ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M.
DIMALOTANG, petitioners, Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First
vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.
FACTS:
 Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734),
entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The plebiscite for
its approval results that only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an
autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government
and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government.
 In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Aquino issued Executive Order No.
426 (E.O. 426), entitled "Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes."
 Nearly nine (9) years later, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Secretary issued D.O. 119 which created the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office that shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and
facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
 Almost 2 years later, President Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999
which is “AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST
DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR”
 Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054) and the same was
ratified through a plebiscite, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended." Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed
provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of
governance of the National Government.
 Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity
as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First
Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur seeking to annul and
set aside D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and to prohibit the respondent DPWH Secretary
from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works
projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; they allege that
D.O.119 violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the
challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8999 and D.O. 119 are constitutional?
RULING: NO.
Republic Act No. 8999
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or
repealed by a subsequent enactment.
 The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than
ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A.
8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite
requirement.37 In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act,
was subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the
functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City
at the time)38 to the Regional Government. By creating an office with previously
devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The
amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM
before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999
has not even become operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054.
Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of
autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur
and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning.
R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction
over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with
R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic
Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction
over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the
provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—which
initiated the creation of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which
defined the basic structure of the autonomous government E.O. 426 sought to
implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication
of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis
of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been
previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the
provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than
its source of power—the Executive.
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented
R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and
maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O.
119 which has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
The Court rationalized the Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the
separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. 44 These
cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.45
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims
and the Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights
their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their
aspirations.51 The Moros' struggle for self-determination dates as far back as the
Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present, the struggle goes on. 52
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace
and order problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy,
decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have become politically
acceptable answers to intractable problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict
and threat of secession.53
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a
sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines."54
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local
government unit vis-à-vis the central government.
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the
people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central
government.
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive
means for national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims,
increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the unhampered
implementation of the development programs in the region.
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.63
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates,
whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It
involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein
a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right
against the central government.64
Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the
delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and
local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as administrative
decentralization.65
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from
the central government to local government units. 66 This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. 67 It aims
to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government
takes control again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in
and tied up.
The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic
Acts and results in the recall of powers which have previously been handed over. This
should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for greater autonomy for
the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears stressing that
national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure
the autonomy of autonomous regions.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as
Judge of the Court of First instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, THE
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SOUTHERN LEYTE, HON. SALVACION O. YNIGUEZ, in
her capacity as Governor of Southern Leyte and the MUNICIPALITY OF
BONTOC, respondents.
FACTS:
 Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc,
formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte.
 A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc
and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised
jurisdiction over ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.
 On June 17, 1952, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617
directing the holding of a plebiscite among the ten barrios to determine
whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality
of Sogod or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted and the results thereof
show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of
Bontoc.
 the Provincial Board of Leyte then issued Resolution No. 519 recommending
to the President and/or to the Congress that Republic Act 522 be amended so
as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the some barrios
claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said
law. The board further recommended that the boundary line between the two
municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.
 The President then promulgated Executive Order No. 368, which approved
the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the
barrios and sitios which shag compose the municipalities of Bontoc and
Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary
line separating Bontoc and Sogod.
 However, on July 14, 1960, the President sent a telegram to the Provincial
Board of Southern Leyte stating to suspend the implementation of Executive
Order 368.
 The Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the
implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee
to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by
Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute.
 The municipality of Sogod filed Civil to enjoin the provincial board and
provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary
dispute between the two municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc
from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to
the municipality of Sogod.
 On August 31, 1973, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in dismissing the action?
RULING: Yes. The trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of
jurisdiction and in allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending
investigation and proceedings on the boundary dispute.
The prevailing law at the time the civil action was filed, which is Section 2167 of the
Revised Administrative, vested the right to settle boundary disputes between
municipalities on the provincial board.The decisions of the boards are then appealable
to the Executive Secretary.
Records in the instant case show that when petitioner municipality filed the civil actions
in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet
conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960 or rendered
any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter
of delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead
of bringing it to the trial court. Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board
the power to determine or even alter municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or
the Executive Department for that matter, was not precluded during that time from
taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute.
It is worthy to note however, that up to this time, the controversy between these two
municipalities has not been settled. The 1987 Constitution now mandates that no
province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Hence, any alteration or modification of
the boundaries of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be enacted by Congress
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the barrios
affected (Section 134, Local Government Code). Thus, under present laws, the function
of the provincial board to fix the municipal boundaries are now strictly limited to the
factual determination of the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified by
natural boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating said
municipalities.
SIMPLICIO C. GRIÑO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ILOILO PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents.
FACTS:
 Guimaras, a sub-province of Iloilo is composed of three municipalities, with a
combined voting population of fifty thousand (50,000), more or less and also
constitute a part of the second district of Iloilo.
 In the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the
sub-province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of
the entire province of Iloilo.
 Upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 462
thereof called for the conversion of existing subprovinces into regular
provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be
held in the areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section likewise
directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with the national
elections following the effectivity of R.A. 7160.
 The Comelec conducted a plebiscite for the conversion of Guimaras into a
regular province simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. It was
however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by the
Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain
any space or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district
of Iloilo, of which the sub-province of Guimaras was a part.
 Petitioners filed the instant petition alleging that Comelec acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of
the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor
of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the
second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was
passed providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a
full-fledged province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the
subprovince shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who,
in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue
to represent said sub-province.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion?
RULING: YES.
Section 462 of the Local Government Code completely addresses an eventuality where
the people of both the original district and the people of the new district to be created
agree to the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity
of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly
created province through appointment, if none has yet been appointed to the same (as
hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan.
But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those affected
by such conversion, what does the law say? The law states that these sub-provincial
positions shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law
however, failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the sub-
province shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent or
whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular province
shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held
simultaneously with the plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for
the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in the plebiscite prevailed, these votes
shall not be considered. If however, the "No" vote prevailed and the voters of Guimaras
were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into
consideration. The Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the
plebiscite decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials.
The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-
province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the
President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a
negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by
registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.
However, this petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic because in
the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly
voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. In this
event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to
newspaper reports, the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he
shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan
in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-
province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the
province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special election for
the purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL and
ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
FACTS:
 On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg.
51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section 3 of the statute
provides that any city now existing with an annual regular derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos
(P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shall be classified as
a highly urbanized city. It further provides that the registered voters of a
component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the
province of which that city is a component, if its charter so provides. However,
voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not
participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the
highly urbanized city is geographically located.
 Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified as
a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election
of the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although the Charter
of Cebu City allows such.
 The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than
P40 million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the
city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter
expressly provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in
the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a
candidate therefor.
 The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the
Cities of Cebu and Mandaue assailing the Section 3 of of Batas Blg.
885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the
only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based
on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect
provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore
such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is correct?
RULING: NO.
Art. XI, Section 4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located. This is as it
should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city due
to a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate
in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since
these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and
authority over said city.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis
of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a
city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a
relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether
the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the
continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of republicanism as
it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the
government unit through the exercise of his right of suffrage. It has been pointed out,
however, that the provincial government has no governmental supervision over highly
urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the province in the administration of
their affairs. Such being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and
election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally
affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the
passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City.
Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. The
questioned statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The
said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an
unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor
General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters
of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will
work to their disadvantage.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage
since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial
officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote
for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither withdraw
nor restrict.
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity
as the Executive Secretary, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.
FACTS:
 President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the
City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535 and seeks to enjoin
the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the
COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches,
and the Department of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for
said plebiscite.
 Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area
were not presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the
passage of R.A. No. 8535 citing the minutes of the public hearings conducted
by the Senate Committee on Local Government on the proposed charter of
the City of Novaliches. Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no
certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon
City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches,
in terms of income, population, and land area.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8535 creating the City of Novaliches is valid?
RULING: YES
Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through
regular congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of
proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably.
We note that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of
Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner
did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to
the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in this regard.
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the
requisites therefor.
Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local
Government were resource persons from the different government offices like National
Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and
Department of Budget, and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself. In
their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on population, land area and income
of the proposed city. Their official statements could serve the same purpose
contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as
witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give
even greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
Moreover, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the
public hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written certifications.
Note that under the Implementing Rules, written certifications are required to be
attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted by interested
municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Petitioner, however,
did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only to prove that it was without
the written certifications attached as required by law.
Petitioner then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of
the proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section 11(a) of the Local
Government Code. Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not
provide for a seat of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal to
the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be. We agree with respondents
that under Section 12 of the Local Government Code, which applies to the proposed
City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535, the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation.
With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of the City of
Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete evidence on this point.
Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the deliberations of the
Senate Committee on Local Government, and made no mention of anything concerning
such adverse effects. As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the
first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City.
The fact that he did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on R.A. No.
8535, stressing instead his concern on the matter of inclusion of all Quezon City voters
in the plebiscite that would decide the fate of the City of Novaliches, is indicative of the
non-existence of such negative issues.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner's contention. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it
provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities
as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the
Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION
and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
FACTS:
 On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that
they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City
of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set
for June 22, 1996.
Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue
raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise
in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays.
The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.

 Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997
 Upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta filed two
Petitions with the COMELEC to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites
scheduled. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of
the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the
Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the
boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the
case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has
already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of
Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo
Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig
and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same
vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico,
Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

 In the first petition the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of
Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to
be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute.

 The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the
Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on
March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments?
RULING: YES.
The Civil Case involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held since the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by
the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny
that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the
City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOAQUIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. NICANOR SIVA,
BASILIO SAPITANAN, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

 Petitioner, Municipality of San Joaquin, seeks the reversal of a decision of the

Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the former's petition for prohibition,
contesting the legality of Executive Order No. 436 of the President of the
Philippines, dated July 10, 1961, creating the municipality of Lawigan out of
twenty-one (21) barrios theretofore forming part of said municipality of San
Joaquin.

 Respondents-appellees are the persons appointed by the President as mayor,

vice-mayor and councilors of Lawigan, who are sought to be restrained from
performing their functions as such, upon the ground that Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order is based,
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers, and, hence,
unconstitutional. The lower court, however, held otherwise. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Order No. 436 is constitutional?

RULING: NO.

The issue herein has been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez vs. Auditor General,
G.R. No. L-23825, promulgated on December 24, 1965, which upheld the theory of
appellant herein, and rejected the view taken in the appealed decision.

There is no valid delegation. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet the well settled requirement for the valid delegation of the power:

(a) The delegation must be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) The delegation must fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and
eminently legislative in character not administrative/executive.

Wherefore, said decision is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
declaring the aforementioned Executive Order No. 436 null and void ab initio, and
directing herein respondents-appellees to refrain from acting as officers of the
municipality of Lawigan, with costs against them. It is so ordered.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.
GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM
MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
FACTS:
 Prior to the enactment of the herein assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan were belonged to only one legislative district.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675
which is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." President Ramos
signed R.A. No. 7675 into law and was later on ratified through a plebiscite
 Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
 Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city,
the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of
this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with
its first representative to be elected at the same election.
 Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that
it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, for it resulted in embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
 Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and
(4) of the Constitution contending that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained
the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that
Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7675 is constitutional?
RULING: YES.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but
is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of
the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any
rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,
Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members
is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress
may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd
since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have
separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG, thru its Mayor, PORFIRIO F. ROYO Vice Mayor,
TOMAS D. MANZANO, Municipal Councilors VALERIANO CLARO, CARIDAD A.
DORONIO FELICULO ESTRADA, GEORGE PEDRO JAIN, LIDO E. MONOY
SALVADOR PASPE and AGUEDO ROTOL petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX L. MOYA,
Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX, and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STO. TOMAS, thru its Mayor, ANICETO SOLIS, Vice-Mayor
LEOPOLDO RECTO, Municipal Councilors DOMINGO CAGADAS, WENCESLAO
CASTRO, WILDA ESPIRITU, PASTOR FERNANDEZ, MACROSQUE PIMENTEL,
DOMINADOR SOLIS, JOSE TAGHOY and ALFONSO VALDEZ, and Municipal
Treasurer JOSE AVENIDO, respondents.

FACTS:

 From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia

created respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts
jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner.

 For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between
the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private respondent, to
the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it
appears that no action was taken on the same. Private respondent then filed
a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao, presided over by
herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of
Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of
collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475.

 On November 22, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of

lack of jurisdiction of the lower court and lack of legal personality of the
Municipality of Santo Tomas, which was opposed by private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

RULING: NO.s

In the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, it is clear that the President has
no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to
speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and
it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits
that respondent Judge should have dismissed the case.

On the ground of jurisdiction, it must be noted that Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to
create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be
a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the
case, since further proceedings would be pointless.
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents.
FACTS:
 On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Then on December 17, 2000 a plebiscite was
conducted and resulted to its ratification
 Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of
Sorsogon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed petition seeking the annulment of
the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city";
B. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
C. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation
of Section 54 thereof; and
D. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct?
RULING: NO.
FIRST ISSUE: Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government
units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides "SECTION 8.
Division and Merger. — Division and merger of existing local government units shall
comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation”
SECOND ISSUE: Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two
principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2)
the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. There is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City
of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of
Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental
effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived
the public of fair information on this consequence.
THIRD ISSUE: Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should
be conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act. The Act was approved
on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims,
the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration
of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired
without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be
ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of
general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of
local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was
completed on September 1, 2000, which date should be the reckoning point in
determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date
of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The
publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law.
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be
conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its
approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for
conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity
of the law.
FOURTH ISSUE: Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an
extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to
the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by
petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the
presumption20 that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under
the law in conducting the plebiscite.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
FACTS:
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati for the following
grounds:1
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill;
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is tenable?
RULING: NO
FIRST GROUND:
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of
Makati, ”the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati
in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City
of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila”
Petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be
made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation
did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land
area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's
land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."In the cases at
bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but
as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
SECOND GROUND:
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including
Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A.
No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has
already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can
still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question
of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in
this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
THIRD GROUND:
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said
case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment
of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at
least one congressional representative.

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. The
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index,
or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to such general subject."
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal
Mayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR
PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
 The Municipality of Nueva Era was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 66 dated September 30, 1916.
 The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." There is no issue
insofar the law is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of
Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the
phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary." It must be
noted that the part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is
now the province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the
second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-
Apayao boundary.
 Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern
side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that
Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such
that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.
 After 30 years, Sangguniang Bayan passed "Resolution Claiming an Area
which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the
Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
 Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution alleging that
since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It argued to the effect that
since the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it
must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.
 According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras
only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of
Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should
not go beyond the territory of said barrios. It further contends that the claim of
Marcos to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.
 The SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. It ruled that R.A. No. 3753
expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of
Nueva Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was
included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.
 The RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision. However, the CA
declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to
the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-
Apayao." By this extension of Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA allocated to
Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a
portion of Nueva Era.
RULING: NO. No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory
are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit: SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding,
Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of
Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a
new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the
following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory,
Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. Had
the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Since the barangays of
Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the
territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done
intentionally.
However, it must be noted that, we agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos'
claim over parts of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the
required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government
Code of 1991 because at the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required
by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without
conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras,
where it was derived. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not
backward. It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so
provided.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V.
BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in
his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as
Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator,
and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
FACTS:
 On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law.
On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected." The consent of the people of the local government unit directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local
government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized
as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be
diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will
have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by
the city will now have to be shared with the province.

 On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A.
No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as
ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification
by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people
thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this
plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when
R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to
consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right.

 The Solicitor General made a comment that R.A. No. 8528

merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,"
hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite.

RULING: YES. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.

The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the
said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, et.al
petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETA CITY, and
MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN through its MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, et.al,
respondents
FACTS:
 This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta City, 1 affirming the legal existence of the
Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation
of its boundary for the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed
by it belong to it.
 The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of
then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
 By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a
portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja,
and Sinara Alto, based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim
was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez.
 In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O.
No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted
jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of
Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77 which fixed the common boundary of
Sinacaban and Jimenez.
 In its decision, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of
Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter
the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested
in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1983.
 The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had
completely organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised
corporate powers for forty years before its existence was questioned; that
Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by
entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and
ordered the relocation of its boundary for the purpose of determining whether
certain areas claimed by it belong to it.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim?
2) Whether or not the RTC is correct in ordering a relocation survey of the
boundary?
RULING: YES
FIRST ISSUE:
The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally
exists, then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without
power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this
case has been reiterated in a number of cases 9 later decided. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 10 this Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order
of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly
30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2)
the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the
municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that
whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be
deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities."
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least
a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area
that apparently is desired for its revenue On the contrary, the State and even the
Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence when
Jimenez entered into agreement with Sinacaban in 1950 regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental.
Also the claim of Jimenez that the creation of Sinacban does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of
new municipalities.
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had
attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only
to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the
requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, §3 of the previous
Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to
municipal corporations created before, such as the Municipality of Sinacaban in the
case at bar.

SECOND ISSUE:

Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of
Sinacaban because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated
in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into an agreement
whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called
barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios,
without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling.
The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining
the boundaries of the municipality and consequently the question to which the
municipality the barangays in question belong.

In 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios belonged to Jimenez, while
certain other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently approved
by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to
E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez contends,
however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the agreement as embodied
in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises the
question whether the Provincial Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to
put it in another way, whether it had the power to declare certain barrios part of one or
the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effect would be to amend the area as
described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power of provincial boards to settle boundary
disputes is "of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is
obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating
a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. If, therefore,
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue),
Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-
Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue) et.al, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon.
CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, et.al, Respondents.
FACTS:
 On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
 The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
 Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
 Then the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
 On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely
noted said petition.
 On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160
declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220
were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
 The petitioners filed a petition maintaining that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sole province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region?
RULING: NO
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in
its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes
are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part
of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only
one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another for regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall
then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of
having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And
since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people. The province of Ifugao
makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section
2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra,
Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City.
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY
OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
FACTS:
 During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
 During the 12thCongress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to
restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.
 After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
 The House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills and later on lapsed
into law. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
 Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
RULING ON FIRST ISSUE: YES
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect
on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory,
there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should
not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100
million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
the Local Government Code.
increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many
municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. The fact of
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limits the exemption to a specific
condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be
limited to existing conditions only.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with
Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while
other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found
with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code. in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13 th Congress. All the hearings
and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and
deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent
Congresses. The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved
bills filed in one Congress become functus officioupon adjournment of that Congress
and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their
respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills
had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken
up for the first time, from the filing to the approval.

RULING ON SECOND ISSUE: YES

Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in

the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.
The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not
have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY;
COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL
R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA,
PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA,
TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and
FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca,
Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE
LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS,
WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC,
JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M.
MAXIMO, respondents.
FACTS:
 President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality
of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, along with
their respective sitios.
 By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, the municipal district of San Andres was
later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality.
 The municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the
Regional Trial Court, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor
General,4 the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No.
353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers.
 In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court finally dismissed the
petition9 for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged
to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of
municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and
executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as Local Government Code of 1991”.
 Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and
void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by
anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act
is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though its has never
been passed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality of San Andres, created by E.O. 353, is legally
existent?
RULING: YES.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining
in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if
not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353,
the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on
24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all
pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No.
174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the
Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of
San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of
Quezon must now be conceded.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its Sanguniang
Bayan and Mayor, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY
OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents.
FACTS:
instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia
was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of
Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of
Bohol.

 This case arise out of the boundary dispute between municipality of Candijay Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality
Bohol and municipality of Alicia Bohol. The lower court's decision,declared of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local
"barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de
municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of jure municipality.
its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further
permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's
control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never
to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio"

 On appeal, the respondent Court stated that the trial court committed an error
in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of
municipality of Candijay." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed
by petitioner based on certain exhibits presented.

 The Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari, as one of its argument is
that the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a
result of having been created under a void executive order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent municipality is legally existent?

RULING: YES.

We noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of
respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent
municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a
quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial
court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it
had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by
President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and
void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which
said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers
to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this
Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.

In this regard, the Court in applied the ruling of the case Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon vs. Mendez. (just refer to the previous case)

Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the
municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres,
and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all
indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, Represented by HONORABLE ROY
PADILLA, as Acting Provincial Governor, petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Represented by HONORABLE HJALMAR QUINTANA, as Acting Provincial
Governor, respondent.
FACTS:
 Historical records disclose that the Camarines region in the Island of Luzon had
been divided originally into the two (2) separate provinces of Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur. The boundary between Ambos Camarines and Tayabas was
defined and written into law in 1916, by Section 47 of Act No. 2657 (the
Administrative Code). Although Act No. 2657 was repealed the following year by
Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code), the provisions pertaining to said
boundary remained unaltered.
Article II. — Defined boundaries
Sec. 42. Ambos Camarines and Tayabas boundary. — The boundary separating the
Province of Ambos Camarines from the Province of Tayabas begins at a point on the eastern
shore of Basiad Bay and extends to a peak known as Mount Cadig in such manner as to
bring the territory of the barrio of Basiad entirely within the municipality of Capalonga, in
Ambos Camarines, and to exclude the same from the territory of Calauag, in Tayabas. From
Mount Cadig it extends along the crest of a mountain range, a distance of 50 kilometers,
more or less, to a peak known as Mount Labo; thence in a southwesterly direction, a distance
of 25 kilometers, more or less, to a prominent stone monument at the source or headwaters
of the Pasay River, thence along the meandering course of said river in a southerly direction,
a distance of 1-1/2 kilometers, more or less, to the Gulf of Ragay.
 Section 68 of the same Act also authorized the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, among others, "to define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
sub-province, municipality, township or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein," subject to what "the public welfare may
require."
 In the meantime, on 3 March 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No.
2809, which authorized once again the partition of Ambos Camarines into two (2)
separate provinces: the Province of Camarines Norte and the Province of
Camarines Sur.
 The boundary dispute evolved when Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1916
and later Section 42 of the Revised Administrative Code of (1917) were enacted.
 In any event, the then Chief of the Executive Bureau, acting upon the authority of
the Secretary of the Interior, rendered decision delineating that portion of the
boundary between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Tayabas which is here
involved.
 The opposition of respondent Quezon Province to the, boundary line claimed and
sought to be enforced here by petitioner Camarines Norte Province is, in the main,
anchored on two (2) arguments. First, it is contended by Quezon Province that the
boundary separating the old Province of Ambos Camarines from Quezon Province
had already been established and defined in Section 42 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Second, Quezon Province argues that the Chief of the
Executive Bureau had no authority to alter or re-define that statutorily-defined
boundary through his decision of 16 June 1922.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the boundary was already "defined" and, therefore, in no need
of further definition?
2. Whether or not there is legal authority for the 16 June 1922 decision of the
Chief Executive Bureau
The two (2) issues are, of course related to one to the other. Should the entirety of the
boundary line between Ambos Camarines and Quezon province be regarded as
already "defined" by Section 42, then any "alteration" or "re-definition" by the Executive
Department would, under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, require the
prior authorization of the then Philippine Legislature
RULING ON THE FIRST ISSUE: NO.
We note that Section 42 does set out a definition or description of the boundary line
between Ambos Camarines and Quezon province. However, that Section 42
does not describe or define the entirety of that line is such a manner as to permit
the whole boundary line to be located on the ground by a surveyor. Close examination
of Section 42 will show that is not the whole boundary line that is disputed but only a
segment thereof. A surveyor on the ground would be unable to locate and monument
the boundary line from Basiad Bay to Mt. Cadig if all he had was the languange found
in Section 42 of the Revised Administrative Code.
We agree with petitioner Camarines Norte's argument. We consider that to that limited
extent, the Ambos Camarines-Quezon boundary line was "undefined" and that there
was thus necessity for the 16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau
to provide more specific guidance that would permit actual Identification or location of
the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig.
RULING ON THE SECOND ISSUE: YES
It is important to stress that the Chief of the Executive Bureau, in rendering that
decision, did not, as he could not, purport to act with unlimited discretion. For Section
42 itself established certain requirements which the disputed portion of the Ambos
Camarines — Tayabas boundary line must satisfy;
It is not disputed by respondent Quezon Province that the line delineated by the Chief
of the Executive Bureau in his decision in fact complied with both the above general
directions or descriptions prescribed in Section 42. The Chief of the Executive Bureau
did not, therefore, "alter" or "re-define" or "amend an existing provincial boundary.." the
boundary line between Ambos Camarines and Tayabas. All that the Chief of the
Executive Bureau did was to implement upon the authority of the Secretary of Interior,
Section 42 of Act No. 2711.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO
BALINDONG, petitioners, vs. PANGANDAPUN BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN
MACAPUNUNG, HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V. DUJERTE
MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR
LAO. respondents.
FACTS:
 The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao
del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest
of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the
same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of
Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386
of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1 of the latter
municipality.
 The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order
386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the
functions of their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez
v. Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.
 On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the
petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no
application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez,
the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been
organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional,
its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself
having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the
institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its
existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an
individual like the petitioner Balindong.
ISSUE: Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation?
RULING: NO.
Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of
validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute
is subsequently declared unconstitutional.
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal
corporation may be:
a. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
b. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been
upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared
void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some
other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the
general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or
potentially, such a de jurecorporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the
invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an
existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a
usurper.10
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite
the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be
made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate
vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when
the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation,
as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva, this Court granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an
executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of
the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before
section 68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted, was
invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de factomunicipal corporation did not arise in that
case.
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done
by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity
because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact
which cannot justly be ignored." There is then no basis for the respondents'
apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would
have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the
creation of that municipality. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the
respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices.
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
NAPARI, petitioner, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary
Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents. powers,]They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted
for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts
FACTS: at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that boundary disputes
Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement by a joint should be resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as follows:
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga on October 31, 1997. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint session issued define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
Resolution certifying that both the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte have failed to settle amicably their boundary jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
dispute and have agreed to elevate the same to the proper court for settlement by any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
of the interested party exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. x
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City x x.
(Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 3722-O.
On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the
Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the
action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent
component city?
RULING: YES
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code. However, Section 118 of the LGC
applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component
city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly
then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the
general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is
found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 Section 19(6) of this law provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions[.]
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
FACTS:
 The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists
of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic
Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054
(RA 9054). Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region
XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in
November 1989.
 On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201.
 On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao
into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.
 In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-
0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao."
ISSUES:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
RULING NO
R.A. 9054 granting the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces is void.
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality
or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because
the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section
10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create
a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in

its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by
a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assembly’s legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative."
Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.