G.R. No.
122646 March 14, 1997
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratix of the
Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO B.
MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC,
Rosario, Batangas, SPS. HERMINIO & CLARITA TAYAG @ SPS.
GEORGE T. TIGLAO & CLARIZZA T. TIGLAO and/or @ TEOFILO
M. ESGUERRA, LEONOR M. ESGUERRA. LETICIA M.
ESGUERRA, JOEL M. ESGUERRA, RICARDO M. ESGUERRA,
VOLTAIRE E. TAYAG, BENITO I. TAYAG, MERLIE MALIG,
ALBERTO T. TAYAG, ROSEMARIE T. TAYAG, LETICIA E. LULU
and the REGISTER OF DEED for the Province of
Batangas, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix
of the intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint
for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and
damages with petition for preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil
Case No. R94-009.1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her
co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto
B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of
the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on
December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by
this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix
of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;2
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 3
their "answer with
motion to dismiss"4 alleging among others that the complaint states
no cause of action and that petitioner's demand had already been
paid.5 On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
pleading entitled "motion to dismiss" invoking, this time, lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and
prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated
in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the
motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation
seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter
which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the
opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioner's
husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the
appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC
of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas
has no jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru
respondent Judge Teh "dismissed without prejudice" the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction "on the ground that the rules governing an
ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different."
Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to discuss the
other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss.6 Upon denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under
Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due
course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an
allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate,
would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended
by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
Page 1 of 35
 where the assessed value of property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat
....
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate . . . (emphasis
ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which
involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the
lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise
falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of
pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an
administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of
estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 737) impliedly
recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for
granting of letters of administration. On the other hand,
probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within
the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net
worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking
such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its
jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse
jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by
Circular 13-958 provides that actions involving title to
property shall be tried in the province where the property is
located, in this case, — Batangas. The mere fact that
petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the
time of his death affects only the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.9
Second, the cases cited 10 by private respondents are not at point
as they involve settlement of estate where the probate court was
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties.In the
present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an
allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does
not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited
the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above
allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in
an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at
least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the
entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally
decide questions of ownership or title to property 11 is not applicable
in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and
the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be
clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure.12 Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not
even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court. 13 Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be
on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an
administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the
whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste,
complaints or petitions filed before them, just so they can comply
with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at
the expense of their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November
14, 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the
disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Page 2 of 35
Footnotes
3 The RTC Resolution dated June 14, 1995 initially stated that
the Answer was filed on January 27, 1995, but in the body of the
Resolution, the said pleading was filed on January 21,
1995; Rollo, p. 54.
7 Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Regional
Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
death, . . . .
8 Sec. 2, Rule 4 Venue in RTC. — (a) Actions affecting title to, . .
., real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies. The Revised Circular
which took effect on August 1, 1995 states: Actions afecting title
to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
10 Private respondents invoked before the lower court the cases
of Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 61 (1917), Ongsingco v. Tan, 97 Phil.
330 (1955), Tagle v. Manalo, 105 Phil. 1124 (unrep. 1959). These
cases, however, involved settlement of an estate and not
appointment of an administrator nor does it involved actions for
reconveyance. The cases of Buermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386
(1908) cited in their comment involves liquidation of business. The
other cases cited are Manalo v. Manalo, 65 Phil. 534 (1938), Recto
v. Dela Rosa. 75 SCRA 226 (1977) and Morales v. CFI of Cavite,
146 SCRA 373 (1986) which pertains to settlement of estates. The
case of Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938) pertains to the power
of an administrator to lease estate properties.
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to
prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of
the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz
Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy
whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-
petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized
as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on
November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land
located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
Page 3 of 35
 On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the
Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married
to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT
No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled
and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M.
Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still
later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan
property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan
City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for
annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the
transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to
inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself
when she made false representations in her Affidavit of
Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court
issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila
P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and
can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18,
2001,[17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without
resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case
for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status
and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case,
citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial
court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the
case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a
Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary
act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was
sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a
status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special
proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary
civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid,
a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the
latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative
heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Page 4 of 35
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction
to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein.
Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3,
in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case
as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v.
Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993])
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378,
March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in
1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however,
to the case in this wise:
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case
was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of
contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan
Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is
not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two
marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only
question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated?
The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus,
merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property.
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose
Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come
two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-
appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore,
been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of
a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in
the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what
the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow
indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the
establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be
determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special
proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this
axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus
affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting
the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint
as it failed to state a cause of action.
Page 5 of 35
 II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling
in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed
to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme
Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one
entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by
petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find
that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be
entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination
of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the
determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of
Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are
likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court
as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the
determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and
that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had established
their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether
petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their
status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her
name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if
not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which
in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents.
The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment
of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for
failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action
and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of
the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the
legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who
are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the
action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that
the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case.
Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this
Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted
a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition
that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January
10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7)
siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia
Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in
Page 6 of 35
1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and
that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the
surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and
issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her
nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against
the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their
complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially
reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly
acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly
heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in
the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only
surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues
raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate
children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam
is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct
the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other
things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the
identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named
therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of
birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary
evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly
insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children
of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower
court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that
Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence
of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the
special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir
Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his
mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal
aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order
declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming
that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground
of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC,
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The
civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered
judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo
had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and
recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . .
in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should
not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein
private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to
discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and
declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an
adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas
(Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings
for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive
mother, following which the probate court directed that the records
of the case be archived.
Page 7 of 35
 Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive
father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion,
preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father
immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project
of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other
things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court,
noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on
Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to
her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil
case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the
order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial
legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was
allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus
posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting
the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the
delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial
court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this
Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and
directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings
had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project
of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir
from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83
Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or
for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
already been closed, and not through an independent action,
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April
24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the
trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil
case to continue because it involves no longer the two
lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the
special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case,
a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.
Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the
right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil
action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about
the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a
property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15,
1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. [37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.
A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare
who are the heirs of a deceased.
Page 8 of 35
 It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of
land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just
to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical;
it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could
and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which
bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased
Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course
and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under
the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court,
Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision
on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[36] SEC. 1 Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all
of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation
in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in
the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the
personal property involved as certified to under oath by the
parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any
just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied).
Page 9 of 35
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION G.R. No. 162956
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land
REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017
Petitioners,
square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]
Present:
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs
CORONA, of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with
*AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an
and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter Promulgated:
DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes
SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject
CATALINA FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. April 10, 2008 parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known
x---------------------------------------------
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and
---x
Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the
DECISION
same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-
35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1)
PUNO, C.J.:
TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera
covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578
45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of
covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4)
Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147,
TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner
entitled Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing
Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581
XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint filed by the
covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-
respondents herein.[1]
98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on

behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah

Page 10 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other
hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera
and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses
Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or
1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived
by two daughters Graciana, who died single and without issue, and
Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent
Deborah Ann who succeeded their parents rights and took
possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During
her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus,
making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject
parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on
to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and
Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00
to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez),
also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses
Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of
land.[4]
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the
subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them
from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16,
1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is
approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July
13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while
302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-
owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the
Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title
in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997
executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto
Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and
fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or
nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. [5]They likewise prayed for the repartition and
resubdivision of the subject property.[6]
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed
the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually
seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
since they can not demand the partition of the real property without
first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an
ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special
proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.[7]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case.[8] The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was
similarly denied.[9]
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the
respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an
Page 11 of 35
ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and
Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of
Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate
and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes
and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new
transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned
documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact.[11]
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest
is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.[12] A real party
in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.[13] Such
interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is
present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. [14] A
plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a legal
right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to
redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act
or omission which had violated the legal right of the former. [15] The
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
purpose of the rule is to protect persons against undue and
unnecessary litigation.[16] It likewise ensures that the court will have
the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the
consideration of a case.[17] Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief
sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name
a property was registered sue to recover the said property through
the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for
reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate
of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court
has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in
an ordinary civil action since the matter is within the exclusive
competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20] In the recent
case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion
to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and
Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs
to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said
special proceedings. Where special proceedings
had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the
right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for
its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be
filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring
Page 12 of 35
 about the annulment of the partition or distribution
or adjudication of a property or properties belonging
to the estate of the deceased.[22]
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as
an action for the Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds,
and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the
allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the
respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they
claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-
fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to
annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the
case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is
applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners
therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title
issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground
that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners
predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to them. In
affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal
heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have
not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except
the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance.[24]
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their
allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject
property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which
would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared
as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial
court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of
action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties
in interest.While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the
complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the
respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of
the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the
new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there
is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be
superfluous to still subject the estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be
achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from
the records of the case that the only property left by the decedent
was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have already
presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the
decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of
this case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto
Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and
Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as
heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other
Page 13 of 35
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had
TINGA, J.:
signed one of the questioned documents.Hence, under the
circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a determination of
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died
the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of
intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto
decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED. pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch
44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
No costs.
The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
SO ORDERED.
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108
SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST plaintiffs therein.[2]
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,* On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed
Acting Chairperson,
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
BRION, JJ.
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated: acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real

DECISION Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased

Page 14 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above- On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases intervene in the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had
as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. [7] Thereafter, the certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued
Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8] proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in
the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court
an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the
the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still
the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
incomplete and inaccurate. intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]

Page 15 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were
denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be
henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by
the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix
Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix
Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the
fair market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. [16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective
solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree
with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under
the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons
fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72
further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors
of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before
us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short,
even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in
accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
Page 16 of 35
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition
should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any
interested persons or any persons interested in the estate to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1)
Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person
interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file
a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters
of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule
76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to
the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any
asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest
therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time
and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators
account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which
requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it
may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule
90, which allows any person interested in the estate to petition for
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on
contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters
of administration and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the
claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death
of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that
the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before
this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to
be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the
intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the
judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may
they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Page 17 of 35

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang
Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A
brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed
an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was
hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan
had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his
complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her
late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-
administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the
civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the
increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case,
the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the
ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court
affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in
intervention in the intestate proceedings it was
only pursuant to their desire to protect their
interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in
fact is the only property of the estate left subject
of administration and distribution; and the court
is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in
the determination and distribution of the
estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-
331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction
over the case but merely makes of record its
existence because of the close interrelation of the two
cases and cannot therefore be branded as having
acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred
in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate
civil action for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of administration
proceedings until after the separate action pertaining
to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the
Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to
recover real or personal property from the estate or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator
cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate
proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate
but claimed by another person should be determined
in a separate action and should be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These
rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold
that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any
time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
Page 18 of 35

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan
conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been
to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein
to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same,
but not for a decision on their action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate
interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful
that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but
also any person interested or persons interested in the estate
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in
the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending
action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably
concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the
estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not
provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right
to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is
no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may
be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court
not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there
is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes
and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as
well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There
is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners.
They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right,
under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate
and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission
that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody
claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would
Page 19 of 35
 fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of
have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how
the Rules of Court x x x[26]
wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable
to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their
right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has
of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein,
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the
preserved.
same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be
allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the
respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special

came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties the

justice shall be public records and shall be available for the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The

inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are

petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place

records in the intestate proceedings. We said: of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
Petitioners' stated main purpose for administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to
accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to
with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1,
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix
the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the
outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in
Page 20 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a
deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to
them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment,
while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the
letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform
either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the
context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of
those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of
the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After
all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the
general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary
to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not
be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification
that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of
Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 21 of 35
 their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith,
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912 petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's

Petitioner, commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in

the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
Present:
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
of negotiating the sale of said realties.
- versus - Chairperson,
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
CHICO-NAZARIO,
grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
NACHURA, and 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
ESTATE OF ALICE O. REYES, JJ. failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3)
SHEKER,
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
VICTORIA S. MEDINA- claim was not filed and served personally.
Administratrix, Promulgated:
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
Respondent. December 13, 2007
without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced
x--------------------------------------------- by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
---x
per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
DECISION
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
raising the following questions:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the
reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate
dated April 9, 2003.
proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
The undisputed facts are as follows. shopping, failing which such claim should be
dismissed?
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice
O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file
Page 22 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
 (b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions.
a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay
the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat? - In the absence of special provisions, the rules

provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to
contain a written explanation on the service and
filing by registered mail?[2]
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non- special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that proceedings, as far as practicable.
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in
ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or
a suppletory manner. perform; capable of being put into practice, done or

The Court gave due course to the petition for review accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special

on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special

Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. [3] proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose
an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does
The petition is imbued with merit.
it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or
merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for
proceedings is not entirely correct.
non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for
money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
provides:
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person as in the present case.

Page 23 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the
RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole
probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin
to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to
the main object of the action and is connected
with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for
the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is
contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate
action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money
claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to
the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because
the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may
order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable
time.[9]After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction
over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-
Page 24 of 35
 latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not
one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate. responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon

receiving notice from the post office that the

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v.
registered mail containing the pleading of or other
De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein,
the Court held thus: paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly

procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse,

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this
not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in
Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the
the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion

to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this
rule is not complied with.
innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely
other modes of service or filing were not resorted
to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
to and no written explanation was made as to why
considering the inefficiency of the postal
personal service was not done in the first
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with
place. The exercise of discretion must,
the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear
necessarily consider the practicability of
clever, resort to the following less than ethical
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to
with the clause whenever practicable.
catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the
Page 25 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
 of may, signifying permissiveness,
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under a violation thereof gives the court
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil discretion whether or not to
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general consider the paper as not
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, filed. While it is true that
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal procedural rules are necessary to
service or filing is practicable, in the light of the secure an orderly and speedy
circumstances of time, place and person, personal administration of justice, rigid
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal application of Section 11, Rule 13
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other may be relaxed in this case in the
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by interest of substantial justice.
a written explanation as to why personal service or (Emphasis and italics supplied)
filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging
the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall In the case at bar, the address of respondents
likewise consider the importance of the subject counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and makes personal service impracticable. As
italics supplied) in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service
was not done personally might have been
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the superfluous.
impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13: As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of where, among other cases, the injustice to the
Court] requires, service and filing of adverse party is not commensurate with the degree
pleadings must be done personally of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
whenever practicable. The court procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
notes that in the present case,
personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the In the present case, petitioner holds office
distance between the Court of
Appeals in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and
and Donsol, Sorsogon where the the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both
petition was posted, clearly, service
by registered mail [sic] would have in Iligan City.The lower court should have taken judicial notice of
entailed considerable time, effort the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
and expense. A written
explanation why service was not not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
done personally might have been following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to
superfluous. In any case, as the
rule is so worded with the use submit a written explanation why service has not been done

Page 26 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should
have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to
dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial
justice.
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute

of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts
and expenses of administration have been paid. [13] The ultimate
purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural

in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus: rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

The filing of a money claim against the decedents

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15,
in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with
protecting the estate of the deceased by
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
informing the executor or administrator of the No pronouncement as to costs.

claims against it, thus enabling him to examine

SO ORDERED.
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper

one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious

RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 2(c).
[3]
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.
xxxx
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the

Page 27 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.
[5] RULES OF COURT, RULE 86, Sec. 5.
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
bated; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same
be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise, they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims
he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and
if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claims had been presented
directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approved at the present value.
[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001]
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO
S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S.
MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar
S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking to annul the Resolution [1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] affirming the Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court
and the Resolution[4]which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts[5] are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street,
Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children,
namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen
M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda
Manalo, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo
left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of
Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos
Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma,
Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8)
of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita,
Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed
a petition[6] with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila[7] for
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting
the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further
directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs
named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition,
the trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default,
Page 28 of 35
except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of
general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of
herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De
Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners,
through counsel, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus
Motion[8] on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider
the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the
motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set
for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for
dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for
the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order[9] which
resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for
the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of
considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary
hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the
dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses
being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and
issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition
of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment
as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the
deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9,
1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the trial court in its
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Order[10] dated September 15, 1993. In their petition
for certiorari with the appellate court, they contend that: (1) the
venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share
of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;
(4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum
shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution[11] promulgated
on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. [12]
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant
petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial
court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the
petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise
involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filing of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-
63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the
same family. They point out that it contains certain averments
which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to
wit:
xxx
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO,
since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had
not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the
properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and
control the properties aforementioned, without proper
accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
xxx
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and
controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and
Page 29 of 35
 prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs
xxx.
xxx
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests,
petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were
forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue
to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and
engaged the services of herein counsel committing to
pay P200,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.[13]
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should
be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be
filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein
failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition
pursuant to Article 222[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature
of an action or proceeding, the averments[15] and the character of
the relief sought[16] in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of
death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as
his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The
fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest.[17] The petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of
the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of
this Honorable Court:
(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be
issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the
administration of the estate of the deceased TORADIO
MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable
sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just
debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the
deceased fully determined, that the said estate of
TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among
the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c) That the litigation expenses o these proceedings in the
amount of P250,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00
per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this
case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
MANALO.[18]
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains
certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil
action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of
the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition
thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer
containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses
and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs[19] in an apparent effort to
make out a case of an ordinary civil action an ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis,
Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to
defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement
Page 30 of 35
of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be
emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court, has
limited and special jurisdiction[20] and cannot hear and dispose of
collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always
been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in
the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it
were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem.[21] So it should be in the instant petition for settlement
of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal
of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding. Petitioners contend that the term proceeding is so broad
that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly
take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules
of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of
the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).[22]
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to
ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it refers
to an action by one person or persons against another or others in
a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which
the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
of a right, whether at law or in equity.[23] A civil action is thus an
action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[24] Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil
actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation
is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
strangers.[25]
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners)
are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of
action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition
for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. [26] The
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be
duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they
can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited
and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena,
JJ., concur.
[14] Now Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Page 31 of 35
[22] Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., 1990, citing Kohl v. U.S., 91
[23]
U.S. 367, 375, 23 L.Ed. 449; Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481; Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg.
Corporation, 169 Misc. 564, 7 N.Y. S.2d 897.
[24] Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.
Report of the Code of Commission, p. 18 cited in the Civil Code
[25]
of the Philippines, Commentaries and jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 1995
Ed. By Arturo M. Tolentino, p. 505.
[26] Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
[G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001]
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
AND THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA
DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-MANANGAN,
ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
estate of a deceased person particularly in questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision[1] of public respondent
Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No.
107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper
court. No costs.
So ordered.
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square
meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together
with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia,
Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of
the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and
the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged
an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his
interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving
only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT
No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the
first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was registered
Page 32 of 35
under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70
square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot[2]to a third person but retained ownership
over the second lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by
TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
186059[4] was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985,
Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children
by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint[5] filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987[6] in favor of herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia
Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer[7] dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner
Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20
March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered
a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during
Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may
not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein
petitioners property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: [8]
1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del
Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law
and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of
sale;
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under
Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or
as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
lower courts decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an
ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as an advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. X X X
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective
mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
assails the appellate courts decision for being contrary to law and
the facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the
instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed
by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.
Page 33 of 35
XXX
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action
is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying
legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term
special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application
or motion.[9]
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial
Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. X
X X A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as
may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice.[10]
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of
the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions
as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order
of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision[11] contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting
in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil
Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said
question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court
so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:
Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of
a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased
to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a
quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance.[12]
Page 34 of 35
 In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo[13] and Mendoza vs.
Teh[14] that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it
is a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.[15]
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein
private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent
even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by
the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a
probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if
the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to decide the question of ownership.[16]
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to
observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of
the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason
to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and
hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate
court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as
other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosarios estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely

an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would
have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.[17] (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the

legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary
that certain steps be taken first.[18] The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the
time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.[19]

Page 35 of 35
Special Proceedings- Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules