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them
with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for
significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case
is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases
at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has
been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse
petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving
from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine,
such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file
petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

4. Moot and Academic Principle

Alunan III v. Mirasol, 276 SCRA 501, 511 (1997)
Facts:
The Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992, provided that there
should be a Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) in every barangay. It also stated that the first elections
for the SK shall be held thirty days after the next local elections. Under the said code, the first local
elections were held on May 11, 1992. However, because of postponements, the SK election was
scheduled only on December 4, 1992. Naturally, registration in Manila was conducted, but on
September 18, 1992, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) through then
secretary Rafael M. Alunan III issued a letter-resolution that exempted Manila from holding the
elections on the ground that the elections held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first
under the Local Government Code.
While the case is still under review by the Supreme Court, a second election occurred, held on May
13, 1996.

Issue:
Will the holding of the second elections render the case moot and academic?

Ruling:
No. It has been held that the courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review. In this case, the question of whether the COMELEC can
validly vest their control and supervision of the SK elections to the DILG is very likely to arise again
in subsequent elections.

AKBAYAN v. Thomas G. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Facts:

· Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition

for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

· The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad
range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless
trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute
avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.

· Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement
violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-
disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation
in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

· Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter
sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right
to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA
- that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issues: Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the
subsequent event that occurred.

HELD:
NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is the
disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,”
public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of
the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having
then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent
that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however,
because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and
Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

Nieto, Jr vs. SEC GR No. 175263, March 14, 2012

Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 10 May 2001.

 Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in
the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were
thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with
an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly
the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not
based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time
because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing
for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same.
If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any
intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void
ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for
relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints
have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are
hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

5. Legal Standing
• Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993)
Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of
Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He
predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of
Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his
retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to
the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of
the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously
and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed." 2
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the
instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise
of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual
 case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner
merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act
as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that
the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44
of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a
successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case
or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be
raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are
absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both
of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing
his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion
by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot
be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants."
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

• Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)

Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease
executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line
lottery system, also know as lotto.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and
ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of
1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the
ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of
the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to
initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings
of various government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of
lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the
title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions
of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary
to law and invalid.
• Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, at 39 (2006)
FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational
company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long engaged
in lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an
initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino
investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the technical and
management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated
by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. On 21 October 1993, the
Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the country's on-line
lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final
clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Petitioners also submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed
Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and
conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding
and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."
Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

HELD:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by
respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The
preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the respondents should
be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental importance to the
public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than
those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of
the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
 On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by
B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot
exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the challenged
Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.

• Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 120293, 20 March 2012.

6. Lis Mota
General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, 29 March 2011

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner
of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector.[3] On January 25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces
as acting NAPOLCOM

Commissioner.[4] When Roces died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21,
2008[5] as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed
Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta)... as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as
NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.[6]

PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of
Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro's appointment paper is
dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of

De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010.[7] On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of
office before Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali.[8]

DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory
letters to the respondents. The letter uniformly reads.

On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office as
NAPOLCOM Commissioners before DILG Secretary Puno and Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Jose R.
Hernandez, respectively.[... he newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency
Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking
Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the

Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."

The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of
her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.[13] Since she failed to finish her six-year term,
then the petitioner is entitled to serve this... unexpired portion or until October (should be September)
2010.

invokes Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975[15] (otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990) which... requires that vacancies in the NAPOLCOM "shall be filled up for the
unexpired term only."... the petitioner concludes that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular"
appointment, notwithstanding... what appears in his appointment paper. As a regular appointee, the
petitioner argues that he cannot be removed from office except for cause.

alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary appointment does not give
the President the license to abuse a public official simply because he lacks security of tenure.

asserts that the validity of his... termination from office depends on the validity of the appointment of the
person intended to replace him.
Issues:

The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de
Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta (collectively, the respondents) as

Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive
Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary
Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents' oath of office.

the petitioner filed the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents' appointments mainly on
the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition... against midnight appointments.[11]...
alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary appointment does not give
the President the license to abuse a public official simply because he lacks security of tenure.

He explains that until a presidential appointment is "officially released," there is no "appointment" to speak
of. Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while... bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the
constitutional ban on appointments,... then the petitioner's... appointment, though temporary in nature,
should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made.

The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta, claiming
that they were also made in violation of the constitutional ban on appointments.

Prefatorily, the respondents characterize Escueta's inclusion in the present petition as an error since his
appointment, acceptance and assumption of office all took place before the constitutional ban on
appointments started. Thus, there is no "case or controversy" as to

Escueta.

the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to file a petition for quo warranto since he was merely
appointed in an acting capacity and could be validly removed from office at anytime.

respondents likewise counter that what the ban on midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution prohibits is only the making of an appointment by the President sixty (60) days before the
next presidential elections and until his term expires;... it does not prohibit the acceptance by the
appointee of his appointment within the same prohibited period.

The petitioner argues in reply that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until another qualified
commissioner is validly appointed by the new President to replace him.[

The petitioner likewise claims that the respondents appeared to have skirted the element of issuance of
an appointment in considering whether an appointment is made. The petitioner asserts that to constitute
an appointment, the President's act of affixing his signature... must be coupled with the physical issuance
of the appointment to the appointee - i.e., the appointment paper is officially issued in favor of the
appointee through the President's proper Cabinet Secretary.

making of an appointment is different from its... issuance since prior to the official issuance of an
appointment, the appointing authority enjoys the prerogative to change his mind.

the respondents' appointment papers were officially issued and communicated to them only on March 19,
2010, well... within the period of the constitutional ban, as shown by the congratulatory letters individually
issued to them.

the petitioner claims that he correctly impleaded Escueta in this case since his appointment also violates
the Constitution. The petitioner adds that Escueta was appointed on July 21, 2008, although then as
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. By... permanently appointing him as NAPOLCOM Commissioner, he
stands to be in office for more than six years, in violation of R.A. No. 6975... even granting that the
President can extend appointments in an acting capacity to NAPOLCOM Commissioners, it may not be
done by "successive appointments" in the same capacity without violating R.A. No. 6975, as amended,
which provides a fixed and... staggered term of office for NAPOLCOM Commissioners.

The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his appointment paper, the appointment extended
to him was really a regular appointment; thus, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. The
petitioner argues that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM

Commissioner or, at the very least, the "successive appointments" of NAPOLCOM Commissioners in an
acting capacity contravenes the safeguards that the law - R.A. No. 6975[33] - intends through the
staggered term of office of NAPOLCOM Commissioners.

Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was issued a permanent appointment; rather, he
claims that his appointment is actually a regular appointment since R.A. No. 6975 does not allegedly
allow an appointment of a NAPOLCOM

Commissioner in an acting capacity.

Thus, as the law now stands, the petitioner's claim that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner is not allowed based on the staggering of terms of office does not even have any statutory
basis.

Ruling:

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents' appointments is not the lis mota of the case.
From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause
of action to institute and maintain this... present petition - a quo warranto against respondent Urro.

etitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the
appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary.

Principles:

E.O. No. 2 read:

SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. - The following appointments made by the former President
and other appointing authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered... as midnight appointments:

(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11,
2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11,
2010, except temporary appointments in the executive positions when... continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said date or appointments to office that
would be vacant only after March 11, 2010.

(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections
in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight Appointments. Midnight appointments, as

defined under Section 1, are hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or
otherwise affected are hereby declared vacant. (Emphasis... supplied.)
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is directed only against the President and his act of
appointment, and is not concerned with the act/s of the appointee.

Since the respondents were appointed (per the date... appearing in their appointment papers) before the
constitutional ban took effect, then their appointments are valid.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2)
the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of... the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case

Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents' appointments in light of
E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent filing before the Court of several petitions questioning this Executive
Order. The parties, however, appear to have overlooked the... basic principle in constitutional adjudication
that enjoins the Court from passing upon a constitutional question, although properly presented, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground.[31] In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought
to... refrain from resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case."

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action."

This last requisite of judicial review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government.

At the outset, the petitioner's use of terms needs some clarification. Appointments may be classified into
two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.

Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting).

Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim.

e power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless
he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is
repugnant to the nature of the office... involved.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official
functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or
another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the... condition that he shall surrender the
office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature[39] and the limitations on or qualifications in the
exercise of this power are strictly construed.

enerally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority's opportunity
to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the
body and its policies.

Interestingly, even a staggered term of office does not ensure that at no instance will the appointing
authority appoint all the members of a body whose members are appointed on staggered basis.

he NAPOLCOM Commissioners are all given a fixed term of six years (except the two of the first
appointees who hold office only for four years). By staggering their terms of office however, the four
regular commissioners would not vacate their... offices at the same time since a vacancy will occur every
two years.
Under the NAPOLCOM set up, the law does not appear to have been designed to attain the purpose of
preventing the same President from appointing all the NAPOLCOM Commissioners by staggering their
terms of office.

It is noteworthy, too, that while the Court nullified the attempt of Congress to consider the terms of office
of the then NAPOLCOM Commissioners as automatically expired on the ground that there was no bona
fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM,... Section 7 of R.A. No. 8551 reads:

Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 16. Term of Office. - The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President for a term of six (6) years without re-appointment or extension."

7. Raise a Constitutional Issue at the Earliest Possible Opportunity

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, 23 November 2010.

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the
former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant
of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-
President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art
VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
 exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.

Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, 5 July 2011.

THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition
filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them
the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUE: (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that
may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

8. Doctrine of Transcendental Importance

• Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994.
FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO
was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational
company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long
engaged in lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with
some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through which the
technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to
PCSO.
 Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated
by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. On 21 October 1993, the
Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the country's on-
line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final
clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. Petitioners also submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed
Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold
and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign
or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of
Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also
known as "lotto."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

HELD:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by
respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The
preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was raised by the respondents
should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of transcendental importance
to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher
than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise.
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to
take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by
B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot
exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. Thus, the
challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.
• Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 16 November 1995.
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of
lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA
was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer
be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the
Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested
in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but
in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different
contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is
a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

8. Taxpayer’s suit
• Tatad v. Garcia, Jr, 243 SCRA 436 (1995)
n 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made
but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA
LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An agreement was
then made between the government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-
Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the
agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train
cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent
for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have
fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the
government for $1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign
corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility
such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The
petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium,
under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public utility hence, the question
of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot own a public utility but in
this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the facilities that it will be building for the
EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used
for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating
the public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one
exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from the proceeds, it shall be paying
the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the
 facilities and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years – it will not operate
the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of
building a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment
for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate
or any other form of authorization for that purpose.
• Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works & Communications, 110 Phil. 331 (1960)
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”.
Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA.
Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals
and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA
would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure
the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a
private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

• Del Mar vs. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 (2000)

SUMMARY. PAGCOR requested legal advice from the Secretary of Justice if it’s
authorized under its charter to operate jai-alai games (a form of sport). The Secretary of
Justice said that PAGCOR has the authority; hence PAGCOR has the power under its
charter to operate. Petitioner del Mar filed a petition for prohibition preventing PAGCOR
from managing jai-alai since its illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter. However, PAGCOR still entered in an
agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, hence, del Mar filed a Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement. Members of the House of Representative also
filed a petition stating that operation of PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not
included in its scope. Respondents then questioned the locus standi or legal standing of
petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of the House of representatives. As stated by
the Court, they have legal standing to the case since it affects public interest (involves
taxes) and affects the powers of the legislative.
DOCTRINE. Locus Standi or Legal Standing to file a petition as taxpayers and member
of the House of Representatives

FACTS.

• PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether
or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country
in relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
• The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and
maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or
game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise
for the purpose.
• On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the
ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution
or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
• On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with BELLE
and FILGAME wherein the latter parties would provide all the required facilities and
requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.
• On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction,
authority, legislative franchise, or authority to enter into such agreement for the operation
and establishment of jai-alai games.
• A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor
filed a Petition for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri
alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in
PAGCOR’s scope.
• Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and intervenor Zubiri are suing as
taxpayers and in their capacity as the members of the House of Representatives.
• Respondent questions the locus standi or the standing of the petitioners to file
the petition at bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-alai does
not involve the disbursement of public funds.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal standing to file the petition – YES.

As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an “oven ready” legal support. A
party suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are
allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. The record shown under their agreement is barren of evidence that
the operation and management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public
money. The Court also holds that as members of the House of Representatives,
petitioners have legal standing to file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-alai
constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant
franchise. Hence, powers of Congress are being impared, so as the powers of each of its
members.

DECISION.
Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition

NOTES.

The states issue is only a “procedural issue” questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.
The substantive issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the
right to manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE
RIGHT to operate jai-alai because:
• It was not stated under its scope.
• In accordance with its historical creation, there is a separate Executive Order
which controls the operating of Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila.
PACGOR’s franchise was never given a franchise to operate jai-alai.
• Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from
each other.
• PAGCOR is engaged in the business affected with public interest.

9. Political Question
• Tanada v. Cuenco, 13 SCRA 375 (1965)
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by
the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the
Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and
3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this
process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would
be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the
Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco
argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to
leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question.
The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether
or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note
that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently
already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from
the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations
like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
• Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.cralaw

FACTS:
(1) May 11, 1987 (After congressional elections) -- Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
(2) September 16, 1988 -- the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their
former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of
the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.
(3) Arguments for the petitioner:
(a) he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is
permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
(b) the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
(4) Arguments for the respondent:
(a) the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court. (Main fact for judicial department)
(b) he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which
changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
(c) nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case

HELD:
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent' s assertion, the Court has
the competence to act on the matter at bar.

RATIO:
(1) What is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed
by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question
because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory
in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of
the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights ...' (1 6C.J .S., 439; emphasis supplied)
I t is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine
the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
(2) The case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

OTHER NOTES:
(1) Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members

• Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)

A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the
legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more
votes than urban votes.
The state claimed redistricting was a political question and non-justiciable.
Baker petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to malapportionment of state legislatures is not
a political question because is fails to meet any of the six political question tests and is, therefore, justiciable.
Baker v. Carr Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:

Under the Tennessee Constitution, legislative districts were required to be drawn every ten years. The
purpose was to adjust to changes in the state’s population. Baker, a Republican citizen of Shelby County,
brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the state had not been redistricted since 1901 and
Shelby County had more residents than rural districts. Baker’s argument stated that because the districts
had not been redrawn and the rural district had ten times fewer people, the rural votes essentially counted
more denying him equal protection of the law. Tennessee claimed that redistricting was a political question
and could not be decided by the courts under the Constitution.

Procedural History:

Baker claimed the malapportionment of state legislatures is justiciable and the state of Tennessee argued
such an issue is a political question not capable of being decided by the courts. Baker petition to the United
States Supreme Court.

Issue and Holding:

Is an equal protection challenge to a malapportionment of state legislatures considered non-justiciable as

a political question? No.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

A challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause to malapportionment of state legislatures is not a
political question and is justiciable.

Judgment:

Remanded to the District Court for consideration on the merits.

Reasoning:
The current case is different than Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), because it is brought under the Equal
Protection Clause and Luther challenged malapportionment under the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause.

An issue is considered a non-justiciable political question when one of six tests are met:

Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another political branch;

Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue;
Impossibility of deciding the issue without making an initial policy determination of a kind not suitable for
judicial discretion;
Lack of respect for the other branches of government in undertaking independent resolution in the case;
Unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
Potential for embarrassment for differing pronouncements of the issue by different branches of government.
This claim does not meet any of the six tests and is justiciable. There are no textually demonstrable
commitments present regarding equal protection issues by other branches of government. Judicial
standards are already in place for the adjudication of like claims. Since Baker is an individual bringing suit
against the state government, no separation of power concerns result.

• Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003.

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August
2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice
ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss
the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at
least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
“[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.”
Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Doctrine of Operative Fact

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012.

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives
from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue: What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?\\

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is
not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality
are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied
on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would
put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid

• League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951, 24 August 2010
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is... an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put... in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative
fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its judicial declaration of... nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself.

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

• Article VIII, Section 5(5)

• Reynato S. Puno, “The View from the Mountaintop,” Keynote Speech delivered at the National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances, Centennial Hall,
Manila Hotel, 16 July 2017, Available at:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications.summit/EJK%20Summit%20CJRSP%20Keynote
%20Speech.pdf
• Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993.

A.
B. JUDICIAL POWER
• Lopez v. Roxas, 17 Phil 766 (1966)
17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined

Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections.
Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:

“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-
president elect of the Philippines.”

In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he
sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is
unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before
the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme
Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should decide
controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another
court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law”

The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political
system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution
confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested
by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and
demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this
reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is
essentially judicial.
Effect of Section 1 (2) on Judicial Inquiry (Section 1)
• Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 688 (1989)
ACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return
to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel
order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power
although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power
during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary
power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

• Echegaray v. The Secretary of Justice, 19 January 1999

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659
“ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions
were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing
Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode
of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau
of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon
City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition.
 The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question
is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel
and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have
abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed
a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :

WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue
delegation of legislative power

HELD:

THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.”
(what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and
one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal
injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of
the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b)
fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out
the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

• In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

acts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using
contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case
 GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court
acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is
a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en
banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap
inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July
1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed
letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum
of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on
16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint

Issue:

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found
guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further
Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the
Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of
powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-
equal branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own
sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

1. SC Division and En Banc (Section 4)

• People v. Dy, 395 SCRA 256 (2003)
Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the
trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the
presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the
crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have
done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing
and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral
confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was
made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral
confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

• Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)

TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which
substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's
decision becomes final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto,
the said agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land
from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries
staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in
October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for
the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory,
had any legal effect.

HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one
(1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing
the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to
disputes once and for all

• Firestone Ceramics v. CA, 334 SCRA 465 (2000)

Firestone Ceramics vs CA / Republic vs CA

FACTS:
• This case involves a 99-hectare land presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which
land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction.
• The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein private
respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover.
• Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of
title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated,
determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.
• Petitioner filed Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases
ISSUE:
WON the SC should hear the case en banc
HELD:
YES. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993: the
following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a
fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention
of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention.

• League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, 21 December 2009, See also:
Dissent of Justice Carpio.

• Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., G.R. No. 196358, 21 March 2012.

Facts:

Petitioner’s case for review on the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of his case on serious misconduct and
dishonesty, was denied by the Supreme through a minute resolution dated 15 June 2011. Petitioner’s
motion to rescind said minute resolution was again denied through the Court’s 21 September 2011
resolution. Upon receipt, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court
En Banc for proper disposition through a signed resolution or decision.

Issues:

Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated 15 June 2011 and 21 September 2011 that Agoy
received are authentic; and Whether or not it was proper for the court to deny his petition through a minute
resolution.

Ruling:

Yes. The stated minute resolutions signed by the Assistant Clerk of Court and the Deputy Clerk of Court
are authentic. The signatories are duly authorized by the Court. As held in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals
(264 SCRA 388), minute resolutions are the results of the deliberations by the Justices of the Court but are
promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants to effect prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court.

Yes. It is proper for the Court to deny Agoy’s petition through a minute resolution. While the Constitution
requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based,
the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal
basis for such denial. Such legal basis is the absence of reversible error in the challenged decision,
resolution or order of the court. In addition, when there is no reversible error in the decision of the CA and
the Court denies the petition, there is no need for it to fully explain the denial, since it already means that it
agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.

The motion to rescind was denied for lack of merit.

• In Re: Problems of Delays on Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, 28 November
2001.
FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained about the huge delay of case disposition in the
 Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 12 month period prescribed for lower collegiate courts in the Constitution apply
to the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:
The 12 month period prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. It only
applies to the Court of Appeals. Special courts like the Sandiganbayan, while also considered
collegiate, are required to decide decisions as governed by their charter and/or their rules, which
in this case, is 3 months

a.i.3 Powers of the Judiciary (Section 5)

.

• In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of
the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of
the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
 inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted
to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission
to the practice of law.

• Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470, 492 (1998)

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against
Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited
himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the
case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27
of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional
provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the SC.

Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.

But what is the proper remedy?

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
• In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 25-27 (1973)
FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all
comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce
must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State.
Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization
of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of
speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court
thus levies a tax. The Court held:

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become
a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of
activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does
compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the state”
Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer may
be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every
government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his
objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.
 As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.

• Tan v. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 501 SCRA 156 (2006)

• Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 7 October 2008.

, the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the
corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.”

• Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922, 26 February
2010
etitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative
organized under RA 6938, or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.

ARTICLE 62(6) OF RA 6938 EXEMPTS COOPERATIVES:

FROM THE PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEES PAYABLE TO THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT FOR AND IN CONNECTION WITH ALL ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THIS
CODE, OR WHERE SUCH ACTION IS BROUGHT BY THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY BEFORE THE COURT, TO ENFORCE THE PAYMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
CONTRACTED IN FAVOR OF THE COOPERATIVE.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed a petition in RTC Baguio to extrajudicially foreclose a

mortgage, however, the extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of
the mortgagee’s claim. Petitioner invoke Art. 62(6) of RA 6938, to be exempted from payment of
fees.

Respondent, RTC judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes denied the petition citing that under Rule 141
Sec. 22 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rule’s coverage only the
“Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities” and certain suits of local
government units. Respondent maintained that the fees collected under Rule 141 are not “fees
payable to the Philippine Government” as they do not accrue to the National Treasury but to a
special fund under the Court’s control.

ISSUE:

The question is whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal
fees under Art. 62(6) of RA 6938.

HELD:

No, RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure proceeding.

The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited
to two types of actions, namely:

(1) actions brought under RA 6938; and

(2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives.
 By simple deduction, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption
from the payment of legal fees because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an
action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act
3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

Separation of Powers

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, the constitution textualized a power sharing scheme
between the Legislature and the Judiciary in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions vested that the:

SUPREME COURT HAS THE “POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING PLEADING,

PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE IN ALL COURTS, AND THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE
OF LAW.” AND THE,
LEGISLATURE HAS THE CONCURRENT POWER TO “REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT”
SUCH RULES.
The 1987 Constitution revised the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting
in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power, and thus, the Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared with Congress”

The rule making power of the Court was expanded and was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987
Constitution explicitly took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is exclusively vested with this Court. x x x x

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. x x x

Petition denied. RTC decision is affirmed.

• People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678, 7 July 2004

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and
to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General
assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision
in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or death.

RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds justification in the 1987 Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does
not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

Judicial and Bar Council (Section 8)

• Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) GR No. 202242, April 16, 2014
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks
of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress.

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in
the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July
17, 2012)
• Chavez vs. JBC GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012

•
• De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.
ACTS:

This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Associate
Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. The question is undoubtedly impressed
with transcendental importance to the nation because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any
President’s most important appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec.
9.

CONSIDERING, ART. VII, UNDER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

ART. VII, SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE
APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN
CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC
SAFETY.
IN RELATION TO ART. VIII, UNDER JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
ART. VIII, SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS
SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST THREE NOMINEES
PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EVERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS
NEED NO CONFIRMATION.
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS WITHIN NINETY
DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.
ISSUE:

Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight Appointment
Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

HELD:

Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections
14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of this Article are the
provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states
that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission
of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15 to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is
preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the
heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and
proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any
appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the
Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant
to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief
Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief
Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from
May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the
next President.

•
• In Re: Nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as replacement for IBP Governor for
Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel AM No. 13-04-03-SC, December 10, 2013

Jardeleza vs. JBC, G.R. No. 213181 (2014)

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be
invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that
due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts
of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
 Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

a.i.4. Salaries fixed by law (Section 10)

• Nitafan v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284
FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila,
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes
a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as
it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987
Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent
of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices
and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government
and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

a.i.5. Legal basis of decisions (Section 14)

• Francisco vs.Permskul, G.R. No. 81006. May 12, 1989.
FACTS: On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a
period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any
damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the
private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum
of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the
lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including
the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore
them to their original condition.

The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of position
papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that the
repainting was not chargeable to him. This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision
reading in full as follows:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby
adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

The decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The defendant went to the Court of
Appeals, his petition for review was denied hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court violates Article VIII Section 14
of the Constitution.

RULING: NO. There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is
to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice, the Constitution now contains
a number of provisions aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection among
the people. The memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing
expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice, but expediency alone, no matter how compelling,
cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the
means. In the case at bar, the court finds that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court in
compliance with the rule on summary procedure. It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did
not review the memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of the petition for
review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum decision and
discussed it at some length in the light of the observations and reservations. The law does not define the
memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. When a law is
questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. The Court has deliberated
extensively on the challenge posed against the memorandum decision as now authorized by law.

• Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 428 SCRA 283 (2004)

Facts:
-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.
-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically
on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their
flock to vote for a specified candidate.
-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the
questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether
the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the
petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church
and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse,
the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public
office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this
aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to
these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Court’s resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondent’s Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial
determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.

Issue: 1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law
and the Rules of Court?
HELD
1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review
or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the basis therefor.

Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :

“A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in
writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.”

The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was
evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play.

In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and
that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended,
among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them
appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which
he disagrees.

The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of
the court’s findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature
of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional
provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents
before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the
extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached
or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her “Decision” with the clause “SO
ORDERED.”

A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is
an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning.

It was truly obvious that the RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure
to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in
the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of
factual comparison?).

Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed
Decision. Stating “Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause.”

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of
the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of
a dispositive portion.

The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court
on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling
factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive
part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the
final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.

The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent
nullity and must be struck down as void.

a.i.6 One Supreme Court

Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, 23 November 2010.

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the
former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant
of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-
President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests
as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article
IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution.

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 3 April 2001.

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 (1948)

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which
provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them
necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other
than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the
infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case
— are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the
constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but
positively violative of the organic law.

Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be
appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as
determined by the Constitution.

However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is
no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate
tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member"
therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of
Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed
(Sec5).

Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109698, 5 December 1994.

a.1.7 Fiscal Autonomy

• In Re: COA Opinion on the Computatuon of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the
Retired Chief/Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, 31 July 2012.
ACTS: In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on
Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when
five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned
to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the
Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles.

ISSUE: Did the COA err when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion?

HELD: The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however,
must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional
provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy.
While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This
authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first
blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is
necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the
grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the
following manner: "as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."

VII. WHAT ARE THE INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL COMISSIONS? (CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISIONS)

COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article IX(A), Sections 1-7

CASE LIST

Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991)

Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for
mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent
filed an election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner.
Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC
decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held
that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction
before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the
petition, private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution, that “Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective
municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s decision involving marked
ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to
this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution,
which petitioner cites, it is stated, “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner.
The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is
beyond the power of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing of the letter "C" after the
word "Galido" in the fifteen (15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design
to identify the ballots and/or voters. This finding should be conclusive on the Court.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX
(C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution).
In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen
(15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots.
May this COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the
herein petitioner)?
Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:
"(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution
which provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory
and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.
The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.
We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari
is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical
evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of
which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.
Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-
Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main
purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act complained
of. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

Mateo v. CA, 247 SCRA 284 (1995)

Friday, April 19, 2013

Mateo v. CA

Mateo v. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
Puno, J.

Issue:

whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal
of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation

Held:

No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No.
44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against
illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action
of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

Garces v. CA, 259 SCRA 99 (1996)

ACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She
was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer
post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to
assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same
is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to
cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R.
Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.
Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled
his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments
of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under
Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on
certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an
en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,
and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the
conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary,
it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of
the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those
that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective
regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an
appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated
before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.”
*Petition denied

CHREA v. CHR, G.R. 155336, July 21, 2006

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the
strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading
and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and
upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of
the DBM are disallowed.

1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that
shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans
qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances,
and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of
the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and
regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597,
the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board
of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to
ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically,
that PPC’s compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No.
6758.” )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first
be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is
consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President
in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of
the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation
of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification
of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now
estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the
COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal
autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence
and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to
the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman,
a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic
and planning agency.

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among
the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated
otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence,
fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is
the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom
and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it
is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of
the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to
formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of
offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that
the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758
more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522
“that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, 13 December 2000.

Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The Commission
on Appointments (COA) and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on September 7,
1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification on the expiry date
of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term
office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be
paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The General
Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.”
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff effective February
2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere
reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the
Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied by COA.

Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.

Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer in good faith until February
2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in
the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President withthe consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.”

Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
1. 1. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Article IX(B), Sections 1-8

CASE LIST
• Mathay, Jr. Civil Service Commission, 312 SCRA 91 (1999)
FACTS:

During his administration, Simon appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units
pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry
of Justice that the PD wasn’t published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didn’t become a proper
law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the revocation of same appointments. The then
mayor Simon remedied this by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the
appointees to the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didn’t quite
reach fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled.
The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor
Mathay. But at the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was no longer approved,
prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to
reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the previous ordinance issued.

HELD:

The CSC has no authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private respondents.
 Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in ordering the
mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of
the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not
to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who shall occupy
the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows
that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped
by the city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the
absorption of specific persons to certain positions.
In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel without
allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping
statement that the doctrine of separation of powers doesn’t apply to local governments, which is
wrong. The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately and
delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power to create,
consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city
council.
By ordering the mayor to reinstate private respondents, the CSC substituted its own judgment to
the appointing power of the mayor. This cannot be done. The CSC’s power is limited to approving
or disapproving an appointment. It doesn’t have the authority to direct that an appointment of a
specific individual be made.
• CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 (1997)
FACTS:
On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security
staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was
terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

HELD:
NO. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the
appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant.

•
• Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., 188 SCRA 154 (1990)
n this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without
just cause in violation of his security of tenure.

Facts:

In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed
office on on April 7, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of
the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as
General Manager, approved by the President on the same date.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager
and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.

On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary
of Tourism.

On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating him
concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person
to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum,
the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original
petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the
President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.

Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority

Held:

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless
sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such
until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the
office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this
sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.

The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an
alter ego of the President.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being
that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot
delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the
exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed
fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another
in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. “

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was true
of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such
acts shall be considered valid only if not ‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as
also happened in the case at bar.
 With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His
designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid
title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized,
the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn
at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the petitioner’s
claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the
ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed
strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors
where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager
of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be
made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.

The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

•
• Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2000)
Dela Torres, Canonizado, Pureza and Adiong were appointed Commissioners of NAPOLCOM.
They were appointed separately, in various years and their terms had not expired at the time the
amendatory law to R.A. 6975 was passed. R.A. 8551 declared the terms of sitting commissioners
as expired upon its effectivity.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition.

HELD:
NO. Under R.A. 6975, the NAPOLCOM ws described a collegial body within the DILG whereas
R.A. 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This
does not result in the creation of an entirely new office.

• Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986)

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,”
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of
the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to
the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of
the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
 Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia
the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was
better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
• Flores v. Drilon and Gordon, 223 SCRA 508 (1993)
FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of
Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of
its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman
and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City
and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely
what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor
of Olongapo City.
 (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is
the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor
of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may
be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective
official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void;
he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Maricelle M. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103 April 23, 2014

FACTS:

Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued a Resolution approving
the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes.
Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested
the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent’s appointment.

The CHR Legal Division Chief rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not
covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has
a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.

Later, CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that it will conduct an investigation
on the appointment of respondent Cortes.

Director Cornelio of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the
appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under
Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According
to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to
respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the prohibition
against nepotism.
RULING:

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

(1) appointing authority;

(2) recommending authority;

(3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.

Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree
of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.

By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition:

(1) persons employed in a confidential capacity;

(2) teachers;

(3) physicians; and

(4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not
fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority referred
to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual
Commissioners who compose it.

The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing
and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a
relative.

Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious
evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body.

What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not
need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
all laws would be illusory.

In the present case, respondent Cortes’ appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.

Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the
appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence
during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.

The CSC-NCR Decisioninvalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being
 nepotistic was REINSTATED.

• Department of Health v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113212, 29 December 1995.

1. 2. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Article IX (C), Sections 1-11

CASE LIST

Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990)

In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was
appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an
acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity”.

Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the President for such
is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC.

HELD: Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that
although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control
of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious
justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions of
the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the
members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence
of Davide (they normally do that by choosing the most senior member).

But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of
COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point here is that, it is the members
who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are
independent bodies.

Buac and Bautista v. COMELEC, 421 SCRA 92 (2004)

FACTS:

On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig
were asked this question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into
a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? ”

On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-
four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig into a city.

However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the
plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.

Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer
for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed
as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.

Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a
plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.

The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s motion and dismissing the
petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed
this Resolution.

Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102
constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.

On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees
on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.

Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by
petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.

Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of
the will of the electorate” because “the revision is incomplete. He claims that:

“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees,
the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes for ‘No.’ The
revision committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.

As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final
Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the
ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all
summed up and tallied as follows:

Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024

Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0

(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.

HELD:

Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.

The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but
finality. This is so because “the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots
which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the
power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC
did not gravely abuse its discretion.

LDP v. COMELEC, 423 SCRA 665 (2004)

Kilosbayan v. COMELEC, 280 SCRA 892 (1997)

Salazar v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 433 (1990)

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)

Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

GMA Network, Inc. vs. COMELEC, Senator Alan Peter "COMPAÑERO" S. Cayetano G.R. No. 20535,
September 2, 2014

Maliksi v. COMELEC and Saquilayan G.R. No. 203302, Maliksi v. COMELEC, March 12, 2013,
reconsidered April 11, 2013

National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, 5 March 1992.

Bulilis v. Nuez, G.R. No. 195953, 9 August 2011.

1. 3. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Article IX (C), Sections 1-11

CASE LIST

DBP v. COA, 373 SCRA 356 (2002)

FACTS:
DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Thereafter, DBP issued
Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive of customs duties and taxes. COA sent
a notice to the chairman of DBP notifying him of the disallowance of the amount of P246,539.25
representing customs duties and taxes and at the same time holding him, along with other petitioners, jointly
and severally liable for the aforementioned sum.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post audit.

HELD:
YES. Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants the commission the power to conduct a
post audit.

Dingcong v. Guingona Jr., 162 SCRA 782 (1988)

Facts:
Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director of Regional Office No. VI
of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City, after public bidding, contracted, admittedly on an "emergency labor
basis," the services of one Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the
renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo City.
When petitioner retired on 17 January 1984, among the items disallowed by the Resident Auditor was the
amount of P6,574.00 from the labor contracts with Layson, by reducing the latter's daily rate from P40.00
per day to P18.00 daily.
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who affirmed the disallowance as being
"excessive and disadvantageous to the government," but increased Layson's daily rate to P25.00 thereby
reducing the total amount disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite petitioner's request for reconsideration,
respondent Commission remained unmoved, hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
WON the disallowance is invalid for being a usurpation of management function and an impairment of
contract

Held:
the Decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby SET ASIDE
COA is vested with power and authority, and is also charged with the duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to the Govt., or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
The COA found that the labor contract which they disallowed, was excessive and thus disadvantageous to
the Govt. however, the court found out that that the rate given is not necessarily disadvantageous. The
Bureau of Treasury hired Layson since he was the one submitted the lowest price in the auction for the
contract. Thus, it being found not disadvantageous, the decision of COA was set aside and ordered the
petitioner to refund the disallowed item.

Danville Maritime, Inc. v. COA, 175 SCRA 701 (1989)

Facts:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the letter-directive of respondent Commission on Audit (COA for brevity)
disapproving the result of the public bidding held by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC for brevity)
of the sale of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio" on the ground that only one bidder submitted a bid
and to direct COA to approve the said sale.

Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent COA committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there
was a failure of bidding when only one bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a rebidding.

Held:
COA Circular No. 88-264 there should at least be two (2) bidders, otherwise there is a failure of bidding.
Negotiated sale may only be undertaken under the failure of the second bidding. Only the SC can review
the decisions made by COA
We see no reason to disturb the interpretation given by the COA to the term "public bidding" and what
constitutes its "failure." No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
use of government funds and properties.

Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 (1971)

Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office and the Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193462, February
4, 2014

Funa vs. Villar GR No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Veloso v. COA, G.R. No. 193677,6 September 2011.

FACTS: In 2000, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 authorizing the conferment of Exemplary
Service Award (EPSA) to elective officials of the City who have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Such officials shall be given a retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to
the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms. In 2006, Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO)-Local of the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of
Disallowance on the ground that LGUs have fiscal autonomy and that they have the power to grant
allowances/gratuity.

ISSUE: Whether or not COA properly exercised its jurisdiction in disallowing the disbursement of the City
of Manila's funds for the EPSA of its former three-term councilors

RULING: Yes. COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds. LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit
jurisdiction of the COA. Moreover, COA was held correct in issuing the Notice of Disallowance because,
contrary to the contention of the petitioners that the award is a form of gratuity, the recomputation of the
award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years,
that includes basic salary, additional compensation. Undoubtedly, the computation of the awardees' reward
is excessive and tantamount to double and additional compensation which is prohibited by law.
1. 4. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES
a. Central Monetary Authority
Article XII, Sections 20-21

b. Economic and Planning Agencies

Article XII, Sections 9-10

c. National Commissions
• Commission on Human Rights (Article XIII)

• Commission on Human Rights Employees Association vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R.
No. 155336, 21 July 2006.

• Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994.

• National Language Commission ( Article XIV, Section 9)

• National Police Commission (Article XVI, Section 6)

VIII. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article X, Sections 1-21

CASE LIST
• Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which
expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869.
PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize
and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by
law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR.
They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and
b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to
waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par.
(2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:

1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities
like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries
and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.”
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the
Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same.

2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
“municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and
abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
 Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of
its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.

• Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786)

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in
a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and
informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings
be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had
"filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region
XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X,
Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former
class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region
XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

 important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion
is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at
the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do
so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a
valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back
in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason,
we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

• Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds
of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several
suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the
CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this
is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was
given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President
over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive
officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision,
are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration
law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred
that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is
exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
• Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)
 In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit
the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez
claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a)
be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” –
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require
– is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In
the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only
the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and
NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

• Paredes v. The Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Pambansa #86 and Presidential Proclamation # 2034, COMELEC was
charged with the implementation of a plebiscite to be held in certain barangays within the
Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao Province to “ to determine whether the said Barangays shall
become a new municipality to be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao.”
Petitioners allege that BP 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the
Constitution which states: “No province, city, municipal ity, or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
 cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”
ISSUE: WON, all inhabitants of Mayoyao, and not just those to be separated, should be included
in the plebiscite?
RULING: The Court rules in the negative, Petition is dismissed. It is a settled doctrine that between
two possible constructions, one upholding constitutionality, and the other upholding
unconstitutionality, the former must be preferred. After all, the basic presumption all these years is
one of validity. And this is supported by the Constitution promoting the autonomy of local units,
especially the smallest unit, the barangay. And when there are indications that the inhabitants of
several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality, they should be allowed to
do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. If is
they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New
burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a
matter of choice – their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow
other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will

• Acebedo Optical Company v. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000)

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After
hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he
attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions
or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said
conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed
the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in
assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the
special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by
the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police
power.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to
practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The
conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor
can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law
or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a
contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.

• Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508, 514 (1991)

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00
a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal
treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However,
the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged
public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must
be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will
only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare,
comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with,
but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort,
and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police
power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion
of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The
care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been
an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights
and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing
the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family
is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have
less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or
as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
 dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
• Dadole v. COA, 393 SCRA 262 (2002

FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly
allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount
they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their
officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within
the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU
if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory
powers over LGUs

• Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)

Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government
Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure
in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.

RTC’s Ruling:

1. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187
of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs
in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioner’s Argument:

1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of
the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Court’s Argument:
 1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-
done. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires
provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs
of LGU not to tax ordinances.

• Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, 477 SCRA 436 (2005)

Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for
lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 635.

At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through
Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.

The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under
the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump
site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President
Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.

A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question
that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it
into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.

Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27
requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities
ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño,
Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to
national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project.

Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the
Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence
 of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by
the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of
the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that
they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality,
grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or
of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, …providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other
similar forest development projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for
the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity
and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage
of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and
within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or
wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.

• League of Cities of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.176951, 177499,178056,
December 21, 2009

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July
2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
 Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

• Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, Esperon, et. al. G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2000
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)

HELD: Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the
matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory
nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

LAWS
1. The Local Government Code of 1991
2. R. A. No. 9054 - The Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao
3. The Bangsamoro Organic Law
SEE ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ON THE BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW
Moot court on the Bangsamoro Basic law

IX. HOW DO WE HOLD PUBLIC OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article XI, Sections 1-18

CASE LIST
• Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, 20 January 1999.

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group
(ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said
requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in
Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that
the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed
in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the
case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of
penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and
then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

• Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105965, 20 March 2011.

Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases
falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts?

Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman us plenary and
unqualified. It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad
enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

malfeasance – bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.

Misfeasance – An act that is legal but performed improperly.
Nonfeasance – omission to do a duty.

The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15
(1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of Ombudman provides: The
prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between
the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts.

• Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, (1982)

Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases
falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts?

Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman us plenary and
unqualified. It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad
enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.

malfeasance – bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.

Misfeasance – An act that is legal but performed improperly.
Nonfeasance – omission to do a duty.

The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15
(1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of Ombudman provides: The
prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between
the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Atty. Valera, 471 SCRA 715 (2005.)

ACTS:
Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. He took his oath and immediately assumed office. On August 20, 2003, the Office of
the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint dated July 28, 2003 charging Respondent Valera with
criminal offenses involving violation of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), Executive Order No. 38, Executive Order No. 298 and R.A. No.
6713 as well as administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance
of Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was respondent Valera’s brother-in-law for
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. But prior to this sworn complaint, criminal and administrative
charges were also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Valera. Similar allegations
as those in the other complaint in that respondent Valera, without being duly authorized by the
Commissioner of Customs, entered into a compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in
Civil Case No. 01-102504 to the prejudice of the government. Meanwhile on November 12, 2003, the
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum inhibiting himself from the foregoing criminal cases as well as the
related administrative case and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his (the
Ombudsman’s) stead and place. On March 17, 2004, pursuant to the above memorandum, petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case OMB-C-A-0379-J, issued the Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six months without pay. In the said order, petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that respondent Valera entered into the compromise agreement
with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 without being duly authorized to do so
by the Commissioner of Customs and without the approval of the Secretary of Finance in violation of
Section 2316 of the TCCP. Said order was deemed immediately effective and executory. Respondent
Valera sought reconsideration of the said Order claiming denial of due process. He averred that he had
already submitted his counter-affidavit refuting the charges leveled against him way back on November 6,
2003. He pointed out that sworn complaint was filed on August 20, 2003 and it was only two months later
or on October 22, 2003 that the Ombudsman found enough bases to proceed with the administrative
investigation of the case by requiring respondent Valera to file his counter-affidavit. He did so on
November 6, 2003. During the said period of two months, the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau-A (PIAB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman did not find enough bases to
preventively suspend him. According to respondent Valera, he was at a loss as to why it was only then
(March 17, 2004) that he was being placed under preventive suspension. Acting on respondent Valera’s
motion for reconsideration, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio issued the Order dated April 5,
2004 explaining that the delay in the issuance of the preventive suspension order was due to the
inhibition of the Ombudsman from the case and for which reason, he (petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio), by virtue of the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003, had to act in his place and stead. Even
before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, however, respondent Valera already filed with the
Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the March 17,
2004 Order of preventive suspension issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. The appellate
court rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension
and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action in OMB-C-
A-03-0379-J. Relying on the two provisions of law (Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 in relation to, Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution), the CA declared that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has no
authority to issue a preventive suspension order since he is neither the Ombudsman nor one of the
Deputy Ombudsmen. Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioners Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio
and the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has the authority to place respondent Valera under
preventive suspension in connection with the administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD:
The Court holds that the Special Prosecutor has no such authority. It is noted that petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio anchors his authority to conduct the administrative investigation in OMB-C-A-03-
0379-J on the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 issued by Ombudsman inhibiting himself
therefrom and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead.
Significantly, Ombudsman did not state in the said memorandum the reason for his inhibition. However,
similar to judges, Ombudsman has no unfettered discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for
just and valid causes. No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman for his inhibition in OMB-C-A-03-
0379-J. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the powers of the
Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following: investigatory power; prosecutory power;
public assistance functions; authority to inquire and obtain information; and function to adopt, institute and
implement preventive measures. The Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. However, if the Ombudsman delegates his authority to
conduct administrative investigation to the Special Prosecutor and the latter finds that the preventive
suspension of the public official or employee subject thereof is warranted, the Special Prosecutor may
recommend to the Ombudsman to place the said public officer or employee under preventive suspension.
With respect to the conduct of administrative investigation, the Special Prosecutor’s authority, insofar as
preventive suspension is concerned, is akin to that of the PIAB-A, i.e., recommendatory in nature. It bears
stressing that the power to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension pending an
investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen.

• Ledesma vs. CA, 465 SCRA 437 (2005)

FACTS:
An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary
Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the administrative case suspending
petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not in finding petitioner administratively liable, Ombudsman has encroached into the power of
the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.

HELD:
NO. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or any of its subdivisions,
agency or instrumentality.

• In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)

The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated
14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a
telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan
had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.

Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a
letter-complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).

The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court
Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of
merit. In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he
should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice
Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr.
Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative
Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as
a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with
finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office.

HELD
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or
any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from
office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of
removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be
held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from
liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement
that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. A member of the Supreme
Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may
he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior
that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

• Francisco, et al. v. House Speaker , et al., 415 SCRA 44 (2003)

F acts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”
Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or
crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

• Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988)

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme
Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get
his petition to be given due course”.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez
to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only
exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where
he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six
justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not
embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the
justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind
of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes
duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to
uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the
case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court
approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

• Laurel v. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48 (2002)

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He
was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the
petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the
petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for
certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer
since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC
is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies.
Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC
performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is
therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it
less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

• Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997)

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore.
His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to
and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to
BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian
of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him.
In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did
not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision
sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion
for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint
charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory
to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the
petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt
for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by
direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a
receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

• Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Gonzales III vs. Office of
the President of the Philippines, acting through and represented by executive secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014

Facts:
· August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and
Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house
located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the
chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk
their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the
only program that would solve the ills of society.

· Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the
NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of
NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and
that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said “Kung kaya nating
pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.”
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain
Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and
the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.
· August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by
the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
· Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the
DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted
Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:
Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should
deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not
published
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner
is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the
authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City
Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the
Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All
recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of
the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from
the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to
the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to
an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its
primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2. No.
· In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
· In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the
Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of
the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or
the public, in general.

3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present
petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

• Flor Gupilan-Aguilar and Honore R. Hernandez, vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307
February 26, 2014
• Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 189434 March 12, 2014
SUMMARY: Proceedings for forfeiture of properties in a single suit may proceed separately for each
property, and the Sandiganbayan need not acquire territorial jurisdiction over the proceeds of a foreign-
registered dummy registered to contravene anti-graft laws to enforce its decisions.
FACTS:
• On 25 April 2012, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand
E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of
assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to
their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie
presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379. Petitioners seek
reconsideration of the denial of their petition, raising the issues below.
ISSUE/S:
• WoN the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because a)
the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma
and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated
o NO. This issue has already been raised and exhaustively discussed in our 25 April 2012
Decision. In fact, the discussion on the first issue is merely a restatement of petitioners’ original assertions
that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to render summary judgment over the assets of Arelma.
o The said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name “Arelma,
Inc.,” which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly
organized for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.
o Respondent Republic’s success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts (see
immediately preceding case Republic vs. Sandiganbayan) does not mean its preclusion from seeking
partial summary judgment over a different subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In
fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1)
holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2) landholdings, buildings,
condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to Php 27,744,535, time
deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs
authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-
denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the United States, among
others. The ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by
the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36.
o Petitioners further insist that “Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account because
the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition concerning it.”
However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and never even substantiated how
such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is
nothing in Republic Act 1379 or in the Rules which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only because of statements allegedly made by one party.
• WoN the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before
the judgment may be enforced
o NO. The execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The
authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated
with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively enforced.
o R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam,
not in rem.
o In any case, the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes
the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets
abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State.
• Ligot, et al. v. Republic GR No. 176944, March 6, 2013

FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials
and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof
took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term
expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section
12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his petition however,
Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay,
also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on
the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa
vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134)
was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be
a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason
that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional
provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be
done directly.”

• Herminio T. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013
• Corona vs. Senate . GR No. 200242, July 17,2012
Facts:

Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly... expressed his rejection of petitioner's
appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for
"derailing his administration's mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the
handiwork of President Aquino's party... mates and supporters, including "hidden forces" who will be
benefited by his ouster.
Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:

(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation of Resolution
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or... representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and
submitting documents on petitioner's or his family's bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception
and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;

(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:

(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;

(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the
Impeachment Complaint;

(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court's Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], as
well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and (iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction permanent.

Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they
have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the... event that petitioner is removed from office.

Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during
the hearings.

They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not
exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of

Senator-Judges during the proceedings.

By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator- Judges are
clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
Petitioner thus failed to prove any... semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges.

Issues:

whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction,... which
would require corrective measures from the Court.

Ruling:

Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"[14] was foreseen
as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest
danger that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt."[15] Given their concededly political character, the precise role of
the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective... functioning
of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are... proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with
grave abuse or arbitrariness.
the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
Constitution.

impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the... influence
of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.

Our own Constitution's provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution.

Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3,... In the meantime, the
impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority
vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated
his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar

Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the
Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among
those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue... raised by petitioner had
been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so
that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[18] In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would... be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.[19]

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.

• Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598 (2016)

FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager
Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and
Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective
demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to
commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx
Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly
or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less,
[by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied
by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired
to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise
denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:
Procedural:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence.
Substantive:
Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte ;
Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there
evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than
P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved
by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings,
and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction
they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it
is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do
so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court
that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or
mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure
to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to,
during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002,
377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information
alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on
the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under
R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not
only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made
answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in
the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind
despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no
evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against
each of them.

Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was
adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at
not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of
the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing
even the remotest possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec.
1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis,
by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the
word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by
the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good,
substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation
occurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds
or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly
or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the
property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that
require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use
of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere
accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that
GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions
issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September
10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-
12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for
insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES
no pronouncements on costs of suit.

• REPUBLIC VS, SERENO G.R. No. 237428. May 11, 2018

LAWS: R.A. No. 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
February 20, 1989 (See also The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

X. WHAT IS OUR VISION OF SOCIETY?

Preambles to the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution

A. STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Article II, Sections 1-28

CASE LIST
• People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and
some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits
and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating
a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the
City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City
of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all
such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of
(Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of
Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

• Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945)

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were
no de facto government.

Issues:

Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States
and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial
acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the
enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to
conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . .
He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but
this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become
re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being
de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial
but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order
of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view
it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing
forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue
local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.

• In Re Letter of Associate Justice Puno, 210 SCRA 589 (1992)

Socialize Us

Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on
1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant
to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he
ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire government, including
the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts
recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him
the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from
number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President,
otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are
affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.

Held:

The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33
phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was
established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O.
No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary
government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.

Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden. radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the Articles
of Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock unless there is a prima facie
evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation.

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were elected, one
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the other by the registered ETPI
stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari before the Sandiganbayan
alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of
the members of the board of directors. The Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their
duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the Court which was granted. The Court referred
the PCGG’s petition to hold the special stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence and resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding of a
special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase ETPI’s
authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the issuance of the writ of
sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the PCGG was entitled to vote the sequestered
shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the increase in ETPI’s
authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously approved”. Africa filed a
motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending that only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan,
has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a
second petition, challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders
meeting and the one denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the
amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG can vote the
sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors.

HELD:

First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering the holding
of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through the
amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile
the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been sequestered and the duty of the conservator to
preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is nothing in the Cojuangco case that would suggest that
the above measures should be incorporated in the articles and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for
the election of the board of directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should
be written in the articles and by-laws before such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable period of time, have
every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate records, and dissipate assets.” That could
be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances of the case require that the election of the board of
directors first be held before the articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation
Code requires the majority vote of the board of directors to amend the articles of incorporation. At the
time Africa filed his motion for the holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were two sets of
ETPI directors, one controlled by the PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of them
is the legitimate board of directors? Which of them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of
incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to cure the
aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation before the articles of incorporation are
amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-called Marcos cronies taking
control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a legitimate concern of the PCGG,
charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless, such danger may be averted by the
“substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the articles after the election of the board.

Second Issue :
The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent cases of
Cojuangco v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Cojuangco, Jr., where the
Court developed a “two-tiered” test in determining whether the PCGG may vote sequestered shares. The
issue of whether PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in SMC necessitates a determination of at least
two factual matters: a.) whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten
and thus belong to the state; and b.) whether there is an immediate danger of dissipation thus
necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG while the main issue pends with the
Sandiganbayan. The two-tiered test, however, does not apply in cases involving funds of “public
character.” In such cases, the government is granted the authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where
government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own
names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed
in private hands. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or
entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.
However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown, prima
facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected
with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. The rule in the jurisdiction is, therefore, clear.
The PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of sequestered property. It is a mere conservator. It
may not vote the shares in a corporation and elect members of the board of directors. The only
conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a business belonging to the government or whose
capitalization comes from public funds, but which landed in private hands as in BASECO. In short, the
Sandiganbayan held that the public character exception does not apply, in which case it should have
proceeded to apply the two-tiered test. This it failed to do. The questions thus remain if there is prima
facie evidence showing that the subject shares are ill- gotten and if there is imminent danger of
dissipation. The Court is not, however, a trier of facts, hence, it is not in a position to rule on the
correctness of the PCGG’s contention. Consequently, the issue must be remanded to the Sandiganbayan
for resolution.

• Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

• Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA, (1994)

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general
law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

• Garcia v. Board of Investments, 224 SCRA 792 (1990)

Facts
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration
with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in
the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but
later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the
site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original
and amended application documents.

The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to
the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protected
the confidentiality of those documents absent consent to disclose.

The BOI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing
notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

Decision Overview
The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that]
is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe”.
[p. 4] The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that required
a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except
with the consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction”. [p. 4] The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order
disclosure of the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under
Article 81, with certain exceptions.

The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny”. [p. 4] Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security” from its order. [p. 4] The Court
did not provide a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public
information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.

• Pamatong v. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96 (2004)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
(2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election;
and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

• Tañada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act.

Discussions:

1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994.
After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

• MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Facts: In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to
compel the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean
up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous
to their health and the inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their
rights to life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also averred under
the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila Bay.

The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed
the decision on the ground that MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary
duty hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a
general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend
to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up such as that ordered by the
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process
of implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not
mean that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s
function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In
short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate the garbage disposal problem in
Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the
law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code involves a general clean
up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform cleaning
in general and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the other
government agencies, must act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.

• AKBAYAN v. Thomas G. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Facts:

· Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

· The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of
topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of
the business environment, and general and final provisions.

· Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates
their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making.

· Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought
involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issues: 1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.

HELD: 1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a public right by its very
nature so petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result. It is enough
that they are part of the general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is anchored on
the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their capacity as citizens, citizen-groups,
petitioner-members of the House of Rep, their standing to file the present suit is grounded on
jurisprudence.

• Ramon Paje vs. Teodoro A. Casino, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015
Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate
for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy,
SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage
will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain
laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the
DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope
of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issues

Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling

Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the
Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or,
at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the
action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to
the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the
issuance of the ECC.

• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises G.R. No.172551 January 15, 2014
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Yatco Agricultural Enterprises
GR177251 January 15, 2014
Ponente: Brion, j.:
Facts:
• Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a 27.5730-
hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-49465.5 On April 30, 1999,6 the government placed the property under the
coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
• Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at P1,126,132.89.8
Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted
summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation.9
• The PARAD computed the value of the property at P16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s
current market value (as shown in the tax declaration11 that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula
"MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up
its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation.
• The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a
petition for the judicial determination of just compensation.
• The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square meter.13 The
RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City,
• Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the valuation that
the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively,
civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing
out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to
consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL).
Issue:
WON the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property was proper?
Held:
No, case was remanded to the lower court.
Ratio:
The LBP essentially questions in the present petition the RTC-SAC’s adoption of the valuation
made by Branch 36 in fixing the just compensation for the property. The LBP asks the question: was the
just compensation fixed by the RTC-SAC for the property, which was based solely on Branch 36’s
valuation, determined in accordance with law?

We find the presented issue clearly one of law. Resolution of this question can be made by mere inquiry
into the law and jurisprudence on the matter, and does not require a review of the parties’ evidence. We,
therefore, disagree with Yatco on this point as we find the present petition compliant with the Rule 45
requirement.

The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Judiciary exercises within
the parameters of the law.

The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function.26 Section 57 of R.A. No.
665727 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for
lands under CARP coverage.

• Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997. (See also: Dissenting Opinions
of Justices Puno and Panganiban)
Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of
the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound
by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

• Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:

Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act.

Discussions:

1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994.
After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

• Duncan v. Glaxo-Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994, 17 September 2014.

ACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship
by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the
employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy in September 1998.

Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from
their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was
planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra.

Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer in
Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest
would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer order and
continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On
November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision
declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

CA sustained; MR denied.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions
among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to
marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or
marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and
does not violate the equal protection clause;

The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets,
procedures and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when
he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein.

ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is
valid

HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims
to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection
of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest
of fair play.21
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and
marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.

Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy.

PETITION DENIED.

______________

Other Issue on Constructive dismissal:

The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new products
which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is
defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30
None of these conditions are present in the instant case.

B. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Article XII, Sections 1-22 CASE LIST

• Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997 (See also: Dissenting Opinions
of Justices Puno and Panganiban.
Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of
the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound
by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

• Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 88637, 7 September 1989.

Facts
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration
with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in
the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but
later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the
site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original
and amended application documents.

The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to
the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protected
the confidentiality of those documents absent consent to disclose.

The BOI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing
notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

Decision Overview
The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on
matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the
inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that]
is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe”.
[p. 4] The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that required
a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except
with the consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction”. [p. 4] The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order
disclosure of the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under
Article 81, with certain exceptions.

The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open
every door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny”. [p. 4] Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security” from its order. [p. 4] The Court
did not provide a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public
information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.

• JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA, 412 SCRA 10 (2003)

FACTS:

National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40
respectively. NIDC’s interest was later transferred to the National Government.

Pursuant to President Aquino’s Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization
(COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the disposition of the government’s non-
performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has
stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested
alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasaki’s interest in PHILSECO—a shipyard is a public
utility–and thus violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents’ act is valid.

HELD:
No.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the
Article XII of the Constitution applies:

“Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share
in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be
citizens of the Philippines.”

Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal “under the same terms.”
This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they
can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion
of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party,
Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not
exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on the other hand, may
purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100%
Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the
capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

• Gamboa vs. Secretary Teves, (GR No. 176579,October 9, 2012)

Facts:

The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12
million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent,
thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner
contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this
new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011
decision?

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to
achieve, that is – to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-
controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’
which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10)
which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an
effective control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous. Thus, the
motion for reconsideration is denied.

[re Preamble]

• Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act.

Discussions:

1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in
the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994.
After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

• Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, 2 April 2009.

Regalian Doctrine, Land Ownership, and Exploitation of Natural Resources

• Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. 180027, 18 July 2012.

Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by
Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion.
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river
banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the
Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to
some other person.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that
the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B
that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than
thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by
the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a
showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners
of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to
acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property
through prescription.

• La Bugal B’laan Tribal v. DENR, 421 SCRA 148 (2004)

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to
the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and
regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be
delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control
of the business.

• Chavez v. PEA and AMARI, 384 SCRA 152 (2002)

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed
creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in
this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint
Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to
AMARI .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!

Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409
of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the
commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to
defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

• Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, et al., 347 SCRA 128 (2000)

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

• Carino vs. Insular Government 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of
the State over said land has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was
never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cariño for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.

• Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, 481 (1947)

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of
deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to
the Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null
and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase
"no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of,
or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of
reciprocity.

• Cheeseman v. IAC, G.R. No. 74833, 21 January 1991.

FACTS:
• Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have
been separated since February 15, 1981.
• On June 4, 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of “Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal
age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City .
• Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to
his wife.
• Thereafter, tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it
to tenants. This happened without any protest from Thomas.
• Criselda sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Cheesman.
The deed described Criselda as being “of legal age, married to an American citizen...”
• Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit in the CFI against Criselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and
consent.
• During the Pre-trial, the sale was declared void ab initio and the the delivery of the property to
Thomas as administrator of the conjugal partnership property was ordered.
• However, the judgment was set aside on a petition for relief filed by the Estrellita, grounded on
"fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to present her case
adequately. Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading as her own answer to the complaint and a
motion for summary judgment.
• The Trial Court found that —
o The evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership and that the immovable in question was in truth Criselda’s
paraphernal property;
o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply because the husband-plaintiff is an American
citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and
o The exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband “had
led Estelita to believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda and on the faith of such
a belief she bought the properties from her and for value” and therefore, Thomas was estopped to impugn
the transfer.
• Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the act of the Trial Court of granting Estelita’s petition
for relief and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition. IAC affirmed the Summary Judgment
and found no reversible error. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of the remedy of appeal to SC? – NO

[COMMENTO: We’re familiar with the Persons related issue –– The foreigner husband has no capacity
or personality to question the sale of the property because it would be an indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands of the public domain.]

RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not
appealable.

• QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: The conclusions made by the trial court were
derived from evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing
on record—are conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a QUESTION OF LAW—which
exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" — "there is a
QUESTION OF FACT when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."
• The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to the Supreme Court.
• The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive
the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence.
• CA was created precisely to take away from the SC the work of examining the evidence, and
confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts
containing the testimony of witnesses.
• The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the CA is subject to certain
exceptions. However, none of which is present in the case at bar.
• Both the Trial Court and the IAC reached the same conclusions on the 3 factual matters, after
assessment of the evidence and determination of the probative value thereof and these determinations
will not be disturbed.
o The facts on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita
Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money
she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did
believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question.
• An order of a CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is NOT
appealable. The failure of the party who opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his
participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of his objection to the
petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the judgment on the
merits of the main case.
• Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter
in order to preserve his right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this
purpose that he has made of record "the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the
action of the court and his grounds therefor."
• The prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer
in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. Once a petition for relief is granted and the
judgment subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment
on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the petitioner's basic pleadings, although different
from that stated in his petition for relief.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

LAWS: R.A No. 8371: The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities to their Ancestral Lands.

• Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008 (Justice Carpio's
Concurring Opinion)

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue: 3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would
be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

HELD: 3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

C. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Article XIII, Sections 1-19

CASE LIST
• Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989)

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only
to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

• Federation of Free Farmers v. CA, 107 SCRA 352 (1981)

• Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are
less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific
amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this
violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation.
This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds
and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of
money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress
is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even
without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything
is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e.,
shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

• Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to
stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for
90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for
certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR
continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such
as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all
forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and
decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with
the trial.

• Cuba v. Cuenco, 502 vs. 324, (2006)

D. OTHER ASPIRATIONS
All provisions of Articles XIV, XV & XVI

CASE LIST
• Ateneo de Manila University v. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries
at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to
the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of
unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of
the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on
all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This
was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo
Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65
considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by
passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is
whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such
as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

• Licup v. University of San Carlos, 178 SCRA 637 (1989)

In April, 1988 the University of San Carlos (USC) announced an increase in tuition and other school fees
by nine percent (9%) effective the first semester of the school year 1988-1989. According to the USC, the
increase was necessary to enable the school to comply with R.A. No. 6640. Under the said law, schools
were required to give a mandatory salary increase of P11.00 per day to teachers and non-academic
personnel earning below P100.00 daily.

Student leaders Emmanuel S. Licup, Noel F. Tabasa and Joel Marc Cairo were in the forefront of the
students protesting the tuition fee hike. They made a research in the Finance Department of the USC and
allegedly found out that the USC could increase the salaries of teachers without necessarily increasing
the tuition fees. The Supreme Student Government of the University led by said three made
representations with the USC officials to reconsider their stand but they refused to roll back the tuition
fees. Thus they led a mass protest of students. Demonstrations were held. The protesters blockaded the
entrance and exit gates for students in the university. Posters and wall statements expressing student
demands were displayed.

By reason thereof, Fr. Gregorio Favia, SVD, vice president for academic affairs, issued a memorandum to
all Deans and Chairmen of the different colleges of the USC instructing them not to allow the student
leaders to campaign against the tuition fee increase inside the classrooms. On the other hand, President
Fr. Roderick Salazar, Jr., SVD of the USC initiated the appropriate administrative actions against several
students including Licup, Tabasa and Cairo for alleged violation of the rules and regulations of the
university and the Bureau of Public Schools.

A Formal Inquiry Committee was created by Pres. Salazar composed of former Associate Justice Mariano
Zosa of the Court of Appeals, Dean Expedito Bugarin of the College of Law, Dr. Aurelio Tiro, former
DECS regional director, and Engineer Roger Bajarias of the College of Engineering - all members of the
faculty of the University.

The respondents-students questioned the impartiality of the said Committee and its authority to charge
them for violation of the university handbook which was allegedly issued without consultation with the
student government. Nevertheless, they submitted themselves to the investigation after which, on
November 15, 1988, the Committee submitted a report to the Disciplinary Board, through its chairman, Fr.
Eduardo R. Rocha, SVD, finding Licup, Tabasa and Cairo guilty of the offense as charged in the
administrative complaint.[1]

On November 16, 1988, Fr. Rocha wrote said three that the Board unanimously voted to impose on them
the penalty of non-readmission in the USC effective the second semester of the academic year 1988-89
and that such decision is final.[2]

On November 21, 1988, they filed an appeal and/or petition for review with the Office of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region VII, Cebu City, pursuant to Bureau of Private Schools
Memorandum No. 4, Series of 1970.[3] On the same day, the Regional Director wrote them that said
office (DECS) had no authority over the case and suggested instead that they file a request for
reconsideration with the USC President.[4]
In the meanwhile said students were prevented from entering any of the campuses of the University by
armed security guards due to the said decision.

Believing that the filing of a Motion for reconsideration with the USC President would serve no useful
purpose as he had already pre-judged the case, Licup, Tabasa and Cairo filed this petition for certiorari
with injunction alleging that irreparable injury have been inflicted on them as students; that what they held
was a peaceful demonstration; that while standing at the Talamban campus petitioners and some student
leaders were dragged by janitors and security guards causing injuries to petitioners; that their posters
were removed; that they were not suffering from academic deficiencies; that the investigation conducted
for alleged violation of the disciplinary regulations was done without fairness or fair play and thereby
violated the ideals of due process; that the penalty that was imposed on them was harsh and brutal and
not commensurate with the offense allegedly committed; that the USC had violated their property rights
without due process of law. They also disputed the statement of Fr. Rocha that the decision was
unanimous when the coordinator of the student disciplinary committee Mr. Orlando Tabasa and the
student representative coming from the Supreme Student Government were not allowed to participate in
the deliberation as members of the Disciplinary Board; that petitioners exhausted all administrative
remedies and attempted to register and enroll with the USC for the second semester but they were barred
on the ground that their expulsion was final; and that the penalty of non-readmission is tantamount to
expulsion because at said point and time, no other school or university would enroll the petitioners. While
the petitioners admit that they were barricading and blockading the school premises during their protest
action they state that there was no actual violence that occurred. Finally, petitioners invoke their right to
continue their course and to due process.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents admitted having increased the tuition fees by 9% but
asserted that the text and guidelines on the tuition fee increases allowed schools to increase the same up
to 15% without consultation with students and parents. Such increase was necessary, otherwise the USC
could not have increased the salaries of its employees. Respondents aver that the student
demonstrations were far from peaceful but was an illegal strike where the students utilized barricades and
blockades to prevent a great majority of the non-striking students from attending their classes; that
physical force, threat, intimidation, and destruction were employed to disrupt the classes and prevent the
non-striking students from entering the campuses; that far from denying the rights of the students to
freedom of speech and assembly, they were allowed the use of the stadium and audio visual rooms for
their meetings but they preferred to mass at the entrances and exits of the USC to prevent non-striking
students from attending their classes; that speeches were not allowed in classrooms as it would disturb
ongoing classes and would be violative of the academic freedom likewise enjoyed by other students; that
the placing of posters indiscriminately on university walls was prohibited as the same should have the
stamp of approval of the Student Affairs Office; they deny that the University security guards employed
physical force on student demonstrators; and they allege that some students may have been injured
when they threw themselves on the ground to prevent the school bus from entering the University
campus. Respondents also aver that the administrative charges against the students were initiated to
determine the truth and to afford the petitioners the opportunity to give their side; that a full-dress trial was
conducted where petitioners were represented by counsel; that the members of the Formal Inquiry
Committee were chosen for their unquestionable competence and impartiality; that the University
handbook was given to the students upon enrollment and they were made to understand that they are
subject to the rules and regulations therein provided; and that, finally, the investigation was conducted in
a fair and impartial manner.

As to the Disciplinary Board they pointed out that there is a student representative in the person of the
President of the Graduate School Organization; that the Supreme Student Government refused to send
their representative to the Board as they allegedly did not want to participate "in a farce"; and that Mr.
Orlando Tabasa, Coordinator of the Student Discipline, was not invited to sit in the Board as petitioner
Tabasa who was one of the respondents is his son.

Respondents aver that the penalty of non-readmission in the second semester of the school year 1988-89
was justified and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University handbook; that they were
most lenient in determining the penalty that should be imposed under the circumstances; that the act of
petitioners of barricading and blocking the university entrances and exits should have merited the outright
expulsion of petitioners but the Board decided on a less severe penalty. Respondents deny that the
substantial and constitutional rights of the petitioners have been violated. Besides, respondents point out
that petitioners Cairo and Licup had academic deficiencies for the school year 1988-89 as follows:

"CAIRO, JOEL MARC B.

1ST SEM 1988-89

FINAL GRADE
ELECTRONICS SERVICING 11
LABORATORY

1C
MACHINE FOUNDATION
1C
REWINDING & REPAIR WIRE &
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
SYSTEM

5.0
INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
1C
THERMO DYNAMICS II
DR
HYDRAULIC MACHINERIES
1E
ELECTRONICS SERVICING II
1C
EE LABORATORY ii
1C
REWINDING & REPAIR LABORATORY
CIRCUITS LABORATORY
INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS LABORATORY

DR

LICUP, EMMANUEL S.
1ST SEMESTER 1988-89

FINAL GRADE
PHILIPPINE LITERATURE
DR
COMPUTER SCIENCE
DR
RIZAL COURSE
DR
HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY
1E
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
DR"[5]
They state that said academic deficiencies are sufficient in themselves to justify the non-readmission of
petitioners.
After careful evaluation of the petition, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any merit. There can be
no question that petitioners were among the leaders of the student demonstrations arising from the
increase of tuition fee of the USC aforestated. In the course thereof, they blockaded and barricaded the
entrances and exits of the University and prevented the students from attending their classes. The
demonstrations were far from peaceful. It was, therefore, within the right of the USC to initiate the
appropriate administrative investigation of the petitioners for violation of the rules and regulations of USC.

The investigation was conducted by a committee wherein petitioners were present and duly represented
by counsel and wherein they were able to adduce their evidence. After the investigation, the committee
submitted to the Disciplinary Board its report recommending the non-readmission of the petitioners in the
University. This recommendation was unanimously indorsed by the Disciplinary Board and was
implemented by the University authorities.

The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they were deprive due process of
law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appears in
the record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately established in an appropriate
investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. The sanction that was
imposed on the petitioners for their infraction appear to be the most lenient under the University
handbook. Instead of expulsion the penalty imposed was non-readmission.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the
court should not review the discretion of university authorities.[6]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

• Miriam College Foundation v. CA, 348 SCRA 265 ( 2000)

acts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected
to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the
Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit
contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead
of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the
jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of
said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always
absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus
Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is
an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to
hear and decide the cases filed against respondent student

• University of San Carlos v. CA, 166 SCRA 570 (1988)

Facts:
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was 7 years old, his father
Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization, Joevani
Tabasa acquired the citizenship of his father. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in August 1995 and was
admitted as “balikbayan” for one year. Petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of
BID on May 23, 1996 in Aklan and was brought to BID Detention Center, Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Donato and on the same day, petitioner was
accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner’s
passport was revoked by the US Department of State. Hence, respondent (petitioner Tabasa) is now an
undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence
Instructions No. 53.
Petitioner’s passport was revoked due to federal charges filed against him. Federal charges are as
follows:
In possession of a firearm and one count of sexual battery (all in violation of the California Penal Code)
Upon revocation of petitioner’s passport, he loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for habeas corpus. That he was not afforded due process; that no
warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of
deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy;
that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant
because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative
naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in
1968. At the time Tabasa filed the petition, he was 35 years old.
Tabasa then filed a supplementary petition alleging that he has acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and because he is now a Filipino citizen, he can no longer be
deported.
CA denied the petition on the grounds that he had only acquired citizenship to escape from the federal
charges filed against him by the US and that he has not successfully acquired citizenship because he
does not fall under any of the requirements under RA 8171.

Issue:
WON petitioner has the privilege reacquire Filipino citizenship through RA 8171.

Ruling:
Petition is not meritorious.
RA 8171 provides repatriation to two classes of persons:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner does not fall under RA 8171 because what is referred in the second class of persons privileged
with repatriation refers to his father.
Even if the Court would concede that petitioner can avail the benefit of RA 8171, he failed to follow
procedure for reacquisition.
Procedure for reacquisition through repatriation is as follows:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as
constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,]
they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation
shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity . — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
Petitioner only took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines then executed an affidavit of
repatriation which he registered together with his birth certificate with the office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila. The said office issued him a certificate of such registration.

• Office of the President v. Buenaobra, 501 SCRA 302 (2006)

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against Nita Buenaobra,
chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in
connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan
ordered a reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel
administrative investigation against respondent charging her with the same acts and ommissions subject
of the Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted PAGC’s recommendation and dismissed
respondent from office.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service postion
could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President.

HELD:
NO. Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just cause
and observance of due process.