A CRITIQUE OF NABAM REBIA AND BAMANG FELIX VS.

DEPUTY
SPEAKER,
ARUNANCHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

A Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the course

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-II, 6th SEMESTER during the Academic Year
2018-2019

SUBMITTED BY:
Saad Ahmad
Roll No. - 1641
B.B.A LL.B

SUBMITTED TO:
Prof. Dr. Anirudh Prasad
FACULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-II

MARCH, 2019

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAYAYA NAGAR,

MEETHAPUR, PATNA-800001
 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that the work reported in the B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) Project Report entitled “A
CRITIQUE OF NABAM REBIA & BAMANG FELIX V DEPUTY SPEAKER,
ARUNANCHAL PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY” submitted at Chanakya
National Law University; Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out under the
supervision of Prof. Dr. Anirudh Prasad. I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any
other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents of my Project Report.

(Signature of the Candidate)

SAAD AHMAD
Chanakya National Law University, Patna

i
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAST GO ALONE

IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAR GO TOGETHER”
A project is a joint endeavour which is to be accomplished with utmost compassion, diligence
and with support of all. Gratitude is a noble response of one’s soul to kindness or help
generously rendered by another and its acknowledgement is the duty and joyance. I am
overwhelmed in all humbleness and gratefulness to acknowledge from the bottom of my
heart to all those who have helped me to put these ideas, well above the level of simplicity
and into something concrete effectively and moreover on time.
This project would not have been completed without combined effort of my revered
Constitutional Law-II teacher Prof. Dr. Anirudh Prasad whose support and guidance was the
driving force to successfully complete this project. I express my heartfelt gratitude to him.
Thanks are also due to my parents, family, siblings, my dear friends and all those who helped
me in this project in any way. Last but not the least; I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to our Constitutional Law-II teacher for providing us with such a golden
opportunity to showcase our talents. Also this project was instrumental in making me know
more about the Pardoning power of the governor. This project played an important role in
making me understand more about the collegium system. It was truly an endeavour which
enabled me to embark on a journey which redefined my intelligentsia, induced my mind to
discover the intricacies involved in the competency of the people in the Pardoning power of
the governor.
Moreover, thanks to all those who helped me in any way be it words, presence,
Encouragement or blessings...

- Saad Ahmad
- 6th Semester
- B.BA LL.B

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration…………………………………………………………………………………….i

Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………………….ii

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………....……………….iii

Aims and Objectives……………………………………………………………………….…iv

Hypothsis..................................................................................................................................iv

Research Methodology......................................................................................................…...iv

1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….1-2

2. Facts and Contentions of the Case..................……………………………………....2-4

3. Analysis of the Judgement..........................................................................................5-9

4. Criticism of the judgement...........................................................................................10

5. Conclusion..............................................................................................................11-12

Bibliography……………………………...………………………......…..……........………13

iii
 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The Aims and Objectives of this project is to through light on imposition of president rule in
states by misusing of power under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. Further researcher
tries to explain article 163 as well as 174 of Indian constitution.

HYPOTHESIS

The researcher considers the following hypothesis:

 The Governor of a particular state can in no way exercise his powers in arbitrary,
whimsical and in caprice manner.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For this study, doctrinal research method was utilised. Various articles, e-articles, reports and
books from library were used extensively in framing all the data and figures in appropriate
form, essential for this study.
The method used in writing this research is primarily analytical.

iv
 INTRODUCTION

In this case of Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix Vs. Deputy speaker, Arunanchal Pradesh
Legislative Assembly1, five-judge constitution bench comprising justices J.S. Khehar, Dipak
Misra, Madan B. Lokur, P.C. Ghose and N.V. Ramana ruled that all the actions of the
Governor was violative of article 163 of the Constitution.
Citing the S R Bommai Vs Union of India2 case ruling on the scope of judicial review of a
decision taken by the President or the Governor, the bench said it had “all the powers to put
the clock back”.
The judgment effectively meant that government formed by rebel congress leader Kalikho
Pul with the help of BJP MLAs has been shown the door. Just before the Apex court had
reserved its verdict on February 20, Pul was sworn in as the Ninth Chief Minister of
Arunachal Pradesh with the support of 18 dissident Congress MLAs and two independents
and 11 BJP MLAs who gave outside support.
Congress party, which had 47 MLAs seats in the 60-member assembly, suffered a jolt when
21 of its lawmakers rebelled in January 2016. Eleven BJP MLAs backed the rebels in the bid
to upstage the government. Later, 14 rebel Congress MLAs were disqualified.
Passing orders after examination of constitutional schemes on the scope of discretionary
powers of the Governor, the bench ruled that the Governor does not have power to call
assembly session without the aid and advice of chief minister and his council of ministers.
The five-judge constitution bench was passing orders after examination of constitutional
schemes on the scope of discretionary powers of the Governor. The bench was essentially
looking into constitutionality of State Governor J.P. Rajkhowa's move to advance the
Arunachal Assembly session, which eventually triggered a political crisis leading to the
ouster of the Congress-led Nabam Tuki government and proclamation of President’s rule in
the State on January 26, 2016.
The Supreme Court was delivering its verdict on an appeal against the January 14, 2016
Gauhati High Court order that upheld the discretionary powers of Rajkhowa to summon or
advance a sitting of the Arunachal Pradesh assembly. Former state assembly speaker Nabam
Rebia had moved the apex court after the Itanagar bench of the high court decided to uphold
the actions of Rajkhowa.The Governor, on 9 December, advanced the date of the assembly
session by a month to 16 December during which Rebia was impeached through a resolution
1
(2016) 8 SCC 1
2
1994 SCC(3)1

1|Page
passed by 33 legislators, including 20 rebel Congress members. Earlier on December 17, On
December 17, a Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Hrishikesh Roy had stayed all the
decisions of the Governor, observing that prima facie it was in violation of Art 174 and 175
of the Constitution dealing with convening of the session by the Governor and his message to
the House.

FACTS AND CONTENTIONS

In November 2016, a constitutional crisis arose in Arunachal Pradesh when 20 Congress

MLAs rebelled against Chief Minister Nabam Tuki. In November, 33 members of the
Assembly – including 20 rebel Congress, 11 BJP and 2 Independent MLAs – met the
Governor to communicate their displeasure with the Speaker and the Government. The
Governor, independently without the advice of the Chief Minister, advanced the Assembly
session from 14th January 2016 to 15th December 2015 and listed the removal of the Speaker
on the legislative agenda. The Speaker, Nabam Rebia, preemptively disqualified the rebel
MLAs on the grounds of defection before the Assembly could meet.3

Briefly, the facts: on 03.11.15, the Governor, on the advice of the Council of Ministers,
issued an order summoning the 6th session of the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh
on 14.01.16. In the interim, however, factional politics raised its ugly head. A notice of
resolution for removal of the Speaker of the house was moved on 19.11.15, with a copy to the
Governor (coming on the heels of several Congress party meetings regarding dissident
factions in the party). These meetings culminated in a petition for disqualification (on
07.12.15), under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, of 14 defecting MLAs of the
Congress (including the Deputy Speaker).
Subsequent to this, the Governor took two actions that formed the basis of the challenge
before the Court. These were4:

1. An Order dated 09.12.15 issued under Article 174(1) of the Constitution, “pre-poning”
the Assembly session from 14.01.16 to 16.12.15, and citing the Governor’s constitutional
obligation to ensure that the resolution of removal of speaker be considered expeditiously.
2. A message dated 09.12.15 issued to the Legislative Assembly under Article
175(2) directing that the resolution for removal of speaker be taken up as the first item on
the agenda with the Deputy Speaker presiding over the session. Interestingly, the
Governor also ordered that “until the session is prorogued, no Presiding Officer shall alter
the party composition in the House.”

3
https://www.livelaw.in/arunachal-judgment-critique/
4
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2016/07/23/the-governor-the-assembly-and-the-court-the-supreme-
courts-arunachal-decision-guest-post/

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In response, the State Cabinet issued a resolution on 14.12.15, echoing the opinion of the
Advocate-General that the unilateral actions of the Governor were unconstitutional. On the
expiry of the notice period under Schedule X, the Speaker went ahead with disqualification
proceedings and passed an ex-parte disqualification order on 15.12.15 against the MLAs
including the Deputy Speaker, thus altering the party composition in the House. On the same
day, the Deputy Speaker set aside this order of disqualification citing, inter alia, the
impropriety of the Speaker’s action in taking up disqualification proceedings while the
resolution for his removal was slated for the next day. The other faction of the assembly went
ahead with the pre-poned session ordered by the Governor on 16.12.15. These proceedings
resulted in the removal of the speaker, a no-confidence motion against Nabam Tuki’s
Government and a confidence vote in favour of a government led by Kahiko Pul. Though the
Petitioners, (the Speaker and some members of the Congress) challenged all the
aforementioned orders and proceedings (except the order of the Speaker), they focussed their
submission on knocking off the first domino i.e. the unilateral intervention of the Governor in
matters of the House.

Contentions
In assailing the actions of the Governor, the Petitioners relied on the general scheme of
responsible government envisaged in the Constitution that dictates governance be carried out
by those who are responsible to the people, i.e. the Council of Ministers collectively
responsible to the Legislature. The Governor is a nominated official who performs functions
only on the aid and advice of the council of ministers. The Constitution has carefully
delineated certain functions and powers which she can exercise in her discretion, but this
power cannot be conflated with a general discretionary power to summon the Assembly
under Article 174, and to direct the manner of proceedings in the house through messages
under Article 175.
The respondents, on the other hand, relied on the broad ambit of Articles 163(1) and (2),
which state that:
(1) There shall be a council of Ministers with the chief Minister at the head to aid and advise
the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this
constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.
(2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the
Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the
Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor
shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his
discretion.
The Respondents argued that the Governor, unlike the President, is vested with discretionary
powers under the constitution to avert perils to democracy of the kind that had arisen in this
case. They also took strength from past instances where the Governor’s power to
3|Page
independently summon and dissolve the Assembly under Article 174 was considered valid.
The mainstay of the Respondents’ argument was Article 163(2), which specifically vests the
final determination of whether a matter falls within the discretion of the Governor with the
Governor herself, and therefore bars judicial review of this aspect. The Court, therefore, was
not entitled to look into the legality of the two impugned orders at all.

4|Page
 ANALYSYS OF THE JUDGEMENT

The judgment of the Supreme Court in Nabam Rabia Vs Deputy Speaker5 seeks to give new
color and content to the provisions of Article 179(c)6 of the Constitution. The researcher
argues that novel interpretation given by the Apex Court to Article 179(c) has, in effect,
virtually rendered the provisions of Tenth Schedule nugatory.
The case was decided by constitutional bench of the Supreme Court comprising of
The Arunachal judgment can be broadly divided in two parts. The first part deals with the
powers of the Governor. In this regard, the judgment rightly reiterates the settled law on the
nominal role of the Governor. The Court holds the powers of the Governor under Articles
174 and 175 could be exercised only on the aid and advice of the Council of ministers; and,
the Governor has no discretionary powers to advance the Assembly or to dictate the agenda
of the House. The Court’s elucidation of the powers of the Governor vis a vis the elected
government of the day follows the settled law of the nominal role of the Governor envisaged
by the Constitution and interpreted by the Supreme Court since Samsher Singh v State of
Punjab7.

However, the Court, whilst dealing the power of the Speaker to adjudicate under the Tenth
Schedule, held that it is “constitutionally impermissible” for a Speaker to proceed with
disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule during the pendency of a motion for
removal of the Speaker.
The procedure for removal of the Speaker is under Article 179(c). A no confidence motion
against a Speaker is preceded by a notice of 14 days under proviso to Article 179(c). The
Speaker can thereafter be removed by a no confidence resolution passed against him by a
majority of ‘all the then members of the Assembly’.

5
(2016) 8 SCC 1
6
179. Vacation and resignation of, and removal from, the offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker.-
A member holding office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of an Assembly-
(a) shall vacate his office if he ceases to be a member of the Assembly;
(b) may at any time by writing under his hand addressed, if such member is the Speaker, to the Deputy
Speaker, and if such member is the Deputy Speaker, to the Speaker, resign his office; and
(c) may be removed from his office by a resolution of the Assembly passed by a majority of all the then
members of the Assembly:
Provided that no resolution for the purpose of clause (c) shall be moved unless at least fourteen days'
notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution:
Provided further that, whenever the Assembly is dissolved, the Speaker shall not vacate his office until
immediately before the first meeting of the Assembly after the dissolution.
7
AIR 1974 SC 2192

5|Page
The Arunachal judgement interprets this term ‘all the then members of the Assembly’ to
mean the composition of the House at the date/time of giving of notice of 14 days for
removal of the Speaker and consequently it was held that no change in the composition of the
House is permissible once such a notice is given till the passing of the resolution under
Article 179(c).8
The practical consequences of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Court are enormous.
Neither in Lok Sabha nor in any of the Legislative Assemblies of India, there is a requirement
of a prescribed minimum number of legislators to give a notice under the proviso to Article
179(c). A notice for removal of Speaker can be given even by one legislator. A notice even
by one legislator, as per the Arunachal judgement has the effect of incapacitating the Speaker
to decide on any disqualification petition till the motion for his removal meets its eventual
fate.
The Tenth Schedule was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty Second
Amendment) Act, 1985 in the wake of ‘aya ram gaya ram’ politics plaguing the country then.
The rampant crossover of politicians after being elected form one political platform to
another was a serious concern eroding the core of democratic morality. The Tenth Schedule,
therefore, prescribed the penalty of disqualification for legislators who commit the
‘constitutional sin’ of defection as defined under para 2 of the Tenth Schedule. The power to
adjudge disqualification was vested in the Speaker of the House.
In 1992, in Kihoto Hollohan v Zachiullu9, the Supreme Court (a Constitution Bench of 5
judges) upheld the validity of the Tenth Schedule. The Kihoto judgment described
unprincipled defection is as a political and social evil. Repelling the argument that the
Speaker could not provide for an independent adjudicatory mechanism on the ground of
likelihood of political bias, the Court observed that the Speaker holds a pivotal position in the
Scheme of Parliamentary democracy and vestiture of adjudicatory power under the Tenth
Schedule in the Speaker cannot be considered ‘exceptionable’. It was held that it is
“inappropriate to express distrust in the high office of the Speaker”. The Court expressed the
hope that “the robes of the Speaker do change and elevate the man inside”10.
Post Kihoto11, the country witnessed several reported cases of this Constitutional trust
reposed in the high office of the Speaker was alleged to be breached by the ‘man inside’.

8
(2016) 8 SCC 1 para 174-176 of majority(Justice J.S. Khehar, Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghosh and Justice N.V.
Ramana) judgement, para 21 of Justice Dipak Mishra’s judgement
9
1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651
10
Para8 IBID
11
SUPRA 5

6|Page
Almost two and half decades after Kihoto12, the Arunachal judgment junked the ‘robes’
principle and has attempted to place legal fetters on the ‘man inside’. The Court has
incapacitated the Speaker from deciding any disqualification petition under the Tenth
Schedule if a no confidence motion is pending against him. The Court has read a
constitutional ‘prohibition’ into the power of the Speaker to adjudicate under the Tenth
Schedule pending a no confidence motion.
The Court has sought to base its opinion on a principle that a person whose authority is under
a ‘cloud’ ought not to decide the fate of others till the ‘cloud’ is removed. The principle is
indeed salutary; but, whilst putting fetters on the Speaker, the Court has, in effect, provided a
safety valve to potential defectors to escape the consequences of the Tenth Schedule.
A single legislator facing disqualification proceedings can thus incapacitate a Speaker under
the Tenth Schedule by giving a notice simpliciter for his removal. Although, the Lok Sabha
Rules provide for a specific charge to be stated in the notice (See Rule 173), this stipulation is
absent in the Rules made by most Legislatures of States.
By giving such a notice, the Speaker is incapacitated to take any penal action. The legislator
can thereafter indulge in to large scale cross over/voluntarily giving up membership or defy
the whip. He/she can even initiate a no confidence motion against the Government and seek
to defeat the Government on the floor of the House by voting against his/her own party
against the express provision of the Tenth Schedule without inviting the wrath of the Tenth
Schedule.
Thus, a single legislator by simply giving a notice for removal of the Speaker/Deputy
Speaker can bring to a grinding halt the entire constitutional mechanism of disqualification
under the anti defection law. All that a constitutional sinner has to do is to give a notice for
removal of the Speaker and then let raw unprincipled politics to take over. This could have
severe repercussions especially in smaller States of the Country where majority is often wafer
thin.
The reasoning in Arunachal judgment appears to be lopsided. If the Speaker is under a
‘cloud’ because of a pending no confidence motion against him and cannot act under the
Tenth Schedule, then a legislator/s against whom disqualification proceedings under the
Tenth Schedule is/are pending should also be under a ‘cloud’. What applies to the goose,
applies to the gander. Why then should the legislator/s who is/are under a ‘cloud’ of
disqualification be permitted to vote in a no confidence motion against the Speaker or for that
matter against the incumbent Government.

12
SUPRA 7

7|Page
Take an example where the legislators who are under the ‘cloud’ of disqualification vote on a
no-confidence motion against the Speaker and get him removed. A new Speaker is thereafter
appointed. Assuming the new speaker of the new political dispensation in power decides such
disqualification proceedings against the said legislators, the disqualification has the effect of
relating back to the date of defection itself which can be at an anterior point of time than the
voting on the resolution of removal of the Speaker. This would have enabled a legislator to
have voted out the Speaker and /or the Government through a no confidence motion despite
the fact that the vote itself was invalid when it was cast. In such a situation, it is doubtful if
the Speaker and/or the Chief Minister would have recourse to judicial review where they are
removed on the basis of disqualified votes.
A legislator/s who has been unjustly disqualified by a biased Speaker has the remedy of
judicial review which can restore his membership if it is found that the decision of the
Speaker is actuated by bias or any other illegality. No such remedy may be available to a
Speaker and/or a Chief Minister who is unjustly removed on the basis of a disqualified vote.
The Arunachal judgement has also not provided any alternate adjudicatory mechanism to
decide Tenth Schedule matters when the Speaker is on trial. The freezing of the adjudicatory
mechanism under the Tenth Schedule on a single member’s notice for removal of the Speaker
creates a constitutional vacuum in adjudication of Tenth Schedule matters. Besides, the
doctrine of necessity is a recognized exception to the principle of apparent bias.
A constitutional prohibition, as has been imposed on the Speaker in the Arunachal judgment
has to be explicit in the letter of the Constitution. There is none on the Speaker under the
Tenth Schedule. The Kihoto judgment had in fact considered the bias argument against the
Speaker and rejected it interalia relying upon the English conventions that the ‘confidence in
the impartiality of the Speaker is an indispensible condition’ for the working of a
parliamentary democracy.
The fetters placed on the Speaker in deciding disqualification matters by the Arunachal
judgment can also be faulted on the principle that possibility of abuse is no test to determine
the validity of power.
The Arunachal judgment’s reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates to justify its reasoning
for fettering a Speaker is also not correct. The Court relies on a debate of 02.06.1949 on Draft
Article 179(c). However, the term “the then Members” was not discussed on that date by the
Constituent Assembly as the said term was deliberated in extenso on earlier occasions. The
term “the then members” is used in Articles 67,90,94,183 other than Article 179(c).

8|Page
The meaning of term “the then Members” was discussed by the Constituent Assembly on
29.12.1948 in the context of Article 6713 [Draft Article 56] In the said debate, Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar succinctly explained that the term “the then Members” meant ‘the composition of
the House’ and not Members present and voting at the time of voting. The words “the then
Members” was explained as being relatable to the composition of the entire House at the time
of voting save and except members whose seats have fallen vacant.
A seat falls vacant under Article 19014 if a member is disqualified. Thus, a disqualification
had been envisaged in the Constitution even between the time when a notice under the
proviso to Article 179(c) is given and the actual voting on the resolution for removal of the
Speaker.

13
67. Term of office of Vice President The Vice President shall hold office for a term of five years from the
date on which he enters upon his office: Provided that
(a) a Vice President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;
(b) a Vice President may be removed from his office by a resolution of the council of States passed by a
majority of all the then members of the council and agreed to by the House of the People; but no resolution for
the purpose of this clause shall be moved unless at least fourteen days notice has been given of the intention to
move the resolution
(c) a Vice President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor
enters upon his office.

14
190. Vacation of seats
(1) No person shall be a member of both Houses of the legislature of a State and provision shall be made by the
Legislature of the State by law for the vacation by a person who is chosen a member of both Houses of his seat
in one House or the other
(2) No person shall be a member of the legislatures of two or more States specified in the First Schedule and if a
person is chosen a member of the Legislatures of two or more such States, then, at the expiration of such period
as may be specified in rules made by the President, that persons seat in the Legislatures of all such States shall
become vacant, unless he has previously resigned his seat in the Legislatures of all but one of the States
(3) If a member of a House of the Legislature of a State
(a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause ( 1 ) or clause ( 2 ) of Article 191; or
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and
his resignation is accepted by th Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, his seat shall thereupon becomes
vacant: Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in sub clause (b), if from information received or
otherwise and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, is
satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such resignation
(4) If for a period of sixty days a member of a House of the Legislature of a State is without permission of the
House absent from all meetings thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant: Provided that in computing the
said period of sixty days no account shall be taken of any period during which the House is prorogued or is
adjourned for more than four consecutive days.

9|Page
 CRITICISM TO THE JUDGEMENT

This crucial debate of the Constituent Assembly appears to have escaped the attention of the
Court in the Arunachal case15.
Yet another criticism of the judgment is that the Court has rendered its observations in the
absence of any list on the subject. The issue as to whether a Speaker could decide a
disqualification petition when there was a notice of resolution under the proviso to Article
179 (c) did not in fact arise for consideration of the Court. The opinion of J. Lokur (though
concurring) rightly distances itself with the observations of the majority judgment by
observing that “the view expressed by my learned Brothers relating to the power or propriety
of the Speaker taking a decision under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution with regard to
the fourteen members of the Legislative Assembly does not at all arise in these appeals16”.
The Supreme Court had repeatedly warned that a Constitutional interpretation ought not to be
attempted in a vacuum and in the absence of a list before the Court. The Arunachal judgment
observes this principle in the breach.
Thus, the sententious observations in Arunachal judgment fortuitously opens a door for
defectors (who are faced with disqualification proceedings) to escape the consequences of
disqualification by issuing a notice simpliciter of no confidence to chain the hands of the
Speaker. The decision, while on the one hand rightly upholds the constitutional epithet of
democratic governance through an elected government, however on the other, could well be
relied upon by unscrupulous legislators for unprincipled cross over politics.

15
https://www.livelaw.in/arunachal-judgment-critique/
16
(2016) 8 SCC 1 para 164 of Justice Madan B. Lokur’s judgement

10 | P a g e
 CONCLUSION

The tone and tenor of this verdict was perfectly in sync with the scathing remarks the bench
made against the centre and governor during exhaustive hearing which lasted for over a
month during which it had even pointed out that “Arunachal experiment to topple state
governments may prove deadly” and the court had the power to “put the clock back”.
Slamming the Governor for his decision to advance the assembly session, it had asked “What
would be the change or the difference if the assembly proceedings would have taken place on
pre-scheduled January 14 instead of December 16. There has to be some object to be
achieved by the Governor by wanting to advance the date. Does it mean that whenever he
feels bored, he can call the assembly to feel the excitement?"
On Governor’s argument that his decisions are not open to judicial review, the court had said
it “cannot be a mute spectator when democratic processes are slaughtered. “If democracy is
slaughtered, how can the court remain silent,” Justice Khehar, the most vocal of all judges in
the bench, had asked.
The court had asked if the governor’s decision was backed by sound constitutional principles
or based on a mere whim ? “You can use constitutional discretion only if it is based on and
only on a constitutional principle… What was the constitutional principle here? Does
advancing the Assembly session come under your discretionary powers?”
It had heard arguments on the contours of the power and discretion of the governor under the
constitution for over a month before reserving its judgment on February 22.
The essential discussion of the Constituent Assembly seems to have gotten away from the
consideration of the Court in this case.
One more analysis of the judgment is that the Court has rendered its perceptions without any
rundown regarding the matter. The issue with respect to whether a Speaker could choose a
preclusion request when there was a notice of goals under the stipulation to Article 179 (c)
did not in reality emerge for thought of the Court. The sentiment of J. Lokur (however
agreeing) properly removes itself with the observations of the majority judgment by
observing that "the view communicated by my educated Brothers identifying with the power
or appropriateness of the Speaker taking a choice under the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution as to the fourteen individuals from the Legislative Assembly does not in any
way emerge in these interests ".

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The Supreme Court had over and again cautioned that a Constitutional understanding should
not to be endeavored in a vacuum and without a rundown under the watchful eye of the
Court. The Arunachal judgment watches this guideline in the rupture.

The hypothesis considered by the researcher was, “The Governor of a particular state can in
no way exercise his powers in arbitrary, whimsical and in caprice manner.”
After the conclusion of the research the researcher has duly approved the hypothesis as it has
been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix Vs.
Deputy Speaker, Arunanchal Pradesh Legislative Assembly that the Governor of a particular
State in exercise of his powers could not be whimsical or arbitrary.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Constitution of India, 1950

Statutes
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860
Books
1. Austin, Granville, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of A Nation, Oxfprd
Publication (1999)
2. Bakshi, PM, Constitution of India, Universal Law Publishing - an imprint of
LexisNexis; Fifteenth - Pocket edition (1 January 2018)
3. Jain, MP, Indian Constitutional Law, LexiNexis; Eighth edition (4 February 2018)
4. Singh, MP, VN Shukla’s Constitutional Law of India
5. Basu, DD, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis; Twenty-Third 2018
edition (25 September 2018)
Websites
1. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/192490620/
2. https://www.livelaw.in/breaking-supreme-court-restores-congress-government-
arunachal-pradesh/
3. https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2016/07/23/the-governor-the-assembly-and-the-
court-the-supreme-courts-arunachal-decision-guest-post/
4. https://www.livelaw.in/arunachal-judgment-critique/
5. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1107337?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
6. http://www.advocatekhoj.com/blogs/index.php?bid=818515a96137da34755614124&
bcmd=VIEW
7. https://www.insightsonindia.com/2016/08/13/insights-issues-political-developments-
arunachal-pradesh-constitutional-implications/

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