notes:

In the case of BPI

Investment Corporation
the "date of the second
release of the loan"
(September 13, 1982)
was considered as the
date of perfection of the
contract of loan. Why
was not the date of the
first release of a sub-
stantial amount of the
loan (August 13, 1982)
considered the date of
perfection of the contract
of loan?
The case of Panteleon
discusses one of the
most common credit
transactions - the credit
card contract. If, as
stated in Pantaleon, the
contractual relationship
that arises between a
credit card issuer and a
credit card holder in a
card membership
agreement is an
agreement providing for
a credit facility to the
cardholder, is this a
contract to loan? Does it
create a creditor-debtor
relationship? Why does
the creditor-debtor
relationship only arise
after the credit card
issuer has approved the
cardholder's purchase
request? Are the rights
and obligations of the
parties under a contract
to loan different from the
rights and obligation of
the same parties under a
contract of loan?

If, as Producers Bank of

the Philippines
concludes, the object of
the commodatum was
money, then was it the
intention of the parties
for the bailee to return
the very same currency
notes delivered? If the
bailor in commoda- turn
retained ownership of the
money delivered, then
what was the relationship
between Sterela and
Producers Bank? Is the
use of money for
purposes of incorporation
even if only for
"accommodation," the
same as "exhibi- tion"?
How is the case
reconciled with Article
1980 which provides that
fixed, savings, and
current deposits of mon-
ey in banks are governed
by the provisions on
mutuum?

In the case of Pajuyo, the

obligation to "maintain
the cleanliness and
orderliness" of the
property loaned was
equated with
compensation. Thus, the
contract was not
considered a
commodatum, which
after all is essentially
gratuitous. But expenses
for "cleanliness and
orderliness" are
undoubtedly ordinary
expenses for use, which a
bai- lee is liable for. How
is this case reconciled
with Article
1941?
Art. 1949. The bailor
shall refund the
extraordinary
expenses during the
contract for the
preservation of the
thing loaned, provided
the bailee brings the
same to the knowledge
of the bailor before
incurring them,except
when they are so urgent
that the reply to the
notification cannot be
awaited without danger.
Act No. 21374, Sec. 58...
"Fungible goods" means
goods of which any unit
is, from its nature by
mercantile custom,
treated as the equivalent
of any other unit.
If the primary purpose of
the contract is the
transfer of ownership of a
non-fungible property
and payment is made by
giving some thing of the
same kind, quantity, and
quality, it is a contract of
barter.5

Art. 1955. The

obligation of a person
who borrows money
shall be governed by
the provisions of
Articles 1249 and
1250 of this Code.
If what was loaned is a
fungible thing other than
money, the debtor owes
another thing of the
same kind, quantity and
quality, even if it should
change in value.
In case it is impossible to
deliver the same kind, its
value at the time of the
perfection of the loan
shall be paid.

Art. 1249. The payment

of debts in money shall
be made in the currency
stipulated,and if it is not
possible to deliver such
currency, then in the
currency which is legal
tender in the Philippines.
The delivery of
promissory notes payable
to or- der, or bills of
exchange or other
mercantile doc- uments
shall produce the effect
of payment only when
they have been cashed,
or when through
the fault of the creditor
they have been impaired.
In the meantime, the
action derived from the
original obligation shall
be held in the abeyance.
Art. 1250. In case an
extraordinary inflation or
deflation of the currency
stipulated should
supervene7, the value of
the currency at the time
of the establishment of
the obligation shall be
the basis of payment,
unless there is an
agreement to the
contrary.
Are all contracts for
parking, contracts of
deposit? Or are there
critical factors in the case
of Triple-V Food
Services that, if not
present in another
situation, would lead to a
different conclusion?
What is clear from the
case of CA Agro-
Industrial Devel- opment
Corporation is that a
contract for the rent of a
safety deposit box is not
a contract of lease. But
why does the Court first
state that it does "not
fully subscribe" to the
view that "the same is a
contract of deposit that is
to be strictly governed
by the provisions in the
Civil Code on deposit,"
characterizing it instead
as a "special kind of
deposit" only to later
conclude that "the
contract involved was
one of deposit'?
Considering that the
contract between De la
Pena and the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank was a
simple loan, and
assuming that the
contract between De la
Pena and the Bishop of
Jaro was a contract of
deposit, how should the
case of The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Ja- ro
be decided?
If a hotel guest gives the
ignition key of his vehicle
to the parking attendant
of a hotel, who in turn
issues a valet parking
claim stub to the guest,
parks the vehicle in the
annex of the hotel and
places the ignition key in
a safety deposit box, is
this a voluntary deposit
or a necessary de- posit?
5 Will the
characterization result in
a difference as to the
liability of the hotel-
keeper?
Despite the procedure
provided in Article 2062
of the Civ- il Code, the
case of Tupaz is basis for
saying that a credi- tor
may secure judgment
against a guarantor even
before excussion has
been resorted to. The
Supreme Court in this
case stated that the
remedy of the guarantor
is to demand deferment
of the execution of the
judgment against it until
after the assets of the
principal debtor have
been ex- hausted. How is
this reconciled with the
clear mandate of Article
2062?

The ruling in Escano is

legal basis for saying that
not all the provisions of
Section 4, Chapter 3,
Title I, Book IV of the
Civil Code apply to
suretyships. The
Supreme Court adopted
the observation that a
suretyship is not "With-
drawn from the
applicable provisions
governing guaran- ty."
The Supreme Court has
applied the provisions of
Ar- ticle 1216 to
suretyships but has also
said that Article 1217
does not. What then are
the other provisions on
joint and solidary
obligations that do not
apply to suretyships?
Why do these not apply?
The Supreme Court has
also
applied the provisions of
Articles 2053, 2066,
2067 and
2079 on guaranty to
contracts of surety. But
the Supreme
Court has stated that
Article 2080 does not.
What other "applicable
provisions governing
guaranty" apply to su-
retyships?
Whichdonotapplyandwhy
?

Although a real estate

mortgage that is not
registered binds the
parties to the mortgage,
an unregistered (or un-
recorded) real estate
mortgage only gives the
mortgagee the right to
demand the execution
and recording of the real
estate mortgage. To bind
third parties, a real
estate mortgage must be
recorded in the Registry
of Property. How then
does this affect the rights
of the parties in an
equitable mortgage?
The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that a
contrac- tual stipulation
similar in wording to
paragraph (k) of the real
estate mortgage in
Grand Farms creates
the addi- tional obligation
that personal notice must
be sent to the mortgagor,
although literally, the
stipulation is merely
informational.
Suico cites Rule 68 as
basis for the right of the
mortgagor to the surplus
(as did the Sult and
Gorospe cases cited in
the annotations). But
Rule 68 refers specifically
to the judicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgages.
In Monzon v.
Relova, et al.67, the
Court, stating that "any
judge, worthy of the robe
he dons, or any lawyer,
for that matter, worth his
salt, ought to know that
different laws apply to
differ- ent kinds of sales
under our jurisdiction,"
concluded that unlike
Rule 68, which governs
judicial foreclosure sales,
Act No. 3135 does not
grant to junior
encumbrancers the right
to receive the surplus of
the purchase price, and
that the only right given
to second mortgagees is
the right to redeem the
foreclosed property. How
are these cases re-
conciled?