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SO ORDERED.
Vapor, issued an Order informing the parties on the
[ AC. No. 7388, Oct 19, 2016 ] aforesaid case whether they were amenable for him to
render judgment on the case of which complainant's
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK v. ATTY. FELIPE G. client agreed and filed their Memorandum. However,
ZAPATOS + complainant was surprised when he received a
Manifestation from the defendants that they are now
represented by respondent, the former judge who once
RESOLUTION
presided over the aforesaid case.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to The restriction extended to engagement or employment.
the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B The respondent could not accept work or employment
of the Rules of Court, to wit: from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter
in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf
of the body or authority that he served during his public
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total employment.[10] The restriction as applied to him lasted
membership, determines that the respondent should be beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he
suspended from the practice or law or disbarred, it shall had intervened as judge.[11] Accordingly, the fact that he
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and was already retired from the Bench, or that he was
already in the private practice of law when he was
engaged for the case was inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G.
ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of
theCode of Professional Responsibility,
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon
receipt of this decision, with warning that a similar
offense by him will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, APRIL 8 2013 "just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was
likewise helping the latter defend herself. Pertinent
SONIA DECENA & REY DECENA v. JUDGE portion of the records of the proceedings are as follows:
NILO MALANYAON
xxxx
Atty.
:First, she has to enter her appearance. Okay?
BERSAMIN, J.: Nieves
Anyway, … I don't think, I do not memorize
A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is my PTR number, I don't remember my PTR
an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance number, but aside from that Your Honor, I
of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from think this Honorable Hearing Officer could
engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the Atty. take judicial notice that Atty. Ed Loria is
beneficiary of the activity being a member of his :
Zamora indeed a lawyer in good standing in IBP.
immediate family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming And moreover, Your Honor, I would like to
of a judge otherwise. inquire as to the personality of the gentleman
next to the lawyer of the defendant or
respondent, Your Honor?
Antecedents I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of
Judge the respondent's counsel, I am Judge
The complainants have lodged an administrative :
Malanyaon Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And so
complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon. what?!!
Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Atty. Ah, you are the counsel of the
Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur. [1] Zamora
:
…(interrupted)
Atty. There's no need to be belligerent… let's calm
In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10, :
Nieves down…
2007,[2] the complainants averred that complainant Rey Your Honor, Your Honor, we all do not
C. Decena had brought an administrative case in know each other, and with due respect to the
Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission judge, there is also a hearing officer here
in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon's wife, Atty. Your Honor, and I think Your Honor the
Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the :
Zamora Hearing Officer here deserves due respect. I
Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of mean, the word "So what?!", I don't think
Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the that would be proper Your Honor in this
administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon Court.
sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Judge I am sorry your Honor, because the … is out
Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case; and :
Malanyaon of turn, out of turn.
that the events that then transpired were as recounted in This is not necessary, actually, this is not
the joint complaint-affidavit, to wit: necessary. So we might as well proceed with
our hearing today. I've already made a ruling
Atty. regarding the, the query regarding PTR.
3. During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing :
Nieves Okay, at this stage it is not proper
officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas Nieves, brought up the considering that Atty. Loria only entered his
matter regarding Dr. Malanyaon's manifestation or appearance during the start of the hearing.
motion (to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction), Okay. So, we have to proceed now.
Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making I am accepting Your Honor the delegation
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by Atty. again of Atty. Loria. I am entering my
scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to :
Zamora appearance as the lead counsel for this case,
the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her Your Honor, as counsel for the complainant.
seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and Atty.
then make some manifestations while reading or :Okay.
Nieves
glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon. At one And may I be clear that the judge will be the
point, Judge Malanyaon even prompted her daughter to Atty.
:collaborating counsel for the respondent or
demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the collaborating Zamora
the counsel of record of the respondent?
counsel of our principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Atty.
Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number. :… of the judge is … I'm sorry?
Nieves
Atty. He manifested Your Honor that he is the
4. When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived :
Zamora counsel of the respondent.
and took over from Atty. Loria, she inquired regarding Atty. No, the counsel of the counsel of the
the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the :
Malanyaon respondent.
lawyer's bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Atty. He has not, he has not entered his
Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and :
Nieves appearance in this case.
manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent's Would that be proper for him Your Honor,
counsel". Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety considering that he is a judge Your Honor?
of Judge Malanyaon's sitting with and assisting his Atty. Would that, ah, there will be undue
daughter in that hearing, being a member of the :
Zamora influence, or whatever, Your Honor? We are
judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that just trying to avoid any bias or undue
he be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from influence in this court, Your Honor.
sitting with his daughter at the lawyers' bench. He Atty. Okay, it will not, considering the fact that he
insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who :
Nieves has not entered his appearance for the
respondent. of need; indeed, it is strange for complainants to
If Your Honor, please, the respondent is my take offense at my presence and accuse me of
wife. Counsel for the respondent is my practicing law during my stint as a judge when
daughter. She just passed the bar! I'm before the bad blood between my wife and her
Judge
:assisting her. Is it not my right, my duty to sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out
Malanyaon
assist my daughter? And to assist my wife with their legal problems gratis et amore and
defend herself? I am only sitting with my they did not complain of my practicing law on
daughter! I'm not acting for the respondent! their behalf, indeed, one of the crosses a judge
I don't think Your Honor under the rule, the must carry is the cross of base ingratitude.[4]
Atty. counsel needs a counsel. Only the one
:
Zamora charged or the one being charged needs a
counsel. On March 27, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida
Okay, let's settle this now. Judge Malanyaon N. Elepaño recommended to the Court that: (a) the
Atty.
:has not entered his appearance. It will not in complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative
Nieves
any way … matter; (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross
xxxx misconduct; and (c) Judge Malanyaon be fined
P50,000.00.[5]
The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife's On September 16, 2009, the Court required the parties to
administrative case in the Civil Service Commission manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing
constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary. records or pleadings filed.[6]
On June 21, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher The complainants complied on November 13, 2009,
O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon to comment on the stating their willingness to submit the case for resolution
complaint.[3] after a formal investigation or hearing was conducted,
and after they were given time to file their respective
On July 15, 2007, Judge Malanyaon filed his comment, position papers or memoranda.[7]
refuting the allegations of the complaint thusly:
On January 11, 2010, the Court resolved: (a) to re-docket
the administrative case as a regular administrative
matter; (b) to await Judge Malanyaon's compliance with
1. Complainants are the sister and nephew of my the September 16, 2009 resolution; and (c) to refer the
wife, Amelita C. Malanyaon, there is bad blood administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
between them arising from divergent political and recommendation.[8]
loyalties and family differences;
After Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance
2. There is no reason for complainants to take with the September 16, 2009 resolution, the Court
offense at my sitting beside my daughter Ma. ordered him on February 10, 2010 to show cause why he
Kristina, when she appeared for my wife in the should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
first hearing of the administrative case Rey C. contempt for such failure, and further directed him to
Decena filed against my wife; the hearing officer still comply with the resolution.[9]
himself could cite no rule disallowing me from
sitting beside my daughter, in the counsel's On February 15, 2010, Judge Malanyaon's counsel
table, and he did not ask me to vacate where I informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon had
sat beside my daughter; the transcript does not meanwhile suffered a massive stroke on September 2,
support complainants' claim; 2009 that had affected his mental faculties and made him
unfit to defend himself here; and prayed for the
3. It is true I snapped at Atty. Zamora, when she suspension of the proceedings until Judge Malanyaon
asked about my personality but she was would have been found competent to comprehend and
speaking out of turn as all I was doing was stand the rigors of the investigation.[10]
sitting beside my daughter when she came as the
transcript will show, I apologized to the hearing On April 12, 2010, the Court deferred action on the case,
officer, who graciously let the matter pass; and required Judge Malanyaon to submit a medical
certificate.[11]
4. My daughter is a new practitioner; her law
partner and lead counsel could not make it on Judge Malanyaon submitted a medical certificate dated
time, and as her consultant, I did not speak, nor May 27, 2010, issued by the Philippine General
enter my appearance for my wife to lend a Hospital, certifying that he had been confined thereaft
helping hand to a neophyte lawyer, defending from September 2, 2009 to October 19, 2009 for the
her mother in an administrative case, is not following reason, to wit:
unethical, nor does it constitute the proscribed
practice of law;
Cerebro Vascular disease, Hypertension Intra Cerebral
5. It is petty for my sister-in-law and for my Hematoma
nephew to complain of my presence during the Left Thalamus with obstructive Hydrocephalus; DM
hearing; it is my filial duty to lend my wife and type II, Chronic
daughter, moral and legal support in their time Obstructive Pulmonary disease; Pneumonia; lleus
(resolved); Neurogenic bladder, Benign Prostatic the case against Judge Malanyaon.
Hypertrophy; Grave's disease;
Arthritis. On February 6, 2012, Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez reiterated the recommendation made on March
OPERATION PERFORMED: 27, 2008 by then Court Administrator Elepaño by
Bilateral tube ventriculostomy[12] recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b)
Judge Malanyaon submitted two more medical Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct
certificates, the first dated October 5, 2010, [13] certifying and fined P50,000.00.[19]
that, among others, he was undergoing regular check-up,
and the other, dated January 24, 2011,[14] certifying that On May 3, 2012, the Court received the complainants'
his functional and mental status had been assessed as compliance dated February 1, 2012, [20] as their response
follows: to the show cause order issued in relation to their failure
to submit the comment the Court had required on
September 26, 2011.[21]
The severity and location of the hemorrage in the brain
resulted in residual epoliptogenic focus (Post-gliotic On September 4, 2012, the Court received from Dr.
seizures) and significant impairment of cognition, Amelita an urgent ex parte motion for immediate
memory judgment behavior (Vascular Dementia). He resolution, praying that the motion to dismiss dated July
has problems with memory recall, analysis of 18, 2011 be already resolved.[22]
information, events and situations which may make
defending himself difficult, if necessary. Although he is
independent on ambulation, he requires assistance even Issues
in basic activities of daily living.[15]
For consideration and resolution are the following
The Court required the complainants to comment on issues, namely: (a) whether or not Judge Malanyaon
Judge Malanyaon's medical certification dated October would be denied due process if the administrative case
5, 2010. was not dismissed; (b) whether the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct
On July 18, 2011, however, Dr. Amelita submitted a unbecoming of a judge; and (c) if Judge Malanyaon was
manifestation and urgent motion to dismiss, seeking the guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge, what should be
dismissal of the administrative case against Judge the correct sanction.
Malanyaon upon the following grounds, to wit:
Ruling
x x x x
We now discuss and resolve the issues accordingly.
2. Unfortunately, in a "Medical Certification" dated June
15, 2011 the original of which is attached hereto as
Annex "1", the attending neurologist of my husband has 1.
pronounced him permanently mentally impaired. x x x. Respondent's right to due process
is not violated by resolution of the case
x x x x
In her manifestation with urgent motion to
3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost dismiss,[23] Dr. Amelita stressed that proceeding against
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the Judge Malanyaon despite his present medical state
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot would violate his right to due process. She stated:
intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate
coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf,
and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. 3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost
Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
an adversarial administrative investigation; administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate
4. Given the progressive mental impairment afflicting coherently with him. He cannot testify in his own behalf,
my husband, he has permanently lost the capacity to and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses.
defend himself. Thus, to continue the administrative Indeed, he cannot properly avail himself of his rights in
investigation against my husband who is no longer in an adversarial administrative investigation.[24]
any position to defend himself would constitute a denial
of his right to be heard (Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Opposing, the complainants argued that Dr. Amelita's
Aurelio Rendon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395 dated 19 concern was unfounded considering that Judge
February 2002).[16] Malanyaon had not only been given the opportunity to
be heard, but had been actually heard on their complaint.
Even so, on September 26, 2011, we required the
complainants to comment on the manifestation and The complainants' argument is well taken.
motion of Dr. Amelita.[17]
On August 3, 2007, or prior to his suffering the massive
Subsequently, Dr. Amelita submitted another motion stroke that impaired his mental faculty, Judge
dated January 23, 2012,[18] praying for the dismissal of Malanyaon already submitted his comment containing
his explanations and refutations of the charge against Section 35[27] of Rule 138 of the Rules of
him. His comment asserted that during the hearing of the Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge
administrative case of his wife in the Regional Office of Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law
the Civil Service Commission, the hearing officer did or giving professional advice to clients. Section
not even cite any rule that prohibited him from sitting 11,[28] Canon 4 (Propriety),[29] of the New Code of
beside his daughter who was then acting as the counsel Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07[30] of the Code of
of Dr. Amelita therein, or that inhibited him from Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging
assisting his daughter in the defense of his wife. He in the private practice of law or giving professional
pointed out that although he had then lost his temper advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound
after the opposing counsel had inquired about his reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
personality in that hearing, he had ultimately apologized duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
to the hearing officer, who had in turn graciously let the attorney are inherently incompatible with the high
matter pass. official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that
Under the circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
accorded due process. In administrative cases, the duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own
requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the private interests, and assure the public of their
parties are afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
to explain their side of the controversy, [25] either through objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and
oral arguments or through pleadings.[26] That is what desire to promote the public interest.[31]
happened herein. Accordingly, Dr. Amelita's motion was
bereft of basis, and should be denied. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the
Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and
2. it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period
Actuations of Judge Malanyaon of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of
rendered him guilty of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to
conduct unbecoming of a judge participation in court proceedings, but extends to the
preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments
reasons set forth below. and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special
First was Judge Malanyaon's occupying a seat beside his proceedings.[32] To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon
daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his
hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and daughter at his wife's administrative case, coaching his
probably even his clear intention to thereby exert his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to
influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife's prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty.
cause. That impression was definitely adverse against Eduardo Loria, collaborating counsel of the
the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed complainants' principal counsel, should produce his
to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily
incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating
Judiciary, and should have acted with greater announcement during the hearing that he was the
circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the
administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he respondent, as his response to the query by the opposing
could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon
counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his thereat.
motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on
his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing Third was Judge Malanyaon's admission that he had
himself. already engaged in the private practice of law even
before the incident now the subject of this case by his
Second was Judge Malanyaon's admission that his statement in his comment that "it is strange for
presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse
what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of me of practicing law during my stint as a judge when
coaching his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly before the bad blood between my wife and her sibling
introduced himself as the "counsel of the respondent's and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal
counsel" upon his presence being challenged by the problems gratis et amoreand they did not complain of
adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still my practicing law on their behalf."[33] He thereby
inexperienced for having just passed her Bar manifested his tendencies to disregard the prohibition
Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded on a against the private practice of law during his
"filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not incumbency on the Bench.
furnish enough reason for him to forsake the ethical
conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the
have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, ethical injunction to conduct himself in a manner that
being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of
the line beyond which was the private practice of law. condemnation.[34] We should abhor any impropriety on
the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their
courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial
The Court has fittingly emphasized in Castillo v. hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private
Calanog, Jr.: [35] practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of
whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other
members of his own family.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of
a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but 3.
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private What is the proper penalty?
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public Court on the following three occasions, namely: (a)
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the A.M. No. RTJ-93-1090, with admonition for gross
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we ignorance of the law and unreasonable delay in resolving
have very recently explained, a judge's official life motions;[37] (b) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444, with reprimand
cannot simply be detached or separated from his for failure to resolve motions;[38] and (c) A.M. No. RTJ-
personal existence. Thus: 02-1669, with a fine of P20,000.00 (coupled with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge would be dealt with more severely) for conduct
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on unbecoming of a judge.[39] He had other administrative
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the cases that were dismissed.[40] Of the three administrative
ordinary citizen. cases that merited sanctions, however, only the third
should be considered as aggravating herein because it
A judge should personify judicial integrity and involved the similar offense of conduct unbecoming of a
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior judge for which he had been given the stern warning of a
of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and more severe penalty upon a repetition.
in private life should be above suspicion.
However, our uniform treatment of administrative
Fourth was Judge Malanyaon's display of arrogance sanctions as having the nature of liabilities akin to those
during the hearing, as reflected by his reaction to the in criminal cases now brings us to offset such
opposing counsel's query on his personality to sit at the aggravating circumstance with the apparent fact that the
counsel table at the hearing, to wit: actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of had not
been motivated by bad faith, or by any malice towards
another. Indeed, he did not intend to thereby cause any
I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the prejudice to another, having so acted from a sincere,
respondent's counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am albeit misplaced, desire to go to the help of his wife and
assisting her. And so what?!! daughter.
Judge Malanyaon's uttering "And so what?" towards the Accordingly, the Court deems it condign and proper to
opposing counsel evinced his instant resentment towards mitigate the fine of P50,000.00 recommended by the
the adverse parties' counsel for rightly challenging his Court Administrator by imposing on Judge Malanyaon a
right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel of the fine of P40,000.00. With his disability retirement from
parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant the Judiciary having been earlier granted by the Court,
tone just after he had introduced himself as a judge, was the fine shall be deducted from his remaining retirement
unbecoming of the judge that he was, and tainted the benefits.
good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all
times.[36] It is true that the challenge of the opposing WHEREFORE, the Court finds and
counsel might have slighted him, but that was not pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
enough to cause him to forget that he was still a judge Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial
expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for
self-restraint. He thereby ignored the presence of the conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with
hearing officer, appearing to project that he could a fine of P40,000.00.
forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion
rightly called for from him and the others just because he SO ORDERED.
was a judge and the other side was not. He should not
forget that a judge like himself should be the last person
to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued
tyrant.
21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of respondent rendered the following explanations in
record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, his comment, to wit:
De Leon avers that the respondent committed a. That the Lim family had
dishonesty and falsification as follows: acquired the properties from
Georgina Flores;
respondents claim in his comment that he had
b. That William and
Leonardo Lim were already represented the Lim family was a deception, because the
actively managing the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his
family business, and now
co-owned the properties by filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and
virtue of the deed of Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the
absolute sale their parents,
time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless
Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, had executed the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor
in their favor; and for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint
c. That because of the execution against the respondent and in denying his motion for
of the deed of absolute sale, reconsideration.
William and Leonardo Lim
had since honestly assumed
that their parents had The Court usually first refers administrative
already caused the transfer
complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the
of the TCTs to their names.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
3. Considering that William and and appropriate recommendations. For the present case,
Leonardo Lim themselves were the
ones who had engaged his services, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to
he (Atty. Castelo) consequently the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and
truthfully stated in the motion
seeking an extension to file based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus,
responsive pleading dated February we decide the complaint on its merits.
3, 2006 the fact that it was the
Ruling
family of the defendants that had
engaged him, and that he had then
advised the children of the We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not
defendants to seek the assistance as
well of a licensed geodetic surveyor commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in
and engineer; Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the
II
To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. and the Code of Professional Responsibility
Batuegas:[11]
6. Simply put, movants- Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses
defendants Lim have become the Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual
indispensable defendants in the principal owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of
complaint of plaintiff DENR, being now
the registered and lawful owners of the ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and
subject property and the real parties-in- that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim)
interest in this case.Without them, no
final determination can be had in the needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether
Principal complaint. the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living
or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings
7. Significantly, the property of
intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leoncould not
subject of his complaint-in-intervention, disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and
is identically, if not similarly, situated as
that of herein movants-defendants Lim, Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the
and likewise, may as well be a proper action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice
subject of the Principal Complaint of
plaintiff DENR. of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He
also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as
8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself,
his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its
concedes the fact that herein movants-
defendants Lim should be substituted as specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William
defendants in the principal complaint as Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not
contained in their Manifestation
dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed validly insist that the respondent committed any
in this case. dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any
SO ORDERED.
MAGAWAY v. AVECILLA 1, 1995 in favor of the Ramiscals because he was
unschooled and he died on December 3, 1963 so that he
AC NO 7072, JULY 27 2016 was already dead for thirty (30) years at the date of the
instruments which was also used in the falsification and
unlawful transfer of the aforementioned Transfer
BERSAMIN, J.: Certificate Titles which was manipulated by Attorney
Avecilla and his wife Loreta in favor of the Ramiscals;
The complainants hereby seek the disbarment of the
respondent for his violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the That Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla of Roxas, Isabela has
duties of attorneys under Section 20, Rule 138 of committed serious damages to us, because we are
the Rules of Court, the rules on notarial practice, and deprived of our rights for hereditary succession over the
the Code of Professional Responsibility. property in question due his unprofessional, illegal,
They aver in their affidavit-complaint dated January anomalous conduct and incompetence in the practice of
2006 the following:[1] law particularly by circum[v]enting the laws in dealing
with registered land through the preparation, notarization
That the OCT P-2419 with a total land area of 10.5
and signing deed of sale where the parties were already
hectares has been mortgaged (Sale with the right to
dead for long time ago (sic);
repurchase) by the late Gavino Magaoay to the late
Elena Gongon in the amount of Three Thousand Nine That due to the unlawful manipulations of Attorney
hundred (P3,900.00) pesos on July 10, 1959 and the late Mariano A. Avecilla, land titles tainted with
Gavino Magaoay was not able to redeemed (sic) the land irregularities were issued in favor of Angelito Ramiscal
because he died on December 3, 1963 prior to the date of Sr et al thus he should be prohibited to practice Law
redemption; because he is incompetent and a liability in the justice
system of the Republic of the Philippines that are
That we have the right of ownership by virtue of right of
contributory to the loosing (sic) trust and confidence by
her[e]ditary succession from the original patent holder,
the people among some (sic) undesirable lawyers and in
[the] late Gavino Magaway who is the registered owner
the administration of Justice in this country;[2]
of OCT P[-]2419 which was fraudulently reconstituted
and fraudulently sold by virtue of the falsified deed of It appears that the notarization of the documents
sale fictitiously executed by [the] late Elena Gongon, (specifically, the deed of sale by attorney-in-fact by
falsified request for issuance of separate titles fictitiously Eleanor Gongon Flores represented by her attorney-in-
executed by the late Gavino Magaoay and falsified fact Efren Vera Cruz, Sr. on August 5, 1992 in favor of
affidavit of non-tenancy fictitiously executed by the late Angelito Ramiscal, Sr.; the deed of sale executed by
Elena Gongon; Elena Gongon on December 7, 1993 in favor of Angelito
That OCT P-2419 whom Gavino Magaoay is the Ramiscal, Sr.; and the affidavit of non-tenancy executed
registered owner and the mortgagor was never by Elena Gongon on December 7, 1993) had led to the
consolidated in the name of Elena Gongon, the filing of two criminal cases and a civil action. The first
mortgagee; criminal case, for estafa through falsification of a public
document, was filed by the complainants against
That it was Attorney Mariano A. Avecilla who duly Angelito Ramiscal, Sr. and the respondent in the Office
prepared, notarized and manipulated the Falsified Deed of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela, but the case was
of Sale executed by Elena Gongon dated December 7, ultimately dismissed on July 15, 1998. The second
1993 with her fictitious Residence Certificate Nr.927294 criminal case, also for falsification of a public document,
which was issued on February 7, 1995 at Roxas, Isabela was initiated by Eleanor Gongon Flores against the
and Affidavit of non-tenancy which was fictitiously Ramiscals, the respondent, and the latter's wife, Loreta
executed by the late Elena Gongon in favor of Angelito Avecilla. The case was also dismissed on October 5,
Ramiscal Sr et al where Transfer Certificate Titles: T- 2000. The civil action seeking the declaration of nullity
238312, T-238313, T-238314 and T-238315 were of fraudulently reconstituted original certificate of title
derived therein and all tainted with irregularities; and all the transfer certificates of title derived therefrom,
and declaration of nullity of instruments registered
That in consideration of the amount of Thirty Thousand affecting them was brought on July 28, 1997 by the
(Php.30,000.00) pesos whom Attorney Mariano A. complainants as the heirs of the late Gavino Magaoay
Avecilla and his wife Loreta had accepted from Angelito against the Ramiscals (namely, Angelito, Sr. and his
Ramiscal Sr. as a package deal in the preparation of the children Arlene, Ervin and Angelito, Jr.) and the
Falsified Deed of Sale dated December 7, 1993 and respondent in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Roxas,
other above mentioned documents that are instrumental Isabela (Civil Case No. 23-551-97), which ultimately
in the anomalous transfer of land Title in favor of the dismissed the complaint through a decision rendered on
Ramiscals' (transcript of stenographic notes, RTC June 14, 2004.[3] On appeal, however, the Court of
Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela dated June 11, 2003). Appeals, through its decision promulgated on August 29,
That Elena Gongon could not have thumb marked the 2008,[4] reversed the dismissal of the case by the RTC.
Deed of Sale and affidavit of non-tenancy dated After the Court referred this administrative complaint to
December 7, 1993 which was notarized by Atty. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
Mariano A. Avecilla because Elena Gongon had already investigation and recommendation, the IBP Board of
died on May 11, 1966 and already dead for twenty seven Governors called the parties for mandatory conferences
(27) years at the date of the instruments; on July 30, 2007 and September 10, 2007.
That Gavino Magaoay could not have signed the request In due time, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel M.
for issuance of separate titles dated April 3, 1995 and Maramba rendered his report and recommendation dated
Public Land Survey Plan PSD 02-053024 dated March October 24, 2008,[5] whereby he found in favor of the
complainants after giving more weight and credence to with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal
their assertions than to the denial and explanation of the solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment
respondent; and he recommended the respondent's or jurat.[14]Indeed, such responsibility was incumbent
suspension from the practice of law for one year, and the upon him by virtue of his solemn Lawyer's Oath to do no
indefinite revocation of the respondent's notarial falsehood or consent to the doing of any, and by virtue
commission. of his undertaking, pursuant to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-21 dated February 19 immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times
2009,[6] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. [15] His
approved the report and recommendation with failure to ascertain the identity of the person executing
modification of the recommended penalty to suspension the same constituted gross negligence in the performance
from the practice of law for one year and disqualification of his duties as a notary public.[16] As such, it is now
from being commissioned as notary public for two years. unavoidable for him to accept the commensurate
The respondent sought reconsideration of the consequences of his indiscretion.[17]
resolution,[7] but the IBP Board of Governors rejected his The respondent's rather convenient assertion that an
motion.[8] impostor had appeared before him and affixed her
In the comment he submitted to the Court, [9] the thumbprint on the ready-made deed of sale and affidavit
respondent contended that his notarization of the three of non-tenancy does not sway the Court. He should have
documents had not prejudiced anyone considering that demanded that such person first prove her identity before
the late Gavino Magaway, the predecessor in interest of acting on the documents she had brought for his
the complainants, did not repurchase the property by notarization. The objective of the requirement, which
April 30, 1960, as stipulated between the late Gavino was to enable him as the notary public to verify the
Magaway, as vendor a retro, and Eleanor Gongon Flores, genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
as the vendee a retro; that the complainants, assuming and to ascertain that the deed of sale and affidavit of
them to be the true legal heirs of the late Gavino non-tenancy were the party's free act and deed, [18] was
Magaway, who had died without issue, had nothing not to be served as casually as he did. By not ensuring
more to inherit; that the sale of the property had been that the person then appearing before him as the executor
first made on August 5, 1992 by Efren Vera Cruz, Sr. as of the documents was really Elena Gongon, not the
the attorney-in-fact of Eleanor Gongon Flores; that on impostor, he clearly did not exercise the precautions and
the same date, Vera Cruz, Sr. had sold the portion of the observe the protocols that would have easily insulated
property with an area of 8.479 hectares to Angelito the performance of his notarial duties from forgery and
Ramiscal, Sr. and his family for P400,000.00; that on falsification.
December 7, 1993, a woman in her mid-30's, claiming By his neglect, the respondent undermined the
herself to be an employee of the Office of the Registry of confidence of the public on the worth of notarized
Deeds of Isabela, had accompanied an elderly woman to documents. He thus breached Canon I of the Code of
the respondent's law office to request him to notarize the Professional Responsibility, by which he as an attorney
ready-made deed of sale the elderly woman had brought commissioned to serve as a notary public was required to
with her; that he had notarized the document out of pity uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
and kindness for the elderly woman, who had affixed her promote respect for the law and legal processes. [19]
thumbprint on the document; and that the elderly woman
turned out to be an impostor. The respondent's argument that no person had been
prejudiced by the execution of the documents was
Ruling of the Court undeserving of consideration. There was no denying that
The findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of the notarization of the deed of sale and affidavit of non-
Governors, being supported by the records, are adopted. tenancy adversely affected the rights of the complainants
and Eleanor Gongon Flores on their existing interest in
The function of a notary public is, among others, to the property involved in such instruments.
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the
execution of public documents.[10] In this case, the Time and again, the Court has reminded notaries public
respondent's affixing of his notarial seal on the of the importance attached to the act of notarization. We
documents and his signature on the notarial must stress yet again that notarization is not an empty, or
acknowledgments transformed the deeds of sale from perfunctory, or meaningless act, for it is invested with
private into public documents,[11] and rendered them substantial public interest. Courts and other public
admissible in court without further proof of their offices, and the public at large could rely upon the
authenticity because the certificate of acknowledgment recitals of the acknowledgment executed by the notary
constituted them the prima facie evidence of their public.[20] For this reason, notaries public must observe
execution.[12] In doing so, he proclaimed to the world with utmost care the basic requirements in the
that all the parties executing the same had personally performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
appeared before him; that they were all personally the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
known to him; that they were the same persons who had would be undermined.[21]
executed the instruments; that he had inquired into the In Lanuzo v. Bongon[22] and Linco v. Lacebal,[23] we have
voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and that ruled that the notarial commission of a notary public
they had acknowledged personally before him that they who fails to faithfully discharge his duties as such should
had voluntarily and freely executed the same. [13] be revoked, and he should be further disqualified from
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, the being commissioned as such for a period of two years.
respondent was mandated to discharge his sacred duties The notary public in such situation may further be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. In this
case, the same penalties should be imposed on the
respondent. Indeed, his acts manifested breach of the
vow he took under his Lawyer's Oath to do no falsehood,
and to delay no man for money or with malice.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVOKES the notarial
commission of respondent ATTY. MARIANO A.
AVECILLA effective
immediately; DISQUALIFIES him from reappointment
as Notary Public for a period of two years effective
immediately; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately with
the WARNING that the repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely;
and DIRECTS him to report the date of receipt of this
decision in order to determine when his suspension shall
take effect.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts throughout the country. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to the personal records of ATTY.
MARIANO A. AVECILLA.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7927, October 19, 2016 The Philippine National Police (PNP) of Legazpi City
filed a case for murder in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Legazpi City arising from the killing of
one Juan Edgardo Yap Bongalon on August 22, 2005.
SANDY V. DOMINGO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
After due proceedings, the Office of the City Prosecutor
PALMARIN E. RUBIO AND ATTY. NICASIO T.
filed an infonnation in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
RUBIO, Respondents.
Legazpi City charging Ariel Dayap and four other
persons who were then not identified with particularity
as having acted in conspiracy with Dayap to commit the
DECISION murder.
x x x x
I
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended Atty. Dealca must guard against
that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from finality of the decision be ordered
against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca. Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the
administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges
and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues
that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and
prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP and court personnel.[15]
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately We see no merit in Atty. Dealca's arguments.
submitted his Report and Recommendation[11] finding
Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Although the Court always admires members of the Bar
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed
frivolous administrative and criminal complaints; and out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts
practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of
Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and insincerity or self-interest. The noble cause of cleansing
was grounded on purely personal whims. the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is
for that reason that Atty. Dealca's complaint against
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,[12] the IBP Board of Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruism in the
the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus: motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant
for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner
Hababag pointed out,[16] his bringing of charges against
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or
and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well
case for lack of merit. knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment
could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal
Judge Madrid filed a petition,[13] which the IBP Board of remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of
Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.[14] according to law, not to harass them. [17]
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his
duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to initiate groundless, findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or
false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly upheld,[25] and the minute resolution then constitutes the
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The
Professional Responsibility thuswise: dismissal of the petition, or its denial of due course
indicates the Court's agreement with and its adoption of
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.[26]
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause. The requirement for stating the facts and the law does
not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issues
His being an officer of the court should have impelled in disposing of a case. The Court explained why
him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: [27]
must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist
the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his
clients' propensities to litigate,[20] so must he equally
guard himself against his own impulses of initiating The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its
unfounded suits. While it is the Court's duty to cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final
investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass decision appealed from is supported by substantial
them, among other things.[21] evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
to assist the courts in the proper administration of execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the
justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing
the unfounded complaints, including this one against the petition always gives the legal basis.
Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise x x x x
of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be
exercised in good faith.[22] Atty. Dealca's bringing of The Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions
the numerous administrative and criminal complaints all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
did not evince any good faith on his part, considering basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
that he made allegations against them therein that he
could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the
frivolous and unworthy of the Court's precious time and issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court
serious consideration. of Appeals.[28] The petitioner contended that the minute
resolutions violated Section 14,[29] Article VIII of the
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various Constitution. The Court, through Justice Regalado,
complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront declared that resolutions were not decisions within the
even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit: constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely
hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the so understood it; and the petition to review the decision
summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of
and court personnel 'for lack of merit', i.e. without even sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
discussing the facts and the law of the case. [23] explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts
and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeal's decision." It pointed out that the constitutional
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for
resolutions the Court could have promulgated in decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing of
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He where the petition was being refused due course, with
thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of
procedure applicable to the Court. The minute the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on
resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to
the actions by the Court.[24] Whenever the Court then deny due course to the petition and stated that the
dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible
through a minute resolution, it is understood that the error in the lower court's decision, there was a sufficient
challenged decision or order, together with all its compliance with the constitutional requirement. [30]
Atty. Dealca's averment that Judge Madrid did not hear
cases being handled by him directly insinuated that
II judges could choose the cases they heard, and could
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed
of the Code of Professional Responsibility between the judges and the litigants or their counsel.
Such averment, if true at all, should have been
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad
"in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general.
inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could
have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
impartiality of the judiciary."[31] However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. document to support it.
Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit
considering that the motion, being purely based on his Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. [32]
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is independent in handling the case must be balanced with
the latter's sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
warranted.
repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of
to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid
from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by Dealca was participating as a counsel.[36] The latter's
law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain bare allegations of Judge Madrid's partiality or hostility
obligations upon them.[33] did not suffice,[37] because the presumption that Judge
Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of justice according to law and the evidence and without
Professional Responsibility pertinently state: fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.[38] As such, Atty.
Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is
should insist on similar conduct by others. not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca. In Montano v. Integrated Bar of
x x x x the Philippines,[39] we reprimanded him for violating
Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a
motives not supported by the record or have no repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
materiality to the case. severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court
imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03,[40] and Canon 11, Rule 11.04[41] of the Code,
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to practice of law for a period one year.
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.
It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability ACCORDINGLY, the
of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
be resting on a very shaky foundation.[34] JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 of the Code of
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from
following averment, to wit: the practice of law for one year effective from notice of
this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Considering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge,
the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's
and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
undersigned x x x.[35] (Bold emphasis supplied)
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 10757, December 05, 2016 ] konsehal na nagbibigay ng allowance sa knila (sic)
pati mga judges". (He put put those words into my
LOUISITO N. CHUA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. mouth to make me appear as arrogant and bad to my
OSCAR A. PASCUA, RESPONDENT. constituents who elected me for three consecutive
terms as councilor when he in fact lost his
DECISION candidacy).
13.1 Yet, the foolishness of the statement of the
BERSAMIN, J.: Honorable Councilor of the 4th District of
Manila is that it is very clear in the 2 nd page of the
The administrative complaint herein was brought by Dr. Order that copies were sent only to counsels;
Louisito N. Chua (Dr. Chua) before the Integrated Bar of Atty. Pascua even accused the Judge of Branch 36
the Philippines (IBP)[1] accusing respondent Atty. Oscar of bungling with (sic) the case and used foul
A. Pascua of violating several provisions of the Code of language in the Court taking advantage of his
Professional Responsibility.[2] 13.experience as a veteran lawyer since 1971. In fact, the
Atty. Pascua was the co-plaintiff in the ejectment suit Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 36, Emma
filed against the complainant and his mother in the S. Young voluntarily inhibited from hearing the case
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). [3] After the and in her order she stated the following, to wit:
MeTC dismissed the ejectment suit, Atty. Pascua and his "It caught the ire of counsel for plaintiff-appellee,
co-plaintiff appealed. Although the RTC initially hence, the foul language in its pleading that the
dismissed the appeal,[4]it reversed itself and rendered undersigned bungled with (sic)the case".
judgment in favor of Atty. Pascua and his co plaintiff x x x x[8]
upon their motion for reconsideration. [5] According to Dr. Chua further declared that Atty. Pascua had abused
Dr. Chua, Atty. Pascua, in filing the motion for court procedures to his advantage, to wit:
reconsideration, did not furnish a copy of the motion to
Dr. Chua and his mother, thereby employing a 16. Respondent Atty. Pascua also played (sic) a
fraudulent scheme designed to prevent him and his mockery of the Court to our prejudice when he
mother from having their day in court. Dr. Chua further alleged that he sent a demand letter to vacate
stated that only Atty. Pascua appeared at the hearing of dated April 5, 2006 which was allegedly mailed
the motion for reconsideration at which he made his oral to me on April 20, 2006 when in truth and in
arguments. Thereby, Atty. Pascua allegedly "obtained a fact it is not April 5, 2006 but April 5, 2005
favorable decision without [their] knowledge."[6] because it was just superimposed to make it
appear as April 5, 2006 and he intentionally did
Following the rendition of the adverse judgment, Dr.
not send said demand letter to me as in fact, he
Chua and his mother moved for reconsideration. In
cant (sic) show proof of receipt and/or
respect to their motion for reconsideration, Atty. Pascua
certification from the post office that he indeed
submitted a comment/opposition in which he used foul
mailed said letter.
language and insulting words.[7]
Alleging that Atty. Pascua had used foul language and 17. Similar to this mockery of Atty. Pascua was his
insulting words in his other written submissions to the act of attaching a different Registry Receipt to
RTC, Dr. Chua declared in his complaint against Atty. his Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 31,
Pascua that: 2008. The proof of mailing which the registry
receipt attached to the motion filed in Court and
xxxx the Affidavit of Service attesting to said mailing
We filed our Motion for Reconsideration for having pertains to two different registry receipts. x x x;
been deprived of our day in Court. However, in his
Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 18. Noticeably, the Registry Receipt with Number
and Omnibus Motion for the Correction of the Order 139883 pertaining to the mail sent to counsel for
12.dated July 16, 2010 and to make Entry of Judgment the plaintiff, Atty. Edgardo Abad and the
filed on September 17, 2010 he stated the following Registry Receipt Number 922640 for MTC
scurrilous words and sentences to damage of (sic) my Branch 3, although both were mailed at the same
name and reputation as a professional doctor and a time (July 31, 2008) and place (Central Post
respectable councilor, and I quote: Office) bore different Registry Numbers.
Par. 9 - Appellee Chua using undue influence and Normally, Registry Receipts for mails (sic)
taking advantage of his being looked upon as a mailed at the same time or simultaneously with
councilor duped Ms. Yolanda Salindognd (sic) cause each other at the same post office would bear a
her t[o] make statement dated August 17, 2010 successive number which is more or less
marked as Annex "A" of their motion for consecutive in character. Respondent is
reconsideration. obviously using fraudulent scheme of the
Par. 9.1 The act of Appellant Chua to take advantage prevailing parties which prevented the plaintiff
of the innocence of Ms. Salindog as well as the trust from having his day in court.
and confidence given to him as a Councilor. Chua
was able to cajole Ms. Salindog to state that she was 19. During the hearing on September 26, 2008,
the one who received the Order dated July 20, 2009 respondent took advantage of the non-
and was to show the copy to Chua only in February appearance of our counsel and despite the
2010: objection of the Honorable Judge insisted in
11. However, his ignorance and abusive having an ex parte presentation of his exhibits
manner led him to say: ―Panalo kami sa kaso, paano which were all photocopies. x x x[9]
ako tatlunin (sic) ni Pascua eh isa lang fiscal at ako
Dr. Chua pointed to the different dates appearing in Atty. Every lawyer is required to act with courtesy at all times,
Pascua's pleadings indicating the supposed date of even towards the adverse parties. This duty is clearly
issuance of his MCLE certificate.[10] Dr. Chua mentioned imposed by the Rules of Court which mandates lawyers
that there were instances when Atty. Pascua did not to "abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
indicate his MCLE compliance certificate number, or no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
when Atty. Pascua used another lawyer's MCLE witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
compliance certificate number.[11] Finally, Dr. Chua which he is charged."[20] Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of
charged Atty. Pascua with fomenting suits that "would the Code of Professional Responsibility reiterates this
require his clients to execute Deed of Sale of Rights as duty by commanding that "[a] lawyer shall not, in his
his payment for Attorney's fees and would make himself professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
as co-plaintiff."[12] offensive or otherwise improper."
In his answer to Dr. Chua's complaint, Atty. Pascua The adversarial nature of our legal system does not
focused on the untruthful statements Dr. Chua had sanction an attorney's use of foul or intemperate
supposedly made regarding the ownership of the language, whether spoken or in pleadings. In Sanchez v.
property subject of the litigation between them.[13] Anent Aguilos,[21] we pointedly observed:
the issue of his acquiring rights over the property from
the client, he asserted that such was a personal matter The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal
between him and his client.[14] He denied using foul system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong
language, insisting that "these are part of the pleadings language in the advancement of the interest of their
filed by complainant without malice but in good faith clients. However, as members of a noble profession,
taking into consideration the facts under the lawyers are always impressed with the duty to
circumstances."[15] He claimed that the errors made in represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to
indicating the date of issuance of his MCLE compliance represent a personal matter in court, with courage
certificate number were merely typographical, not and zeal but that should not be used as license for the
intentional.[16] use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a
After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of lawyer's language — spoken or in his pleadings —
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar must be dignified. (Emphasis supplied)
of the Philippines (CBD-IBP) rendered a report with the
following recommendation, to wit: At issue is whether or not Atty. Pascua's use of words
and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that for encouraging innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner,
suit, using intemperate, offensive and foul language in foolishness in reference to Dr. Chua as one of the
his pleadings, for misusing the legal processes to the adverse parties, and bungling in reference to the trial
ends of justice, for using another lawyers['] MCLE in his judge, was offensive and abusive as to violate the
pleading and for attributing to a judge motive not aforecited command to every lawyer not to use abusive,
supported by the records, RESPONDENT be suspended offensive or otherwise improper language in his
from the practice of law of six (6) months effective from professional dealings.
notice.[17]
It is notable that the Investigating Commissioner, in his
On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a report and recommendation, concluded that Atty. Pascua
resolution adopting and approving the report and had "on several instances filed pleadings with the Court,
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of using offensive and intemperate language against the
the CBD-IBP, viz.: parties as well as the court, even if the same is not
material to the case.‖[22] However, the Investigating
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby Commissioner did not explain or justify his conclusion
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report against Atty. Pascua, particularly to disclose why he
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner considered the words and phrases of Atty. Pascua
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this adverted to as offensive and intemperate.
resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on We declare that the report and recommendation of the
record and the applicable laws and rules and for Investigating Commissioner were bereft of factual basis.
encouraging suit, using intemperate, offensive and foul
language in his pleading, for misusing the legal Words and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the
processes to defeat the ends of justice, for using another innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner,
lawyers['] MCLE number in his pleading and for foolishness, and bungling (even if the latter referred to
attributing to a Judge a motive not supported by the the act of the trial judge) are of common usage in our
records, Atty. Oscar Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED daily life. They should be understood by what they
from the practice of law for six (6) months.[18] ordinarily convey. Admittedly, they can at times be
considered as off-color or even as abrasive, but their
In a subsequent resolution, the IBP Board of Governors being so considered depends on the specific context or
denied Atty. Pascua's motion for reconsideration. [19] situation in which they are used or uttered. That they
have synonyms or alternatives that
Ruling of the Court are more orless expressive does not warrant
The Court reverses the IBP Board of Governors' characterizing them as excessive, intemperate or
resolutions adopting and upholding the findings and offensive. To depreciatingly generalize about them, as
recommendation and imposing the penalty of suspension the Investigating Commissioner obviously did, is to
from the practice of law for six months. unwarrantedly relegate them to a negative light. Doing
so herein would be uncalled for because the
Investigating Commissioner did not render any
justification for his negative conclusion about them. His
omission has effectively deprived the Court of the
factual basis for reviewing and affirming his conclusion.
Atty. Pascua's alleged usage of a wrong MCLE
compliance certificate number, or of that pertaining to
another lawyer, if established, could really constitute a
violation of Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs that "[a]
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice." But for the Court to
find against him in this respect will be unwarranted
considering the absence from the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation of any
factual finding thereon. Neither did his report and
recommendation advert to any evidence sufficiently
showing Atty. Pascua to have abused legal processes and
procedure.
We presume that the silence of the report and
recommendation on the foregoing matters was by virtue
of the absence of a clear showing by the complainant of
the factual circumstances supporting the charges against
Atty. Pascual. Otherwise, the Investigating
Commissioner would have easily stated his factual
findings thereon because it was his duty to do so under
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which
expressly provides:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator
shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the
Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's Report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer
Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not safeguard the client's confidential information xxx.
represent conflicting interests except by written consent Preventing use of confidential client information against
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the the interests of the client, either to benefit the lawyer's
facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster
entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal an assumed public purpose is facilitated through
in the maintenance and defense of their rights. [25] He was conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve abuse.
the clients' cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed
to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.[26] Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not
exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[27] the Court discussed the gift to the lawyer xxx.
concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests
of the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations
to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation,
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. complicating the process of taking proof and
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is compromise adversary argumentation x x x. [29]
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is
his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to
him when he argues for the other client." This rule prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
covers not only cases in which confidential representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to
communications have been confided, but also those in any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the involving the same or a substantially related matter that
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act is materially adverse to the former client only if the
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter former client consents to it after consultation.[30] The rule
in which he represents him and also whether he will be is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
called upon in his new relation to use against his first loyalty.[31] Throughout the course of a lawyer-client
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether with the client's case, including the weak and strong
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
thereof.[28] the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five administration of justice.[32] The nature of that
rationales, rendered as follows: relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.[33]
Contrary to Atty. Era's ill-conceived attempt to explain
his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination
of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule
is that the client's confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired
in the previous relation.[34] In this regard, Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him."
WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO
O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two
years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a
warning that his commission of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
NILO DIONGZON v. ATTY WILLIAM MIRANO extension of the time for him to file his comment.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA T. BAYONLA v. ATTY. PURITA deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated
REYES
demands; that on June 5, 1995, Atty. Reyes had
AC No. 4808, NOV 22, 2011 collected the amount of P121,119.11 from the ATO; that
On June 22, 1997, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes In so far as this case of disbarment
with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of is concerned, the issue hinges only on
the complainants position; one of the
trust. Bayonla alleged that on October 21, 1993, she and
heirs of Paz Durban whose legal
Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to services of the respondent was not
collect their share in the expropriation compensation revoked.
from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De The parties were required to
Oro City, [3]
agreeing to her attorneys fees of 10% of submit documents relative to their
respective defenses (sic) specially the
whatever amount would be collected; that in November actual amounts released by ATO, actual
1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from the amount due to the complainant as her
share, the remittances made by the
ATO; that Bayonlas share, after deducting Atty. Reyes
respondent to the complainant of her
attorneys fees, would be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes share and receipts to prove the same.
had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to
Unfortunately, only the Rule 16.01 A
respondent filed an answer without the lawyer shall account for
necessary documents required of them all money or property
and attached only a xerox copy of the collected or received for
computation made by Atty. Ismael Laya or from the client.
for the heir of Pedro Durban which had
already been previously attached to the Respondent was given a chance to
records of this case. rectify whatever errors or misgivings
(sic) she had done for her client but she
In the said computation it appears unfortunately failed to do so and did not
that for the release on February 17, comply with the Order dated October
1993, the heirs of Durban 29, 1998.
received P84,852.00 and for the second
release each of them as well as the Wherefore, in view of the
complainant was entitled P121,119.11. foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully
It could be inferred from here that recommends that the respondent be
complainant was supposed to received required to render an accounting or
(sic) P205,971.11 as her share. inventory duly confirmed by the
complainant of all the collected shares
Inasmuch as the attorneys fees of due the complainant and remit to the
40% was (sic) supported by evidence latter the said amount of P44.582.66;
instead of (sic) complainants allegation
of ten [10%] percent; then respondent Until such time that respondent
was entitled to P82,388.45 as attorneys had complied with the aforementioned,
fees; leaving a balance of P123,582.66 she is suspended from the practice of her
due to the complainant. legal profession.
On May 24, 2010, the Office of the Bar Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle
Confidant (OBC) recommended the final resolution of would each receive the amount of P84,852.00 out of the
this case.[15] The recommendation was noted by the first release, and the amount of P121,119.11 out of the
[16]
Court on June 29, 2010. second release. Her total share from the two releases
was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled
Issue to P82,388.44 as attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of
Bayonlas share, the net share of Bayonla
Whether or not the findings and was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors were her only P79,000.00,[19] which was short
proper. by P44,582.67. Despite demands by Bayonla and despite
the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to
Ruling remit the shortage,[20] Atty. Reyes refused to do so.
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her
Governors, which were supported by the records, but we demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons.
modify the sanctions to be imposed on Atty. Reyes. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of
Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to be
I immediately turned over to the client.[21]The unjustified
Respondent was guilty of violating the canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility withholding of money belonging to the client warrants
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the
lawyer.[22] Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional immediately account for and to deliver the money upon
Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
all moneys and properties of her client that may come converted the money to her own use, in violation of the
into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted gross
the lawyer the duty to account for all money or property misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit: inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. In this light, we refer to this
Section 27. Disbarment or Courts ruling in Berbano vs. Barcelona,
suspension of attorneys by Supreme citing In re Almacen, where it was held:
Court, grounds therefor. A member of Disciplinary proceedings
the bar may be disbarred against lawyers are sui
or suspended from his office as attorney generis. Neither purely civil
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, nor purely criminal, they do
malpractice, or other gross misconduct not involve a trial of an action
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or a suit, but rather
or by reason of his conviction of a crime investigations by the Court
involving moral turpitude, or for any into the conduct of one of its
violation of the oath which he is officers. Not being intended
required to take before admission to to inflict punishment, [they
practice, or for a wilful disobedience are] in no sense a criminal
appearing as an attorney for a party to a prosecution. Accordingly,
case without authority so to do. The there is neither a plaintiff nor
practice of soliciting cases at law for the a prosecutor therein. [They]
purpose of gain, either personally or may be initiated by the
through paid agents or brokers, Court motu proprio. Public
constitutes malpractice. interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real
The disbarment or suspension of a question for determination is
member of the Philippine Bar by a whether or not the attorney is
competent court or other disciplinary still a fit person to be allowed
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where the privileges as
he has also been admitted as an attorney such. Hence, in the exercise
is a ground for his disbarment or of its disciplinary powers,
suspension if the basis of such action the Court merely calls upon
includes any of the acts hereinabove a member of the Bar to
enumerated. account for his actuations as
an officer of the Court with
The judgment, resolution or order the end in view of
of the foreign court or disciplinary preserving the purity of the
agency shall be prima facie evidence of legal profession and the
the ground for disbarment or proper and honest
suspension. (As amended by SC administration of justice by
Resolution dated February 13, 1992.) purging the profession of
members who by their
misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy
II to be entrusted with the
Pendency of other cases not an obstacle duties and responsibilities
to administrative proceeding against respondent pertaining to the office of an
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016 ] claimed ownership of the land where the church of the
CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by
PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER, the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, COMPLAINANT, VS.
Loy;[2] that the MTC later on decided the case by
ATTY. DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, RESPONDENT.
declaring the respondent to have the better right of
DECISION possession; and that the MTC further declared that the
CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice
BERSAMIN, J.: to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the
building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil
This administrative case against the respondent attorney
Code.[3]
did not arise from any attorney-client relationship gone
wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and
in which the respondent attorney, as the plaintiff,
obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
successfully defeated the local congregation of the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local
promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises
Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other
by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's
structures were the objects of the action. After the
financial assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of
defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed
execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ
to settle among themselves, with the defendants
of demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S.
withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to
Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by
voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August
the respondent and elements of the Philippine National
31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the
demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by
respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged
demolishing the church building and the pastoral house
on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's
of the CSP-PLC.[4]
instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures
Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a
of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled
materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by
by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his legal
its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring the
knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the
disbarment complaint against the respondent based on
structures sans the demolition order; that such taking
his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the
away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and
demolition of the structures without the demolition order
malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his
from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and
disbarment.
disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that
he thereby abused his legal knowledge.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He
counters that the demolition was backed up by a court
order;[5] that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the
Antecedents parties entered into a compromise agreement by virtue of
which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to
voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him;[6] that
building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La Trinidad, despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not
Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had vacate the premises even within the grace period given
bought it from Larry Ogas;[1] that on June 11, 2012, to them;[7] that he then moved for the execution of the
Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons judgment, and his motion was granted by the
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La MTC;[8] that the sheriffs report dated November 21,
Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the 2013[9] stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by the with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
respondent; that based on the allegations of the structures on the premises; that he consequently sought
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256 from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC
entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino issued the writ of demolition.[10]
Omiles and all persons staying with and/or acting on her
behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, who implemented the writ of demolition; that the
represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the
conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself
Pante and the other members of the church personally upon the verified complaint of any person.
observed the conduct of the demolition; and that the
sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be
defiance of the lawful order of the court.[11] filed directly with the Court, the complaint is referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in The reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the
his appropriating the dismantled materials to ensure factual basis for the charge may be contested or
compensation for the expenses incurred in the disputed, or may require the reception of the evidence of
demolition; and that the complaint for his disbarment the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the
should be dismissed. referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and
recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review
by the Court.[12]Yet, the Court may dispense with the
referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay.
Ruling of the Court This happens particularly when the charge is patently
frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of to harass and spite the respondent attorney.
merit and substance.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as direct filing with it of administrative complaints against
follows: attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian
of the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the
Court is both a right and a duty.[13] Quite recently,
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B[14] to
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the to directly receive administrative complaints against
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified attorneys, thus:
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the
documents as may substantiate said facts. disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service. Provided, by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court may substantiate said facts.
of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are
jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
Supreme Court; Provided, further, That charges filed appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including
those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court
shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against
for disposition and adjudication lawyers in the government service, whether or not they
are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of to the discharge of their official functions. If the
its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the
verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the
IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall
2000.) forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
SO ORDERED
ATTY. ARTURO MATURAN v. JUDGE LIZABETH
GUTIERREZ-TORRES
In her comment,8ςrνll Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies Guided by the foregoing tenets, we dismiss the
the charges of professional negligence and disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate.
incompetence, and of representing conflicting interests.
She states that Seares, Jr. solicited her legal services in I.
the last week of May 2007 because his counsel, Atty.
Yasser Lumbos, informed him that he could not go to Charge of professional negligence and incompetence
Abra to handle his ad cautelam petition;9ςrνll that is unfounded and devoid of substance
Seares, Jr. and his parents were themselves the ones who
decided not anymore to appeal the dismissal of the ad Seares, Jr. insists that Atty. Gonzales-Alzates submission
cautelam petition despite her advice that an appeal of a "fatally defective" petition in his election protest
would likely succeed;10ςrνll that she did not convince violated Canon 1719ςrνll and Canon 1820ςrνll of the
Seares, Jr. to file the second petition because he and his Code of Professional Responsibility, claiming that her
parents were the ones who insisted on filing the appeal attaching a "cut-and-paste" certificate of non-forum
in disregard of the possibly adverse consequences of shopping to his election protest, which the trial courts
doing so;11ςrνll and that the imputation of negligence decision described as "professional negligence,"
against her based on the trial judges declaration that she reflected her lack of diligence and competence as an
submitted a false certification against forum shopping attorney because it was fatal to his protest.
was unwarranted, because all that she did was to make
The complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is form prevail over substance still remains to be the
unfounded and devoid of substance. judicial ideal.
For administrative liability under Canon 18 to attach, the The foregoing notwithstanding, we doubt the sincerity of
negligent act of the attorney should be gross21ςrνlland the charge of professional negligence and incompetence.
inexcusable22ςrνll as to lead to a result that was highly Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by Atty. Gonzales-
prejudicial to the clients interest.23ςrνll Accordingly, Alzates negligent and incompetent handling of his
the Court has imposed administrative sanctions on a election protest, we wonder why he would denounce her
grossly negligent attorney for unreasonable failure to file only after nearly five years have passed. The motivation
a required pleading,24ςrνll or for unreasonable failure for the charge becomes suspect, and the charge is
to file an appeal,25ςrνll especially when the failure thereby weakened all the more.
occurred after the attorney moved for several extensions
to file the pleading26ςrνll and offered several excuses II.
for his nonfeasance.27ςrνll The Court has found the
attendance of inexcusable negligence when an attorney Charge of representing
resorts to a wrong remedy,28ςrνll or belatedly files an conflicting interests is bereft of merit
appeal,29ςrνll or inordinately delays the filing of a
complaint,30ςrνll or fails to attend scheduled court Seares, Jr. next charges Gonzales-Alzate with violating
hearings.31ςrνll Gross misconduct on the part of an Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
attorney is determined from the circumstances of the supposedly representing conflicting interests when she
case, the nature of the act done and the motive that took on the administrative complaint that Turqueza
induced the attorney to commit the act.32ςrνll brought against Seares, Jr.
Yet, a reading of the June 8, 2007 order of the RTC The charge of Seares, Jr. is bereft of merit.
(Branch I) in Bangued, Abra shows that the true cause of
the dismissal of Seares, Jr.s "Petition For Protest Ad Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Cautelam" was its prematurity in light of the pendency prohibits an attorney from representing a party in a
in the Commission on Elections of his "Petition to controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to
Suspend Canvass and Proclamation."33ςrνll The RTC the subject matter of a previous litigation involving
cogently held that "(t)he primary objective of this another client. Relevantly, Rule 15.01, Rule15.02 and
petition is to pray for the issuance of a Preliminary Rule15.03 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Precaution Order xxx (but) a prayer for the issuance of
the protection of ballot boxes, Books and Lists of Voters
Rule 15.01A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective
and other election paraphernalia in the recently
client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
concluded elections is well within the power of the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his
Commission on Elections."34ςrνll We see no trace of
own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
professional negligence or incompetence on the part of
prospective client.
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in her handling of Seares, Jr.s
protest, especially because she even filed in his behalf a
"Motion for Reconsideration,"35ςrνll a "Comment on Rule 15.02A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
the Courts Dismissal of the Protest Ad privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed
Cautelam"36ςrνll and a "Motion to Withdraw Cash to him by a prospective client.
Deposit."37ςrνll Besides, her explanation that it was
Seares, Jr. himself who decided not to pursue the appeal Rule 15.03A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
and who instead requested her to move for the interests except by written consent of all concerned
withdrawal of his cash deposit was very plausible. given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Also, we cannot find Atty. Gonzales-Alzate Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal representation of Turqueza
professionally negligent in respect of the filing and neither resulted in her betrayal of the fidelity and loyalty
eventual dismissal of the subsequent "Petition for she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor
Protest." The verification and certification against forum invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
shopping attached to the petition contained handwritten while she was performing her duties as an
superimpositions by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate, but such attorney.39ςrνll Representing conflicting interests
superimpositions were apparently made only to reflect would occur only where the attorneys new engagement
the corrections of the dates of subscription and the would require her to use against a former client any
notarial document number and docket number for the confidential information gained from the previous
verification and certification. If that was all there was to professional relation.40ςrνll The prohibition did not
the superimpositions, then there was nothing to support cover a situation where the subject matter of the present
the trial judges observation that the "cut and paste" engagement was totally unrelated to the previous
method in preparing the verification and certification for engagement of the attorney.41ςrνll To constitute the
non-forum shopping constituted "professional violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally
negligence" that proved fatal to her clients use against the former client the confidential information
protest.38ςrνll As a matter of policy, a court-bound acquired by her during the previous
document or paper prepared in a slipshod manner affects employment.42ςrνll But a mere allegation of
only the form but not the substance of the submission. professional misconduct would not suffice to establish
Such slipshod preparation, even assuming it to be true, the charge, because accusation was not synonymous
would not deserve administrative censure. Not letting with guilt.43ςrνll
As it turned out, the charge of representing conflicting The Court emphasizes that an attorney enjoys the
interests leveled against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was presumption of innocence, and whoever initiates
imaginary. The charge was immediately unworthy of administrative proceedings against the attorney bears the
serious consideration because it was clear from the start burden of proof to establish the allegation of
that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not take advantage of her professional misconduct.45ςrνll When the complainant
previous engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal fails to discharge the burden of proof, the Court has no
representation of Turqueza in the latters administrative alternative but to dismiss the charge and absolve the
charge against Seares, Jr. There was no indication attorney.
whatsoever of her having gained any confidential
information during her previous engagement by Seares, We find that the administrative complaint against Atty.
Jr. that could be used against Seares, Jr. Her engagement Gonzales-Alzate was nothing but an attempt to vex,
by Seares, Jr. related only to the election protest in 2007, harass and humiliate her as well as to get even with her
but Turquezas complaint involved Seares, Jr.s for representing Turqueza against Seares, Jr. Such an ill-
supposedly unlawful interference in ousting Turqueza as motivated bid to disbar Atty. Gonzales-Alzate trifles
the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Dolores, with the Courts esteem for the members of the Bar who
Abra in 2010. There is no question that both charges form one of the solid pillars of Justice in our land. We
were entirely foreign to one another. cannot tolerate it because attorneys are officers of the
Court who are placed under our supervision and control
Moreover, the prohibition against representing due to the law imposing upon them peculiar duties,
conflicting interests further necessitated identity of the responsibilities and liabilities.46ςrνll We exist in a
parties or interests involved in the previous and present symbiotic environment with them where their duty to
engagements. But such identity was not true here. The defend the courts is reciprocated by our shielding them
adverse party in Seares, Jr.s election protest in 2007 was from vindictive individuals who are deterred by nothing
Albert Z. Guzman, the newly-elected Municipal Mayor just to strip them of their privilege to practice law.
of Dolores, Abra, who was not involved in Turquezas
administrative complaint against Seares, Jr. In fact, In De Leon v. Castelo,47ςrνll we underscored the need
Turqueza was not even a mayoral candidate in Dolores, to shield attorneys as officers of the Court from the
Abra in the elections held in 2007 and in 2010. The mindless assaults intended to vex or harass them in their
allegation by Seares, Jr. that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate performance of duty, stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
represented his political opponent was not even true
because Turqueza was Seares, Jr.s political ally, as Atty. According to Justice Cardozo, "xxx the fair fame of a
Gonzales-Alzate stated. lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of
the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a
It is notable, too, that Seares, Jr. expressly agreed to calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once
Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal representation of Turqueza lost, is not easily restored."
in the latters administrative case against Seares, Jr. This
is borne out by the affidavit of Turqueza that Atty. A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object.
Gonzales-Alzate submitted,44ςrνll the relevant portion The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield
of which follows: such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous
and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting
xxx down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer;
and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever
6. When Mayor Robert Victor Seares arrived, he was brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is
with a black shirt and jeans and the Vice Governor insulated from intimidation and harassment is
started the conference asking us if there is a possibility encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can
of amicable settlement. Atty. Ma. Saniata Liwliwa then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
Gonzales-Alzate first talked and she raised the fact that administration of justice.48ςrνll
in 2007 Mayor Robert Victor Seares was her client in an
election protest and she even said how she represented In Lim v. Antonio,49ςrνll we censured the complainant
him, and Mayor Seares said "wen Attorney (yes because revenge and bad faith had motivated him into
Attorney) and the Atty. Gonzales-Alzate said to all of us filing a baseless complaint against an attorney,
in the said room that she was before the lawyer of Jr. stressing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Seares (Mayor Robert Victor Seares) and now if Jr. will
not oppose it, she will be representing me in the said The dignity and honor of the profession require that acts
administrative case and this time, she will now be a unworthy of membership in the bar should be visited
lawyer against Jr. Seares. The said lawyer was even with the appropriate penalty. The charge against
smiling when she said that and Jr. Seares (Mayor Robert respondent is of a serious character. If in fact there was
Victor Seares) was normally giggling and smiling and such a violation of the law as charged, he should be duly
said "wen attorney, awan ti kuak dita, iyabogaduam latta penalized. It is quite clear, however, that the complaint is
a, isuna lang a ni kapitan no nya paylang ti kayatna, unfounded. It was the product of ill-will, the desire of
nayted la ngarud sueldo nan" (Yes, attorney, I have no complainant to avenge himself. It certainly was not made
concern with that, you lawyer for him if that is so, I dont in good faith. If it were so, its dismissal would have
know what the (barangay) captain would still want, his sufficed. To repeat, such is not the case. As the Report
salary was already released to him.) xxx. made clear, the complaint arose from a feeling of
resentment, even of hate. To allow complainant to trifle
xxx with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an
instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the
rule of law. He should be held to strict accountability,
considering that this is his second attempt. Such
stubbornness, compounds the gravity of his offense. He
appears to be incorrigible. At the very least, therefore, he
should be censured.50ςrνll
SO ORDERED.
MAYOR BALINDONG v. CA 4 August 1999 Resolution, then Secretary Serafin
GR No. 177600, Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed the
LIMBONA v. HON. JUDGE BALUT OF RTC Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two (2)
BRANCH 76, GR No. 178684, OCT 19 2015 informations for frustrated murder with attempted
murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and
BERSAMIN, J.: an information for attempted murder" against private
respondents. Subsequently, in a 1 December 1999
The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest Resolution, Secretary Cuevas denied private
upon filing of the information and supporting papers respondents' Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:
implies the determination of probable cause for the
offense charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to "The matters raised in the instant motion for
seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the reconsideration have been taken into consideration in
pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed arriving at our resolution, hence, we find no cogent
independently of the executive determination of reason to reconsider the same.
probable cause to charge the proper offense.
In view, however, of the Supplemental Manifestation
filed by Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote on October 19,
The Case 1999, the dispositive portion of our resolution dated
August 4, 1999 is hereby modified to read as follows:
Before us are the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 177600
and G.R. No. 178684. G.R. No. 177600 involves the xxx WHEREFORE, your resolution is hereby modified.
appeal by petition for review on certiorari of Mayor You are directed to file two (2) informations for murder
Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, Mayor with attempted murder, two (2) informations for
Amer Oden Balindong, and Ali Balindong frustrated murder and an information for attempted
(Balindong, et al.) to assail the Decision promulgated on murder against respondents Datu Anwar Berua
April 24, 2007 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, PO1 Kennedy
G.R. SP No. 97121.[1] G.R. No. 178684 relates to Macaborod Balindong, Datu Amer-Oden Sarip
the Petition (To Show Cause Why Respondent Should Balindong and Datu Ali Sarip Balindong. Report your
Not Be Held in Contempt of Court)[2]brought by Zenaida compliance within ten (10) days from receipt hereof x x
M. Limbona (Limbona), the private complainant in the x"
criminal cases instituted against Balindong, et al., The corresponding Amended Informations were
charging Presiding Judge Alexander S. Balut of the accordingly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, in Quezon City Maguindanao, Cotabato City and docketed as Criminal
with contempt of court for issuing the order dated July Case Nos. 2503, 2573, 2574, 2575 and 2576. Private
16, 2007 suspending the proceedings in the criminal respondents, in the meantime, filed a second Motion for
cases involving Balindong, et al. out of judicial Reconsideration, which the succeeding DOJ Secretary
courtesy.[3] Artemio G. Tuquero in a 16 March 2000
Resolution denied "with finality and with warning that
no further pleadings will be entertained". Undeterred by
Antecedents the tenor of the denial of their second motion for
reconsideration, they filed a Third Motion for
The CA's decision being assailed in CA-G.R. SP No. Reconsideration that was eventually granted by the new
97121 rendered the following factual antecedents, to wit: DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a 12 March 2001
Resolution. Private complainants sought reconsideration
The long-drawn controversy now raised in the instant thereof but the same was subsequently denied in a 24
petition was instigated by a shooting incident that took July 2001 Resolution, prompting them to bring the
place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur on May 11, matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
1998 that resulted in the death of Dante Limbona and certiorari docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 66858. In a 22
Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of Azis May 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the
Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the course of the assailed issuances of DOJ Secretary Perez and reinstated
preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor the 4 August 1999, 1 December 1999 and 16 March
found probable cause to charge private respondents Lt. 2000 DOJ Resolutions, in due time denying private
Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration in a 23
PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden September 2003 Resolution.
Balindong and Ali Sarip Balindong with Double
Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. Later, Criminal Case Nos. 2503 and 2573 were re-raffled
The Information was thereupon filed before the Regional to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12. Branch 219 and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-
However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, 01-998992-93 [sic], Q-01-100542-43 and Q-01-100594.
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the Then, pursuant to the 22 May 2003 Decision of the Court
charges against private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a resolution
D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong and Kennedy finding probable cause to charge private respondents
Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden for Murder with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
Balindong and Ali Balindong. Private complainant Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Frustrated Murder in Criminal
Zenaida Limbona, the widow of the victim Dante Case No. Q-01-100542-43, and Attempted Murderin
Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the Criminal Case No. Q-01-100594. The warrants of arrest
Provincial Prosecutor's 28 August 1998 were accordingly issued against private respondents,
Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a who, undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to
question the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way of cause and consequently ordering the downgrading of the
a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. crimes charged. The cases were then re-raffled to RTC-
159962. Soon after, the Supreme Court promulgated Branch 77, presided by respondent Judge Vivencio S.
therein its 16 December 2004 Decision, the dispositive Baclig, who then issued the second assailed 18 October
portion of which states: 2006 Order denying a Motion for Reconsideration of
the 12 May 2006 Order issued by respondent Judge Lee
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the and setting the arraignment on November 3, 2006.
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 Private complainants filed a motion for the voluntary
which annulled the DOJ Resolution dated March 12, inhibition of respondent Judge Baclig, who later denied
2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August said motion and re-set the arraignment on December 11,
1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is 2006 in the 22 November 2006 Order.[4]
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued Aggrieved by the orders issued on May 12, 2006 and
on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED, October 18, 2006, respectively, by Judge Ralph S. Lee
and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch and Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, the State, through the
219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03 Office of Solicitor General, commenced a special civil
December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of action for certiorari in the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97121),
arrest against all the accused. The said court is directed alleging that:
to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof." RESPONDENT JUDGES COMMITTED GRAVE
Private respondents filed a Motion for ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
Reconsideration but the same was denied with finality as OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
the Supreme Court declared in its 6 June 2005 ASSAILED MAY 12, 2006 AND OCTOBER 18, 2006
Resolution that "there is no longer any obstacle to the ORDERS.[5]
implementation of the existing warrants of arrest". On November 20, 2006, the Court promulgated its
Despite the categorical pronouncement, however, private Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and
respondents adamantly filed another motion purportedly Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect contempt,[6] viz.:
for clarification of the 16 December 2004 Decision but
which was in fact an attempt to have the High Court In the present case, private respondents are guilty of
order a re-determination by the trial court of the indirect contempt for filing the following:
appropriate crime with which to charge private
respondents. In the 14 August 2005 Resolution, the Urgent Motion for Clarification of the dispositive
Supreme Court ruled thus: (1)portion of the December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R.
No. 159962;
"The Court Resolves to (a) EXPUNGE from the records Motion for Determination of Probable Cause and/or
of this case petitioners' urgent motion for clarification Motion to Dismiss the Case and to Quash Warrant of
dated June 25, 2005, xxx; and Arrest (with prayer for suspension of the enforcement
(2)
(b) ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay of warrant of arrest pending hearing) filed on
heed to the directives of this Court and against September 1, 2005 before Branch 100 of the RTC of
misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desist Quezon City presided by Judge Christine Jacob;
from any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Jacob's January
OF CONTEMPT." (3)4, 2006 Order denying their motion dated September
The 16 December 2006 Decision of the Supreme Court 1, 2005 filed on January 24, 2006;
became final and executory on July 5, 2005. Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Subsequently, due to the inhibition of the presiding Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even
judge of the RTC-Branch 219 the criminal cases were (4)Warrant Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges
raffled to RTC-Branch 100, whose presiding judge was of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicide
expressly ordered by the Supreme Court to enforce the filed before Branch 83 on February 21, 2006.
warrants of arrest against private respondents with
utmost dispatch in a 12 December 2005 Resolution. The December 16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R.
After issuing the Order relative to the enforcement of the No. 159962 clearly sustained the filing of two
warrants of arrest against private respondents, however, Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two
the presiding judge of the RTC-Branch 100 inhibited Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information
herself as well from hearing the criminal cases and the for Attempted Murder against private respondents. The
same were re-raffled anew to the RTC-Branch 83, Court even directed the implementation of the arrest
presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee. warrants against them. This, notwithstanding, private
respondents filed a motion for determination of probable
Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 cause and/or dismissal of the case against them. Worse,
a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non- this was done after being admonished by the Court to
Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant pay heed to its directives under pain of contempt.
Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges of
Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. Private With the finality of this Court's Decision, all issues
complainants, on the other hand, moved for respondent relative to the determination of the proper offenses with
Judge Lee's inhibition when the latter failed to act upon a which to charge private respondents had been laid to
motion for the issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest. rest. In continuing to file pleadings and motions
However, prior to voluntarily inhibiting himself from the purportedly seeking for the clarification of the proper
subject criminal cases, respondent Judge Lee issued the charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their
assailed 12 May 2006 Order granting private tired arguments and unavailing assertions. They did not
respondents' motion for redetermination of probable only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of the
aforesaid cases but also willfully and deliberately flouted touch upon a procedural infirmity but ruled further on
this Court's directives with their stubborn refusal to private respondents' material objections to the propriety
abide by our pronouncement and their incessant nit- of the murder charge against them. x x x
picking of issues already resolved with finality.
x x x x
In granting respondents' motions for reconsideration and
re-determination of probable cause, and consequently To reiterate the rule, determination of qualifying
down-grading the charges against respondents in his circumstances is a matter of evidence. Thus, as pointed
Order dated May 12, 2006, Judge Lee contravened this out by petitioner, by arbitrarily downgrading the original
Court's directive in G.R. No. 159962 and in the subject charge from murder, frustrated murder and attempted
Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own murder to homicide, frustrated homicide and attempted
judgment for that of this Court. Had he thoroughly homicide, respondent Judge Lee effectively denied the
reviewed the records of the case, it would have been prosecution the opportunity to prove the attendance of
impossible for him to misread the import of said qualifying circumstances in a fullblown trial.[17]
Decisions and Resolutions.[7] The CA took note of the ruling of the Court in G.R. No.
Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases, 173290, which said in part:
which were re-assigned to Branch 91 the RTC, presided
by Judge Lita Tolentino-Genilo, who, on May 24, 2007, Finally, whatever other grounds for opposition raised by
issued an order: (a) reinstating the charges against private respondents in their Comment to the
Balindong, et al. for two counts of murder with Petition and Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply, the
attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and resolution of this case has been simplified by the
one count of attempted murder to conform with the promulgation of the Supreme Court 20 November 2006
decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962; (b) Decision in the petition for indirect contempt filed
issuing alias warrants of arrest against them; and (c) against private respondents. In granting private
inhibiting herself from further hearing the respondents' motion for reconsideration and re-
cases.[8] Subsequently, the criminal cases were re-raffled detcrmination of probable cause, and consequently
to Branch 76, whose Presiding Judge was respondent downgrading the charges, the Supreme Court found
Judge Alexander S. Balut. respondent Judge Lee guilty of indirect contempt for
having clearly contravened the Court's directive in G.R.
Aggrieved by the dispositions of Judge Tolentino- No. 159962 and impudently substituting his own
Genilo, Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for judgment for that of the Court. It further found private
Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of respondents' persistent attempts to raise issues long
Arrest.[9] As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut settled by a final and executory judgment a
opted to defer action to await the Court's ruling in G.R. contumacious defiance of the Court's authority. x x x
No. 177600.[10] He further suspended the enforcement of
the alias warrants issued for the arrest of Balindong, et x x x x
al.[11] Hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.
Accordingly, private respondents have been penalized
On April 24, 2007, the CA promulgated its ruling in CA- for their contumacious acts and the issue concerning the
G.R. SP No. 97121,[12] disposing: proper crimes with which they should be charged has
been laid to rest.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is Balindong, et al. have appealed the CA's decision in CA-
hereby GRANTED. The 12 May 2006 Order of the G.R. SP No. 97121 (G.R. No. 177600).
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, as well
as, the 18 October 2006 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 Issues
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In G.R. No. 177600, Balindong, et al. submit the
SO ORDERED.[13] following issue:
The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and
Judge Baclig to be in clear defiance of the Court's WHETHER OR NOT AFTER THE EXHAUSTION OF
decision in G.R. No. 159962.[14] It pronounced that PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WHICH
Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only REACHED THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BY
sustained in G.R. No. 159962 the executive WAY OF PETITION FOR REVIEW, TO THE COURT
determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not OF APPEALS AND ULTIMATELY TO THIS
touched on what appropriate crimes should have been HONORABLE COURT (IN G.R. NO. 159962), AND
charged against Balindong, et al.;[15] and that Judge AFTER THE PROSECUTION'S STAND
Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not SUSTAINING THE ORIGINAL INFORMATIONS
prohibit the trial judge from determining the appropriate FOR MURDER, FRUSTRATED AND ATTEMPTED
crime to be filed against the accused [once] the cases HAD BEEN MADE FINAL AND EXECUTORY, THE
were brought to his sala."[16] It pointed out that: RTC - COURT (A COURT OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION) AND/OR YOUR PETITIONERS
There are no two ways to construe the 16 December ACCUSED, ARE PRECLUDED/ PROHIBITED
2004 Decision of the Supreme Court relative the FROM INVOKING SECTION 14, RULE 110 OR
appropriate charges to be filed against private SECTION 19, RULE 119 OF THE 2000 REVISED
respondents. In upholding the Court of Appeals' ruling RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ESPECIALLY
that the DOJ should not have entertained a third motion SINCE IT WAS MADE FOR THE FIRST TIME
for reconsideration, the Supreme Court did not merely AFTER YOUR PETITIONERS' EXECUTIVE
REMEDY FROM TFIE PRELIMINARY (governing appeals) prohibiting second or further
INVESTIGATION TO A PETITION FORE REVIEW motions for reconsideration; and, secondly, by acting on
(BEFORE THE DOJ), THE APPELLATE COURT and granting the third motion for reconsideration despite
AND THIS HONORABLE COURT WAS the grounds relied upon by Balindong, et al. being
EXHAUSTED AND NOTHING MORE.[19] previously raised in the first and second motions for
In G.R. No. 178684, Limbona raises as the sole ground reconsideration and being already fully passed upon by
for her petition to cite in contempt of court Judge Balut his predecessors in office in the guise of serving the
and Balindong, et al. that: interest of justice and as an exception to Section 13 of
DOJ Circular No. 70.
Petitioner respectfully submits the foregoing acts of
Respondent in willfully disobeying the decision and The Court disposed in G.R. No. 159962 as follows:
resolutions issued by the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 159962 and G.R. 173290 (sic), which tend to WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
impede upon or obstruct the administration of justice, Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003
constitutes an indirect contempt which ought to be which annulled the DOJ Resolution dated 12 March
punished.[20] 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued on 04 August
Rulings of the Court 1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
G.R. No. 177600 on 18 February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED,
and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 177600 219, is ORDERED to implement its Resolution dated 03
is denied for being bereft of merit. December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused. The said Court is directed
Despite conceding that the Decision promulgated in G.R. to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from
No. 159962 had long become final and receipt hereof.
executory,[21] Balindong, et al. insist that they were not
precluded from still seeking from the RTC as the trial Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department
court the judicial determination of probable cause of Justice for its information and appropriate action.
against them because all that the Court had upheld in
G.R. No. 159962 was only the executive determination SO ORDERED.[25]
of probable cause. They argue that the Court did not The language and meaning of the Decision promulgated
thereby prevent their resort to available judicial in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges
remedies, like filing the proper motions for the judicial against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder
determination of probable cause in the trial with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
court,[22] anchoring their argument on Section 14, Rule murder, and one count of attempted murder, were
110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of clear and forthright enough to require elaboration.
the Rules of Court Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC "to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003
The insistence of Balindong, et al. is legally relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all
unwarranted. the accused," did not need to dwell specifically on the
judicial determination of probable cause independently
To recall, G.R. No. 159962 was an appeal by of the executive determination. We should remind that
Balindong, et al. to review the judgment the CA had the trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already
promulgated on May 22, 2003: (a) granting the petition found the existence of probable cause against
for certiorari of Limbona; (b) setting aside DOJ Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of
Resolution issued on March 12, 2001 by then Secretary arrest upon filing of the information and supporting
of Justice Hernando Perez favorably acting on papers implied that the judge has determined the
the third motion for reconsideration of Balindong, et al. existence of probable cause for the offenses charged. It
relative to the proper offenses to be charged against them is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial
despite the denial with finality of determination of probable cause on the pretext that the
their first and second motions for reconsideration; and trial court should still act and proceed independently of
(c) reinstating the DOJ Resolutions dated August 4, the executive determination of probable cause to charge
1999, December 1, 1999 and March 16, 2000 issued by the proper offense. Rule 112 of the Rules of
the predecessors of Secretary Perez.[23] It is noted that in Courtrelevantly provides:
his assailed Resolution of March 12, 2001, Secretary of
Justice Perez had dropped Amer Oden Balindong and Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the
Ali S. Balindong from the informations, and had directed Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
"to cause the filing of the amended information for personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
against Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
Jalandoni Cota and PO1 Kennedy Balindong."[24] probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
In granting the petition for certiorari of Limbona, the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
CA declared that Secretary of Justice Perez had issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack investigation when the complaint or information was
or excess of jurisdiction, firstly, by totally disregarding filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
the clear provision of Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five Kennedy Balindong," and dropped Amer Oden
(5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by Balindong and Ali S. Balindong from the informations.
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the But their success was overturned by the CA, whose
complaint or information. (bold emphasis supplied) nullification of Secretary Perez's favorable action on
their third motion for reconsideration was affirmed in
xxxx G.R. No. 159962. Thus, this Court even issued its
Moreover, Balindong, et al. could not reasonably judicial imprimatur on the probable cause for two counts
support their position that they could still have the trial of murder with attempted murder, two counts of
court determine the existence of probable cause in their frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder.
criminal cases independently of the executive For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14, supra, as
determination of probable cause by the DOJ by relying basis for the RTC to still reach a determination of
on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule probable cause different from those sanctioned in G.R.
119, both of the Rules of Court. No. 159962 would be untenable.
However, any amendment before plea, which Limbona claims that Judge Balut's actions constituted a
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or disobedience to the decisions of the Court in G.R. No.
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, 159962 and G.R. No. 173290 because the suspension of
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with the enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest "has a
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The predilection to put the dignity of the [Court] in disrepute,
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, the disposition or (sic) the court's business in the
especially the offended party. (n) performance of its function in an orderly
manner."[27] She also points out that the "order to
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake suspend the enforcement of the said warrants has the
has been made in charging the proper offense, the same effect of a temporary restraining order,"[28] which,
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information in effect, "pre-empted the [Court's] resolution of the
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense prayer for the issuance of the temporary restraining
in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the order/injunction."[29]
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their Let us also look at Judge Balut's order of July 16, 2007,
appearance at the trial. (14a) (bold emphasis supplied) in which he stated as follows:
Ostensibly, Section 14, supra, applies only to a situation
in which there has been a mistake on the part of public Without necessarily addressing the merit of the motion,
prosecutor in charging the proper offense. that is, whether or not the alias warrants of arrest issued
against the accused should be recalled or set aside, and
It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor to avert any conflicting determinations on the matter at
make a mistake in charging the proper offenses against hand, the Court deems it but prudent to defer any action
Balindong, et al.? hereto considering that the accused's petition for review
in G.R. No. 177600 assailing the Court of Appeals'
The answer is no. judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121, which precipitated
the issuance of the order of arrest sought to be
There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. reconsidered/recalled by herein accused, is still pending
Balindong, et al. fully exhausted the procedure to before the Honorable Supreme Court for final
determine the proper offenses to be charged against them determination.
by going all the way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their
quest was ultimately settled with finality by the In the meantime, while awaiting resolution of the said
Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for petition for review in G.R. No. 177600, the enforcement
reconsideration and declaring that such offenses were of the alias warrants of arrest, dated May 25, 2007,
two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts issued against the accused is hereby suspended. [30]
of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder. Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial
They thereafter attempted to undo such final courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion on the
determination by filing a third motion for matters in question, to wit:
reconsideration in the DOJ, and they initially succeeded
because Secretary Perez directed the Office of the As a backgrounder, five (5) consolidated criminal cases
Provincial Prosecutor of Lanao del Sur "to cause the were filed charging the accused Mayor Anwar Berua
filing of the amended information for double homicide Balindong et al. with murder with attempted murder,
with multiple frustrated homicide against Mayor Anwar frustrated murder and attempted murder. Thereafter, a
Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota and PO1 legal battle ensued concerned mainly on what is the
appropriate crime with which to charge the accused. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his
After several years of legal haggling, flip-flopping of Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the
charges and the inhibition of five (5) trial judges, these implementation of the warrants of arrest against
cases finally landed in the undersigned's sala with a Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a
pending incident: the accused's MOTION FOR willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR RECALL SUSPEND Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the
ORDER OF ARREST. Conscientious of his duty to parties. In the absence of the clear showing of bad faith
dispose of pending incidents with dispatch, the on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of
undersigned, fully aware that any resolution of the said judgment, for which he could not be held to account.
incident would spark controversy, which would Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the
necessarily entail another series of legal maneuverings transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero
resulting in the further delay of the disposition of these from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the successive
cases, resolved to withhold action thereon and deemed it inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of
best to observe judicial courtesy and await this petitions for certiorari bearing on the handling of the
Honorable Court's determination of the accused's criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including
petition for review in G.R. No. 177600. this Court,[32] must have probably persuaded Judge Balut
to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he
No less than the imperative of judicial courtesy impelled expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to
the undersigned Presiding Judge to issue the order dated avert any conflicting determinations" pending the
July 16, 2007. A PETITION FOR REVIEW assailing promulgation of the Court's Decision in G.R. No.
the Court of Appeals' Decision reversing and setting 177600. And, thirdly, his actuations were entirely
aside the May 12, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial different from those of Judge Lee's, who downgraded the
Court of Quezon City (Branch 83), as well as the offenses from two counts of murder with attempted
October 18, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count
Quezon City (Branch 77) is pending before this of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple
Honorable Court. It is to be recalled that in the May 12, frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the
2006 Order, Judge Ralph S. Lee downgraded the warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge
offenses charged in the informations from Murder with Lee thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No.
Attempted Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted 159962.
Murder, to Double Homicide with Attempted Homicide,
Multiple Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Homicide, Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in this
respectively. In the October 18, 2006 Order, Judge manner:
Vivencio S. Baclig denied the prosecution's MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION thereof. In ordering the Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the
suspension of the enforcement of the alias warrants of Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
arrest dated May 25, 2007, the undersigned, not dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
unmindful of the Decision dated December 16, 2004 in disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct
G.R. No. 159962, the two Resolutions dated June 6, which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
2005 and December 12, 2005, and the Decision dated administration of law into disrepute or in some manner
November 20, 2006 in G.R. No. 173290, merely to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of
exercised his judicial discretion. He most respectfully court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
submits that the issuance of the Order downgrading the the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
offenses is a supervening fact which now divides the and administration of the law into disrespect or to
procedural antecedents of the case, i.e, "prior to the interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their
order dated May 12, 2006" and "after said order". Prior witnesses during litigation.[33]
to the order, this Honorable Court in ordering the The contempt power of the courts has been discussed
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 219) to in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,[34] to wit:
implement its Resolution dated December 3, 2003
relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court
the accused, resolved that there is no longer any obstacle and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power
to the implementation of the existing warrants of arrest, lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to
and ordered Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Presiding protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
Branch 100) to enforce the warrants of arrest against the administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
petitioners on December 3, 2004 with utmost dispatch. offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to
In this stage, there could certainly be no question or comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt
issue as to the enforcement of the warrants of arrest. The is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce
Court indeed spoke with finality. However, "after the cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
Order, " where the undersigned is, another issue interference with the courts orderly process by exacting
evolved, which issue is still pending final determination summary punishment. The contempt power was given to
by the Honorable Court. The foundation for this the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and
Honorable Court's issuances, "before the order" could necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are
not be said to be the same judicial foundation now, ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to
"after the order," as to hold the undersigned for the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for
contempt in suspending the enforcement of the warrants the laws themselves.[35]
of arrest. The legal milieu has changed. x x x [31] Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is
It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. judiciously.[36] Self-restraint in wielding contempt
powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is
clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must
manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
cause injustice.[37]
SO ORDERED.
[ ADM. CASE NO. 9612, March 13, 2013 ] February 14, 1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac
DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such
JOHNNY M. PESTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. interview had been scheduled; that adding to their
MARCELITO M. MILLO, RESPONDENT. dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it
was only upon reaching home in Quezon City when he
DECISION
received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again
been scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that
BERSAMIN, J.:
when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of found; and that they learned after an hour of waiting in
diligence by giving wrong information to his client the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested
regarding the matter subject of their professional the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their
relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer knowledge.[5]
of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect and ineptitude,
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the
to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14,
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against
Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of P15,643.75
client with competence and diligence. representing the penalties for the non-payment of the
capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00 given for the
adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted
one Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent him
Antecedents
during his and his wife's absence from the country.
In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his
Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo answer.[6] Although an extension of the period to file was
with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, granted at his instance,[7] he filed no answer in the
misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and end.[8] He did not also appear at the hearings despite due
incompetence and negligence in the performance of his notice.[9]
duty as a lawyer.
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through
Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were
(Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle held in abeyance to await the appropriate motion from
the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and Johnny's counsel.[10]
the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;[1] that Johnny
and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of The administrative matter did not move for several
P14,000.00 for the transfer of title[2] and P10,000.00 for years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the
the adoption case;[3] that Atty. Millo thereafter President of the IBP on October 28, 1998. [11] It was only
repeatedly gave them false information and numerous on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on
excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on
of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that June 29, 2001.[12] At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared
the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way through a representative, and presented a
[13]
back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the manifestation/motion, whereby he claimed that
country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella would be
tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted withdrawing the complaint against him.
that he had already paid the same, but he could not
produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty. On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through
Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed
P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millo's the case submitted for resolution.[14]
office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that
Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor
the liability for the accrued penalties. [4] C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and recommendation,
Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon
adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development recommended his suspension from the practice of law
(Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated for six months.[15]
that Atty. Millo made him and his wife believe that an
interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November
19, 2011,[16] the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render
findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but competent and efficient professional service to them as
lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty. his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
Millo to return the amount of P16,000.00, to wit: inefficient and negligent in going about what the
professional service he had assumed required him to do.
He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false
information to his clients about having already paid the
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the financial liability in the form of penalties.
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve
finding the recommendation fully supported by the his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03,
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) expressly so demanded of him, to wit:
against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount of
P16,000.00 to complainant. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009
IRCA),13 Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015 incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as
the Chairperson of the 16th Division, and considering
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice
WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST Ybañez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the
HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order
ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO- No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13th)
JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the
OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. awaited decision on February 28, 2014.14cralawred
108807
Justice Ybañez admitted in his comment15 that C.A.-
DECISION G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload
following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He
stated that he had conscientiously complied with the
BERSAMIN, J.:
Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to
We hereby resolve the administrative complaint1 brought
the older cases assigned to him; that he had already
against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C.
assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his
Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and
legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously
Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier for their undue
ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he
delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon
108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v.
being offered a permanent position in another agency of
Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie Cuevas and Joseph
the Government; that after disposing of the older cases
Denamarca.
assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before
Antecedents
becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and
that he had not been remiss in his duty and responsibility
Complainants Wenefredo Parreño and Ronnie Cuevas,
to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing
with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the
a monthly average of 15 cases.16cralawred
Department of Environment and Natural Resources of
the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and
14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez
promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution
and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal
submitting the case for decision because only filled in
Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the
the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence
protest,3 but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by
of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular
the DENR.4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez
Member of the 16th Division. She pointed out, however,
appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which
that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the
denied their appeal.5 With their motion for
return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be
reconsideration having been similarly denied,6 Enriquez
administratively liable for any delay in deciding the
and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for
case.17cralawred
review,7 and it is such appeal from which this
administrative complaint arose.
Issue
It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth
Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding
(16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision.8 However, the
complainants lament that from the issuance of the Ruling
resolution until the filing of their complaint on February
8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special The administrative complaint is without merit.
16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision,
which the complainants insist was in patent violation of The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like
the mandatory period within which the respondents the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the
should decide under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the
1987 Constitution.9cralawred court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2),
Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to
The Court required the respondents to submit their wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
comments on the administrative complaint.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the
In her comment,10 Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
she became the Chairperson of the CA 16 thDivision resolved within twenty-four months from date of
effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office
Order No. 198-12-ABR11 and CA Office Order No. 220- (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
12-ABR,12 respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of only Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution
Court or by the court itself.chanrobleslaw of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders.
The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it
x x x x cralawlawlibrary would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the
Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and
Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for exact a rigid and literal compliance with the
the delay? rule."26cralawred
Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said
decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or
after the parties did not file their memoranda, 18 it was the deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice.
13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybañez as He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of
the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the
Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for
promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another
nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus,
the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on
VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being
responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members entirely plausible, is accepted.
of the Division to which he or she then belonged.
Determining who should be administratively accountable
must consider the specific role each of the respondents WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of
played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia
108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Justice
liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
108807 might devolve only on the Members of the
13th Division who actually promulgated the decision. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Undaunted, NTA filed a petition for relief in the The decisive considerations are whether the
CSC, arguing that it had been unable to appeal from the negligence of NTAs counsel was excusable, and whether
CSCs earlier resolutions due to excusable negligence; NTAs appeal was still allowable.
that it had a meritorious defense; and that the questioned
resolutions were inconsistent with the CSCs We rule against NTA.
pronouncement in Dabu v. NTA (CSC Case No. 99-
0767), a case whose facts were identical to those of this NTAs argument that its former counsel faced the
case. It explained that its former counsels excessively herculean task of personally handling the numerous legal
numerous duties (in addition to his being the Deputy cases of the petitioner without any lawyer assistant in
Administrator for Operations of NTA) had rendered his addition to his regular duties and responsibilities as
compliance with all the legal requirements of NTAs Deputy Administrator for Operations of the
agency,[11] even assuming it to be true, did not justify the WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review
erroneous filing of a second motion for on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated March 22,
reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment 2002 and the resolution dated June 26,
in the CSC where such recourses were not allowed under 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil SP No. 67551.
Service. NTAs former counsel ought to have known of
the correct recourses to take from the adverse resolution SO ORDERED.
of the CSC.
To our surprise though, we came to know that the Ruling of the Court
Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a preparatory
pleading for certiorari. No way could it even stop the We find and hold that the respondent grossly violated his
intrusion into our property. Basically, we were deceived Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney
by Atty. Bangot into believing that the Manifestation he because he did not observe candor and fairness in his
filed would stop any legal disturbance on our property dealings with his clients.
and the same is preparatory for certiorari.[5]
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring The findings of IBP Commissioner Cachapero, which
their complaint against the respondent. sufficiently described the violations of the respondent,
provide an irrefutable insight into the gravity of the
On his part, the respondent denied the allegations of the violations by the respondent, as follows:
complainants. He insisted that the complaint against him
was a harassment tactic designed to intimidate him from The question to ask is, "Was the MOA fair to the parties
seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the and entered into by them in goodfaith?"
validity of the MOA;[6] that the MOA was valid; that
the Manifestation for Information he had filed in court The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin with,
prevented the intrusion into the complainants' land; that the conduct of Respondent had evinced an instinctive
the administrative complaint was designed to insure the interest in the property of Complainants. He had the
derailment of his application for a judgeship position, MOA executed at the same time he filed the
and to cover up the negligence of the complainants' Manifestation for Information before the court that was
counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2008-302 (for hearing LRC Case No. 98-010. Not only that,
annulment and/or rescission of agreement), which case Respondent's proposal to have a MOA executed between
was dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement him and the Complainant was meant to impress that his
for the prior barangay conciliation proceedings; and that supposed attorney's fees would be paid on contingent
they had voluntarily signed the MOA without basis, however, a perusal of the MOA indicates that the
intimidation, fraud or undue influence.[7] payment of Respondents' fee by way of a real property is
being made immediately effective upon execution of the
On August 23, 2010, the Court referred the complaint to agreement.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [8] As to the agreement of the Complainant and the
Respondent, the undersigned gives full faith to the
allegation of Complainant that the payment of
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP Respondent's attorney's fees by way of a real property
would come from TCT No. 121709 and not T-121708.
In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero Complainants explained that the latter lot had already
submitted his Report and Recommendation[9] finding the been committed to their seven (7) children especially
complaint against the respondent meritorious, and because this lot is situated in a prime location thus they
recommending that the respondent be suspended from could not have picked the same over Lot No. 121709.
the practice of law for one year for his unfair and The Respondent knew straightforwardly that lot 121708
injudicious treatment of the complainants as his clients. was a better lot yet Respondent gave a different account
of their agreement and took advantage of the frailty and
In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,[10] the IBP Board of advance ages (sic) of his clients.
Governors increased the duration of the respondent's
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent inequity or
law for two years, viz.: disproportion between the amount of attorney's fees
(measured from the value of the property taken by
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby Respondent) and the effort or service already performed
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with or still to be performed by him. The Complainants were
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the not made parties to the LRC case or any other case and
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, Respondent filed a mere two-paged Manifestation for
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and Information in court which he did almost effortlessly. It
finding the recommendation fully supported by the is not clear how the court had reacted to the
manifestation but Respondent did not follow it up with Surely, the totality of the respondent's actuations
[any] other action. Despite the same, Respondent stuck inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.
to his tale that the Complainants had signed [the] MOA On the basis of his acts and actuations, the attorney's
and despite his minimal representation of the fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were
Complainants in court, he held on to his idea that he had unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck
taken from his clients valid title to a million [pesos] down for failing to pass muster under the aforestated
worth of real estate in payment of his fees. guidelines.
The undersigned does not see fairness and judiciousness The respondent appears to have impressed on the
to Respondent's treatment of his clients, 81 and 76 years complainants at the time of their negotiations that the
old, respectively, and he need not add to his brief attorney's fees in the form of the lot would be delivered
disquisition in this regard.[12] to him only on a contingent basis. Again, he had
We adopt the findings and note the insights thus misrepresented himself to them because the express
expressed. terms of the MOA stipulated that "this agreement shall
take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties
We must, therefore, highlight the following reasons why [and] cannot be revoked, amended or modified by the
the findings and insights should be sustained. Second Party without the consent of the First Party."
To determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the As worded, the agreement was not a contingent fee
following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee arrangement is a
the Code of Professional Responsibility may serve as a contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed
guide, to wit: (a) the time spent and the extent of the percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is
services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce
difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance or defend a supposed right.[15] The amount of the
of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to
probability of losing other employment as a result of the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much
charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to should the suit fail. Such arrangement is generally
the client from the service; (h) the contingency or recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but
certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the its terms must be reasonable.[16] Canon 13 of the Canons
employment, whether occasional or established; and j) of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a
the professional standing of the lawyer. contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
It was not disputed that only the filing of the two- including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
paged Manifestation for Information constituted the but should always be subject to the supervision of a
respondent's rendition of professional services for the court, as to its reasonableness." A contract of this nature
complainants. Although he did claim that the filing of is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the
the Manifestation for Information had prevented any poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the
intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his end of client has a meritorious cause of action but has no means
the contract,[13] the worth of such minimal effort was with which to pay for the legal services unless he can,
exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
context of the attorney's fees being Lot No. 37925-G contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the
with 300 square meters in area. The two- litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement is the only
paged Manifestation for Information was not even the means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress
procedural precursor of the promised petition for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.[17]
for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the
petition for certiorari as he had promised. And, lastly, he Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is
did nothing more after filing the Manifestation for susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely scrutinize
Information. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer's it to protect the client from unjust charges. The court
Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the
the complainants after having made them believe that he stipulated fee under the circumstances of each
could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties. case.[18] Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
He took advantage of them who had reposed their full Court explicitly provides:
trust and confidence in his ability to perform the task by
virtue of his being a lawyer. He was definitely bent on Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to
obtaining Lot No. 37925-G than in protecting the fees. -- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
complainants' interest in their property. He exhibited this from his client no more than a reasonable
zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his attorney's compensation for his services, with a view to the
fees instead of the land. We sadly note in this connection importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
that his changing the property ostensibly agreed upon extent of the services rendered, and the professional
with the bigger lot as payment for his legal standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
services[14] reflected his deceit at the start of the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
relationship. He maintained the deceit by ultimately compensation, but may disregard such testimony and
enforcing the MOA against them through the action for base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
specific performance. A written contract for services shall control the amount
to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be was holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City as
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis ours) such, his officemate or law partner at Butuan City (sic).
All the foregoing circumstances established that the Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios eventually
respondent was deceitful, dishonest and unreasonable in became the IBP National President;
his dealings with the complainants as his clients. He thus
violated his Lawyer's Oath, whereby he vowed, among x x x x
others, to do no falsehood, and not to consent to the
doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any man's 18. The statement by Commissioner Cachapero in his
cause for money or malice but to conduct himself as a Report and Recommendation, 1st sentence, 2nd par.,
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and thereof that: "On October 10 & 11, 2008, a survey was
discretion "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351 situated at
to [his] clients. He also breached the following canons of Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: reconstitution of the lost title of the lot which was then
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, R-
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, 10, Cagayan de Oro City." is quite confusing and
dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. designed to put down respondent probably at any cost
and probably by an "unseen but influential
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and hands (sic)";[20]
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his The aforequoted allegations indicated that the
clients. respondent had readily attributed the filing of the
administrative charge to the lawyer representing the
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his complainants in the suit against him to annul or rescind
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence the MOA, as well as to "unseen but influential hands" in
reposed in him. the hierarchy of the IBP. The attribution was bereft of
factual and legal justifications, however, because he did
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter not even attempt to establish it with satisfactory proof.
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection We cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious and
therewith shall render him liable. unfounded in view of the record establishing his serious
ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and professionalism by casting aspersions against his peers,
reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid and exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage
controversies with clients concerning his compensation others, which should move us to consider his violations
and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent as aggravated.
imposition, injustice or fraud.
We have said time and again, and this we cannot To be now considered, therefore, is the condign penalty
overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor a craft of the respondent. A review of precedents shows that the
but a profession whose basic ideal is to render public penalty of suspension, or even disbarment, has been
service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If meted on similar violations and transgressions.
the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has In Santeco v. Avance,[21] the respondent attorney was
to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should suspended for five years for abandoning the cause of her
not only master its tenets and principles but should also, client without notice despite her having collected her
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets legal fees. She also failed to account for the money of
and principles.[19] The respondent's behavior and deceit the client and constantly refused to submit herself to the
demonstrated a preference for self-gain that transgressed proceedings of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[22] this
his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his Court disbarred the respondent attorney who did not
clients' cause. His betrayal of his clients' trust promptly account for the funds he had received for the
besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession. benefit of his client, and for his deceit in dealings with
These considerations justify suspending him from the his client. In Overgaard v. Valdez,[23] the respondent
practice of law. attorney was disbarred for assuring the complainant that
his property involved in a civil case would be
Moreover, the respondent made the following allegations safeguarded, and then collecting the full amount of legal
in his motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP fees amounting to P900,000.00, only to desert the
Board of Governors, to wit: complainant after receiving the fees. The respondent
attorney had further failed to submit an answer as well as
9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty. Palasan's to attend the proceedings before the IBP.
negligence and reckless filing of Annulment and/or
Rescission of Agreement titled Spouses Emilio Jacinto Although the complainants appeared to have initially
and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty. Emelie P. Bangot docketed bound themselves to give a part of their land as the
as Civil Case No. 2008-302 before the Regional Trial respondent's professional fees, they did so apparently
Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City where the because he had misrepresented to them the gravity and
subject matter was the Memorandum of Agreement extent of their legal matter. His misrepresentation was
(MOA) between the complainant and respondent, said undeniably calculated to make them part with their
counsel resorted to another forum by filing this valuable asset in lieu of cash. He did not thereafter
administrative case where his chance of oppressing and render any worthy professional legal service in their
harassing respondent is far greater because when he filed favor. Verily, as the cliche goes, they did not get their
said administrative case Atty. Roan Libarios then one of money's worth from him. Even if this charge was his
the Officers of the IBP National Chapter and member of first infraction, the grossness of his violations of the
the Board of Governors, representing Eastern Mindanao, Lawyer's Oath and the various relevant canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted earlier
absolutely warranted his suspension from the practice of
law for five years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with warning of sterner sanctions should he
hereafter commit a similar offense. This duration of
suspension was the penalty we prescribed in the recent
case of Mercullo v. Ramon[24] where the respondent
lawyer had deceived the complainants into parting with
the substantial sum of P350,000.00 as her attorney's fees
but did not subsequently perform her professional
undertaking.
WHEREFORE, this
Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY.
EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for five (5) years effective upon notice of this
decision, with warning that sterner sanctions will be
meted on him for a similar offense;
and DECLARES that he is not entitled to recover any
attorney's fees from the complainants.
SO ORDERED.
CZARINA MALVAR v. KRAFT FOOD PH. INC.
Undaunted, KFPI and Bautista assailed the adverse
G.R. No. 183952, SEPT 9 2013 outcome before the CA on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
69660), contending that the NLRC thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion. However, the petition
for certiorariwas dismissed by the CA on December 22,
BERSAMIN, J.: 2004, but with the CA reversing the order of
reinstatement and instead directing the payment of
Although the practice of law is not a business, an
separation pay to Malvar, and also reducing the amounts
attorney is entitled to be properly compensated for the awarded as moral and exemplary damages. [4]
professional services rendered for the client, who is
bound by her express agreement to duly compensate the
After the judgment in her favor became final and
attorney. The client may not deny her attorney such just
executory on March 14, 2006, Malvar moved for the
compensation. issuance of a writ of execution.[5] The Executive Labor
Arbiter then referred the case to the Research and
Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for the
The Case computation of the monetary awards under the
judgment. The RCU's computation ultimately arrived at
The case initially concerned the execution of a final the total sum of P41,627,593.75.[6]
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in a labor
litigation, but has mutated into a dispute over attorney's
On November 9, 2006, however, Labor Arbiter Jaime M.
fees between the winning employee and her attorney Reyno issued an order,[7] finding that the RCU's
after she entered into a compromise agreement with her computation lacked legal basis for including the salary
employer under circumstances that the attorney has
increases that the decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP
bewailed as designed to prevent the recovery of just
No. 69660 did not include. Hence, Labor Arbiter Reyno
professional fees. reduced Malvar's total monetary award to
P27,786,378.11, viz:
Antecedents WHEREFORE, premises considered, in so far as the
computation of complainant's other benefits and
On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) allowances are concerned, the same are in order.
hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its Corporate Planning
However, insofar as the computation of her backwages
Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the
and other monetary benefits (separation pay, unpaid
ranks, becoming in 1996 the Vice President for Finance salary for January 1 to 26, 2005, holiday pay, sick leave
in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods pay, vacation leave pay, 13th month pay), the same are
International (KFI), KFPI's mother company. On
hereby recomputed as follows:
November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista,
as Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the 1.Separation Pay
Vice President and Area Director for Southeast Asia of 8/1/88-1/26/05 =
KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why
16 yrs
no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for
P344,575.83 x 16
possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful 5,513,213.28
=
violation of company rules and regulations. Following
the submission of her written explanation, an
2.Unpaid Salary
investigating body was formed. In due time, she was
1/1-26/05 = 87
placed under preventive suspension with pay. mos.
Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice P344,575.83 x 87
of termination. 299,780.97
=
Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for
3.Holiday Pay
illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KFPI and 4/1/00-1/26/05 =
Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission 55 holidays
(NLRC). In a decision dated April 30, 2001, [1] the Labor
P4,134,910/12
Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal
mos/20.83 days x 909,825.77
illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment 55 days
of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, plus attorney's fees.
Unpaid 13th month
4. 344,575.83
pay for Dec 2000
On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled that Malvar was 5.Sick Leave Pay
entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she
Year 1999 to 2004
was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she
= 6 yrs
not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as P344,575.88/20.83
well as to moral and exemplary damages.[2] x 15 days x 6 =
1,488,805.79
Year 2005
KFPI and Bautista sought the reconsideration of the
P344,575.83/20.83
NLRC's decision, but the NLRC denied their motion to 20,677.86 1,509,483.65
x 15/12 x 1
that effect.[3]
Vacation Leave G.R. SP No. 99865,[12] disposing thusly:
6.
Pay
Year 1999 to 2004 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein
= 6 years Petition is GRANTED and the 19 April 2007 Decision
P344,575.88/20.83 of the NLRC and the 31 May 2007 Resolution in NLRC
2,183,581.83
x 22 days x 6 = NCR 30-07-02316-00 are hereby REVERSED and SET
Year 2005 ASIDE.
P344,575.83/20.83
30,327.55 2,213,909.36
x 22/12 x 1 The matter of computation of monetary awards for
10,790,788.86 private respondent is hereby REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter and he is DIRECTED to recompute the
Backwages (from 3/7/00- monetary award due to private respondent based on her
4/30/01, award in LA Sytian's4,651,773.75 salary at the time of her termination, without including
Decision projected salary increases. In computing the said
Allowances & benefits, the Labor Arbiter is further directed
Other Benefits: to DISREGARD monetary awards arising from: (a) the
Management management incentive plan and (b) the share option
7,355,166.58
Incentive Plan grant, including cash dividends arising therefrom
Cash Dividend on without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate remedy
Philip Morris 2,711,646.00 by the private respondent in the proper forum. Private
Shares respondent's allowances for car maintenance and
Car Maintenance 381,702.92 gasoline are likewise DELETED unless private
Gas Allowance 198,000.00 respondent proves, by appropriate receipts, her
Entitlement to a entitlement thereto.
438,650.00
Company Driver
Rice Subsidy 58,650.00 With respect to the Motion to Exclude the Undisputed
Moral Damages 500,000.00 Amount of P14,252,192.12 from the coverage of the
Exemplary Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to order its
200,000.00
Damages immediate release, the same is hereby GRANTED for
Attorney's Fees 500,000.00 reasons stated therefor, which amount shall be deducted
Entitlement to from the amount to be given to private respondent after
Subject to
Philip Sch G proper computation.
"Share Option
Market Price
Grant" As regards the Motions for Reconsideration of the
27,786,378.11 Resolution denying the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition
and the Omnibus Motion dated 30 October 2007, both
SO ORDERED. motions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Both parties appealed the computation to the NLRC,
which, on April 19, 2007, rendered its decision setting SO ORDERED.[13]
aside Labor Arbiter Reyno's November 9, 2006 order, Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her
and adopting the computation by the RCU. [8] motion on July 30, 2008.[14]
In its resolution dated May 31, 2007,[9] the NLRC denied Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the
the respondents' motion for reconsideration. CA's decision.
Malvar filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in
of execution to enforce the decision of the NLRC this Court, Malvar and the respondents entered into a
rendered on April 19, 2007. After the writ of execution compromise agreement, the pertinent dispositive portion
was issued, a partial enforcement was effected by of which is quoted as follows:
garnishing the respondents' funds deposited with
Citibank worth P37,391,696.06.[10] NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
covenants and understanding between the parties herein,
On July 27, 2007, the respondents went to the CA the parties hereto have entered into this Agreement on
on certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a the following terms and conditions:
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction), assailing the NLRC's setting aside of the 1. Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in
computation by Labor Arbiter Reyno (CA-G.R. SP No. the presence of Ms. Malvar's attorney, KFPI shall pay
99865). The petition mainly argued that the NLRC had Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos Forty
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that: (a) the Million (Php 40,000,000.00), which is in addition to the
inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary Philippine Pesos Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-
benefits in the award to Malvar was final and executory; Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two and Twelve
and (b) the finality of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. Centavos (Php14,252, 192.12) already paid to and
69660 precluded the respondents from challenging the received by Ms. Malvar from KFPI in August 2008
inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary (both amounts constituting the "Compromise
benefits. The CA issued a TRO, enjoining the NLRC and Payment"). The Compromise Payment includes full and
Malvar from implementing the NLRC's decision.[11] complete payment and settlement of Ms. Malvar's
salaries and wages up to the last day of her employment,
On April 17, 2008, the CA rendered its decision in CA- allowances, 13th and 14th month pay, cash conversion of
her accrued vacation, sick and emergency leaves, Here, it is the lawyer who is eaten up alive by the
separation pay, retirement pay and such other benefits, warring but conspiring litigants who finally settled their
entitlements, claims for stock, stock options or other differences without the knowledge, much less,
forms of equity compensation whether vested or participation, of Petitioner's counsel that labored hard
otherwise and claims of any and all kinds against KFPI and did everything to champion her cause.
and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors-in-
interest, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or x x x x
successors-in-interest, affiliates and subsidiaries, up to
the last day of the aforesaid cessation of her This Motion for Intervention will illustrate an aberration
employment. from the norm where the lawyer ends up seeking
protection from his client's and Respondents' indecent
2. In consideration of the Compromise Payment, Ms. and cunning maneuverings. x x x.
Malvar hereby freely and voluntarily releases and
forever discharges KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., x x x x
their predecessors or successors-in-interest,
stockholders, officers, including Mr. Bautista who was On 18 March 2008 Petitioner engaged the
impleaded in the Labor Case as a party respondent, professional services of Intervenor x x x on a
directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and contingency basis whereby the former agreed in
subsidiaries from any and all manner of action, cause of writing to pay the latter contingency fees amounting
action, sum of money, damages, claims and demands to almost P19,600,000.00 (10% of her total claim of
whatsoever in law or in equity which Ms. Malvar or her almost P196,000,000.00 in connection with her labor
heirs, successors and assigns had, or now have against case against Respondents. x x x.
KFPI and/or KFI and/or Altria Group, Inc., including but
not limited to, unpaid wages, salaries, separation pay, x x x x
retirement pay, holiday pay, allowances, 13thand
14th month pay, claims for stock, stock options or other According to their agreement (Annex "A"),
forms of equity compensation whether vested or Petitioner bound herself to pay Intervenor
otherwise whether arising from her employment contingency fees as follows (a) 10% of P14, 252,
contract, company grant, present and future contractual 192.12 upon its collection; (b) 10% of the remaining
commitments, company policies or practices, or balance of P41,627,593.75; and (c)10% of the value of
otherwise, in connection with Ms. Malvar's employment the stock options Petitioner claims to be entitled to,
with KFPI.[15] or roughly P154,000,000.00 as of April 2008.
xxxx x x x x
Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw Case,[16]praying that the appeal be Intervenor's efforts resulted in the award and partial
immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the release of Petitioner's claim amounting to
compromise agreement, and that the case be considered P14,252,192.12 out of which Petitioner paid Intervenor
closed and terminated. 10% or P1,425,219.21 as contingency fees pursuant to
their engagement agreement (Annex "A"). Copy of the
check payment of Petitioner payable to Intervenor's Of
Intervention Counsel is attached as Annex "C".
x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights;
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft
had against any or all of the responsible persons Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to
jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm,
represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent fees of 10% of
P41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10%
of the value of the stock option.
SO ORDERED.
LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, Francisca V. Flores[13] and Tarcela V. Sajulan.[14]
& FE V. FLORES v. ATTY ROMAN
VILLANUEVA The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-
motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment
AC NO 11099, SEPT 27 2016 complaint against him.[15] He contended that the
complainants did not present sufficient proof showing
that he had falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal;
and asserted that the basis for the partition of the
contested property had been the compromise agreement
BERSAMIN, J.: entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca,
the complainants' mother;[16] and that he had been born
Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth
of public documents should not be the occasion to certificate.[17]
establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should
first be duly and competently established either in
criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that IBP Report and Recommendation
purpose.
After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
The Case submitted his report and recommendation[18] finding the
respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and
complaint lodged against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. recommended his two-year suspension from the practice
for allegedly falsifying a public document concerning of law. Commissioner Fernandez dismissed the charge
realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age m order of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because
to secure his appointment as state prosecutor. his birth certificate prevailed over the documents
submitted by the complainants.[19]
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late
due execution and authenticity of the affidavit of registration of the respondent's birth should not
waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document.[27]In view of adversely affect the validity of the entries made in his
this, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the birth certificate.
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to
overcome the positive value of it as a notarized And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants
document.[28] It is settled that notarization converts a bore the burden of proof in this disbarment proceeding
private document into a public document, whereby the against the respondent. They must establish their charges
document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and
satisfactory proof.[34] Surmises, suspicion and
conjectures are not bases of finding his
culpability.[35] The foregoing disquisitions on the
falsification show that the complainants did not
discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did
not convincingly establish that the respondent had
willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment
as a state prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened
on February 22, 2006[36] but his late registration of his
birth occurred on July 3, 2006.[37] If the intention for the
late registration was to make it appear that he st ill met
the age requirement for public prosecutors, he should
have effected the late registration prior to the
appointment, not several months subsequently. In
addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing
him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan
on September 20, 2003, and to have been born on
November 29, 1943.[38] Under the circumstances, that he
had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself
to meet the age requirement for the position of state
prosecutor three years later became plainly improbable.
III
SO ORDERED.
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PH INC. v. ATTY dismissed its complaint for estafa and qualified theft, it
REBECCA SIMBILLO had timely brought an appeal to the Department of
AC NO 9464, AUG 24 2016 Justice (DOJ); and that the criminal case against the
respondent should still be considered as pending. [6]
SO ORDERED.
GSIS v. CANCINO-ERUM an injunction case. She then explained the practice that
once a TRO/injunction case had been raffled to a
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 [FORMERLY A.M. NO. 08- Branch, that particular Branch would be automatically
3007-RTJ], SEPT 25 2012 excluded from the raffle until all the other Branches had
each been assigned a TRO/injunction case. Thus, there
BERSAMIN, J.: being only four regular RTC Branches in Mandaluyong
City (i.e., Branches 208, 212, 213 and 214), every fourth
For resolution are the respondents' separate motions
TRO/injunction case filed was no longer raffled but
seeking the reconsideration of the resolution
automatically assigned to the remaining Branch.
promulgated on June 3, 2009,[1] whereby the Court,
adopting and approving the recommendation of the GSIS stated that it sought a clarification from Judge
Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA), imposed a
Erum on the non- raffling of Civil Case No. MC08-3660
fine of P5,000.00 on each of them for violating the rules
to know which particular Supreme Court circular
regulating the raffle of cases.[2] authorized the rotation scheme, but Judge Erum merely
replied that the scheme had been a long-standing
practice of raffling and assigning TRO/injunction cases
Antecedents in the RTC in Mandaluyong City; that it subsequently
requested the re-raffle of Civil Case No. MC08-3660
This administrative complaint emanated from the filing through its letter dated September 1, 2008; that Judge
on July 18, 2008 by one Belinda Martizano (Martizano)
Erum denied the request on the ground that there was
of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and
nothing irregular in the assignment of Civil Case No.
Communications (DOTC), Land Transportation Office MC08-3660 to Branch 213; that such conduct showed
(LTO), Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM), Insurance her incompetence, lack of integrity, and partiality; and
Commission, and Government Service Insurance System
that she thereby gave rise to an anomalous situation in
(GSIS) from implementing DOTC Department Order
which
No. 2007-28 (DO 2007-28), an issuance that constituted
the LTO the sole insurance provider of compulsory third
party liability (CTPL) that was required for the
xxx. [A]ll that a litigant with an injunction complaint in
registration of motor vehicles.
Mandaluyong has to do is to time the filing of his her
case by waiting until the favored judge is the only sala
The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. MC08-3660 of the left without an injunction case. Considering that there
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City,
are only four salas in Mandaluyong, a litigant may not
claimed that the implementation of DO 2007-28 would
have to wait long until this happens. Once the favored
deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance judge is the only sala left, then the litigant is assured that
agent.[3] She applied for the issuance of a temporary his or her case will automatically be assigned to that
restraining order (TRO). On July 21, 2008, Civil Case
judge.[7]
No. MC08-3660 was raffled and assigned to Branch 213
of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Carlos A. Against Judge Valenzuela, GSIS asserted that he showed
Valenzuela.[4] manifest partiality as a member of the Raffle Committee
by consenting to the assignment of Civil Case No.
On October 2, 2008, GSIS charged respondent RTC
MC08-3660 to his Branch without the benefit of raffle;
Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum, the then Executive Judge that despite having previously worked at FGU Insurance
of the RTC in Mandaluyong City, with grave Corporation, a member of the Philippine Insurance and
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of
Reinsurance Association (PIRA) that had actively
the Rules of Court.[5] On the same date, GSIS also
opposed the implementation of DO 2007-28 and had
charged Judge Valenzuela with grave misconduct, gross even filed a petition in the RTC in Makati City for the
ignorance of the law, violation of the Rules of Court, and nullification of DO 2007-28, he refused to inhibit
knowingly rendering an unjust order. [6] himself from handling Civil Case No. MC08-3660, and,
instead, issued a TRO restraining the implementation of
The charges against the respondents were both based on
DO 2007-28 despite Martizano's failure to substantiate
the non- raffling of Civil Case No. MC08- her application for the TRO, and without waiting for the
3660. Allegedly, Judge Erum violated Section 2, Rule opposition and comment of STRADCOM as well as
20 of the Rules of Court by assigning Civil Case No.
without requiring Martizano to post a bond; and that he
MC083660 to Branch 213 without the benefit of a raffle.
also unreasonably denied the motion to dismiss filed in
Civil No. MC08-3660.[8]
According to the GSIS, the raffle of Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 had been set on July 21, 2008 at 1:00 p.m.
In her comment dated October 24, 2008, Judge Erum
inside the courtroom of Judge Erum. On said date, all
took the position that the assignment of Civil Case No.
the parties, as well as the members of the raffle MC08-3660 to Branch 213 was by raffle, not by rotation,
committee, namely, the respondents and RTC Judge contrary to GSIS's position, thus:
Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., attended. For the conduct of the
raffle, a roulette bearing the numbers 208, 212, 213 and
214 (representing the RTC Branches involved in the 14. xxx The assignment of cases including TRO cases is
raffle) was brought inside the courtroom. However, by raffle, and not by "rotation" in its strict sense.
Judge Erum announced that Civil Case No. MC08-3660
Because if we say rotation, we follow the consecutive
was being assigned to Branch 213 because Branches
number of the branches participating. Relative to MC08-
208, 212, and 214 had already been assigned an 3660, the 1st TRO case after closing the last preceding
injunction case each, leaving only Branch 213 without round was raffled to Branch 208 on July 7, 2008 raffle
(and we used the roulette). The 2nd TRO case was of civil cases with application for a TRO/Injunction for
raffled to Branch 212 (and we used the roulette) on July the particular "round." The raffle committee would just
14, 2008 raffle, and the 3rd TRO case was raffled to be wasting time and make fool out of ourselves if we
Branch 214 on July 14, 2008 raffle (and we also used the would still spin the roulette, on that particular raffle of
roulette). The next raffle was held on July 21, 2008, and July 21, 2008 for the raffle of Civil Case No.
that's where the case of MC08-3660 was raffled for it MC083660, and wait until the pointer of the roulette
was during this period that it was filed, and the case was would be finally pointed to the portion where the words
assigned to Branch 213, still by raffle although we did "RTC 213" is located in the roulette since it is only
not use the roulette anymore in this particular case. RTC-Branch 213 which is the only court included in the
raffle of civil cases with application for a
15. Had there been "rotation" in its strict sense, and not TRO/Injunction for the particular "round."
by raffle as what complainant is saying, then the
sequence of the raffle would be Branch 208 to get the 1st Judge Valenzuela justified the proceedings taken thusly:
TRO case, Branch 212 to get the 2nd TRO case, Branch
213 to get the 3rd TRO case, and the last or 4th TRO
case would be Branch 214. That did not happen in this [T]he same was agreed upon by the judges as its internal
case because as it appears in the minutes of raffle, after rules so as not burden a particular judge with several
Branch 208 and Branch 212 got their share, the next cases with application for TRO/preliminary injunction
Branch to which the 3rd TRO case was raffled was to since as aforestated, such applications requires the
Branch 214. immediate attention of the judge in view of the fact that
each court has hundreds or thousands of cases clogging
Judge Erum explained that the roulette was not used in in its respective dockets."
the assignment of Civil Case No. MC08-3660 because
only Branch 213 of the four regular Branches in Albeit admitting being a former employee of FGU
Mandaluyong City had not been assigned a TRO or Insurance Corporation, Judge Valenzuela clarified that
injunction case. She cited the existing practice whereby a FGU Insurance Corporation was not a party in Civil
Branch to which a TRO was already raffled would be Case No. MC08-3660. He assured that all the parties in
excluded from the next raffle, stating that the practice Civil Case No. MC08-3660 were given the opportunity
was adopted by consensus among the RTC Judges in to argue for or against the issuance of the TRO; that
Mandaluyong City for the purpose of equalizing the although he had granted a period of five days to
distribution of TRO/injunction cases among the several STRADCOM within which to file its
Branches of the station. She insisted that GSIS lodged own comment/opposition to Martizano's application for
the charges only because Judge Valenzuela denied its the TRO, he did not wait anymore for STRADCOM's
motion to inhibit and motion to dismiss filed in Civil written comment/opposition owing to the public interest
Case No. MC08-3660.[9] involved and the urgency of resolving the issues
concerning DO 2007-28. He said that the non-imposition
Judge Valenzuela submitted his own comment dated of a bond on Martizano was justified under Rule 58,
October 20, 2008, in which he maintained as follows: Section 4(b) of the Rules of Court; that he denied
the motion to dismiss because the requisites for the
grounds relied upon were not met; and that the supposed
3. xxx The raffle of all cases and those which includes anomaly attending the raffle proceedings was only the
application for TRO/Injunction is done on a "round product of GSIS's "polluted mind."[10]
system." The raffle of cases at present only involves the
four (4) RTC branches, i.e., RTC- Branch 208, RTC- On April 1, 2009, the OCA rendered a report, stating:
Branch 212, RTC-Branch 213, and RTC-Branch 214,
RTC-Branch 209 having been designated as a Family
Court, a special court, hence excluded from raffle of A careful study of the records of the case shows that
ordinary cases, civil and criminal, the same with RTC- respondent violated the procedure on the raffle of cases
Branch 210, presided by the Executive Judge, which is by automatically assigning a case to Branch 213 on the
likewise a special court since the same was designated as ground that the said procedure has been the practice of
Drug Court, and RTC- Branch 211 which at present has her predecessors.
no presiding judge, the raffle of cases only involves said
four regular courts. Even on the assumption, as respondent admitted, that the
procedure has been the practice prior to her assumption
During the said raffle of July 21, 2008, it was only this as Executive Judge, she should have borne in mind that
court which has not received its share of cases with practice is not the law. The law is very explicit on this as
application for TRO/Injunction for said "round" hence, expressed by Article 7 of the New Civil Code which
Civil Case No. MC-08-3660 was considered raffled and provides: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
automatically assigned to the court of the undersigned at and their violation or non-observance shall not be
RTC-Branch 213 to close the raffle of cases with excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the
application for TRO/Injunction for said "round." contrary" (Ceferino Inciong vs. Honorable Leticia S.
Mariano De Guia, A.M. No. R-249-RTJ, September 17,
xxxx 1987).
In short, Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled on July Circular No. 20, dated October 4, 1979, clearly provides
21, 2008 xxx, there is no need to spin the roulette, which that all cases filed with the court in stations or groupings
was used in the raffle of cases, since it was only the where there are two or more branches shall be assigned
court of the undersigned which has not received its share or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case
may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. advance so that they may be present therein if they so
Respondents could not go against Circular No. 20 of the desire.
Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule-making power
until it is repealed or otherwise modified.[11] The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive
method of assigning cases among several branches of a
The OCA recommended that: (a) both respondents be court in the same station is two fold: one, to equalize the
held guilty of violating the rules on the raffle of cases distribution of the cases among the several branches, and
contained in Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, thereby foster the Court's policy of promoting speedy
with stern warning that the commission of the same or and efficient disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the
similar acts in the future would be dealt with more impartial adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any
severely; (b) the charge against Judge Valenzuela for suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
issuing the questioned orders in Civil Case No. MC08- predetermined judges.[17]
3660 be dismissed for lack of merit; (c) the matter be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (d) each To achieve and implement this two-fold purpose, the
of the respondents be fined P5,000.00 for violating Supreme Court issued Circular No. 7 on September 23,
Circular No. 7.[12] 1974, which pertinently stated:
We grant the motions for reconsideration, and reconsider Notice of the day and hour of the raffle shall be posted
and set aside the resolution dated June 3, 2009. We prominently in the bulletin boards of the Courts and at a
absolve the respondents. conspicuous place at the main door of the session hall of
the Executive Judge. Other notices to the parties may be
sent as the interest of justice may require on request of
1. any party and with the prior approval of the Executive
Rules in Raffling of Cases Judge. There shall be no special raffle of any case except
on meritorious application in writing by any party to the
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made case and with the approval of the Executive Judge.
the raffle the exclusive method of assigning cases among
several branches of a court in a judicial station by III. MANNER OF RAFFLING
providing in Section 2 of Rule 20, as follows:
The raffle must be conducted at the lawyer's table in
open court by the Executive Judge personally with the
Section 2. Assignment of Cases. The assignment of cases attendance of two other Judges or, in case of the latter's
to the different branches of a court shall be done inability, of their duly authorized representatives. In
exclusively by raffle. The assignment shall be done in stations where there are only two salas the Judges of
open session of which adequate notice shall be given so both or either and the Clerk of Court or the Branch Clerk
as to afford interested parties the opportunity to be of Court should be present. In the absence of the
present. (7a,R22) Executive Judge, the Judge at the station who is the most
senior in point of appointment to the Judiciary shall
Previously, under the Revised Rules of Court (1964), the personally conduct the raffle. Under no circumstance
distribution of cases among different branches by raffle may any raffle be made in chambers. The raffle
was not exclusive, considering that Rule 22 then allowed proceedings should be stenographically recorded, and
other methods, to wit: minutes thereof shall be prepared by signed by the
Judges (or their representatives) and the Clerk of Court
in attendance. Immediately after the raffle on any
Section 7. Assignment of cases. In the assignment of particular branch to which the case is assigned, the same
cases to the different branches of a Court of First to be written in words and in figures on the cover of the
Instance or their transfer from one branch to another Rollo and on the first page of the original complaint or
whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their information and initialed by the Executive Judge and the
counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in other two officers who attended said raffle.
only sala left, then the litigant is assured that his or her
The raffle must be conducted in such manner that all the case will automatically be assigned to that judge."[18]
branches of the Court in that station or grouping
including vacant salas, shall receive more or less the We find the position of GSIS untenable. The urgent
same number of civil, criminal and other kinds of cases. nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt
action and immediate attention, thereby compelling the
For purposes of facilitating implementation of the filing of the case in the proper court without delay. To
foregoing rules, a Raffle Committee composed of the assume that a party desiring to file an injunction or TRO
Executive Judge and two other judges shall, as much as case will just stand idly by and mark time until his
practicable, be constituted. favored Branch is the only Branch left without an
assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously
IV. IN CASE OF URGENT OR INTERLOCUTORY speculative. Moreover, the "anomalous situation" is
MATTERS highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of having the
favored Branch remain the only Branch without an
Whenever an incidental or interlocutory matter in a case injunction or TRO case following the series of raffle.
is of such urgent nature that it may not wait for the
regular raffle, the interested party may request the The OCA has cited Hilario v. Ocampo III[19] and Fineza
Executive Judge in writing for a special raffle. If the v. Rivera[20] to support its adverse recommendation
request is granted and the special raffle is conducted, the against the respondents. However, said rulings were not
case shall immediately be referred to the branch to which on all fours with the situation of the respondents.
it corresponds. The Executive Judge shall have no In Hilario v. Ocampo III, the respondent was an
authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter executive judge who had assigned 13 related cases to the
in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle. branch to which the case having the lowest docket
number had been assigned, thereby causing the uneven
distribution of cases among the various branches of the
II. station. That was not true herein, because the
Respondents did not violate the respondents as members of the Raffle Committee had
purposes of the rule requiring raffle earlier conducted a series of raffle involving injunction
and TRO cases before assigning Civil Case No. MC08-
Circular No. 7, supra, stated that only the maximum 3660 to Branch 213 conformably with the standing
number of cases, according to their dates of filing, as practice designed to ensure the equalization of the
could be equally distributed to all the branches in the distribution of cases among the several Branches in the
particular station or grouping should be included in the Mandaluyong City station. In Fineza v. Rivera, the
raffle; and that cases in excess of the number sufficient respondent was an executive judge who had disregarded
for equal distributionshould be included in the next the procedure for the assignment of cases by relying
scheduled raffle. instead on sequencing, that is, if a case was raffled to
Branch 1, the next case was assigned to the next branch
Despite not strictly following the procedure under (Branch 2), and so on. In contrast, the respondents herein
Circular No. 7 in assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 assigned Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213
to Branch 213, the respondents as members of the Raffle without considering their preference or without
Committee could not be held to have violated the rule on exercising their unregulated choice of the Branch, but
the exclusivity of raffle because there were obviously entirely pursuant to their existing practice.
less TRO or injunction cases available at anytime for
raffling than the number of Branches of the RTC. Given Even if we now absolve the respondents from
the urgent nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of administrative liability on the basis of the foregoing, we
them had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity cannot hereafter sanction any practice that does not
must have led to the adoption of the practice of raffling conform to the raffle as the exclusive method of
such cases despite their number being less than the assigning cases among several Branches within the
number of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The judicial station. We reiterate that the raffle should always
practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in be the rule rather than the exception.
view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its
fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory Henceforth, adherence to the procedure for the raffle set
matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application) forth in Circular No. 7 is demanded of all Raffle
that might not wait for the regular raffle. Committees in multi-sala trial courts in order to achieve
the two-fold objectives earlier mentioned. Only the
Still, GSIS posits that assigning Civil Case No. MC08- exceptions expressly recognized under item IV of
3660 to Branch 213 without raffle could easily "create Circular No. 7 shall be permitted.
an anomalous situation," which it describes in the
following terms:
III.
Dismissal of charges for gross ignorance of the law,
They create an anomalous situation whereby all that a grave misconduct, and knowingly rendering
litigant with an injunction complaint in Mandaluyong unjust judgment was proper
has to do is to time the filing of his her case by waiting
until the favored judge is the only sala left without an The dismissal of the charges of gross ignorance of the
injunction case. Considering that there are only four law, grave misconduct, and knowingly rendering unjust
salas in Mandaluyong, a litigant may not have to wait judgment, as the OCA recommended, was justified
long until this happens. Once the favored judge is the because the charges were really devoid of merit.
In the absence of any showing that improper motives or
corruption had actuated the respondents, the respondents
should be presumed to have acted in utmost good faith in
assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 according to the
existing practice of raffling cases adopted by the Raffle
Committee. As such, they could not be held guilty of
either gross ignorance of the law or grave misconduct.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. [21] Grave
misconduct refers to a wrongful act inspired by
corruption or intention to violate the law.[22]
SO ORDERED.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the
L. ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO
authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman to issue
OF FH-GYMN MULTI-PURPOSE AND
TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, motorized tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its
AGAINST HON. JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR., HON. members.[4] During the ensuing scheduled public
RAMON M. BATO, JR. AND HON. FLORITO S. hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and
MACALINO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, COURT OF
Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC President
APPEALS
Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J employee of the Sanggunian), were alleged to have
January 31, 2012 uttered statements exhibiting their bias against FH-
GYMN, giving FH-GYMN reason to believe that the
Committee members were favoring the
RESOLUTION existing franchisees Francisco Homes Tricycle
We find the administrative complaint against Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth Division complied
respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals baseless and with the requirements of the constitutional
[14]
utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly provision, viz:
dismiss it.
The petition is without merit.
Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on Petitioner alleged that the
January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal Ombudsman erred in not finding
respondents liable for violation of the
foundation and did not even address the five issues Cooperative Code of the Philippines
presented in the petition for review; and that the considering that their actuations
constituted acts of direct or indirect
respondents as members of the CAs Sixth Division interference or intervention with the
thereby violated Section 14, Article VIII of the internal affairs of FH-GYMN and that
Constitution, which provides as follows: recommendation to deny FH-GYMNs
application was tantamount to any other
act inimical or adverse to its autonomy
Section 14. No decision shall be and independence.
rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly We disagree.
the facts and the law on which it is
based. It is well settled that in
administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving, does not signify giving of
by substantial evidence, the allegations undue favors to FRAHTODA
in his complaint. Section 27 of the or BMTODA, or causing of
Ombudsman Act is undue injury to FH-GYMN,
unequivocal. Findings of fact by the inasmuch as said
Office of the Ombudsman, when recommendation or decision,
supported by substantial evidence, are as the records vividly
conclusive. Conversely, when the show,was arrived at by the
findings of fact by the Ombudsman are said respondents in honest
not adequately supported by substantial exercise of their sound
evidence, they shall not be binding upon judgment based on their
the courts (Marcelo vs. Bungubung, 552 interpretation of the
SCRA 589). applicable ordinance
governing the operation of
In the present case, the Deputy tricycles within their area of
Ombudsman found no substantial jurisdiction. Evidence on
evidence to prove that there was record no doubt failed to
interference in the internal affairs of FH- sufficiently establish that, in
GYMN nor was there a violation of the so making the questioned
law by the respondents. As aptly ruled recommendation, respondents
by the Ombudsman: Baluyot, Concepcion and
Aguirre acted with manifest
While the utterances made partiality, evident bad faith or
by respondents Baluyot, gross inexcusable
Aguirre and Mendoza in the negligence. It is likewise
course of public hearings worthy to note that, contrary
earlier mentioned indeed to complainants insinuation,
demonstrate exaltation of the letter-request adverted to
FRAHTODA and BMTODA, was acted upon by
to the apparent disadvantage respondents Baluyot,
of FH-GYMN, the same does Concepcion and Aguirre
not imply or suggest within a reasonable time and,
interference in the internal as a matter of fact,
affairs of the latter complainant had been notified
considering that said remarks of the action taken by the
or comments were made former relative to his letter-
precisely in the lawful request or proposals.
exercise of the mandate of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Time and again, it has
the locality concerned through been held, no less than by the
the Committee on Supreme Court, that mere
Transporation and suspicions and speculations
Communication. It is worthy can never be the basis of
to emphasize that were it not conviction in a criminal
for the complainants letter- case. Guided by the same
request dated July 23, 2004, doctrinal rule, this Office is
the committee concerned not duty-bound to proceed
would not have conducted the with the indictment of the
aforementioned public public respondents as
hearings, thus, there would charged.Indeed well
have been no occasion for the entrenched is the rule that
subject unfavorable remarks (t)he purpose of a preliminary
to unleash. Thus, it would be investigation is to secure the
irrational to conclude that innocent against hasty,
simply because the questioned malicious and oppressive
utterances were unfavorable prosecution and to protect him
to FH-GYMN, the same from an open and public
constitutes interference or accusation of crime, from the
intervention in the internal trouble, expense and anxiety
affairs of the said cooperative. of a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless
In the same vein, while and expensive trials (Joint
respondents Baluyot, Resolution, October 17, 2005,
Concepcion and Aguirre Rollo pp. 142-143).
rendered an adverse
recommendation as against Moreover, petitioners failed to
complaints letter-request rebut the presumption of regularity in
earlier mentioned, the same the performance of the official duties of
respondents by affirmative evidence of against respondent Justices, that his administrative
irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption prevails and complaint must rest on the quality of the evidence; and
becomes conclusive until it is overcome that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and
by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Every speculations would not suffice to hold them
reasonable intendment will be made in administratively liable for rendering the adverse
support of the presumption and in case
decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for
of doubt as to an officers act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this
be in favor of its lawfulness (Bustillo vs. administrative complaint against them despite conceding
People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
160718, May 12, 2010). in the administrative complaint itself his having no proof
of his charges, viz:
There being no substantial
evidence to reverse the findings of the
Ombudsman, the instant petition is 21. The petition to review in
denied. determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation had reached
WHEREFORE, premises this far and may reach the Supreme
considered the Petition for Review Court due to corrupt practices and
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Joint culpable violation of the 1987
Resolution dated October 17, 2005 and Constitution committed by Ombudsman
Joint Order dated April 25, 2006 of the officials and the herein respondents of
Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon the Court of Appeals. A Motion for
are AFFIRMED. Reconsideration was submitted with
prayer for the respondents to inhibit
SO ORDERED. themselves to act on it. Otherwise, it
will add to congest the court docket
which this Honorable Court should
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CAs intercede to look deeper into this
matter by exercising its disciplinary
Sixth Division that the Deputy Ombudsman found no functions over herein
substantial evidence to prove that there was interference respondents. The arbitrary denial of the
Petition for Review rendered by the
in the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a
herein respondents is meant that there is
violation of the law by the respondents[15] met the no sufficient ground out of the five (5)
constitutional demand for a clear and distinct statement issues raised to engender a well-founded
belief that no single offense has been
of the facts and the law on which the decision was committed.[18]
based. The CAs Sixth Division did not have to point out xxx
24. Though there was no clear
and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition evidence to link Ombudsman officials,
considering that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman they may have persuaded, induced or
sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the influenced the herein respondents,
who are either their schoolmates or
denial of the petition. associates, to deny the Petition for
Moreover, the CAs Sixth Division expressly found that Review in their bid to establish
innocence on the related offense charged
FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as the against them on 18 August 2010 before
petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial the Office of the President docketed as
OP-DC Case No. 11-C-006. Likewise,
evidence.[16] In administrative cases involving judicial
they may have manipulated the delivery
officers, the complainants always carried on their of a copy of Decision intended for the
shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their petitioner in order for the latter to fail in
submitting a motion for reconsideration
allegations through substantial evidence. That standard purposely to make the Decision final
of substantial evidence is satisfied only when there is and executory by which the said
Ombudsman officials could use such
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is Decision to attain impunity on
responsible for the misconduct complained of although complaint against them filed with the
Office of the President.[19] (emphasis
such evidence may not be overwhelming or even
supplied)
preponderant.[17]
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure
again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate
brought against any judge in relation to the performance the evidence presented does not necessarily incur
of his official functions are neither complementary to administrative liability,[23] for to hold him
nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling
[21]
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, will be
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust nothing short of harassment and will make his position
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be
and criminal actions. We explained why in In Re: rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try
[22]
Joaquin T. Borromeo: the facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his
Given the nature of the judicial function, [24]
the power vested by the Constitution in judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal
the Supreme Court and the lower courts liability should be visited on him only when the error is
established by law, the question submits
so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with
to only one answer: the administrative
or criminal remedies are neither evident bad faith,[25] or only in clear cases of violations
alternative or cumulative to judicial by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good
review where such review is available,
and must wait on the result thereof. behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or
fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. [26]
Simple reflection will make this
proposition amply clear, and What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos
demonstrate that any contrary proclivity to indiscriminately file complaints. His
postulation can have only intolerable proclivity reminds us now of Joaquin T. Borromeo
legal implications. Allowing a party
who feels aggrieved by a judicial order whom this Court pronounced guilty of indirect contempt
or decision not yet final and executory of court he repeatedly committed over time, despite
to mount an administrative, civil or
criminal prosecution for unjust warnings and instructions given to him.[27] The Court
judgment against the issuing judge imposed the penalty for contempt of court to the end that
would, at a minimum and as an
he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct
indispensable first step, confer the
prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an and learn due respect for the Courts and their
incongruous function pertaining, not to authority.[28]
him, but to the courts: the determination
of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or Having determined that the administrative
conclusions of law, or both. If he does
proceed despite that impediment, charge against respondent Justices had no factual and
whatever determination he makes could legal bases, we cannot hesitate to shield them by
well set off a proliferation of
immediately rejecting the charge. We do so because
administrative or criminal litigation, a
possibility hereafter more fully unfounded administrative charges do not contribute
explored. anything worthwhile to the orderly administration of
Such actions are impermissible and justice; instead, they retard it.
cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public
Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass
and go unchallenged. We recognize that unfounded
administrative charges against judges really degrade the
judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be
warranted to now direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act
of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent
Justices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court:
(a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S.
Macalino for its utter lack of merit; and
(b) ORDERSEngr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for interfering with
the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
AC NO. 7297, SEPT 29, 2009 of the property to herself through the fraudulent
IMELDA BIBES-ULASO v. ATTY. EDITA NOE- execution of the deed of sale.[3]
LACSAMANA
DECISION
The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-
called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature
BERSAMIN, J.: preceded by the word for above the printed name IRENE
BIDES. The signature bore a positive resemblance to the
The decisive question to be resolved in this respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of
administrative proceeding is whether or not the the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and shopping.[4] Seeing the defective execution of
affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the initiatory the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion to
own signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part dismiss on July 22, 2003,[5] citing the defect as a ground,
of the notary-counsel. along with another.
The respondent argues that this proceeding Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of
should be abated by virtue of its withdrawal by Ulaso the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the
pursuant to the compromise agreement concluded in the complaint diminished the Courts inherent power to
criminal case and approved by the trial court. discipline a member of the Bar whenever appropriate.
First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no
application to disbarment or suspension
The respondents argument is unwarranted. proceedings against members of the Bar.[19] Indeed,
such proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to
the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights
The agreement between Bides and Ulaso are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but
stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case against are rather investigations into the conduct of the members
the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the
of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the
administrative proceeding against the respondent as a Constitution to regulate the practice of law.[20] The
member of the Philippine Bar. We explained why proceedings, which the Court may even motu
in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,[18] viz: proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors.
The public interest is their primary objective, the true
question for determination being whether or not the
The affidavit of withdrawal of respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed
the disbarment case allegedly executed to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges
by complainant does not, in any way,
appurtenant to such memberships.[21]
exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed
the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum
B. Basis for Disciplinary Action shopping was intended to replace the original one
attached to the initiatory pleading of Bides. Thus, bad
faith did not motivate the respondent into notarizing the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
Ulaso insists that the respondents act of signing
shopping.
the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping for Bides as plaintiff-affiant violated the penal
law, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Lawyers
The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
nonetheless concur with the findings of Investigating
Notarial Law.
Commissioner Velez that the respondents notarizing
the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant
In contrast, the respondent maintains that her
constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and
signature was made not to fool the trial court, but only to
was highly censurable.[22]
illustrate to her new secretary how and where Bides
should sign the form; and that the amended verification
and affidavit of non-forum shopping, merely a sample-
The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in
draft, was wrongly attached.
which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to
before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential.
Considering that notarization is not an empty,
Investigating Commissioner Velez found that
meaningless, routinary act,[23] the faithful observance
the respondent had deliberately and with malice led the
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in
trial court to believe that her signature in
the juratare sacrosanct.[24]
the amendedverification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping had been that of Bides.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC 2008 resolution in the letter dated July 17, 2008 (Re:
Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability
[ A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 09, 2013 ] Retirement Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave
Credits) he had sent to Chief Justice Reynato S.
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A. Puno.[7] He remarked that the Court had actually granted
CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED his request for the payment of his disability retirement
FOR DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING benefits subject to the retention of P200,000.00 pending
MOTIONS IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
resolution of the pending administrative cases against
BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
him.[8]
RESOLUTION
In his July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge
BERSAMIN, J.: Carbonell surmised that the Audit Team might have
This administrative case originates from the judicial overlooked the fact that he had inherited some of the
audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator undecided cases from the predecessor judge; that
(OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial said cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes,
Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of because of which he was impelled to require the parties
the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. to submit their respective memoranda; that the cases
Carbonell on December 31, 2007. would only be considered submitted for decision after
the parties would have filed their respective memoranda;
According to the Audit Team's Report, Branch 27 had a and that he had undergone a quadruple heart bypass
total caseload of 231 cases, consisting of 147 criminal operation in 2005 that had adversely affected his pace in
cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to deciding the cases.
decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil
cases (four inherited), namely: Criminal Case Nos. On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge
1183, 4559, 5117, 3532, 3672, 5165, 5007, 5946, 6934, Carbonell's letter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
5763, 7014, 5991, 4724, 6311, 6076, 4789, 6297, 5424, recommendation.[9]
4928, 6403, 6816, 5635, 5666, 5134, 5865, 6284, 6454,
5394, 6770, 5375, 5356, 7557, 5940, 6311, 6333, 7729, In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011,[10] the OCA
7111, 6325, 6068, 6517, and 7766; and Civil Case Nos. reiterated its recommendation to impose a fine of
3009, 4564, 4563, 4714, 3647, 4362, 6041, 4798, 4561, P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting that he had failed
6989, 2882, 6185, 7153, 7163, LRC 2332, SCA 7198, to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the
7310, 3487, 7327, 7331, 7298, and 7323.[1] cases submitted for decision and in resolving the
pending motions or incidents in other cases. The OCA
Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to noted that only five cases submitted for decision had
resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal been inherited; and that the case records did not bear any
cases and 12 civil cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. requests for extension of time or any directive for the
7559, 6409, 7787, and 7788; and Civil Case Nos. 4793, transcription of stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy
LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC 1797, caseload would not justify the failure to promptly decide
7100, 7152, 7060, SP 2986, and SP 2987. [2] and resolve cases because he could have simply asked
the Court for an extension of time.
In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA
recommended to the Court that a fine of P50,000.00 be The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject
imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for to the modification of the penalty to be imposed.
failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve
pending motions and incidents.[3] As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge
should at all times act with efficiency and probity. He is
On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to
to furnish Judge Carbonell with a copy of the Audit maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
Team's Report, and ordered him to submit his comment excellence ought always to be his guiding principle.
on the report within ten days from notice. [4] Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the
trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him
Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell and the institution he represents.[11]
despite the lapse of the time given, the Court resolved on
September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in disposition or resolution of cases.[12] Delay in the
contempt.[5] disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as
Judge Carbonell replied,[6] stating that he had judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without
incorporated his comment/compliance to the June 17, undue delay.[13] Thus, judges have been constantly
reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or
disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is
by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall
months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
memorandum for lower courts.[14] To further impress period for deciding the case unless the case was
upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued previously heard by another judge not the deciding
guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated judge in which case the latter shall have the full
January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to transcripts within which to decide the same.
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution. The court may grant extension of time to file
(4)memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of deciding shall not be interrupted thereby.
our judges and understanding of circumstances that may
hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell's failure to decide
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a several cases within the reglementary period, without
judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross
of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
invariably granted such request. sanctions,[15]like fines. The fines imposed have varied in
each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and decided within the reglementary period and other
to resolve 16 pending motions or incidents within the 90- factors, including the presence of aggravating or
day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the
health affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had such parties from the delay, the health condition and age of
been the case, then he should have explained his the judge, etc.[16] Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated
predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from
time to decide the cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and
so. imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to
decide 31 cases.[17]
Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited cases
had no transcripts of stenographic notes, thereby Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to
preventing him from resolving the cases on time. He disability, the Court believes that his poor health
posits that a case would not be considered submitted for condition greatly contributed to his inability to
decision if the parties did not yet file their respective efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That
memoranda. mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason
the Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine
The Audit Team's Report shows that, in an apparent from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.
attempt to suspend the running of the 90-day period to
decide the cases, Judge Carbonell liberally gave the WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell
parties in most of the overdue cases several extensions of is ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 to be
time to file their respective memoranda. Some deducted from the P200,000.00 that was withheld from
extensions were even for indefinite periods, with the his retirement benefits, and the balance to be
parties being simply given "ample time to file their immediately released to him.
memo," as the relevant court orders stated.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell's excuses are
futile in the light of the following provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, viz:
Antecedents
Misconduct is a transgression of
II. Making False Entries in the DTR
some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal
from the service, the misconduct must Justice Atienza found that Ong had made false entries in
be grave, serious, important, weighty, her DTRs by indicating therein that she had been at work
momentous and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful although she had been elsewhere. We sustain the finding
intention and not a mere error of of Justice Atienza and pronounce Ong administratively
judgment. The misconduct must also
have a direct relation to and be liable for committing irregularities in the keeping of her
connected with the performance of his DTRs.[20] Her false entries in the DTRs constituted
official duties amounting either to
dishonesty,[21] an act that Section 52, Rule IV, Uniform
maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect or failure to Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
discharge the duties of the office. classifies as a grave offense for which the penalty of
There must also be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts dismissal from the service even for the first commission
complained of were corrupt or is imposable.
inspired by an intention to violate the
law.
Again, the Court opts not to wield the axe of
outright dismissal, a penalty that may be too extreme. As
earlier observed, there is no record of Ong having been
previously charged with and penalized for any
administrative offense. Section 53, Rule IV of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Servicegrants the disciplining authority the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of the proper penalty.[22] The Court thus
imposes upon her the penalty of suspension of one year
without pay, with warning that a repetition of the offense
will surely be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO OLAGUER v. JUDGE ALFREDO designated as a Special Court for Tax Cases, Election
AMPUAN
Court, and Small Claims Court.
AM NO. MTJ-10-1769, OCT 6, 2010
No. 27653 until only on June 2, 2009, which was way directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the
beyond the three-month reglementary period.[2] complainant had manifested that the defendants had not
In his comment,[3] respondent Judge explained that he filed their memorandum. Yet, he did not, but instead
had inherited Civil Case No. 27653 from two took more than seven months before issuing such order
predecessors, and that he had started handling it only on March 15, 2009.
taken the TSNs had transferred to another court, causing or designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not
a delay in the submission of the TSNs; and that the make him less liable for the delay.[5] Verily, a judge
charges against him were unfair, stressing that he cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for
conducted daily hearings because his sala was deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Had his
additional court assignments or designations unduly
prevented him from deciding Civil Case No. 27653,
respondent Judge could have easily sought additional
time by requesting an extension from the Court, through
the OCAd, but he did not avail himself of this remedy.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his
failure to decide within the required period
constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative
sanction.[6]
SO ORDERED.
LOURDES FERRER & PROSPERIDAD aforesaid Judgment. The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule
ARANDEZ v. JUDGE ROMEO RABACA
70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.[2]
AM NO. MTJ-05-1580, OCT 6, 2010
On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the
a motion for immediate execution,praying that a writ of administrative complaint against him.
execution be issued for the immediate execution of the
In his comment dated September 16, judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he
2004,[5] respondent Judge denied the charges. He had grossly neglected his duties mandated by law by
explained that he had honestly thought that his court had failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate
lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving
of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court(which due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond
provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court having been filed and approved by the trial court.
loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,[7] then
appeal of the other parties) once he had given due course Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now
to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the
had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-
after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that
applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00
thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
his doing so should be considered as error of judgment would be dealt with more severely, based on an
on his part. evaluation of the charges, as follows:
He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the EVALUATION: We agree with the
complainants that respondent erred
parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and had absolutely when he did not act on complainants
no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the motion for immediate execution.
defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised
to show that the orders had been issued for a Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance
SEC. 19. If judgment is
of the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith. rendered against the
defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,[6] the motion, unless an appeal has
complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution
his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on files a supersedeas bond,
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred approved by the Municipal
Trial Court and executed in
to appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40,
favor of the plaintiff to pay
which contained provisions on appeal from the the rents, damages, and costs
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from,
which provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the and unless, during the
appeal and the effect of such perfection should be pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate
governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, court the amount of rent due
concerned appeals by notice of appeal in general; and from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined
that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19,
by the judgment of the
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Municipal Trial Court.
XXXXXXXX XXXX.
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge It is clear from the foregoing that the
apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and perfection of an appeal by itself is not
sufficient to stay the execution of the
detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a judgment in an ejectment case. The
notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a losing party should likewise file a
notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond supersedeas bond executed in favor of
the plaintiff to answer for rents,
approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to damages and costs, and, if the judgment
pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the of the court requires it, he should
likewise deposit the amount of the rent
time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that before the appellate court from the time
respondent Judges invocation of good faith and error of during the pendency of the
appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina,
ministerial and imperative.(Philippine MeTJ wherein the Court said that-
Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela,
104 SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Respondent Judge is
Construction and Development correct in saying that she had
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 lost jurisdiction to entertain
SCRA 612, 626). the motion for execution after
the perfection of the appeal
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably and after she issued an order
filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July to transmit the records of the
2004on 13 July 2004; he however failed case to the appellate court for
to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to review.
the filing of such notice of appeal, more
specifically on 12 July 2004, The facts of the case against Judge
complainants have already filed their Bunyi-Medina are however different
Motion for Execution dated 8 July from those prevailing in the instant
2004. Instead of acting on the Motion case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15)
for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca day period within which to perfect the
gave due course to the appeal in an appeal had already lapsed before the
Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed complainant therein moved for the
his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the execution of the execution
records of the case to the Regional Trial judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had
Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of already been perfected. In the instant
Court however failed to forward the case, although the defendant had filed
records to the RTC. This fact is clear his appeal, the period to appeal had not
from Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had his
2004 wherein he directed the Branch own period to appeal from the judgment
Clerk of Court to forward the records of and such period had not yet lapsed. The
the case to the Manila Regional Trial provision relied upon by judge Rabaca,
Court immediately. more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, clearly states that, In
From the foregoing, it is clear that when appeals by notice of appeal, the court
the complainant moved for the loses jurisdiction over the case upon
immediate execution of Judge Rabacas perfection of the appeals filed on due
decision, the latter still had jurisdiction time and the expiration of the time to
over the case. He therefore clearly erred appeal of the other parties. Moreover
when he refused to act on the Motion for and more importantly, the herein
Execution. The relevant question that complainants filed their Motion for
we should resolve however is whether Execution even before the defendant had
such error is an error of judgment or an filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion
error amounting to incompetence that was therefore still well within the
calls for administrative discipline. jurisdiction of the lower court.
In appeals by notice of We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court
appeal, the court loses Administrator.
jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the
expiration of the time to
plaintiffs motion for immediate execution considering
appeal of the other parties.
that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas
He likewise allegedly relied on the bond despite having appealed. Granting the
ruling of the Court in Administrative
Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: plaintiffs motion for immediate executionbecame his
Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the
sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested
the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz: with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to
Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many
Section 19. Immediate execution such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the
of judgment; how to stay same. If
judgment is rendered against the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of
defendant, execution shall issue immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the
immediately upon motion, unless an
appeal has been perfected and the abject inanity of his excuses.
defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore,
by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19 was
pay the rents, damages, and costs inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the
accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the
during the pendency of the appeal, he plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any
deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for
under the contract, if any, as immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he
determined by the judgment of the
could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence
of a contract, he shall deposit with the resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the
Regional Trial Court the reasonable repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his
value of the use and occupation of the
premises for the preceding month or judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not
period at the rate determined by the know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly
judgment of the lower court on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed
transmitted by the Municipal Trial
to render him administratively accountable.
Court, with the other papers, to the clerk
of the Regional Trial Court to which the
action is appealed. This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of
xxx
the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate
under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction
writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in
over the case by virtue of the defendants appeal, was
actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the
unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the
defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special
appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable
civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying
action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution.
the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to
The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the
prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their
mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the
rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the
appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning
time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly
with more severely is also correct. The Court
justify his omission to act according to the provision by
Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the
claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack
penalty thuswise:
of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as
Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure is classified as serious offense
us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack
for which the imposable penalty ranges
of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there from a fine to dismissal. However, we
is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or find respondents acts not ingrained with
malice or bad faith. It is a matter of
applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so public policy that in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous.
In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the
penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousand pesos was deemed sufficient
where it was held that respondents lack
of malice or bad faith frees him from
administrative liability but not for gross
ignorance of the law.
Denying any intention not to decide the cases or to delay Thus, on June 20, 2005, the Court directed the
the submission of the reports, Judge Herrera cited his re-docketing of the case as a regular administrative
heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, health reasons, matter.[9]
and the physical impossibility of complying with the
requirements in his explanation. He mentioned that his In another letter dated June 8, 2009,[10] Judge
court had inherited about 1,000 cases, many of which Herrera prayed for the early resolution of the
included voluminous records and some of which administrative matter, and reminded that he had been
required the retaking of testimonies due to unavailability retired for already five years and was already entitled to
of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). He receive his monthly pension and other benefits as a
claimed that his regular Branch Clerk of Court had been retired RTC Judge. He cited his lack of income due to
appointed an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, leaving his not having engaged in the private practice of law
him to do his work without any assistance by a Branch since his retirement due to poor health requiring his
Clerk of Court; and that the stenographers had lacked continuous medication.
It appears that on September 21, 2005, through a
resolution issued in Administrative Matter No. 12086- Judge Herrera was guilty of undue delay in the
entitled Re: Application for OptionalRetirement under his early retirement, he had not decided 49 cases already
R.A. 910, as amended, of Judge Damaso A. Herrera, due for decision, which total did not include the four
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Binan, Laguna, the cases that Judge Herrera claimed to have by then decided
Court ordered the release of Judge Herreras retirement and the two that had supposedly become due for decision
benefits but withheld the amount of P40,000.00 subject already within the period of prohibition for him to act in
to the outcome of this administrative matter.[11] view of his application for early retirement.
After considering the circumstances of the Judge Herreras failure to decide his cases with dispatch
administrative matter concerning Judge Herrera, the constituted gross inefficiency and warranted the
[14]
Court adopts the recommendation of the OCAd imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. As
embodied in itsmemorandum dated April 21, 2005. the Court has pointed out in Re: Judicial Audit of the
RTC, Br. 14, Zamboanga City, Presided over by Hon.
Every judge should decide cases with us to allow reasonable extensions of the time for trial
dispatch and should be careful, judges to decide their cases. But we have to remind
punctual, and observant in the
Judge Herrera and other trial judges that no judge can
performance of his functions for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the choose to prolong, on his own, the period for deciding
faith and confidence of our people in the cases beyond the period authorized by the law. Without
judiciary, lowers its standards and
brings it into disrepute. Indeed, a judge an order of extension granted by the Court, a failure to
must display that interest in his office decide even a single case within the required period
which stops not at the minimum of the
days labor fixed by law, and which rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
[16]
ceases not at the expiration of official administrative sanction.
sessions, but which proceeds diligently
on holidays and by artificial light and
even into vacation periods. Only thus Judge Herrera should have sought additional
can he do his part in the great work of time by simply filing a request for extension if, to him,
speeding up the administration of justice
and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the rendering a decision or resolve a matter beyond the
estimation of the people. reglementary period became unavoidable. That he did
not so seek additional time reflected his indifference to
the prescription to decide within the time limits of the
law. Thus, we choose not to consider seriously his
excuses as exempting him from the due observance of
the time limits of the law or as exonerating him from
administrative liability. The excuses, assuming they
were true, could only be treated as mitigating
circumstances vis--vis the properly imposable
[17]
penalty. In this regard, the fact that the more than
1,000 inherited cases added to Judge Herreras workload
can be treated as a mitigating circumstance.
SO ORDERED.
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR A.
III ROHERMIA
J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly
GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and Prejudicial to the Interest
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN of the Service, and Falsification of
Public Documents
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases originating
DECISION from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the
region of origin, except only when the greater
convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or
BERSAMIN, J.:
other compelling considerations require
The Chairman, however, arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the
welcomes any question on the procedure hearing.
they are presently adopting.
Section 6. Judges shall maintain The charge of manifest partiality for issuing
order and decorum in all proceedings the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the
before the court and be patient,
accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As
dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and already mentioned, this Court upheld the
others with whom the judge deals in assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116
an official capacity.Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special
court staff and others subject to their Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have failed to
influence, direction or control.
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
We point out that publicizing professional warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
qualifications or boasting of having studied in and appellate jurisdiction.
At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will Section 10. Light Charges. Light
charges include:
be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust
judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge,
or some other similar motive.[32] 1. Vulgar and unbecoming
conduct;
Penalties
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of That respondent Justices responsibilities as
Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges members of a Division were different compels us to
and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows: differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Section 11. Sanctions. xxx
xxx xxx xxx Justice Ong
On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a guarantee that his Divisions proceedings came within the
light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot,
Antecedents
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I
continued to wrestle and struggle, and as I saw that we
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place
Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or where I was supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña made
suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone another move of pressing his finger against my private
Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint part;
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as
follows: 11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car's door
and told him categorically that I was getting off the car.
But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated
a bit more instead, but sensing my insistence to get off,
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off. He then
went to the Public Attorney's Office in Parañaque City, reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00
in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA a.m. for the continuation of hearing of my case;
about the status of my case for support for my two minor
children against my husband, which case is being 12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case,
handled by Atty. Pedreña; but this time, I brought with me my five-year-old child
to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty.
2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing, Pedreña then, so I just signed some documents; [1]
so I waited at his office until he arrived at about II :45
a.m. Atty. Pedreña told me to go ahead to Tita Babes
Restaurant so we could take our lunch together and to In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon's
talk about my said case; allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a
complaint would open the gates to those who had evil
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the
me many personal matters rather than to discuss my said complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the
case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already
my lawyer; charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque
City Prosecutor's Office; and that he had also filed a
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on complaint for theft against De Leon.[2]
February I, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according to him,
my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more Attached to Atty. Pedreña's answer were his counter-
time to study; affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness
and his complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter
5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De
then, he told me then to ride with him and he would just Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances
drop me by the jeepney station; on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him during
the ride that even made it hard for him to shift gears, and
6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently that the ride had lasted for only two to three
minutes.[3] He claimed that De Leon was allowing There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove
herself to be used by his detractors in the Public her case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory
Attorney's Office (PAO) after he had opposed the hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in
practice of certain PAO staff members of charging answering the questions propounded on her. Her account
indigent clients for every document that they prepared. of the incident that happened on 30 January 2006 was
In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint
another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to and Verified Position Paper.
De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the other
passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three On.the other hand, Respondent's defenses are not
minutes; and that the other passenger was Emma Crespo, credible enough to rebut the claims of Complainant. His
who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had defenses are replete with inconsistencies and his
witnessed De Leon's act of taking his (Pedreña) actuations in the entire proceedings show lack of
cellphone from the handbrake box of the car. [4] integrity in his dealings with both the Complainant and
this Commission.
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing. [5] Hence,
Atty. Pedreña was deemed to have waived his right to xxxx
participate in the proceedings.[6]
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the mere afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal
striking off of his name from the Roll of complaint hinged on a claim that there was another
Attorneys.[7] Holding that a disbarment case was sui person during that incident who allegedly saw
generis and could proceed independently of the criminal Complainant stealing Respondent's mobile phone. Yet,
case that was based on the same facts; and that the in Respondent's Position Paper and in his Counter-
proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was
for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña executed after the institution of the criminal complaint
was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a
Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña. had made third person being present during the incident. If the
sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule presence of this third person was crucial to prove his
1.01[8] and Rule 7.03[9] of the Code of Professional case against herein Complainant, there is no reason why
Responsibility. this allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper
and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September
19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and Furthermore, Respondent's contention that Complainant
approved with modification the report and is being used by his detractors is self-serving. His memo
recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a
and imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the relatively harmless query to a higher authority, which
practice of law for three months. [10] could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other
people to file cases against Respondent.[15]
Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the
IBP,[11] which adopted and approved Resolution No.
XX-2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion We adopt the findings and conclusions of the
and affirming with modification its Resolution No. Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP
XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to Board of Governors, for being substantiated by the
six months.[12] evidence on record.
On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the
transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and complainant's right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
the records of the case for final approval. [13] finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and
forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted finger against her private part. Given the circumstances
the IBP Board of Governors' notice ofResolution No. in which he committed them, his acts were not merely
XX-2012-43.[14] offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and
grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the
Ruling part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that
The report and recommendation of the Investigating immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
Commissioner stated thusly: constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community's sense of decency.[16] undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the
respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but
The possession of good moral character is both a reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to with clients.
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly In Barrientos v. Daarol,[21] the respondent lawyer was
duty bound to observe the highest degree of morality and disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not only
integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but
Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to also because of his deceit. He had been already married
expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage
or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer's public or private to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of
activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyer's suspension her, and made her pregnant. He not only suggested that
or disbarment.[17] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of she abort the pregnancy, but he also breached his
Court, provides that a member of the Bar may be promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her
disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or and their child.
violation of his oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we
have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[22] the Court adjudged the
to live up to the standards and norms of the Legal respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly
Profession by upholding the ideals and principles immoral for having taken advantage of his position as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in
enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to
Atty. Pedreña's misconduct was aggravated by the fact have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she
that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide would flunk in all her subjects should she refuse. The
free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact respondent was disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
that De Leon was then such a client. He also disregarded
his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant's sad
accountable at all times, because he thereby took experience, however, we consider the acts committed by
advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in Atty. Pedreña to be not of the same degree as the acts
desperate need of his legal assistance. punished under the cited judicial precedents. Neither did
his acts approximate the act committed by the
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller,[23] whereby we
consider the recommended penalty of suspension for six disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor's
months not commensurate with the gravity of the wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not proved
offensive acts committed. beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for
the crime. We further note that, unlike
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos
erring lawyer is within the Court's discretion. The Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of
exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor the respondent lawyer's position, Atty. Pedreña did not
despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or prejudice employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he
towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled desisted upon the first signs of the complainant's firm
by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity refusal to give in to his advances.
and independence of the Bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to In view of these considerations, the penalty of
his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the suspension from the practice of law for two years is
general public.[18] fitting and just.
In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY.
Atty. Pedreña, therefore, we take into consideration TYRONE PEDRENAfrom the practice of law for two
judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on years effective upon receipt of this decision, with
sexual matters. Although most of the judicial precedents a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
or cohabited with women other than their wives, [19] they
are nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
immorality committed by the respondent. the Bar Confidant, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator
In Advincula v. Macabata,[20] the Court held that the for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
errant lawyer's acts of turning his client's head towards
him and then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but SO ORDERED.
still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
Associate Justices of the CA, and for interfering with the
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT due performance of their work for the Judiciary. [6]
OF AMA LAND INC. AGAINST ASSOC JUSTICES
HON. DANTON BUESER, HON. SESINANDO The aforenamed members of the AMALI Board, with
VILLON & HON. RICARDO ROSARIO the exception of Atty. Acsay who had meanwhile passed
OCA IPI N 12-204-CA-J away on March 29, 2014,[7] uniformly manifested that
MARCH 11, 2014 only Atty. Acsay, Hibo and Dominguez had taken part in
the meeting of the Board of Directors at which the
BERSAMIN, J.: resolution to file the present complaint had been
adopted; that it was Atty. Acsay who had moved for the
In the resolution promulgated on July 15, 2014,[1] the approval of the resolution; and that they had caused the
Court: (a) declared Joseph B. Usita guilty of two counts filing of the administrative complaint in their belief that
of indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 they were thereby raising a valid legal issue, without any
of the Rules of Court, but deferred the determination and intention of offending or disrespecting respondent
imposition of the penalties against him; (b) ordered Usita Associate Justices of the CA.[8] It was further manifested
to disclose the names of all the members of the Board of that Colambo and Buenviaje had been absent from the
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI) who had meeting when the resolution to file the complaint had
authorized him to bring the two administrative charges been tackled.[9]
against respondent Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA); and (c) required Usita and a certain Garry
de Vera to shed light on the true interest or participation Ruling of the Court
of the so-called JC-AT-JC Law Offices whose office
address de Vera had stated as his in the affidavit of We first deal with the penalties to be meted on Usita.
service he had executed for purposes of this case.
Usita's assertion that he did not disobey and defy the
Consequently, Usita submitted his compliance dated decision promulgated on March 11, 2014 is hollow in
August 11, 2014,[2]wherein he again apologized for his light of the solid and firm findings of the Court about
actions, but appealed for the understanding and AMALI having been prone to bring charges against
forgiveness of the Court. He denied having disobeyed judicial officers who had ruled against it in its cases. On
the decision of March 11, 2014, and pointed out that the the contrary, such assertion constitutes his continuing
other complaint against respondent Associate Justices of refusal to own his contumacious part in the filing of
the CA dated October 2, 2012 (OCA-IPI No. 12-202- frivolous administrative charges against respondent
CA-J entitled Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of Associate Justices of the CA. His tendered withdrawal of
AMA Land, Inc. Represented by Joseph B. Usita v. Hon. the complaint in OCA-IPI No. 12-202-CA-J is even
Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinado E. Villon and Hon. irrelevant now considering that we dismissed his charges
Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of therein last January 15, 2013 due to their patent lack of
Appeals) had been filed earlier than the present merit. Verily, his filing of two unfounded identical
complaint; that he had filed the present complaint administrative complaints against respondent Associate
against respondent Associate Justices of the CA "in good Justices of the CA displayed his utter lack of respect for
faith and merely to petition this Honorable Court for their judicial office. His plea for understanding and
redress of what he believed to be a judicial forgiveness should be ignored for being actually
wrong;"[3] and that he was anyway withdrawing the insincere and frivolous.
complaint in OCA-IPI No. 12-202-CA-J as a
manifestation of his "good faith and sincere remorse for Nonetheless, we have frequently reminded that the
his inaction (sic)."[4] power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly,
with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and in
Regarding the participation of the so-called JC-AT-JC due regard to the provisions of the law and the
Law Office, Usita explained that de Vera was an constitutional rights of the individual.[10] This approach
employee of AMALI rendering messengerial services to impels us now to hold Usita responsible for only one
the JC-AT-JC Law Office, one of the retained counsels count of indirect contempt by considering his forthright
of AMALI; and that the JC-AT-JC Law Office did not compliance with our directive for him to identify the
have any involvement in the filing of the administrative members of AMALI's Board of Directors who had
complaints. caused him to bring the unfounded charges as a
mitigating circumstance.
De Vera submitted a salaysay ng
pagpapaliwanag,[5] which contained explanations similar Anent the liability of the abovenamed members of
to those made by Usita. AMALI's Board of Directors, the general rule is that a
corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable
Finally, Usita disclosed by name the members of the for contempt of court for disobeying judgments, decrees,
AMALI Board of Directors who had authorized him to or orders of a court issued in a case within its
file the present complaint, as follows: (a) Atty. Vicente jurisdiction,[11] or for committing any improper conduct
Acsay; (b) Felizardo R. Colambo; (c), Arnel F. Hibo; (d) tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
Darwin V. Dominguez; and (e) Alberto L. Buenviaje. degrade the administration of justice.[12] So it must be
herein.
On September 30, 2014, the Court directed the
abovenamed officers of AMALI to show cause in The abovenamed members of the AMALI Board of
writing why they should not be held liable for indirect Directors specifically claimed that they had brought the
contempt for degrading the judicial office of respondent complaints against respondent Associate Justices of the
CA in their belief in good faith that they were thereby imprisonment, will suffice, provided the amount thereof
raising a valid legal issue. Their claim is preposterous, is not petty or trivial. The need to deter litigants and
however, because the complaints were identical, and those acting upon their bidding from ever trying to
palpably designed to intimidate or influence respondent intimidate or influence sitting judges in the performance
Associate Justices of the CA in respect of AMALI's case of their sworn duties should be recognized. This instance
in their Division. The abovenamed members of the is a good occasion to do so.
AMALI Board of Directors could not allowed to hide
behind the shield of good faith because their charges We have judicial precedents to serve as guides in
were from the beginning bereft of factual and legal determining the proper amount of fine. In Ang Bagong
merit. In this regard, we observed in our decision of Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
March 11, 2014, as follows: Elections,[14] the Court meted on the COMELEC
Chairman and four COMELEC Commissioners a fine of
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by P20,000.00 each for various actions, including issuing
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright three resolutions that were outside of the jurisdiction of
disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. the COMELEC, for degrading the dignity of the Court,
Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly for brazen disobedience to the lawful directives of the
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due Court, and for delaying the ultimate resolution of the
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although many incidents of the party-list case to the prejudice of
the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first the litigants and of the country. It is notable that the
administrative case AMALI or its representative Court prescribed a fine of P5,000.00 each on the two
personally responsible for the unfounded charges remaining Commissioners whose actions were deemed
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, less serious in degree. In Heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda.
proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the de Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[15] we imposed a fine of
dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the P10,000.00 on the corporate officer who had caused the
CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI preparation and filing of the unwarranted complaint for
and its representatives have thereby demonstrated reconveyance, damages and quieting of title in the trial
their penchant for harassment of the judges who did court, an act that tended to impede the orderly
not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing administration of justice. In Lee v. Regional Trial Court
so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate of Quezon City, Branch 85,[16] the corporate officers who
the actuations of AMALI and its representatives had acted for the corporation to frustrate the execution of
would be to reward them with undeserved impunity the immutable judgment rendered against the
for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court corporation by a resort to various moves merited the
and its judicial officers.[13] maximum fine of P30,000.00 for each of them. Based on
Moreover, there is no doubt that the abovenamed these precedents, the amount of the fine is fixed at
members of the AMALI Board of Directors, led by the P20,000.00 each for Usita, Dominguez and Hibo by
late Atty. Acsay, were well aware, or, at least, ought to virtue of their direct participation in the filing of the
have known that no judicial officer could be legitimately frivolous and contumacious complaints.
held administratively accountable for the performance of
his duties as a judicial officer for the reason that such Considering that Colambo and Bucnviaje did not take
performance was a matter of discharging a public duty part in the meeting of the Board of Directors of AMALI,
and responsibility. they are absolved of liability for indirect contempt of
court. Likewise, Garry de Vera is absolved of any
The abovenamed members of AMALI's Board of liability because he was a mere messenger of AMALI.
Directors are hereby found and pronounced guilty of
indirect contempt of court for thereby causing the WHEREFORE, the Court:
bringing of the unfounded and unwarranted
administrative charges against respondent Associate ABSOLVES and PURGES Felizardo R. Colambo,
Justices of the CA in order to intimidate or harass them, (1)Alberto L. Buenviaje and Garry de Vera of any act of
thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing or contempt of court:
degrading the administration of justice. DECLARES and PRONOUNCES Joseph B. Usita,
Darwin V. Dominguez and Arnel F.
Any sanction, to be proper, should be commensurate to Hibo GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for
the contumacious conduct of Usita and the abovenamed degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
members of AMALI's Board of Directors. The sanction Justices of the Court of Appeals, and for obstructing
(2)
should be meaningful and condign; otherwise, it would and impeding the due performance of their work for
be mocked and derided, rendering it inutile for the the Judiciary, and, ACCORDINGLY, metes on each
purpose. It must also be within the bounds of Rule 71 of of Usita, Dominguez and Hibo a fine of P20,000.00,
the Rules of Court, whose Section 7 relevantly provides: the same to be paid within 10 days from notice of this
resolution.
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the AMA Land, Inc., Joseph B. Usita, Darwin V.
respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt Dominguez and Arnel F. Hibo are WARNED that a
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine more severely in the future.
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x SO ORDERED.
Although the conduct we hereby seek to punish tended
to obstruct and degrade the administration of justice by
respondent Associate Justices of the CA, fine, instead of
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. in a Clandestine Laboratory, Large Quantity of
JUDGE EDWIN LARIDA JR Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as
AM NO RTJ-08-2151, MARCH 11 2014 Shabu) despite their positive identification as the
perpetrators of the crime;
BERSAMIN, J.:
6. granting a motion to quash the information in
A mysterious early Sunday morning fire in the records Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a case record
room of a courthouse set off a series of red flags pointing and without requiring a comment from the prosecutor;
to anomalous acts allegedly committed by its and
inhabitants. It led to the resignation of a clerk of court
after he had formally denounced the Presiding Judge for 7. granting a petition for the issuance of owner's
committing various anomalies and irregularities that are duplicate copies of various titles in LRC case No. TG-
now the subjects of this administrative case against the 06-1183 under questionable circumstances.[3]
Presiding Judge.
Upon recommendation of the OCA, and on the basis of
the investigation report, the Court resolved on November
Antecedents 18, 2008 to:
At around 7:50 a.m. on October 12, 2008, a Sunday, a
fire occurred at the records room of Branch 18 of the a) x x x
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City. The fire,
although declared under control by 8:10 a.m., was b) DIRECT Judge Larida to cease and desist from
extinguished only ten minutes later. Recovered from the hearing and deciding cases at RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
records room were a 1.5 liter plastic bottle containing City;
gasoline, a container of glue, and a candle. [1] Atty.
Stanlee D.C. Calma, the Branch Clerk of Court of c) DESIGNATE Judge Larida as Assting Judge of RTC,
Branch 18, immediately reported the fire as a clear case Branch 74, Malabon City to decide inherited cases
of arson to the Office of the Court Administrator submitted for decision and already beyond the
(OCA).[2] On October 13, 2008, then Court reglementary period to decide in the aforesaid court;
Administrator Jose Portugal Perez, now a Member of the
Court, formed and dispatched an investigative team d) DIRECT Messrs. Jayson A. Marticio and Larry G.
consisting of lawyers from the OCA to conduct an Laggui to report back to the City Government of
investigation upon the instructions of Chief Justice Tagaytay, effective immediately;
Reynato S. Puno. The investigative team started
interviewing the personnel of Branch 18, including Atty. e) PROHIBIT Messrs. Marticio, Laggui and Napoleon
Calma, in the afternoon of October 13, 2008, and their Cabanizas, Jr., from entering the premises of RTC,
declarations aided the review starting on October 14, Branch 18, Tagaytay City;
2008 of the records of the cases decided and pending in
Branch 18. x x x x
In the course of its investigation, the investigative team i) REVOKE the designation of Judge Emma S. Young,
uncovered anomalies supposedly committed by RTC, Branch 36, Manila, as Assisting Judge of RTC,
Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida), Branch 18, Tagaytay City, pursuant to Administrative
namely: Order No. 132-2008 dated September 15, 2008, and
instead, DESIGNATE Judge Young as Acting Presiding
Judge thereat effective immediately and to continue until
1. violation of Administrative Circular No. 28-2008, in further orders from the Court. x x x
authorizing the detail of locally-funded employees to his
court without obtaining permission from the Supreme The Court further Resolved to REFER the instant
Court, and in allowing them to take custody of court administrative complaint against Judge Larida to (a) the
records and to draft court orders and decisions for him; Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE
among the justices thereat within five (5) days from
2. knowingly allowing detailed employees Jason notice hereof and (b) the Court of Appeals Justice to
Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon Cabanizas to whom the complaint will be raffled for
demand commissions from bonding companies in INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND
exchange for the issuance of release orders; RECOMMENDATION thereon within sixty (60) days
from the date of the raffle.[4]
3. extorting money from detained accused Raymund
Wang, with the help of Jason Marticio and Larry Laggui; In the meantime, Jayson A. Marticio, a locally-funded
employee formerly detailed in Branch 18, and who was
4. defying the directive of the Supreme Court in among those barred by the Court from entering the
Administrative Order No. 132-2008, dated 15 September RTC's premises in the aftermath of the arson incident,
2008, to stop from trying and hearing cases and to presented a letter-complaint dated October 20,
instead, decide cases already submitted for decision; 2008[5] whereby he denounced the following anomalies
and irregularities committed by the RTC staff of Branch
5. releasing the accused on bail in Criminal Case No. 18, to wit:
TG-4382-03 for Violation of Section 8, Article II, RA
9165 (Manufacturing or Engaging in the Manufacture of,
1. That the court staff are practicing the "duty that a commission of a similar act will be dealt with
system" wherein a court employee will be more severely;
assigned to report early in order to punch in their
daily time cards; 3. for immediately granting Jayson Espiritu's motion to
quash in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without giving
2. That a certain "Rommel" and other court the prosecution a chance to comment thereon or file an
employees were asking commissions from opposition thereto, it is recommended that respondent
bondsmen, specifically, the Monarch Insurance Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. be STERNLY WARNED
Company which he avers has connections with that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more
the Office of the Clerk of Court; severe penalty.
3. That Clerk of Court Stanlee Calma and Legal There being no substantial evidence to support the
Researcher Diana Ruiz are soliciting monetary charges of
considerations from litigants in exchange for fast
and favorable decisions; a) extorting money from detained accused Raymund
Wang;
4. That Clerk of Court Calma received a huge b) defying the directive of Supreme Court in
amount of money and a Pajero from a certain Administrative Order No. 132-2008;
"Norma" in exchange for a favorable decision in c) improperly granting bail in Criminal Case No. TG-
an election protest; and 4382-03;
d) receiving a bribe in exchange for granting Jayson
5. That there are court employees who seek his Espiritu's motion to quash the information in Criminal
assistance in drafting decisions/orders and use Case No. TG-5307-06;
the same to ask for considerations from e) granting a petition for the issuance of owner's
litigants.[6] duplicate copies of various titles in LRC Case No. TG-
06-1183 under questionable circumstances; and
f) involvement in the fire that razed RTC, Branch 18,
Marticio's letter-complaint was consolidated with A.M. Tagaytay City;
RTJ-08-2151, the case involving Judge Larida.[7] The
consolidated cases were assigned to Associate Justice it is recommended that the foregoing charges be
Ricardo R. Rosario of the Court of Appeals (CA) for DISMISSED and respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.,
investigation, report and recommendation. be ABSOLVED of liability for the same.[12]
After receiving the information, Atty. Calma supposedly In Administrative Order No. 132-2008, promulgated on
informed respondent Judge that certain people might be September 15, 2008, the Court directed Judge Larida: (1)
using his name but the latter only said that the problem is to cease and desist from trying cases; (2) to concentrate
that people are accusing others but are afraid to show up. on deciding the cases submitted for decision, whether
before him or before his predecessors; and (3) to give
Thereafter, Atty. Calma did his own investigation and priority to cases submitted for decision for more than
found out that the cellphone number calling Necita five years already. The administrative order designated
Ramos belonged to Jayson Marticio. Armed with this Judge Emma S. Young as the Assisting Judge for Branch
information, Atty. Calma and Necita Ramos went to the 18, with authority to conduct hearings.
Office of the City Prosecutor. However, no statements
were taken and no action was done. Upon verification by The OCA charged Judge Larida with wilfully violating
the audit team of the OCA, the Office of the City Administrative Order No. 132-2008 by antedating
Prosecutor opined that the suspicion of Atty. Calma and several orders in order to anticipate or circumvent the
Necita Ramos would not prosper since their bases were effectivity of the administrative order.
all hearsay.
Anent this charge, the Investigating Justice has reported:
For his part, respondent Judge denied that Atty. Calma
informed him of this incident. In his Judicial Affidavit,
respondent Judge averred that he had asked his legal In his Judicial Affidavit, former Branch Clerk of Court,
researcher, Diana Ruiz, to prepare a digest of the case Atty. Calma, accused respondent Judge of continuing to
but she prepared, instead a decision acquitting Wang. issue interlocutory orders in certain cases even after the
This allegedly triggered a suspicion in respondent Judge effectivity of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 on 15
that Diana Ruiz and Atty. Calma were selectively September 2008. Atty. Calma's testimony is supported
preparing decisions and placing them inside his by the Judicial Affidavit of civil docket clerk, Anita
chambers, but before he could investigate, a fire gutted Goboy. Together, they enumerate the orders issued by
the court. respondent Judge allegedly in violation of the
Administrative Order, to wit:
Based on the foregoing testimonies on record, it is
apparent that the charge against respondent Judge of
soliciting money from accused Wang has not been 1. Order dated 15 August 2008, granting the
proved. Apart from the hearsay testimony of Atty. motions to consolidate and set for pre-trial Civil
Case Nos. TG-07-2588 entitled Tagaytay docket clerk Anita Goboy to merely indicate at the back
Properties & Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Pascua, of said orders the date when she actually received them
TG-07-2589 entitled Tagaytay Properties & evinces a certain degree of malice incongruent with his
Holdings Corp. vs dela Vega; TG-07-2590 key and noble position in the court.[30]
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp.
vs. Sps. Catolico; and TG-07-2592 It is worth noting that only two of the affected orders
entitled Tagaytay Properties & Holdings Corp. were issued after the effectivity of Administrative Order
vs. Sps. Mirandilla; but denying consolidation of No. 132-2008, to wit:
TG-07-2591 entitled Tagaytay Properties &
Holdings Corp. vs. Sps. Lomerio, Sr.with said
cases;
1. the Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting
2. Order, dated 15 September 2008, granting plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (to resolve motion to preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519
cancel notice of lis pendens) in Civil Case No. entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil Trust Co.; and
TG-08-2743 entitled Osato-Agro Industrial
Development Corporation vs. AB Capital & 2. the Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying
Investment Corporation; private defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-
TG-08-2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort
3. Order, dated 18 September 2008, granting Development Corporation vs. Nazareno.[31]
plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in SP No. TG-05-2519
entitled Metro Alliance vs. Phil. Trust Co.; and, The two orders were issued by Judge Larida two and
three days after the effectivity of Administrative Order
4. Order, dated 19 September 2008, denying No. 132-2008. Even if the administrative order had taken
defendant's motion to dismiss in SCA-TG-08- effect immediately, the time when he acquired actual
2593 entitled Tagaytay Resort Development notice of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 was not
Corporation vs. Nazareno. shown. On the other hand, that our administrative
circulars and issuances take time to reach the lower
It is Atty. Calma's conclusion that said orders were courts is a matter proper for judicial notice. As such, his
intentionally ante-dated by respondent Judge based on intent to violate or circumvent Administrative Order No.
the fact that the latter, through Larry Laggui, gave such 132-2008 was not proved.
orders to civil docket clerk Anita Goboy only on 26
September 2008 although they all appear to have been Moreover, the Investigating Justice's following
signed or promulgated on earlier dates, as above- observations are cogent, to wit:
enumerated. Since Administrative Order No. 132-2008
was already in effect by then, Atty. Calma reasoned that
the sole purpose of ante-dating the orders could only be According to the Memorandum submitted by the OCA
the circumvention of said Administrative Order. to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
For his part, respondent Judge declared that he signed "the administrative order was issued in view of the 139
the orders in question on the dates indicated thereon and cases submitted for decision in RTC, Branch 18,
released them to the civil docket clerk on the same day. Tagaytay City which are already beyond the
Respondent Judge, thus, was surprised to find out that reglementary period to decide as reflected in the
said orders were all uniformly released by Larry Laggui monthly report of cases submitted by the aforesaid court
to the civil docket clerk only on 26 September 2008. In for the month of April 2008."
any event, respondent Judge pointed out that since the Given the purpose of Administrative Order No. 132-
civil docket clerk had brought the matter to Atty. 2008, it would appear that the mandate given to
Calma's attention, the latter-being aware of the respondent Judge to "cease and desist from trying cases"
effectivity of Administrative Order No. 132-2008 should was not meant to penalize him but was given only as a
have informed him about it and stopped the remedial measure to ensure that he will spend his
promulgation on said date to avoid a violation of the time writing the decisions of the long-pending 139
Administrative Order.[29] undecided cases instead of trying and hearing other
cases.
We declare that the interlocutory orders concerned were
signed on the dates indicated therein. The claim of Atty. Hence, respondent Judge's issuance of the 2 orders in
Calma and Anita Goboy to the effect that the foregoing question, on 18 and 19 September 2008, respectively,
orders had been antedated to circumvent the mandate of while not in strict compliance with the letter of the
Administrative Order No.132-200 was improbable in Administrative Order, also do not prevent the attainment
light of the following relevant observations of the of its purpose. Indeed, there is nothing on record to even
Investigating Justice, viz: hint at an improper motive on the part of respondent
Judge in issuing said orders apart from the obvious
reason that they were necessary in the disposition of
x x x. If it were true that Atty. Calma believed that their interlocutory matters in these cases.[32]
release on a date different from the date of their signing
amounted to an anomaly, then he should have Hence, we dismiss the charge of circumventing
immediately brought the same to the attention of the Administrative Order No. 132-2008.
presiding Judge. Atty. Calma's act of instructing civil
when the transcript of stenographic notes say otherwise.
What can you say to this?
5.
Releasing the accused in Criminal Case A: The lack or the improper identification of the accused
No. TG-432-03 on bail despite their being was just one of the grounds I cited to grant the petition.
positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime My assessment of the evidence on this matter was
arrived at on two grounds: 1. failure of police officer
Eusebio to positively identify the accused in his direct
The Investigating Justice found and recommended on testimony, and 2. the failure of another prosecution
this charge thuswise: witness Mr. Basilio to positively identify the accused
taking his entire testimony into consideration, the direct
and cross.
In Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03, the accused Leandro
Go y Ling, Wen Li Chen, Daniel Co, Wilson Li, Michael x x x x
Fandag and Arnel Villaser were charged with Violation
of Section 8, Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing or 52. Q: What can you say to the allegations of Atty.
Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a Clandestine Calma that you had a meeting together with some
Laboratory, Large Quantity of Metamphetamine concerned court personnel in your chamber purposely to
Hydrochloride, Commonly Known as Shabu). discuss the resolution specifically on the matter of
positive identification?
From the Memorandum of the OCA to the Hon. Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, it appears that arraignment A: Indeed it transpired but I stood pat on my decision.
proceeded on 7 December 2004; pre-trial commenced on The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is
8 August 2005; and trial ensued on 19 October 2005. On strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with
24 March 2006, the Chinese accused (Go, Li Chen, Co the judge. Such discretion must be sound and exercised
and Li) filed a petition to fix bail for their provisional within reasonable bounds. In this case, it appears that
liberty. The prosecution did not object thereto, and, respondent Judge gave a lot of thought to the petition for
instead filed a formal offer of evidence on 3 May 2007, bail before granting it, even going to the extent of
as it had, by then, finished with its presentation of consulting with some of his court personnel on the
evidence. On 1 June 2007, the Chinese accused filed a matter after receiving the evidence of the prosecution.
memorandum in support of their petition for bail. On After much cogitation, respondent Judge exercised his
June 14, 2007, respondent Judge granted the petition for judicial discretion and came to the conclusion that the
bail of the accused. evidence against the accused was not strong and they
were not positively identified as the perpetrators of the
In this administrative charge against respondent Judge, crime.
the OCA questions his grant of bail to the accused for
the reasons that: (1) the crime they are accused of is a Respondent Judge's appreciation of the evidence against
capital offense, and the transcript of stenographic notes the accused lies within his sound discretion. This
taken during the presentation of the evidence for the mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
prosecution indicates that 2 witnesses positively reposed on the Branch Clerk of Court, who cannot be
identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime; allowed to supplant his personal opinions for that of the
and (2) there are suspicious circumstances surrounding judge. As long as there was no irregularity in the
the release of the resolution granting bail to the proceedings adopted in the grant of bail, judicial
accused.[33] discretion must be respected and considered to have
been rendered within reasonable bounds.
x x x x
Respondent Judge's lack of malice or bad faith in
In this case, after the prosecution finished presenting its granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-
evidence, respondent Judge came to the conclusion that 4382-03 is underscored by the proceedings that
the evidence of the accused's guilt was not strong and so transpired thereafter. According to the Memorandum of
granted their petition for bail. the OCA to the Hon. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on
2 July 2007, the prosecution filed a motion for
However, the OCA disputes respondent Judge's reconsideration of the 14 June 2007 resolution granting
assessment of the guilt of the accused based on the bail. The motion was set for hearing and the accused
evaluation made by Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee were mandated to appear before the court. Upon failure
D.C. Calma of the transcript of stenographic notes on the of the accused (except Li and Li Chen) to attend the
case that 2 witnesses for the prosecution had positively hearing, respondent Judge canceled their cash bail and
identified the accused as the perpetrators of the issued warrants for their arrest. Further, upon motion of
crime. [34] the prosecution, respondent Judge issued a hold-
departure order against the accused on 23 July 2007.[35]
x x x x
We concur with the foregoing findings and
On the other hand, respondent Judge defends his grant of recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
bail in his Judicial Affidavit as follows:
Verily, the determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt of the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03
Q: OCA was faulting you for stating in your resolution was strong for purposes of resolving the petition for bail
that there was no positive identification of the accused was a matter of judicial discretion for Judge Larida as
the trial judge. Only he could competently resolve the
matter of bail. His exercise of discretion must be sound Anent this, Atty. Villaseca explained his presence in
and reasonable. In the view of the Investigating Justice, Branch 18 in the following manner:
Judge Larida, having given a lot of thought to the
petition for bail before granting it, soundly and
reasonably exercised his discretion thereon. Unless an 2. Q: On June 18, 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the
appropriate judicial review would show him to have morning, where were you?
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically in doing
so, his granting of the petition for bail should be upheld A: I was at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus,
and respected. Cavite before the Honorable Judge Norberto J.
Quisumbing, Jr. I just came from the Regional Trial
This administrative investigation could not be the Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite as I initially attended
occasion to review Judge Larida's granting of bail. Only the hearing of Criminal Case No. B-2002-623 titled
the proper superior court could say whether his exercise "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Benedicto
of discretion in resolving the petition for bail was sound Baraquilles Maliksi, Accused," for Homicide. The case
and reasonable. Thus, Atty. Calma's adverse conclusion was postponed as the Prosecutor in said case was sick. I
based on the transcript of the proceedings to the effect have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the "Minutes"
that the Prosecution's witnesses had positively identified which I signed together with the "Order" of the
the accused could not effectively contradict Judge Honorable Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguangco both dated
Larida's determination of the issue of bail. June 18, 2007.
Whether the identification in Criminal Case No. TG- 3. Q: What were you doing at that time before the
4382-03 was positively made or not was a matter for the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at the sala
judicial perception of Judge Larida only. In these of the Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
proceedings, he explained his reasons for granting bail.
We must respect his explanation. The accused in A: I attended the hearing and appeared as counsel for
Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 were charged with the both of the accused in the case of People of the
manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi
relevant testimony of the Prosecution's witnesses was to and Paulino Silla y Purificacion, Accused, docketed as
the effect that at the time the police arrested them on Criminal Case No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
July 12, 2003 the accused were loading boxes unto
various trucks and vans, with the boxes being later on 4. Q: What document or documents, if any, do you have
determined to contain illegal substances.[36] As such, the to show before this Honorable Court that on June 18,
testimony did not establish the manufacture of 2007 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning you attended
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the non-bailable and appeared before a criminal case at the Regional Trial
offense charged, but a bailable lesser offense. Judge Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite before the sale (sic) of
Larida's June 14, 2007 resolution granting the petition Honorable Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr.?
for bail reflected the distinction, viz:
A: I have with me the "Original Copy" of the Honorable
Court's "Order" dated June 18, 2007 together with a
In the ensuing enforcement of the search warrant issued "Certified True Copy of my "Appearance" indicated by
by the Municipal Trial Court of Silang, Cavite, several my two signatures therein and the "Minutes of the
containers and sacks were found in the house described Proceedings" in the case of People of the Philippines,
therein which were suspected to be essential chemicals Plaintiff, versus, Guillermo Silla y Legaspi and Paulino
in the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride, Silla y Purificacion, Accused, docketed as Criminal Case
a prohibited drug. But there was no evidence to establish No. 10242-02 for Homicide.
that the accused had something to do with the presence
of these alleged illegal substances in the house subject of 5. Q: At about what time did you leave the Regional
the search warrant. The accused were not caught inside Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite after you attended
the house which the prosecution claims to be a and appeared in the case you are handling?
clandestine shabu laboratory. But the "Chinese-looking
persons" were apprehended outside the clandestine A: I left the courtroom at around 10:30 o'clock in the
laboratory, outside its gates. They were arrested in morning after my case was called.
flagrante delictoloading the containers of illegal
substances onto the vans/trucks outside the house. 6. Q: What did you [do] after you left the Regional Trial
Loading them onto a motor vehicle does not fall within Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite at around 10:30 o'clock
the purview of the word "manufacture" of prohibited in the morning of June 18, 2007?
drugs otherwise, we are stretching the meaning of the
term a bit too far.[37] A: I went to my office to get the records of another case
I was handling that day in the afternoon and briefly
Aside from assailing the resolution granting the petition prepared for its afternoon hearing.
for bail, Atty. Calma maintained that the resolution had
been released under suspicious circumstances 7. Q: what is this case all about?
considering that the defense counsel, Atty. Albert T.
Villaseca, had already gone to the RTC ready to post the A: It is a civil case for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
cash bail of P200,000.00 for each of the accused even Annulment of Title and Damages docketed as Civil Case
prior to the release of the June 14, 2007 resolution No. TG-2209 titled Benjamin Q. Diwa, et. al., Plaintiffs,
granting bail.[38] versus, Maxima R. Matias and International Exchange
Bank, Defendants, pending before the Regional Trial 15. Q: What happened next, if any?
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at the sala of the
Honorable Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. which is A: I personally received a copy of the Honorable Court's
scheduled to be heard in the afternoon of June 18, 2007 Resolution and, thereafter, immediately and excitedly
at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. informed the aunt of one of my clients as I know she
would be very happy about it as my clients have been
8. Q: What happened next after you arrived at your innocently lingering in jail for almost four years and
office to get the records and prepared (sic) for this other have already lost faith and hope of ever having
case that you are handling in the afternoon of June 18, temporary liberty.
2007?
16. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: At around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, I left my
office in Imus, Cavite and together with my driver and A: I informed the aunt of one of my clients the amount
one of my office personnel, proceeded [to] Tagaytay of the bond required to (be) posted in cash and she told
City to attend to the hearing of my case. me to meet her at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires
City, Province of Cavite and give her a copy of the
9. Q: What happened next, if any? Honorable Court's Resolution and she would provide for
the amount of the cash bond required by the Honorable
A: I arrived at the parking ground of the Regional Trial Court.
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City at around 12:30 o'clock
in the afternoon. 17. Q: What happened next, if any?
10. Q: Then, what happened next? A: I inquired from one of the court personnel that if we
could post a cash bail bond that afternoon, could my
A: Upon arriving at the office of the personnel and staff clients be ordered released, and what other documents
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, I the court requires to immediately avail of the "order of
was informed by my clients and a court personnel that Release."
all the cases scheduled in the afternoon would be
rescheduled to another date as there was an unusual 18. Q: What happened next, if any?
incident which transpired inside the courtroom earlier.
A: After I was informed by one of the court personnel
11. Q: What is that unusual incident which transpired that since there are no cases to be heard that afternoon
earlier in the courtroom of the Regional Trial Court, and since all the cases will just be rescheduled to another
Branch 18, Tagaytay City? date, they have a lot of time to take care of the "Order of
Release" of my clients as long as all the other court
A: I was informed that one of the accused in a rape case requirements for the posting of the cash bail bond are
from the Provincial Jail of the Province of Cavite took complied with. I wasted no time and hurriedly left the
hostage of one of the court employees and that is the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
reason why all the cases scheduled to be heard in the Proceeded to the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City,
afternoon were rescheduled to another date. Province of Cavite to inform my clients about the
Honorable Court's Resolution and to meet the aunt of
12: Q: What document, if any, do you have to show one of my clients who will take care of the cash bail
before this Honorable Court that there was a hostage bond required. On my way, I informed the aunt of my
taking incident that transpired in the morning of June 18, client about the other requirements for the posting of the
2007 in side(sic) the courtroom of the Regional Trial cash bail bond and prepared the Cash Bond Undertaking
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City? of my clients in my laptop computer.
A: I have with me a "Certified True Copy" of the Police 19. Q: What happened next, if any?
Blotter issued by SPO4 Samuel Baybay of the Tagaytay
City Police Station. A: I arrived at the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City,
Province of Cavite before 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
13. Q: What did you do after that? Delivered a copy of the Honorable Court's Resolution to
the Provincial Jail Warden and met the aunt of one of my
A: I provided the court personnel with my available date, clients who provided me with the cash in the amount of
briefly talked to my clients and knowing that our case P400,000.00 for the cash bail bond required, pictures of
was already postponed I inquired about the status of my the accused together with the other requirements for the
other cases pending before the Regional Trial Court, cash bail bond. I explained the consequences of a Cash
Branch 18, Tagaytay City. Bond Undertaking to my clients, have (sic) them sign
and subscribe to it and then notarized it.
14. Q: What happened next, after that?
20. Q: What happened next, if any?
A: As I (was) browsing upon the records of Criminal
Case No. TG-4382-03 titled The People of the A: I wasted no time and hurriedly left for Tagaytay City.
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Leandro Go y Lim, et al, Thereafter, I posted the cash bail bond and submitted all
Accused, for Violation of Sec. 8, Art. 2, RA 9165, I the requirements to secure an "Order of Release" for my
came across the resolution of the Honorable Court in our clients.
petition for bail.
21. Q: What happened next, if any?
law and acted swiftly in the best interests of the minor
A: All documents I submitted were found in order by the accused. Respondent Judge asserts that he personally
personnel in charge. I was able to secure an "Order of prepared the order on 15 September 2008. [40]
Release" for my clients. Thereafter, I again proceeded to
the Provincial Jail at Trece Martires City, Province of Jayson Espiritu, the accused in Criminal Case No. TG-
Cavite and delivered to the Provincial Jail Warden an 5307-06, was a minor of 15 years and 11 months at the
copy of the "Order of Release."[39] time of the commission of the offense charged as borne
out by the copy of his birth certificate attached to the
motion to quash. He was for that reason entitled to the
Atty. Calma's bare allegations, which were obviously quashal of the information filed against him for being
based on surmise and speculation, cannot be preferred exempt from criminal liability based on Section 6 of
because Atty. Villaseca's foregoing explanation of his Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
presence in Branch 18 was supported by authentic Act of 2006), which states as follows:
documents. Accordingly, we dismiss the charge of Judge
Larida's having improperly granted bail in Criminal Case
No. TG-4382-03. Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
6. liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
Charge of granting the motion to quash the intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
information
in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06 without a case A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
record and without (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
requiring a comment from the public prosecutor criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
The Investigating Justice said regarding this charge: in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
In Criminal case No. TG-5307-06, Jayson Espiritu, The exemption from criminal liability herein established
among others, was charged with Murder and was does not include exemption from civil liability, which
arrested on 6 August 2008 and detained at the Provincial shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Jail. On 22 August 2008, Jayson Espiritu filed a motion (Emphasis supplied)
to quash/dismiss information on the ground that he was a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense. The foregoing notwithstanding, Judge Larida should not
have acted on Espiritu's motion to quash without first
In an Order, dated 5 September 2008, respondent Judge giving the public prosecutor the opportunity to comment
set the motion to quash for hearing on October 3, 2008 on the motion. That opportunity was demanded by due
and gave the prosecution 15 days to file its process.[41] As a judge, he should exercise patience and
comment/opposition thereto. However, without waiting circumspection to ensure that the opposing sides are
for the 15-day period to expire, respondent Judge allowed the opportunity to be present and to be
granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash on 15 heard.[42] Only thereby could he preclude any suspicion
September 2008. on the impartiality of his actuations.[43] But he cannot
now be sanctioned because it is a matter of public policy
According to the Judicial Affidavit of former Branch that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
Clerk of Court Atty. Stanlee D.C. Calma, aside from not acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
giving the prosecution a chance to oppose Jayson subject to disciplinary action although they are
Espiritu's motion to quash, respondent Judge personally erroneous.[44] Considering that there was no fraud,
drafted the Order granting said motion without access to dishonesty or corruption that attended the omission of
the records of the case. Moreover, respondent Judge prior notice, we simply caution him against a repetition
allegedly gave an advance copy of the Order granting the of the omission of prior notice.
motion to quash to the father of Jayson Espiritu, who, in
turn, showed the same to the warden of the Provincial The Investigating Justice found the charge of bribery
Jail even before the court had personally served the same against Judge Larida unsupported by competent
upon said warden on 26 September 2008. According to evidence.[45] We concur. The records are bereft of the
Atty. Calma, he was informed by the widow of the evidence that would establish the charge. Innuendo and
victim in said criminal case that respondent Judge had hearsay will not establish the accusation. We insist that
been paid off to quash the information against Jayson any accusation of bribery against a judicial officer
Espiritu. should be made upon hard and firm evidence of it.
Hence, we dismiss the charge of bribery.
In his defense, respondent Judge explained that he
granted Jayson Espiritu's motion to quash pursuant to
RA 9344 because Jayson Espiritu was only a minor at 7.
the time of the commission of the offense, as proved by Charge of granting under questionable
his birth certificate attached to the motion. Respondent circumstances
Judge denied having received a pay-off to quash the the petition for the issuance of owner's duplicate
information against Jayson Espiritu, and explained that copies
he did not wait for the comment/opposition of the of various TCTs in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183
prosecution because he followed the substance of the
investigating team's accusations were faithful
In its report, the investigating team from the OCA made reproductions of the originals that formed part of LRC
the following observations with respect to LRC Case No. Case No. TG-06-1183, without more, did not suffice to
TG-06-1183, to wit: establish the commission of irregularities in the
disposition of the case. It is important to stress that the
proceedings upon administrative charges made against
1. There was no hearing conducted to establish the judicial officers should be viewed with utmost care, and
jurisdiction of the court and subsequent referral of the such proceedings are governed by the rules of law
reception of evidence ex parte to Clerk of Court Desiree applicable to criminal cases, with the charges to be
Macaraeg as commissioner; proved beyond reasonable doubt, by virtue of their
nature as highly penal in character.[48]
2. There was no proof to establish that the Register [of]
Deeds of Tagaytay City, although furnished with a copy
of the petition, had actually received it; 8.
Charge of liability for the fire
3. There was no commissioner's report attached to the that occurred on October 12, 2008
record relative to the reception of evidence ex parte
conducted on 5 & 10 May 2006; Anent the fire that occurred in the records room of
Branch 18, we absolve Judge Larida because no
4. The affidavit of loss of titles was presented by evidence directly linking him to the arson incident was
petitioner Santos to the Register of Deeds only on 5 May presented.[49] It further appears that at the time of the
2006 at the same time the petition was allegedly heard occurrence of the fire, Judge Larida was hospitalized for
by the commissioner; a kidney injury that he had sustained from a fall on the
night of October 9, 2008.[50]
5. Per minutes dated 10 May 2006, there appears the
name [of] Fiscal Manuel D. Noche, for the government, Nevertheless, the OCA insisted on Judge Larida's
yet the TSN state[s] that there was no appearance of responsibility for the fire based on certain circumstances,
Fiscal Noche on 10 May 2006 or even the 5 May 2006 namely: (a) the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
ex-parte hearing. revealed that access to the courthouse was through the
rear entrance,[51] and he admitted that such entrance was
6. Petitioner's formal offer of evidence was admitted on his access to the courthouse;[52] (b) despite his being the
10 May 2007 when the same was filed only on 11 May Presiding Judge of Branch 18, he did not actively take
2007. The order also made it appear that there is no part in the investigation of the arson incident, thereby
objection interposed by the City Prosecutor despite non- manifesting his lack of interest in or concern over the
appearance thereof. burning of the courthouse;[53] and (c) he had a motive to
burn the courthouse in order to destroy the court's case
7. The comment of the Register of Deeds on petitioner's records that would reveal his wrongdoings. [54]
Urgent Manifestation alleging that the Register of Deeds
delivered the TCT's to Marie Cruz although stated 4 However, Atty. Calma disclosed that aside from Judge
September 2006 was filed in court only on 4 December Larida, utility workers Ofelia Parasdas and Romelito
2006.[46] Fernando, Judge Young, and Marticio all had keys to the
entrance doors of the courthouse (i.e., two front doors
The Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of and one back door),[55] and that he (Atty. Calma), along
the charge of irregularity for lack of evidence and with the clerk-in-charge of the civil docket Anita Goboy
substantiation, thusly: and criminal docket clerk Romelito Fernando, were the
only ones who had access to the records room because
only they knew the location of the key to the records
Although the Investigation Report details the legal room.[56]
proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-06-1183, and certain
documents from the case were offered in evidence for Equally notable is that the forensic report denominated
the complainant, the OCA did not fully elaborate on the as Dactyloscopy Report No. F-129-08 issued by the
exact nature of this charge against respondent Judge. Philippine National Police Cavite Provincial Crime
Moreover, during the cross-examination of Diana Ruiz, Laboratory Office on November 21, 2008 [57] showed that
the latter manifested a lack of knowledge over the events one of the latent prints lifted from the crime scene
that transpired in said LRC case. No other witnesses belonged to Romelito Fernando, a personnel who had
were presented to substantiate this charge. Therefore, it testified against Judge Larida during the investigation.
is recommended that this charge against respondent
Judge be DISMISSED.[47] Judge Larida denied his supposed lack of interest in the
investigation of the arson incident by reminding that he
The finding and recommendation by the Investigating had immediately requested the NBI to investigate the
Justice are well-taken. The mere specification of arson incident upon learning about it.[58] He explained
accusations against Judge Larida could not demonstrate that he had refrained from further actively participating
the veracity of the accusations notwithstanding the in the investigation because he had been barred by the
attachment of all the documents allegedly in support of OCA from reporting for work;[59] that unlike the staff
the accusations. Evidence that was relevant and members of RTC Branch 18 who had continued to report
competent must have been adduced to support the for work and had been interviewed by the investigating
accusation. Diana Ruiz's judicial affidavit attesting that team, he had not been summoned for any interview; and
the corresponding documents in support of the that he also learned from the NBI agents themselves that
they had been ordered to cease from further investigating prosecute it.
the fire upon the entry of the OCA in the
investigation.[60] SO ORDERED.
9.
Consolidated Penalty for Judge Larida
10.
Letter-complaint of Jayson Marticio
x-----------------------x
For the Court‘s consideration.7 In Court Administrator v. Sevillo,17 the act of stealing
mail matter by the respondent, a process server in the
Municipal Circuit Court of Jordan Buenavista-Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras, was held to constitute "grave
Meanwhile, on May 4, 2009, Ordoñez resigned from the dishonesty and grave misconduct or conduct prejudicial
PHILJA, citing the approval of his family‘s visa to the best interest of the service," with the Court
application for immigrant status in Canada as the reason opining:
for his resignation.8 On June 23, 2009, the Court En
Banc approved his resignation, subject tothe usual
clearance requirements and without prejudice to the
outcome of this administrative case.9 Subsequently, the It can never be said often enough that the conduct of
parties manifested that they were submitting the case for judges and court personnel must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum at all times but
resolution upon the pleadings filed.10
must also be above suspicion. In this regard, respondent
Sevillo has been grossly deficient. By stealing mail
matters he has blatantly degraded the judiciary and
On August 20, 2014, the Third Division directed the diminished the respect and regard of the people for the
consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No. court and its personnel. Every employee of the judiciary
2008-23-SC.11 The Banc accepted the consolidation on should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
September 9, 2014. honesty. Lamentably, respondent has become no better
than a common thief; consequently, he does not deserve
to stay a minute longer in the judicial service.
Ruling
xxx Considering that the On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a
Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B.
TRO,[8] to wit:
Alvizo, the Presiding Judge of RTC-
Branch 4 and Acting-Designate
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but
who is now in Cebu City for medical The Court believes that there is a
treatment, it would be impractical to need to maintain the status quo until all
include his courts in the re-raffling of the other issues in the complaint shall
cases for the reason that the case is for have been duly heard and determined
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, etc., without necessarily implying that
that needs immediate action. The herein plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for
Vice-Executive Judge who is the injunction. The Court hereby resolves in
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, the meantime to grant a temporary
could not also act on this case on the restraining order.
ground of 'delicadeza' considering that
defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides
Theresa B. Plaza is his 'kumadre' plus
WHEREFORE, defendants City
the fact that before becoming judge he
Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor
was the legal counsel of the LDP party
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their
here in Butuan City, in the election of
attorneys, agents, employees, police
1992 and 1995, which is the political
authorities and/or any person acting
party of the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1,
upon the Mayors order and instruction
being the exclusive Family Court cannot
under her authority are hereby enjoined
also be included in any raffle.
to cease, desist and to refrain from
closing or padlocking RADYO
BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing,
In view of the foregoing, and on or molesting its business operations,
the ground of expediency, the Clerk of including but not limited to the use and
Court is ordered to send this case to operation of its building, structures and
RTC-Branch 5, without raffle anymore, broadcasting facilities, and the ingress
it being the only practical available or egress of its employees therein.
court in this jurisdiction as of this
moment.
As this Court cannot issue a
seventy-two (72) hour Temporary
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, Restraining Order because of the
incoming delay on Monday, February
presided by Judge Augustus L. Calo, who recused
25, 2002, a temporary restraining order
because his wife had been recently appointed is hereby issued effective for twenty
by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule
ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure).
Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge
Tomaneng.
Section 1. Disqualification of
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos judges. No judge or judicial officer shall
did not gravely abuse his discretion in re-assuming sit in any case in which he, or his wife
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193 in the light of the or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed
which he is related to either party within
decision, to wit:[17] the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the of civil law, or in which he has been
reality that after the respondent judge executor, administrator, guardian,
issued his order of inhibition and trustee or counsel, or in which he has
directed the return of the case to the presided in any inferior court when his
Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle ruling or decision is the subject of
to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge review, without the written consent of
all parties-in-interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned
after the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to him by the
A judge may, in the exercise of
Vice Executive Judge that his self-doubt about his ability
his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just and valid to dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by
reasons other than those mentioned the airing of criticisms against him and other public
above. officials by CBSs commentators and reporters would not
ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment. Such re-
assessment of the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one showing of any malice or other improper motive on his
taken in accordance with the second paragraph of part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound
Section 1. Our resolution herein turns, therefore, on the exercise of his discretion.That, it seems to us, even the
proper interpretation and application of the second petitioners conceded, their objection being based only on
paragraph. whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil
Case No. 5193.
xxx
[formerly A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA] Upon submission by the board of commissioners of its
report on the just compensation, the RTC rendered
another decision on July 24, 2001 ordering Cebu City to
compensate the Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al. in the
RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR
amount of P34,905,000.00 for the parcels of land plus
ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES
interest of 12% per annum computed from the date of
RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN
the decision until fully paid; P50,000.00 as attorney‘s
CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS
fees; and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.3
EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL
HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES.
The RTC granted the motion of the Heirs of Vicente
Rallos, et al. for the execution pending appeal of the July
24, 2001 decision. In implementing the execution
x---------------x
pending appeal, the RTC issued three separate orders, all
dated December 21, 2001. Both parties sought the
reconsideration of the orders dated December 21, 2001.4
A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA On March 21, 2002, the RTC issued its consolidated
order resolving the motions for reconsideration of the
parties.5
RE: COMPLAINT FILED BY LUCENA B.
RALLOS AGAINST JUSTICE GABRIEL T.
INGLES, PAMELA ANN MAXIMO, and Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
CARMELITA S. MANAHAN. Visayas Station. The Heirs of Vicente Rallos, et al.
assailed the July 24, 2001 decision and the March 21,
2002 consolidated order of the RTC. On its part, Cebu
DECISION City challenged the decisions of January 14, 2000, July
24, 2001, and March 21, 2002. On May 29, 2007, the
CA promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal of
Cebu City for its failure to file a record on appeal.6 Cebu
BERSAMIN, J.:
City moved for are consideration, but the CA denied its
motion in there solution promulgated on August 30,
2007. Thence, Cebu City filed its petition for review in
Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative this Court (G.R. No. 179662), but the Court denied the
disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in petition for review.7
good faith.
Respondents question the authenticity of the Decision To date, the foregoing issuances have not been recalled,
embodying the Convenio since the same is purportedly such that, when the limited life of the previously granted
unsigned. This challenge shall be fully contended with TRO expires, the sheriff can proceed with garnishing
when we evaluate the merits of the petition, but at this petitioner‘s bank deposits and selling its patrimonial
juncture, suffice it to say that our inclination to regard property described in the Notice of Execution Sale of
the Decision as authentic, for purposes of resolving the Public Auction. The involvement of public funds and
propriety of the herein ancillary remedy, is anchored on property justifies the urgency and necessity of the
these reasons: (1) the 1940 decision is more than thirty issuance of a WPI to prevent serious damage to
(30) years old; and (2) it was produced from a custody in petitioner. It is best to preserve the status quo pending
which it would be naturally found if genuine. the final determination of this case, otherwise, whatever
Respondents‘ counsel, Atty. Glenn Cañete, admitted Decision hereon will be rendered ineffectual and
during the hearing that he personally went to RTC nugatory.
Branch 9, and found out for himself that indeed, there is
a copy of the said Decision in the records of the court.
Moreover, respondent Maurillo Rallos, likewise, attested WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of
in his Affidavit that he personally went to the Offcie of Preliminary Injunction issue enjoining respondents, their
the RTC Clerk of Court and upon personally examining successors, agents, representatives, assigns, and any and
its records, saw for himself that the decision was actually
all persons acting under their supervision, direction and
in the custody of the clerk. on their behalf, from executing the Decisions dated
January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001, the Order dated
Febraury 9, 2001, Consolidated Order dated December
Second, the invasion of petitioner‘s right sought to be 21, 2001 and Order dated February 27, 2012 of the
protected is material and substantial. It appears, from the respondent court, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
sampling of evidence, that respondents deliberately Cebu City, and from causing the release of any funds, or
suppressed Convenio when they lodged Civil Case No. the auction of property/ies of petitioner in satisfaction
CEB-20388, seeking for forfeiture of improvements and thereof, until further orders from the Court.31
payment of fair market value with damages, litigation
expenses and attorneys fees, against petitioner. The non-
disclosure of the Convenio resulted in the violation of The Heirs of Vicente Rallos moved for there
petitioner‘s right to for it is now made to pay, with the
consideration of the grant of the application for the writ
use of public funds, just compensation for properties that of preliminary injunction.32
were supposed to be donated and transferred to it
without cost. In fact, petitioner already paid Fifty Six
Million One Hundred Ninety Six thousand, three
hundred sixty nine and 42/100 Pesos (P56,196,369.42) On August 10, 2012, the Court received the letter-
in 2001 and 2009. complaint from Rallos requesting an investigation of the
allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct of Justice
Abarintos, Justice Hernando and Justice Paredes as
Members of the 18thDivision in dealing with CA-G.R.
Third, there is urgent and paramount necessity for the CEB SP.No. 06676.33 On August 30, 2012, the Court
writ to prevent serious damage. In propounding its received another letter from Rallos requesting
application for WPI, petitioner alleged that public permission to amend her letter-complaint and to admit
respondent issued an Order (Order) dated February 27,
her attached amended letter-complaint.34 The Court
2012, directing : 1) the depositary banks of the City of docketed the amended letter-complaint as A.M. No. 12-
Cebu to release to the Sheriff, certifications as to the 8-06-CA.35
correct account numbers under petitioner‘s name in
order to cater to the final judgment in Civil Case No.
CEB-20388; (2) the plaintiffs to demand the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact the appropriation On September 12, 2012, the Court received an affidavit-
ordinance; and (3) the depositary banks to release the complaint from Rallos, whereby she also charged Justice
Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan with determine CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676; that the
administrative and criminal offenses. The Court "appearance of impropriety" became more apparent
docketed the affidavit-complaint as A.M. No. 12-9-08- when Justice Abarintos and several other Justices
CA.36 inhibited themselves from participation in CA-G.R.
CEBSP.No. 06676; and that Justice Hernando was
biased because he inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB
SP. No. 06676 immediately after rendering the March
On September 18, 2012, the Court promulgated a
resolution in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA requiring Justice 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions.42
Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan to comment
on the affidavit-complaint of Rallos, and consolidating
A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA with A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA.37 Rallos argued that litigants in the CA had the right to be
informed of the inhibition of the Justices, and to object if
the inhibition was invalid; that a Justice could not simply
On December 13, 2012, the Court received the joint inhibit from a case because doing so would raise doubts
comment/answer of Justice Ingles, Justice Maxino and on the integrity of the judicial process; and that the
inhibitions of the respondent Justices raised the
Justice Manahan, whereby they prayed for the dismissal
of the charges in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA for lack of suspicion of manipulation wherein the Justices who were
merit.38 unwilling to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by Cebu City were forced to inhibit themselves in
order that other Justices sympathetic towards Cebu City
couldbe put in their places.
On January 8, 2013, the Court re-docketed A.M. No. 12-
8-06-CA as OCA I.P.I. No. 12-203-CA-J, and ordered
Justice Abarintos, Justice Hernando and Justice Paredes
Rallos prayed that the respondent Justices be held
to comment on the letter-complaint.39 They separately
complied, but all of them prayed for the dismissal of the administratively and criminally liable, and in the
letter-complaint for lack of merit.40 meantime be temporarily suspended to avoid influencing
the investigation of the letter-complaint; and that the CA
be directed to furnish her with the list of inhibitions and
replacements of the respondent Justices in CA-G.R. SP
Chargesin IPI No. 12-203-CA-J No. 06676,and the grounds for the inhibitions and
replacements.43
(formerly A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA)
We dismiss both administrative complaints for their In A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, although Rallos had moved
lackofbasis. for the reconsideration of the June 26, 2012 resolution,
she did not anymore wait for the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration. Instead, she filed the complaint-
1. affidavit. That, too, was impermissible, because her
appropriate recourse was to await the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration and then to appeal should the
CA deny the motion. It is to be mentioned, too, that the
Administrative complaints are not proper remedies
CA had not yet resolved Cebu City‘s main suit for the
to assail alleged erroneous resolutions of respondent annulment of judgment on the merits; hence, it was
Justices premature and unprocedural for her to insist that the
respondent Justices could have already ruled on the Rallos family had previously donated the property that
grounds for annulment. That resolution should be was subsequently expropriated by Cebu City.
awaited because the issue on the validity and
effectiveness of the convenio would precisely still
require the CA‘s appreciation of the convenio as 4. In short, the impression of the appellate court at the
evidence. Nor were the principle of immutability of time is why should Cebu City be made to pay just
judgment and the applicability of any law or
compensation by the Rallos heirs for the expropriation of
jurisprudence to bar Cebu City‘s action for annulment of their property which had been donated by the Rallos
judgment already in effect, considering that the CA still family to Cebu City in the first place? This
had to discharge its adjudicatory function respecting the circumstance, in the appellate court‘s fair and objective
matter of the validity and effectiveness of the convenio.
view, justified the grant of the injunctive relief.
Otherwise, the Rallos heirs, which includes the
complainant, would unduly enrich themselves at the
2. expense of Cebu City and essentially swindle it of its
assets (that were about to be executed upon by the RTC
Truth of the allegations of bias, negligence or Sheriff) when they acceded to the expropriation of their
improper motives against respondent Justices property that should have been delivered by them to the
city as a piece of donated property.x x x.50
cannot be presumed but must be substantiated
xxxx
In their comment/answer regarding the issuance of the
March 28, 2012 resolution, the respondent Justices
declared that they had resolved not to outrightly dismiss Furthermore, the grant or denial of a temporary
the petition of Cebu City despite its several defects restraining order is discretionary on the part of the court.
because:(1) the defects had been minor or non-essential; The matter is judicial in nature, and as such, the party‘s
(2) the petition had alleged the discovery of the convenio remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a judge/justice
that would supposedly show that Cebu City should not given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing
be obliged to expend the huge amount of public funds to court, and not with the OCA by means of an
compensate the Heirs of Vicente Rallos; (3) the petition administrative complaint.51 With regard to the June 26,
must be decided on the merits rather than on technicality 2012 resolution, the respondent Justices elucidated in
because the release of a huge amount of public funds their comment/answer:
would be involved; (4) the rules of procedure should not
be utilized as tools to defeat justice; and (5) even with
the foregoing being weighty enough, they had still
imposed the condition that any action on the petition and Indeed, the judgment sought to be executed is already
the application for the TRO application would be held in final, and the general rule is that, as there is nothing left
abeyance pending compliance with the order for the to be done the final judgment has to be executed or
rectification of the defects. enforced. This rule, however, is not absolute. It admits of
exceptions, to wit:
3. The CA Resolution granting the TRO was issued In the instant case, the stay of execution of the judgment
based on the appellate court‘s fair and objective paying just compensation to petitioner for the properties
estimation that indeed, there was a compelling and in litigation is warranted by the fact that there is still a
urgent ground for its grant. The Sheriff of the Regional pending case regarding the ownership of the said
Trial Court was in the act of implementing the lower properties, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06364 entitled
court‘s writ of execution on the properties of the City of Cebu vs. Lucena B. Rallos, et. al. In that case,
applicant and there was, at that point, a necessity to stop the City of Cebu seeks to nullify the 13 October 1998
the implementation, particularly since Cebu City had Order in Spec. Proc. No. 107-R entitled "Testate Estate
shown at least at that stage of the proceedings, that the of Vicente Rallos, deceased, Vicente Gullas, Executor",
Rallos heirs had conveniently withheld from it the with prayer to direct the administratix of the testate
existence of a Deed of Donation (Convenio) whereby the estate of Vicente Rallos to execute a deed of donation
thereby donating the disputed lots in favour of the City
of Cebu, pursuant to a "convenio".x x x
questioned resolutions was not tainted by bias,
negligence or any improper motives.
It bears stressing that the cases before the respondent
justices involve public funds, more specifically, city
funds to be used in the delivery of basic services to
constituents of the City of Cebu. As defined "public Moreover, the respondent Justices conducted a hearing
funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any before issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in favor
political subdivision of the State; more specifically, of Cebu City. In that hearing, the counsels of the parties
taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of attended, and were granted ample opportunity to argue
law for the support of the government or for the for their respective sides.
discharge of its obligations." For this reason alone, there
is the need to protect government funds–for which the
City of Cebu is accountable, and this should not be Anent the voluntary inhibitions of the respondent
jeopardized through the supposed violation by the city Justices concerned, it serves well to note that Section 1,
government of petitioner‘s right to enjoy the fruits of the Rule 137 of the Rules of Court set standing guidelines
final judgment in her favour when government for that purpose. The guidelines have required just and
protection can be done and is being done without valid causes to justify voluntary inhibitions. Thereby, the
adverse effects to petitioner‘s rights should the case be discretion to decide whether to voluntarily inhibit or not
eventually resolved in her favour. could not be unfettered, for, as fittingly said in Abrajano
v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr.:53
Therefore, pending determination as to who has legal A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
right to the subject properties, there is a patent, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
imperative need to be provisionally enjoin execution to reasons other than those mentioned above.
prevent release of public funds or sale of any of the
city‘s property for payment of just compensation, or, to
restrain acts that may render moot and academic the
Thus stated, the rule contemplates two kinds of
judgment or order that may be rendered in this case.52
inhibition: compulsory disqualification assumes that a
judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the
reasons stated in the first paragraph, while voluntary
A reading of them easily shows that the questioned inhibition under the second paragraph leaves to the
resolutions exhaustively explained their factual and legal judge‘s discretion whether he should desist from sitting
bases. Apparently, the respondent Justices concerned in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his
promulgated the questioned resolutions with prudence conscience to guide him.
and fairness, and upon due consideration of the
surrounding circumstances. Contrary to the posture of
Rallos, therefore, the respondent Justices‘ issuance of the
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of To recall, the resolution of March 28, 2012 concerned
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. the preliminary matter of having Cebu City comply with
This discretion is an acknowledgement of the fact that the deficiencies of its petition in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
judges are in a better position to determine the issue of 06676, while the resolution of April13, 2012 involved
inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the the issuance of the TRO to prevent the execution of the
parties-litigants in their courtrooms. The decision on decisions and the consolidated order by the RTC that
whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be would probably render the consideration and
based on his rational and logical assessment of the adjudication of CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 moot and
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. academic. If, at that stage of the proceedings in CA-G.R.
CEB SP.No. 06676, Justice Abarintos believed himself
to be capacitated to take part, the Court is in no position
The rule does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to dispute his capacity to do so in the absence of any
to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. clear and persuasive showing by Rallos that he would
The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The not be objective and impartial as far as the issues and the
parties were concerned. Indeed, at that stage of the
mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will
not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing proceedings, any decision to voluntarily inhibit was
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
his part. The discretion, according to Abrajano v. Heirs
will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., supra, "is an acknowledgement
The disqualification of a judge cannot be based on mere of the fact that judges are in a better position to
speculations and surmises or be predicated on the determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones
who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their
adverse nature of the judge‘s rulings towards the movant
for inhibition.54 (Bold underscoring supplied for courtrooms," provided the decision is based on a
emphasis) "rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him." Thus, based
on the guidelines set in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, the participation of Justice Abarintos in the
Rallos contends that Justice Abarintos improperly initial stage of the proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
participated in CA.G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 despite 06676 despite having previously inhibited himself in
having previously inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06364 could not be held as
SP. No. 06364,whichhadinvolved Cebu City as the improper under the circumstances.
petitioner and the Heirs of Vicente Rallos as the
respondents, on the ground that some of the siblings and
relatives of Rallos were his friends.55
In any event, Justice Abarintos subsequently saw the
need for his voluntary inhibition when CA-G.R. CEB
SP. No. 06676 came to be assigned to him following the
We disagree with the contention of Rallos. transfer to Manila of Justice Paredes. His voluntary
inhibition occurred on June 7, 2012. What is note worthy
is that Rallos could have filed a motion for his inhibition
It appears that Rallos, in her capacity as the if she considered the participation of Justice Abarintos in
administratix of the estate of Vicente Rallos, had CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 as improper. That she
submitted in Special Proceeding No. 1017-R entitled raises the issue of his inhibition only before this Court in
Testate Estate of Vicente Rallos, deceased; Vicente this administrative proceeding leaves the Court no
Gullas, Executor a supplemental inventory of the choice but to regard her imputation of impropriety and
properties of the estate that included the two parcels of bias against him as a mere after thought considering that
land that were later the subject of CA.G.R. CEB SP.No. she does so only after the CA had issued the writ of
06676.The probate court issued an order on October 13, preliminary injunction sought by Cebu City.
1998 directing the transfer of the properties listed in the
supplemental inventory to Rallos and her co-heirs.
Feeling aggrieved, Cebu City appealed to the CA to Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he
nullify the October 13, 1998 order, and also to pray that voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
Rallos as the administratix of the testate estate of 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012
Vicente Rallos be directed to execute a deed of donation and April 13, 2012 resolutions.56
respecting the disputed lots in favor of Cebu City
pursuant to the convenio (CA-G.R. CEB SP. No.
06364).
Again, we cannot agree with Rallos.
In the notice he sent to the CA Raffle Committee, Justice Judicial Conduct, he/she shall immediately notify the
Hernando stated the reasons why he decided to inhibit Raffle Committee and the members of his/herDivision.
himself from the case, to wit:
Section 1. Mandatory Inhibition of Justices. –When a As the foregoing rules indicate, there are two kinds of
Justice is disqualified under any of the grounds inhibition, the mandatory and the voluntary. In
enumerated in the first paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of mandatory inhibition, the disqualified Justice must notify
the Rules of Court and in Rule 3.12 of the Code of the Raffle Committee and the Members of the Division
of the decision to inhibit. Involuntary inhibition, the or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
inhibiting Justice must inform the other Members of the injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause.
Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee,
and the Division Clerk of Court of the decision to inhibit
and the reason for the inhibition. There is nothing in WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the
Rule V or in any other part of the Internal Rules of the administrative complaints against Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the party-
Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, Associate
litigants be informed of the mandatory or voluntary Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, Associate Justice
inhibition of a Justice. Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Associate Justice Gabriel T.
Ingles, Associate Justice Pamela Ann Maxino and
Associate Justice Carmelita S. Manahan for their lack of
Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed merit and substance.
of the inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the
inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner
provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules The Court DIRECTS that henceforth all the parties in
of the Court of Appeals, supra. Upon the filing of the
any action or proceedings shall be notified within five
motion, the party-litigant becomes entitled to be notified (5) days of the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
of the CA‘s action on the motion for inhibition and of inhibition of a Judge or Justice who has participated in
the reasons for the action. Likewise, the party-litigant
any action of the court, stating the reason or reasons for
may seek the reconsideration or may appeal to the Court the mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition.
any action on the part of the CA on the motion for
inhibition or motion for reconsideration. Alas, Rallos did
not submit a motion for the inhibition of any of the
respondent Justices. The Court Administrator is ORDERED to disseminate
this decision to all courts of the Philippines for their
guidance and strict compliance.
BERSAMIN, J.:
On July 5, 2010, the OAS directed the concerned
Employees of the Judiciary should observe punctuality employees to explain in writing why no administrative
in reporting to work. Tardiness, if habitual, prejudices disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
the efficiency of the service being rendered by the habitual tardiness during the covered period, which
Judiciary to the people, and cannot be tolerated. Thus, habitual tardiness was in violation of Civil Service
we sanction certain administrative employees of the Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 04,
Court for their habitual tardiness. Series of 1991, viz:
This administrative matter emanated from the reports An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he
dated June 16, 2010 and June 17, 2010 made by the incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten
Leave Division under the Office of Administrative (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a
Services (OAS) to the Complaints and Investigation semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during
Division, also under the OAS, to the effect that the the year. xxx
following employees had been habitually tardy in the
second semester of 2009, viz: The concerned employees subsequently rendered their
respective explanations, which the OAS summarized
1
thuswise:
No. of times Reported Tardy for the 2nd
Semester of 2009
Names A. Employees previously penalized for habitual
tardiness:
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
1. Mr. ALBERT C. SEMILLA – He was tardy
1. Mr. Marc Reman A. Bessat for twelve (12) times in the month of September
Computer Maintenance Technologist III and ten (10) times in the month of November. In
10 10 dated July 9, 2010, Mr. Semilla
his explanation
Systems Planning & Project Evaluation Division,
readily admitted having incurred those tardiness
MISO
and humbly submitted to any disciplinary action
for the offense. He stated that due to financial
2. Mr. Melquiades A. Briones difficulties, he reports to work and likewise
Clerk III 14 15 returns home through his bicycle. He supports
Office of the Clerk of Court, En Banc his family as a solo parent and even enrolled in a
short course for Medical Transcriptionists in an
attempt to improve their plight. He added that in
3. Mr. Benjie B. Cajandig the summer of 2009, his blood pressure started
Judicial Staff Assistant II to rise abnormally. It was the cause why he was
12 10 to the
rushed 12hospital twice. Since May 2009, he
Mediation Planning & Research Division
PHILJA was under the care of the SC Clinic for Benign
Prostatic Hyperthropy, which ailment caused
him many sleepless nights.
4. Ms. Sherrylyn A. Nate-Cruz
Fiscal Clerk II 10 As shown by the records,
10 this is Mr. Semilla‘s fourth
Finance Division, FMBO incursion of habitual tardiness. He was
REPRIMANDED for his first incursion of the offense
pursuant to the Court En Banc resolution dated August
5. Mr. Florentino A. Pascual 8, 2000 in A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, Re: Imposition of
Human Resource Management Officer II 10
Corresponding 11
Penalties to Employees Committing
Personnel Division, OAS-OCA Habitual Tardiness; SUSPENDED for five (5) days for
committing habitual tardiness for the second time
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC dated November 27,
6. Mr. Albert C. Semilla
2002, Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for
Computer Operator III Habitual 12Tardiness committed during the Second
10
Records Division Semester of 2000; and SUSPENDED for ten (10) days
Office of the Chief Attorney for committing the same offense for the third time
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC dated March 16,
2004, Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for
7. Ms. Jolina Pauline T. Tuazon 11 11committed during the 1st and 2nd
Habitual Tardiness
Executive Assistant II Semester of 2003.
His service records show that Mr. Semilla entered the during those months. He manifested that he will
government service in the Supreme Court as Messenger do his best to address his tardiness.
on November 7, 1979. He was promoted as Clerk on
July 1, 1983, Clerk III on July 1, 1989, and Computer 4. Ms. SHERRYLYN A. NATE-CRUZ – She
Operator III on October 17, 2006, the position he is was tardy for ten (10) times each in the months
holding at present. His performance ratings for the 1st of July and October. In her letter dated July 6,
and 2nd semesters of the year 2009 show that he 2010, Ms. Cruz explained that due to the
performed his work very satisfactorily. Since 2003, this alarming increase in her blood sugar during
is the only time again that he has incurred tardiness. those days, she was required to have a regular
medical checkup that resulted to her tardiness in
2. Mr. FLORENTINO A. PASCUAL – He was reporting for work. She added that at present,
tardy for ten (10) times in the month of she is six (6) months pregnant on her second
September and eleven (11) times in the month of child and has pre-gestational diabetes. But she
October. In his letter dated July 7, 2010, he said she will try her best not to be late for work.
explained that his tardiness was caused by his
unstable blood pressure and the traffic situation. 5. Ms. JOLINA PAULINE T. TUAZON – She
He manifested that to the best of his ability, he was tardy for eleven (11) times each in the
will try to be punctual despite his present health months of September and October. In her letter
condition caused by a mild stroke. dated July 8, 2010, she explained that during the
said period, she was preparing for an entrance
As shown by the records, this is Mr. Pascual‘s second examination scheduled for November aside from
incursion of habitual tardiness. He was the reviews she had in the evening. Thus during
REPRIMANDED for his first incursion of the offense the months of September and October, she had
pursuant to the Court En Banc Resolution dated March been going home late which at times caused her
16, 2004 in A.M. No. 00-06-09-SC, Re: Habitual to be late for work the next day. She expressed
Tardiness for the 1st and 2nd Semester of 2003. regret in committing the offense and promised to
avoid the same violation.
B. Employees incurring habitual tardiness for the first
time: 6. Ms. MARY JINGLE M. VILLOCERO – She
was tardy for eleven (11) times in the month of
1. Mr. MARC REMAN A. BESSAT – He was July and ten (10) times in the month of October.
tardy for ten (10) times each for the months of In her explanation dated July 8, 2010, Ms.
July and October. In his explanation dated July Villocero stated that her tardiness was caused by
9, 2010, he stated that during the said period, he the fact that she has three (3) children and
experienced abdominal cramping, bloating, without any maid to assist her in taking care of
gassiness and painful bowel habits, especially on them. Her husband is under medication with
mornings. He claimed that he consulted a anti-depressant, thus, she sometimes cannot
Gastroenterologist on March 2010 and was compel him to take care of everything and attend
diagnosed with Internal Hemorrhoids. He to all her children‘s needs. She averred that she
promised to do everything to improve his time is also a working student with classes during
of arrival. Saturdays and Sundays, and has been working
hard for the advancement of her career. She
2. Mr. MELQUIADES A. BRIONES – He was added that she has been trying her best to meet
tardy for fourteen (14) times in the month of her duties and obligations, both as a responsible
July and fifteen (15) times in the month of employee of the judiciary and as a mother, but in
August. In his letter dated July 6, 2010, Mr. the process, she still incurred tardiness. She
Briones explained that during those times, he vowed not to violate again the rules on tardiness.
was the only one who could manage to
accompany his son in going to school and was The OAS concluded that the concerned employees had
always caught in traffic. His wife could not incurred habitual tardiness and that their justifications
replace him in accompanying their son to school were unacceptable. Thus, it recommended the penalties
because she has fatal diabetes and could hardly to be imposed on the concerned employees,2 as follows:
move and travel far. He added that during the
said period, he was also having his medication 1. Mr. Albert Semilla, for having been found
concerning his allergies in both hands and feet. habitually tardy for the fourth time, be meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months
3. Mr. BENJIE B. CAJANDIG – He was tardy without pay with a FINAL WARNING that a
for twelve (12) times each in the months of July repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
and October, and ten (10) times in the month of more severely;
October. In his letter dated July 7, 2010, Mr.
Cajandig explained that his tardiness was mostly 2. Mr. Florentino A. Pascual, for having been
due to the distance of his residence from the found habitually tardy for the second time, be
office and due to heavy traffic which he meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for five (5)
encounters when traveling from Marcos days with a WARNING that a repetition of the
Highway to the LRT 2 Santolan Station. He same shall be dealt with more severely;
averred that this was aggravated during the rainy
season since most of his tardiness were incurred
3. Messrs. Marc Remman A. Bessat, Melquiades CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999,
A. Briones, Benjie B. Cajandig, Mmes. considers habitual tardiness as a light offense with the
Sherrylyn A. Nate-Cruz, Jolina Pauline T. following penalties:
Tuazon, and Mary Jingle M. Villocero, for
having been found habitually tardy for the first First Offense Reprimand
time, be meted the penalty of REPRIMAND
with the same warning that a repetition of the Second Offense Suspension
same shall be dealt with more severely.
Third Offense Dismissal
Ruling
The penalties recommended by the OAS are well taken.
We adopt the evaluation of the OAS. However, in the case of Albert C. Semilla, we moderate
the recommended penalty of suspension for three months
It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is without pay to one month suspension without pay but
a public trust.3 This canon includes the mandate for the with a final warning that a repetition will be dealt with
observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient more severely upon humanitarian considerations.
use of every moment of such hours for the public Although we insist that every official or employee of the
service, because only thereby may the public servants Judiciary must meet the standards of public service, we
recompense the Government and the people for must practice compassion in deserving cases to avoid the
shouldering the costs of maintaining the wrong and unwanted impression that the Court wields
Judiciary.4 Accordingly, court officials and employees only mailed fists. Semilla deserves a degree of
must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire mitigation. In that regard, Section 53 of Rule IV of the
the public‘s respect for the justice system.5 Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service9 grants the disciplining authority the
The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the
upon court officials and employees reflect the premium imposition of the proper penalty. Thus, the mitigating
placed on the image of the courts of justice. That image factors in Semilla‘s favor are the following:
is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work in the (a) His length of service and satisfactory
Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative duty of performance (i.e., having started as messenger of
everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from the Court on November 7, 1979 and having
the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts‘ served continuously until the present, with his
good name and standing as true temples of justice.6 performance in the first and second semesters of
2009, the year in question, being satisfactory);
There is no question that all the concerned employees
incurred habitual tardiness within the context of CSC (b) The fact that this infraction of habitual
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, supra. tardiness was his first since 2003; and
Thereby, they fell short of the standard of conduct
demanded from everyone connected with the (c) His pleas for compassion (due to his medical
administration of justice. Worthy of stress is that the condition of benign prostatic hyperthropy, for
nature and functions of the employment of the officials which he was under the care of the SC Clinic
and employees of the Judiciary require them to be role since May 2009, and due to his reporting to
models in the faithful observance of the constitutional work and returning home through his bicycle to
canon that public office is a public trust. They are always add to his financial capacity as a solo parent of
accountable to the people, whom they must serve with his family).
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
They can surely inspire public respect for the justice Even so, we hereby emphatically hold all the concerned
system by strictly observing official time, among others. employees to their respective promises that they will not
Absenteeism and tardiness are, therefore, commit the same infraction hereafter, or else they will be
impermissible.7 at the end of the mailed fists of the Court. Our
compassion, which is not limitless but discriminating,
The respective justifications of the concerned employees should not be taken for granted.
(consisting of illness or poor health, travel difficulties,
household responsibilities, and similar causes) are not WHEREFORE, we find and pronounce:
unacceptable. Already in Re: Supreme Court Employees
Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of 1. Albert Semilla guilty of habitual tardiness for
2005,8 we enunciated that justifications for absences and the fourth time and suspended for one (1) month
tardiness falling under the categories of illness, moral without pay, with a final warning that a
obligation to family and relatives, performance of repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
household chores, traffic and health or physical more severely;
condition are neither novel nor persuasive, and hardly
evoke sympathy. If at all, such justifications may only
2. Florentino A. Pascual guilty of habitual
mitigate liability.
tardiness for the second time and suspended for
five (5) days without pay, with a warning that a
We next discuss the penalties. repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely; and
3. Marc Remman A. Bessat, Melquiades A.
Briones, Benjie B. Cajandig, Sherrylyn A. Nate-
Cruz, Jolina Pauline T. Tuazon, and Mary Jingle
M. Villocero guilty of habitual tardiness for the
first time and reprimanded, with warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. CA-13-51-J July 2, 2013 ₱7,574.00 actual damages;
On their part, the heirs of Fabiana filed a motion for WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, we
reconsideration in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382, which the CA hereby DENY the aforementioned motion to dismiss
denied. Hence, on November 23, 2009, they appealed to filed in this case.
the Court by petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No.
189726). However, the Court, through the Third We hereby give the parties a fresh period of fifteen (15)
Division,9 denied the petition for review on certiorari days from notice hereof within which to file memoranda
through the resolution of January 13, 2010,10 quoted as in support of their respective sides of the case.
follows:
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Decision dated 29 September 2009 of the Court of The second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) was
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382, the Court resolves ultimately resolved on September 16, 2011 by the Sixth
to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that Division of the CA, composed of Associate Justice
the appellate court committed any reversible error in the Amelita G. Tolentino, Associate Justice Normandie B.
challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Pizarro (ponente) and Associate Justice Rodil V.
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Zalameda, dismissing the petition upon not finding the
NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion.
A careful consideration of the petition indicates a failure
of the petitioners to show any cogent reason why the As earlier adverted to, the complainant accuses Presiding
actions of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Justice Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Dicdican and
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals which Associate Justice Cruz with thereby willfully disobeying
have passed upon the same issue should be reversed. the resolution of January 13, 2010 promulgated by the
Petitioners failed to show that their factual findings are Court.
not based on substantial evidence or that their decisions
are contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence. The complaint lacks merit.
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On
OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY
July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI‘s prayer for the
JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
WPMI.3
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium
project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be
known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI‘s petition
DECISION
for corporate rehabilitation was approved.4
BERSAMIN, J.:
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No.
65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere with the injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a
due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO
complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin
court as a means of vindicating the integrity and the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
exemplars of fairness and honesty in both their official No. L-345 of the Municipal Trial
conduct and their personal actuations, including their Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,
business and commercial transactions. The community Dumaguete City (that is, the
sees them in no other light. Thus, we insist upon this criminal case the complainant had
standard in dealing with the administrative complaint filed against Hernando charging him
against an employee in the Office of the Clerk of Court with other deceits), because said
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City, case was based on the same facts
1999,[1] complainant Wilson Tan charged respondent due to his failure to keep his
Jesus F. Hernando, Clerk IV, with dishonesty, moral promise to pay to the complainant
borrow P3,000.00 because Hernando then needed hold in abeyance its action on the evaluation, report and
money; that as payment Hernando promised to deliver recommendation in order to await the final outcome of
his October 1998 half-month salary check Criminal Case No. L-345.[7]
reneged on his promise and did not pay his obligation Administrator (OCAd) received from the complainant a
despite repeated demands; and that the act of Hernando certified copy of the decision promulgated in Criminal
compelled him to commence a criminal case Case No. L-345 on August 9, 2004 by the MTCC,
for estafa against Hernando.[2] Branch 2, in Dumaguete City,[8] together with the entry
of final judgment.[9]
borrowed P3,000.00 from the complainant on October 1, matter to the Executive Judge, RTC,
1998, but insisted that he had already paid the loan in in Dumaguete City for evaluation, report and
On March 12, 2001, we referred the matter to Bustamante reported that the decision in Criminal Case
Executive Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu of the RTC No. L-345 rendered by the MTCC, Branch 2,
in Dumaguete City for investigation, report and in Dumaguete City had absolved Hernando criminally
Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the On August 13, 2003, the OCA recommended that a
Judiciary is a very serious offense that must be severely resolution addressed to Catena‘s home and office
punished. Dismissal may be meted on the employee, addresses requiring her to comment within 10 days from
unless she had meanwhile ceased to be an employee, in notice be issued.6 On October 1, 2003, therefore, the
which case a high fine shall be imposed. Court, after noting the anonymous complaint, required
Catena to comment on it within 10 days from notice. 7
Antecedents
Catena still failed to comment on the complaint
This administrative case stemmed from an undated thereafter, prompting the Court to require her on March
anonymous letter-complaint charging respondent Nonita 17, 2004 to show cause why she should not be
Catena (Catena), a Court Stenographer III of Branch 50 disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
of the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City, failure, and to comply with the October 1, 2003
Palawan (RTC) with gross dishonesty she allegedly resolution by submitting the comment within 10
committed in connection with her Civil Service days.8 Subsequently, on November 24, 2004, the Court
eligibility accusing her of having caused another person issued another resolution to reiterate the show-cause
to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her order of March 17, 2004.9
stead.
On March 9, 2005, however, Judge Nelia Yap-
1
The letter reads, thus: Fernandez of the RTC formally informed the Court that
Catena had already resigned from her position effective
Sir: on January 2, 2003.10
I would like to bring to your attention an anomaly In view of this communication, the Court resolved on
brought about by one Noneta Catina. April 11, 2005, to await the compliance of Catena with
the resolution dated November 24, 2004.11 On
September 26, 2005, the Court required Judge Yap-
She is permanently employed as stenographer under the
Fernandez to provide Catena‘s current and correct
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 50 here in the
address within 15 days from notice because Catena
Justice Hall of Puerto Princesa City.
continued to ignore the previous resolutions.12
In 1998, somebody took the stenographer‘s examination
Eventually on February 12, 2007, the Court directed the
in her behalf in Leyte. She allegedly passed said
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC to provide Catena‘s
examination that gave her the permanent position of
current and correct address within 10 days13 because of
stenographer in 1998.
Judge Yap-Fernandez‘s intervening disability
14
retirement. In turn, Ms. Jessie C. Gipal, as Officer-in-
May I request for a verification and if found guilty, I Charge of the RTC, complied, and furnished Catena‘s
hope CSC will do something in fairness to those who are current and correct address to be at Purok Sandiwa,
taking your Stenographer‘s examination. Brgy. New Princess 5300, Puerto Princesa City, 15 which
compliance was duly noted on June 25,
Thank you very much and more power! 2007.16 Subsequently, on February 4, 2008, the Court
considered as served on Catena the previous resolutions
Concerned Citizen of June 25 2007, October 1, 2003, March 17, 2004 and
November 24, 2004 because of the return on the service
On January 18, 2002, Justice Jose P. Perez, a Member of at that address being "Return to Sender-unclaimed."17
this Court, as Deputy Court Administrator, forwarded
the complaint against Catena for investigation by the On April 28, 2008, the Court resolved anew to await
Legal Division of the Office of the Court Administrator Catena‘s comment,18 and decided to dispense with her
(OCA). The investigation revealed discrepancies comment only on August 20, 2008, and to refer the
between the pictures, signatures and other details complaint to the OCA for evaluation, report and
contained in the Career Service Examination permit recommendation.19
submitted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on
one hand, and the 201 file of Catena, on the other.2 The complaint was later on re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter on the basis of the
On February 21, 2002, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, a recommendation made on October 7, 2009 by Justice
Member of this Court, the Court Administrator then, Perez, then already the Court Administrator, who
recommended that Catena be held liable for dishonesty to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her
and be dismissed from the service with prejudice to re- cessation from office by virtue of her intervening
employment in any branch, agency, instrumentality of resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the
the government, including government owned and administrative complaint against her, for the act
controlled corporations.20 complained of had been committed when she was still in
the service. Nor did such cessation from office render
On October 26, 2009, the Court required Catena to the administrative case moot and academic. Indeed, the
manifest if she was willing to submit the case for Court‘s jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
resolution on the basis of the records and pleadings filed administrative complaint was not lost because the
within 10 days from notice.21 On December 13, 2010, respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of
the Court resent the resolution because the postal carrier the case.29 Otherwise, exacting responsibility for
reported that Catena as the addressee had been "out of administrative liabilities incurred would be easily
town" and did not receive the mail matter.22 avoided or evaded.
After the subsequent attempt to serve still failed because, The point of the complaint against Catena is that she
as noted on the envelope, Catena as the addressee had misrepresented in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that
"moved out," the Court deemed the resolution of she held a Sub-Professional Civil Service Eligibility, but
October 26, 2009 as served on her on April 13, 2011. 23 in truth another person had taken the Civil Service
Examination in her place. Her claim that she held a Sub-
Still, on May 30, 2011,24 the Court directed the Director Professional Civil Service Eligibility with a rating of
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate 86.48%, as stated in her PDS submitted to the Court,
the whereabouts of Catena and to submit a report thereon was, therefore, entirely false.30
within 10 days from notice.
Attempting to disprove the charge that she did not take
On August 5, 2011, Head Agent (HA) Rosauro D. the eligibility examination herself, Catena submitted her
Bautista of the NBI District Office in Puerto Princesa approved leave application and her daily time records
City sent the following report, viz: corresponding to the period of the eligibility
examination. Her submission was really not enough,
Respondent, NONITA V. CATENA was located at her however, because said documents did not establish that
residence in Purok Sandiwa, Barangay Tiniguiban, she had herself taken the examination, or that she had
Puerto Princesa but refused to sign the herein NOTICE, been personally at the testing site on the date of the
nevertheless received the document. Agent of the Puerto examination. At best, the approved leave application
Princesa District Office served the herein NOTICE on attested only that she had applied for a leave of absence
respondent on July 25, 2011 and the same was from work, and that her application had been approved,
communicated to the Office of the Deputy Director for while her daily time records affirmed only that she did
Operations Services in Manila. Photograph of herein not report to her office on the dates that she had
respondent was taken for identitifcation and reference supposedly gone on leave.
purposes.25
Perhaps anticipating that her submission of the daily
On August 9, 2011, NBI Director Magtanggol Gatdula, time records and approved leave application would not
citing and quoting the foregoing report of HA Bautista, suffice to support her explanation, she stated in her
submitted his compliance with the resolution of May 30, request for the 30-day extension to file the comment that
2011,26 praying that the compliance be accepted. she would be needing the time to gather the documents
she would submit as her evidence to disprove the charge
Hence, we resolve. of gross dishonesty,31 specifically: (1) a certification
from the head office of the Negros Navigation Company
in Manila, to show that she had travelled from Puerto
Ruling
Princesa City to Iloilo City, and from Cebu City to Leyte
on the date of the examination; (2) affidavits of residents
Based on its investigation, the OCA found discrepancies of Leyte attesting to her being in the locality of the
between the pictures, signatures and other details examination and to her taking the examination herself;
contained in Catena‘s Career Service Examination (3) records on file with the CSC office in Leyte; and (4)
permit submitted to the CSC, on one hand, and those other evidence of similar nature. But ultimately she did
found in her 201 file,27 on the other; and concluded that not come forward with the promised documentary
she was thereby guilty of gross dishonesty. It evidence, notwithstanding her awareness of the desire of
recommended her dismissal from the service, with the Court to hear her side.
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency,
instrumentality or agency of the government including
Compounding Catena‘s situation was her unusual silence
government-owned and -controlled corporations.28
on the complaint despite the very ample opportunity
accorded her to comment. Being conscious of the gravity
The findings and recommendation of the OCA, being of the complaint against her, she should have come
based on established facts, are well-taken, but we modify forward to explain her side. In that regard, too, we have
the recommended sanction in view of Catena‘s to stress that the directives for her to comment were not
intervening resignation from the service effective on mere requests to be lightly taken, but firm commands to
January 2, 2003. be obeyed without the least delay.32 What her silence
signified was that she had no desire to clear her name
Let it be said at the outset that Catena‘s resignation from and to save her employment in the Judiciary. Worse, her
the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction
silence now also signifies that she had nothing to say in d. The penalty of suspension shall carry with it
her own defense, because it was naturally expected of disqualification for promotion corresponding to
her based on the natural instinct of man for self- the period of suspension.
preservation to resist the serious charge if it was untrue
and unfair. Her silence in the face of the accusation of e. The penalty of fine shall carry with it
gross dishonesty was justifiably construed as her implied disqualification for promotion for a period of
admission of the truth thereof.33 twice the number of days he was fined.
Considering that Catena‘s misrepresentation of her f. The penalty of fine shall be paid to the agency
eligibility concerned a material fact that enabled her to imposing the same, computed on the basis of
secure her appointment equated to her deliberate respondent‘s salary at the time the decision
fabrication of the truth concerning her eligibility, she becomes final and executor.
was guilty of gross dishonesty. She should not be
allowed to remain in the service of the Judiciary, g. The following are the Guidelines for the
because no other office in the Government exacted a payment of fine:
greater demand for mortal righteousness from an official
or employee than a position in the Judiciary.34 xxxx
A finding of dishonesty against an employee in the Civil In Civil Service Commission v. Macud,35 the penalty of
Service carries with it the penalty of dismissal. Under dismissal was prescribed with the accessory penalties
Rule IV Section 52 (A) (1) of the Revised Uniform against respondent who had been found guilty of making
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Rules a false declaration in her PDS that she had passed the
(Revised Uniform Rules), dishonesty is classified as a Professional Board Examination for Teachers. In Cruz v.
grave offense that is already punishable by dismissal Civil Service Commission36 and Civil Service
from the service even at the first offense. Commission v. Sta. Ana,37 the employees found guilty of
similar offenses were dismissed. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim
In addition, Section 57 and Section 58 of the Revised had masqueraded as Gilda Cruz, and had taken the Civil
Uniform Rules provide as follows: Service examination in lieu of Cruz. Both Paitim and
Cruz were meted the penalty of dismissal from the
Section 57. Administrative Disabilities/Accessories to service. In Sta. Ana, another person had taken the Civil
Administrative Penalties. Service examination for Sta. Ana, who was held guilty
of dishonesty and dismissed from the service.
a. Cancellation of eligibility
We do not deviate from such precedents. Catena‘s
b. Forfeiture of retirement benefits. dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty,
with her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement
c. Disqualification for reinstatement or benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from
reemployment. reemployment in the government service to be perpetual.
Nonetheless, we do not forfeit her accrued leave credits
d. Disqualification for promotion. to accord with the ruling in Sta. Ana.38
e. Bar from taking any Civil Service Catena‘s intervening resignation necessarily means that
Examination the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented
against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion
Certain Penalties. of the Court.39 As earlier clarified, the resignation did
not prevent this resolution from being made, because
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it resignation should not be used as a convenient means or
that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of strategy to evade administrative liability.40
retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules
government service, unless otherwise provided provides that the penalty of fine shall be in an amount
in the decision. not exceeding the salary for six months had respondent
not resigned, the rate for which is that obtaining upon at
b. The penalty of transfer shall carry with it the time of her resignation.
disqualification for promotion for a period of six
(6) months from the date of respondent reports Finally, even though her penalty is a fine, she should still
to the new position or station. suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from re-employment in the Government that the penalty
c. The penalty of demotion shall carry with it of dismissal carried. A contrary holding would have the
disqualification for promotion at the rate of two undesirable effect of giving the erring employee the
(2) months for every step or one (1) month for means to avoid the accessory penalty by the simple
every range of salary by which he was demoted expedient of resigning.
to be computed from the date respondent reports
to the new position or station.1âwphi1 Let it be stressed that all court employees of the
Judiciary, being public servants in an office dispensing
justice, must always act with a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court
regulations. They should be models of uprightness,
fairness and honesty, for that is the only way to maintain
the people's respect for and faith in the Judiciary. They
should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts.41
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6732, Oct 22, 2013 writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the
falsification.[6]
ATTY. OSCAR EMBIDO v. ATTY. SALVADOR
PE In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley
Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
BERSAMIN, J.: 2005,[7] wherein he stated that it was the respondent who
had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a
and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment. fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary
Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit
The Case dated March 20, 2005.[8]
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, [9] but
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The
(respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy
allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn
the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique statement.
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido. the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of
the investigation, with a recommendation that the
respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public
Antecedent document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Court of the RTC, received a written communication Practices Act).[10] The NBI likewise recommended to the
from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment
Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the proceedings be commenced against the
decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge respondent.[11] Then Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Confidant.[12]
Quioyo.[1]
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter submitted his counter-affidavit,[13] whereby he denied
from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley's petition for
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice
Rey Laserna.[2] on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds
for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what
retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 appeared to be a court decision;[14] that Dy Quioyo had
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the
RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation;
wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW),
court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW;
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia,
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria. Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of
Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
Informed that the requested decision and case records statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit
did not exist,[3] Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that
2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible
in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Quioyo.[15]
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in
court proceedings in the UK.[4] Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution[16] treating the
respondent's counter-affidavit as his comment, and
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr.
Hunt to apprise him of the situation. [5]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the
Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in In a report and recommendation dated June 14,
2006,[17] Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP The respondent's main defense consisted in blanket
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no
of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney's hand in the falsification, and claimed that the
Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
recommended his suspension from the practice of law implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady
for one year. She concluded that the respondent had characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the
forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that
making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death means to achieve his ends.
of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner,
when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the However, the respondent's denial and his implication
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo's
petitioner;[18] and that the respondent had received categorical declaration on the respondent's personal
P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature
She rationalized her conclusions thusly: was positive evidence, was not overcome by the
respondent's blanket denial, which by nature was
negative evidence.[23] Also, the imputation of
Respondent's denials are not worthy of merit. wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics
Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa and did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too,
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after
thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10,
of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to 2005, had required him to comment.[24] The belatedness
believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing
Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim more than an afterthought.
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuela's branch except for the names and dates? The respondent relied on the sworn statement
Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her
did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked deceased husband had been instrumental in the
his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance
true, he should have made this known in the was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the
investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay
mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by
falsely implicate him in this incident.[19] the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the
falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the
2007,[20] the IBP Board of Governors adopted and real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
approved, with modification, the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by In light of the established circumstances, the respondent
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the
six years. falsification of the decision in a non-existent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at
passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709[21] denying the all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
respondent's motion for reconsideration and affirming Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[22] of law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave
the Rules of Court. in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage
respondent's comment/opposition as his appeal by in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant's conduct.
reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to
require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant's Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral
comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
the IBP to transmit the original records of the case lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of
within 15 days from notice. law.[25] Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected
a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the
Ruling act made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing
for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum as a member of the Bar.
of money.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the
Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in
any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in
their professional fidelity and integrity.[26] The Court will
not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on
those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to
meet the enduring demands of their Attorney's Oath for
them to:
SO ORDERED.