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O Felix Culpa!

A Theological Response to the Problem of Evil

by

Christopher John Quiroz

Presented in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
graduation from
Faith Christian School
April 18, 2018

Thesis Advisor: Vincent Oliveri


Quiroz 1

O Felix Culpa!

A Theological Response to the Problem of Evil

Stephen Fry, a notable comedian, actor, and activist, revealed what he would say if he

came face-to-face with God: “I’d say, ‘Bone cancer in children? What’s that about? How dare

you? How dare you create a world to which there is such misery that is not our fault? It’s not

right; it’s utterly, utterly evil. Why should I respect a capricious, mean-minded, stupid God who

creates a world that is so full of injustice and pain?’... [T]he God that created this universe, if it

was created by God, is quite clearly a maniac…totally selfish...Yes, the world is very splendid,

but it also has in it insects whose whole life cycle is to burrow into the eyes of children, make

them blind… ‘Why did you do that to us? You could easily have made a creation in which that

didn’t exist…’ What kind of a God is he? It’s perfectly apparent. He’s… utterly monstrous and

deserves no respect whatsoever. The moment you banish him, your life becomes simpler, purer,

cleaner and more worth living,” (“Stephen”).

The problem of evil and suffering is prevalent in nearly every aspect of our society.

Everything from art to science, politics, and religion - all of these fields have different answers to

why such intense pain and misery exist. In Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, an

agnostic character named Ivan ponders the suffering of children, saying “if the suffering of

children goes to make up the sum of suffering needed to buy truth, then I assert beforehand that

the whole of truth is not worth such a price” (Dostoevsky 5.4.21). He believes that ending the

suffering of all mankind and discovering the truth about God is not worth the suffering of one

innocent child. Even those whom the God of the Bible deemed righteous were driven to question

the intense suffering of the world, such as the example set forth by Job. After having suffered

excruciating pain and terrible loss, Job accuses God, saying:


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“He has cast me into the mire, and I have become like dust and ashes. I cry to you and
you do not answer me; I stand, and you merely look at me. You have turned cruel to me;
with the might of your hand you persecute me. You lift me up on the wind, you make me
ride on it, and you toss me about in the roar of the storm. I know that you will bring me to
death, and to the house appointed for all living” (Job 30:18-23, NRSV).

All of these examples encompass one large question: How could an omnibenevolent and

omnipotent, or all-good and all-powerful God allow such intense suffering and evil to exist in the

world? Many scholars affirm that if God does indeed possess these essential attributes, He

should not only feel inclined to obliterate the seemingly gratuitous evils within the world, but be

required by His own nature to do so. This dilemma is commonly referred to as the Problem of

Evil. I believe that an examination of the logical, evidential, and existential problems of evil, as

well as a presentation of a formal defense of God in light of the Problem of Evil should reveal

that God’s ways can indeed be justified, even in the context of suffering.

The Problem of Evil is regarded by many to be the strongest objection to not only the

Christian faith, but to theism in general. William Lane Craig, internationally-known theologian

and active apologist, claims that this conundrum is without a doubt “the greatest obstacle to

belief in the existence of God” (Craig). Other scholars hold that of the many atheistic arguments

used, this is the longest-standing, most written about, and most diverse when it comes to how

Christians respond to it.

There are three main pieces to this mystifying enigma that must be examined and

effectively refuted if a person wishes to defend an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God: The

logical problem of evil, the evidential problem of evil, and the existential problem of evil.

Theodicies are used in hope of finding an answer to these problems. The term “theodicy” was

coined by Gottfried Leibniz in 1710 and derives from the Greek words “Τheos,” meaning “God,”

and “dikē,” meaning “trial” or “judgement.” Thus, “theodicy” literally translates to "justifying
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God” (Godwin, “The Theodicy”). In order to attempt a proper defense of God in the face of evil,

a person would likely have to accept these following assumptions outlined by Dr. Philip Irving

Mitchell with Dallas Baptist University: “God is all good and all powerful (and, therefore, all

knowing), the universe/creation was made by God and/or exists in a contingent relationship to

God, and Evil exists in the world” (Mitchell). All of these factors need to be taken into account

before attempting to solve the problem of evil.

The problem of evil has existed for millennia, but formal theodicies did not appear until

mid-to-late 2nd Century A.D. with St. Irenaeus’ Soul-Making Theodicy. Irenaeus proposed that

all humans are in a primal state of personhood and need suffering in order to become fully made

in the image of God (Godwin, “Irenaeus”). The Soul-Making Theodicy focuses on the evolving

resolution of evil, essentially saying that evil is a necessary obstacle that must be overcome for a

human to mature spiritually into the being that God intended her to be. Irenaeus argued that we

need suffering to become truly human.

Another significant theodicy is the one put forth by St. Augustine around the early 5th

century, commonly referred to as his “Free Will” theodicy. Augustine suggested that suffering

and evil both find their genesis in the fall of humanity, when God’s generous gift of free will was

abused by Adam, who freely choose to disobey specific divine instruction (Godwin, “The

Theodicy”). St. Augustine’s A Good Creation’s Capacity for Evil focuses on the origin of evil in

the world as a necessary means in order to bring about two main ends: to vindicate God while

also maintaining the guilt of humanity (Peterson 6). The “Free Will” theodicy also introduces the

important topics of God’s desire of turning evil into good, God’s personal perception of true

goodness, and the finite minds of humans. The argument essentially holds that God's ideal
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creation involved humans that possessed free will and the ability to love. Suffering and evil are a

result of an expression of disordered love which corrupted the nature of creation.

In the 18th century, the term “theodicy” was officially born after Gottfried Leibniz

published his thesis on our world being the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz offered that

“there is an infinity of possible worlds, among which God must have chosen the best” (Leibniz

Theodicy: Part 1.8). Leibniz argues against the notion that God could have created a world better

than the one we inhabit currently, specifically a world without pain and suffering (Leibniz,

“Best” 51). Leibniz argued that a world with less evil in it might not truly be imaginable. Due to

the infinite factors that affect the outcome of every single event that occurs, it would be

impossible to determine if another world would merely contain different forms of greater evils

than the ones experienced in our own world (Editors). He makes the argument that it would be

against God’s very nature, which is considered to be sheer perfection, to take a course of action

or create something that is not the absolute best. Therefore, God did indeed create the best of all

possible worlds, however evil exists as part of that world, not due to it being created by God, but

rather due to it being a privation of good. (Murray).

In the 20th Century, theodicies became increasingly popular in philosophical and

theological circles alike. C.S. Lewis presented his take on the enigma in The Problem of Pain.

Lewis fundamentally proposed that if humans can recognize that suffering is atrocious and

unnatural, there must also be some form of universal goodness that would have to be assumed

(Lewis). This evidence of an absolute good should lead directly to God. He also maintained

that “pain insists upon being attended to. God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our

consciences, but shouts in our pains. It is his megaphone to rouse a deaf world” (Lewis). This is
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a call to bring our attention to what is really going on behind what humans see at face value,

namely the reality of God’s presence and His purpose for us.

Finally, in the 21st century, Alvin Plantinga put together what he referred to as the “O

Felix Culpa” theodicy. The Latin phrase ‘O Felix Culpa!’ translates to “O Fortunate Fault!” and

has been a part of Catholic doctrine for centuries, appearing in many theological works, such as

those from the previously mentioned Augustine and Leibniz, as well as some popular works of

literature, such as John Milton’s Paradise Lost. The idea argues that the fall of humanity and

entrance of evil is ultimately an exceedingly fortuitous event, for it would lead to God enacting a

plan of redemption that would involve the unparalleled goodness of the Incarnation and

Atonement of Christ (Turner). Plantinga researched this topic extensively and put forth his

formal theodicy in 2004. I believe this theodicy in particular is the most logically, evidentially,

and existentially sufficient defense we have, and I will address this later in my thesis in order to

explain why the argument is particularly convincing.

The problem of evil, as previously noted, is three-dimensional: there is a logical problem,

an evidential problem, and an existential problem, all of which need to be examined and rebutted

effectively if one is to defend the goodness and justice of God. The first dimension we will

consider is the logical problem of evil. The logical problem states that after an examination of

the nature of God and the existence of evil, deductive reasoning will lead a person to effectively

disprove God’s existence. According to Matthew McKeon with Michigan State University, “the

primary aim of logic is to tell us what follows logically from what” (McKeon). Basically, an

argument is logically sound if the truth of the offered premises logically ensures the truth of the

conclusion. For example, No dogs are cats. Scooby-Doo is a dog. Therefore, Scooby-Doo is not
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a cat. The premises not only agree with each other, but also logically prove the soundness of the

conclusion.

J.L. Mackie, a 20th century atheist philosopher, is widely recognized for his attempt to

logically prove the contradictions of an all-good, all-powerful God existing alongside evil. In his

work Evil and Omnipotence, Mackie suggested that the problem of evil altogether is only a

problem for a person who believes in an all-powerful, all-good God that exists alongside evil

(Mackie 82). He claims that there is a contradiction in these three ideas, so that if any two are

true, then the other must be false. He essentially makes the following assertions: 1) If God is

omnipotent and wholly good, He would be required by His nature to eliminate all evil. 2) If God

is omnipotent and evil exists, He must not be wholly good, for He would eliminate it. And 3) If

God is wholly good, yet evil exists, He must not be powerful enough to eliminate it. It would

seem as if a person who believes all three premises would have to “adhere, but not consistently

adhere to all three” (Mackie 82). Mackie proposes what largely amounts to a rehashing of the

ancient Epicurean paradox of omnipotence, which is later restated by David Hume as follows:

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing?

Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? From where then is evil?” However, Mackie

makes it clear that additional premises must be added in order to reveal the contradiction,

specifically premises that connect the terms “good,” “evil,” and “omnipotent”: “Good is opposed

to evil. A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. And there are no limits to what an

omnipotent thing can do” (Mackie 82). After accepting these additional premises, it should result

logically that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, thereby proving a

contradiction.
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Mackie goes on to point out some inadequate solutions, or poor attempts to prove that

there is no contradiction in the three premises. The first of these inadequate solutions is “Good

cannot exist without evil” or “Evil is necessary as a counterpart to good” (Mackie 84). Mackie is

by no means unjustified in saying that this proposed solution is not sufficient. This proposition

sets absurd limits to God’s capabilities, making Him assume the role of a dualistic God that

cannot create good without simultaneously creating evil. Mackie also believes the statement

“evil is necessary as a means to good” implies an extreme stipulation to what God can and

cannot do (Mackie 87). By saying that God can only bring about a certain good by allowing

some wicked event, a person is placing God in a position where He is subject to some outside

force or law that controls or puts limits to His abilities.

Perhaps the most important proposed solution that Mackie addresses is that “evil is due

to human free will” (Mackie 90). This view focuses on ascribing all evil and suffering to the

actions of humans, who acted independently from God when they brought sin into the world.

The argument Mackie attempts to convey here is that it seems as if God has made mankind free

to an extent where He is unable to control their wills (Mackie 91). The idea of God restricting

His own power leads us to consider the paradox of omnipotence and sovereignty (Mackie 91-

92). A question similar to this one is by no means uncommon: if God is all-powerful, is He able

to create a stone so big that even He cannot lift it? This would appear to be a paradox, for if a

person says that God can create a rock of such magnitude, He would still be powerless to lift it.

On the other hand, if a person says that God cannot create something He cannot lift, then His

power is limited once more. Mackie would contend that an omnipotent God who cannot do

something (such as control the free wills of His own creatures) is a clear contradiction and

should cast doubt into the minds of those who believe in an omnipotent God.
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In regards to Mackie’s Evil and Omnipotence, Alvin Plantinga published his response in

the form of The Free Will Defense, attempting to show that there is no contradiction in the idea

of an all-good, all-powerful God existing alongside evil. To prove that there is no contradiction

between premises, it is imperative that a person defines what exactly a contradiction is. There are

two main types of contradictions: explicit contradictions and formal contradictions (Mackie 95-

97). An explicit contradiction contains premises that clearly and directly deny each other. For

example, if we have the premise David Tennant is an actor and present it as a true statement, it

would be explicitly contradictory to suggest that the second premise, David Tennant is not an

actor, is also true. So, is Mackie’s set of propositions for the problem of evil, God is omnipotent,

God is wholly good, yet evil exists, explicitly contradictory? It would seem that there is no

premise that directly denies another premise, therefore the proposition is not explicitly

contradictory (Mackie 97).

A formal contradiction can be found when an explicit contradiction is discovered through

the laws of logic (Plantinga 97). For example, “If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal. All

men are mortal. Socrates is not mortal” (Plantinga 97). While no two premises contradict each

other at face value, an explicit contradiction can be found when using deduction. However, this

is not the case when it comes to Mackie’s set of propositions. Plantinga shows that “no laws of

logic permit us to deduce the denial of one of the propositions from the other members”

(Plantinga 98). None of the statements necessarily lead to a contradiction; therefore, it is neither

a formal nor explicit contradiction.

It seems as if there is no real contradiction in Mackie’s set of propositions, but how can a

Christian possibly resolve the Paradox of Omnipotence and Sovereignty? It must be understood

that Christianity does not necessarily believe in a God with unlimited omnipotence. This means
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that His power is indeed limited, but limited to his own nature. The laws of the universe are a

reflection of God’s perfect nature, therefore God must conform to them. Asking God to create a

set of circumstances in which He cannot do something is similar to asking God to make two plus

two equal three, or to create a spherical cube. It simply cannot be done due to its complete

irrationality. The logical problem of evil is now considered by many scholars, theist and atheist

alike, to be bankrupt. J.L. Mackie (qtd. in Beebe) himself eventually conceded to Plantinga’s

defense, saying “we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central

doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another” (Mackie, The Miracle).

The second dimension to the Problem of Evil is the evidential problem, a mere extension

of the logical problem. The evidential problem concedes that while it may be possible that God

could have His reasons to allow evil and suffering, it is reasonable to think that at least some of

the evils of this world are gratuitous, or unnecessary (Rowe 132). These gratuitous evils would

make God’s existence highly unlikely. In his article Evil Is Evidence against Theistic Belief,

philosopher of religion William L. Rowe asks, “Is it true that [every instance] of intense…

suffering occurring daily in our world lead[s] to greater goods in such a way that even an all-

powerful, all-knowing being could not have achieved any of those goods without permitting the

instances of suffering…?” (Rowe 133). Rowe asserts that it is absurd to think that every instance,

every moment of suffering is absolutely needed in order to achieve some abstract greater good.

Therefore, while the Problem of Evil does not necessarily disprove God’s existence, it certainly

makes His existence extremely improbable, so improbable that atheism would be far more

reasonable than theism.

Theologians Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann responded to Rowe’s

argument by attempting to prove that “evil does not make atheism more reasonable than theism”
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(Howard-Snyder and Bergmann 143). The two colleagues point out the so-called “No-see-um”

argument, the idea that just because an answer is not able to be seen, it does not logically follow

that it is not there. For example, if a tree falls in a certain forest and nobody is able to be around

in order to see it or hear it fall, it does not change the fact that the tree fell. A person should not

assume that no trees fell in that forest, just because she was unable to see it happen. Humanity’s

relation to God is similar. Just because humans are unable to see God’s reasons for allowing

evils and instances of suffering, it does not mean that this counts as evidence against God having

reasons (Howard-Snyder and Bergmann 147). We have no reason to think that our finite minds

are able to grasp all the connections between goods and evils, but such matters may be known by

divine wisdom (Peterson 5). Furthermore, for the same reason it cannot be said that the existence

of God is made impossible due to evil, it cannot be said that His existence is unlikely (Keller).

We are simply unable to assess the probability. Theologian and Pastor Timothy Keller suggests

that just as we are unable to assess how the flapping of a butterfly’s wings affects the path of a

hurricane, we are unable to assess the “massive and infinitely complex ripple effects” that could

play a factor in the reasons of allowing evil and suffering (Keller 100). It would be absurd to

think that our minds could ever grasp details that are so deeply complex. Therefore, it would be a

fault to say that we could gauge the probability of God’s existence due to the evidence of evil in

the world.

The third and final dimension to the Problem of Evil is the existential problem. The most

personal of the issues, the existential problem is described by William Hasker, an American

philosopher of religion, as “the form [of the problem] in which theism is questioned and/or

rejected on the basis of moral protest, indignation, and outrage at the evils of this world” (Hasker

193-194). The problem essentially states that God cannot exist because the perfect and powerful
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God that an individual envisions does not align with what the individual has seen and

experienced.

The existential problem could be considered the very thing that makes us question the

Problem of Evil in the first place. So perhaps we can make a strong logical case for believing in

God despite all the evils in the world, but how do we address this issue on personal terms that

speak to the heart, rather than only using philosophy and logic to speak to the mind?

There are two main ways to respond to this inner questioning: a humanistic response and

a theological response. The humanistic response focuses a great deal on broad inner reflection,

specifically about our place in the grand spectrum of everything that was, is, and will be.

William Hasker invites people to ask themselves questions such as “Am I glad that I exist?” and

“What is the worth of living at all?” (Hasker 194, 195). A person would typically concede that it

is a good thing to live, that she should appreciate her existence as opposed to non-existence.

However, if a couple of events in history been different, a person and her loved ones probably

would not exist (Hasker 195). This notion leads Hasker to ask the question, is your own life

worth the suffering of those who came before you? The humanistic approach to the existential

problem would hope for a “yes” in this scenario, but it indirectly brings about a feeling of guilt,

worsening the existential problem. The humanistic approach is not sufficient when it comes to

answering this problem.

The theological response to the existential problem is slightly more extensive and much

more sufficient. In the words of theologian Marilyn Adams, the theological response attempts to

prove that “the Christian approach to evil through redemptive suffering affords a distinctive

solution of the problem of evil, for believers and unbelievers as well” (Adams 211). Adams

highlights God’s costly approach to the Problem of Evil in the form of martyrdom and the cross.
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A martyr is someone who bears witness for a certain belief or person and must pay the ultimate

price for it (Adams 219). Adams states that martyrdom can be viewed as “a vehicle of God’s

goodness to the martyr” (Adams 222). Through His redemption of humanity, God as Christ turns

martyrdom into an opportunity for a person to not only enter an intimate relationship with Him

but also find their identity in Him (Adams 223). God understands human suffering more than

anyone on earth possibly could, suffering Himself as Christ in order to save humanity. He uses

the persecution of His people both as “instruments of divine judgement and as opportunities for

relationship building, intimacy, and identification” (Adams 223). This model of martyrdom has

its limitations, however. Firstly there may be suffering in which the victim will receive the

benefits of a developing relationship, but there is also suffering in which one cannot (Adams

224). Secondly, while suffering that comes about through natural causes may strengthen the faith

of the afflicted, it may also significantly weaken faith as well. Finally, the price a victim must

pay could be considered far too high in terms of what is gained.

All of this being said, how can so much suffering be considered worth the struggle?

Adams suggests that suffering cannot seem redeemable unless it is looked at in terms of

Christianity (Adams 225). An intimate relationship with God must be seen as the purpose for

humans, a call to share in His joy and glory. Once engaging this relationship, a person is able to

more closely understand the person and deity of God, eventually recognizing His blameless and

perfect state of being. At this point, the Christian would recognize that neither she nor anyone

else would be disposed to blame God for being apathetic towards evils or for not having a

sufficient love (Adams 226). Evil and sin were not part of God’s original intentions, but they

were rather “byproducts of free persons,” and Christian and non-Christian alike are unable to

understand why God permits the amount that He does (Adams 227). Perhaps the most important
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thing to note about the Christian relationship with God is that God has only good intentions,

wanting to share in joy as well as agony. To have a God who not only desires a personal

relationship, but desires to share in the burdens and suffering of His own creation is something

extraordinarily unique. Adams puts it well when she says, “The fact of evil is a mystery, but the

answer (God) is a greater mystery” (Adams 230). The cross, the symbol for Christ’s suffering,

unveils God’s righteous love and serves as the epitome of his redemptive use of suffering,

providing a proper solution to the existential problem of evil.

Although the three dimensions of the Problem of Evil can be effectively answered, there

are still questions left unanswered, most importantly What exactly is God’s reason for allowing

evil and suffering? A proper theodicy is needed in order to tie together any loose threads. Of all

the theodicies I have mentioned and researched, one stands out from the rest due to its logical,

evidential, and existential sufficiencies: Alvin Plantinga’s “O Felix Culpa” theodicy.

O Felix Culpa is often placed under the category of supralapsarianism, the claim that

“God has decreed to permit humanity to fall into sin; he has also decreed to save at least some of

the fallen” (Plantinga 363). This view is often associated with Calvinism, for many Supras also

believe that before the fall even occurred, God determined who would be damned as well as

those who would be saved (Plantinga 386). The main point to be made about supralapsarianism,

however, is that God’s plan of redemption was made before He decreed to permit sin (Plantinga

363).

Plantinga makes sure to define what exactly suffering is, saying that it “encompasses any

kind of pain or discomfort: pain or discomfort that results from disease, injury, oppression,

[etc.]” (Plantinga 364). He also defines evil as “fundamentally a matter of free creatures doing

what is wrong and/or displaying vicious character traits” (Plantinga 364). It should be said that
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there needs to be a distinction between human evils, or evils that stem from human wrongdoing,

and natural evils, or evils that stem from forces typically beyond the control of humans, such as

natural disasters, disease, famine, etc.

Plantinga begins his theodicy by considering God’s thought process when He decided to

create a world. God considered the infinite number of possible worlds, “each with its own degree

of excellence or value.” (Plantinga 366-367). We must now ask what makes something good,

valuable, or excellent, and what makes something bad, unhappy, or deplorable (Plantinga 367).

In the simplest form, a thing’s state of affairs can be categorized as either good or bad. So, what

would make one world better than another? Plantinga suggests that the value of a world can be

determined by the amount of “creaturely happiness, ...beauty, justice, creaturely goodness,

performance of duty, [and other factors along those lines]” (Plantinga 368). He then specifically

states that if a world possesses creatures who “love God above all and their neighbor as

themselves,” then that world is of greater value than one without these creatures (Plantinga 368).

A world could be considered bad if there is a great amount of anguish, rejection of God, and sin.

Fundamentally, if God prefers one world over another, it is because that world aligns more to His

own perfect, omnibenevolent nature.

In order to show that our world is incredibly valuable, the topics of the Incarnation and

Atonement must be addressed. The Incarnation is the process God went through in order to

become human and dwell here on earth in the person of Jesus Christ. The Atonement is the

redemptive act of Christ when He, as a completely innocent and righteous man, died on the cross

for the sake of humanity, so that all people could be reconciled to God. Plantinga notes that these

two things are unthinkably great goods. He describes these events with awe when he says, “Jesus

Christ, the second person of the divine Trinity, incomparably good, holy, sinless, was willing to
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empty himself, to take on our flesh and become incarnate, and to suffer and die so that we human

beings can have life and be reconciled to the Father” (Plantinga 368). To do this, Christ willingly

endured the worst suffering possible, showing an unrivaled, infinitely good display of love,

proven further when thinking about how humans constantly reject God and His love (Plantinga

368-369). Creaturely acts of goodness, such as helping others, could not begin to match the

spectacular nature of these acts of divine goodness. Therefore, any world that possesses these

displays of affection would be of significantly greater value, or even infinitely greater value than

one without.

Due to His nature, it would be safe to assume that it is not possible for God to create a

world that is less than very good (Plantinga 369). After considering all the possible worlds that

could exist, good and bad, it would stand to reason that those worlds in which the Incarnation

and Atonement occur are far better than any other. Therefore, sin and evil are necessary

conditions of a really good possible world. Also, if God knew that He was going to create a very

good world, He must have permitted the fall even before the creation of the world, putting all of

these possible good worlds under the viewpoint of supralapsarianism.

While the reasoning is quite sound itself, Plantinga recognized that there are some

justified objections to his “O Felix Culpa” theodicy, such as “Why does God permit suffering as

well as evil?” (Plantinga 375). Obviously it is unreasonable to have the incarnation and

atonement without sin and evil, but why must suffering be present as well? In regards to human

evil, “free creatures are free to do evil” and due to this freedom, some indeed choose to inflict

evil upon others, causing suffering (Plantinga 376). Free creatures more closely resemble a free

God, making free creatures a feature of a more valuable world. However, this freedom in the

hands of mortals comes with the ability to choose evil over good, giving humans the ability to
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inflict suffering as a means to their own selfish ends. Perhaps the more important part of the

issue of suffering lies in natural evil. Plantinga suggests multiple ways to respond to this

problem, the most notable of which is the idea that suffering is intrinsically valuable (Plantinga

376). Scripture suggests multiple times that suffering brings about our glorification (see 2 Cor.

4:10-11, 14, Rom. 8:17-18, 2 Cor. 4:17, and Phil. 3:10-11). Suffering itself is shown to be a

reflection of Christ and the suffering He endured for us on the cross. Plantinga says that “this is a

means of fellowship with [Christ] at a very profound level,” a means to “resemble Christ in an

important respect, displaying the image of God” (Plantinga 380).

Another reasonable objection to “O Felix Culpa” is the question, “Why does God permit

so much suffering and evil?” (Plantinga 380). To answer this question we must recognize that

there is no known maximum or minimum of suffering in possible worlds (Plantinga 381). We

can always imagine a world with more or less suffering than the one we inhabit now, but

Plantinga suggests that in the end, “we have no way at all of estimating how much suffering the

best worlds will contain, or where the amount of suffering and evil contained in [our world]

stands in comparison with those worlds” (Plantinga 382). While the objection is interesting and a

fair question to ask, the truth is that it cannot be answered by mortal deduction, making it

inconclusive.

The final objection that Plantinga offers is as follows: “If God permitted human suffering

and evil in order to achieve a world in which there is incarnation and atonement, wouldn’t He be

manipulative, calculating, treating His creatures like means instead of ends?” (Plantinga 382).

This objection is a misunderstanding of the Trinity, neglecting the fact that the Son of God (who

is God Himself) suffered an unimaginably awful death in order to bring about an unimaginably

wonderful gift in the form of the atonement. The main points of the incarnation and atonement
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are to display His glory, reveal how His love for us is infinitely deep, and to bring us the

incomparably awesome gift of salvation. Therefore, God should not be considered to be a

manipulative deity acting only in order to achieve His own selfish gains, because His goals,

intentions, and actions are the exact opposite of selfish.

It should be noted that the O Felix Culpa theodicy is by no means perfect, nor should it

be said that there currently exists a perfect theodicy. There is a reason that this is still an ongoing

philosophical discussion with new insight given daily. However, Plantinga’s theodicy is

extremely helpful and a stellar contribution to the continuing conversation. We have wrestled for

millennia with the logical, evidential, and existential problems of evil, and we could be wrestling

with these issues for millennia to come. I am recommending this theodicy in particular because it

is very useful at this moment in time. I believe it is the best argument that the theist community

has to offer at this juncture in the dialogue. It is extremely valuable to think deeply about the

problem of evil both theologically and philosophically, calling upon our greatest resources, such

as the Bible and Christ’s story of redemption, to engage these pressing questions.

So where does this leave us? Why should we care about answering the problem of evil?

Is it merely beneficial for Christians to evangelize, or is there something more to it all? Cultures

around the world have their own ways of dealing and coping with suffering. It is something we

all must experience, a question we all must face at some point or another, especially if we are

constantly in an environment that promotes the idea of a perfect and all-powerful God. We need

to treat this issue seriously, giving it the respect and attention it deserves. The church as a whole

should not avoid this issue, but address it directly so that we further learn of Christ’s love and

connection to us through suffering. For the individual, I would highly suggest looking into this

issue; it is something eye-opening and life-changing that I am very thankful to have had the
Quiroz 18

opportunity to study this past school year. We, as a community and a culture, need to think about

this in practically every aspect of our lives, for it affects everything we do, every moment of

every day. Suffer with each other. Cultivate the habit of listening and comforting, bearing each

other’s burdens. Talk with everyone: atheists, theists, agnostics alike. Try to understand where

they are coming from. The sooner we are able to connect with and begin to understand those

different than us, the sooner we can start building relationships that have the potential to lead to

something wonderful. Look to the cross and resurrection as the answer to your suffering.

Christians believe in a God who answered our suffering by suffering. It’s something truly

incredible and unique that we have taken for granted far too often. Embody a different culture of

suffering, a culture of suffering based in redemption and the promises of God. Embody a life of

service in order to assist not only those in your community, but also those outside of your

community who experience suffering right alongside you. Embody Christ. Good work.
Quiroz 19

Works Cited

Adams, Marilyn M. “Redemptive Suffering as a Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil.” The

Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of

Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 210–231.

Beebe, James R. “Logical Problem of Evil.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/.

Craig, William Lane. “The Problem of Evil.” ReasonableFaith.org, www.reasonablefaith.org/the-

problem-of-evil. Web.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, and Edward Garnett. The Brothers Karamozov. Dent, 1927.

Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. “Best of All Possible Worlds.” Encyclopædia Britannica,

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 6 June 2017, www.britannica.com/topic/best-of-all-possible-

worlds.

Godwin, Simon J. “Irenaeus Theodicy.” Scandalon,

www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/theodicy_irenaeus.htm. Web.

Harmon, Jana. “C.S. Lewis on the Problem of Pain.” C.S. Lewis Institute, 8 Dec. 2012,

www.cslewisinstitute.org/C_S_Lewis_on_the_Problem_of_Pain_page3. Web.

Hasker, William. “On Regretting the Evils of This World.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,

edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 193-209.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Michael Bergmann. “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than

Theism.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed.,

University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 143-158.

Lewis, C S. The Problem of Pain. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Print.


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Mackie, J.L. “Evil and Omnipotence.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited by Michael L.

Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 81-94.

Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McKeon, Matthew. “Logical Consequence.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

www.iep.utm.edu/logcon/#H1.

Mitchell, Philip Irving. “Theodicy: An Overview.” Dallas Baptist University,

www3.dbu.edu/mitchell/theodicy.htm. Web.

Murray, Michael J., and Sean Greenberg. “Leibniz on the Problem of Evil.” Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, Stanford University, 4 Jan. 1998, plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/. Web.

Peterson, Michael L. “Introduction: The Problem of Evil.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,

edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 1-13.

Plantinga, Alvin. “The Free Will Defense.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited by Michael

L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 95-129.

Plantinga, Alvin. “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,

edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 363-389.

Rowe, William L. “Evil Is Evidence against Theistic Belief.” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings,

edited by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 130-143.

St. Augustine. “A Good Creation’s Capacity for Evil’” The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited

by Michael L. Peterson, Second ed., University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 235-241.

“Stephen Fry - On God.” YouTube.com, 7 Oct. 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5RtDpva7nE.

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