OCAMPO III. VS.

PEOPLE
G.R Nos. 156547-51. February 4, 2008

FACTS:

The Department of Budget and Management released the amount of Php 100 Million for
the support of the local government unit of the province of Tarlac. However, petitioner Ocampo,
governor of Tarlac, loaned out more than P 56.6 million in which he contracted with Lingkod
Tarlac Foundation, Inc.. thus, it was the subject of 25 criminal charges against the petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds.
However, the petitioner contended that the loan was private in character since it was a loan
contracted with the Taralc Foundation.

ISSUE:

Whether the amount loaned out was private in nature.

RULING:

Yes, the loan was private in nature because Art. 1953 of the New Civil Code provides
that “a person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership
thereof, and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.”
The fact that the petitioner-Governor contracted the loan, the public fund changed its
nature to private character, thus it is not malversation which is the subject of this case, instead it
must be a simple collection of money suit against the petitioner in case of non payment .
therefore, the petitioner is acquitted for the crime of malversation.

Leung Ben vs. O’Brien

G.R. No. L-13602, April 6, 1918
38 Phil. 182

FACTS:

On December 12, 1917 an action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by O’Brien to
recover from Leung Ben the sum of P15, 000.00 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the
defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted during the two or
three months prior to the institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the plaintiff asked for
an attachment, under sections 424 and 412 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure against the
property of the defendant on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine
Island with intent to defraud his creditors. The attachment was issued and acting on the authority
thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15, 000.00 which had been deposited by the defendant
with the International Banking Corporation.

The defendant moved to quash the attachment; the court however, dismissed said motion.
On January 8, 1918, petitioner Leung Ben, the defendant in that action filed his petition for writ
of certiorari directed against O’Brien and the judges of CFI. The prayer is that, the honorable
James A. Ostrand be required to certify the records for review and that the order of attachment
that had been issued should be revoked and discharged with cost.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming is an
obligation from “contract, express or implied.”

HELD:

The duty of the defendant to refund the money which he won from the plaintiff at gaming
is not an obligation from “contract, express or implied” rather it is a duty imposed by statute.
Upon general principles, recognized both in civil and common law, money lost at gaming and
voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner cannot, in the absence of statute, be recovered in a
civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes
several forms of gambling, containing numerous provisions recognizing the right to recover
money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain games. The obligation of the defendant to
restore or refund the money which he won from the plaintiff at gaming therefore arises ex lege.

Arturo Pelayo vs. Marcelo Lauron

G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909
12 Phil. 453

FACTS:

On or about October 13, 1906, the plaintiff Arturo Pelayo was called to the house of the
defendants, Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he
was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to
give birth to a child. After consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, the plaintiff
found it necessary to remove the fetus by means of an operation, in which service he was
occupied until the following morning, and had visited the patient several times. The equitable
value of the services rendered by the plaintiff was P500.00, which the defendants refused to pay.
On November 23, 1906, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants and prayed that the
judgment be rendered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500
and costs, together with any other relief that may be deemed proper. In answer, the defendants
denied all allegations and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law died as a
consequence of the said childbirth, and when she was still alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house and without any relation whatsoever with them, and on the
day she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and
due to fortuitous circumstances. Thus, the defendants prayed that they be absolved from the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred the answer and that the lower court sustained the demurrer
directing the defendants to amend their answer. In compliance, the defendants amended their
answer denying each and every allegation contained in the complaint. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendants absolving them from the complaint.

ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the parents-in-law are under any obligation to pay the fees claimed
by the plaintiff.

HELD:
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal
provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between them
and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. When either of them by
reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that the health may be
restored; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore, liable for all the expenses,
including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. The liability arises from the
obligation, which the law has expressly established, between married couples. It is therefore the
husband of the patient who is bound to pay for the services of the plaintiff. The fact that it was
not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested the medical assistance for his wife is no
bar to his fulfillment of such obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that the medical assistance
was urgently needed. Therefore, plaintiff should direct his action against the husband of the
patient, and not against her parents-in-law.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Roberto Reyes

G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
452 SCRA 532

FACTS:

Respondent herein Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name “Amay
Bisaya,” alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by
Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend of several years, invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr.
Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for whom she replied: “of course.” Reyes then went up
with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the
celebrant. At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready,
Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. Reyes alleged that Ruby Lim, in
a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, told him to leave the party because he was not invited. Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart but the latter, who was within hearing distance,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Afterwards, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step
out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos
moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally liable with Dr. Filart
for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is
not negligent in doing so.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s ruling that Ms. Lim did not abuse her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. In the absence of
any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and
is indeed incredible. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee. Had respondent simply left the party as requested, there was
no need for the police to take him out.
 St. Mary’s Academy vs. William Carpitanos and Lucia S. Carpitanos
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
426 Phil 878

FACTS:

From 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an

enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan
City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle.Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

HELD:
For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence
of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

SPS. GUANIO v. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL

GR No. 190601, February 7 2011

FACTS:
 For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna
Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati.Prior to the event, Makati
Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial and final food tasting. The
parties eventually agreed on a final price ─ P1,150 per person.On July 27, 2001, the parties
finalized and signed their contract.

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives, Catering Director
Bea Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they
would; their guests complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in
the published menu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and unapologetic when
confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promise that there would be no charge for the
extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for
the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day. They further claim that they
brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not served
to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.

Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.and
received an apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotel’s Executive Assistant Manager in
charge of Food and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and
damages before the RTC of Makati City. Respondents averred that it was the increase in number
of the unexpected guests that led to the shortage claimed by the petitioners.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and was reversed by the CA, upon
appeal, the latter holding that the proximate cause of petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase
in their guests.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that the proximate cause of petitioners’ injury was
an unexpected increase in their guests.

HELD:

The Court finds that since petitioners’ complaint arose from a contract, the doctrine of
proximate cause finds no application to it, the latter applicable only to actions for quasi-delicts,
not in actions involving breach of contract.

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms
of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which
forms the whole or part of the contract. The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that
petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the expected
number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to
discharge such obligation thus excused respondent from liability for “any damage or
inconvenience” occasioned thereby.
 TSPIC CORPORATION VS. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R No. 163419. February 13, 2008

FACTS:

TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the corporation
Union for the increase of salary for the latter’s members for the year 2000 to 2002 starting from
January 2000. thus, the increased in salary was materialized on January 1, 2000. However, on
October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and production Board raised daily minimum wage
from P 223.50 to P 250.00 starting November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of the 17
probationary employees were increased to P250.00 and became regular employees therefore
receiving another 10% increase in salary. In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage
rates as mandated by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17 recently
regularized employees, received less wages. On January 19, 2001, TSPIC’s HRD notified the 24
employees who are private respondents, that due to an error in the automated payroll system, they
were overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries starting February 2001.
The Union on the other hand, asserted that there was no error and the deduction of the alleged
overpayment constituted diminution of pay.

ISSUE:

Whether the alleged overpayment constitutes diminution of pay as alleged by the Union.

RULING:

Yes, because it is considered that Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by unions
and their employers are binding upon the parties and be acted in strict compliance therewith. Thus,
the CBA in this case is the law between the employers and their employees.

Therefore, there was no overpayment when there was an increase of salary for the members
of the union simultaneous with the increasing of minimum wage for workers in the National
Capital Region. The CBA should be followed thus, the senior employees who were first promoted
as regular employees shall be entitled for the increase in their salaries and the same with lower
rank workers.

Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology

G.R. No. 156109
November 8, 2004

FACTS:
 Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student of
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went
to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. She enrolled Logic and Statistics
subjects under Rachelle Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively as teachers.

In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed “The Rave Party and
Dance Revolution” the proceeds which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00 each.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebration, Regino refused to pay tickets. On March 14 and 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of
examinations in Logics and Statistics, the teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
Petitioner then filed as pauper litigant, a complaint for damages against PCST. She prayed for
P500,000.00 as nominal; P500,000.00 as moral and at least P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P250,000.00 as actual damages & cost of litigation and attorney’s fees.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that Commission on
Higher Education, not the court, has jurisdiction over the controversy.

ISSUES:

Whether or not court has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Whether or not there was a breach of contract and liability of tort.

HELD:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Court for reasons of law,
comity and convenience should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies
have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity
to act and correct their alleged errors. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is a competence on the part of the administrative bodies to act upon the matter complained
of.
The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception-upon
enrolment of the student.

PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly in the middle of the
semester, It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for students in taking the final
examinations and ultimately for recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however,
was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
 Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted, and the assailed orders reversed. The trial
court is directed to reinstate the complaint and with all deliberate speed, to continue the
proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.

Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa Diana Realty

G.R. No. 134284, December 1, 2000
346 SCRA 663

FACTS:

Petitioner Ayala Corporation (Ayala) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 square meters more or less and covered
by TCT no. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng
married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained Special
Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building
in violation of the Special Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka
Kieng were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corp. with Ayala’s
approval. As a consideration for Ayala to release the certificate of title of the subject property, Rosa-
Diana, executed an undertaking promising to abide by said Special Condition of Sale executed between
Ayala and the original vendees. Upon the submission of the undertaking, together with the building
plans for a condominium project, known as the Peak, Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling
Rosa-Diana to register the Deed of Sale on its favor and obtain certificate of Title in its name.

Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building
plans which were substantially different from those that it earlier submitted to Ayala for approval.
During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project, Ayala filed an action with the RTC
of Makati for specific performance with application for a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to
compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations under the Deed of Restriction annotated
on the title as well as with the building plans it submitted to the latter. In the alternative, Ayala prayed
for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty. The lower court denied Ayala’s
prayer for injunctive relief; thus, enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the construction of the building.
Ayala tried to cause the annotation a notice of lis pendens on Rosa-Diana’s title but the Register of Deed
of Makati refused registration on the ground that the case pending before the trial court being an
action for specific performance and or rescission is an action in personam which does not involve the
title, use or possession of the property. The Land Registration Authority reversed the ruling of the
Register of Deeds. The decision of the LRA, however, was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether or not respondent Rosa-Diana has the obligation to enforce the Deed of
Restrictions contained in the contract it entered with Ayala.
HELD:

Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any
allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they
must be complied with in good faith. Hence, Article 1159 of the new Civil Code provides “obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.

Hence, respondent Rosa-Diana has the obligation to enforce the Deed of Restrictions
contained in the contract it entered with Ayala.

PADCOM Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association, Inc.,

G.R. No. 146807, May 9, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter PADCOM) owns and manages
the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at Emerald Avenue,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on which the building stands was originally acquired from
the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra Development Corporation
(TDC) under a Deed of Sale dated 4 September 1974. Among the terms and conditions in the
deed of sale was the requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must become
members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the
Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed
by TDC in favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer dated 25 February 1975.
In 1982, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. (hereafter the Association) was organized
to advance the interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term
lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount
of two thousand seven hundred twenty-four pesos and forty centavos (P2, 724.40) per month
from PADCOM. The corporate books showed that PADCOM owed the Association P639,
961.47, representing membership dues, interests and penalty charges from April 1983 to June
1993. The letters exchanged between the parties through the years showed repeated demands for
payment, requests for extensions of payment, and even a settlement scheme proposed by
PADCOM in September 1990.
In view of PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including interests
and penalties thereon, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before
the trial court. The Association averred that purchasers of lands within the Ortigas Center
complex from OCLP are obligated under their contracts of sale to become members of the
Association. This obligation was allegedly passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from
TDC, its predecessor-in-interest.
The trial court dismissed the case. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the same in favor of
the Association.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PADCOM is a member of the Ortigas Center Association, Inc.

HELD:
 As a lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for
membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a ministerial function
considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular member upon the acquisition of the lot
pursuant to the automatic membership clause annotated in the Certificate of Title of the property
and the Deed of Transfer. PADCOM’s contention that the automatic membership clause is a
violation of its freedom of association because it was never forced to join the association is
likewise untenable. Nobody forced it to buy the land when it bought the building with the
annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed.
PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus to join the
Association.
Having ruled that PADCOM is a member of the Association, it is obligated to pay its dues
incidental thereto as mandated by Article 1159 of the Civil Code which states that “obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith”.
Assuming in gratis argumenti that PADCOM is not a member of the Association, it cannot
evade payment without violating the equitable principles underlying quasi-contracts. Article
2142 of the Civil Code provides that “certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited
at the expense of another”.

TITAN-IKEDA VS. PRIMETOWN

G.R No. 158768
February 12, 2008

FACTS:

The respondent Primetown Property Corporation entered into contract weith the
petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction Corporation for the structural works of a 32-storey prime
tower. After the construction of the tower, respondent again awarded to the petitioner the amount
of P 130,000,000.00 for the tower’s architectural design and structure. Howevere, in 1994, the
respondent entered inot a contract of sale of the tower in favor of the petitioner in a manner
called full-swapping. Since the respondent had allegedly constructed almost one third of the
project as weel as selling some units to third persons unknown to the petitioner. Integrated Inc.
took over the project, thus the petitioner is demanding for the return of its advanced payment in
the amount of P2, 000,000.00 as weel as the keys of the unit.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to damages.

RULING:
 No, because in a contract necessarily that there is a meeting of the minds of the parties in
which this will be the binding law upon them. Thus, in a reciprocal obligation. Both parties are
obliged to perform their obligation simultaneously and in good faith. In this case, petitioner,
Titan-Ikeda can not recover damages because it was found out there was no solutio indebiti or
mistake in payment in this case since the latter is just entitled to the actual services it rendered to
the respondent and thus it is ordered to return the condominium units to the respondent.

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas

G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994
236 SCRA 239

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19,
1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its resolution of May 20, 1992, dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of the accused did
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The
Solicitor General insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel of the accused, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and
civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the criminal liability in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability; and therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
civil liability.

HELD:

In People v. Castillo, The Court resolved this issue stating Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code which states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict.
As to the personal penalties and as to the pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
 The legal import of the term ‘final judgment’ is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal
Code. Articles 72 and 78 of the legal body mention the term ‘final judgment’ in the sense that it
is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that the judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.

Since the death of the accused occurred while his appeal is pending, the decision has not
yet become final and executory; thus, his civil liability together with his criminal liability is
extinguished. However, if the civil obligation arises from other sources of obligation other than
the crime complained of, the civil liability of the accused survived in spite of his death pending
his appeal. A preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove his civil liability.

ABELLANA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011

FACTS:

In 1985, petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana extended a loan to private respondents spouses

Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot
Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed
of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses
Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto
appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his
name and sold the lots to third persons.On August 12, 1999, respondent spouses filed a
complaint charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.

The RTC found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto and
that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private
individual under Article 172(1)in relation to Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code and not
Estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.

Petitioner, upon appeal, raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted
of the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically
charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The
CA held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of
public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of
Public Document by a Private Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). Thus,
the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information
or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the
trial court's finding with respect to petitioner's civil liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his
acquittal.
HELD:
NO. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The "extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist."
Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to
spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the
spouses.Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
Even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the
notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily
nullify or render void ab initio the parties' transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. And since
the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of
said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of
said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto's title and the
issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage
resulted to the spouses Alonto.

Fausto Barredo vs. Severino Garcia

G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942
73 PHIL 607

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correctional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July
8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,
000.00 plus legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
 The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, as there has been no civil action
against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in
this case.

However, the decision of the Court of Appeals expressed that the liability sought to be
imposed against Fausto Barredo is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor,
but an obligation imposed in Article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the
selection or supervision of his servant or employee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primary and directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as the
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

HELD:

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct legal institution under the Civil
Code with substantivity of it own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a
delict or crime. Upon this principle, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.

To hold that there is only one way to make the employer’s liability effective, and that is,
to sue the driver and exhaust his properties is tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also an expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers
and presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of their servants. It is
but right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial
safety of the others.

PHILIPPINE HAWK CORP. v. TAN LEE

G.R. No. 166869
February 16, 2010

FACTS:

On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint against petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for
damages based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17,
1991 in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of
respondent's husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent physical injuries. The accident
involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by
petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila.

On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her children, in the civil case for damages against petitioner. Respondent sought the
payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and
interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle's repair,
attorney's fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.

In its Answer, petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino
Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.

The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila,
wherein it adjudged guilty of simple negligence. It further held petitioner bus company liable for
failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in the award of damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.

HELD:

YES. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests
were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that
Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. The Court also affirmed the CA's
decision in awarding civil indemnity for the death of respondent's husband, temperate damages,
and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages
granted by the trial court to respondent.

DY TEBAN VS. LIBERTY FOREST

G.R No. 161803
February 4, 2008
FACTS:

A Prime Mover Trailer suffered a tire blow out during the night of its travel at a national
highway. The trailer was owned by the respondent Liberty Forest. The driver allegedly put earl
warning devices but the only evidence being witnessed was a banana trunks and candles. Since
the car was placed at the right wing of the road, thus it cause the swerving of a Nissan van owned
by the petitioner when a passenger bus was coming in between the trailer. The Nissan van owner
claimed for damages against the respondent. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the
three –way accident is the negligence and carelessness of driver of the respondent . However
reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether there was negligence on the part of the respondent.

RULING:

Yes. There was negligence on the part of the respondent when the latter failed to put and
used an early warning device because it was found out that there was no early warning device
being prescribed by law that was used by the driver in order to warn incoming vehicle.
Furthermore, the proximate cause of the accident was due to the position of the trailer where it
covered a cemented part of the road, thus confused and made trick way for other vehicles to pass
by. Thus the respondent is declared liable due to violation of road rules and regulations.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS. TANGCO

G.R No. 165732
December 14, 2006

FACTS:

The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also a licensed-
fire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to renew her time deposit and
along with her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the bank, upon knowing that the
victim carries a firearm, the security guard shot the victim causing the latter’s instant death. The
heirs of the victim filed a criminal case against security guard and an action against Safeguard
Security for failure to observe diligence of a goof father implied upon the act of its agent.

ISSUE:

Whether Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent.
RULING:

Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of an
employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to overcome
this presumption, the employer must prove that there was no negligence on his part in the
supervision of his employees.

It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. Thus, due diligence on
the supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his
employees. Thus, in this case, Safeguard Security committed negligence in identifying the
qualifications and ability of its agents.

VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO

G.R No. 144274
September 20, 2004

FACTS:

In 1991, a collision was made by a green Mitsubishi lancer owned by Ocfemia against a
silver Mitsubishi lancer driven by Leandro Domingo and owned by petitioner Priscilla Domingo.
The incident caused the car of Domingo bumped another two parked vehicles. A charged was
filed against Ocfemia and the owner Villanueva. Villanueva claimed that he must not be held
liable for the incident because he is no longer the owner of the car, that it was already swapped to
another car . however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay the damages incurred by the
silver Mitsubishi lancer car.

ISSUE:
Whether the owner Villanueva be held liable for the mishap.

RULING:

Under the Motor Vehicle law, it was declared that the registered owner of any vehicle is
primary land directly liable for any injury it incurs while it is being operated. Thus, even the
petitioner claimed that he was no longer the present owner of the car, still the registry was under
his name, thus it is presumed that he still possesses the car and that the damages caused by the
car be charge against him being the registered owner. The primary function of Motor vehicle
registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury
is caused by the vehicle, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.

CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 122039
May 31, 2000

FACTS:

Eliza Sunga was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by the petitioner Calalas.
Private respondent Sunga sat in the rear protion of the jeepney where the conductor gave Sunga
an extension seat. When the jeep stopped, Sunga gave way to a passenger going outside the jeep.
However, an Isuzu Truck driven by Verene and owned by Salva, accidentally hit Sunga causing
the latter to suffer physical injuries where the attending physician ordered a three months of rest.
Sunga filed an action for damages against the petitioner for breach of contract of common
carriage by the petitioner.

On the other hand, the petitioner Calalas filed an action against Salva, being the owner of
the truck. The lower court ruled in favor of ther petitioner, thus the truck owner is liable for the
damage to the jeep of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitionerr is liable.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by Sunga. Under Article 1756
of the New Civil Code, it provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof.

In this case, the law presumes that any injury suffered by a passenger of the jeep
is deemed to be due to the negligence of the driver. This is a case on Culpa Contractual where
there was pre-existing obligations and that the fault is incidental to the performance of the
obligation. Thus, it was clearly observed that the petitioner has negligence in the conduct of his
duty when he allowed Sunga to seat in the rear portion of the jeep which is prone to accident.

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219
MARCH 15, 1918
FACTS:

The plaintiff, riding on his pony was half way across the Carlatan bridge when the
defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten
or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew
his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and
heard the warning signals. However, thinking that he has no sufficient time to go to the other
side of the road, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. The defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse. When he had gotten
quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of
the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of
the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and
the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge he
clearly saw that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. The control of the situation
had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.

The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But it was the defendant who had the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and when he failed to do so, he is deemed negligent, thus
liable to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff.