Grace Poe Citizenship: 5 Things To Know

About The SC Decision

BY MARICRIS FADERUGAO ON 03/15/16 AT 03:02 PM

2016 Philippine presidential candidate senator Grace Poe greets her

supporters after addressing the International Women's Day rally by Gabriela
Party List women's group in Manila March 8, 2016.
The issue on Grace Poe’s residency and citizenship has been hounding her
from the time she announced her bid for the Philippine presidency. On
December 23, 2015, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sitting en
banc, canceled Poe’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of alleged
misrepresentation. Afterwhich, The case was brought to the Supreme Court
(SC) for judicial review.

More than Poe’s political career, the decision sets an important precedence
on the citizenship status of foundlings in the Philippines.

Supreme Court Spokesman Theodore Te announced on March 8, 2016 that

SC ruled in favor of Poe in a 9-6 vote, effectively annulling COMELEC’s
decision. Three days later, the high court explained its ruling in a 47-page
decision written by Justice Perez. Here are five of the highlights of the
decision:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that Poe has met the 10-year residency
requirement for President under the constitution. The court ruled that the
period for Poe’s residency began in May 25, 2005 when she returned from the
United States for good.
There are three requisites to acquire residency: a. Physical presence in a new
locality, b. Intention to remain on the same locality, and c. Intention to
abandon the old domicile. To determine the date, one must demonstrate bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one coupled definite acts which corresponds to the purpose.

According to the Supreme Court decision, Poe satisfied all the requisites by
presenting “voluminious evidence.” These evidences are:
a. U.S. passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the
Philippines everytime she travelled abroad
b. E-mail correspondences from March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange shipment of their household items to the Philippines
c. School records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 with tax identification card issued on July 2005

d. March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change
of address

e. Documents of sale of their US home on April 27, 2006

f. A filled-up questionnaire submitted to the US embassy where petitioner

indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005 with an
affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe attesting the same

g. An affidavit from her husband confirming that they decided to relocated in

the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the US only to finish
some work and to sell the family home.

The said pieces of evidence were undisputed by the COMELEC.

2. The SC ruled that foundlings in the Philippines are natural-born

Filipino citizens. Given Poe’s “unknown parentage” as a foundling, those
who assail her candidacy argue that Poe is not a ‘natural-born’ citizen
because blood relationship determines natural-born status. The SC said that
asking Poe to identify her parents would be an impossible condition. Despite
being a foundling, the court said that Poe’s blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen is “demonstrable” with sufficient circumstantial evidences. Case in
point, the Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority from 1965 to 1975 (Poe was born in 1968). The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino is 99.83%. For Iloilo province alone, between 1960 to 1970, 99.62% of
the population were Filipinos. Poe’s physical features: her height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and oval face were also taken
into consideration.
Parenthetically, the court also noted that the burden of proof rests on those
who filed for her disqualification. They should have shown that Poe’s parents
are foreigners. Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden
to her because such fact did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos.

The court also inquired into the intention of the framers of the 1935
Constitution. The records show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. The Solicitor General points out that the framers
“worked to create a just and humane society” that “they were reasonable
patriots that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent
against foundlings.”

The ruling cited International law as its legal basis in concluding that
foundlings in the Philippines are natural-born Filipino citizens. The court
invoked the doctrine of incorporation which states that “generally accepted
principles of international law form part of the laws of the land” for the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, UN Convention on the Rights of a child and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which guarantees the right
of every child to acquire a nationality.

Likewise, the court also explained that under Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
a child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. The principle is also analogous to the principle contained in
Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness which says that foundlings are presumed to be born of citizens
of the country where they were found. These principles were affirmed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory.

3. The natural-born citizenship status can be reacquired. One of the

issues raised in the disqualification case is that Poe’s repatriation in July 2006
did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC
argued that what is reacquired is only plain “Philippine citizenship.” The court
said that this is erroneous. Citing the case of Bengson III vs HRET and
Tabasa vs Court of Appeals, the court said that repatriation under R.A. No.
9225, will restore the natural-born status if the applicant was a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
4. The COMELEC does not have the power to directly rule on the
constitutional qualifications of the candidate. The court said that the
COMELEC is authorized to cancel a candidate’s certificate of candidacy
exclusively on the ground of material misrepresentation” but it is restrained
from deciding the qualifications or lack thereof of the candidate. Thus, if the
candidate’s qualifications under the constitution is a subject of debate, such
factual issue on the candidate’s qualifications should be established first by
the proper authority.
5. Residency is a separate qualification from citizenship. One of the
arguments used is that Poe’s residence should not have been established in
2005 because at the time, she was still an American citizen. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly established that citizenship and residency are two
separate formal qualifications with independent rationale. In other words, Poe
need not be a citizen at the time she became a resident. She only needed to
establish her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen before the 2016 May
elections.

2. What are the modes in acquiring Philippine citizenship?

There are two (2) generally recognized forms of acquiring Philippine

citizenship:

1. Filipino by birth
1. Jus soli (right of soil) which is the legal principle that a
person’s nationality at birth is determined by the place of
birth (e.g. the territory of a given state)
2. Jus sanguinis (right of blood) which is the legal principle
that, at birth, an individual acquires the nationality of
his/her natural parent/s. The Philippine adheres to this
principle.
2. Filipino by naturalization

2. What are the modes in acquiring Philippine citizenship?

There are two (2) generally recognized forms of acquiring Philippine

citizenship:

1. Filipino by birth
1. Jus soli (right of soil) which is the legal principle that a
person’s nationality at birth is determined by the place of
birth (e.g. the territory of a given state)
2. Jus sanguinis (right of blood) which is the legal principle
that, at birth, an individual acquires the nationality of
his/her natural parent/s. The Philippine adheres to this
principle.
2. Filipino by naturalization

ARTICLE IV, SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority;

“Frivaldo Doctrine,” the Supreme Court affirmed and installed a foreign citizen who
won governor in a local election.
GLORIA VS. PEOPLE

ISSUES:

1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial
of the demurrers to evidence – YES.

PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her
demurrer to evidence.

HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
GMA’s demurrer to evidence.

General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides,
“the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”

Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ
will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial” (citing Ong v.
People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000]).

2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO.

A. As regards petitioner GMA

HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in denying GMA’s
demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and committed plunder. The
Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and
Uriarte.

A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was
an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective
actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not
allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who
may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express
conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified
in either manner. Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “The gravamen of the conspiracy charge…is that
each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.”

Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such
identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be
properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the
charges against each of them.

PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an implied
conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. The sole overt act of
GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the
requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests
in that manner, GMA violated the following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence
funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs
only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.

HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any
design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire illgotten
wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof
thereon, GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of
any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval
was not by any means irregular or illegal.

a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The
requests, similarly worded, furnished:

(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;

(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and

(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.

The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the integrity of its
operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to how specific
the requests should be made.

b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently,
although only 15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF
could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO’s revenues, already co-mingled with the operating
fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was available budget from which to
draw the additional requests for CIFs.

PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the
amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over
PCSO.

HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to

impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is
misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible.

The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all
litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue (compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo [G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011]).

B. As regards Aguas

HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient
bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime. Without GMA’s participation, he could not release any money because there was then no
budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not
amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the
crime of plunder – NO.

A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
total amount of not less than P50 million – NO.

HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even
Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired illgotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution
showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.

B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information was proved
by the Prosecution – NO.

SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the
Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was
necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public coffers.

HELD: The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080
together (misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds) is that the public
officer used the property taken. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:

Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx

xxxx

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its

case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused with or without leave of court.

As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence amounts

to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof
would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

WHAT IS A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE?

 It is a motion to dismiss the case filed by the defense after the prosecution rests
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution
An interlocutory order is one that does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be decided upon.[8] An order granting or denying an
application for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not
appealable.[9] Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari
and/or Prohibition under Rule 65

An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits
is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.

Corpus Delicti
A Latin term meaning the "body of [the] crime" that refers to the idea that
the requisite elements of a crime must be proven before an individual can be
tried for the crime.
 The doctrine of noscitur a sociis means that "the meaning of an unclear or
ambiguous word in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering
the words with which it is associated in the context."

Malum inse v malum prohibita

TECSON vs COMELEC

Monday, June 29, 2015

Consti II case digest: Tecson vs. Comelec

Citizenship
TECSON VS COMELEC
FACTS:
FPJ was a candidate for presidential election. However his qualification was questioned, specifically he being a
natural born Filipino Citizen. Petitioner herein contended that FPJ, being an illegitimate son of an alleged Filipino
Citizen and an America Citizen could have not acquired that Citizenship og his father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizenship.

HELD:
In arriving at the answer whether or not FPJ is a natural born citizen, the Supreme Court reviewed the following
instances:

 The citizenship of the father and the grand father of FPJ.

 The constitutional provision existing at the time the father of FPJ acquired his citizenship from the former's father,
the grand father of FPJ.

The Supreme court held that,t he the constitutional provision applicable in finding out the answer is the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902.

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Posted by Whentheskyisblue at 11:26 AM

considering that for all intents and purposes, he is Filipino and natural-born at that, with his ancestors
benefitting from the en-masse Filipinization that occurred by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
lawyer further explained that pursuant to said law, all inhabitants of the Philippines at that time, including
their descendants, were considered Filipino citizens.

MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS

Liberty abode and the right to travel are constitutionally guaranteed rights in many countries where
liberty abode means that a person has a right to live wherever they wish, and the right to travel
means that a person has a right to travel wherever they wish. It is considered a part of domestic law in
most countries and is an accepted principle of international law.

Liberty of abode is freedom of person to have his home in any place chosen and
to change it at will, and go travel as he pleases without interference from any
source, except upon lawful order of the court or in interest of national security,
public safety or public health. This is shown in article iii sec 6

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR no. 88211 September 15,1989

Posted on August 2, 2008 by asteroids08

FACTS:
The petitioner are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
president’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in determining that return of former
president Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to returned to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated power of the
president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the president to determine whether it must be granted or denied
 Liberty of abode is freedom of person to have his home in any place chosen and
to change it at will, and go travel as he pleases without interference from any
source, except upon lawful order of the court or in interest of national security,
public safety or public health. This is shown in