G.R. No.
179943 June 26, 2009 of a certain Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant
Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000,
Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier;
and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at
Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX
arrived for service at the said gasoline station.3
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side
in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He
saw through the lowered window shield that there were about six to seven persons aboard
the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing this,
he returned the key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the
engine of the vehicle would not start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push.
While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at the
back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the same vehicle,
except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and
.38 caliber pistol.5
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go
near the Car Wash Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked at them.8
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's
wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the
latter on his nape with a gun.9
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money
worth ₱3,000.00.10 Those four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the
stomach.11 Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service firearm.12
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions
immediately leave the place.13 The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward
San Mateo, Rizal.14 When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta
Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin
Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which
transported the injured Edralin Macahis to the hospital.15 Later on, Edralin Macahis died at
the hospital due to the gunshot wound.16
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a
gun at him.17
However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his
Tita Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of
January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked permission from his Tita Emma to go
to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger brother,
accompanied appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX,
Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to hitch a ride on his
vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other passengers
in the said vehicle.18
When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not
allowed to do so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join them in their
destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he woke up, they were in a
gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-
up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed
with fear. After he heard the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to
the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they were followed by policemen
who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the
vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving
him behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.19
As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed
against appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, an alias "Rey," an alias "Jonard," an alias "Precie," and an alias "Renato,"
which read as:
Criminal Case No. 4747
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "
Precie" and Alias "Renato" whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by
Regino C. Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings worth ₱3,000.00, to the
damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00
and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with
unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias
"Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard
of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 4748
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating , together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "
Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
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while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the
Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00
to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the occasion of the
said robbery, the above-named accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to
kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie"
and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 4749
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal,
and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number 13265 valued at
₱12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its
General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-
Q) Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid amount of ₱12,000.00 and on the occasion
of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms, with
intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey", Alias "Jonard", Alias "
Precie" and Alias "Renato", whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his
trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 4750
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a
gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:
a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch
(automatic) valued at ₱2,000.00
b) Cash money worth ₱50.00
to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie"
and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
entered a plea of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad, 20 then officer-in-
charge of Energex Gasoline Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis,21 a cousin
of the deceased security guard Edralin Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of
the same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta,23 also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and
Alberto Quintos,24 general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the
deceased security guard was employed.
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo, 25 a
cousin of appellant and the appellant26 himself.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision27 convicting appellant beyond
reasonable doubt of all the charges against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under
No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy
with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay
Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad and represented by Macario C.
Natividad the amount of ₱3,000.00 as compensatory damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under
No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy
with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
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unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to
pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable ground of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under
No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy
with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to
indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; to
pay ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no
longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under
No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy
with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay
Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the amount of ₱2,050.00 as compensatory
damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer possible and to pay the costs.
As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-
large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime,
sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said
accused.
As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and are still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent
to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and
apprehension of the said accused.
SO ORDERED.
The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004, 28 in conformity
with the Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the
Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution
of this Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in
cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate
rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing
an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court. This Court
transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the
dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide of only one count.
Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty
imposed upon Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,30 the penalty imposed being
reclusion perpetua.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and
Motion In Lieu of the Supplemental Brief31 dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no
longer file a supplemental brief, considering that appellant has not raised any new issue that
would require the filing of a supplemental brief.
Appellant filed a Manifestation32 on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts
his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT
THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH
A SINGLE PENALTY.
The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime and the
appellant's participation in the crime had been established.
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion
perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although
alleged in the Information, was not alleged with specificity.
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with
homicide, thus:
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.37
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.38 The intent to
commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.39 The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration.40 There is no such felony of
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robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.
Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable
doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not
presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away
and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.41 The prosecution is not burdened
to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether
the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment, because
the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.42
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.43
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery,
he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to
commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited
and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.44
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission
of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there
is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a
place other than the situs of the robbery.
From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed.
There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that their main intention was to
rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed.
The question now is whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According
to appellant, the prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this
Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy.45 The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The
witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness
Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him,
thus:
Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court whether those two (2)
persons who poked their guns at you were (sic) present now?
A: Only one, sir, and there he is.
(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON when asked.)
Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?
A: His gun was poked at me, sir.
Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?
A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.
Q: What else, Mr. Witness?
A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.
Q: Who hit you with a gun?
A: His other companion, sir.46
Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:
Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him,
was he also armed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?
A: Also .38 caliber, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta
to go to the carwash section?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly point to him?
A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert
de Leon).47
Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the
robbery, that a conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their
common criminal objective.48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,49 since all the conspirators are principals.
As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any
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clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case. 50
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence
during the commission of the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to
the matter. Granting that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not
exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof.51 Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt
act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from
taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial
and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct them to
suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing
thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.52
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of
robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne
from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As decided53 by the Court of Appeals:
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a
series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts,
there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. 55
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and
that is the Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by
force the money and valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly
inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal
resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may
occupy.56 This can be said of the case at hand.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery that took place
in several houses belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held
not to be taken as separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of
the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor General
argued that the [appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the evidence
shows distinct and different acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized
persons.58 The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that the perpetrated acts were not entirely
distinct and unconnected from one another.59 Thus, the single offense or crime.
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision60 merely states that,
in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon
appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua, but is silent as to how it had
arrived into such a conclusion.1avvphi1
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with
homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties.
Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. 61 It must be
remembered that the Informations filed with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance
of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a
generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by this
Court in Palaganas v. People:62
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those
mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the
Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum
period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged
and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated.63 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special
conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same
cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under
Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not
change the character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in the
information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.65 Moreover, it
cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating
circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating
circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating
circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,66 as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294,67 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to
whether it is generic or qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same
must be interpreted in favor of the accused." 69Since a generic aggravating circumstance is
more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter
changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court
proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be
considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance.70 This interpretation is erroneous,
since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6
June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a
SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.71 Republic Act
No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes
in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant
case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not
merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by
testimony, even without the presentation of the firearm.73 In the said case, it was established
that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The
ballistic examination of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they
were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was
also established that the same appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court
ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance.
5|P a g e
After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of
unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates
that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed
to present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to
carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
cannot be appreciated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin
Macahis the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱12,000.00 as compensatory
damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages. Actual damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this Court's
rulings74 on temperate damages apply, thus:
In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual
damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to
prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine
specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was presented
in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than
₱25,000 are proved during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more
recent case of People vs. Villanueva77which modified the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva,
we held that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
₱25,000, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual
damages of a lesser amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the
victim’s heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less than
₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at
all but would now be entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages.78
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion
perpetua in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is
also liable to pay the heirs of the victim, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to
the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San
Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137404 February 14, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOSE CASITAS JR., appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven as clearly as the crime itself. In any
event, even if they are established beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be appreciated
unless they are alleged in the information, pursuant to the current Rules on Criminal
Procedure. This is a requirement of due process.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the January 15, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay (Branch 15) in Criminal Case No. T-2970, finding Jose Casitas Jr.
y Cea guilty of murder and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused JOSE CASITAS, JR. y CEA alias
‘BOBOY’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 7659 with the aggravating
circumstance of the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the offended party under par.
3 Art. 14, Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH.
"Additionally, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Haide Marbella the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil liability."2
In an Information dated June 25, 1998 and filed in the RTC on July 3, 1998, 3 appellant was
charged in these words:
"That on or about the 25th of March 1998 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at
Karangahan Blvd., Barangay Bombon, Municipality of Tobaco, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, while armed with a bladed weapon, with evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength, and with cruelty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab HAIDE BOMBALES-MARBELLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her painful death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs."4
During his arraignment on July 28, 1998, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, 5
pleaded not guilty.6 After pretrial and due trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed
Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the
facts as follows:
"At around 7:30 o’clock in the morning of March 2[5], 1998, at Karangahan, Bombon, Tabaco,
Albay, appellant Jose Casitas, Jr., also known as Boboy, was at the store of Romeo Briones.
This store is located near the house of Mario Chan, the house where Haide Marbella was
working as caretaker.
"Appellant and Romeo Briones were able to converse for about 20 minutes. During their
conversation, appellant showed Romeo the 3 25-centavo coins which he had and said, ‘and
lakaw kong ini sapalaran x x x (this venture of mine is being taken on a chance).[’]
"Thereafter, Romeo turned away and lay down on the table. He never noticed when
appellant left his store.
"Nearby, Corazon Goyena passed by the store of Romeo Briones going towards the Jasmin
Street for the purpose of dumping the sand piled at the side of the road on the drainage. This
pile of sand was on the road beside the house of Mario Chan.
"While she was proceeding to the pile of sand, Corazon saw Haide standing in the middle of
the road near the steel gate of the house of Mario Chan talking with Meriam Manzano.
"Seeing that Haide wanted to talk with her, Corazon went to the store of Romeo and waited
there for Haide. At the store, Haide asked Corazon if the latter was willing to lend her
₱200.00 to which the latter agreed. Before Haide left to go back to the house of Mario Chan,
she looked at appellant who was still at the store.
"Thereafter, Corazon followed Haide to borrow the shovel which she would use for the pile
of sand. She then proceeded towards the pile of sand and began to shovel sand to a pail and
dumped it on the drainage.
6|P a g e
"After 3 trips, Corazon felt thirsty. As the house of Mario Chan was the closest house, she
went there to ask Haide for cold drinking water.
"Calling out to Haide, Corazon decided to enter the compound as there was no answer from
inside the house. Since the gate and the door to the house were not locked, Corazon entered
the house to look for Haide. Again, she called for Haide but still she did not get any response.
"Looking inside the room of Haide, Corazon saw that there was nobody there. So, she
proceeded towards the kitchen of the house of Mario Chan.
"At the kitchen, she saw Haide sprawled on the kitchen floor lying face down and bloodied.
Surprised, Corazon ran outside and asked for help from Romeo.
"On the other side of the house of Mario Chan, Nemesio Capiz, the house boy of Gerardo
Musa Jr., while bringing out a gas tank to the car of latter, saw a man inside the compound of
the residence of Mario Chan.
"At a distance of about 25 meters, Nemesio saw the man looking from side to side and then
jumped over the fence. Then, this man casually walked away from the house of Mario Chan
tucking in his shirt inside his pants. Nemesio noticed that the man’s shirt was bloodied and
very red and the edge of his pants [was] red. Nemesio recognized this man to be appellant.
"However, Nemesio did not mind appellant. Instead, he went back to the house of Gerardo
Musa and informed the latter that he saw a man jumping from the fence of the house of
Mario Chan and that the man’s shirt and pants were very red. Thereafter, he went to the
pigsty and continued to work.
"Outside the house of Mario Chan, Remegio Almonte, Jr. saw the commotion and entered
the house of Mario Chan. There, he saw the bloodied cadaver of Haide. He suggested that
the cadaver be brought to the hospital and one man lifted the cadaver and brought it
outside. Outside, people commented that there were many stab wounds on the neck of
Haide. Remegio tried to look for clues about the murder but he found nothing. Then he
decided to go home.
xxxxxxxxx
"The autopsy report issued by Dr. Audwin Adaza enumerated around 17 wounds suffered by
Haide Marbella. The cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab
wounds. x x x"7
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant invokes denial and alibi as defenses. We quote from his Brief as
follows:
"The defense presented the oral testimonies of Gerondina Casitas and Jose Casitas, Jr.
"[Gerondina Casitas] testified that on March 25, 1998, between 7:00 to 7:30 a.m., Jose
Casitas, Jr. was preparing and packing his clothes because he was busy going to Manila. But
before going to Manila, he will [pass] by Legaspi City where he will get the money she
borrowed from Angelo Orenze. At around 9:30 to 10:00 a.m., two (2) policemen came by the
house to inquire about the whereabouts of Jose, to which she answered that he already left
for Manila. The two (2) policemen came back at around 10:30 or 11:00 a.m. and asked for a
picture of his son, to which she obliged and gave them an ID of her son. After the policemen
left, she noticed a commotion outside. Upon inquiry, she learned from a neighbor that Haide
was killed and that there was plenty of blood which caused her to be nervous.
"The last witness is Jose Casitas, Jr. He testified that at around 6:00 a.m., March 25, 1998, he
woke up and ate his breakfast because he was leaving for Manila. But before proceeding to
Manila, he dropped by Legaspi, Albay to get the money which his mother was borrowing
from Angelo Orense[.] He waited for Angelo Orense up to 12:00 noon of the same day. He
left Legaspi at around 6:00 p.m. and arrived in Manila at around 4:00 o’clock a.m. the next
day, March 26, 1998. He proceeded to the house of his cousin, Benjur Camu, but since his
cousin [was] not around, he proceeded to the house of his aunt Adoracion, in Cogeo. He
stayed there for three (3) days. In the morning of March 28, 1998, while he was at the house
of his half-brother, Roberto Casitas, two (2) men arrived and asked his aunt if he was around.
The smaller of the two (2) men asked him whether he was ‘Boboy Casitas’ and he answered
yes. They told him they have a warrant of arrest for him and he asked them to show him the
warrant. When he was about to [approach] them, the big man fired at him and he was hit at
his left leg. He decided to [run] because of fear and he entered a house to hide. The two (2)
men found him inside the house while sitting beside the bed. He was brought to the E.
Rodriguez Hospital for treatment of his wound and after which he was detained at the
Quezon City jail. On March 28, 1998, he was brought back to Tabaco and detained at the
Municipal Jail of Tabaco. He said that there are several persons in their neighborhood who
[fit] the description given by Nemesio Capiz, Jr., of the person whom [the latter] saw jumping
out of the Chan’s compound, aside from [appellant]."8 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC convicted appellant of murder on the basis of circumstantial evidence pointing to
him as the perpetrator of the crime. To support its finding of guilt, the trial court enumerated
specific factual circumstances relative to his whereabouts and actuations before and after
the commission of the crime.
In particular, the trial court noted his presence in the immediate vicinity of the crime scene
prior to the discovery of the victim’s body. It noted, as well, that he was identified as the man
who had jumped over the fence from inside the house where the body was found. It also
took into account how he had precariously climbed over the fence and suspiciously looked
from side to side to check if there were other people around.
Likewise, the trial court considered physical evidence like the bloodied lower front portion of
the shirt of appellant who, while leaving the house, had been seen by one of the witnesses. It
also mentioned that the main gate of the house was open, so the former could have
conveniently exited through that gate, if he was not escaping or hiding something.
Moreover, the trial court considered the following circumstances as indicative of the guilt of
appellant: his hasty departure for Manila, his act of running away and hiding from the
authorities for almost one hour after he was shown a warrant of arrest, and his restless
demeanor before the witness stand.
The trial court ruled that the killing had been attended by the qualifying circumstance of
superior strength. It also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since the
victim had been killed inside the house where she was staying, as shown by traces of blood
found in the kitchen.
Hence, this automatic review.9
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
"I
"The lower court erred in relying mainly on circumstan[t]ial [evidence] presented by the
prosecution as basis for the conviction of the accused.
"II
"The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659."10
The Court’s Ruling
7|P a g e
We affirm the trial court’s finding of guilt, but rule that the crime committed was only
homicide and not murder.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence
Appellant argues that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While he does not deny the death of the victim, he disclaims any
participation or involvement in it. Moreover, he avers that the trial court erroneously relied
on circumstantial evidence in convicting him.
Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient to Convict
At the outset, we may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is
not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a
chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction.11 Certainly, rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence.12
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction:
(a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the
crime.13 Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.14
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient to identify him as the author of the killing. When
viewed as a whole, this evidence effectively establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the
trial court’s finding of guilt:
First, appellant was in a store right in front of the house where the crime was committed, just
before the victim was found dead.
Second, he was seen climbing over the fence of the house where the murder had occurred a
few moments before.
Third, he was spotted walking away from the house while tucking in his bloodied shirt.
Fourth, he was the only person seen leaving the house prior to the discovery of the victim’s
lifeless body.
Fifth, he hastily left for Manila soon after the commission of the crime.
Sixth, he attempted to elude the police authorities until a warrant for his arrest was
presented to him.
Seventh, he was observed by the trial court to be restless and fidgety during the course of his
testimony.
It is worth noting that the failure of the prosecution to present eyewitnesses to the actual
killing does not ipso facto dispel appellant’s guilt.15 Otherwise, the prosecution of vicious
felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
impossible, to prove. Indeed, resorting to circumstantial evidence becomes essential when
insisting on direct testimony would invariably result in setting felons free. 16
In People v. Whisenhunt,17 the Court expounded on this matter thus:
"While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of [the victim], the
confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant creates an
unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when
direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community
would be denied proper protection."18
The accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence, when the
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and
pointing to the accused -- to the exclusion of all others -- as the guilty person.19 The
peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that guilt cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just
one particular piece of evidence. Establishing it is akin to weaving a tapestry of events that
culminate in a vivid depiction of the crime of which the accused is the author.20
The pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together,
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that appellant perpetrated the dastardly deed.21
On the basis of the foregoing established facts, it can reasonably be inferred that appellant
was the only person inside the house with the victim when the latter was brutally killed.
Before the dead body was found, no other person had been seen entering or leaving the
house. The act of appellant -- climbing over the fence of the house with his clothes soaked in
blood, coupled with the subsequent discovery of the dead body lying in a pool of blood --
impels us to arrive at the logical conclusion that he was responsible for the killing. If he truly
had nothing to do with it, he would have gone out through the gate of the house and
immediately asked for help from the neighbors. Instead, he left the victim sprawled in a
dreadful bloodbath and surreptitiously fled from the scene of the crime, hoping that nobody
would notice him leaving.
Furthermore, appellant immediately left for Manila when the police authorities began to look
for him. When he was finally located there, he tried to run away again, even when the police
had shown him a valid warrant for his arrest. If he were really innocent of the charges as he
claims, he would have wasted no time in submitting himself to the investigators, so that he
would have a chance to disprove the accusations against him at the soonest possible
opportunity.
To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not entail absolute certainty.22 What is required
only is that degree of proof which, after an examination of the entire records of the case,
produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused.23
Finally, absent any showing that certain facts of substance and significance have been
overlooked by the trial court, or that its findings have been arbitrary, the conclusions it
arrives at must be respected and its judgment based thereon affirmed.24
Defense of Alibi
For his part, appellant interposes denial and alibi as defenses. He claims that it was
impossible for him to have killed the victim, because he was at home preparing for his
departure for Manila when she was killed.
For his alibi to prosper, he must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at
the time of its commission.25
Appellant insists that he was nowhere near the crime scene when the murder was
committed. However, his assertion was positively overturned by the testimony of
Prosecution Witness Romeo Briones, who said that he had seen and even talked with the
former in the vicinity around 7:30 a.m. on March 25, 1998. Briones testified thus:
"Q: Now Mr. Briones, do you recall where you were on March 25, 1998 at around 7:30 in the
morning?
A: I was at the store at around 7:30 in the morning.
Q: Where is that store situated?
8|P a g e
A: In front where Haide Marbella resides. Q: You mentioned the word, Boboy, how long have you known this person before seeing him
Q: Who were there aside from you, if any? on that morning past 8:00 o’clock on March 25, 1998?
A: We were the only two (2) there talking to each other. A: From the start of my employment at Mrs. Mosa.
Q: Who was the other persons aside from you who were there? Q: That was since the first week of April, 1997?
ATTY. GONZAGO: A: Yes, sir.
Objection, very leading. Q: Where did you see him?
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: A: At the store, sir.
Q: You said there were two (2) of you, who were the two (2) x x x there? Q: All right, since the time you entered the service of Mr. and Mrs. Mosa how many time[s]
A: I and Boboy Casitas. have you seen Boboy?
Q: This Boboy Casitas is the accused in this case? A: Many time[s], sir.
A: I do not know but we were the only two (2) talking together. Q: You mentioned his name is Boboy, don’t you know his full name then?
Q: Now, you said you were talking with somebody at around 7:30 in the morning on March A: No, sir.
25, 1998. To whom you were talking to is present in the courtroom, will you please point at Q: If this Boboy is present in Court will you point to him?
him? A: Yes, sir.
(witness points to accused Boboy Casitas) Q: Will you point to him?
Q: Now, what were you talking about? INTERPRETER:
A: We talked for about twenty (20) minutes. He was holding three (3) twenty-five (25) Witness points to a man in white shirt, who when asked answered to the name of Jose
[centavo] coins and he said ‘ANG LAKAW KONG INI SAPALARAN.’ Casitas, Jr.
xxxxxxxxx Q: All right, seeing Boboy holding on to the rail what did you do?
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: A: I did not mind him.
Q: After accused, Jose Casitas[,] said these words, what happened next? Q: From the place where you saw him up to the point where he was standing holding to the
A: I did not mind anymore because he turned away from me. He remained [seated] in front rail what was the distance more or less?
of the store of his aunt. A: Fifteen meters, sir.
Q: [How about] you, what did you do? Q: Why could you see this person from the place where you were standing?
A: I did not mind him. After he turned away I lie down on the table. A: The fence of Mrs. Mosa was made of bamboo tops and the place was clear so I can see
Q: After that what happened next? him clearly.
A: After that, while I was lying on the table, I noticed Corazon Goyena carrying a pail of sand. Q: Now having seen [him], what did you do?
She carried around 3 pails of sand. After that, she went x x x to get x x x ice when she felt ATTY. GONZAGA:
thirsty in the house where Haide Marbella lives. Already answered.
xxxxxxxxx [PRIVATE PROSECUTOR] BONTO:
Q: While you were lying down and this Corazon Goyena was carrying three (3) pails of sand, Q: And then what did you do?
where was Boboy then? A: I proceeded outside to board the gas tank.
A: He was no longer there in the place where we were talking."26 Q: To where were you going to board the gas tank?
Indubitably, appellant cannot rule out his presence at the scene of the crime when the killing A: To the owner type jeep, sir.
took place. He had been seen in a store right in front of the house where the victim was Q: Belonging to whom?
found dead a few moments later. The store owner testified that appellant even talked with A: Mrs. Mosa’s jeep, sir.
him before leaving the store immediately after their conversation. Later, around 8:00 a.m., as Q: And then while you are going to load it to the owner type jeep, what did you see next if
the latter was climbing over the fence of the house where the victim was killed, he was seen any?
by another witness, Nemesio Capiz, who positively identified him as follows: A: Boboy stepped on the cement and jumped over the fence outside going out coming from
"Q: All right, in the morning of March 25, 1998 were you still there working with the Mosas? the inside.
A: Yes, sir. Q: How far were you from Boboy during this second time that you saw Boboy jumping from
Q: At about past 8:00 o’clock in the morning, what were you doing? the fence?
A: I was ordered by Mrs. Mosa to bring the gas tank to the store because it was already A: Twenty[-]five meters, sir.
empty. Q: And the moment this Boboy landed what did you notice if any?
Q: All right. While you were bringing out the gas tank what if any did you see? A: His t-shirt was bloodied and very red.
A: I saw ‘Boboy’ holding on the fence of the house of Haide Marbella, inside. Q: And what did he do with that front portion of his t-shirt?
Q: What kind of fence was it? A: He rolled it over and inserted it inside his pants.
A: It was made of cement with iron grills. Q: What else did you see?

9|P a g e
A: The edge of his pants were red.
Q: And then what happened next?
A: He went away."27
It is a hornbook doctrine that when credible witnesses positively identify the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime, the defense of alibi becomes negative and self-serving.28 Moreover,
an alibi that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence deserves no weight in law. It
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.29 Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and
renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.30
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
While we uphold the trial court’s finding that appellant was criminally liable for the killing of
the victim, we do not agree with its conclusion that the crime committed was murder.
The RTC qualified the killing to murder by appreciating the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Settled is the rule that such circumstance is present whenever there is inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, superior strength is advantageous for the
aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime.31
Under the facts, no one actually saw how the killing was perpetrated. No evidence, whether
direct or circumstantial, was presented to establish that there had been inequality of
strength between the appellant and the victim, or that the former had purposely or
consciously taken advantage of superior strength in committing the crime. Thus, the RTC
erroneously relied on mere suppositions on the manner of the killing and improvidently
concluded that there was abuse of superior strength despite the lacuna of evidence thereof.
Indeed, to qualify a killing to murder, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
indubitably as the killing itself. It cannot be deduced from mere supposition.32
Likewise, we find that the RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
to justify the imposition of the death penalty. As a general rule, dwelling is considered
aggravating if the crime was committed by the accused in the home of the offended party,
and if the latter had not provoked the former.33
However, this Court has categorically ruled that when the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling is not alleged in the information, it cannot be appreciated to raise the penalty from
reclusion perpetua to death.34 Thus, in People v. Gallego,35 the Court ratiocinated in this wise:
"In People v. Albert, we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form – death – because the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible,
hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties’ evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate, the grain of
human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of the capital
punishment for an erroneous conviction ‘ will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of
justice.’ The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on
an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order
for the Court to properly ‘exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties’ evidence.’ This,
the accused can do only if he is apprised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty
imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable,
we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of
the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him." 36
(Italics supplied)
In any case, it is worth noting that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, now require that the aggravating as well as the qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court, even if they are subsequently
proved during trial.37 The pertinent portions of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules are reproduced
hereunder:
"SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute; aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
"SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment." (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the foregoing amendments which are favorable or beneficial to appellant, should
be applied retroactively inasmuch as procedural rules are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time they were approved.37-a
A perusal of the Information filed against appellant clearly shows that dwelling was not
alleged as an aggravating circumstance. Even assuming that this circumstance was
subsequently proven during trial, the lower court was precluded from appreciating it because
of the new requirement under the rules. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Article 249 of the RPC,
which defines and penalizes the crime of homicide. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and considering the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper
penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.38 1a\^/phi1.net
Although the trial court correctly awarded ₱50,000 to the heirs of the victim as civil
indemnity, it failed to grant actual and moral damages, which were prayed for and proven
during the trial. An examination of the records of the case will show that the defense agreed
to the stipulation of ₱39,000 as actual damages, which the heirs had spent for the funeral of
the victim. Moreover, the prosecution presented one of her children to prove the pain and
the moral anguish they had suffered by reason of her untimely demise.39
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum; to 14 years eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, he
shall pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral
damages and ₱39,000 as actual damages.40 No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176385 February 26, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA, accused-appellants.
10 | P a g e
 DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880 which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64,
finding appellants Emelio E. Tolentino and Jesus M. Trinidad, guilty of the crime of Murder
and two counts of Frustrated Murder.
On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of Frustrated
Murder were filed before the RTC against appellants, together with accused Jimmy Trinidad
and Arnel Trinidad. The murder case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0258 while the
two frustrated murder cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 98-0260 and No. 98-0270.
The accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 98-0258
For: Murder
That on or about 11:10 o’clock in the evening, more or less, on the 29 th day of August, 1997,
at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, and helping each
other to attain a common purpose, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, while armed with firearms, assault, attack, and use personal violence upon
one JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO, by then and there shooting the said victim on her face
causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and proximate
cause of the death of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
That the commission of the offense is attended by aggravating circumstance of nighttime
purposely sought to facilitate the same and dwelling.
Criminal Case No. 98-0260
For: Frustrated Murder
That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay
San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
each other to attain a common purpose, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, with intent to kill, while armed with firearms and knife, and with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault, and use personal
violence upon one ANTONIO BEA, by then and there, poking a firearm at said private
offended party, tying his hands with a rope and thereafter, stabbing said victim on different
parts of his body, thus causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds capable of causing
death, hence, performing all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their (accused) will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said victim which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of herein
private complainant.
Criminal Case No. 98-0270
For: Frustrated Murder
That on or about 11:10 o’clock in the evening of August 29, 1997 at the fishpond at Purok 7,
Barangay San Vicente, municipality of Santa Elena, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and
evident premeditation and while armed with long firearms and 12 gauge shot gun, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, kick and strike one ANTONIO
NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the different parts of his body and then shot one said
Antonio Novelo but missed, which ordinarily would cause the death of Antonio Novelo thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their
will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Antonio Novelo,
which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.3
During the arraignment on 13 July 1998, appellants, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
entered their respective pleas of not guilty.4 Accused Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad remained at
large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the merits of the three criminal cases ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses and their respective testimonies: (1)
Antonio Bea testified as an eyewitness on the killing of Josita Novelo and narrated his own
near death experience; (2) Ricardo Basila testified that he saw the accused escorting Antonio
Bea whose hands were tied and disclosed that he was also subjected to violent acts of the
accused. He claimed that he later heard a gunshot coming from Josita Novelo’s house; (3)
Wilfredo Llarena, a Barangay Captain, testified that several persons went to his house
carrying an injured Antonio Bea and they proceeded to the hospital. He later reported the
incident to the police officers; (4) Antonio Novelo testified that the accused went to the
house of Josita Novelo and attempted to kill him; (5) Dr. Noli Bayani, the rural health
physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body
of Josita Novelo; (6) Belen Avellera testified on the existence of the medical records of
Antonio Bea; (7) SPO2 Nelson Ricierra testified that Wilfredo Llarena reported to him the
stabbing and the killing incidents and that he was a member of the team who made a follow-
up investigation of the report; (8) Rogelio Novelo testified that Jesus Trinidad used to be his
partner in operating a fishpond and that their partnership turned sour as Jesus Trinidad
harvested the yields of the fishpond without his consent; (9) Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Manila, conducted an autopsy of the body of Josita Novelo.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" - a photograph
of the bloody body of Josita Novelo; Exhibit "A-1" - the "x" mark on the face of Josita Novelo;
Exhibit "B" – a photograph showing the victim prostrate on the ground; Exhibits "C" and "D" -
photographs of the house where the incident of killing took place; Exhibit "E" - the medical
certificate of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "F" - the affidavit of Antonio Bea; Exhibit "G" - the affidavit
of Ricardo Basila; Exhibit "H" - the affidavit of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "I" - the medical
certificate of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit "J" - the death certificate of Josita Novelo showing the
result of the post-mortem examination; and Exhibit "K" - the NBI autopsy report.
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that sometime in January 1997,
Rogelio Novelo, the surviving spouse of the deceased-victim Josita Novelo, and appellant
Jesus Trinidad agreed to manage and operate a rented fishpond located at Baranggay San
Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte. Sometime in April of the same year, when the
fishpond was yielding its first harvest, Rogelio Novelo and his wife Josita brought the produce
to Manila to be sold, while appellant Jesus Trinidad was left to manage the fishpond. Upon
the couple’s return, they discovered that all the fish and crabs in the fishpond had already
been harvested and disposed of. Believing that appellant Trinidad was responsible for the
pilferage, Josita demanded from him either the return of the couple’s investment or be
allowed to buy appellant Trinidad’s share in the partnership. Appellant chose the latter and
was paid by the couple the amount of P9,700.00 as his share in the partnership. After their
partnership with appellant Trinidad was terminated, the couple proceeded to replenish the
fishpond with crab seedlings. When the crabs were ready for harvest, appellant Jesus
Trinidad with appellant Emelio Tolentino, Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad, without the permission
11 | P a g e
from the couple, harvested the crabs for their own benefit. The couple confronted appellants
and their cohorts, but the former’s protestation was merely ignored by the latter. The couple
filed a complaint before the barangay which was then set for hearing on 30 August 1997. A
few days before the scheduled hearing, Rogelio Novelo took a trip to Manila, leaving his wife
Josita to manage the fishpond.
On 29 August 1997, at around 10:30 p.m., Antonio Bea, one of the complainants and the
caretaker of the couple’s fishpond, was inside his house located at Purok 7, Tinagong Dagat,
Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte.5 He heard someone calling his name
from outside his house. Carrying a flashlight, Bea went outside and focused his flashlight
towards the direction of the fishpond watergate ("prensa").6 Suddenly, someone whom he
recognized to be appellant Emelio Tolentino grabbed his hand and pulled him out of the
house.7 There he saw appellant Jesus Trinidad, Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. Jesus
Trinidad kicked Bea on the right side of his hip, and tied a rope around his hands behind his
back. Then appellant Emelio Tolentino pulled him by the rope towards the house of a certain
Ricardo Basila.8 Upon reaching the house of Ricardo Basila, Arnel Trinidad called out the
former. Ricardo Basila, with a flashlight in his hand, went out of his house and focused the
flashlight at the faces of the four perpetrators. Irritated by what Ricardo Basila did, Emelio
Tolentino, Jesus and Arnel Trinidad took turns in kicking Ricardo Basila and ordered the latter
to get inside his house.9 While inside his house, Ricardo Basila noticed that Emelio Tolentino
was carrying a weapon.10
The assailants, together with Antonio Bea, proceeded to the house of the spouses Novelo
situated alongside the fishpond which was more or less 100 meters from Basila’s house.11
When they arrived at the Novelo house, Jesus Trinidad called Josita Novelo to get out of the
house.12 Josita Novelo went out of the house holding a light. 13 Jesus Trinidad quickly grabbed
Josita Novelo by her mouth and the two of them went inside the house together with Emelio
Tolentino, Jesus Trinidad and Antonio Bea. From inside the house, Emelio Tolentino and
Jesus Trinidad took Antonio Bea to another door leading outside and chanced upon Antonio
Novelo, Rogelio Novelo’s brother.14Immediately, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino kicked
Antonio Novelo causing the latter to fall right into the fishpond and disappear from sight.15
Antonio Bea was then tied to the door from the waist down with Emelio Tolentino guarding
him.16 In that position, Antonio Bea saw Josita Novelo being mauled by Jesus Trinidad and
Arnel Trinidad. All of a sudden, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo on the left cheek with a
gun.17 Immediately after, Emelio Tolentino entered the house and slashed the face of Josita
with a jungle bolo.18 The three assailants untied the binding on Antonio Bea’s feet while
leaving the ropes tied behind his back.19 They left Novelo’s house proceeding towards the
fishpond watergate which was about three meters from the house. Emelio Tolentino led the
way, followed by Bea, with Jesus and Arnel Trinidad taking the rear. Without warning, Emelio
Tolentino stabbed Antonio Bea four times in the stomach with the former’s jungle bolo.
Antonio Bea fell into the fishpond.
The assailants left the victim and boarded a boat which was operated by Jimmy Trinidad.
Injured and bleeding, Antonio Bea managed to untie his hands and swim across the river to
ask for help. He received help from the people of Purok 7 and was brought to the house of
the Barangay Captain Wilfredo Llarena in a hammock.20 The barangay captain then brought
the victim to a hospital. From the hospital, Barangay Captain Wilfredo Llarena, along with
some members of the police, went to the house of spouses Novelo and came upon the dead
body of Josita Novelo.21
Dr. Noli Bayani, the Rural Health Physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted an
autopsy of the body and found that the cause of Josita Novelo’s death was "[h]ypovolemic
shock secondary to gunshot wounds and lacerated wound."22 Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who also conducted an autopsy
on the body of the deceased, testified that the shotgun wound at the left side of the face of
the victim caused her death.23
The medical certificate of Antonio Bea shows that the four stab wounds inflicted on him
caused damage to his intestines.24
On 19 October 1999, the prosecution rested its case and made a formal offer of evidence.25
On 13 April 2000, appellants through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence, without leave of
court.26 In an order27dated 17 May 2000, the RTC denied the demurrer and submitted the
case for decision pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 28
On 31 May 2000, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the order
denying their Demurrer to Evidence be recalled and that they be allowed to present
evidence. The RTC denied the said motion. Unfazed, appellants filed a petition for certiorari
before this Court. This Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated 2 December 2002,
which became final and executory on 5 February 2003. As a result, the case was submitted
for decision without any evidence proffered by the defense.
On 30 November 2004, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the crimes
charged in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 and Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for murder and
frustrated murder, respectively. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0258
For: MURDER
WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y
MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim, Josita Novelo, the amount of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0260
For : FRUSTRATED MURDER
WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y
MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to
pay their victim, Antonio Bea the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.29
The trial court, however, acquitted appellants of the crime of frustrated murder allegedly
committed against Antonio Novelo in Criminal Case No. 98-0270.
On 10 December 2004, appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that "errors of
law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial."30 Appellants argued that in the interest of justice and equity, they should be
given the opportunity to testify in their favor considering that they are meted out by the RTC
the supreme penalty of death.
In an Order31 dated 15 December 2004, the RTC denied appellants’ motion for new trial
ratiocinating that the error of appellants’ counsel during the trial does not amount to error of
law or irregularity which constitutes a valid ground for the granting of a motion for new trial.
It appears that appellants no longer questioned the denial of their motion for new trial.
The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court.
Thereafter, this Court ordered the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals conformably
with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.32
12 | P a g e
The Court of Appeals, on 8 November 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the judgment
of the trial court convicting the appellants, with modifications on the award of civil liabilities,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64,
of Labo, Camarines Norte finding accused-appellants Emelio Tolentino y Estrella and Jesus
Trinidad y Maravilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal
Case No. 98-0258, and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following modifications, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, accused –appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and in addition, to pay the heirs of the victim Josita
Fernandez Novelo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for her death; P50,000 as moral
damages and P25,000 representing exemplary damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, accused-appellants are hereby sentenced each to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum. Moreover, they are
ordered to pay the victim Antonio Bea the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages;
P30,000 as moral damages, P30,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages.33
Hence, the instant case.
In their brief, the appellants assign the following errors:
I accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO
PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
III
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF INFLICTING
INJURY ON ANTONIO BEA, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THEM GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF FRUSTRATED MURDER ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT
BEA’S WOUNDS WERE MORTAL.34
Before proceeding to the first and third assignment of errors, the Court deems it proper to
first deal with the second assignment.
Appellants, as earlier mentioned, urge this Court to revisit the issue as to the propriety of the
trial court’s Order dated 17 May 2000 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and preventing
them from presenting evidence due to their failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of
the demurrer to evidence.
It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial court’s order dated 17 May
2000 was elevated by appellants to this Court via petition for certiorari. This Court in a
Resolution dated 2 December 2000, dismissed the said petition, and upheld the trial court’s
ruling that appellants are barred from presenting their evidence for failure to seek leave of
court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was denied by the lower court.
Since the issue of whether or not appellants may be allowed to adduce evidence despite
their failure to file a prior leave of court had already been finally put to rest, the same has
attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to pass upon anew this final
ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. 35 More
specifically, it means that whatever is already irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. 36 Indeed,
courts must adhere thereto because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy require
such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.37
Besides, under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that
when an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied,
he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the
right to present evidence for the accused.38 The rationale for this rule is that when the
evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore,
any need for him to present any evidence is negated.39 An accused cannot be allowed to
wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints
whenever dictated by convenience.40 The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the
dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after
denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence. 41Thus, when
the trial court disallowed the appellants to present evidence on their behalf, it properly
applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not even the gravity of
the penalty for a particular offense can change this rule. As stressed by this Court:
The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial
results in the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on record.
Considering that the governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental component
of criminal procedure, respondent judge had the obligation to observe the same,
regardless of the gravity of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant concessions to the
accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The rule is clear that upon the denial of the
demurrer to evidence in this case, the accused, who failed to ask for leave of court, shall
waive the right to present evidence in his behalf.42
Going back to the first issue, appellants take exception with the trial court’s assessment of
the evidence before it and in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. Appellants maintain that considering the lateness of the hour when the incident
took place, and the fact that it was dark, witness Antonio Bea could not have seen clearly the
faces of his attackers and that of the deceased Josita Novelo. Antoio Bea, according to
appellants, is incompetent to testify on matters relating to what was done to the late Josita
Novelo because he was tied from the waist down to the door outside the house, thus, he
could not have seen what had happened inside the house where the deceased was brutally
attacked.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
13 | P a g e
magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and Cross-examination:
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.43 Thus, appellate courts will not Q: Who was the person who held you?
disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, A: Emelio Tolentino, sir.
unless it be manifestly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily Q: How did you recognize him to be Emelio Tolentino?
the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.44 A: When I focused the light, I saw them because of the light, wearing bonnet and their
In the instant case, prosecution witness Antonio Bea steadfastly pointed to appellants and faces were exposed to the light.
their companions as the malefactors. Such identification was detailed as follows: Q: You said "them", how many were they?
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla? A: Jesus Trinidad, Emelio Tolentino and Arnel Trinidad, sir.46
A: Yes, sir. The identification of witness Antonio Bea of the perpetrators of the crimes evinces factual
xxxx truth of what really occurred on that fateful night. He could not have been mistaken as to the
Q: A certain Emelio Tolentino y Estrella, do you know a person with such name? identity of the appellants since, at that time, he has known them personally for ten (10) years
A: Yes, sir. already. Their faces were illuminated by the flashlight when witness Antonio Bea focused the
xxxx same in their direction. Also, Bea’s identification of the assailants was corroborated by
Q: These persons that I made mention to you since when have you known them? Ricardo Basila and Antionio Novelo who testified that they likewise suffered violent acts from
A: For almost ten (10) years. the malefactors during the incident.
Q: And because of that length of time you could not possibly [be] mistaken as to their Although Antonio Bea was tied at the door outside the house of Josita Novelo, he declared
identity? with clarity the circumstances leading to the killing of Josita and his near-death experience,
A: Yes, sir. viz:
xxxx Q: x x x Mr. Witness, where were you when you said you went out of the house let’s go
Q: On August 29, 1997 at about 10:30 or 11:00 in the evening thereof, do you recall of any back to the situation wherein you entered the house of Josita Novelo in one door and then
unusual incident that happened? you exited on the other and there you said the other two, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio
A: Yes, sir. Tolentino saw Antonio Novelo, where you at that time?
Q: Will you please tell us what is that incident that you recalled? A: I was with them sir, because they are holding the other end of the rope.
A: There was somebody that called me, sir. Q: And what did they do to you afterwards?
xxxx A: They tied me at the door, sir.
Q: When you heard somebody called you on that occasion, what did you do? Q: That door where you exited?
A: I flash[ed] a light to the Prensa, sir. A: Yes, sir.
xxxx xxxx
Q: x x x [W]hat happened next? Q: From the place you were tied did you see Josita Novelo?
A: Somebody hold (sic) my hand sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you recognize who held your hand? Q: And while you were tied on that occasion what happened to Josita Novelo?
A: Yes, sir. A: They are asking Josita Novelo where was it placed?
Q: Who? Q: Do you know what were they asking?
A: Emelio Tolentino. xxxx
xxxx Q: Did you hear the reply of Josita Novelo, if any?
Q: Mr. Witness, what happened next after Emelio Tolentino held your hand? A: I cannot hear the reply of Josita Novelo because they are mauling her or "binubugbog
A: He pulled me outside, sir. nila."
Q: And what happened next after you were pulled outside your house? Q: Who in particular was mauling Josita Novelo?
A: I am (sic) telling him I have no fault. A: Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad, sir.
xxxx Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what was he doing?
Q: Nang oras na iyon sino pa ang nakita mo kung mayroon man? A: He is outside guarding me, sir.
A: Jesus Trinidad, sir. Q: What happened after Josita Novelo was mauled by these two you mentioned?
Q: Who else if any? A: Suddenly, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo.
A: Arnel Trinidad, sir. Q: Did you see where Josita Novelo was hit?
Q: What happened after you told them you have (sic) no fault? A: Yes, sir.
A: He kicked me, sir. Q: Where was she hit, if you have seen?
Q: Who kicked you in particular? A: On the left cheek which exited at the back of her head.
A: Jesus Trinidad, sir.45 Q: After they have shot Josita Novelo, what did they do next?

14 | P a g e
A: They get (sic) out, sir.
xxxx
Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what did he do if any?
A: Emelio Tolentino entered the house and then slashed the face of Josita Novelo.
Court: Anong ginamit? Nakita mo?
A: Jungle bolo.
Q: Saan? Sa kanan o kaliwa?
A: Sa kaliwa, po.
xxxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said that after Josita Novelo was shot by Jesus Trinidad, and
Emelio Tolentino went inside the house and put an X mark on the face of that dead woman,
what happened next?
A: They untied me, sir.
Q: And what did they do after untying you?
A: They passed through the prensa and stabbed me, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, you said you were untied is it (sic) not?
A: Yes, sir, sa paa lang.
xxxx
Q: So in other words from the time you were untied you walked towards that ‘prensa’ for
about three (3) meters?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you walked, who was ahead of you, if any?
A: Emelio Tolentino, sir.
Q: Were your hands still tied?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about Tolentino who was ahead of you what was he doing?
A: He has a jungle bolo sir, and stabbed me.
xxxx
Q: How many times were you stabbed on that occasion?
A: Four times, sir.47
The foregoing testimony can only be told by a person who had really witnessed the incident
and had been subjected to personal violence from the perpetrators, hence, such testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. Furthermore, Bea’s testimony jibed with the physical
evidence. The nature of the wound of the deceased was affirmed by the medical experts to
be a result of a gunshot wound. The location of the wounds found on Josita Novelo’s face as
described by witness Bea was consistent with the documentary evidence, i.e., photographs,
autopsy result and the physical examination of the corpse of the victim. All these tend to
dispel any doubt that witness Bea would have concocted the whole story. The prosecution
successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants and their cohorts killed
Josita Novelo.
Anent the third issue, appellants argue that in the stabbing of Antonio Bea, they should have
been liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated murder since the prosecution
failed to prove, due to its failure to present the attending physician, that the injury suffered
by the victim was fatal.
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
result in the consummation of the crime. 48 The offender has passed the subjective phase in
the commission of the crime.49Subjectively, the crime is complete.50 Nothing interrupted the
offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to
consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.51 In homicide cases, the
offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the
victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or
attendance.52
In the instant case, the prosecution established that Antonio Bea sustained four stab wounds
inflicted by Emelio Tolentino which caused damage to the victim’s abdomen resulting in
massive blood loss. The victim was hospitalized for two months because of these injuries.53 In
fact, at the trial, the victim showed the scars in his abdomen. All these tend to show the
seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim and which would have caused his death
had it not been for the timely medical intervention.
The trial court, in assessing the testimonial evidence of the prosecution, made this
appropriate observation:
In the instant cases, the corroborative testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Antonio Bea,
Ricardo Basila and Antonio Novelo, positively identifying the accused as the perpetrators of
the crime satisfactorily persuade the Court. x x x.
xxxx
Witness Antonio Bea testified that accused Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino are known to
him for almost ten (10) years x x x.
Likewise, witness Antonio Novelo, on cross-examination, testified that he recognized the
accused because their voices are very familiar to him being neighbors and he had known the
accused for a long time.
xxxx
The identification of an accused through his voice is acceptable, particulary if the witness
knows the accused personally.
The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is
established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years.54
Worth stressing is that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. The settled rule
is that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.55 We find no cogent reason to veer
away from their findings.
In an effort to exculpate themselves from the charges, appellants identified inconsistent
statements of witness Bea such as the latter’s declaration that he was a friend of Jesus
Trinidad which is contradictory to his earlier testimony the he got mad at Jesus Trinidad four
months prior to the incident. They also make an issue of the statement of Bea during the
cross-examination wherein he made mention that a gun was poked at him, which declaration
is missing in the direct examination.
These inconsistencies are very trivial and insignificant. Minor inconsistencies do not warrant
rejection of the entire testimony nor the reversal of judgment.56 Accuracy in accounts had
never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are tested since it is
undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions and the
passage of time.57 Witness Bea’s inconsistencies rather enhance truthfulness for it erases
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The RTC convicted the appellants of murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 for the killing of
Josita Novelo and frustrated murder for the assault of Antonio Bea in Criminal Case No. 98-
0260 by appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling.
15 | P a g e
The RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of
Josita Novelo and in the stabbing of Antonio Bea.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.58 Frontal attack can be treacherous
when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.59 What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to
retaliate.60
In the killing of Josita Novelo, the victim was at her home when someone called her. When
the victim went outside, suddenly Jesus Trinidad held her. Thereafter, Jesus Trinidad and
Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo. Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot the helpless victim
on the cheek. Said attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had not been given
the opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression. She was unarmed when she was
attacked. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the assault on the victim was
treacherous.
The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with treachery. While Bea, whose hands were
tied behind his back, and the assailants were walking along the dike, Emelio Tolentino
unexpectedly stabbed the victim four times. The victim could not put up a defense as the
attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel the same since his hands were tied.
Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of dwelling in Criminal Case No. 98-0258. Evidence shows that Josita Novelo
was killed in her own house. When the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.61 Here, the crime was committed inside the house of the deceased
victim. Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode.62 He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.63
Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 considering that the
same was not alleged in the information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Court, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved otherwise;
even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall not be considered by the
Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused. 64
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases was improperly appreciated by the
RTC. Nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is sought to prevent
the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. There must be proof that this
was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime and that the perpetrators
took advantage of it. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence
that the appellants and their companions took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime
facilitated the commission of the crime.
Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, in Criminal Case No. 98-0258, it must be borne in
mind that the prosecution successfully established the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the killing of Josita Novelo. With this, the crime committed by
the appellants is murder in accordance with Article 248. With the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed should be in its maximum,
which is death.65
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006,
the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.66 Thus, the penalty imposed upon
appellants in Criminal case No. 98-0258 should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.67
As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(6) interest, in proper cases.68
The RTC awarded P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo as civil indemnity. The
Court of Appeals reduced the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo is in order.69
The RTC also correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the
violent death of the victim. This does not require allegation and proof of the emotional
suffering of the heirs.70 Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in
this case.71 To deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of
P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
In Criminal Case No. 98-060, the RTC imposed upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the crime of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to 8
years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Under Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of frustrated murder is
one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.72 Reclusion
temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal,
the penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances in the commission
of the crime.73 The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range
of prision mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no
modifying circumstance in the commission of the frustrated murder, an indeterminate prison
term of eight (8) years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum74 may be considered reasonable for the
frustrated murder under the facts of this case.
As to the award of actual damages, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to
substantiate Antonio Bea’s hospitalization expenses. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that
Antonio was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award
P20,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he suffered pecuniary loss.
The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order.75 Moreover, Antonio is
also entitled to moral damages which this Court hereby awards in the amount of P40,000.00.
Although there was no testimony on the moral damages that he sustained, the medical
certificate issued by the hospital indicated that Antonio Bea sustained serious stab injuries
inflicted by appellants. It is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human
experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Antonio Bea would
naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.76
Finally, the award in the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is also in order
considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. When a
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.77
This kind of damage is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrong-doings, and as a
16 | P a g e
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.78
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 08 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00880 finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case. No. 98-0258, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modifications:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of the victim Josita Novelo the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 representing exemplary damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, for the crime of Frustrated Murder, appellants are
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In addition,
appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim Antonio Bea the amount of
P40,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P20,000.00 as temperate
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148912 September 10, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias "Tomy," appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By interposing self-defense, herein appellant admits authorship of the killing. Thus, shifted to
him is the burden of proof showing that the killing was justified. Despite his failure to prove
self-defense, he may be convicted only of homicide, not murder, because of the inability of
the prosecution to establish any qualifying circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the
victim's awareness of the impending attack.
The Case
For automatic review before the Court is the May 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Branch 46) in Criminal Case No. U-10792, finding
appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to death. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt
accused Timoteo Escarlos of the crime of Murder and the Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; he is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Antonio Balisacan the sum
of P28,650.00 as actual damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the further
sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
"The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Timoteo Escarlos to the
National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision." 2
The Information3 dated August 29, 2000, charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about July 1, 2000, in the evening, at Barangay Dumanpot, Asingan, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
sharp pointed bladed weapon, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hold
and stab from behind Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below right clavicle measuring 3 inches length and 8 inches depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 [inches] length and 6 inches depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
which injuries directly caused the death of said Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659."4
During his arraignment on November 8, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,5
pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] After trial in due course, he was found guilty by the lower
court.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual version of the prosecution as
follows:
"Around 9 o'clock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan went to the residence of
Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan to attend a benefit dance which was near the
place. In the benefit dance was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who attended the dance with his
friends. Crisanto stood beside the emcee, Ceasario Escarlos, appellant's brother. While
Ceasario was calling the victim, Antonio Balisacan, to come to the the stage as he was a
kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back shout 'Ay!'. Five (5) to six (6) meters at his
back, with the place [illuminated] by a 50 to 100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father,
Antonio, several times. Crisanto was momentarily shocked that he was not able to react.
When appellant fled, Crisanto came to his senses and ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive
so he brought him to Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital where he expired a few minutes after
arrival.
"Jesus Dismaya was also beside Ceasario when Antonio Balisacan's name was called. When
he heard people shout, he turned around and saw from a distance of four (4) meters
appellant stabbing Antonio four (4) times with a ten (10) inch-long knife. He then called
Antonio's brother, [Marcelo] Balisacan.
"Within the vicinity was Antonio's brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He was in the Asingan-
Urdaneta road, which was about fifteen (15) meters outside Ulep's yard when he heard
people shout and run from the benefit dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he
went to the benefit dance and saw that Antonio was stabbed. He went near Antonio, hugged
him, and asked who stabbed him. He replied, 'Tomy Escarlos.'
"Meanwhile around 9:30 of the same evening of July 1, 2000. SPO1 Patricio Badua was on
duty. He received a phone call about a stabbing incident in a benefit dance in Domampot,
Asingan, Pangasinan. When he went to the scene of the crime, the victim, Antonio Balisacan
was already in the hospital and appellant had already fled. He later learn[ed] that Antonio
died.
"Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy on Antonio's body and found:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below the right clavicle measuring 3 inches length (in) and 8 inches
(in) depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 inches length and 6 inches depth.
17 | P a g e
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
"She later issued a death certificate. She stated in court that out of the four (4) stab wounds,
Antonio's second stab wound was fatal because the lungs were penetrated.
"Dr. Ronald Bandonil, an NBI medico-legal officer confirmed Taganas' autopsy report. He also
conducted an autopsy on the exhumed body of Antonio. In his autopsy he found that
Antonio's first and second wounds were fatal as these caused his death due to hypovalmic
shock or massive blood loss."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts in this manner:
"On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARLOS together with Rexie Yabes, Fredo
Ramos, Erwin Ramos, Rowena Alamigo and others were at the yard of Jaime Ulep, in Purok
Inanama, Domanpot Asingan, Pangasinan watching a benefit dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs.
Organization. He was invited to buy lechon during the benefit dance.
"While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and
told him, 'You are here again to create trouble.' Accused was offended so he answered back
saying 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.' Antonio Balisacan
told him, 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo
was hit on the forehead, which left a scar on his forehead about an inch above the right
eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen
knife, so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the
knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him
twice and when the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.
"The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a kitchen knife about 10 to 12
inches. Antonio drew the knife from his left side. Timoteo was able to get hold of the handle
of the knife when he grappled for the same from the victim, by taking hold of the knife with
his right hand and stabbed Antonio who was intending to stab him. Antonio was one (1) inch
taller than accused.
"Timoteo's testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness, CESARIO ESCARLOS, the brother of
Timoteo and president of the Mr. & Mrs. Association which sponsored the benefit dance on
July 1, 2000.
"On the night of July 1, 2000, Cesario Escarlos was at the yard of Jaime Ulep. At about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of the said date, he saw his brother Timoteo Escarlos together with
Dexie Yabis standing in a corner watching the dance. Several minutes later Kgd. Antonio
Balisacan arrived and later on, while Cesario was on his way to urinate. He heard Antonio
uttered to Timoteo 'ADDA CAYO MANEN NGA AGARAMED TI NILOLOCON.' While relieving
himself, he heard both Timoteo and Antonio arguing and before he could get near and pacify
them, he saw them wrestling with each other. Many people were around but nobody
pacified them. Next minute he saw Antonio bloodied and lying on the ground. There were at
least 100 people then and might have seen the incident. He noticed that Jesus Dismaya was
there but the latter did not do anything. Cesario, after the incident only stayed there for 3
minutes because he was looking for his three year-old daughter. In the meantime, nobody
touched the body of the victim."8
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court believed that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of
murder qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea of self-defense, because there had been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
"x x x. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the persons who filed a case
of malicious mischief against [appellant]. Said case was filed five (5) months before the
instant case happened. To the mind of the Court, the accused only found a way of avenging
what he felt towards the victim. He took advantage of that x x x particular time and place to
let out his feelings in the presence of his barangay mates. Such hidden grudge by the accused
against the victim, established the motive of the former.
xxx xxx xxx
"The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The nature, location and the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim belie and negate the accused['s] claim of self-defense. The
post mortem findings of the autopsy report showed that the victim sustained four stab
wounds.
"If there is any truth to the accused'[s] claim of self-defense, he would not have stabbed him
several times. [Worse,] the location of the wounds suggested that the accused was at the
back of the victim when the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident from the conduct
of the accused that he was determined to kill the victim and did not just act to defend
himself. In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to discuss the third element."9
Hence, this automatic review.10
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
"1. The honorable trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance
despite failure of the prosecution to prove its attendance.
"2. The honorable trial court erred in not finding that the testimony of the supposed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution as to the attendance of treachery is flawed and unworthy
of belief.
"3. The honorable trial court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the theory of self-
defense interpose[d] by the accused-appellant.
"4. The honorable trial court committed a grave and serious error in not finding that the
victim [was] the first to assault accused.
"5. The honorable trial court erred in considering motive to establish the guilt of the accused.
"6. The honorable court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder instead of
acquitting him or at most convicting him of homicide."11
These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, (2) viability of
self-defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of
the penalty and the damages imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence as an
issue, this Court nonetheless deliberated on it motu proprio, because an automatic appeal in
a criminal action opens the whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecution's
evidence must be passed upon, especially in cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed by the trial court.12 We have carefully examined the evidence for the prosecution
and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond
reasonable doubt.
18 | P a g e
Prosecution Witness Crisanto Balisacan, son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident, What is that shouting about?
which had occurred during a benefit dance on that fateful night of July 1, 2000. The witness' ATTY. VELASCO:
testimony is as follows: You heard shoutin[g], according to you, what did you hear, if you know?
"COURT: A: About the incident.
You go to the main point. COURT:
ATTY. VELASCO: Tell [us] exactly what you heard[.]
While there, did you observe or did you see if there was any unusual incident that took A: I heard shouting, 'Ay!'
place? Q: How many people shouted, 'Ay'?
A: Yes, your Honor. A: Many, your Honor, because that was a benefit dance.
Q: What was that unusual incident you have seen and observed? ATTY. VELASCO:
A: Stabbing incident, your Honor. When you heard shoutin[g], what did you do, if any?
COURT: A: I turned my head to my back.
Who was stabbed? Q: When you focused your attention and sight at your back, what happened next?
ATTY. VELASCO: A: I saw stabbing. I saw my father stabbed by Timoteo Escarlos, your Honor."13 (Italics
Who was the victim of that stabbing? supplied)
A: My father. Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant
Q: Who stabbed him? are clear and undisputed. He did not at all deny the allegations against him and openly
A: Mr. Timoteo 'Tomy' Escarlos, the accused in this case, your Honor. admitted that he had killed the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his
Q: Will you please focus your eyes within this Honorable Court and tell us whether the exoneration from criminal liability.
person you said who stabbed your father by the name of Timoteo Escarlos is in the premises Second Issue:
of this Honorable Court? Plea of Self-Defense
A: Yes, sir. In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and
Q: Will you please stand up and point to him? assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend himself under the
A: The first one, your Honor (Witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench circumstances. In his testimony before the trial court, he described the confrontation that
inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked, he answered Timoteo Escarlos). had led to the fatal killing as follows:
Q: How long have you been acquainted with the accused Timoteo Escarlos? "Q: And while you were there at the yard of Jaime Ulep on that night of July 1, 2000 do
A: About ten years, your Honor. you remember having seen the person of one Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?
Q: He is also from Domampot? A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, your Honor. Q: And did he see you also?
Q: Considering that it is already about 9:20-9:30 o'clock in the evening when this A: Yes, sir.
stabbing incident took place, how can you be sure that it was Timoteo Escarlos who stabbed Q: And did you happen to see him?
your father? A: When he passed in front of me he uttered in a loud voice – 'you are here again to
A: There was x x x light, your Honor. create trouble' (ADDA KA MANEN DITOY NGA AGARAMID TI NILILOKO).
Q: What kind of light are you trying to say? Q: To whom did Antonio Balisacan utter these words?
A: 50–100 watts bulb. A: I, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Q: And you said it was uttered in a loud manner, how far were you when he uttered
ATTY. VELASCO: these words?
Did you see the spot where your father was actually stabbed? A: More or less 3 to 4 meters, sir.
A: Yes, sir. Q: What did you say?
Q: How far is this place where your father was stabbed in relation to the entrance of the A: I was offended, sir.
dance arena. Q: And do you know the physical appearance of Antonio Balisacan when he mentioned
A: About 5 to 6 meters at my back, your Honor. those words to you?
Q: And at that distance, what happened next while you were watching? A: As if he was drunk, sir.
A: I heard shouting. Q: What made you say that as if he was drunk?
Q: These shouting that you heard, where did they come from? A: I smell his breath, sir.
A: From my back. Q: How did you react later when Antonio Balisacan uttered those words to you?
xxx xxx xxx A: I said: 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.'
COURT:

19 | P a g e
Q: By the way, when Antonio Balisacan said those words to you, were you doing following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
anything that time? means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
A: None, sir. on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.20 Verily, to invoke self-defense
Q: What happened later on when you answered Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan? successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
A: He said: 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your mother) and then he boxed me, sir. life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
Q: Were you hit? employing reasonable means to resist the attack.21
A: Yes, sir. Unlawful Aggression on the Part of the Victim
Q: What part of your body was hit? In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
A: This one on my forehead, sir. (Witness is pointing on his forehead). victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their
Q: Were you injured? argument. Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that
A: Yes, sir. the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the
Q: What injury did you suffer? weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he was
A: My forehead was injured (Witness is pointing a [to] a scar on his forehead about an legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the
inch at the right above the right eyecrow). knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend himself would be asking too
Q: And what did you do after you were boxed by Antonio Balisacan? much, he argues.
A: When I intend to box him I noticed that he withdrew a balisong and I tried to grab and The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated
used the balisong in stabbing, sir. the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an
xxx xxx xxx unlawful aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.
COURT: The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of
How many times did you stab him? words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged
A: Two times but when he was about to fall down I was able to hit him once for the third drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent
time, sir. danger. The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Q: You said that he drew a knife, where did he draw the knife? Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not
A: At his left side, sir. merely threatening and intimidating action.22 Uncertain, premature and speculative was the
Q: What kind of weapon did he draw? assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely
A: I sized it to be a kitchen knife, sir. drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court the length of that knife to include the handle? immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual,
A: 10 to 12 inches, sir. not just speculative.23
Q: And how did you grapple for the possession of that knife? Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that
A: I was able to hold the handle of the kitchen knife, sir. some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
xxx xxx xxx appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had
Q: What prompted you to stab him considering that you already got hold [of] the knife successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would
from him? have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful aggressor
A: Yes, sir, because he intend[ed] to stab me, so, when I had possession of the knife I when he stabbed the victim.24
stabbed him, sir."14 (Italics supplied) When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
We stress that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.25 To be sure, when the
the prosecution to the defense. Thus, the latter assumes the responsibility of establishing present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
this plea by clear and convincing evidence. 15Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant
the satisfaction of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of self-defense.16 legal self-defense on the part of appellant.26 Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of
The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is concerned was self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the
explained by the Court in Macalino v. People,17 from which we quote: latter, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
"In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the Attack
then incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or
court, relying on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. determine the effects of his blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict
The reason is that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved them in order to save his own life.
after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the victim."18 As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds
The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus inflicted upon the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense.27 The claim of
probandi of proving the elements thereof.19 The essential requisites of self-defense are the appellant that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the

20 | P a g e
means he employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He
admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for the third time, even when the
latter was about to fall.
The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate
to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, as held by the Court in
People v. Obordo:28
"Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's
punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused-
appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something from his
waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of
immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's body was
unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the
victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him."29
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.30
Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.31 Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing
to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.32
Third Issue:
Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to
put up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the
aggressor.33 Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.34
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between
the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant
towards the former.35
In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was
no treachery, and that the victim was aware of the imminent danger to his life.36 Moreover,
the prosecution failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous
mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat. 37
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent
physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim
clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the
opportunity to put up a defense.38 Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor
of the accused.39
In People v. Cariño,40 we modified the trial court's decision and ruled that the crime
committed was only homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not
been clearly established. Thus, the Court declared:
"However, we agree with the OSG's recommendation that appellant be held liable only for
homicide, not murder. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
conclusively established. For treachery to exist, the following requisites must be met: (1) that
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard concerning a possible assault by
Pedro. First, there was a heated argument between them at the place of the wake. Second,
Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando were followed outside by appellant, who did
not adopt any means to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third,
the abrasions and contusions on Edmundo's face show that Edmundo was able to put up a
fight before he was fatally stabbed. These circumstances negate the existence of treachery in
the commission of the offense."41
As in People v. Cariño, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in this case that
appellant be convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery had not been sufficiently established.42
The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
not present in the killing. Essentially, there is evident premeditation when the execution of a
criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a
criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.43 Obviously, the
acts of appellant in the present case can hardly be described as a product of reflective
thought or deliberate planning towards a decisive resolve to kill the victim. On the contrary,
the confrontation that escalated to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous, casual and
incidental. Verily, the brutal killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to
end the life of the victim.
The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when the accused decided
to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to the
determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the
determination and the subsequent execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused an
opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of the act.44 As found by the trial court, the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish any of the foregoing requisites.
To be sure, when there is no showing how and when the plan to kill was decided or how
much time had elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident
premeditation.45
In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme penalty of death --
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which the accused is charged must be established.46
Fourth Issue:
Proper Penalty and Award of Damages
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should
be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to award
P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim. Moral damages cannot be granted in
the absence of proof therefor.47 Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not automatically
given in murder or homicide. The prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in
the sum of P28,650. The award of exemplary damages should be omitted considering that no
aggravating circumstance was duly proven.48
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of homicide and
sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
21 | P a g e
maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P28,650 as actual damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[49] The grant of
moral and exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118649. March 9, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME REYES y AROGANSIA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Jaime Reyes y Arogansia seeks the reversal of the decision [1] of Branch 27
of the Regional Trial Court in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, dated October 5, 1994, declaring him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as then punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659.
By way of backdrop, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
in Paraaque pursuant to a warrant of arrest[2] issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, and was turned over to the custody of the Philippine National Police of said province.
On May 2, 1990, appellant was admitted to bail. The criminal complaint was later amended
to change his middle name stated therein from Bautista to Arogansia.[3]
Appellant failed to submit his counter-affidavit as ordered by the municipal trial court, hence
he was deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. The records of the case
were then forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna which filed an
information on July 2, 1990 charging herein appellant with murder and alleging
That on or about February 15, 1990, in the municipality of Santa Cruz, province of Laguna,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused while conveniently armed with a handgun and motivated by hate and
revenge with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, by means of treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot at MEYNARDO ALTOBAR y
MENGUITO with the said weapon, thereby the latter suffered gunshot wound which directly
caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances were present: (1) evident
premeditation & treachery.[4]
During his arraignment with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.[5] The pre-trial conference was terminated on November 28,
1990 and, thereafter, trial proceeded. In the course of the proceedings, the bail of appellant
was cancelled and he was ordered arrested by virtue of a bench warrant for failure to appear
on a scheduled hearing.
Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas testified that on or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
February 15, 1990, he and the victim, Meynardo "Jun Boy" Altobar, Jr., together with another
prosecution witness, Joel Apundar, were seated in front of the sari-sari store of Edwin
Laborde at M.H. del Pilar Street, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They were talking with each other when
suddenly a "bemoustached" man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si Jun
Boy?" When the latter replied by nodding his head, the man, who was later identified as
herein appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which looked like a book
tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.
Broas was able to push the wounded victim aside before the assailant pulled the trigger for a
second shot. Thereafter, appellant pointed the gun at the group and pulled the trigger , but
the gun jammed and did not fire. Appellant thereupon ran towards the opposite direction,
obviously to avoid being caught or identified by them.[6] The group rushed to the aid of the
victim who sat slouched on the pavement, bathed in his own blood, about a meter away
from where they were seated. They hailed a tricycle and brought the victim to the hospital
where he expired.[7]
Prosecution witness Joel Apundar corroborated the testimony of Broas in its material points.
He testified further that when appellant escaped by running towards the direction of the P.
Guevarra Memorial High School, he shouted, "Habulin ninyo iyan, habulin ninyo!" which was
heard by several persons within the vicinity.[8] Broas and Apundar both testified that the man
was wearing a piece of lady's stocking as a mask, RayBan type sunglasses, a"sure-fit" cap,[9]
black pants and a white t-shirt.[10]
Another prosecution witness, Johnny Abao, testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 15, 1990, he was in the company of Felix Herbosa and Jun Laborte at Del
Pilat Street in the same town. They heard two gunshots and somebody shouted, "Habulin
ninyo." Then he saw a man running away from the direction where the gunshots and shout
emanated and going towards them. Their group was about 30 meters away from the Laborte
store. The man ran along Del Pilar Street, turned right to Kamatoy Street, and then right to P.
Guevarra Street. As he ran after the man, he picked up something for his defense. He only
gave up the chase when he saw that the man had boarded a slow moving tricycle waiting
along P. Guevarra Street. He later helped witnesses Apundar and Broas in bringing the victim
to the hospital on board a tricycle driven by Martin Buena.[11]
Dr. Guia G. Abad, a medico-legal officer, conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. Her
findings were set forth in a Medico Necropsy Report, marked as Exhibit "G" by the
prosecution, as follows:
"1. One circular wound measuring 2 mm x 2 mm penetrating located 2 cm above the medial
insertion of the left clavicle directed rightwards to a wound with irregular edges measuring 1
cm x 1 cm located 12 cm from midspinal on right upper back at a level 4 cm below the lower
border of nape, just above the upper edge of right scapular bond.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock due to hemorrhage due to penetrating wound."[12]
Another prosecution witness Manolito A. Manuel testified that, while riding on his racer-type
bicycle passing along P. Guevarra Street on his way home to Barangay Sto. Angel Sur in the
same town, he heard two gunshots which he ignored. Upon reaching the corner of P.
Guevarra and Kamatoy Streets, he fell from his bicycle because he was nearly sideswiped by
a passenger jeep. While sprawled on the street with his bicycle, he saw a man running
towards a slow-moving tricycle and who then boarded the same. Inside the tricycle, the man
removed his mask and put a gun on the passenger seat.[13] When Manuel stood up and rode
his bicycle again, he noticed that the man was staring at him. He was more or less five meters
away from the said tricycle and the place was illuminated by the lamppost.
Just as he reached the big bridge, he noticed that the said tricycle, with the same driver and
passenger, was moving behind him. Upon reaching a street corner, he made a full stop and
again noticed the driver and the passenger of the said tricycle giving him an intimidating
look. He thereafter proceeded towards his home and he tricycle went in the direction of
Patimbao.[14] He later identified the passenger as appellant,[15] and the driver as Ernan Reyes,
a son of Ely Reyes who is a cousin of appellant.[16]
22 | P a g e
Appellant, as expected, denied having killed Altobar, Jr. He testified that on the date and
time in question, he was at the Paraaque Cockpit owned by Rolly Ligon, together with Obet
Legasto and Raul Reyes, on a painting job. The said cockpit is reportedly 85 to 90 kilometers
away from Sta. Cruz, Laguna and it would take more than two hours to travel from one place
to the other.[17] Appellant's alibi was corroborated by his relative, Raul Reyes, who testified
that he and appellant were together the whole night of February 15, 1990 and they never left
the cockpit compound.[18]
However, the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, Serafin Nepomuceno and
Eleodoro Anibersaryo to refute this alibi of appellant. Witness Nepomuceno testified that at
around 5:30 in the afternoon of February 15, 1990, he was at the house of witness
Anibersaryo at Green Village Subdivision, also in Sta. Cruz. They were having a celebration
when appellant arrived together with Felix Mercado, Anibersaryo's half brother. Appellant
left after drinking a bottle of beer. The celebration did not last long because the group had to
attend to important matters in the public market. On their way thereto aboard an owner-
type jeep, they saw appellant walking along Taleon Street[19] which was a few blocks away
from the scene of the crime.
The other rebuttal witness, Eleodoro Anibersaryo, corroborated the testimony of
Nepomuceno. He testified that they saw appellant on February 15, 1991 at around 5:30 in
the afternoon, first, when appellant arrived in Anibersaryo's house and, second, when
appellant was walking along Taleon Street.[20] In fact, their group greeted appellant but could
not accommodate him in their jeep which was already full.[21]
Based on the evidence introduced by the prosecution vis a vis what was adduced by the
defense, which will hereafter be discussed, the trial court concluded that it was appellant
Jaime Reyes who shot and killed victim Meynardo Altobar, Jr. Thus,on October 5, 1994, the
court below rendered the following judgment:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused JAIME REYES y AROGANSIA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendant generic
circumstance of nocturnity and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
Meynardo Altobar y Menguito the amount of P90,000.00 for and as actual and compensatory
damages inclusive of expenses incident to the burial, P100,000.00 for and as moral damages,
P50,000.00 for and as exemplary damages and the further sum of P20,000.00 for expenses of
litigation inclusive of attorney's fee, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his
preventive imprisonment."[22]
Hence, this appeal wherein appellant imputes four supposed errors to the trial court, namely,
(1) in finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim Meynardo Altobar, Jr.; (2) in
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to qualify the crime to
murder; (3) in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime; and (4) in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
Appellants faults the trial court for holding that the killing of victim Altobar, Jr. was attended
by treachery. He contends that when he openly approached the victim and asked him, "Ikaw
ba si Jun Boy?" the latter must already been alerted and forewarned of an impending attack.
Moreover, the attack was frontal as shown by the fact that the victim was hit near the
neck[24] above the left clavicle. The Court disagrees.
The prosecution evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the commission of
the crime, viz.: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of the attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the letter of any real
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.[25]
As argued by the prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and asked him if
he was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim of an impending harm. It
could not have taken appellant more than three seconds to ask the question and
immediately after getting a positive response, he fired at the victim.[26] This is sustained by
reliable witness accounts.
Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas lucidly explained:
"Q: Do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident which happened on that particular occasion
while in the process of telling stories among yourselves?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you tell the Court what happened?
A: While we were telling stories at that time, a certain man came and then asked who this
Jun Boy is.
Q: Will you tell the Court if you recall the exact words of this man, what was (sic) the exact
words?
A: The exact words by the man was (sic) "ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" and then he pulled out a gun
from something like a book pressed between his left armpit and then he fired a shot at Jun
Boy.
Q: Was Jun Boy hit by that first shot?
A: He was hit, sir.
Q: Did you notice on what part of his body as Jun Boy hit?
A: Jun Boy was hit near the neck.
Q: Before he was shot by this man, was Jun Boy able to answer or utter any remarks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his answer?
A: He just nodded his head.
Q: After Jun Boy nodded if as you mentioned that he was the Jun Boy being sought by this
man, this man suddenly pulled out a gun from what appeared to be a book pressed between
his left armpit, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir."[27]
This was corroborated by witness Joel Apundar:
"Q: While you were there at that time in the store of this Laborde, do you recall of (sic) any
unusual incident that happened?
A: There was.
Q: What happened?
A: We were sitting on a wooden bench and while we were sitting on a wooden bench,
somebody approached us and asked who among us is Jun Boy and after knowing who was
Jun Boy, he immediately fired a gun at us."[28]
We can infer from the foregoing testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that the
suddenness and mode of the attack adopted by appellant placed the victim in a situation
where it would be impossible for him to foresee any impending harm and to resist the attack
or defend himself. It has repeatedly been held that even if the attack on the victim was
immediately preceded by a cry or signal from the accused, such attack is no less
23 | P a g e
treacherous[29] since the immediacy of the assault prevents the victim from evading the same
or defending himself therefrom. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden
and unexpected and the victim was unarmed,[30] as what happened in the case at bar.
Apropos to the foregoing, the rule is that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is
ordinarily deemed absorbed in treachery[31] because it forms part of the treacherous means
and manner specifically employed by the accused to insure the execution of his criminal act.
Nocturnity is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance only when it is purposely sought by
or affords some degree of impunity to the offender, which does not appear to be so in this
case. The prosecution witnesses testified that although the crime was committed at around
7:00 o'clock in the evening, the locus criminis was well lighted[32] and the face of appellant
could easily be seen through his transparent mask.[33] The circumstances of treachery and
nocturnity may well be regarded then as complementing each other, with the latter
absorbed by treachery thus creating a single circumstance qualifying the killing as murder.
It is also worth mentioning that while appellant reportedly had a sort of a mask and was
using sunglasses, these clumsy accouterments could not constitute the aggravating
circumstance of disguise. Legally, disfraz contemplates a superficial but somewhat effective
dissembling to avoid identification. Here, even if it is true that he assumed that masquerade,
appellant was readily recognizable because his face could easily be seen together with the
identifying feature of his mustache. Thus, there was no mention of his having used a disguise,
whether in the information or by the trial court, the prosecution or the Solicitor General.
Why appellant resorted to that juvenile gaucherie is an example of the delusive quirks of the
criminal mind which defy rational explanation.
What is instead in issue is the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant
claims that the trial court erred in appreciating this as another qualifying circumstance, on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove all the requisites thereof. [34] Appellant is
correct. The prosecution failed to prove (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [35] These elements of
evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act
itself before it can be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
The testimony of prosecution witness Jonas Soriano that on February 7, 1990 Mercy Reyes,
daughter of appellant, told him to inform the victim to be careful because appellant had a
gun and was looking for him;[36] and the testimony of Perla Ramos that on February 8, 1990,
appellant went to her house looking for his daughter[37]and, before leaving, he stated,
"Huwag lang mayroong mangyayari sa anak ko wala kayong narinig, wala kayong nakita,"[38]
cannot be taken against appellant as evidence of his intent or plan to kill the victim.
Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable they might be,
would not be enough to sustain a finding of this qualifying circumstance. [39] For that matter,
absent the elements thereof as earlier noted, neither can it be considered as an aggavating
circumstance. Nonetheless, appellant is still liable for the crime of murder as the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present and proven by the prosecution.
Appellant faults the lower court in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [40] This submission is not only
too generalized an averment but is likewise devoid of merit. Although the prosecution's
eyewitnesses, Broas and Apundar, initially failed to reveal or disclose the name of appellant
in their preliminary affidavits, the physical description and identification of the gunman as
narrated by them matches the identity of herein appellant.
Moreover, during the trial, appellant was positively identified by Broas and Apundar as the
man who shot Altobar, Jr. Broas explained that the day in his disclosure of the name or
identity of appellant was because he was afraid to mention the name of the person who shot
the victim and he was so afraid because he definitely knew the assailant.[41] Apundar, in turn,
confessed that the delay in his revelation of the identity of appellant was because he was
"afraid that Jaime might return" to him.[42]
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to immediately name or identify herein appellant as
the culprit is understandable. It is common for witnesses to delay or vacillate in disclosing the
identity of the offender after the startling occurrence for fear of reprisal, more so since they
were townmates and one of them is related to appellant. Incidentally, prosecution witness
Manuel, on his part, positively identified appellant as the man who ran towards a slow-
moving tricycle, boarded the same, placed his gun on the passenger seat, removed his mask.,
and gave him an intimidating look.[43]
It is a jurisprudential doctrine of long standing that, aside from its intrinsic weakness, the
defense of alibi and denial invoked by herein appellant cannot prevail over the positive
identification by these prosecution witnesses who had no improper motive whatsoever to
falsely testify against him.[44] This decisional rule applies squarely to demolish appellant's
pretensions.
As to the trial court's award of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of deceased
Meynardo Altobar, Jr., the Court finds the same to be excessive with respect to moral
damages and unwarranted with regard to exemplary damages. Consistent with our
jurisprudence, the award of moral damages in the present case has necessarily to be limited
by the Court to the maximum amount of P50,000.00.[45]
Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases where the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.[46] In the instant case, no aggravating circumstance is
present to warrant the award of exemplary damages since treachery has been used to qualify
the killing to murder, nocturnity has been absorbed by treachery, and evident premeditation
has not been proved.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with MODIFICATION of the
civil liability of accused-appellant Jaime Reyes. Conformably with the foregoing discussion, he
is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Meynardo Altobar, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for funeral expenses, P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and P20,000.00 as actual damages for litigation expenses inclusive of
attorney's fees, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
March 13, 2017
G.R. No. 226475
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
CYRUS VILLANUEVA y ISO RENA alias "Tutoy" and AL VIN SA YSON y ESPONCILLA alias
"Alvin Talangka", Accused-Appellants
DECISION
REYES, J.:
On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated April 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 07069. The CA affirmed the conviction of Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena (Villanueva) and
Alvin Sayson y Esponcilla (Sayson) (collectively, the accused-appellants) for Murder as
24 | P a g e
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in its Decision3 dated September
16, 2014 in Criminal Case No. 12-001.
Facts
The accused-appellants were charged in an Information dated January 2, 2012, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 2012, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
knife, with intent to kill, and with the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, conspiring and confederating with one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, ENRICO ENRIQUEZ y
VINLUAN on the left side of his chest, thus causing fatal injury which directly caused his
death.4
On January 19, 2012, the prosecution moved to admit an amended information to include
Christian Jay Valencia (Valencia) as an accused, which was granted by the RTC in its Order
dated February 8, 2012. A warrant of arrest was, thus, issued against Valencia, but he could
not be located and still remains at large. Upon arraignment, the accused-appellants entered
a plea of not guilty to the charge against them. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
of the case ensued.5
The prosecution alleged the following:
At around past 5:00 a.m. of January 1, 2012, Amie Bafiaga (Bañaga) was selling tapsilog to a
group of persons playing cara y cruz at the comer of an alley in Summitville, Barangay
Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Thereupon, Bafiaga saw the accused-appellants and Valencia
arrive and ask the group if they know Enrico Enriquez (Enrico), to which they answered in the
negative. Thereupon, the accused-appellants and Valencia went to the tricycle terminal,
which was about 10 to 15 meters away, where they saw Enrico. They then simultaneously
attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the latter at
the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Valencia then stabbed Enrico on the
left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail. The assailants thereafter
fled. However, Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle.6
At that time, Barangay Police Djohann Gonzales (Gonzales) was on duty in their office at the
Barangay Hall of Putatan, Muntinlupa City.1âwphi1 Gonzales then received a call requesting
their assistance on a stabbing incident at the tricycle terminal in Summitville. Gonzales then
went to the said terminal with Romeo Arciaga. Thereat, Gonzales saw a bloodied man, who
was later identified as Villanueva, being held by the tricycle drivers. Gonzales brought
Villanueva to the Barangay Hall where the stabbing incident was recorded in the barangay
police blotter. Thereafter, Villanueva was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
office of the Muntinlupa City Police Station where Villanueva's sister arrived and informed
the authorities that Sayson was still in their house in Purok 1, Bayanan, Muntinlupa City.
Antonio Enriquez, Enrico's brother, was also at the police station when Villanueva was
brought there.7
Enrico was brought to the Muntinlupa Medical Center, but he was declared dead on arrival.8
Dr. Roberto Rey C. San Diego, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
conducted an autopsy on Enrico's body. He noted two stab wounds on the left side of
Enrico's chest, one of which penetrated the left atrium of the heart.9
On the other hand, the accused-appellants denied the allegations against them. Villanueva
claimed that on January 1, 2012, at around 2:00 a.m., the accused-appellants and Valencia
went to the house of their friend in Summitville to eat. Thereafter, Valencia invited them to
have a drinking spree with Alvin Abad and Charlotte. At around 4:30 a.m., Valencia left the
group and, 30 minutes thereafter, the accused-appellants also went home. On their way
home, the accused-appellants saw Valencia arguing with Enrico which led to a fistfight. They
tried to pacify Valencia and Enrico, but the latter suddenly fell on the ground. Valencia
immediately ran away, leaving the accused-appellants standing near the body of Enrico.
Villanueva then ran away as he was scared that the bystanders in the tricycle terminal would
gang up on them. On his way home, Villanueva noticed a tricycle boarded by Bañaga and his
companions. Bafiaga then forced him to board the tricycle and, once inside, he was beaten
up by Bañaga and his companions. Villanueva was then brought to the Philippine General
Hospital to be treated.10
On January 3, 2012, Villanueva was brought to the CID office for investigation and thereafter
to the Muntinlupa City Jail where he was detained. Villanueva alleged that Bafiaga
pinpointed him as one of the assailants since he was angry at him as he belonged to the
same group as Valencia. Sayson corroborated Villanueva's testimony as regards the stabbing
incident. He averred that after Enrico fell on the ground, he ran to his house. He was
surprised when the two barangay officials arrived at his house later in the morning that same
day to invite him for questioning.11
Ruling of the RTC
On September 16, 2014, the RTC rendered a Decision,12 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds [the accused-appellants] GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the [RPC] and accordingly sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[The accused-appellants] are likewise directed to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
victim [Enrico] the following:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱26,032.02 as actual damages;
3. ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus for the immediate
transfer of the [accused-appellants] to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Considering that [VALENCIA] remains at large, let an alias Warrant of Arrest be issued against
him to be returned only upon his arrest and in the meantime send this case into the archives
insofar as [Valencia] is concerned.
SO ORDERED.13
The R TC held that there was conspiracy among the accused=appellants and Valencia. 14 In
convicting them of the crime of murder, the RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength considering that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked by the
accused-appellants and Valencia.15
Unperturbed, the accused-appellants appealed the RTC decision to the CA,16 claiming that
the RTC erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime
of murder. They maintained that the RTC improperly appreciated the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength.17 They also assailed the legality of the warrantless arrest
effected by the barangay officials upon Villanueva.18
Ruling of the CA
On April 21, 2016, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision19 affirming the conviction of
the accused-appellants for the crime of murder rendered by the RTC in its Decision dated
September 16, 2014. Thus:
25 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The judgment dated
September 16, 2014 of the [RTC] Branch 276 of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 12-001
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, this appeal. Both the accused-appellants and the Office of the Solicitor General
manifested that they would no longer file with the Court supplemental briefs, and adopted
instead their respective briefs with the CA.21
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision dated September 16, 2014, which found the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.22 One of the circumstances mentioned
in Article 248, which qualifies the killing of the victim to murder, is abuse of superior
strength.
After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the evidence
presented by the prosecution amply demonstrate that Enrico was killed and that it was the
accused-appellants and Valencia who killed him. Prosecution eyewitness Bañaga was able to
identify the accused-appellants and Valencia who killed Enrico. He actually witnessed what
exactly happened on that fateful day and was able to narrate the individual participation of
each of the accused-appellants and Valencia in killing Enrico. They simultaneously attacked
Enrico while he was standing at the tricycle terminal. Villanueva punched Enrico twice on the
face while Sayson hit the latter with a rock. Thereafter, Valencia stabbed Enrico in the chest,
twice, which ultimately caused his death.
Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Both the lower courts concluded that the accused-appellants and Valencia,
having the intent to kill Enrico, employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution
and success of the crime. The RTC concluded that the facts that Enrico was all alone when he
was attacked by the accused-appellants and Valencia, who were armed by a knife and a
stone, are clear indicia of the abuse of superior strength employed by the accused-appellants
and Valencia against Enrico.23 The RTC's conclusion was entirely adopted by the CA.24
The foregoing conclusion is baseless. The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia,
armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not automatically merit the
conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. In People v. Beduya, et al.,25 brothers Ric and Elizer Beduya (Elizer) were
charged for the death of Dominador Acope, Sr.; it was shown that Ric slapped the victim
while Elizer stabbed the latter. The Court, elucidating on the proper appreciation of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, ruled that:
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there
being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate
intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.
The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of
the parties.26 (Citations omitted)
In Valenzuela v. People,27 brothers Ramie and Hermie Valenzuela (Hermie) were charged
with the crime of frustrated murder committed against Gregorio Cruz (Gregorio). It was
shown in that case that when Gregorio was walking, Ramie and Hermie suddenly appeared
behind him; that Ramie held his shoulder, while Hermie stabbed him twice at the left side of
his back. The Court ruled that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was
not sufficiently established in the said case, viz.:
Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that abuse of superior strength was present
because the petitioner "held the arms of [Gregorio] to facilitate the stabbing by his brother
(Hermie) and to limit the degree of resistance that [Gregorio] may put up." The trial court, in
particular, held that "there is no doubt that accused took advantage of their combined
strength when one held [Gregorio] by the shoulder and armpit and the other inflicted two
stab wounds on the left side of his back." We find this reasoning erroneous.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime. Evidence must show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the
age, size and strength of the parties.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in
age, size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed
with a knife, attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a
knife, is not per se indicative of abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does
not indicate the presence of this circumstance. Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely
from the victim's possibly weaker physical constitution. In fact, what the evidence shows in
this case is a victim who is taller than the assailants and who was even able to deliver
retaliatory fist blows against the knife-wielder.28 (Citations omitted)
In this case, the prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in
age, size, strength or force between the accused-appellants and Valencia, on one hand, and
Enrico, on the other. Indeed, the lower courts merely inferred the existence of qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength on the facts that Enrico was attacked by three
assailants, the accused-appellants and Valencia, who were armed with a knife and a stone.
However, mere superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior
strength.29
Accordingly, the Court is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of abuse of
superior strength by the lower courts. The accused-appellants' guilt is, thus, limited to the
crime of homicide.
The accused-appellants' claim that there was no proof of the conspiracy among them and
Valencia is untenable. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.30 "Conspiracy can be inferred
from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests."31 The evidence
26 | P a g e
presented by the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellants and Valencia, through their acts, indeed agreed to kill Enrico. On this
score, the RTC's disquisition is apropos:
From the testimony of the principal eyewitness, it is clear that the three (3) accused were
united by a single purpose, that is, to bring about the death of the victim. They acted with a
common objective to harm and inflict fatal blows on the victim. The three (3) accused were
together looking for the victim Enrico. When they saw Enrico, they simultaneously attacked
him. While [the accused-appellants] respectively boxed and hit with a stone the victim
Enrico, [Valencia] delivered the fatal stabs. The individual acts of the three accused, taken
together, undoubtedly points to a single objective which is to harm or inflict serious injuries
to the victim, or x x x put an end to his life. This is the very essence of conspiracy. It is settled
that to be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.32
Likewise, without merit is the accused-appellants' contention as regards the validity of their
warrantless arrest. The accused-appellants never raised the supposed illegality of their arrest
prior to their arraignment. In fact, nowhere in any part of the proceedings before the R TC
did the accused-appellants assail the validity of their arrest. The accused-appellants only
brought up the supposed irregularity in their arrest for the first time in their appeal to the
CA. It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.33
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. Since there are
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,34 each of the accused-appellants should be
sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is that properly
imposable under the RPC, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Accordingly, minimum term of the prison sentence that should be imposed upon each of the
accused-appellants must be within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor. On the other hand, the maximum term of the indeterminate prison
sentence must be within the range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court affirms the award of actual damages to the heirs of Enrico in the amount of
₱26,032.02 considering that the said amount was properly supported by receipts.35 Pursuant
to People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta,36 the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
₱50,000.00 is affirmed. However, the award of moral damages should be decreased from
₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. Also, the award of exemplary damages is deleted in the absence
of any aggravating circumstance. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated April 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07069 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena and
Alvin Sayson y Esponcilla are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and shall accordingly each suffer an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
They are directed to pay the heirs of victim Enrico Enriquez ₱26,032.02 as actual damages,
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. They are likewise ordered
to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR., accused-appellant.
DISSENTING OPINION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of a firearm
did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in the
course of her husband’s altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the Garden
of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the
accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and
accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately preceding the
shooting are controverted by both parties but the events leading to this tragedy are not
disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private
complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on
their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu
Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a
maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his
nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection near the Garden of
Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and
the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their two
vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellant’s vehicle for
some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so.1 Noel Andres then got
out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant’s car window.2 This is as far as their versions
of the incident coincide.
The prosecution’s version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to be
careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to this
Gonzalez allegedly replied, "Accidents are accidents, what’s your problem." Andres stated
that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when
he was blocked by the appellant’s son who said, "Anong problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres
testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the
driver’s seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk
back to appellant’s son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said "Binaril kami". He turned
to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw
his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and
Dino were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his
vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his family
27 | P a g e
to the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three were then taken to the Sta.
Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
The defense’s version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellant’s path by positioning
his FX obliquely along the appellant’s lane from the latter’s left side. Andres then got out of
his vehicle, stood beside the appellant’s car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant,
"Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo
mo."3 The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, "Pasensiya ka na hindi kita
nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." The appellant Gonzalez and another witness for the
defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way
that it is straight in front of the appellant’s car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again
and continued shouting and cursing at the appellant. 4 Dino, the appellant’s son, who rode in
another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his father’s car behind him. When
Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino
and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with
Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot
where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove compartment and
feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw that
Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun. This is when the
appellant’s daughter Trisha who was riding in Dino’s car arrived at the scene, walked past
Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father and in the process
held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun
accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did not know he shot somebody until the
private complainant’s sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied
small boy. The defense claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the
complainant’s sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated
Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:
"That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal
violence by means of treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the person of Noel
Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but instead
hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoño, on the left back portion of her head, thereby inflicting
upon her serious and mortal wound which directly caused her death, as well as hitting John
Kenneth Andres y Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y Ordoño physical injuries which ordinarily would
have caused their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of some cause or causes, independent of their will, that is, the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to John Kenneth Andres y Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y Ordoño to
their damage and prejudice as well as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Feliber
Andres y Ordoño."
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die
instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl5 by caesarian section and died the
following morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy Report6 states:
"FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post mortem lividity.
Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Surgical incisions were noted at left
tempero-parietal region. Surgical incisions is also noted at the abdominal region secondary to
a caesarian section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 1 by 0.9 cm,
9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm., directed
posteriorwards, slightly downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left
temporal bones, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with a deformed slug fragment
embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left cerebral hemisphere. (2)
hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline. There
are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 ½ glassful of partially
digested food particles mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head."
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their faces. They
were discharged from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the complex
crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for
the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant to
the maximum of the imposable penalty which is death. The trial court held:
"Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal declarations of the
accused that the court ‘a quo’ has jurisdiction over the case; that he owns the black Gluck 9
mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet
was fired from his gun; and that the victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this exegesis
and the declarations in open court of the eyewitness of both the prosecution and some of
the defense, there is no real dispute on the antecedent facts showing that the accused fired
on Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John Kenneth
Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of the latter. The
court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made in their memorandum
demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of events leading to the death of Feliber
Andres and the wounding of John Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as follows:
First is when Noel Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path;
Second is when Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third is
when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused; Forth is when,
Inocencio seeing his son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect Dino; and
Fifth is when Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to reach
for the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance and as he was falling backward
to his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear window of the Tamaraw FX van and the
gun accidentally went off hitting the victim, who were all then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in this case
which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. Practically, the stages before an automatic firearm would be
capable of firing are as follows: 1) the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the
cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the releasing of the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the
trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will hit the cartridge to propel the bullet
out to hit the target. Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is
loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety pin is
engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However,
even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall
not be achieved. Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and
28 | P a g e
forms employed for its execution is already conceived. And once it is tended directly and
specifically to insure its execution, it consequently produces the conscious and deliberate
intention. Finally if all the acts of execution had been effectively done without risk on the
part of the offender arising from any defense coming from the offended party, treachery
results. In brief, there is treachery when the offender commits any crime against persons,
employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make (People vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G.
R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate treachery two (2) conditions must be present,
to wit: 1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711; People vs. Peña, G. R. No. 116022,
July 1, 1998, p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically, the accused is
positive of the crime charged against him. When he alighted with a drawn gun to protect his
son and released all the safety measures of his gun as he fired and missed at Noel who was
then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which
resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate that the accused has executed the two (2)
conditions to generate treachery enough to qualify the crime committed to murder."
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y Esquivel
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder penalized under Art. 248, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of Death by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for the injuries
sustained by the deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of P23,622.58 representing the
expenses for the untimely delivery of the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for the injuries
sustained by the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely death of his wife
Feliber Andres and for the injuries caused to his son John Kenneth Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees and a fee of P2,000.00 per
appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained by the victim Kevin
Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED."
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
"1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there was treachery by
taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to due process when it took judicial notice of the feature of the automatic
pistol involved in this case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-Appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong,
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act,
incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the shooting incident
was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic principle that the
accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-Appellant to pay for
the civil liabilities."
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from
criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres
much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha approached
and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant
tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit
the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX. The appellant claims that he did not see
the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is corroborated by the
testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who testified that the windows of Andres’
vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person outside the vehicle would not be able to see if
there are people inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel
Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly. The defense asserts that
the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of treachery and without
the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime committed is homicide, not
murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding that the shooting
happened in a matter of seconds and that it was preceded by a heated argument between
the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that the shooting could not have been attended
by treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously and deliberately employ the
mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against any one of the actual victims, to insure its
execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged
intended victim. And yet, the trial court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the
loading of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the release of
the safety pin and the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of his automatic pistol constitute
conscious and deliberate effort to employ the gun as a means of committing the crime and
resultantly, qualified its commission by treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the
appellant loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that very moment when his son Dino and
Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on record. The appellant testified
that his gun was loaded before he left the house and two witnesses for prosecution stated in
court that a few seconds after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting at each other, the
29 | P a g e
appellant got out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side of the complainant’s
vehicle. Further, the appellant assigns as error the procedure adopted by the trial court in
taking judicial notice that the gun used by the appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it
will not fire unless aimed at the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court is
contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.7 The trial court should have given both
parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if necessary, to inform the
court on the subject matter. The appellant argues that the factual finding borne by such
erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the appellant is a semi-automatic
and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used has no external safety pin to be
released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The pulling of the trigger, intentional or
not, will fire the gun. The use of a semi-automatic pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro and Ramos were
improperly given credence by the trial court. The appellant contends that a reading of their
testimonies would show that their narration of the incident is rather absurd and would show
that they did not witness the actual shooting. Defense witnesses, Gonzalez and his daughter,
Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro and Ramos arrived at the scene only after the
shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that considering that
there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in the hospital only for six days, the crime
committed is physical injuries. It is argued that the trial court erred in awarding damages. The
bunch of receipts allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred for the injuries
sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in evidence, without first requiring the
prosecution to establish the authenticity of the receipts. The appellant also points out that
the award for loss of earning capacity has no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the
time of the incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial court’s rejection of the mitigating
circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended the commission of the
crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that these mitigating
circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by the evidence on
record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw the appellant getting red
in anger after they, Andres and the appellant, had a heated argument immediately prior to
the shooting. These admitted circumstances show that the appellant was not in his proper
state of mind at the time of the shooting. First, he was angered by Andres’ abusive language
and later he got out of his car with a loaded gun to protect his son from a perceived danger.
The appellant clams that his willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to the
police should likewise be considered as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of
penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime committed by the appellant for the
death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. The appellee takes into consideration that
the shooting was preceded by a heated argument and that the supposed victim was placed
on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that the shooting was done impulsively.
There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately employed the means of attack to insure
execution of the crime and at the same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from the private
complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant that the trial court erred in
equating the use of an automatic pistol with treachery. The trial court made the factual
finding that the appellant’s automatic pistol would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is
deliberately pulled and hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if
we follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant intended to
shoot at the complainant’s vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last window on the left
side of the FX away from where Andres was allegedly seated. The fact that the gun was
drawn and fired does not mean that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately
employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the appellee disagrees
with the contention that the appellant is liable only for slight physical injuries. The injuries
sustained by both children are head injuries and could have caused their death if not for the
immediate medical attention given them. The number of days spent in the hospital is not
determinative of the severity of the wounds. Their nature and location should instead be
considered. The appellant cannot escape liability for frustrated homicide for the injuries of
the two children on the ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel Andres. He is
liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime committed is different
from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can be
considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the appellant did not
voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears from the testimonies of witnesses that he
entertained the possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the exit of the
memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is belied by his own
admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he lowered his hand
holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the time of the
shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate the commission of
the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by the trial court.
The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber Andres was a 38 year
old registered nurse at the time of the shooting. Although she was then unemployed on
account of her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and the trial court properly applied
the salary of a government nurse under the salary standardization scheme in the
computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity. The receipts presented in evidence
by the prosecution to establish hospitalization and other medical expenses incurred by the
private complainants by reason of the injuries suffered by the victims were duly
authenticated by the prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that they are exact
copies of the original receipts presented in court. The objections raised by the appellant in
this regard were duly met by the evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single shot and in the
process committed four offenses the appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of
homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated homicide against Kevin and
Kenneth and attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules on complex crimes
the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e., reclusion temporal for homicide, should be imposed
in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two
elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would insure the
safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter
30 | P a g e
without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender.8 The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack
was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack as
treacherous.9This is of particular significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by
the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter
accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.10 The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately
adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time
eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.11 Accordingly, it has been
consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed
at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a
treacherous mode of attack.12 Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden
attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting
the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be
without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal.13 For the rules on
treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused,
unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter.14
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack succeeds against its
intended victim or injures another or whether the crime committed is graver than that
intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the
said qualifying circumstance may still be considered by the court.15 Thus, the determining
factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the
resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its execution.16
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have
been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.17
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended
by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They were
total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial
park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned
by a short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the improvident
use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it would appear that
Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with him, among others, on board the
Tamaraw FX provoked the altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle with that of the
appellant, he tailed behind the latter’s car towards the exit until he had the chance to cut
him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic rules.18 Andres stated in court that he
calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and denied that he was angry when he
alighted from his vehicle to confront the appellant.19 His statement is belied by the
witnesses, two prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that Andres
quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the appellant for the latter’s recklessness at the
intersection.20 The appellant narrated in court that Andres repeatedly shouted at him,
"Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na gago ka pa".21 Andres’ hostile behavior towards the
appellant is evident from his statement in court that he noticed the appellant turning red in
anger.22 It is highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in anger had Andres been
polite, as he claims he was, in scolding Gonzalez. Andres could have simply communicated to
the appellant his disgust for the latter’s bad driving when he overtook the appellant’s car
near the scene of the shooting but instead he chose to block the appellant’s path, insult and
virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez’ infuriation he immediately walked
towards his vehicle, because according to him the altercation was over. On his way to his FX
he met another man, whom he later found out to be the appellant’s son, Dino. It appears
that the altercation was far from over because again Andres had a shouting match this time
with Dino.23 In a matter of seconds, the appellant alighted from his car and fired a single shot
at the last window on the left side of Andres’ vehicle at an angle away from Noel Andres. The
single bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal region above the left
eye and the two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces, one at the
cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating arrangement of the victims
inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures of the vehicle 24 one of
which shows a mass of blood stains on the left side (towards the driver’s seat) of the white
seat cover below the head rest25, would show that the deceased Feliber must have been
seated at the front passenger’s seat and the children at the middle row behind the driver’s
seat.26 Another picture shows a bullet hole on the last window on the left side of the
vehicle27 and another shows that the front windshield appears undamaged.28 A ballistics
expert appeared in court for the prosecution and testified that the bullet fired at the FX came
from the appellant’s gun, which fact was admitted by the defense. The prosecution did not
inquire from the ballistics expert regarding the trajectory of the bullet or the approximate
distance of the appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not the
appellant aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at the latter’s vehicle.29
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by treachery as
she was inside the FX witnessing her husband’s altercation, first, with the appellant then with
the appellant’s son, totally defenseless from the shot that came suddenly from her left side.
Public outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was then
pregnant with her second child and her death left a new born baby girl and a two year old
boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of treachery and
any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of an offense, in favor of the
accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel
Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not disputed that the
appellant’s car was directly behind the complainant’s FX and that Gonzalez who was then
seated at the driver’s seat alighted from his car, took a few steps then fired at the left side of
the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated at the driver’s seat inside his vehicle when Gonzalez
fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of the driver’s seat
outside his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired away from Noel
Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her temple above the left eye indicating that she was
facing left towards her husband when the shot was fired.30 The direct hit on Feliber’s head
shows that the angle of the shot was indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for
the prosecution testified that had the appellant intended to kill Noel Andres he could have
shot directly at him, considering that Noel Andres was just a few steps away from him 31 and
that Noel Andres was visible from the outside because his window was partially open. 32 The
pictures show that the bullet hole was on the third window on the left side of the Tamaraw
31 | P a g e
FX33 belying any attempt to shoot Noel Andres. Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and Castro
unequivocally declared that "nothing or no one" prevented Gonzalez from shooting directly
at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply done so if he wanted to. But after
alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and shot at the left side window of the FX.34
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to
treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned himself
behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the
evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellant’s car was not of his own doing
but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after
the latter cut off the appellant’s path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alight
from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it.35 For his part Gonzalez
categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened Andres during their
short spat.36 Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not react to Andres’ cursing
until the latter was having an altercation with the appellant’s son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed
that he perceived that his son was in imminent danger.37 Whether he overreacted or he shot
at Andres’ vehicle out of rage over Andres’ aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to
us, that the shooting was not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX
are heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if anybody was inside. 38
The pictures of the FX39 on record confirm the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses that the other passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez
admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned that he has passengers with him while he was
shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no indication that Gonzalez had any
opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on
record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack
to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any decisive
evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime committed is
homicide.40
The trial court’s finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer and finally the
pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of appellant to use the gun as
a means of a treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot
be divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was involved. 41 The entire incident
happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by witnesses, and as noted by the trial
court.42 It was error to our mind for the trial court to divide the assault in stages to arrive at
the conclusion that the mode of attack was consciously employed by the appellant. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of his
car, the appellant testified that he loaded his gun before he left the house and that it was
ready to fire when he alighted his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of
attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX a few
seconds after Dino and Noel Andres started shouting at each other.43 We note further that
the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the appellant prepared his gun to shoot,
this was an indication of the deliberate employment of the gun as a means to kill; i.e. that
the use of an automatic pistol shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery, unless it is
shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun to insure the
commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed above,
the encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance encounter and the
appellant’s gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before he left his house. The
shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made by the appellant
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant. Jurisprudence
teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not obtaining. In the case of People vs.
Valles,44 the accused, a security guard, fired his Armalite and mortally wounded the victim
when the latter approached the accused four times insisting on entering the workplace
wearing improper uniform, then cursed and insulted and challenged the accused to a fight.
We held that the shooting was not attended by treachery as the shooting was preceded by a
heated altercation at the instance of the victim. It is to be noted that the kind of weapon
used against an unarmed victim was not taken into consideration in determining the
attendance of treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the accused under the
particular circumstances of a case that determines its attendance in the commission of a
crime. We find that the prosecution has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting
was attended by treachery and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death of
Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed are
two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime
committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of
the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.45 In a case wherein the
accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit by a stray bullet
causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the crime committed is slight
physical injuries.46 In case of doubt as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be
convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.47We have earlier pointed out that the
intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small metallic fragment was
extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while another fragment was extracted from Kevin
"immediately below the level of his skin before the cheek bone".48 An examination of the
testimonies of the attending physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the two
children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death if left
untreated. One of the attending physician testified in court that the fragments themselves
"will not cause complication, it is the entry of the fragment" or the open wound that is
susceptible to infection.49 Two small fragments were no longer extracted from the face of
Kevin Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication. 50 We note that
the various sizes of the metallic fragments were not established, at least to give an indication
of the severity of the wounds sustained. Both children were discharged after six days of
treatment and there is no showing that they required subsequent treatment or that they
were immobilized for a greater number of days by reason of the injuries sustained.
Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the number of days required for
their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained by the children
are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code which
imposes a penalty of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries sustained
that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine days or required medical attendance for the
same period. For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the complainant, Noel Andres, as
above stated, the information for attempted homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense,
were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary
surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards the gate of the
32 | P a g e
memorial park while he was questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres and
onlookers blocked his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.51
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this
mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient
to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the
crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the
unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s mind; and that (3) "the passion
and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or
revenge".52 Noel Andres’ act of shouting at the appellant’s son, who was then a nurse and of
legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused.
Besides, the appellant’s son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case
wherein the appellant’s son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his
reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellant’s claim of
provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to
commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime
committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the
case.53 The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be
demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant’s
vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant
and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally,
the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong
and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed
and the injury sustained by the victim.54 The appellant’s use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the
appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to
produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries
committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two or
more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing
another; in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25 defines grave
felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or afflictive penalties
from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light
felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos.
Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing a single shot are
one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light
felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which requires two or
more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly established by
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported by the original receipts for
hospitalization and other medical expenses presented in evidence by the prosecution. The
award for loss of earning capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that while Feliber
Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time of death, it is not disputed that she
was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres also testified that he and his
wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work after Feliber had given birth to their second
baby. While there is no evidence as to Feliber’s actual income at the time of her death, in
view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy, we do not consider it
reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning capacity to that of the salary of a
government nurse under the salary standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable
assessment of her earning capacity at the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous to
deny her spouse and her minor children damages for the support that they would have
received, considering clear evidence on record that she did have earning capacity at the time
of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the injuries sustained
by the two children, which under the circumstances are reasonable, are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby
found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres
and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190322 November 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his
victim from behind. "Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when une)(pected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it."1
On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y
Viscarra (appellant) of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱35,000.00 for funerale) (penses, and ₱16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under
Article248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the Information4 filed
against him read:
33 | P a g e
That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill one Romeo Gibaga, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said deadly weapon the said Romeo Gibaga, hitting him on
the trunk, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wound[s] which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon (Maricris),
Anselmo Benito (Anselmo), and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga (Linda), the wife of the
victim Romeo, and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula), the Medico-Legal officer
who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, also testified for the prosecution.
Their testimonies are summarized below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo were
walking on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and her son were
tailing them about four meters behind. As they were making their way to the market, they
saw appellant in his store located on the right side of the street. Suddenly, appellant rushed
towards them and stabbed Romeo twice - one on the chest and another on the abdomen.
They were all caught by surprise due to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to the
ground while appellant quickly ran away from the scene. Aurelio chased appellant but failed
to catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeo’s house to inform his wife Linda about what
had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not find
her husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the Sapang Palay District
Hospital. Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical Center where he died after
three days. Linda testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that appellant was his
assailant.6
Due to Romeo’s injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent ₱16,770.69 for hospital expenses,
₱35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab wound
penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen pierced the
pancreas and his small intestines. Both stab wounds appeared to have been caused by a
single-bladed weapon.7
Version of the Defense
The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the witness
stand that on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction
worker in a site 8 to 9 kilometers away from his residence. On his way home, Nestor Basco,
his neighbor, informed him about a stabbing incident that had just taken place near his
home. Upon arriving at his house, his wife and his parents told him that the stabbing incident
took place in front of their store and that the alleged assailant passed through their yard to
the street at the back. The alleged assailant managed to escape, and the stabbing was
wrongly imputed against appellant. On December 9, 2004, appellant was arrested. He
claimed that he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the stabbing incident. The
only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he turned down
Anselmo’s request for ₱200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when they were having a
drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the stabbing incident. According to appellant,
Anselmo got infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the crime of
murder. Itfound that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery as it was "sudden and unexpected such that [Romeo] was unable to react or
defend himself from the assault of [appellant]"8
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the family of the deceased Romeo
Gibaga the following amounts:
1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses;
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its August
28,2009 Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84,
Malolos City is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of the victim are
additionally awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the same
issues he raised before the CA.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.11
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Citing the testimony12 of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant posits that the eye
witnesses could not have possibly identified the true assailant because it was already 5:45
p.m. and the place where the stabbing incident occurred was almost shrouded in darkness.
Appellant also stresses that witness Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk at the time of
the incident, thereby impairing his perception and making his judgment in identifying the
assailant unreliable. Because there is uncertainty as to the identity of the true malefactor,
appellant asserts that he is entitled toan acquittal.
We are not persuaded.
The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, viz:
34 | P a g e
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio])
straightforward and credible, hence, [deserving] recognition and respect as truthful account
of what actually transpired during the incident in question. The Court likewise noted the
assertions of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are familiar with or know the accused
and the victim well since they are neighbors in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte City,
Bulacan. The Court therefore does not doubt [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] in identifying
the accused as the attacker and assailant of [Romeo]. Besides, no evidence was offered to
show ulterior motive on the part of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] to testify falsely against
the accused.13
It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was not based
solely on the testimony of Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant
as the person who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and Maricris were consistent in their
testimonies identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Excerpts of their
testimonies are reproduced below:
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Gibaga. [W]hile
you were walking, what happened if any?
[ANSELMO BENITO:]
A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir.
Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed?
A: He was at myleft side, sir.
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he?
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir.
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on your left, you
mentioned that somebody came and stabbed this Romeo Gibaga[. W]ere you able to see or
notice where this assailant came from before he stabbed Romeo Gibaga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: He came from behind, sir.
xxxx
Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this Romeo Gibaga
actually saw the assailant before he was stabbed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: None, sir.
Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed?
A: Because he was not aware, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who stabbed Romeo
Gibaga[. I]f he is now present, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainee’s t-shirt who identified himself as
Virgilio Amora.
Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom you [have
just] identified[. W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in stabbing Romeo Gibaga?
A: No, sir.14
xxxx
[FISCAL ROQUE :]
Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x any unusual
incident that transpired?
[MARICRIS ALIDON:]
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?
A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.
Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was he?
A: Virgilio Amora, sir.
Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora.15
It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. Astestified to by the witnesses and correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, he was the
person who attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that their motive
for falsely testifying against him was because of his refusal to give them money for shabu.
The Court finds that appellant’s assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant
consideration. His explanation is neither supported by evidentiary proof nor buttressed by
established facts. We have consistently ruled that positive identification by credible
witnesses prevails over self-serving statements of the accused. Such statements cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was working at a
construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He argues that it was
thus impossible for him to be the person who stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him tobe at the scene of the crime"16during its commission. "Physical
impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminisand the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so
far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."17
In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8 to 9
kilometersis quite far, appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his claims
regarding his whereabouts. Aside from his own testimony, appellant did not bother to
present the testimony of other witnesses or any other proof to support his defense. Since he
claimed that his parents and wife saw the stabbing incident and that the assailant allegedly
even entered their yard, it is puzzling why he did not present them as witnesses to bolster his
denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of the
crime. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails
over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."18
35 | P a g e
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-settled
that factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded
great weight and utmost respect given that trial courts have firsthand observation of the
witnesses’ demeanor while testifying in court. We shall not supplant our own interpretation
of the witnesses’ testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
determine the issue of credibility of witnesses. Moreover, in the absence of misapprehension
of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and especially when the CA, asin this case, has affirmed
the findings of the trial judge, the assessments and conclusions of the trial court shall not be
overturned.
Treachery
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." Thus in order for the
qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be
shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the
safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity
being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the means, method, or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence
of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape."19
In this case, the appellant’s suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery was
employed in the commission of the crime.1âwphi1 The eyewitnesses were all consistent in
declaring that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo such that the latter had
no opportunityto defend himself or to fight back.20 The deliberate swiftness of the attack
significantly diminished the risk to himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the
victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to his
torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then attacked Romeo from
the front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and
on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it," 21 as in this
case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder
under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Penalties and Awards of Damages
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, is correct in holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
the lower of the two indivisible penalties, by reason of the absence of any aggravating
circumstance. "It mustbe emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." 22
With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.23 Civil indemnity is
mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the commission of the
crime.24 We uphold the CA in awarding moral damages to the heirs of Romeo in the amount
of ₱50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family." 25 We
likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a crime is committed with
an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages
is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.26 The CA however erred in awarding
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Records show
that the RTC already awarded the heirs of the victim actualdamages consisting of ₱16,770.69
as medical expenses and ₱35,000.00 as funeral expenses. These expenses were fully
supported by receipts.27
Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the finality of this
Resolution until fully paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetuais AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;
(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
(4) the award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and
(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at the legal rate of
6% per annumon all the amounts ofdamages awarded, commencing from the date of finality
of this Resolution until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102705 July 30, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOROTEO MEJORADA y SILLAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leonardo D. Suario for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On appeal is the 14 June 1991 decision1 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 138 (88). The accused therein, now the appellant, was
found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the "penalty of reclusion perpetua
or imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law." Fortunately for the
accused, however, the court a quo decided not to award damages to the offended party
since there was "no showing that filing and other fees have been paid."
It was on 11 October 1988 that the offended party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, filed a
complaint against the accused with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Cruz, Davao del
Sur.2 The latter was subsequently arrested after the court conducted a preliminary
examination. Finding that a prima facie case existed against him, the MTC transmitted the
case records to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Sur3 which, in turn, filed on 8
36 | P a g e
November 1988 with the RTC in Digos an Information charging the accused with the crime of
rape committed as follows:
That on or about October 7, 1988, in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused aforenamed, being then armed with a knife,
and after having forcibly dragged or pushed said Elizabeth B. Regino from her house into a
(sic) grassy ground, and by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge of said Elizabeth B. Regino, against her will;
to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Law and with the aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed in
disregard of the respect due the offended party, she being a school teacher.4
No bail was recommended for the accused's temporary liberty.
Trial on the merits ensued after the accused entered a not guilty plea during his arraignment
on 12 December 1988.5
Presented by the prosecution as its witnesses were Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, Lydia Duterte,
Carlito Duterte, Vice Mayor Proceso Guido and Dr. Lydia Ozoa of the Davao Medical Center.
Mrs. Regino and her husband, Eduardo, then testified as rebuttal witnesses.
On the other hand, the defense called on the accused himself, his wife Nilda and his daughter
Nancy.
On 20 June 1991, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the inevitable conclusion of this Court that the
accused Doroteo Mejorada is guilty of rape as charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua or
imprisonment for life with the accessory penalties of the law. Since there is no showing that
filing and other fees have been paid, there is no award for civil damages. The kitchen knife
used in the rape is confiscated in favor of the State. The accused, however, is entitled to
deduction in the number of days in the service of his prison terms (sic).
SO ORDERED.6
The inculpatory facts, as established by the prosecution's evidence, are summarized by the
trial court as follows:
The prosecution's version may be narrated thus: Mrs. Elizabeth Regino, a public school
teacher, then 25 years of age and married, worked as school (sic) teacher at Sta. Cruz
National High School, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, since 1986. She has been married for four
years and has three children.
In the evening of October 7, 1988, she was sleeping at their house together with Nancy
Mejorada, the accused's daughter. Her husband at that time was attending the nightly prayer
for his dead grandmother. Their three children were brought by her husband to the house of
her mother-in-law, because she was making test questions in preparation for the third
grading period. That was also the reason why she requested Nancy to accompany her
because she was alone in their house. At about 11:40 in the evening, she noticed that
somebody forcibly opened the door. The person came in and was moving around. Their
house is only half finished. So, the door was only tied with a rope. Believing that the person
who went inside was her husband, she stood up in order to switch on the light. Before she
reached the light, she was hugged by the person and a knife was pressed on her face. The
accused pressed her downward and forced her in going out of their house. She was brought
at the back of their house, particularly at the grassy area. She was able to recognize the
accused when he was hit by the light in the chapel. She recognized the knife for the reason
that she used to borrow the same with (sic) her sister. When they were in the grassy area,
she struggled more to completely recognize the person. She made a sudden glance by
swerving her face towards the left and she recognized him to be the accused, Doroteo
Mejorada. She pleaded not (sic) to harm her. The accused did not heed her pleas. He forcibly
pushed her down and she was at the kneeling position with her two hands as a support to
her body. The accused bent his body towards her. She struggled. The knife was touching her
side. The accused kept on telling her not to shout or else he will kill her. She was at the
kneeling position when the accused removed her underwear downward up to her knee. He
(the accused) pushed her down. He succeeded. At that time the accused started to have
sexual intercourse with her by trying to insert his penis in her organ. She felt that it has
penetrated. After the accused satisfied his lust, he withdrew, stood up and left her, leaving
words "ayaw tug-ani ang imong bana ha! Kon motug-an ka, patyon ta ka o kon dili ang imong
bana akong patyon". (Don't tell your husband, otherwise, I'll kill you or I'll kill your husband).
On October 9, 1988, she narrated the whole incident to Vice Mayor Guido in the presence of
her husband. She did not reveal the whole incident to her husband in their house because
she was afraid that her husband might lose his control and probably kill the accused. Vice
Mayor Guido then summoned the accused. When the accused was already with them, and
was informed about her complaint, the accused asked forgiveness and appealed for
settlement. Vice-Mayor Guido prepared a written settlement. When the accused was about
to sign, she shouted, because her conscience could not tolerate being abused by the accused.
Vice-Mayor Guido then decided to bring his matter to the police station for the filing of the
proper complaint, for the case cannot be settled. The accused was brought to the 46th IB's
Station Commander.
On October 10, 1988, she went to Dr. Lydia Ozoa for a medical examination. This was also
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Ozoa. A medical certificate was then issued portion (sic)
of which are quoted herein below:
(A) Physical Examinations:
1. Superficial, Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Right Ring Finger. Distal 3rd.
2. Superficial. Wound 0.25 cm. Proximal to Wound 1.
3. Superficial Wound 0.5 cm. Palmar Aspect of Left Thumb.
4. Superficial Wound 0.2 cm. at the Tip of left Middle Finger.
5. Superficial Wound 3 cm. Right Elbow.
(B) Vulva:
1. Old Median Periveal Laceration.
2. Caruncles Noted on the Hymen. In toitus is Parons Cervic is close, Non-tender
Uterus is small, anteverted. No Adnexal masser: Whitish discharges.
Sperm cell Determination: Presence of Sperm cells.
The same was properly explained and illustrated by Dr. Ozoa and (sic) further identified her
signature in the said medical certificate; She (Dr. Ozoa) asked the victim how she incurred
these injuries and she informed her that she was raped and that she resisted.
The testimony of the victim was also substantiated by Vice-Mayor Guido. The victim and her
husband were in his house on October 9, 1988 at about 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning.
The victim narrated to him the incident. Thinking that he could settle their conflict, being his
neighbors, he requested the appearance of the accused Doroteo Mejorada. That was that
time when the accused asked for forgiveness to (sic) the complainant, claiming that he was
drunk during that incident.
Doroteo Duterte testified that on October 6, 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
accused borrowed his knife because according to him (accused), he will use the knife in
37 | P a g e
butchering the pig. He identified the knife (Exh. "A") used by the accused in threatening the
victim to be the same knife borrowed by the accused from him.7
On the other hand, the accused's version of denial and alibi is condensed by the trial court in
this wise:
Against this evidence of the prosecution, the accused relied mainly on denial and alibi. He
flatly rejected the complainant's allegations, claiming that on October 7, 1988 he was in the
house of Carding Ayop, his companion, working in the Franklin Baker, to help in the
preparation for the barrio fiesta in Astorga. At 10:45 in the evening of the same day, he went
back to his house. He brought a little food for his family. After eating, he had a conversation
with his wife. He slept together with his wife. The wife of the accused also corroborated his
testimony. Same is true with Nancy Mejorada, the daughter of the accused. She declared
that his (sic) father at that evening was in the house of Carding Ayop. She was told by her
mother to accompany Elizabeth in their house. When she was in the house of Elizabeth, they
had a conversation particularly on the fact that Elizabeth's husband left their conjugal home.
At about midnight, when she was about to sleep, she noticed that Elizabeth rose from their
bed and went out. Thinking that Elizabeth will just urinate outside, she continued sleeping.
After few (sic) minutes or an hour, Elizabeth woke her up and told her that she will
accompany her to the place where the vigil was being conducted. She was then requested to
get a glass of water. After drinking, they proceeded to the place of the vigil. On cross, she
further testified that she did not notice of any wound on Elizabeth's hand's nor any dirt of
(sic) her duster.
The defense (sic) version was belied by the complainant and her husband Eduardo on
rebuttal.8
We find both summaries to be accurate and fully supported by the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the witnesses' testimonies.
The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly to the declarations of the offended party; it concluded that Mrs. Regino harbored
no ill-motives to falsely charge the accused with the commission of rape. Moreover, the
court found it difficult to believe that Mrs. Regino, a married woman, would tell her husband
that she had been raped by another married man, a neighbor at that, if there was no truth to
it. It rejected the accused's claim of denial and alibi in view of his having been positively
identified.
Immediately after the promulgation of sentence, the accused filed a Notice of Appeal 9 which
was given due course by the RTC on the same date. 10
In the Appellant's Brief 11 filed on 21 September 1992, the accused assigns this single error:
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
and, in support thereof, alleges that he is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable
doubt because the prosecution's evidence is not clear and convincing while Mrs. Regino's
testimony is "too incredible," "unnatural" and contrary to "common experience," and
contains "deliberate and studied perjury" signifying falsehood. The accused then cites the
incredible and improbable declarations of the offended party together with the reasons for
such a characterization: (a) Mrs. Regino failed to attend the final night's prayer for her
husband's deceased grandmother which would have ended, as it usually does, at 9:00 o'clock
because she had to finish preparing 400 test questions for the third grading period in school;
in fact, she even requested her husband to bring their children, including their two-month
old baby, to her mother-in-law; and yet, Mrs. Regino went to sleep at 10:00 o'clock that same
evening; (b) the accused entered her house to rape her knowing fully well that his twelve-
year old daughter, Nancy Mejorada, was also there; the accused was supposed to have even
struggled with the offended party in the very room where Nancy was sleeping; (c) she said
that she thought it was her husband who entered the house that night; however, she also
knew that the latter would be staying in the wake of his late grandmother; it also seems that
forcing the door open was not her husband's way of entering their house; she likewise
revealed that after discovering that the person who entered was not her husband, she did
not shout for help; (d) the accused was wearing only a pair of briefs despite the fact that the
place of the incident was surrounded by houses and had adequate lighting; moreover,
employees of the Franklin Baker Company were reporting for duty at midnight; (e) she did
not even tell Nancy Mejorada about the rape upon returning to the house; nor did she
inform her husband later on that evening when she went to his grandmother's house and
played "solitaire"; and (f) she said that she was bending over, with her hands supporting her
body and her face looking downward, as she was being supposedly raped by the accused;
despite such a position, she was unable to break free from him.
Insisting that his account is more credible, the accused conjures up a tale of infidelity on the
part of Mrs. Regino. He claims that the latter was having an illicit affair with another man at
the time of the incident. In fact, he avers that the stepped out of her house on the night in
question to meet with the said man. Accused further states that he was framed by this man
who is very powerful; that in the evening of 7 October 1988, Mrs. Regino deliberately
avoided going to the wake of her husband's grandmother and even asked her husband to
bring the children with him because she was going to have a tryst with her paramour; and
that in order to avoid suspicion, she requested Nancy's mother to allow Nancy to accompany
her.
The Appellee refutes the accused's contentions, explains the alleged improbable portions of
the offended party's testimony and urges us to affirm the accused's conviction for rape, with
the modification that moral damages be awarded in favor of the offended party despite the
non-payment of filing and other fees.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
At the core of the controversy is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. On such point,
the trial court had this to say:
In the case at bar, the complainant's version is not bare. It is supported with (sic) witnesses,
especially that of Dr. Lydia Ozoa, who found several wounds and the presence of sperm cells.
Besides, the weapon used in the intimidation was produced . . . .
These evidences and the natural and straightforward testimony of the victim alone would be
too difficult to ignore. It was clear and free from any serious contradiction. It was ringing
throughout with the bell of truth and it bears with (sic) the stamp of absolute candor.
Underiably, it was impeccable. Her mistakes are signs of a story that is free from rehearsals.
12
It is settled that appellate courts will generally respect the findings of the trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses since the latter are in a better position to weigh the conflicting
testimonies, having heard such witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 13 We find
no reason to depart from this salutary rule as a careful examination of the records in this
case reveals that the findings of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence.
Be that as it may, we shall meet the points raised by the accused head-on. We find to be
neither incredible nor improbable the portions of the offended party's testimony which are
assailed by the accused. Mrs. Regino's decision to stay home on the night of 7 October 1988
was satisfactorily explained by her. She had just reported back to her teaching post at the
38 | P a g e
Sta. Cruz National High School after taking a maternity leave. As she was under pressure to
catch up with her work in school, particularly in her preparation of the test questions for the
grading period, she returned even before her 60-day leave period expired. Her staying home
and failing to attend the wake of her husband's grandmother was prompted by nothing more
than her desire to finish the 400 test questions which she had to submit to her school
principal the following day. 14 Such behavior should therefore be seen as a measure of her
dedication and devotion to duty as a public school teacher.
It is to be noted that the accused failed to present the principal, Mrs. Lourdes Bendigo, to
rebut Mrs. Regino's claim regarding the test questions to be submitted for checking, despite
his counsel's manifestation that she would be so summoned to testify. 15 Furthermore, the
accused's own daughter, Nancy, declared that she saw the test questions in the house of
Mrs. Regino 16 that night, thereby confirming the latter's testimony.
The accused's contention that he would not have been so minded to enter the offended
party's house with rape in his heart because he knew that his daughter Nancy was there, had
in fact been rendered academic by his own admission, during the confrontation at Vice
Mayor Guido's house, that he committed the acts attributed to him; in fact, he even asked
for forgiveness from Mrs. Regino. 17 Besides, no evidence was presented to show that the
accused knew or was informed that his daughter was to sleep with Mrs. Regino that night. It
is to be remembered that permission on Nancy's behalf was sought from her mother, and
not from the accused who was then in barangay Astorga. And even if the accused was aware
of such an arrangement, it would not have really mattered as the presence of close relatives
has not deterred men who have descended to the level of beasts and forsaken the highest
and noblest in their humanity. Indeed, we have affirmed many a conviction involving men
charged with raping their own flesh and blood.
Nor would it have been improbable for the accused to have been wearing only a pair of briefs
at the time of the rape because, as he claims, the place of the incident was well-lit and
surrounded by houses, and there were employees of the Franklin Baker Company reporting
for duty at midnight. In the first place, the accused admitted that he was drunk. As the
Appellee correctly noted, a person who is drunk would be capable of doing things he would
not normally do if he were sober. Secondly, the accused's house is only 5-7 meters away
from the house of the Reginos. Moreover, it was not proven that he had walked to the
latter's house with only his briefs on. Hence, it could very well be that the accused removed
his trousers just before entering Mrs. Regino's room. Lastly, the accused failed to present any
witness to testify that at the time of the incident, employees of the Franklin Baker Company
were indeed reporting for work.
Mrs. Regino's initial presumption that the person who entered their house that night was her
husband should not be doubted. As was convincingly explained in the Appellee's Brief, her
husband could have simply forgotten something that he needed for the wake. Besides, the
wake was held in a house just 100 to 110 meters away. 18 It was because of this initial belief
that she did not immediately shout when the accused hugged her from behind. By the time
she realized that it was the accused who was behind her, however, she was already being
tightly held by him and threatened with the knife he was poking at her face. Being thus
effectively intimidated and overwhelmed, she could not be expected to shout. If Mrs. Regino
failed to scream, it was precisely because she feared for her life. Under such circumstances,
her failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make her submission to the criminal
acts of the accused voluntary, since there existed a continuing intimidation which cowed her
and made her realize that crying out for help or offering a spirited resistance would prove
futile. It would likewise be "demanding too much from an ordinary mortal placed under such
a stressful psychological and emotional situation to require that she shout or ward off the
impending evil." 19
Mrs. Regino also satisfactorily explained her failure to immediately inform both her husband
and Nancy Mejorada about the rape. The former
had, at that time, already positively identified the malefactor — Nancy's own father — and
was thus understandably reluctant to disclose such a serious and delicate matter to the
young girl. Mrs. Regino likewise declared that her immediate concern then was to leave the
house as soon as possible because of the accused's threats of death and the fear that he
might come back. 20 Furthermore, when she and Nancy arrived at the house of her husband's
grandmother, her husband had just gone to sleep, and so she decided to wait until he woke
up. In the meantime, however, she played solitaire by herself to give an appearance of
normalcy because, in her own words, "there were many people" and she was ashamed to
reveal the rape at that time. She added that as a teacher, she would be "put into shame." 21
When her husband finally woke up, she merely told him that somebody had entered their
house. She revealed neither the rape nor the malefactor's identity for fear that her husband
"might lose his control and might kill" the accused. She said that she did not want to be
involved in two cases. 22
On re-direct examination, Mrs. Regino further explained her decision not to divulge
everything to her husband immediately and reveal instead the rape during the meeting at
Vice Mayor Guido's residence, thus:
Atty. Almazan (continuing):
Q [w]hy did you not at first tell the whole incident to your husband?
A [i] did not tell/reveal to him completely because of some reasons. [f]irst, [i] am
afraid he might not believe me. [s]econd, [i] am afraid he might entertain doubts on his mind
that the incident was voluntary on my part. [t]hird, [i] was afraid of his (accused) threat that
he will kill my husband, me, and my family, and [i] am afraid to tell the whole story because
of Sta. Cruz will know and it is shameful on my part as teacher (sic).
Q [w]hy did you decide to reveal the entire incident in the house of Vice Mayor
Guido?
A [i] revealed it completely to him, ma'am, because [i) could not tolerate that [i] will
hide something to (sic) my husband especially that [i] was sexually abused. 23
Mrs. Regino's initial fears are not only consistent with the Filipina's traditional modesty and
aversion for airing matters affecting their honor — to the point that some would rather
suffer in silence than admit the dishonor — they are also well-founded in view of the
accused's death threats.
Having been amply explained, the lapse of one and a half days from the time the rape was
consummated until it was finally revealed and reported to the authorities, is no longer
significant. Delay in reporting the rape due to death threats is justified, 24 especially in this
case where the malefactor is the offended party's neighbor. We have also ruled that a delay
of three days before complaining to the authorities due to embarrassment is justified, 25 and
that a lapse of thirty-five days before the victim finally reported the sexual abuse done to her
is not considered unreasonably long as to render the victim's testimony doubtful, if the same
is fully explained and is due to a fear of the malefactor or the shame and dishonor that would
follow its disclosure. 26
Accused's contention that rape is not possible or could not have been consummated in the
manner described by Mrs. Regino, that is, in a "dog-style" position, is without merit. As
correctly pointed out by the Appellee, this Court, in People vs. Saylan, 27 sustained a
conviction for rape where the accused used not only the "missionary position, i.e., male
39 | P a g e
superior, female inferior, but also "[T]he same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind."
In the case at bar, Mrs. Regino even asked if she could demonstrate in open court, during
cross-examination, how the accused accomplished the sexual act, including the positioning of
his hands. The defense counsel, however, denied the request. 28 The case of People v. Bania,
29 which was cited by the accused, is not applicable since the position of the offended party
therein was different; the latter was lying on her back with her panty rolled down to her
knees. We declared in Bania that rape could not have been committed because the accused
therein was clutching a knife on one hand and was holding the offended party's hands with
the other.
The "other man" theory presented by the accused is nothing but a malicious imputation
resorted to in a final attempt to create doubt on the prosecution's version. We find it highly
improbable that the offended party, a public school teacher whose good reputation remains
unsullied and who had just given birth to her third child, would carry on an immoral and illicit
relationship with another man whose identity was never even revealed by the accused. The
alleged liaison is pure concoction as no evidence in support thereof was offered. Moreover,
defense witness Nancy Mejorada never mentioned during her testimony that she saw the
offended party meet anyone on the night of 7 October 1988.
Further reinforcing our belief in Mrs. Regino's story is the fact that she is a married public
high school teacher with three young children. Absent a most compelling reason or motive, it
is inconceivable that she would allow the examination of her private part, subject herself to
the ordeal of a public trial, risk receiving the stigma and social humiliation which accompany
an admission of having been raped or openly and publicly lie or concoct a story which could
very well send a man — her neighbor, no less — to jail. 30 The accused miserably failed to
prove any ill-motive on the part of Mrs. Regino.
The court a quo correctly rejected the accused's claim of alibi. For this defense to have
prospered, the latter should have proven that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. 31 The accused admitted that he had gotten back from Astorga and was already in his
house at around 10:45 p.m. in the evening of 7 October 1988 when the rape was committed.
It bears stressing that his house is just 5 to 7 meters away from the house of the Reginos.
Furthermore, he was positively identified by Mrs. Regino, first inside the house when his face
was illuminated by the light coming from the chapel near her house, and then at the grassy
area behind her house when she suddenly swerved to the left to look at her assailant's face.
32 Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused
perpetrated the crime. 33
It cannot likewise be doubted that in the commission of the rape, the accused used a deadly
weapon — a circumstance which, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, raises
the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death.
As indisputably shown by the evidence, the rape was consummated at the grassy portion
behind the house of the Reginos. It was here that Mrs. Regino was, through threats and
intimidation, forcibly dragged against her will by the accused. That the latter was moved by
lewd designs is beyond doubt as he was wearing only his briefs at the time and did, in fact,
eventually consummate the crime of rape against Mrs. Regino. While it may appear that
forcible abduction, as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code,
was also committed, we are not about to convict the accused for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. First of all, although the information sufficiently alleges the
forcible taking of Mrs. Regino to the grassy ground, the same fails to allege "lewd designs."
Secondly, it appears that the accused's real intention was to rape Mrs. Regino in her room
but that since his daughter was in the same room as she, he decided to forcibly drag her
instead to the rear of the house. Given such circumstances, the incidental forcible abduction
was absorbed in the crime of rape. We have held that rape may absorb forcible abduction if
the main objective was to rape the victim. 34
The trial court should have, however, appreciated against the accused the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and ignominy 35 which, though not alleged in the information,
were duly proven without objection on the part of the accused. At twenty minutes to
midnight, the latter unleashed the fury of his criminal mind on a sleeping victim. He defiled
the sanctity of Mrs. Regino's home by forcibly opening its door. Wanting to force upon her
his evil desires, he hugged her and then pressed a knife to her face without any provocation
on her part. He thereupon had sexual intercourse with her in a "dog-style" position. While
such a position has been resorted to by consenting adults, it adds ignominy when employed
in rape cases. 36
Such aggravating circumstances would have justified the imposition of the greater penalty of
death pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering, however, that the
Constitution prohibits its imposition, 37 the appropriate imposable penalty would be reclusion
perpetua, which the trial court correctly imposed, although it sought to define the same as
"imprisonment for life." The penalty of reclusion perpetua is not, of course, similar to or
synonymous with "life imprisonment." As this Court has repeatedly ruled in many cases,
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous but distinct in nature, duration
and accessory penalties. 38
However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in not
awarding civil damages to Mrs. Regino for the alleged lack of payment of filing and other
fees. There can be no question that rape necessarily entitles the victim to moral damages as
a result of the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation 39 that accompany the crime. In fact, Article 2219 of the Civil Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of, inter alia, rape.
The non-payment of the filing and other fees should not have barred the trial court from
awarding damages. In General vs. Claravall, 40 this Court, in clarifying further the issue of
filing fees for the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case, ruled that:
In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and
certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the
offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it
separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of damages other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information" filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court for trial;"
2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in
the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid
and shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual
damages."
Conformably with the current policy of this Court, we hereby award Mrs. Regino moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. 41 Considering further the perversity with which the
accused committed the crime — particularly by his having violated the sanctity of her home
and grievously defiled the institution of marriage by raping a married school teacher — the
40 | P a g e
imposition of exemplary damages by way of example, i.e., to deter others from committing
similar acts, or correction for the public good, 42 herein fixed at P25,000.00, is in order.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, subject to the modification above
indicated, the appealed decision of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur in
Criminal Case No. 138 (88). As modified, the accused is further ordered to pay the offended
party, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Regino, the sums of P50,000.00 in concept of moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134802 October 26, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO Z. DIZON, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219, in Crim. Case No. Q-97-71910, finding Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty of Robbery
with Rape, attended by two aggravating circumstances, imposing upon him the penalty of
Death and ordering him to pay complainant Arlie Rosalin P9,500.00 for actual damages,
P200,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Culled principally from the testimony of private complainant, the facts of the case are as
follows:
On July 7, 1997, around 9:30 p.m., private complainant Arlie Rosalin, then a 21-year old
engineering student from Dinalupihan, Bataan, alighted from a bus as it stopped by a small
bridge along EDSA just before Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.2 Seconds later, she heard
someone call out "Miss!" and when she turned her head around, she found appellant behind
her.3 Appellant suddenly seized her, pointing a fan knife to the side of her neck, and
announced a holdup. He then told her to face the railing of the bridge and asked for her
wallet and jewelry. Terrified, private complainant complied. Still not content, though,
appellant got her backpack, warning her that should he find another wallet inside, he would
kill her and throw her over the bridge as he had done to his other victims.4
After appellant stripped her of her valuables, appellant instructed private complainant to
walk with him along EDSA and pretend that they were a couple. 5 They crossed Roosevelt
Avenue, passed the Muñoz market, then headed for Project7. Private complainant could not
ask for anyone's help because, all the while, appellant had his arm around her and a knife
pressed to her side.6 Appellant further frightened her by telling her that he had already killed
many people.7 Scared as she was, however, private complainant would furtively look at
appellant's face whenever they passed a lighted place, vowing to herself that should she ever
be able to escape, she would remember him and have him arrested.8
After walking for some time, they finally reached a dark and empty basketball court. 9 There,
appellant ordered private complainant to remove her pants and underwear. Private
complainant could not do anything but follow appellant's orders since he was holding her at
knifepoint. Besides, even if she screamed, nobody would hear her. 10
Appellant kissed private complainant on the lips, neck, and breasts, which he also mashed. 11
He likewise bit her nipple at least three times, as well as the right side of her back and
vagina.12 Unable to control his lustful urges any longer, he forced her to bend forward over
the hood of a taxi and, in this position, forcefully penetrated her vagina with his organ. 13
After satisfying himself in this fashion, appellant ordered private complainant to hold and
massage his penis which, he boastfully informed the latter, carried bolitas. 14 He then forced
her to put his foul-smelling penis into her mouth, which sickened her to the pit of her
stomach.15
Still not done with her, appellant forced private complainant to lie on the ground.16 Private
complainant could not fight off any of appellant's demands, because whenever she tried to
resist, and whenever she failed to answer any of his questions, he would bang her head on
the hood of the taxi, slam her head on the wall, or slap her hard in the face.17
After appellant pushed private complainant to the ground, he went down on her and
proceeded to ravish her all over again.18
Though admittedly spent by now, appellant still refused to let go of private complainant.
Instead, he made her sit astride over him, and to make sure she would not be able to escape,
held her tightly by the hair with both hands.19When private complainant balked at inserting
his organ inside of hers, appellant removed one hand from her hair and groped in the dark. 20
Sensing that he was reaching for his knife and would finally kill her, private complainant
struggled with all her might and broke free from appellant's hold. She scampered to her feet,
grabbed her pants, and ran as fast as she could away from appellant.21
Soon, private complainant found a store that was about to close. She barged in, informing
the people that she had been raped, and pleaded for their help. However, the owner of the
store did not want to get involved. Instead, he reminded her to wear her pants, then referred
her to the barangay.22
When a barangay officer arrived, he accompanied her back to the basketball court, where
they were able to recover her shoes, underwear, and appellant's black cap.23 Since appellant
was no longer around, private complainant just gave a description of him: he was dark, 5'3"
to 5'4" in height, and with a body covered with tattoos from the waist down. 24 Private
complainant was then brought to the police station where her statement was taken.25
About three days later, the barangay informed private complainant that they already had a
suspect who matched appellant's description. Accompanied by policemen, among others,
she went to the vicinity of the Muñoz market, where appellant was reportedly working as a
tricycle dispatcher.26 After some anxious moments of searching in the crowd, private
complainant finally caught sight of appellant and pointed him out to her companions. 27 One
of the police officers accosted appellant and asked him if he knew private complainant. 28
Upon seeing her, appellant pulled out the same fan knife he had earlier used on her. 29 He
was not quick enough, however, because the police officers were able to disarm him.
Appellant was then handcuffed and brought to the police station.30
In an Information31 dated July 14, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor Mercedes D. Penamora
charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of July, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain, by means of force and violence against and/or intimidation
upon person did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the person of one
ARLIE ROSALIN Y NICDAO in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned while said complainant was walking along the sidewalk of EDSA, Muñoz, this
city after alighting from a passenger bus, said accused suddenly appeared and embraced
complainant and at knife point announced a hold-up and then and there rob, took and carted
away the following items, to wit:
One necklace w/pendant P300.00
41 | P a g e

Two (2) gold rings 5,000.00
One bag pack containing Assorted clothes 2,000.00
One (1) paper bag (bench) Containing stuff toys 200.00
Perfume 1,000.00
Cash 1,000.00
all in the total amount of P9,500.00, Philippine Currency, all belonging to said ARLIE ROSALIN
y NICDAO, to her damage and prejudice and on the occasion of the robbery, accused with
lewd designs and with force and intimidation and with use of a knife undressed said
complainant and put himself on top of her and have carnal knowledge with said ARLIE
ROSALIN y NICDAO against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the said ARLIE ROSALIN Y NICDAO.
"Contrary to law."
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on August 7, 1997, with the assistance
of Atty. Donato A. Mallabo.32 Trial proceeded in due course. The prosecution presented as
witnesses the victim herself, Arlie Rosalin; SPO1 Cristopher Hael, a police officer assigned at
the Baler Police Station who testified on the circumstances leading to the arrest of the
accused; PO1 Emelito de la Cruz, the police investigator; and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the PNP
medico-legal officer who conducted the examination on Arlie Rosalin.
The appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant's testimony was not
corroborated by any other witness. His testimony consisted mainly of denials of his
involvement in the crime being imputed against him. He averred that as a tricycle dispatcher,
he used to work from 7:00 o'clock to 11:00 o'clock in the morning and from 2:00 o'clock to
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that on the evening of July 7, 1997, he was just at home
resting; that he was at work when he was arrested and when he was brought to the police
station, he was beaten up; that he told the police that he had nothing to do with what
happened to the complainant and that he saw her for the first time only when he was
arrested; that he did not know of any reason why she singled him out and filed a case against
him; and that when he was brought to the fiscal, he again denied the charges against him.
On July 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with rape under paragraph one, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, attended by two aggravating circumstances,
the Court hereby sentences him (1) to suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to indemnify
complainant Arlie Rosalin in the amount of P9,500.00 as actual damages; (3) to pay her
P200,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) to pay the costs.
"Let the records of the case be transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
"SO ORDERED."
Appellant impugns the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:
"1. The lower court erred in convicting the accused when in truth and in fact he was
not positively identified by the victim.
"2. The lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and
uninhabited place against the accused.
"3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with rape in violation of Art. 294, Par. 1 (should be par. 2) of the Revised
Penal Code."
We affirm the trial court's decision.
Being interrelated, appellant's first and third assigned errors, which boil down to a question
of credibility of the private complainant, will be discussed jointly.
In assailing the credibility of the private complainant, appellant puts the following in issue:
First, appellant states that he has only two hands; hence, it was impossible for him to remove
his pants, restrain private complainant, and hold a fan knife all at the same time.
Second, appellant points out an alleged inconsistency between private complainant's account
of rape and her alleged refusal to escape her rapist despite opportunity to do so.
Third, appellant argues that he was not positively identified by private complainant because
somebody had to tell her where he was when she and the police went out to look for him at
the market place in Muñoz.
We find appellant's arguments to be untenable.
On the first point, it is not impossible for appellant to undress while holding his victim and a
fan knife at the same time. On direct examination, the private complainant testified thus:
"Q When he raped you did he remove his pants?
"A Yes, ma'am he removed his pants.
"Q When he removed his pants, did you run?
"A No, Ma'am because he was holding me and the knife was pointed at me.
"Q When he was holding you and the gun (sic) was pointing (sic) at you how did he
remove his pants?
"A Like this, ma'am . . .
COURT INTERPRETER
Witness holding the right wrist of the Interpreter using the left hand. The witness
demonstrating that the accused was using his right hand holding the knife while unbuttoning
his pants and every time she would resist the accused would point the knife at her."33
Countless cases of rape have been committed in a similar fashion. We quote the pertinent
portions of two such cases:
"x x x When she saw her father naked, she got scared and did not move. Because of her
refusal, her father poked a three-cantos knife at her neck and he undressed her by pulling
down her skirt and her panty until they were removed from her body. Her father then told
her to sit up and when she did, he pulled her t-shirt off her head. She cried and her father
threatened to kill her if her cries will be heard by others.34
"x x x The accused awakened Mergena upon arriving from a drinking session with his
brothers, pointed a knife at her and ordered her to stand up. When she refused to obey, he
pulled her up. He removed his short pants, then with a knife still pointed at her, removed her
skirt and made her lie down. He removed her panty and his underwear, separated her thighs
and inserted his penis into her vagina while fondling her breast. This entire time his left hand
was holding the knife."35
42 | P a g e
On the second point, that private complainant could have escaped her captor with facility is
something easier said than done. Private complainant was a terrified captive, held fast at the
wrist by appellant while the latter, using his other hand, unbuttoned his pants, stopping only
to brandish his fan knife at private complainant whenever she showed the least sign of
resistance. Overcome with fear, it is understandable why she was not able to escape at that
moment.
On the third point, contrary to appellant's assertion, private complainant was able to identify
appellant as her assailant. While somebody did point out to private complainant and her
companions that they had already passed the person they were looking for, this was
understandable because the place where they were searching was crowded. The failure to
see is not the same as failure to recognize which is what is crucial in identification. Nobody
prodded her to point to appellant. Nobody told her that he was the malefactor. What is
important is that it was private complainant herself who had provided appellant's description
and who, without assistance, eventually picked him out from the crowd as the person who
robbed and raped her.
Appellant finds it unbelievable that private complainant was able to recognize him "when she
did not even touch his penis and test it for the presence of bolitas during his identification at
the Muñoz market." Private complainant did not have to do that. She was able to recognize
appellant because of his mole on the cheek and his body smeared with tattoos, and more
importantly, because she repeatedly gazed at appellant's face every time they passed a well-
lit place on their way to the basketball court.36 She was also able to take a good hard look at
appellant's face and body while she was forced to sit on top of him during an unwanted
sexual act at the basketball court.37
On cross-examination, private complainant testified thus:
"Q So much so that because his hands were placed around your neck and the knife was
pressed in your body, practically, you were closing your eyes, you just believed whatever he
tells (sic) you?
"A Everytime we would pass by a lighted area, even if I was scared, I would look at him,
sir.
"Q But as much as possible, because you were scared and you were already angry, you
would not like to see the face of that stranger, right?
"A No, sir, because I was really trying to memorize the face."38
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Why were you interested in the face of that stranger?
"A So that in case I would be able to escape, I would have him arrested."39
And on re-direct examination, private complainant testified:
"Q Are you very sure that it was the accused now in this case who actually sexually
abused you?
"A Yes, ma'am I am sure.
"Q Why are you so sure?
"A Because I could see his face everytime I passed by a lighted area, ma'am (witness
crying)."40
This only shows that private complainant had ample opportunity to behold the appellant so
that she was able to positively identify the appellant as the one who robbed her and sexually
abused her.
In the light of this positive and direct evidence of appellant's culpability, the trial court
correctly discarded his defense of denial and alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot
prevail over the clear and positive identification of the appellant as the very person who
committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the
accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at
the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.41 This, appellant miserably failed to
do. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene in Project
7, Quezon City, considering that he claimed to have been a mere tricycle ride away in his
house in San Jose del Monte, Quezon City around the time of the commission of the crime.
Considering all the foregoing, the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of private complainant. This, especially since appellant has not even imputed any
ill motive on the part of private complainant to testify falsely against him. Where there is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the
logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.42
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but
not reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to
the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the
present case to depart from this rule.43
On the second assigned error, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of cruelty and uninhabited place against appellant.
Indeed, the term "cruelty" often conjures bloody and gory images which are conspicuously
absent in this case. However, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, "the appreciation of
cruelty, as an aggravating circumstance, is relative. It depends upon the crime committed. As
long as the wrong done in the commission of the offense is deliberately augmented and that
such wrong is not essential for the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose of the offender,
the same could be considered as aggravating. The nature of the wrong or the number
thereof is immaterial."44
The trial court's pronouncement finds support in a long line of jurisprudence. As held in
People vs. Basao,45 People vs. Lacao,46 People vs. Ilaoa,47 People vs. Alban,48 and other cases,
the test of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong
by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the
victim's suffering, or outraged, or scoffed at his person or corpse. Where the accused, for his
pleasure and satisfaction, inflicted on the victim unnecessary physical and moral pain, with
the intention of deliberately and inhumanly intensifying or aggravating the sufferings of the
victim, cruelty is present.
Tested against the foregoing yardstick, the element of cruelty undoubtedly 'attended the
commission of the crime in this case. As recounted by private complainant, appellant not
only raped her, but subjected her to various dehumanizing indignities, such as making her
fondle and put his foul-smelling penis in her mouth, forcing her to admire his bolitas, and
demanding that she assume embarrassing and indelicate positions. Furthermore, he viciously
slammed her head against the hood of the taxi, banged her head against the wall, and
slapped her hard in the face whenever she failed to answer any of his questions. All these
wrongs were no longer necessary insofar as appellant's purpose of raping private
complainant was concerned. By subjecting her to these unwarranted physical and moral
43 | P a g e
abuses on top of raping her, appellant deliberately and inhumanly augmented her pain and
sufferings, thus, committing cruelty.
Finally, appellant claims that the generic aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place
cannot be appreciated against him since the basketball court where he supposedly brought
his victim cannot be considered an uninhabited place. Appellant cites private complainant's
testimony that the basketball court was near a highway and surrounded by houses.
We are not convinced.
Whether or not a place may be considered uninhabited, is determined not by the distance of
the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission,
there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.49 In People vs. Desalisa,50
the crime was considered as having been committed in an uninhabited place because the
killing was done during nighttime, and many fruit trees and shrubs obstructed the view of
neighbors and passersby. Similarly, in the case of People vs. Damaso, et al.,51 the court,
notwithstanding the close proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to
the national highway and some houses, still considered the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place because the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the
field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby. The situation is no
different in the case at bar. Appellant precisely sought the solitude of the basketball court to
ensure that private complainant would not be able to call for, and receive, any help. Aside
from being cloaked by the darkness of the night, the basketball court was a relatively isolated
place, shielded from the public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses.52 Private
complainant could have screamed at the top of her lungs and nobody still would have heard
her. Without a doubt, therefore, the trial court properly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place against appellant.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 provides:
"ARTICLE 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. —
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."
In the case at bar, two (2) aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
robbery with rape, thus the trial court correctly imposed on the appellant the penalty of
death.
The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim P200,000.00 as moral damages.
Ordinarily, the victims of rape are awarded a minimum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
However, the factual circumstances of the case at bar calls for a stiffer penalty. After robbing
and raping the victim, appellant subjected the victim to physical harm like biting her nipples
and vagina; banging her head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall; and subjecting her to
indignities like holding and massaging his penis and worst of all, forcing her to put his foul-
smelling penis into her mouth. The trial court was correct in ordering the appellant to pay his
victim the amount P200,000.00 as moral damages for all of these repulsive acts and
P9,500.00 as actual damages for the money and valuables taken from her. We also hold that
the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of
rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural
foundations.53 Furthermore, under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.54 Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 proper.
Four Justices of the Court maintain their position that R. A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219 in Crim. Case No. Q-71910 finding appellant Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape under paragraph one, Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay victim Arlie Rosalin P200,000.00 as
moral damages; and P9,500.00 as actual damages, with the MODIFICATION that he shall
further pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified copies thereof, as well as the records of
this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176060 October 5, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ARNULFO FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 22 September 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR-HC No. 00296, affirming the trial court’s decision finding appellant Arnulfo Fernandez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
Appellant was charged with raping AAA, his first degree cousin, who was then alleged to be
14 years old. During the trial, the trial court found that AAA was only 13 years old while
appellant was 20 years old at the time of the incident. It was established that on the night of
7 July 1997, appellant and AAA’s father were drinking wine. Appellant gave money to AAA’s
father to buy more wine. When AAA’s father left, appellant went upstairs where AAA and her
younger siblings were sleeping. Appellant covered AAA’s mouth and then raped her. When
AAA woke up, she noticed appellant lying on top of her and she felt pain in her vagina. She
could not overpower appellant who was heavier and stronger than her. Appellant thereafter
went down and had another drinking bout with AAA’s father. When appellant left, AAA’s
father went upstairs and noticed that AAA’s panty was on her knees and that there were
bloodstains on her blanket. When asked what happened, AAA told him that appellant raped
her. The following morning, AAA’s father reported the incident to the Barangay Captain and
the police. AAA’s blanket with some bloodstains and male discharge was submitted to the
police as evidence. The Barangay Captain summoned appellant but he could not be located.
Appellant surrendered to a certain Kagawad Putian one week later.
Appellant alleged that AAA was his girlfriend. He admitted during cross-examination that AAA
is mentally slow and shy. He alleged that they had sexual intercourse from 1995 until 1997,
although it was only in 1997 that AAA became his girlfriend. He accused AAA of initiating
their sexual intercourse and claimed that AAA is a sex maniac. He admitted that on the night
of 7 July 1997, he had a drinking spree with AAA’s father. When AAA’s father left to buy more
wine, he went upstairs and saw that AAA’s siblings were asleep. Appellant claimed that AAA
enticed him to have sexual intercourse and AAA then removed her panty down to her knees.
44 | P a g e
Appellant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA that night. The following day,
appellant went to Banban to work at a hollow block factory. It was only when appellant went
back to their house a few days later that his mother informed him that he was accused of
raping AAA. Appellant then surrendered to Kagawad Putian.
The trial court did not believe appellant’s "sweetheart theory." The trial court likewise found
incredible appellant’s claim that AAA is a sex maniac who initiated all their sexual
encounters.
On 12 October 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Arnulfo Fernandez GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape which is punished under Art. 335, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law."
This specific provision refers to the situation wherein the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, as in this case wherein the offended party was sleeping and
therefore deprived of her free will.
Although it has been held that in crimes against chastity such as rape, relationship is
aggravating (People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613), the said circumstance is offset by the
voluntary (albeit one week late) surrender of the accused. Accordingly, the court hereby
sentences the accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Based on latest
jurisprudence, the accused is further ordered to indemnify the victim, who is a minor, the
amount of ₱50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal, appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In its 22 September 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
with the modification that an additional ₱50,000 as civil indemnity be awarded to the victim.
The Court of Appeals held that factual findings of the trial court are accorded the highest
respect unless some important facts have been clearly overlooked which if considered would
affect the result of the case. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court was correct in
relying on AAA’s positive and straightforward testimony rather than on appellant’s bare
denial of the charge.
Hence, this appeal.
We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the ruling of
the trial court that rape was clearly established by the witnesses and the evidence of the
prosecution. The trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies.3 Thus, the trial court’s findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court
has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the
result of the case.4
In this case, appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with AAA on the night of 7 July
1997 but alleges that it was consensual and that AAA initiated the sexual act. We agree with
the trial court and the appellate court that appellant’s version of the incident is unbelievable.
Appellant himself testified that he went upstairs where he knew AAA was sleeping with her
siblings. AAA could not have initiated their sexual intercourse considering that she was
already asleep when appellant went upstairs. Under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code,
rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman who is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious. Thus, there is rape where the woman was unconscious as when she
was asleep when the carnal act was accomplished.5
Appellant’s allegations that AAA was his girlfriend and that they had sexual relation since
1995 are likewise hard to believe. Appellant would have us believe that AAA, who was then
only 11 years old in 1995, was already engaging in sexual intercourse with appellant. Besides,
the doctor6 who examined AAA testified that there was fresh laceration of AAA’s hymen
which could mean that the incident on 7 July 1997 was probably AAA’s first sexual
experience.
The Court notes that the trial court mistakenly considered as an aggravating circumstance
the relationship of appellant to AAA. Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the
alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister,
or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The relationship between appellant
and AAA as first cousins is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.1âwphi1
Nevertheless, even if the aggravating circumstance of relationship is deleted, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, which is a single indivisible penalty, still applies. Under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, in cases where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 22 September 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR-HC No. 00296 finding appellant Arnulfo Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape with the MODIFICATION that the aggravating circumstance of relationship is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134362 February 27, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant
Emelito Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating:
That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARK ANTHONY
FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 ½ years old, by then and there mauling and clubbing him
on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick,
approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge.2 However, before testifying in his own
defense on June 4, 1998, appellant admitted that he killed the victim and changed his plea to
guilty.3
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's
eight-year old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel
Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima
Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency.
45 | P a g e
Appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house located at 2001 Batangas
Street, Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the first floor of
the same house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to
her children when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway,
her children in tow. The open door of the upper floor allowed Lilia to witness appellant
beating two-year old Mark Anthony Fernandez. From a distance of less than three arms’
length, Lilia saw appellant hit various parts of the boy’s body with a piece of wood, about 14
½ inches in length and 2 ½ inches in diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy
against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the
house to bring him to the hospital. The two-year old was "already black" and no longer
moving.4
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky.
According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom
Roberto called Kuya Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a "2x2" piece of
wood. Roberto could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito
might also beat him up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother,
who could barely talk, was not crying anymore.5
Roberto identified the two pieces of wood6 that appellant allegedly used in beating the
victim. He also identified the T-shirt7 that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javier
that a boy had been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital, he found the boy
already dead. He observed that the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right
index finger and both feet. The child also had lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all
over his head and body.
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellant’s house at No. 2001, Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila. Human
feces and fresh blood splattered on the floor. PO3 Javier recovered from the house the
broken wooden sticks, the steel hammer,8which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as
well as a bloodstained white T-shirt.
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellant’s sister in Del Fierro St., Tondo, who informed
him of matters relative to appellant’s identification. Thereafter, the police conducted a
search operation in Cavite where appellant’s mother lived but they did not find him
there.1âwphi1 Later that afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that appellant had surrendered to
Station 3 of their district.
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned
over to PO3 Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly also used in beating the victim.
Roberto Fernandez, the victim’s brother, had given the belt to the staff member.9
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem
examination of the victim’s body on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found that the boy had
suffered many injuries, including three wounds at the head and the anterior chest, which
could have been inflicted with the use of blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. The
child could have been dead three to four hours, or not more than eight hours, prior to the
postmortem examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded that the victim died of "bilateral
pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries" or complication of the lungs due to
said injuries.10 The autopsy report of Dr. Lagonera shows that Mark Anthony Fernandez
sustained the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.
2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2x0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring 2
x0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6x5 cms.
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5x0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5x1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17x12 cms.
10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd , right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9x5 cms.
14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13x6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6x2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17x6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region,
measuring 13x6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24x8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22x7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2x0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the mid-
occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patcy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach.11
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an examination to determine the
presence and "grouping" of human blood found on the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and
the T-shirt that were sent to his office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the
Western Police District in Manila.12 She prepared Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen
No. 1 or the steel hammer, was positive for human blood "but insufficient for blood group."
Specimen Nos. 2 (the broken wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also positive for
human blood "showing reactions of Group A."13
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant
admitted killing the two-year old victim, the son of his "live-in" partner. He and the boy’s
mother had lived together for two years before the incident, starting when the boy was
about a year old. He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that
he killed the boy only because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana and Valium 10
at that time. Appellant professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also
taken drugs two weeks before the incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over
the pillow, the bed sheets and the curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, "Putang-ina ka
Macky! Bakit mo ikinalat ng ganyan ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para
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hugasan!" Appellant got hold of Macky but the boy struggled to free himself from appellant’s
grasp. Appellant, still reeling from the Valium 10 he had just taken, became so angry that he
picked up a broom with a wooden handle, and hit the boy. Appellant did not realize that he
had hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He
dressed Macky and brought him to the Galang Medical Center at the corner of Abad Santos
Avenue and Tayabas Street, Manila. He prayed to God that nothing serious would happen to
the boy.
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all
she can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the
child, the doctor told appellant that she could not do anything more – Macky was dead. The
same day, appellant surrendered to the police. He was brought to the Homicide Section at
3:00 p.m.
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental."
He reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the
other. He was a drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay
Rehabilitation Center. He said he was conscious when the incident happened but he simply
did not realize that he had hit the child hard with the broom’s wooden handle. He denied
having hit the boy with a hammer or having banged his head against the wall. He hoped the
trial court would be lenient with him because of his voluntary surrender. He prayed that the
court would not impose upon him the death penalty.14
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay the
costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora, moral
and nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death
compensation in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony
Fernandez. Appellant’s guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and
Roberto Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further
corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima
Francisco, as well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court
admitted beating the poor child, which beating resulted in the latter’s death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from
liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any "person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused).16
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latter’s body,
the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries. 17 Assuming,
therefore, that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is
nevertheless liable for the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.18 It is beyond dispute
that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected
to put up a defense, is treacherous.19
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time
between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequence of his act.20 The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or
inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. 21
The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim
suffer slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the
consummation of the criminal act which he intended to commit.22 The sheer number of
wounds, however, is not a test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of
a crime.23
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The
inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic
bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor
General defends this ruling, contending that appellant’s habitual drug addiction is an
alternative circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is
habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree.1âwphi1 Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of
mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the accused’s penalty. Article 13(10) allows
courts to consider "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those"
mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances 24 nor
Article 15 on alternative circumstances,25 however, contain a provision similar to Article
13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider appellant’s drug addiction as an aggravating
circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought
within their terms who is not clearly within them.26
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, this
Court said in People v. Ramos:27
To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the
first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the
timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of
guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have
such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he
was just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
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The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.1âwphi1 For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be
established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was
voluntary.28 It is sufficient that the surrender be "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly
indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which
will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.29
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he
"surrendered" to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the
circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom
he surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the
latter. PO3 Javier’s testimony that he "learned" of appellant’s alleged surrender is hearsay
and does not serve to corroborate appellant’s claim.
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a
wrong against his victim. Appellant’s intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill
him. When appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately
brought the victim to the hospital.30 Sadly, his efforts were for naught.
In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the
victim is qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by
reclusion perpetua to death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence,
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed upon appellant.31
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 without proof of damages.32 Moral
damages that are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress suffered by the
heirs of the victim cannot be awarded here as the prosecution did not present any evidence
to justify its award.33
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, as defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Mark
Anthony Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30609 September 28, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO ABANES and MELECIO BENITEZ, defendants-appellants.
CONCEPCION JR, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Defendants were convicted of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to indemnify the
heirs of the late Eustaquio Colobong in the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and severally. From
this decision, they appealed. Benitez subsequently withdrew his appeal; hence only the
appeal of Abanes is before Us.
The incident in question took place in Bo. Banawang, San Roque, Agoo, La Union, on October
9, 1967. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, appellant Roberto Abanes and
victim Eustaquio Colobong, a half- wit, were in the yard of one Rolly Laroza. Melecio Benitez
was also present, talking with Laroza. Moments later, Abanes and Colobong were seen
walking together towards the north direction of Bo. Banawang, San Roque, followed by
Benitez. That was the last time Eustaquio Colobong was seen alive. An hour later, his body
was found near the bridge of San Roque under a bamboo tree. As shown in the autopsy
report 1 of Dr. Fidel Verceles, the deceased sustained five stab wounds from which he died.
The incident was reported to the police authorities who lost no time in going to the scene of
the crime. With the aid of a brother of Roberto Abanes, policeman Alejandro Ulat found the
fatal weapon 2 a three-bladed edge sharp instrument, known locally in that area as "tres
cantos", about ten meters from the house of appellant Abanes. Because he was one of the
two persons last seen with the victim while the latter was still alive, and because of the
discovery of the weapon near his house, Abanes was apprehended and brought to the
municipal building for questioning. At that investigation, he admitted in writings 3 having
stabbed the deceased and implicated Melecio Benitez in the commission of the crime.
How did the victim die?
The evidence of record establishes that on the day in question Abanes, Benitez and the
deceased were on their way to the house of the barrio captain because the deceased had
told the two of them that there were raw shrimps to be eaten thereat. Benitez was in an ugly
mood, considering that before they left the yard of Laroza, he (Benitez) uttered the following
words: "If somebody will make trouble in San Roque, I will kill him." While the three were
thus walking along the dike with the deceased leading the way, Benitez told Abanes to ask
the deceased if indeed there were raw shrimps to be eaten at the house of the barrio
captain, and if the deceased was just fooling them to stab him. Without much ado, Abanes
suddenly stabbed from behind the unarmed and unsuspecting Colobong who had not given
any provocation whatsoever for the attack. Immediately thereafter, Benitez grabbed the
weapon from Abanes and himself stabbed the victim three times without giving the latter a
chance to evade the attack or make any defense whatsoever. These stab wounds were the
direct and immediate cause of the victim's death.
When Abanes testified in his own behalf, he denied having signed a written confession. He
stated that on the date and time in question, while he was walking along the dike towards
the house of the barrio captain with Eustaquio Colobong ahead of him and Melecio Benitez
behind him, he was enticed by the latter to stab the victim if the latter was just fooling them
in stating that there were raw shrimps to be eaten in the house of the barrio captain. Abanes
claimed that Benitez threatened to kill him if he (Abanes) would not stab the victim; and that
out of fear of Benitez whom he knew to be a tough guy and quite capable of killing him, he
was forced to follow the order.
In this appeal, Roberto Abanes insists on his plea that he stabbed the deceased under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury;
and, furthermore, that if found guilty, he should be entitled to, as mitigating, the alternative
circumstance of degree of instruction and education for the reason that he studied only up to
Grade One.
There is nothing in the record to sustain this allegation. While Abanes claims that Benitez was
armed with a brass knuckle, there is no showing that he ever tried to use it against Abanes
nor did he ever lift a finger to exact the latter's cooperation in the execution of the crime.
Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an effect
upon the individual that, inspite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as
such, incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, inspite of the resistance of the
person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. 4 Neither
can we consider the claim of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury in favor of
Abanes. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. Fear in order to be a valid defense,
48 | P a g e
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or limb. In this case, the
fear, if any, harbored by Abanes was imaginary and speculative. This is not the uncontrollable
fear contemplated by law. Furthermore, when Benitez allegedly gave the order to stab the
deceased, Abanes was armed and yet he did not offer any resistance. Neither did he warn
the intended victim of the impending peril. And finally, the act of Abanes in not fleeing but
instead of waiting for Benitez while the latter was stabbing the victim belies his claim of fear
of Benitez.
Likewise, lack of instruction or education can not be appreciated in favor of Roberto Abanes
as a mitigating circumstance. The criteria in determining lack of education is not illiteracy
alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence. 5 The record discloses that far from his claim
that he suffers from lack of education, appellant possesses an intelligence worthy of an
educated man. In fact, the trial court observed that he talked as if he were a doctor. 6
WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision to be in accordance with the law and the
evidence, we hereby affirm the same without costs. Abanes should be credited in full for the
period of his preventive imprisonment, if he agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; otherwise, with four-fifths
thereof. 7
SO ORDERED.

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