1
Mirasol v CA 351 SCRA 44
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture
FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar
allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's
purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might
realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the
proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners
asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.
Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make
unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked
petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago
still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law,
all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National
Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting,
specific performance, and damages against PNB.
Issue: Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
Ruling: As regards the second issue, petitioners contend that P.D.
No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property
without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise
its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the
exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a
law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds.[17] The policy of
the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This
means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with
the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and
specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's
obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be
determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No.
579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to
PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The governing
law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted
as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite that the
constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case
is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.
Petitioners further contend that the passage of R.A. No.
7202[19] rendered P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional, since R.A. No. 7202
affirms that under P.D. 579, the due process clause of the Constitution
and the right of the sugar planters not to be deprived of their property
without just compensation were violated.
A perusal of the text of R.A. No. 7202 shows that the repealing
clause of said law merely reads:
"SEC. 10. All laws, acts, executive orders and circulars in
conflict herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."
The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by
implication are not favored.[20] R.A. No. 7202 cannot be deemed to
have repealed P.D. No. 579. In addition, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with the courts. [21]
Assuming arguendo that R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579,
said repeal is not a legislative declaration finding the earlier law
unconstitutional.
Fariñas v Executive Sec., 147387
Facts: In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was
signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code which states that an elective official, except the
President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed
resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while
he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that
an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however
retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the
minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the
ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue
advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in
its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of
the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill
No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting
provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference
Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were
convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had
its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never
subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it
appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though
there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said
compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be
passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law
unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is
not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote;
while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices,
are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA
9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.
Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral
Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired
into by the Court.
Astoraga v Villegas, L-23475
Facts: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of
Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been
assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under
authority of RA 4065).

Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He
then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et
al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been enacted.
When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as
House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities
headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made
before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations.
During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The
bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved
by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it
became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed
by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent
to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the
version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as
amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to
this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines
withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said
law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that
the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the
statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
Issue: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
Ruling: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC
is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the
SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.
Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they
withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill
intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that
the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
Caltex v Palomar, L19650
Facts: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest”. The mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible.
No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries
at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the
Philippine Postal Office. However, then acting Postmaster Enrico
Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the
contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter
belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class
matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails,
or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be
delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in
any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence,
communications pertaining thereto cannot be mailed by Caltex via
Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular
courts thru a petition for declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their
contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery
consists of the following elements:
a. consideration; b. prize; c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the
first element, consideration, is missing. Said element is missing
because participants are not required to pay anything – there’s no
consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is
not proper. He insisted that he was merely applying the law and that
there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call
for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued
that even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a
lottery, the same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still
prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is
proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
2
Ruling: 1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order
if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words
used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary:
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No. The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well
taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court
went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence and legal
doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no
explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the
Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the
term “lottery”. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in
statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only
logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is
prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift
enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not
include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex
should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v La Trinidad Water District,
166471
Facts: Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was
organized to provide domestic water services in Brgy. Twang, La
Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility
created under PD No. 198, authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purpose within municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board
an application for Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate
and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD claimed that
under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional under Sec. 2,
Art. XII.
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter
cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid;
that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the State, through its
authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and
maintain ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public
utilities. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise
exclusive in character so as to preclude the State itself from granting a
franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee when
public interest so requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by TMPC.
Issue:Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid

Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando
aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – Those that
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Under Sec. 2 and
11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and
Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character
by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. And the rule is that in
case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the former
prevails, because the constitution is the basic law to which all other
laws must conform to.
GSIS v Pauig, 210328
Facts: Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig) was the Municipal
Agriculturist of the Municipality of San Pablo, lsabela. He started in the
government service on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on
casual status. Later, he became a temporary employee from July 5,
1972 to July 18, 1977. On July 19, 1977, he became a permanent
employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became a GSIS member, as
indicated in his Information for Membership.
Thereafter, on November 3, 2004, he retired from the service
upon reaching the mandatory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years
old. But when he filed his retirement papers with the GSIS-Cauayan,
the latter processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable Service
(RCS) and a Total Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years.
Disagreeing with the computation, Pauig wrote a letter-complaint to the
GSIS, arguing that his first fourteen (14) years in the government
service had been. erroneously omitted.
The GSIS ratiocinated that Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in
the government were excluded in the computation of his retirement
benefits because during those years, no premium payments were
remitted to it. Under the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS which took
effect on August 1, 2003, only periods of service where premium
payments were made and duly remitted to the System shall be included
in the computation of retirement benefits. Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case
before the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela.
Issue: Whether or not the GSIS should include Pauig's first fourteen
(14) years in government service for the calculation of the latter's
retirement benefits claim
Ruling: The Court must deny Pauig's appeal to liberal construction
since the applicable law is clear and unambiguous. The primary
modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of
the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction
in this consideration, the Court finds that the language of the retirement
law is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation
exists, only the application of the letter of the law.[15] Therefore,
Pauig's casual and temporary service in the government from February
12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 must necessarily be excluded from the
creditable period of service for retirement purposes.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
GRANTS the petition and REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the Decision
dated July 15, 2013 and Order dated December 4, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, in Civil Case No.
22-1035 insofar as it directs the Government Service Insurance
System to include Apolinario C. Pauig's casual and temporary service
in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 as
creditable service for purposes of computing his retirement benefits.
SSC and SSS v Teresa Favilla, 170195
Facts: Respondent Teresita Favila filed a claim with the SSS for
pension benefits, and averred therein that after she was married to
Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter designated
her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before
petitioner Social Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June
30, 1970.When they begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II,
her husband likewise designated each one of them as
beneficiaries.Teresa further averred that when Florante died on
February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were given to
their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his
emancipation at age 21.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is
likewise entitled to receive Florantes pension benefits, Teresa
subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS.The SSS,
however, denied the claim.
Resolving Teresitas claim, the SSC stated that the surviving
spouses entitlement to an SSS members death benefits is dependent
on two factors which must concur at the time of the latters death, to
wit:(1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2) dependency for
support.As to dependency for support, the SSC opined that same is
affected by factors such as separationde factoof the spouses, marital
infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under
the law.Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florantes
designated beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from
claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not dependent
for support from Florante due to marital infidelity.
The CA, however, reversed the SSCs decision.
Issue: W/N Teresa is entitled to Florante’s death benefits, in
contemplation of the SS Law?
Ruling: NO. SS Law Sec. 8 defines dependent as the legitimate
spouse dependent for support upon the employee; beneficiaries =
dependent spouse. The law’s purpose is plain and simple. A
beneficiary must not only be a legitimate spouse, but also dependent
for a spouse to qualify as primary beneficiary.
BASIC STATCON RULE: if a statute is plain and clearly free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
intended interpretation. “verba legis non est recedendum”, from the
words of a statute, there must be no departure.
SC finds untenable Teresa’s assertion that being the legal
wife, she is presumed to be a primary dependent. In Aguas, SC clearly
concluded thata wife separated de fact from her husband cannot be
said to be dependent for support upon the husband. Wife-claimant had
burden to show proof that all requirements were complied with.
Teresa did not present any evidence to prove that she was
dependent upon the support of Florante until his death.
(e) Dependents ‐ The dependent shall be the following:
3
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty‐
one years (21) of age, or if over twenty‐one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated
and incapable of self‐ support, physically or mentally
LBP v Heirs of Puyat, 175055
Facts: Gloria and Maximo Puyat (deceased) owns a parcel of riceland
consisting of 46.8731 hectares. The said land was subjected to
acquisition pursuant to PD 27 but the records does not show when the
DAR acquired the same. Sometime in December 1989 DAR then,
issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farm-
beneficiaries. The Puyat's however, did not receive any compensation
for the acquisition.
Sometime in September 1992 LBP received DAR's instruction
to pay the just compensation to the Puyats. The LBP made its
evaluation, but the heirs of the Puyat rejected the valuation and filed a
complain for determination of just compensation with the RTC. The
following are the valuation of the property:
LBP = P 92,752.10 @ P 2,012.50 per hectare (in compliance wit the
formula under PD 27 and EO 228. LBP also contended that the
valuation should be done at the time of the taking (1976));
RTC = P 4,430,900.00 @ P 100,000.00 per hectare since 44.3090
hectares were distributed to farmer-beneficiaries and 6% legal interest
from the date of taking until the amount is fully paid (due to delay in
payment);
CA = same as RTC but modified the legal interest not from 1990 but
from March 20, 1990 for precision.
Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using
the factors in Sec. 17 of RA 6657.
Issue: Should the case be remanded to the trial court for the
recomputation of just compensation using Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended by RA 9700
Ruling: Lastly, in arriving at the valuations for respondents property,
the Court also considers that the courts below had already followed
Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended. That RA 9700 added two new
factors to the said provision, is not sufficient ground for remanding the
case under the factual milieu of this case. To remand the case now for
another valuation, so that the two new factors may also be considered,
appears impractical and inequitable. The respondents have been
deprived of their property for 22 years. It is time that they receive what
has long been due them.
No wanton disregard of the factors provided under Republic
Act No. 6657
Land Bank maintains that, assuming arguendo that RA 6657
is the applicable law, the trial and appellate courts wantonly
disregarded the basic valuation formula in DAR AO No. 5, series of
1998, which implements Section 17 of RA 6657. It insists that courts
are not at liberty to dispense of these formulations at will. Land Bank
thus asks that the case be remanded to the trial court for a proper
 4

determination of the just compensation in accordance with DAR AO

No. 5, series of 1998.
We disagree. The trial and appellate courts arrived at the just
compensation with due consideration for the factors provided in
Section 17 of RA 6657 (prior to its amendment by RA 9700). They took
into account the nature of the property, its actual use or the crops
planted thereon, the volume of its produce, and its value according to
government assessors. As the CA correctly held, the determination of
just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly
restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the
courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic
function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While the courts
should be mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in
arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere
thereto if the situations before them do not warrant it.[42] Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[43] thoroughly discusses this issue, to
wit:
x x x [T]he basic formula and its alternatives administratively
determined (as it is not found in Republic Act No. 6657, but merely set
forth in DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998) although referred to and even
applied by the courts in certain instances, does not and cannot strictly
bind the courts. To insist that the formula must be applied with utmost
rigidity whereby the valuation is drawn following a strict mathematical
computation goes beyond the intent and spirit of the law. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile.
Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. As we have
established in earlier jurisprudence, the valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the
regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies.
The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial
discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which
cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an
administrative agency. Surely, DAR AO No. 5 did not intend to
straightjacket the hands of the court in the computation of the land
valuation. While it provides a formula, it could not have been its
intention to shackle the courts into applying the formula in every
instance. The court shall apply the formula after an evaluation of the
three factors, or it may proceed to make its own computation based on
the extended list in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which includes
other factors[.] x x x[44]
As a final note, it has not escaped the Courts notice that the
DAR and the Land Bank appear nonchalant in depriving landowners of
their properties. They seem to ignore the requirements of law such as
notice, valuation, and deposit of initial valuation before taking these
properties, and yet they ask for a strict compliance with the law when it
comes to compensating the landowners. This inequitable situation
appears in innumerable cases and this Court feels duty-bound to
remind the DAR and the Land Bank to give as much regard for the law
when taking property as they do when they are ordered to pay for them.
The rights of landowners cannot be lightly set aside and disregarded
for the attainment of the lofty ideals of agrarian reform