PARAS v.

COURT OF APPEALS
91 Phil 389 May 28, 1952

Facts:
Respondent Lazaro Leodones was originally the owner of lot No. 2817 of the Penaranda
Cadastre No. 226 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2443. On July 31, 1935,
Lazaro mortgage the homestead in favor of the Philippine National Bank to secure the
payment of a loan. Failing to pay said loan, the Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings.

At the auction sale held on September 7, 1940, the Bank was the sole bidder and bought
the land for P400 although the mortgage indebtedness of Lazaro at the time of the
auction amounted to P668.25, thereby leaving Lazaro still indebted to the Bank in the
sum of P268.25. Because of his failure to repurchase the lot within one year, the Bank
on October 23, 1941, executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership.

On May 25, 1943 executed a deed of absolute sale of the property to Paras. By virtue of
this deed of absolute sale, the Register of Deeds issued in favor of Paras Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 19339.

On November 19, 1941, however, about a year before the Bank executed the deed of
promise to sell in favor of Paras, Lazaro made a written offer to the Bank to repurchase
the property subject to the auction sale, and show his good faith, he deposited the sum
of P200 with the Bank. Lazaro offered to repurchase the land from the appellant but the
appellant turned down the offer unless he was paid P4,000. Again Lazaro offered to buy
the land from Paras on November 23, 1945 and on February 12, 1946, but Paras
refused both offers.

Despite the purchase of the land at the auction sale by the Bank and its subsequent
conveyance to Paras, Lazaro Leodones and his son Demetrio Leodones continued in
possession of the property and presumably in the enjoyment of the fruits thereof.
Because of this, Paras brought the original action to have himself declared absolute
owner of the property, to obtain possession from defendants, and to compel them render
accounting of the products of the land from the year 1943.

The trial court annulled the auction sale. The Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial
court as to the annulment of the auction sale, and considered that sale valid. However, it
held that Lazaro had offered to purchase the land within the five-year period provided by
the Public Land Act. Paras has now brought the case to us on appeal by certiorari.

Issue: How to compute the five-year within which a homesteader may repurchase his
homestead of having conveyed the same

Ruling:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the five year period within which a homesteader
or his widow or heirs may repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure
sale under Act 3135 as amended, begins not at the date of the sale when merely a
certificate is issued by the Sheriff or other official, but rather on the day after the
expiration of the period of repurchase when the deed of absolute sale is executed and
the property formally transferred to the purchaser. As this Court said in the case of
Gonzales vs. Calimbas and Poblete, 51 Phil., 355, the certificate of sale issued to the
purchaser at an auction sale is intended to be a mere memorandum of the purchase. It
does not transfer the property but merely identifies the purchaser and the property,
states the price and the date when the right of redemption expires. The effective
conveyance is made by the deed of absolute sale executed after the expiration of the
period of redemption.

In the present case it is clear that whether the five-year period fixed by section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 be computed as commencing to run from the date of the
expiration of the one year for repurchase or from the date of the affidavit of consolidation
of ownership and the issuance of the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title in favor
of the Bank, the offer repurchase by Lazaro in November 1945, was made on time. Not
only this, but according to the findings of the Court of Appeals, Lazaro made the first
offer to repurchase the property as early as November 1941, although he desisted from
it because of the promise made by Paras. Again Lazaro made another offer immediately
after liberation which must have been around April or May, 1945, considering the date
when Nueva Ecija was liberated from the Japanese, which date was certainly less than
five years even from the day of the auction sale made in September, 1940. So that in all
respects and from whatever angle we view this case, respondent Lazaro Leodones is
entitled to repurchase his homestead.

BELISARIO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

165 SCRA 101 August 30, 1988

Facts:
The subject matter of this case is a piece of land originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 366, pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 45183 issued in the
names of Rufino Belisario and Felipa Lauga. Upon the death of Rufino Belisario, the
ownership of the land was extra-judicially settled among his children.

Sometime in 1950, on the strength of a special power of attorney executed by some of

the petitioners in favor of petitioner, Benjamin Belisario, said land was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory note in the sum of P1,200.00.

Petitioners-mortgagors defaulted in the payment of the loan. Consequently, the

mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and on January 31, 1963 the land was sold at
public auction for P3,134.76 with respondent PNB as the highest bidder.

On April 21, 1971, petitioners wrote to respondent PNB making known their "desire to
redeem and/or repurchase the said property for and in the same price as the auction
sale, P3,134.76," and enclosed therein a postal money order in the amount of P630.00
as partial payment, with the balance to be paid in twelve equal monthly installments. At
the time petitioners offered to redeem the subject property, the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale covering the sale at public auction to the respondent PNB was not yet registered.

On August 24, 1971, respondent PNB sent a reply letter to petitioners, refusing the
tender of P630.00 as partial payment of the total obligations of P7,041.41 due from
petitioners and stating further that under existing regulations of the bank, payment by
way of redemption must be paid in full and not by installments.

On February 8, 1973, respondent PNB sold the land in question to respondent Cabrera
for P5,000.00 and the corresponding TCT No. 7264 was issued in his name.
On November 20, 1974, respondent Cabrera filed an action for Recovery of Possession
and Damages against herein petitioners, together with their tenants, who were actual
possessors of the land. In turn, petitioners filed on January 9, 1975, an action for
Repurchase of Homestead against the respondents PNB and Cabrera.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised their right to repurchase effectively?

Ruling:
Yes. The general rule in redemption is that in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient
that a person offering to redeem makes manifestation of his desire to repurchase; this
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment, which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. The rule
that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of
redemption finds support is civil law. Articles 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, fumishes the
guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale ... "

However, the filing of a complaint to enforce repurchase within the period for redemption
is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to
redemption.

For purposes of determining whether petitioners exercised their right to repurchase

effectively, We have only to consider their filing of the action for Repurchase of
Homestead on January 9,1975, against respondent PNB and Cabrera, which was filed
well within the five-year period to repurchase. The question of timeliness of the tender of
payment by petitioners on August 1 and 4, 1977 of the amount of P5,000.00 had
become insignificant in view of the filing of the action for Repurchase of Homestead
which has been held equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect by itself of
preserving their right of recovering the property.

AQUINO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

39 Phil 850 March 31, 1919

Facts:
On November 19, 1914, Quintin Tañedo y Perez filed an application in the Court of First
Instance for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Tarlac. One
of the adjoining owners was stated to be Florencia Tañedo.The applicant relied upon
possession by himself and father for more than eighty years. Florencia Tañedo with
others were duly notified of the pendency of the action. A number of persons, not
including Florencia Tanedo, entered opposition; among them was the Director of Lands,
on the ground that the land was a part of the public domain belonging to the Government
of the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and was then occupied by a considerable number of homesteaders.
The Director of Lands further alleged that the applicant had failed to establish in himself
or his predecessors in interest a sufficient title to warrant registration, the land not having
been acquired by any title derived from the Spanish government. The applicant in this
case in fact did not produce any title or grant from the State. On August 23, 1915, the
Court of First Instance rendered its judgment denying the registration and sustaining the
opposition of the Director of Lands. On appeal to the Supreme Court, a decision, under
date of October 20, 1916,l was handed down by a unanimous court affirming the
judgment of the Court of First Instance

On June 15, 1917, or a few months after the promulgation of the confirmatory judgment
of the Supreme Court, Florencia Tañedo, one of those who it will be remembered had
received notice of the proceedings in behalf of Quintin Tañedo, and who failed to enter
her opposition, sold land of approximately 370 hectares to Benigno S. Aquino for the
sum of P2,000. This parcel of land is within the perimeter of the parcel of land subject of
the registration proceedings on behalf of Quintin Tañedo. After purchase, Benigno S.
Aquino filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the adjudication and
registration in his name of the land purchased from Florencia Tañedo. Among others
Quintin Tañedo was notified of the pendency of the proceedings. The Director of Lands
again opposed the registration on the ground that the same pertained to the public
domain, a greater portion of it being forest land, and that it was actually cupied by
several homestead grantees. The Attorney-General acting in behalf of the Director of
Lands further relied upon the unsuccessful attempt of Quintin Tañedo to acquire a good
title.

Issue: Did the decision of the Court of First Instance, affirmed by the Supreme Court, in
the case in which Quintin Tañedo was applicant, constitute res adjudicata as against
Florencia Tañedo, the predecessor in interest of the applicant and appellee herein?

Ruling:
Yes. It constitute Res Judicata. In support of this conclusion a few other pertinent
observations may be made. Suppose that in the original proceeding, instead of Quintin
Tañedo being unsuccessful he had been successful, and that the court gave him title to
the property, could Florencia Tañedo, even with her Spanish documents, now impeach
the title acquired by Quintin Tañedo? Obviously not, in view of her own laches and of the
primary purpose of the Torrens system. In the Grey Alba case, just as an example, in the
original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee was
made a party defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice. The
Supreme Court held that the decree of the Court of Land Registration was conclusive
against him as well as all the world. If therefore Florencia Tañedo could not successfully
have assailed the title of Quintin Tañedo, just as surely she should not be permitted to
contest what was not exactly a title in the Government, but what was at least a
declaration to that effect.

The decision of this Court in Henson v. Director of Lands and Commanding General of
the Division of the Philippines is controlling. Leaving out of view the dissenting opinion
which began from an entirely different point of view, according to the syllabus the
majority decision stands for this proposition: "A judgment dismissing an application for
the registration of land does not operate as a conclusive adjudication res adjudicata
between the applicant and the opponent who has successfully resisted the application.
As a consequence the applicant, or any person deriving title from him, may institute
another proceeding for the registration of the same land; and the fact that he or his
predecessor in interest was unsuccessful in the former proceeding does not constitute a
bar thereto." The fundamental reason why the judgment dismissing an application to
register land cannot operate as an estoppel between the applicant and the opponent is,
according to the decision, "that in such a proceeding no contentious issue is made
between the parties." If, as we have herein indeavored to demonstrate, when one brings
himself under the provisions of the Public Land Law the antagonistic relationship which
means an issue is present, then the doctrine announced in the Henson case becomes
inapplicable. otherwise stated the propositions of the Henson case stand in so far as
they relate primarily to the Land Registration Law but are not to be extended to cover the
Public Land Law. Such a holding should have a beneficial effect, as it leaves a
passageway out of somewhat antagonistic juridical doctrines, as it arrives at certainty in
land titles, and as it protects the homesteader and the public interest.

JABUTAY v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

C.A. G.R. No. 16969 November 7, 1958

Facts:
Juan Jabutay owns Lot 6733 and sold half of it to Eustaquio Paraiso on August 11, 1939.
However, Jabutay continued to occupy the lot he just sold. Without informing, Jabutay,
Paraiso sold the land to Vicente Cañada on July 20, 1951 or 22 years later. Cañada filed
an action for partition against Jabutay to recover his half portion. The trial court declared
both Cañada and Jabutay as co-owners and ordered that the land be partitioned
between them in equal parts.Jabutay filed an application for registration of the entire Lot
6733 in his name, without informing Cañada and while his appeal to the CA was
pending. On March 2, 1959, OCT 51 was issued to him.
Later on April 22, 1959, he sold the entire lot to Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation
(GOCHAN) who was unaware of the pendency of the case. The company was issued a
TCT for such sale.
Five years later, Cañada learned of the sale and filed an action against Jabutay and
Gochan to annul the sale, cancel Gochan’s TCT and have a new title issued to him. A lis
pendens was annotated on Gochan’s TCT. Cañada later was substituted by Mona Lisa
Reyes.
Issue: Whether or not Gochan’s title was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. When Gochan bought the entire land from Jabutay, the title over it was clean and
free from liens and encumbrances. Thus, when it was transferred to him, it was still
clean. It was only five years later after the title was subject to lis pendens. When Gochan
registered the entire lot under its name, under the Torrens system, all claims, liens and
encumbrances on the land asserted prior to the issuance of the decree of registration
except statutory liens and those noted on the certificate were extinguished. Gochan was
an innocent purchaser of the land for value.

BASIG v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

C.A. G.R. No. L-5981 February 27, 1954

Facts:

On June 15, 1949, Francisco Bassig filed this land registration case in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, claiming to be the owner of eight lots, assessed at PI, 790 and
situated in the barmo of Aggugaddan, municipality of Penablanca, Cagayan, more
particularly described in the plans and technical descriptions attached to the application.

Applicant’s claim of ownership of said eight lots is based on a deed of sale executed by
Fructuoso Eclipse in his favor, dated December 4, 1939, at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, duly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. Francisco Bassig is of legal
age, Filipino citizen and resident of Ugac, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. His application was
opposed by the Director of Lands on December 19, 1949, who contends that said lots
are of public domain and belong to the Republic of the Philippines, for neitherthe
applicant nor his predecessors in interest possess sufficient title to said parcels of land,
the same not having been acquired either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 30,
1894.

After proper proceedings and hearing the court rendered judgment that decrees the
registration of lots

Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496 in the name of
Francisco Bassig, of legal age, married to Maria Lunato, Filipino and resident of Ugac,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; and dismisses the application in so far as lots Nos. 1, 2 and 7.

The Director of Lands as well as the oppositors Juan Ma- ramag, Abelardo Lopez and
Guillermo Nadal appealed from said decision and, together with applicant Francisco
Bassig who also appealed, requested authority, which was granted, to submit, as they
did, a joint record on appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in adjudicating lots Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of plan
Exhibit A to the applicant, and in not declaring these lots as well as lots Nos. 1, 2 and 7
as lands of public domain.

Ruling:

Upon going over record, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the applicant has by
preponderance of evidence shown his right to the registration in his name not only of lots
Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 but also of lots Nos. 1, 2 and 7. The pri- vate oppositors have not
presented any documentary evidence that can be relied upon to establish their
respective pretensions, and W(e are satisfied that lots 1 to 8 applied for registration
herein, of a total area of 103,325 square meters, are the same or included in the land
that Francisco Bassig bought from Policarpio Eclipse, of an area of 117,160 square
meters.

Without touching on the question of whether lands of public domain may be acquired by
continued possession or prescription, when the record shows that a certain property, the
registration of which is applied for, has been possessed and cultivated by the applicant
and his predecessors in interest for a long number of years without the Government
taking any action to dislodge the occupants from their holdings and when these lands
have passed from one hand to another by inheritance or by purchase, the Government
is in duty bound to prove that the lands which it avers to be of public domain are really of
said nature. We hold this opinion because after the lapse of over 60 years since the
promulgation of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and after the burning or
destruction of public records on account of the revolution against the Spanish regime,
and of several wars that have ravaged this country, it would be unjust and unfair to hold
applicants duty-bound to prove that they and their predecessors in interest have been in
possession of the land before 1894.

PINERO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. L-36507 June 14, 1974

Facts:

That Antonio Piñero, Jr., and Emma Piñero Bernad are residents of Dipolog, Zamboanga
del Norte; while Fortunate Piñero is presently a resident of Negros Oriental. That the
identities of Lots Nos. 5790, 5792 and 2532, all of Pls- 100, situated at Napuyan,
Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte, are submitted. On August 8, 1958, the Director of Lands
issued an order directing the investigation of the protest of Eusebio Camansi, against the
patented application of Antonio Piñero Jr., a copy of said order being found on page 14
of the expediente;

On March 24, 1959 the Director of Lands thru the Chief Legal Division directed the
Provincial Land Officer at Dipolog, to investigate the protest of Nicanor Alasaas against
the patented application of Emma Piñero Bernad. As regards Lot 5790 Pls - 100 the
protest of Eusebio Camansi has been given due course against the claim of Antonio
Piñero Jr., which protest has been investigated and terminated, Antonio Piñero Jr., being
represented by his counsel Atty. Jesus Sarmiento.

The present case is an ppeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in its Civil Case No. 1128, granting the writ of
prohibition prayed for by appellees against the appellant Director of Lands, the Provincial
Land Officer of the same province and other subordinate officials who, by order of said
director, had initiated an investigation of alleged fraud claimed to have led to the
issuance of the Free Patents and corresponding Certificates of Title to the said
appellees.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition be granted.

Ruling: No. The writ of prohibition sought by the appellees is denied. We hold the
appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the facts disclosed in the foregoing stipulation,
We reiterate Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, wherein we held that it is not only the right
but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the investigation of any alleged fraud in
securing a free patent and the corresponding title to a public land and to file the
corresponding court action for the reversion of the same to the State, if the facts
disclosed in the course of such investigation should so warrant. Consequently,
prohibition cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation despite the existence of a
Torrens title.

The Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1935,
in force during the material dates of the events herein involved, declaring that "all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain . . and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State...." And under Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, "the scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading
and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being
to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of
all natural resources of the Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands
from the State through any of the means provided for in the Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act 141, must necessarily be subject to the reservation expressly made
in above quoted Section 91 to the effect that "the statements made in the application
shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any ... title ... issued on the
basis of such application" and that "any false statement therein or omission of facts
altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the material facts
set forth in the application shall ipso facto 1 produce the cancellation of the concession,
title or permit granted."

It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the
basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured.
And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been
emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for
annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may
be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is
to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an ever
existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor
General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding
action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to
disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such
title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.

Nothing said above, however, should be understood as holding that the Court has found
that the titles of appellees have been in fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be
resolved only after the Director of Lands shall have finished his investigation.

PATRICIO v. BAYOG
112 SCRA 42 February 16, 1982

Facts:
in 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a patent and Torrens title for a homestead located
at Sitio Badiangon, Iligan City. He and his wife, Petra Macaliag and their nine children
lived on the land, cleared it and planted coconuts thereon.

In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and Ester
Fuentes. In 1958, Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the sale. Lamberang
countered with an ejectment suit. On March 20, 1961, Mendez and his children filed an
action against the Lamberang spouses for the reconveyance of the homestead.

The Court of Appeals which in a decision ordered Lamberang to reconvey the

homestead to the Mendezes "free of all liens and encumbrances " upon their payment to
Lamberang of P19,411.28 as redemption price. It was also held that upon the execution
of the deed of reconveyance and the delivery of the redemption price to the Lamberang
spouses, the Mendezes Would be "entitled to the possession and occupancy" of the
homestead.

The Mendezes paid the redemption price and the Lamberang spouses reconveyed the
homestead. However, the tenants reentered the homestead allegedly upon instruction of
Bernardino O. Nuñez, a trial attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistant. The
Agrarian Court held that the plaintiffs were "tenants of the landholding in question" and
ordered their reinstatement therein. The Agrarian Court concluded that the plaintiffs
became the tenants of the Mendezes because the Lamberangs, with whom they
established a tenancy relationship, were not illegal possessors of the land, having
acquired it through a sale. The court said that under Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian
Reform tenants are entitled to security of tenure and that under section 36 of that Code,
personal cultivation by the landowner is no longer a ground for terminating tenancy.

The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared that the Mendezes are
"entitled to the homestead without the gravamen of plaintiffs' tenancies" because the
purpose of granting homesteads is "to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State
to land destitute citizens for their home and cultivation".

Issue: Whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a homestead planted to coconuts
and bananas may be ejected by the homesteader's heirs who were allowed by the Court
of Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who desire to personally possess and till
the land

Ruling:

Yes. This is a case where two competing interests have to be weighed against each
other: the tenant's right to security of tenure as against the right of the homesteader or
his heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and
livelihood.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right
of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from
the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.

This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish
agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and "to achieve a dignified existence for
the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices"

LASUD v. LASUD
63 O.G. 1 P. 43 January 2,1967

Facts:
The parcel of land subject of the action was originally a homestead of the deceased
father of plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and defendant Santay Lasud. Original Certificate of Title
No. 1232 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 26114 in the name of their
father on February 1, 1934. Because of the death of their father plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and
defendant Santay Lasud inherited the land and became co-owners thereof.
Sigbe Lasud sold her interest, right and participation in said parcel of land including her
improvements thereon in favor of her brother defendant Santay Lasud and his wife
Guinantana Cia. Then a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Santay Lasud.

Sigbe Lasud brought this action against her brother Santay Lasud to compel him to
reconvey back to plaintiff the one-half share that plaintiff had sold to him. Defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it is barred under Article 1391 of the new
Civil Code (if the suit is for the annulment of the sale), and it is also barred under Article
1606 of the same code (if the suit is to exercise a right to repurchase). The court
sustained these objections and dismissed the action.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that the land sought to be
purchased was originally acquired as a homestead under the Public Land Act; that
plaintiff has offered to repurchase her one-half share that she had sold to defendant but
that defendant refused to admit the repurchase.

Issue: Whether or not the right to redeem will prosper?

Ruling:

The right to redeem can apply only to sales outside the family circle, unlike the sale in
the case at bar. The court held that considering that Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law
aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which
the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned
therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And
certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third party in relation to
the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him
and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality
of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her
brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a ‘proper’ case to be brought under the
operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the
land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father, that is, the sale is not in
contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, ‘to preserve and keep the
family of the homesteader’, the land granted to him by the State.

VISAYAN REALTY v. MEER

96 Phil 515

Facts:
Fortunato S. Veloso and three others filed with the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce sales applications for four tracts of land situated in barrio Odiongan, Oriental
Misamis. The Director of Forestry certified that said tracks of land were not needed for
forest purposes subject to the condition that the applicants cannot cut and dispose of for
commercial purposes for any timber growing thereon without license from the Bureau of
Forestry. The four awardees then transferred their rights and interest under sales
applications to the Visayan Realty, Inc., plaintiff herein.

From January 13, 1930 to November 4, 1940 the Collector of Internal Revenue collected
from the plaintiff the amount of P69,138.67 representing forest charges for the timber cut
and removed from said four tracts of land. The payments made during the period from
January 13, 1930 to June 1, 1939 amounting to P53,189.01 were made without protest.
However, the payment corresponding to the period from July 3, 1939 to November 4,
1940 amounting to plaintiff had not paid to the Government the amount of P9,986.70 for
forest charges and surcharges corresponding to the period from November, 1935 to
December, 1940 despite the demand made for its payment by the Collector of Internal
Revenue.

The plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in ruling that the ownership of the four
tracts of land did not pass to the plaintiff when the award of the sales was made in 1929
but only when the award of the sales was made in 1929 but only when the sales patents
were registered in the Office of Register of Deeds or when the corresponding
certification of title covering the lands were issued in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff-
appellant contends that the title to those four tracts of land passed from the Government
to said plaintiff as of the dates when the sales applications of its predecessors-in-interest
were approved in 1929 and not when certificate of title was issued by the Register of
Deeds in 1940, because the issuance of said certificates of title is but a matter of
formality which cannot diminish nor affect the substantial fact that the naked ownership
of said lands had already passed from the Government to plaintiff predecessors-in-
interest from the time their sales application had been awarded to them. From this time,
plaintiff contends, the sales became perfected and binding between the parties.

Issue: Whether or not the Visayan Realty must pay the forest charges and surcharges
which it has failed to pay during the period from November, 1935 to December, 1940.

Ruling:
Yes. The award of a sales application merely authorizes the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law
before a final patent can be issued in his favor before these requirements are complied
with, the Government still remains the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still
be cancelled and the land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal
requirements had not been complied with. What divests the Government of its title to the
land is the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of
the Register of Deeds. Such registration is the operative act that would bind the land and
convey its ownership to the applicant. Since the timber in question was cut by the
plaintiff before the issuance of sales patent in its name or in that of its predecessors-in-
interest, it follows that plaintiff was not yet the owner of the lands when the timber
growing thereon had been cut, and so it cannot claim exemption from the payment of the
forest charges upon the mere plea that it already acquired ownership of said lands.

The facts that the Director of Forestry has certified that the four tracts of land in question
were not needed for forest purposes and can therefore be opened to public sale does
not take said lands out of the operation of said Section 1513 of the Revised
Administration Code for the only reason behind such certification is to remove said land
from the classification of timber or mineral lands and transfer it to that of agricultural or
alienable lands so that it could be opened to private disposal and be utilized for
agricultural purposes. In fact, when said certification was made, it was so made subject
to the condition that the applicant can not cut and dispose of for commercial purposes
any timber growing thereon without license from the Director of Forestry.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA & LASTIMADO

G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979

Facts:

Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over
a portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre. The trial Court rendered a Decision
granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner Republic filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the
ground of fraud alleging that during the period of alleged adverse possession by private
respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan.
which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22,
1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore,
not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law.

The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud was
committed by private respondent, which deprived petitioner of its day in Court as there
was no showing that she was aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she
could not have suppressed them with intent to deceive. The trial Court also noted that
petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings
despite notices sent not only to the Solicitor General as required by Republic Act No.
931. but to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well therefore, estopped
from questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint?

Ruling:

Yes. Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the
Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial
Court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition
outright but should have afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in
support of the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private
respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., it was held that "the action
of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within
one year from entry of the deed without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation
and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to
be in error, because the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity
to prove it."

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation
at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral
proceeding nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if
the land in question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System.

Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect,
yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal
consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that
it is moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

COLLADO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107764 October 20,,2002

Facts:
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a
parcelof land with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares. The said lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached
to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by
Robert C.Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, "this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."

Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-

applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal
Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’application.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in thename of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early
as March 22, 1902

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have registrable title over the Lot?

Ruling:
No. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and
submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof
and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes.
Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible ofoccupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation.

The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

Facts:
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25,
1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the
petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed. It is undisputed by the
parties that the land in dispute is a mangrove land HOWEVER the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares are still in contention. Director of Forestry claims that it
is forestall and is not disposable. On the other hand, Private respondents insists that it is
alienable as agricultural land.

Issue: What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are
commonly known?

Ruling:
Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution or are they
considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public

forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and
invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been
challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul
it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been
issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It
could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so,
it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to
the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

The Respondent even showed, a survey of the land and its tax declaration to support its
claim, however the court held that the same is insufficient especially now that the land is
a forest land.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING v. DUMYUNG

G.R. L-31666 April 20, 1979

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in
the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for
annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the
corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground
of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants,
Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively.

The private respondents were acquitted for falsification. The Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases
for cancellation of titles. The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is
that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber lands and
mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court
dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free patents
on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Baguio.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the three cases?

Ruling:

Yes. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National
Cultural Minorities; that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4,
1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the
Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications
must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that
it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for
free patents thereon.

It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the
patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled
that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the
hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar
to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification
was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents
had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of
whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the
private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in
issue in the criminal case.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS & VALERIANO

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

Facts:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision
and Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in
private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D,
Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan,
and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private
respondents have converted it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed
that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through
inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest
zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their
names.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the
Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that
"through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of
land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application" and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the
subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as
part of forest lands. "

Issue: Whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land and whether or not
the property is alienable?

Ruling: No
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of
the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in
consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of
properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and
disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present
classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around
the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter
of classification of the land in question.

PAJOMAYO v. MANIPON
G.R. No. L-33676 June 30,1971

Facts:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land described in the
complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego
Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.The plaintiffs
prayed that they be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in question, and
that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them the damages they have
suffered.

In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint,
alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings
of the Malasique cadastre and that apparently the plaintiffs are claiming the same parcel
of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by
inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse possession of said
land for more than 70 years.

Issue:
Which of the two original certificates of title should prevail — the No. 1089 held by the
plaintiffs-appellees which was issued in virtue of the homestead patent, or the No. 14034
held by the defendants-appellants which was issued in connection with the cadastral
proceedings

Ruling:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail as between the original parties, and in case of successive registration where,
more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
certificate. 5

In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 upon
which the defendant appellants base their claim of ownership over the land in question
was issued on April 1, 1957, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon which
plaintiffs-appellees base a similar claim was issued on November 27, 1931, under the
law and the authorities. We have herein cited, the latter certificate of title should prevail,
and the former should be cancelled.