that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the
VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987 261
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
PETITION to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture,
whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is
unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not
equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and
of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the
scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.1
_______________
1Rollo, p. 5.
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share
of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same
vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of
P440.00.3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an
area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area.4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem
the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen.5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla
Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother.6
The trial court ** also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right
had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in
1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held
law.7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly
denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which
consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the
petitioners.8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same
house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemp-
_______________
263
VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987 263
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
tion.9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and
neighbors whose children went to school together.10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and
that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had
merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just
narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the
petitioners had been purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially
significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by
the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the
other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and
application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the
petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period
of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor."
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court*** declared that the notice required
by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals11 applied by the
trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was
required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the
_______________
264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So
long, therefore, as the latter (i.e.,the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale
1
and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start
running."
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy,12 the Court, speaking through the same
learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by
the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article
1623, reading as follows:
" Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by
the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners."
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would
not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that
"hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the
fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs.
Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit,
that in view of such deficiency, the 30day period for redemption had not begun to
run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in-
_______________
124 SCRA 527.
265
VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such
a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard
to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."13 While we admittedly may not legislate,
we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the
will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment.
In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth,"
to give effect to the lawmaker's will.'
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit
is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
_______________
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
the law makers."14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting
time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it
is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to
begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day
or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The
complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and
fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends
265 to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be
written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid
notice although it was not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day
period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents'
pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in
1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the
other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964,
_______________
14 Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila Race
Horse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil.
622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.
2
315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578; People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
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Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976,
when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually
informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and
ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of
thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties
sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
redemption had already been extinguished because the period f or its exercise had
already expired.
The f ollowing doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which
he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon
inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
same as if he had known the facts. "15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all
of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then
it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
_______________
15Ater v. Smith 245 111. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves
are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply
is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the
filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their
267
right ofredemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due."16 That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
Petition granted.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. us. NLRC
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a “Memorandum for File” which did not mention the words “resign” and/or
“resignation” nonetheless juridically constitute voluntary resignation? In
answering this question, the Court took into account not merely the literal meaning
of the words and phrases used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances
attendant to its writing as well as antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent
actions, which were
207
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 207
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
inconsistent with the desire for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent
executive occupying a position of trust in the Philippine Star and gifted with an
unusual writing ability.
These circumstances and actions are explained by this Court in resolving this
petition for certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division)2 in NLRC NCR CA 001863–91 entitled “Felix R.
Alegre, Jr. vs. Philippines Today, Inc” promulgated on September 30, 1993, which
reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., dated May 15, 1991.
In a Resolution dated November 16, 1993, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
was denied.3
The Facts
3
The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI) is the
owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of national and international
circulation, while the individual petitioners are officers and members of the board
of directors of PTI, namely, Betty Go-Belmonte, chairman of the board; Arturo A.
Borjal, president; Maximo V. Soliven, publisher and chairman, editorial board; and
Isaac G. Belmonte, treasurer. Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed
by PTI in July 1986 as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star with a
monthly salary of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00). He later became chief
investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher. His monthly compensation
was correspondingly increased to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
On October 20,1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of
absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for
him to undergo fur-
________________
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
ther medical consultations abroad.4 Four days later, on October 24, 1988, he wrote
a “Memorandum for File"5 addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte with copies
furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI, the text of which. is
reproduced below:
“MEMORANDUM FOR FILE
FOR : BETTY GO-BELMONTE
Chairman & CEO, The STAR Group of Publications
FROM : FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
DATE : 24 October 1988
SUBJECT : HAVING IT ALL
Truth like medicine hurts. But it cures.
The nice little chat we had last Thursday was most revealing. And certainly
disconcerting.
What you had to tell me pained me, or course. But it has helped me just as
much. It enabled me to see things clearly in their right perspectives. More
importantly, it provided me with the answers to the questions that had long nagged
me in my wakeful state.
For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts
by most of the senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put
a finger at such a feeling somehow enhanced the angst within me. Until our chat.
Now all the demons of my anxiety have been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick
the wounds of my betrayal. lt isn’t easy, I know. But I shall pull through. Your
candor and demonstrated faith in my person have been most assuaging. And for
that alone, I am most grateful.
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less
than the publisher himself, to join him at the Philippines Today, Inc., and the STAR
Group of Publications, I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well.
The insults he had later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had
spread around, casting doubts on my personal and professional integrity, had
mercilessly torn at my soul, causing metaphysical death.
_______________
209
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 209
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
My credentials as a working journalist, I’d like to believe, got me this job at the
STAR in the first place. And my bylines in the series of articles in the STAR From
Day One of my official affiliation with the Company, should establish that fact.
I was an investigative reporter at the Manila Times when the publisher offered
me to work with him at the STAR in 1986. I was given the assignment as senior
investigative reporter, then chief investigative writer, until I was given a fancy title
of assistant to the publisher.
As a corporate guy assisting the publisher in his day-to-day official function—
and this is where I feel very strongly about citing some specifics of the things I did
in this area, to wit:
... (omitted are said “specifics” of Respondent Alegre’s accomplishments as
assistant to the publisher deemed by this Court as not relevant to the appreciation
of this memorandum in relation to the consideration of the petition.)
As can be gleaned from this recital of some of the “things done” (despite my
distaste for trumpeting one’s deeds, but has to be said, to set the record straight, in
this instance), one can see that I obviously don different hats at any one time, doing
administration and operations functions, apart from my journalistic duties. That I
work as a teamplayer, and trying hard to be goodat (sic) it, cannot be denied.
FOR DOING ALL THESE in the best spirit of corporate teamupmanship, what
did I get in RETURN?
1. 1.A pittance, salary/compensation-wise
2. 2.Being conveniently bypassed in promotions, pay hikes, and other perks
3. 3.Hindered from active participation in corporate affairs, by shooting at
my ideas that otherwise would have been workable and profitable for
the Company and its people (CF. Item 2 of my memo dtd 06 September
88 which had you interested in and supportive of).
4. 4.Personally and professionally maligned, and accused of being an NPA
(non-performing asshole, pardon my French).
By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable
society: ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove .... anything or everything comes crashing down.
I’M HAVING IT ALL!
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
 I am writing this letter not, certainly, to make any appeal, but simply to go on
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
record that I did not resign. I filed a leave of absence. Yes. And that was
Since I am on leave, I guess I won’t be able to see you for a while. I wish to take this
dully (sic) approved. Then I sent you a memorandum for file expressing my
opportunity to express my profound appreciation and sincere thanks for your
sentiments on certain things, candid statements that came to b4 (sic)expressed
genuine concren (sic) and honest initiatives to do a good turn on my behalf. You
inspired by your candor and sincerity in our last little chat. Now, if you read that
have been most candid and forthright with me. I can’t be any less.
memo to mean resignation, that is your responsibility. And I am not just about to
Thank you for everything. God bless.
contest it. x x x”
Very sincerely,
This was followed by another letter on January 2, 1989, wherein Alegre through
(Sgd.) FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
counsel,8 reiterated that he never resigned. He accused petitioners of illegal
dismissal as can be perceived allegedly from the discrimination against him in
copy furnished: promotions, benefits and the ploy to oust him by considering his memorandum as a
resignation. He claimed that as a result, he suffered mental anguish, social
Members of the Board, Phils. Today, Inc. humiliation, besmirched reputation and moral shock. He thus demanded
Dr. Ronaldo G. Asuncion indemnification for “the material and moral losses he has incurred.” He further
Mr. Antonio Roces” wrote that he was not insisting to be taken back after being shown that he was no
On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a longer wanted in the company.
letter,6 as follows: Counsel9 for petitioners, in a reply on January 19, 1989, explained that the
“November 9, 1988 acceptance of Alegre’s resignation was a Collective decision of the board of directors
MR. FELIX ALEGRE since “nobody in his right mind would write a memorandum of the sort he wrote
and still not resign. To them, the memorandum was tantamount to a resignation
Dear Jun, even if Mr. Alegre did not say so
_______________
During our board meeting yesterday, we discussed your letter dated October 24,
1988, and the Board decided to accept your resignation and that it would take effect
on November 22, 1988 upon expiration of your one-month leave. 212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
I would like to take this opportunity to say that we were happy to have had you
with the STAR Group of Publications and that we would like to wish you the best Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
of luck. in so much words.” With respect to his claim for damages, petitioners’ counsel said,
God bless. Thank you. “he has not shown any specific fact or circumstance that would justify his claim,
Very truly yours, even remotely.” Hence, “the Star cannot accede to the same”
BETTY GO BELMONTE On May 17, 1989, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
Chairman of the Board damages against herein petitioners.10 The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint in
The Philippine Star” his decision of May 15, 1991. We quote significant portions of said decision:
The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing “This office has minutely disected (sic) the letter and while it be said that nothing
surprise over the acceptance of his therein mentions about resigning from his position as Assistant to the Publisher, a
________________ perusal of the letter as a whole shows that the intention of the complainant was to
resign from his post. The subject as—“Having it all” together with his frustrations
and disappointment in the office coupled with his statement that “when push comes
6Records, p. 28.
to a shove, everything comes crushing (sic) down” and that: he is “having it all” and
211
with his concluding sentence of “Thank you for everything” are (sic) clear
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 211 indications that he was in fact resigning.
As a journalist and a writer, complainant need not write his letter of resignation
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
in black and white. He can do so in many other ways, words and actions to show his
“resignation” as stated in the above-quoted letter. His letter 7 partly stated:
real intention of leaving his job.
“It certainly beats me to be told that my ‘resignation’ has been accepted, when in
xxx xxx xxx
truth and in fact, no such move, however implicit it may be, and no such letter has
Complainant’s subsequent overt acts particularly his failure to report to his job
ever been made from my end.
after the expiration of his leave of absence, his being gainfully employed with the
xxx xxx xxx
Office of Senator Laurel (as Chief of Staff) and his act of clearing and removing his

5
personal files, things and belongings from his desk prior to his (complainant)
knowledge or receipt of the letter accepting his resignation(,) clearly indicates that
complainant was not terminated from his job but rather he resigned from his job ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal and damages for lack of merit, and ordering
respondent, Philippines Today, Inc., to pay complainant the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS by way of separation pay in the interest of
compassionate
_______________
10NLRC Case No. 00–05–02317–89.
213
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
labor justice; and dismissing Respondents (sic) counterclaim for damages for lack of
merit.11
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC. Adopting the
definition in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition) of resignation as a “formal
renouncement or relinquishment of an office,” it held that herein Respondent Alegre
did not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete
and operative resignation. According to the NLRC, the request for a leave of absence
by Respondent Alegre meant that he intended to return after the period of his
absence. Such intent was bolstered by his filing of a request for an extension of his
leave. Further, when he received the letter of Petitioner Belmonte dated November
9, 1988 informing him of the acceptance by the Board of his resignation, he
immediately wrote a letter to Petitioner Belmonte, expressing in no uncertain terms
that he did not resign. These circumstances led the NLRC to hold that Respondent
Alegre was constructively dismissed without just cause and to order petitioners to
pay him full backwages for three years from the time of dismissal, separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 12
Issues
Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion:
1. 1.in finding them guilty of illegally dismissing Respondent Alegre;
2. 2.in awarding Respondent Alegre moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees without any factual and legal basis; and,
3. 3.even assuming that Respondent Alegre was illegally dismissed, in
contravening and disregarding this Court’s ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al.
vs. NLRC (Second Di
________________
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
1. vision)13 by erroneously computing backwages, as it did not deduct the
amounts earned by Respondent Alegre while he was admittedly
employed in the office of Senator Sotero H. Laurel.
The pivotal question is whether the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre
addressed to Petitioner Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation.
In construing it so, petitioners advance these arguments: (1) Respondent Alegre
had spoken openly to Petitioner Belmonte of his desire to leave the Philippine
Star\ (2) the contents of his memorandum indicate an intention on his part not to
return to his job even if he did not categorically mention resignation; (3) he never
213 returned to work after his authorized leave expired and even cleared his desk of his
personal belongings; and, (4) he obtained employment as chief of staff of the office
of Senator Sotero Laurel for which he was paid a higher salary. Having been led to
believe that Alegre wanted to resign and in honestly perceiving his memorandum
as a resignation letter, petitioners cannot be held liable for moral and exemplary
damages because they believe their action was in accordance with law. Lastly,
petitioners contend that, even assuming they were liable for illegal dismissal, the
NLRC, in granting backwages, should have deducted the amount earned by Alegre
from his subsequent employment.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had no intention of
resigning from PTI. He insists that: (1) in writing the memorandum, he was merely
lamenting the work environment at PTI and apprising Petitioner Belmonte of the
situation; (2) a resignation should be unequivocal in nature; (3) his non-return to
work after his original leave expired is explained by his subsequent request for an
extension thereof due to medical reasons; (4) and the letter of Petitioner Belmonte
obviated any desire for him to return to his work since petitioners practically
terminated his employment. He further contends that petitioners’ tenacious
resistance in admitting
________________
13224 SCRA 410, July 05, 1993 (not August 13, 1993 as stated in the petition).
215
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 215
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
their mistake bespeaks of bad faith and shows their real intention to end his
services, which entitles him to moral and exemplary damages. In representation of
public respondent, the Solicitor General supported private respondent’s position.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Pivotal Issue: Did the Memorandum for File
Constitute Voluntary Resignation?
6
After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a
careful deliberation on the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the
antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions of private respondent, we
hold that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They
are more in accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor
arbiter correctly deduced from Alegre’s memorandum and attendant actuations
that he resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what
constitutes “resignation.” It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the word
without relating it to the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the
case. Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in
making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal
interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic new must
must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment.
Incendiary words and sarcastic remarks
negate alleged desire to improve relations
Alegre’s choice of words and way of expression betray his allegation that the
memorandum was simply an “opportunity to open the eyes of (Petitioner) Belmonte
to the work environment in petitioners’ newspaper with the end in view of
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
persuading (her) to take a hand at improving said environment.” Apprising his
employer (or top-level management) of his frustrations in his job and differences
with his immediate superior is certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and
disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due
deference to one’s superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking
management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values
of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a
family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An
employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the
“proverbial hen that lays the golden egg,"14 so to speak. An aggrieved employee who
wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or
relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior
directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the
problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious
conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his employer professionally, and
even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful
and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful pen. Here,
respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too
affrontive, combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even
when read by an objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks, to
quote some:
“For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts by
most of the senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put a
finger at such a feeling somehow enhanced the angst within me. x x x Now all the
demons of my anxiety have been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds
of my betrayal. x x x
_______________
14 Homeowners Savings and Loan Association vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 97067,
September 26, 1996, Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr., ponente.
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VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 217
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less
than the publisher himself, to join him x x x, I was unwittingly signing my own
death warrant as well. The insults he had later on hurled at my person, the
malicious innuendoes he had spread around, casting doubts on my personal and
professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul, causing metaphysical
death.”
negate any desire to improve work relations with Petitioner Soliven and other PTI
executives. Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of “burning his bridges”
with the officers of the company.
Seeking relief incompatible with writing offensive letter
Any management officer, much so an immediate superior, would be offended, if not
enraged, with the insults and innuendoes stated in said memorandum; more so
because the memorandum was not directly addressed to him but to the chairman
and CEO and copy furnished all other officers and members of the board of directors.
Any discerning mind can perceive that the letter is not simply a recitation of
respondent Alegre’s gripes, disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against
the company and its officers particularly Petitioner Soliven, as postulated by the
Solicitor General in his comment.15 If it were so, why was it not addressed directly
to the person concerned? His memorandum clearly indicated that his problems
involved, or were supposedly caused by only one person, Mr. Soliven, his immediate
superior. But it was not even addressed to him! How can he expect amends in their
relations if that was all he wanted? The Solicitor General was simply turning a
blind eye to the obvious fact that said memorandum, for all intents and purposes,
was in-, tended, wittingly or unwittingly, to end employment relations.
________________
15Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 6; rollo, pp. 89–103.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
Respondent Alegre a well-educated journalist
It should not escape our attention that respondent Alegre is a professional
journalist and persuasive writer, On top of that, he was a law graduate. He must
have known the drilling effect of his bitter and sarcastic remarks upon the
petitioners and must have intended the same. Ordinary words are to be construed
7
in their ordinary meaning. Common sense dictates that Alegre meant to resign
when he wrote the memorandum. Otherwise, he should have used a more tempered
language and a less confrontational tone. Moreover, he held a position of evident
responsibility requiring the utmost confidence of his immediate superior. As
assistant to the publisher doing, in his very own words, “administration and
operations functions, apart from (my) journalistic duties,” it is apparent that Alegre
was not employed simply for his writing skills. Top management certainly reposed
full trust and confidence in him and placed him in a position of considerable
management influence.
PTI officers of uncommon
intelligence and perception
Furthermore, his memorandum was addressed to the chairman and chief executive
officer of PTI and furnished all members of the board of directors. These officers
which include the likes of the late Betty Go-Belmonte, Maximo V. Soliven and
Arturo A. Borjal, long-time and well-respected journalists acclaimed locally and
internationally, are themselves people of uncommon perception and intellect. They
will not miscomprehend the meaning and intent of Alegre’s memorandum, which
was not by any means a simple way of seeking relief but well a way to get out of the
company. What else could he have meant with these concluding remarks:
“By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable
society: ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove ... anything or everything comes crashing down.
I’M HAVING IT ALL!"
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VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997
Philippines Today, Inc. us. NLRC
Respondent Alegre, being a journalist himself and having worked with them for
sometime, knew how his letter would be perceived and received. Besides, as
discussed earlier, Alegre is likewise a well-educated man of more than average
intelligence. The conclusion is inevitable that he had more than enough sense to
anticipate the consequences and effects of his words and actions. Indeed, what a
man sows, he reaps.
Trust and confidence breached
In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job
at the pleasure of his employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the
trust and confidence of his employer. Corollarily, he likewise must repose trust and
confidence in his employer or, at the very least, his immediate superior. But any
superior hurled with invectives from a confidential employee, much more one
occupying a managerial position at the same time, will definitely lose trust and
confidence in the latter. And there can be no way to interpret such letter other than
as a withering of trust and confidence by the employee in his boss. The use of
offensive language can only mean expression of disloyalty and disrespect. It renders
the writer unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It is
beyond human nature to expect two persons with underlying mistrust in each other
to continue to work together effectively, not to say, harmoniously.
Antecedent, Contemporaneous and Subsequent
Actions Affirming Resignation
In addition to his memorandum and the circumstances attendant thereto which
were just discussed, the Court notes some peculiar actions confirming Alegre’s
intention to terminate his employment with the Star.
(1) Medical reasons for leave of absence not proved
First, he claims that his leave of absence was due to medical reasons, for which he
was supposed to seek relief abroad.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
However, the Court scoured the records but found nothing to show that he actually
underwent any medical check-up. Much less, medical examination abroad. Nothing
really backs up such claim except his bare statements which, evidentially, are at
best self-serving.
(2) Cleared desk of personal belongings
Second, respondent Alegre cleared his desk of his personal belongings even before
he knew of the acceptance of his resignation. 16 Such act certainly bares his intent
to leave his job. Respondent Alegre has not refuted nor offered any sufficient
explanation for this action. We cannot but give due credit to the petitioners’
contention that such act was expressive of his intent to resign.
(3) Did d not report back to work
219 Third, respondent Alegre did not return to his job after his authorized leave of
absence expired in November 1988. Although he sent another letter17 requesting for
an extension of his leave, there is no showing on record that the same was approved
by petitioners. It is standard office procedure that applications for leave of absence
are subject to the approval of the employer. These are not automatically granted
upon filing. Except to cite in his request “travel log (sic) coupled with advice of my
physician,” respondent Alegre has not proven the emergency nature of the cause/s
of his extended leave. Again, we cannot but give due credence to petitioners’
contention that this was another operative evidence of Alegre’s intent to resign.
His non-return to work, though, is not equivalent to abandonment of work. For
in the latter, it is necessary to prove “clear and deliberate intent” coupled with
unjustified absence
________________
221
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 221
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
and overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore.18 In the case at bench, Alegre voluntarily resigned through
his memorandum albeit written in the guise of a grievance letter. The law and
jurisprudence on abandonment have thus no application in the present case.
8
(4) Not deprived of chance to return to work
Fourth, if Respondent Alegre had really no intention to resign, he could have
reported back to work. His contention that he was effectively deprived of any chance
to return to his work because of the acceptance of his purported resignation cannot
be sustained. He claims that he received the notice dated November 9, 1988 only on
December 6, 1988. But this means that for about two weeks after his leave expired,
he had all chances to return to his work. Yet he chose not to. The obvious reason is
that he had actually no intention of doing so.
(5) Alegre expressly manifested intention to resign
Prior to sending his memorandum, Respondent Alegre informed Petitioner
Belmonte of his intention to resign from the Philippine Star. This is shown by the
testimony (cross examination) of the late Mrs. Belmonte before the labor arbiter on
January 13, 1990, as follows:
‘ATTY. BORRETA:
And you took that action, meaning the Board acted on this Memo or File which you
considered as his letter of resignation without consulting or talking with the complainant
first?
________________
18 Kingsize vs. NLRC 238 SCRA 349, November 24, 1994; Nueva Ecija vs.
Minister of Labor, 184 SCRA 25, April 3, 1990, citing Flexo Manufacturing vs.
NLRC, 135 SCRA 145, February 28, 1985; Peñaflor vs. NLRC, 120 SCRA 68,
January 17, 1983.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
WITNESS:
The complainant had also applied for leave of absence and he talked with me that he was
leaving for the United States. Actually I remember he requested a conversation but he did not
specify what the conversation was about, Your Honor. He was telling me that he wanted to
leave[has signed another job. And I told him that that is not my prerogative and I am only
Chairman of the Board; and he came upon the recommendation of our Publisher and he was
at that time Assistant to the Publisher; that he should talk to the Publisher first and I even
advised him to patch up whatever differences he might have. In that conversation, he said
something about leaving and he even said to me that when he leaves, he would ask his two
(2) sons who were working with us to leave too. And I think I made a comment, and that
must be what he was referring to. I said; oh, but your sons are very hardw orking. In fact I
said the Publisher, Max Soliven, told me that ‘sana you were as good as your sons’ maybe
that was his feeling. That is my way of trying to tell him that your sons are very hardworking
because he said when I leave I am going to ask them to leave too. Maybe because of that he
gave me the impression that he wanted to leave.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And this happened before he wrote this memo for file on October 24, 1988?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And because of that you got the impression that he had the intention to resign?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.” “19
(6) Assumed job in another office
Finally, the most telling of the actions undertaken by Respondent Alegre which
evidently demonstrate his intent to resign was his immediate employment as chief
of staff of the
________________
19TSN, January 13, 1990, pp. 90–94.
223
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997 223
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
office of then Senator Sotero H. Laurel, with a much higher compensation at
P14,600.00 per month plus P2,000.00 per month driver’s allowance. He admitted in
his testimony before the labor arbiter on November 6, 1989 that he was employed
therein about a year before (the date of his testimony) or sometime in November
1988.20 The date coincided with the period of his leave of absence or immediately
thereafter. If he had no intention of resigning and was on leave for medical reasons
as he alleged, why then did he commence a new job in another office at about the
same period? His assumption of a new job prior to receiving Mrs. Belmonte’s letter
on December 6, 1988 is clearly inconsistent with any desire to remain in
employment with PTI. This is particularly evident because both jobs required full-
time work. Moreover, working in a newspaper which prides in its independence
from partisan activities is incompatible with a concurrent political office held by
respondent.
Side Issue: May a Resignation Be Unilaterally Withdrawn?
Having established that Respondent Alegre resigned, we now tackle the corollary
issue of whether he can unilaterally withdraw his resignation. We hold that he
cannot do so.
The case of lntertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC21 is in point. The employee
therein who was a ship engineer, while at Port Pylus, Greece, requested for relief
9
due to “personal reasons.” The master of the ship, who had authority to “sign off”
an employee requesting relief, approved his request but informed the employee that
repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty days notice
in view of clause 5 of the employment contract. When the vessel was at Port Said,
Egypt four days later, the master “signed him off” and paid him in cash all amounts
due him less repatriation expenses. On his return to the Philippines, the employee
filed a complaint charging his employer with breach of employment
________________
20TSN, November 6, 1989, pp. 5–7.
21198 SCRA 318, June 19, 1991.
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
contract and violation of the National Seamen Board rules and regulations. He
claimed that his request for relief was only for the sole purpose of enabling him to
take care of a fellow member of the crew who was hospitalized in Greece, Hence,
after he was disallowed from disembarking thereat, the reason no longer existed
and, consequently, he was illegally dismissed when he was forced to “sign off” in
Egypt even as he signified his intention of continuing his work.
The Court ruled against the employee. It held that resignations, once accepted,
may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts
the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee
cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally
dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of
service to them.
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which
requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is
consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee “finds himself in a situation
where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency
of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his
employment."22 If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is
severance of the contract of employment.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to reapply therefor,
and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an
appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier
decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic
right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the
employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including
_______________
22Ibid., citing Dosch vs. NLRC, 123 SCRA 296, July 5, 1983.
225
VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
hiring.23 The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.24
Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre
after its acceptance by petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent
of the latter. In fairness to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his
resignation at his whim and without the conformity of the former.
The instant case is unlike Molave Tours Corporation vs. NLRC25and People’s
Security, Inc. vs. NLRC,26 In Molave, acting on reports that the employee was on
several occasions found drunk within work premises, the employer required him to
explain in writing said charges. Notwithstanding his explanation and request for a
confrontation with his accusers, the employee was made to sign a resignation letter,
Two months after, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter,
affirmed by the NLRC, found that the employee was merely forced and intimidated
into resigning. The Court reiterated that resignation must be voluntary on the part
of the employee. It thus ordered the employer to reinstate the employee and award
backwages and other benefits due him since there was no effective resignation.
Likewise in People’s Security, there was a finding of involuntary resignation.
The employees therein who were security guards were not given assignments by
their employer after the latter’s security services .contract with Meralco expired.
The employees requested for loans to be deducted from their security bond deposits,
which requests were denied by the employer who insisted that they must turn in
their resignations first before their security bond deposits could be re-
________________
23 See San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) vs. Ople, 170 SCRA 25,
February 8,1989; Homeowners, supra note 14.
24 Supra note 21 citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. PAL Employees
Association, 57 SCRA 489, June 28, 1974.
25 250 SCRA 326, November 24, 1995.
26 226 SCRA 146, September 8, 1993.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
leased. Not having been given new work assignments and being in dire financial
need, the employees submitted their resignation letters. Three months later, they
filed money claims which were later amended to include illegal dismissal. The
employer contended that the employees voluntarily severed their employment
because they turned in their resignation letters and assumed jobs with another
security agency. Again, the Court held that resignation is a voluntary act of the
employee. When the employees were told that they would not be granted loans
unless they resigned, they had no choice since they desperately needed money to
meet their respective families’ needs. They were also forced to accept jobs at another
agency as a practical solution to their employment problems which were caused by
225 the employer’s refusal and failure to provide them with new assignments.
10
 In the case of Indophil vs. NLRC,27 on the other hand, the employee voluntarily
submitted a resignation letter but later tried to retrieve the same. He contended
though, that he was thereafter prevented by the company guard from entering the
work premises because of his resignation. He sued for illegal dismissal. His
employer claimed abandonment of work since he was required to report and to
explain his unauthorized absences but did not. In holding that there was no
dismissal, the Court regarded the employer’s act of requiring the employee to report
and explain his unauthorized absences as non-acceptance of the previous
resignation of the employee. Thus, the employer still considered him as its employee
in spite of the filed resignation letter. With respect to the latter’s allegation that he
was prevented by the company guard from entering the premises, the Court chided
him for not having inquired into its veracity and for simply relying on the bare
statement of the guard. It said that the employee should be more vigilant of his
rights.
The above three cases are dissimilar to the case at bar. In the first two cases,
there were involuntary resignations while in the third there was an unaccepted
resignation. In the in-
________________
27226 SCRA 723, September 27, 1993.
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VOL. 267, JANUARY 30, 1997
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
stant case, however, the resignation was voluntary and it was accepted by the
employer. Thus, our grant of the petition.
Since we find no case of illegal dismissal, we will no longer pass upon the two
other issues raised by petitioners which are mere consequences of the contrary
finding made by the NLRC. Necessarily, there can be no award of any moral or
exemplary damages, backwages and separation pay.
Epilogue
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code mandate a bias in favor of labor. Hence,
this Court, as a matter of judicial policy, leans backwards to protect labor and the
working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially
entrenched employers. In the present case, however, it is obvious to us that private
respondent’s memorandum could not have been intended merely to persuade
management to improve the work environment at the Philippine Star. Rather, it
was evidently a recitation of the facts and reasons why respondent Alegre could no
longer continue working under what he believed were unbearable conditions in the
work place. The offensive language used by a well-educated man endowed with
unusual writing skill could not have been intended merely for the “suggestion box.”
That it was addressed and given to persons of uncommon perception themselves
takes the letter out of ordinary employer-employee communications. It is true that
there was no direct mention of the word “resignation.” However, the incendiary
words employed denote a clear intent to end the writer’s association of trust and
confidence with his superiors and employer. This intent becomes even more
manifest when viewed in light of attendant acts of Alegre, particularly his prolonged
leave of absence, his clearing of his own desk of personal belongings, his failure to
report back to work after the expiration of his approved leave, his verbal expression
of his intent to resign, and most notably, his assumption of a higher paying job in a
political office which was incompatible with his work at the Star.
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC
In deciding cases, this Court does not matter-of-factly apply and interpret laws in a
vacuum. General principles do not decide specific cases. Rather, laws are
interpreted always in the context of the peculiar factual situation of each case, Each
case has its own flesh and blood and cannot be decided simply on the basis of
isolated clinical classroom principles. The circumstances of time, place, event,
person, and particularly attendant circumstances and actions before, during and
after the operative fact should all be taken in their totality so that justice can be
rationally and fairly dispensed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the NLRC are SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
227 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the “original intent” of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even
constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless
we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our
day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
1. a.)Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960;
2. b.)After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. 1.)Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and
respondents;
2. 2.)Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that
“Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever”
11
 1. i.)has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners’ favor in viola-
29
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
1. tion of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;
2. ii.)has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
3. iii.)has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign
currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an
authorized bank.
The antecedent facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed
and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times
each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items:
1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account—China
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in
seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed
against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and
Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same
day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-
3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February
24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the
latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott,
the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated
February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981
by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment
29 on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its
answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff
of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying
that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the
disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue
of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer
to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter
dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the
effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central
Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960
has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said
section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the
claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
31
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997 31
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
May 26, 1989
“Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmena Avenue
South Admiral Village
Parañaque, Metro Manila
“Dear Ms. Carolino:
“This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on
Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
“The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any
exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
“The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country’s
banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no
intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your
subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law.
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
“Very truly yours,
(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director”1
12
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for leave
to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled “Karen
Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott.” Summons with the complaint was
published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg
Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on
August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, ordering the latter:
1. “1.To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;
_______________
1Annex “R,” Petition.
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
1. “2.To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and
Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of
P300,000.00 for both of them;
2. “3.To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
3. “4.To pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 25% ofthe total
amount of damages herein awarded;
4. “5.To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
5. “6.Costs of the suit.
“SO ORDERED.”
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were
related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
“The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati
but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail
Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts
of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly,
upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by
publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by
the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon
motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and
plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
“In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen
E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a
certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following testimony:
“Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but
has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.
“In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati
Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about
3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza
Fair, an American ap-
33
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997 33
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
proached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she
was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
“The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat
beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that
he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who
is about Karen’s age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
“The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it’s
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach
Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his
niece. (Id., pp. 5-6) “They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right
to reach the defendant’s house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
“When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant’s
alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was
inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told
her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
“Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became
nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and
tied Karen’s hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but
defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it
and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
“Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near
the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front
of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to
shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When
defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after
the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
“He then got a Johnson’s Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as
to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to
do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a
lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his
sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9).
34
13

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
“After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to
take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the
water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex
organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime,
defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining
the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give
her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o’clock the following
morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
“The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and
coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding.
For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at
about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant
had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
“lugaw.” For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those
three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say
whether the organ was inserted wholly.
“Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not
tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for
help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were
closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid
that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still
possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides,
the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At
nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
“On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the
morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and
again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because
everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around
fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered
by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer
and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
35
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
“That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left
but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered
by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she
cried for help through the hole. She cried: ‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan
n’yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!’ Somebody heard her. It was a woman,
probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was ‘istorbo.’ Karen pleaded for
help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell
asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16).
“She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in
bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again
got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with
biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times.
The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30-9:00, and the third was
after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but
only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did
not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time,
he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom
and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices.
The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion.
After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police.
They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the
room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call
for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At
that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her
dress. (Id., p. 16)
“Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had
asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He
told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on
Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then
he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but
she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
“When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs,
she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked
her name
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
and the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs,
he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to
them. ‘Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,’ Karen added. “The policeman told him to
just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
“They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the
house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong
35
Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second
floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
“At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The
written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator
and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private
parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they
14
reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer
has been marked as Exhibit B.
“She was studying at the St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City at the time of the
incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano
University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject
of conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos,
Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she
was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
“After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother
and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-
minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She
appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral
damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would always
recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from
this experience.” (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
37
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of
judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to
two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original
jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as
amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 providing that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,” should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners
to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy
the judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an
undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.)
the Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has
exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiff’s
substantive right to have the claim sought to be
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff’s substantive right
to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank
deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the
Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its
power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of
R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that
grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but
the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due
37 process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the
law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of
procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said: that one reason for ex-empting the foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of
any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another
reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign
currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed
to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just
stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from eco-
39
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997 39
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
nomic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic
development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some
kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution attachment
especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it
specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
15
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons
similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank
is not unmind-ful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E.
Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to
release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of
R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite
the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to
follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious. Petitioner deserves to
receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory
relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-
3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief.2 However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus,
where the petition has far-
_______________
2 Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1.
40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be
treated as one for mandamus.3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good
and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language
as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment,
and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten
times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able
to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having
received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more
than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and
besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long
time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not,
however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore, makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision,
“Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel
so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was
refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she
sought to transfer from another school simply because the school authorities of the
said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they
might be implicated in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton
and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of
serious illegal detention of his hapless vic-
_______________
3 Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62
SCRA 275; |and Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and
Employment, supra.
41
VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997 41
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
tim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naïve and
credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have
such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being
only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of
an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, x x x.”4
If Karen’s sad fate had happened to anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for him
to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important
than his child’s rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim’s claim for
damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time
when the country’s economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were
minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But
the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically;
and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law
for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be
good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
It has thus been said that—
“But I also know,5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep
pace with the times . . . We might as well require a man to wear still
_______________
4 Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 & 12; Rollo, pp.
66 & 69.
5 Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York, Penguin,
1946) p. 171.
16
 42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors.”
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
“The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to
obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and
regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application
thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the question
whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process
accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960
applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere
transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
“The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who
are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
“x x x Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the
Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
‘Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment.—Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.’
“Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 6426:
‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules
and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.’
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VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
“The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits.—All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any
other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency
deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.’
“The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment,
garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its
whereases, viz.:
‘WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are
authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
‘WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing
the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore
banking units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain
cases;
“WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality
of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income
of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such
foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the
vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such in-
44
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
stitutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments
in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the
country;’
“Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign
currency deposits is ‘to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines’ (3rd
Whereas). “The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn,
the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
43
‘WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking
system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication
facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access
as possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;
‘WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.
‘WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and
other positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;’
17
 “On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD
No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
‘WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines
has been authorized under a separate decree;
‘WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the
said depository banks under RA 6426
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VOL. 278, AUGUST 21, 1997
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction
of the proposed offshore banking units;’
“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits
from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third
Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and
given protection and incentives by them.
“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
“Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
“For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the
dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.”6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article
10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
________________
6Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128-129; 135-136.
46
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No.
960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may—but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the
Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the
dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and
victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
45 We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served
the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and
PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents
are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch
CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ.,concur.
Padilla, J., No part.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Private Respondents required to comply writ of execution.
——o0o——
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo “Lenny” Villa—the victim in this
case—on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due
in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups
were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.3 Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of “consent” and “initial innocent act” in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.4
_______________
18
 1 Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of
Session Proceedings No. 34 (08 October 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at
21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
2 Id.
3 Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9th
Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
4 Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9th
Congress, 1st Regular Sess. at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].
529
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.5 Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged—those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe
a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system—“[N]o act constitutes a
crime… unless it is made so by law.”7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if
an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot
be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters
of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by
strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense
and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) 8and the trial
court,9 are as follows:
_______________
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam”
Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo
“Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny” Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of
the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
to last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
529
walked towards the pelotacourt of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites included the “Indian Run,” which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on
their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in which the
auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.531
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 531
Villareal vs. People
On the morning of their second day—9 February 1991—the neophytes were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would
give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon,
the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation
rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the
neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received
several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.
He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the
day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept
at the carport.
19
 After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 533
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Villareal vs. People
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
pronounced dead on arrival. 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
_______________ Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were
532 jointly tried.11 On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had
to be resolved first.12
Villareal vs. People On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Aquilans: of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) Penal Code.13A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) commenced anew.14
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz.:
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants—Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) Brigola (Victorino et al.)—were
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) _______________
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) 534
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General) Villareal vs. People
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) reasonable doubt.
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) 2. Four of the accused-appellants—Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.)—were
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima) victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) 3. Two of the accused-appellants—Fidelito Dizon and Artemio
25. Adel Abas (Abas) Villareal—were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola) of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca) temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos) of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)533 On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy

20
trial.16 Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.17 On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.19
_______________
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258—Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520—
first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice,
petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject
matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of
the accused.
G.R. No. 155101—Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the
CA’s Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-
G.R. No. 15520.21Petitioner sets forth two main issues—first, that he was denied
due process when the CA sustained the trial court’s forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same “ratio decidendithat served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused.”22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s
right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented
separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
con-
_______________
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
sidered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues
that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted
that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and
not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise
been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional
initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.23 He claims that the additional
paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out
that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites
“decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal
proceeded to do the paddling….”24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the
Solicitor General that “the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could
not have resulted in Lenny’s death.”25 The Solicitor General purportedly averred
that, “on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is
535
the violent death of the victim.”26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will.
He claims that Lenny’s father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s
father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same
place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive
of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space
were only part of the “psychological initiation.” He then cites the testimony of
Lenny’s co-neophyte—witness Marquez—who admitted knowing “it was not true
and that he was just making it up….”27
_______________
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 537
Villareal vs. People
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by
his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony
of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the
neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter’s chills.
When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through
a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill
motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the
victim’s well-being.
G.R. No. 154954—People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R.
No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.28 According to
the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should
have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that
the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.29 The said article provides:
“Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.
According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
21
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court’s finding
of conspiracy and in ruling that
_______________
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
the criminal liability of all the accused must be based on their individual
participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080—Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for
the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17
May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.30 The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
Due to “several pending incidents,” the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
“various reasons,” the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005,
or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the
9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the
original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in
the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1.
Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
_______________
30 Villa’s Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057
and 178080), p. 1; Rollo, p. 84.
539
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258—Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to
final judgment. The term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,31 while the term “pecuniary penalties” (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability predicated on the
_______________
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).33However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action. 34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delictcomplained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception
of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September;
and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.35The Order likewise stated that “it will not
entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required
539 shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.”36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open
court that his client—Antonio General—would no longer present separate evidence.
Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who
had already testified.37 Because of this development and pursuant to the trial
court’s Order that the parties “should be ready at all times down the line,” the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date—25 August 1993—
22
instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start
two weeks later, or on 8 Sep-
_______________
33 People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA
239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.
34 People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
35 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; Rollo, p. 68.
36 Id.
37 Id.
541
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
tember 1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August
1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he
would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his
clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated
the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice
rule under the Rules of Court.40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure
of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.41
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of
law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him,
the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered
justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until
8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he
was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted
on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that “in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused … shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel…” This constitutional right includes the right to present
evidence in one’s
_______________
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
defense,43 as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every
stage of the proceedings.44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the
defense’s presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995
hearing was cancelled due to “lack of quorum in the regular membership” of the
Sandiganbayan’s Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The
hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order
directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation
of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to
present evidence because of his nonappearance at “yesterday’s and today’s
scheduled hearings.” In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
“Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomo’s non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was
merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and
not for the succeeding trial dates…
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not
541
have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan’s counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present
case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made
aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In
fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences
of another failure to attend the succeed-
_______________
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 543
Villareal vs. People
ing hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms
the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even
forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his
right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence
on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case
involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of
the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.”46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused—General—had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-
assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
23
 Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of
the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding
of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the
trial court.47 In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver,
the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.48
_______________
46 Id.
47 People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838; 398 SCRA 642 (2003).
48 Id.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve
the case at bar. Neither can we see any “procedural unfairness or irregularity” that
would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of
the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition
corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is
really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial
court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of
Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that “all actions of the petitioner were part
of the traditional rites,” and that “the alleged extension of the initiation rites was
not outside the official activity of the fraternity.”49 He even argues that “Dizon did
not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned.”50
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one
judge or justice to another—at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme
Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon
would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for
almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to
decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused
failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and
that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that “the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in
the movement of this case when
_______________
49 Dizon’s Petition for Review, supra note 21 at p. 20; Rollo, p. 22.
50 Id., at p. 23; Rollo, p. 25.
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Villareal vs. People
the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.”51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2)
and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a
trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.53 The right is deemed
violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial,
or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and
for no cause or justifiable motive.54 In determining the right of the accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 55 The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the
prejudice wrought upon the defendant.57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.59 As we have previously discussed,
however, where
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546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy
is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal
instead of the correctness thereof.61Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to
lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from
attaching.62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their
right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
“An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and
24
the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already
issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution
did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by
the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance
on the part of the prosecution. It is
_______________
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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Villareal vs. People
not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even
until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the
trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting
the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002,
or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part
of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution
and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court
did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of
time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.”63(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information
was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.64 On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained
interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the
arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases—a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.67 Thus, we held:
“The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the
disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a
speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office
_______________
63 CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 24-30, supra note 14; Rollo, pp. 151-157.
64 Id., at 4; Rollo, p. 131.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985; 355 SCRA 641 (2001).
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years
disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on complaints before
him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the
information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition
of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by
547 the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.”68 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
89060 that accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there
is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall
be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system.
It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated—either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused—the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an
identical offense.69 This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. 71 It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and
in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, 72 viz.:
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Villareal vs. People
Article III – Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:73
“SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
25
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.74 The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s
express consent.75
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550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, “[a] verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.
It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal,
from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.”76 We further stressed that “an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal.”77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in
the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process;78 (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.80
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. blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
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Villareal vs. People
The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.81 Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility;82or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as
to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. 83 In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. 84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, “the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x.”85 Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when
it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 86 The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were
_______________
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s
consent to hazing.87
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. 88 In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.89 Mere errors
of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al.—the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug—the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against
the accused.91 We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
to dis-
_______________
551
91 De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420; 380
SCRA 596 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804; 366 SCRA 535 (2001); People v.
Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400; 81 SCRA 453 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955),
citing People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954).
553
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 553
Villareal vs. People
pense justice.92 The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of
discretion.
26
 In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
“Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of
the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, theinjuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and
the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor,
the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much
the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R,
June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De
los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in
nature.”93(Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the
four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the
CA, because of “the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine
the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required.” 95 The reliance
on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim’s
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor
_______________
92 See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76;
and People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, supra note 79.
93 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; Rollo, pp. 82-83.
94 People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
95 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; Rollo, pp. 82-83.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
required medical attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not
even serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own
findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused “were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa.”99 It then adopted the NBI medico-legal
officer’s findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was the “multiple
traumatic injuries” he suffered from the initiation rites.100Considering that the CA
found that the “physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,”101 it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that
intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act,
such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing
the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries—
punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies – is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the manda-
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555
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 555
Villareal vs. People
tory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the
framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles
246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not
under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies
are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused
cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon—as if only their acts,
in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa—is contrary to the CA’s own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries he suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we
therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable
as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.104
_______________
102 See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429; 28 SCRA 1062 (1969).
27
 103 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
170.
104 Id., at p. 58; Rollo, p. 167.
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556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there
could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had
knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their
individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused—Victorino et al.—were acquitted; 4
of them—Tecson et al.—were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the
remaining 2—Dizon and Villareal—were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain
advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the
case involves an ex ante situation in which a man—driven by his own desire to join
a society of men—pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand
how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem
it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping
intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological
initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. 105 The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil.106 It asserts that one should only
be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.107 The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that
_______________
105 RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE – Volume One 3 (1961);
see People v. Estrada, 389 Phil. 216; 333 SCRA 699 (2000); People v.
Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503; 275 SCRA 505 (1997).
106 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: ANNOTATED AND
COMMENTED – BOOK ONE 4 (3rd ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
107 FRANCISCO, supra at p. 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
557
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Villareal vs. People
humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference
to the principles of pleasure and pain.108 They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime.109Here, criminal liability is thus based on the
free will and moral blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea—defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent—is the predominant
consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.112 In order for
an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of dolo or “malice.”113
The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.115 The second
element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts,
as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act. 116 The last
element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.117
The element of intent—on which this Court shall focus—is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It does not
refer to mere will, for the latter
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558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.120While motive is the
“moving power” that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the “purpose”
of using a particular means to produce the result.121 On the other hand, the term
“felonious” means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose.122 With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent
in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and
malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus—that the act or omission
be done “willfully,” “maliciously,” “with deliberate evil intent,” and “with malice
aforethought.”123 The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea—a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.124 As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to
attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code—which provides that “conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it”—is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies
committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase “coming to an agreement”
connotes the existence of a prefaced “intent” to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable
_______________
120 ALBERT, supra note 114 at p. 23.
557
121 People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366; 285 SCRA 438 (1998); Bagajo v.
Marave, 176 Phil. 20; 86 SCRA 389 (1978), citing People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264,
297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
122 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 118 at p. 520.
123 See FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at p. 34; ALBERT, supra note 114 at pp. 23-
25.
124 U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
125 U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521; 392 SCRA
46 (2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476, 481 (1966); People v.
28
Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza,
38 Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64
Phil. 614 (1937); and People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
559
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Villareal vs. People
felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design.126 Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a
wrongful act.127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite
in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means
of culpa.128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.129 Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice
or dolo130 immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.131 Intent to kill—or animus interficendi—cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.132Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent—but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence—
the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting
in homicide.134
_______________
126 People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816; 424 SCRA 655 (2004), citing People v.
Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943); FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at pp. 51-52, citing People v.
Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
127 See generally FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at p. 51.
128 Id., at p. 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil,
43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15 (1931).
129 Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737,
citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.
130 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505; 259 SCRA 191 (1996).
131 Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.
132 Dado v. People, supra note 125.
133 People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450; 396 SCRA 386 (2003), citing WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW—Vol. 1, 473-474 (12th ed., 1932).
134 See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102; 425 SCRA 221 (2004), citing PEOPLE
V. CARMEN, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267; U.S. v.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.136 Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,138 where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
559
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.139Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values
of ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical
legitimacy to a “tradition” or “ritual” whereby prospective members are asked to
prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invita-
_______________
Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468
(1909).
135 A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation
for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 407 (2000).
136 Id.
137 In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010)
(U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment, In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-
Related Deaths, 31 MCGEORGE L REV. 1087, 1088-1089 (2000); and SYMPOSIUM,
THE WORKS OF PLATO (THE MODERN LIBRARY 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell
Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S.
Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC.
138 In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
139 Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We’ll Never
Tell): How the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and
Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 477, 480
(2004), citingRutledge, supra.
140 Id.
141 Id.
561
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 561
Villareal vs. People
tion in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter. 142 The neophyte period is
usually one to two semesters long.143 During the “program,” neophytes are required
to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter
history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified
grade point average; to participate in the organization’s activities; and to show
dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and
alumni members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to
involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization. 146In hazing, the “recruit,”
“pledge,” “neophyte,” “initiate,” “applicant”—or any other term by which the
29
organization may refer to such a person—is generally placed in embarrassing or
humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar
tasks or activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate,
degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.148 These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or
injury.149
_______________
142 Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride,
Comment, Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad is
the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 147-8
(1997).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
146 See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the
Anti-Hazing Law.
147 Id.
148 In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, 1041 (1986); and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y.
Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
149 See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the
Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins, Hazing: Defining and Understanding
Psychological Damages, 2 Ann.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than
a century ago, our national hero—Andres Bonifacio—organized a secret society
named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be
inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities
approved by the Catholic Church.151 The Katipunan’s ideology was brought home to
each member through the society’s initiation ritual. 152 It is said that initiates were
brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. 153 They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as “pagsuot sa isang lungga” or
“[pagtalon] sa balon.”154 It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of “pangherong bakal sa pisngi” and to endure a “matalas na punyal.”155 As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with his own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar
to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth
classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes
_______________
150 REYNALDO C. ILETO, THE DIORAMA EXPERIENCE: A VISUAL HISTORY OF THE
PHILIPPINES 84 (2004).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10—Cartilla
del Katipunan, quoted in LUIS CAMARA DERY, ALAY SA INANG BAYAN: PANIBAGONG
PAGBIBIGAY KAHULUGAN SA KASAYSAYAN NG HIMAGSIKAN NG 1896, 16-24 (1999).
154 Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 17.
155 Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 18.
156 Ileto, supra note 150.
563
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Villareal vs. People
resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in
various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got
involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second
year at West Point.158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim
was injured during the shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation
ceremonies for Hejaz membership.159 The ritual involved what was known as the
“mattress-rotating barrel trick.”160 It required each candidate to slide down an eight
to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over
which the candidate was required to climb.161 Members of Hejaz would stand on
each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the
barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper
jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were
shown writhing and crying
_______________
157 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF WEST
POINT 222 (1999).
158 Id.
159 Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C.
1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence
supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association carried out
“mattress-rotating barrel trick,” a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted
actionable negligence; and (2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony,
January 31, 1997, available at<http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-
31/us/9701_31_hazing_1_hazing-incident-camp-lejeune-marines?_s=PM:US>
(visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury
30
Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and
Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the
chests of the victims.164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University
chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship
program.165 The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and “body slamming,” an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to
the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station
circle of physical abuse.167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by
fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in
Alabama.168 The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump
into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto
walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter,
and “yerks” (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, but-
_______________
164 CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
165 State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges –
Michael Davis – blacked out and never regained consciousness. He died the
following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s
conviction of hazing. Id.)
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing;
and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the fraternity’s
assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered
the summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the victim’s
negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)
565
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
ter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members,
such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and
running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. “meetings,” during which the
pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) “running the gauntlet,” during
which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim—Sylvester
Lloyd—was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity.170 He participated in initiation activities, which included various
forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim
suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternity’s initiation
rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones—a university student in Florida—sought
initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha
_______________
169 Id.
170 Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL
47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999) (U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against
Cornell University for the latter’s liability resulting from the injuries the former
sustained during the alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court
granted defendant Cornell’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. Id.)
171 Id.
172 Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct.
2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty
to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity was not
established; (3) individual fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate
from harm; and (4) the evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of care to initiate. Id.)
173 Id.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The pledge’s efforts to join the
fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones,
together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on
his face and buttocks.175 In these rituals described as “preliminaries,” which lasted
for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.176 During
the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges sustained
roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other
candidates passed out.179
The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial “birth by
fire,” through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves
565
his or her worth.180 Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish
unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the
organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
31
opportunities; and the esprit d’corpassociated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.182
_______________
174 Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The
District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the conviction for felony hazing and
remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury instruction. Id.)
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Rutledge, supra note 137.
181 Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat
a Brother?, TRIAL, September 1991, at p. 63.
182 Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F.
Lake, Reconceptualizing the University’s Duty to Provide A Safe Learning
Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L. Spaziano, It’s All Fun and
Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions
of Student Organizations, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 213 (1994);
567
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in
the military.183 The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.184 It
was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing
conduct “whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom.” 185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts
of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations,
that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing
hazing.186 As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes
proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.188 Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs.189
_______________
Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at p.
63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-
evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 Rev. Litig.
191, 210 (1988)].
183 Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-
Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61 Miss. L.J. 111, 117
(1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent
154, 155 (1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was directed
specifically at the United States Naval Academy.
184 Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing
Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New Jersey’s Anti-Hazing Act, 26 Quinnipiac L.
Rev. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note Error: Reference source not found at
p. 118.
185 Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note Error: Reference source not
found at pp. 118-119.
186 Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note Error: Reference source not
found at p. 119.
187 Acquaviva, supra at p. 313.
188 Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of
Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 377,
377 (2002).
189 Id.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that
results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. 190 In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years.191 Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
567 recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that result in serious bodily
injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly
weapon.193 As an element of a Class C felony—criminal recklessness—resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of “serious bodily injury.” 194 A
person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two
(2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years. 195Pursuant
to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
becomes a Class C felony.196A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not
to exceed seven years.197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. 198 An
individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state
jail for any term of not more than two years
_______________
190 Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
191 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.)
(U.S.).
192 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
193 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
194 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.)
citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
195 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
196 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
197 Mo. Stat. Ann. § 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary
Gen. Ass. Sess.).
32
 198 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.152 (Vernon while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father’s parking space had
1996) (U.S.). been stolen by the victim’s father.207 As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
569 suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareal’s brother.208 The CA then ruled as follows:
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 569
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
Villareal vs. People clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
or not less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must
injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.200A person who has been and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not the crime of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
to exceed five years.201West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to
penalties provided therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context
hazing results in the death of another.203A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to
$25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.204 reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez’s testimony:
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room
as there was no hazing statute.205 This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma and we were briefed as to what to expect during the next
Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for three days and we were told the members of the fraternity
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until and their batch and we were also told about the
1994.206 fraternity song, sir.
The existence of animus interficendi or intent _______________
to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt 207 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 15, supra Rollo, p. 76.
The presence of an ex ante situation—in this case, fraternity initiation rites— 208 Id.
does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If 209 Id.
it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a 571
guilty mind—whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise— VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 571
they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
_______________ Villareal vs. People
199 Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 xxx xxx xxx
Legis. Sess.) (U.S.). Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we
200 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.). were made to ride a van and we were brought to another
201 Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.). place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place
202 Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code § 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.). of Mariano Almeda, sir.
203 See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. § 948.51 (1996) (U.S.). xxx xxx xxx
204 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.). Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down
205 Pelletier, supra note 188 at p. 381. and to link our arms and then the driver of the van and
206 Id. other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us
570 inside the van, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Witnes We heard voices shouted outside the van to the
Villareal vs. People effect, “Villa akin ka,” “Asuncion Patay ka” and the
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that— people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
with the exception of Villareal and Dizon—accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how
Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the strong a voice these remarks uttered upon your arrival?
other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding. Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court excitement in their voices, sir.
and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny xxx xxx xxx
Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of
homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will

33
 Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked father,” sir. So, that’s why he inflicted more pain on Villa
through and through, what were the voices or and that went on, sir.
utterances that you heard? Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness “Villa akin ka,” “Asuncion patay ka,” “Recinto Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
patay ka sa amin,” etc., sir. Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they accusing you of having your family have his brother
continue during the rocking of the van which lasted killed, what was your response?
for 5 minutes? Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that
xxx xxx xxx he was just making it up sir. So he said that I knew
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after
hearing voices, sir. the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those words/
xxx xxx xxx statements so that it would in turn justify him and to
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical give me harder blows, sir.573
beating] were being inflicted, was there any
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 573
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were Villareal vs. People
discouraging, and some were encouraging others xxx xxx xxx
who were pounding and beating us, it was just like Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
a fiesta mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father stole the
572 parking space allotted for his father, do you recall
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Villareal vs. People Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed xxx xxx xxx
looking us being pounded, sir. Witness There were different times made this accusation so there
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard? were different people who heard from time to time, sir.
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked xxx xxx xxx
us whether “matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.” Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular accusation against Lenny Villa’s father was made?
words that you quote? Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were came near to us and when Lenny Villa’s turn, I
utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin point who heard him uttered those statements, sir.
uttered those words, sir. Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to
xxx xxx xxx Lenny Villa’s father?
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
conduct of this Bicol Express? Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances. Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what and sometime he stand up and he kicked his thighs and
were the utterances that you remember? sometimes jumped at it, sir.
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon xxx xxx xxx
stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I quote Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now.
“ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid You mentioned also that accusations made by
ko,” so that would in turn sort of justifying him in Dizon “you or your family had his brother
inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just killed,” can you inform this Honorable Court
walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on what exactly were the accusations that were
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that charged against you while inflicting blows upon
“this guy, his father stole the parking space of my you in particular?

34
 Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in 210 TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72,
particular if I knew that his family who had his brother 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I 575
knew that it was just a story that he made up and I
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 575
said that I knew nothing about it and he continued
inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was574 Villareal vs. People
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could
immediately go back to school. All the
Villareal vs. People bruises would be limited to our arms and
when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw school uniforms like long sleeves, it would
that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: be covered actually so we have no
“Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that
aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin,” sir. you would have bruises on your body but
Atty. Tadiar What else? that will be covered?
Witness That’s all, sir. Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or
doctor or a physician came around as promised to you implements that you expect that would
earlier? create bruises to your body?
Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied) Witness At that point I am already sure that
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus: there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle,
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct sir.
examination Mr. Marquez, have you xxx xxx xxx
stated that there was a briefing that Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that
was conducted immediately before your much of the initiation procedures is
initiation as regards to what to psychological in nature?
expect during the initiation, did I Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis
hear you right? supplied)
Witness Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing? Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson consist only of physical initiation, meaning
Victorino. body contact, is that correct?
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court Witness Yes, sir.
what they told you to expect during Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called
the initiation? psychological initiation, correct?
Witness They told us at the time we would be Witness Yes, sir.
brought to a particular place, we would Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you
be mocked at, sir. believe of things calculated to terrify
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, you, scare you, correct?
ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the Witness Yes, sir.
likes? Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters
Witness Yes, sir. made belief situation intended to, I
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there repeat, terrify you, frighten you,
would be physical contact? scare you into perhaps quitting the
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing. initiation, is this correct?
xxx xxx xxx _______________
_______________

35
 211 TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was
43. followed by the initiating masters not
576 only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.577
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 577
Villareal vs. People
Witness Sometimes sir, yes. Villareal vs. People
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that
was initiating you, he said or he was whatever forms of initiation was
supposed to have said according to you that administered by one master, was
your family were responsible for the also administered by one master on a
killing of his brother who was an NPA, do neophyte, was also administered by
you remember saying that? another master on the other
Witness Yes, sir. neophyte, this is correct?
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
statement said to you by Dizon that you According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA
did not believe him because that is to Dizon and Villareal were “baseless,”213 since the statements of the accused were
not true, correct? “just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the
Witness Yes, sir. neophytes”; that “[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only Marquez”; and that the “harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
psychologizing you perhaps, the ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their
purpose as I have mentioned before, initiation rites.”214
terrifying you, scaring you or We agree with the Solicitor General.
frightening you into quitting the The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
initiation, this is correct? substantial proportion on the part of the CA—it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was
reason, I think, why he was saying the CA’s primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
those things was because he wanted thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
to inflict injury. according to Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only who uttered both “accusations” against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
perception, correct? participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was “Boyet
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s] thigh”; and who told witness Marquez, “[I]to,
telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me. yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko.” It was also Dizon who jumped on
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] Villa’s
subjected to the same forms of initiation by _______________
all the initiating masters? You said that 212 TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 24-28.
earlier, right? 213 People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; Rollo, p. 626;
Witness Yes, sir. People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-123; Rollo, pp. 727-
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who 730.
jumped on you or kicked you said 214 People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; Rollo,
something similar as was told to you by pp. 625-626; People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-
Mr. Dizon? 123; Rollo, pp. 727-730.
Witness No, sir. 578
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right? Villareal vs. People
Witness Yes, sir.

36
thighs while saying, “[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father.”
With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the
existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the
entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were
briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare
them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They
heard fraternity members shout, “Patay ka, Recinto,” “Yari ka,Recinto,” “Villa, akin
ka,” “Asuncion, gulpi ka,” “Putang ina mo, Asuncion,” “Putang ina nyo, patay kayo
sa amin,” or some other words to that effect.215 While beating the neophytes, Dizon
accused Marquez of the death of the former’s purported NPA brother, and then
blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space of Dizon’s father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He
concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could “justify” giving the neophytes harder
blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the
neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing.
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law,
former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
_______________
215 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supraRollo, pp. 127-
144.
216 People’s Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; Rollo,
pp. 625-626; People’s Comment (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-
123; Rollo, pp. 727-730.
579
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
“Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period
of interpellations on why we included the phrase “or psychological pain and
suffering.”
xxx xxx xxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit
but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or
playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times
but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the
building—these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by
these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared
during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what
we want to prevent.”217 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity’s psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte,
Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he “knew it was not true
and that [Dizon] was just making it up….”218 Even the trial court did not give weight
to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: “[T]he cumulative acts of all
the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical
harm as
_______________
217 Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9th Congress, 1st Regular Sess.,
pp. 12-13.
218 TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72,
90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134; see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim.
Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim.
Case No. C-38340), pp. 24-28.
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x.”219 The Solicitor General shares the same
view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent
to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof
579 beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.220 Instead, we adopt and reinstate the
finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or
malicious intent to injure not proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor
General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be
liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266
of the Revised Penal Code,222 the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer—iniuria
ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot
_______________
37
 219 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
167.
220 Dado v. People, supra note 125.
221 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 58, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
167.
222 The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on
Physical Injuries. These are the following: (a) Art. 262—Mutilation; (b) Art. 263—
Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264—Administering Injurious Substances or
Beverages; (d) Art. 265—Less Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266—Slight
Physical Injuries and Maltreatment.
581
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specificanimus iniuriandi or malicious
intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are.223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. Marave,225 the accused teacher, using
a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form
of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal liability for slight
physical injuries, this Court stated thus: “Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she
had done with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and
that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.” Considering
the applicable laws, we then ruled that “as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur
any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil.” In People v. Carmen,226 the
accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of
Fatima—under the guise of a “ritual or treatment”—plunged the head of the victim
into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with
fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of
“nervous break-
_______________
223 Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v.
People, 517 Phil. 272; 482 SCRA 44 (2006).
224 Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564; 355
SCRA 267 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 (1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil.
939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 204 (1925).
225 176 Phil. 20; 86 SCRA 389 (1978).
226 People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
down” by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The
collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent
was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be
held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to
581 a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject
to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be
judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused. 227What persons do
is the best index of their intention.228 We have also ruled that the method employed,
the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted
may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator. 229 The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
“traditional” initiation rites, including the “Indian Run,” “Bicol Express,” “Rounds,”
and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round.” The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes’ arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again
subjected to “traditional” initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the
_______________
227 People v. Regato, supra note 118.
228 Id.
229 Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
583
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 583
Villareal vs. People
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
“traditional” ritual—paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological
pain on the initiates.230 It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical
blows; to help the neophytes to “pump” their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or “round”; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.
38
 These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.231 A few days before the
“rites,” he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His
father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days.233The CA found as follows:
“It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily
consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from
the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become
members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in
a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and
physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation
would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of
their right and opportunity to
_______________
230 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 38-44, supra note 9; Rollo,
pp. 147-153.
231 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; Rollo,
pp. 127-144.
232 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.
233 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified
that accused Tecson told him that “after a week, you can already play basketball.”
Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the
initiates would be hit “in the arms and legs,” that a wooden paddle would
be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs….
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.”234 (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching,
kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily,
freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional “rounds” on the second night were held upon the insistence
of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of
the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still
participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant
to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other “weapon” was used to inflict injuries
on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The
designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the
specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during
the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of “traditional”
initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a
different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that
_______________
234 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 13-14, supra note 8; Rollo, pp. 74-75.
585
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 585
Villareal vs. People
hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.235 The totality of the
circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was
rooted may also be determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation
and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of
the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished
under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death,
the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated
homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so
it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense
under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing
a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement of
initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that
no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can
become a member without being held criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the
_______________
235 Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
39
 586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing
which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing,
abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges
or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised
Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When
a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining
entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or
is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let
us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing
is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the
sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
“hazing.”Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is
why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa
mga kabataan na: “Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.”
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the
distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the
death, that resulted in the serious
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physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused
in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel
situation where we create the special crime without having to go
into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to
initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor
admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a
new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not
going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid
that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being
criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the
sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will
admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal
act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of
the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical
pain can easily escape responsibility and say, “We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do
not have any intention to kill or maim.”
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera,
where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they
are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that
initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under
this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy
or not anymore?588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have
to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that
occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should
587
be hazing, Mr. President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator
Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to
the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as
necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by
two persons with or without consent.
40
 To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of
sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr.
President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase “without consent” for
purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with
the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done
without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact,
when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for
that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended
victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his
consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices
that attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical
infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be
_______________
236 Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
589
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Villareal vs. People
physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is
duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that
there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of
the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of
the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the
distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that
society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some
individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the
private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways
that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the
act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of
pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed,
that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, “Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it.” So, if we allow
that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then
we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if
we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed
the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if
it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation
of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?
589 (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.237 (Emphasis
supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent,
Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
“I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea
of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special
law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal
Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.”238 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did
not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing—unique as against typical crimes—cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny’s parents would not have
consented239 to his partici-
_______________
237 Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at pp. 13-15.
238 Senate TSP No. 47, supra note 3.
239 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.
591
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 591
Villareal vs. People
41
pation in Aquila Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were
considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice
(now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that “in our nation’s very recent history,
the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive
of … hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.”240Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing—or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering—has not been traditionally
criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna
in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there
is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required
in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique
nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without
malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or
_______________
240 Vedaña v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332; 295 SCRA 1, 18 (1998).
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or
advertence on the part of the person committing it. 241In this case, the danger is
visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. 242 In contrast, simple imprudence
or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. 243Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act
is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved.247 If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid
damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.249 It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or
diligence that may be required of an individual, “from a
_______________
241 Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing LUIS B. REYES, THE
REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW—BOOK ONE 995 (15th ed. 2001); People v.
Vistan, 42 Phil. 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, 17 January 1919
(unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).
242 People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court
of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460; 165 SCRA 378 (1988).
246 Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
247 Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs.
Gomez, supra note 241.
248 Id.
249 Id.
593
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 593
Villareal vs. People
transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.”250 The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case.251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure
secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.252 The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.253 In the present case, the victim’s heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the “channeling” of the blood supply
from the entire circulatory system—including the heart, arteries, veins, venules,
and capillaries—to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the
formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas were
wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from
injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the
like.257 Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the
capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce
death.258 The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines,
and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the
lungs, were pale due
_______________
250 See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at p. 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
251 Id.
42
 252 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supraRollo, p. 146.
253 Id.
254 Id., at p. 36; Rollo, p. 145.
255 Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-
67.
256 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
146.
257 Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-
69.
258 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms. 259 It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim
suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital
organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light
of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the
testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed,
kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and
thighs.261 They were also “paddled” at the back of their thighs or legs;262 and slapped
on their faces.263 They were made to play rough basketball.264 Witness Marquez
testified on Lenny, saying: “[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.”265 The NBI medico-legal
officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.266The relevant portion of the testimony is
as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your
testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have
enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny
Villa previously marked as Exhibit “G-1” to
“G-14” individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I
am going to pro-
_______________
259 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
146.
260 TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.
261 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-21, supraRollo, pp.
127-130.
262 Id., at p. 23; Rollo, p. 132.
263 Id., at p. 25; Rollo, p. 134.
264 Id., at p. 26; Rollo, p. 135.
265 TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-
176.
266 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 61, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
170.
595
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012 595
Villareal vs. People
pound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries
marked from Exhibit “G-1” to “G-14”?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the
demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are
talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus
one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in
whole and not in part.267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victim’s death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in
and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity—accused
Dizon and Villareal—restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the
initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show
that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites—
having in mind the concept of “seniority” in fraternities—the implication of the
presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We
further note that some of the fraternity members were
_______________
267 TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 92-93.
268 TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 110-111.
269 Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C.
App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329
S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
43
intoxicated during Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to
Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly—or unwittingly—impose the
misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish “kinship.” A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such
as tips during bar examinations.270 Another initiate did not give up, because he
feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the
hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had
the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members
would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing
when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time
of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable
doubt, Victorino et al.’s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries
upon Lenny Villa.273 As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished
_______________
270 RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 34, supra note 9; Rollo, p.
143.
271 Id., at p. 27; Rollo, p. 136.
272 Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-
Hazing Law.
273 CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 22, supraRollo, p. 83.
597
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Villareal vs. People
by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the
applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicideshall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of
P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of
the victim.274 In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s
award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,
including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as
the claim is supported by tangible documents.276 Though we are prepared to award
actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are
bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during
_______________
274 Briñas v. People, 211 Phil. 37; 125 SCRA 687 (1983); see also People v.
Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, 658 SCRA 385, citing People v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011, 642 SCRA 625.
275 People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 499
[citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 478; People v.
Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010, 627 SCRA 519; People v. Ogan, G.R. No.
186461, 5 July 2010, 623 SCRA 479; and People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July
2010, 623 SCRA 655].
276 Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villareal vs. People
trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
for actual damages.277
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on
account of the victim’s death.278 This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the
Civil Code, which provides that the “spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased.”279 Thus, we hereby affirm the CA’s award
of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner
Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954—finding Antonio Mariano Almeda,
597 Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries—is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs
of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded
at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
_______________
44
 277 People’s Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p.
144; Rollo, p. 1709.
278 Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March
2011, 645 SCRA 93 citing Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593;
444 SCRA 355, 370 (2004).
279 Id.
280 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July
1994, 234 SCRA 78.
599
VOL. 664, FEBRUARY 1, 2012
Villareal vs. People
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident
or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgments in G.R. No. 155101 and G.R. No. 154954 modified and set aside in
part; Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 affirmed; and Petition in G.R. No.
151258 dismissed.
Notes.—The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in the
Supreme Court totally extinguished his criminal liability based on Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Bunay, 630 SCRA 445 [2010])
The action filed by the heirs for the recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract of carriage is an independent civil action which is separate and distinct
from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the
heirs by reason of the same incident. (Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa vs. G & S
Transport Corporation, 645 SCRA 93 [2011])
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
cate an absurdity, the creation of an unfair situation. By any objective
interpretation of its terms, the contract can only be understood as imposing on the
GSIS an obligation to deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably habitable dwelling in return
for his undertaking to pay the stipulated price.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that in reciprocal obligations,
neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in
a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.—Since GSIS did not fulfill that
obligation, and was not willing to put the house in habitable state, it cannot invoke
Agcaoili’s suspension of payment of amortizations as cause to cancel the contract
between them. It is axiomatic that “(i)n reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs
in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner
with what is incumbent upon him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that Agcaoili breached the
agreement by failing to occupy the house must be rejected as devoid of merit.—Nor
may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award to Agcaoili by the
claim that the latter had not complied with the condition of occupying the house
within three (3) days. The record shows that Agcaoili did try to fulfill the condition;
he did try to occupy the house but found it to be so uninhabitable that he had to
leave it the following day. He did however leave a friend in the structure, who being
599
homeless and hence willing to accept shelter even of the most rudimentary sort,
agreed to stay therein and look after it. Thus the argument that Agcaoili breached
the agreement by failing to occupy the house, and by allowing another person to
stay in it without the consent of the GSIS, must be rejected as devoid of merit.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 8.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Artemio L. Agcaoili for plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.
NARVASA, J.:
The appellant Government Service Insurance System, (GSIS, for short) having
approved the application of the appellee Agcaoili for the purchase of a house and lot
in the GSIS
3
VOL. 165, AUGUST 30, 1988. 3
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, subject to the condition that the latter
should forthwith occupy the house, a condition that Agacoili tried to fulfill but could
not for the reason that the house was absolutely uninhabitable; Agcaoili, after
paying the first installment and other fees, having thereafter refused to make
further payment of other stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house
habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting instead to cancel the award
and demand the vacation by Agcaoili of the premises; and Agcaoili having sued the
GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance with damages
and having obtained a favorable judgment, the case was appealled to this Court by
the GSIS. Its appeal must fail.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Approval of Agcaoili’s aforementioned
application for purchase1 was contained in a letter2addressed to Agcaoili and signed
by GSIS Manager Archimedes Villanueva in behalf of the Chairman-General
Manager, reading as follows:
“Please be informed that your application to purchase a house and lot in our GSIS
Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, has been approved by this Office. Lot
45
No. 26, Block No. (48) 2, together with the housing unit constructed thereon, has
been allocated to you.
“You are, therefore, advised to occupy the said house immediately.
“If you fail to occupy the same within three (3) days from receipt of this notice,
your application shall be considered automatically disapproved and the said house
and lot will be awarded to another applicant.”
Agcaoili lost no time in occupying the house. He could not stay in it, however, and
had to leave the very next day, because the house was nothing more than a shell, in
such a state of incompleteness that civilized occupation was not possible: ceiling,
stairs, double walling, lighting facilities, water connection, bathroom, toilet kitchen,
drainage, were inexistent. Agcaoili did however ask a homeless friend, a certain
Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending
________________
1Dated June 24, 1964.
2Dated October 5, 1965 (Exh. A); Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
4 1. 4)Ordering the defendant to pay P100.00 as damages and P300.00 as and
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
completion of the construction of the house. Agcaoili thereafter complained to the
GSIS, to no avail.
The GSIS asked Agcaoili to pay the monthly amortizations and other fees.
Agcaoili paid the first monthly installment and the incidental fees, 3 but refused to
make further payments until and unless the GSIS completed the housing unit.
What the GSIS did was to cancel the award and require Agcaoili to vacate the
premises.4Agcaoili reacted by instituting suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for specific performance and damages.5 Pending the action, a written protest
was lodged by other awardees of housing units in the same subdivision, regarding
the failure of the System to complete construction of their own houses. 6 Judgment
was in due course rendered,7 on the basis of the evidence adduced by Agcaoili only,
the GSIS having opted to dispense with presentation of its own proofs. The
judgment was in Agcaoili’s favor and contained the following dispositions, 8 to wit:
1. “1)Declaring the cancellation of the award (of a house and lot) in favor of
plaintiff (Mariano Agcaoili) illegal and void;
2. 2)Ordering the defendant (GSIS) to respect and enforce the aforesaid
award to the plaintiff relative to Lot No. 26, Block No. (48) 2 of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) low cost housing project
at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal;
3. 3)Ordering the defendant to complete the house in question so as to make
the same habitable and authorizing it (defendant) to collect the monthly
amortization thereon only after said house shall have been completed
under the terms and conditions mentioned in Exhibit A; and
_________________
3 O.R. No. 186558, Oct. 10, 1966.
4 Exh. D, Folder of Exhibits, p. 4.
5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 69417.
6 The letter was sent thru the awardees’ “Samahang Lakas ng Mahihirap,” copy
having been marked at the trial as Exh. F; to the letter was attached a resolution
of said Samahan adopted at its meeting of July 23, 1967 and to which, in turn, was
appended a 3-page list of uncompleted houses with a specification of items not
completed.
7 By Hon. Manuel P. Barcelona, presiding over Br. VIII of the CFI of Manila;
Record on Appeal, pp. 22-25, Rollo, p. 13.
8 Parenthetical insertions identifying the parties, supplied.
5
VOL. 165, AUGUST 30, 1988. 5
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
for attorney’s fees, and costs.”
Appellant GSIS would have this Court reverse this judgment on the argument
that—
1. 1)Agcaoili had no right to suspend payment of amortizations on account
of the incompleteness of his housing unit, since said unit had been sold
“in the condition and state of completion then existing x x x (and) he is
deemed to have accepted the same in the condition he found it when he
accepted the award;” and assuming indefiniteness of the contract in this
regard, such circumstance precludes a judgment for specific
performance.9
2. 2)Perfection of the contract of sale between it and Agcaoili being
conditioned upon the latter’s immediate occupancy of the house subject
thereof, and the latter having failed to com-ply with the condition, no
contract ever came into existence between them;10
3. 3)Agcaoili’s act of placing his homeless friend, Villanueva, in possession,
“without the prior or subsequent knowledge or consent of the defendant
(GSIS)” operated as a repudiation by Agcaoili of the award and a
deprivation of the GSIS at the same time of the reasonable rental value
of the property.11
Agcaoili’s offer to buy from GSIS was contained in a printed form drawn up by the
latter, entitled “Application to Purchase a House and/or Lot.” Agcaoili filled up the
form, signed it, and submitted it.12The acceptance of the application was also set
out in a form (mimeographed) also prepared by the GSIS. As already mentioned,
this form sent to Agcaoili, duly filled up, advised him of the approval of his
“application to purchase a house and lot in our GSIS Housing Project at NANGKA,
MARIKINA, RIZAL,” and that “Lot No. 26, Block No. (48) 2, together with the
46
housing unit constructed thereon, has been allocated to you.” Neither the
application form nor the acceptance or approval form of the GSIS—nor the notice to
com-
_________________
9 Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-14.
10 Id., pp. 7-8.
11 Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.
12 Exh. E.
6 proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.”15
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
mence payment of monthly amortizations, which again refers to “the house and lot
awarded”—contained any hint that the house was incomplete, and was being sold
“as is,” i.e., in whatever state of completion it might be at the time. On the other
hand, the condition explicitly imposed on Agcaoili—”to occupy the said house
immediately,” or in any case within three (3) days from notice, otherwise his
“application shall be considered automatically disapproved and the said house and
lot will be awarded to another applicant”—would imply that construction of the
house was more or less complete, and it was by reasonable standards, habitable,
and that indeed, the awardee should stay and live in it; it could not be interpreted
as meaning that the awardee would occupy it in the sense of a pioneer or settler in
a rude wilderness, making do with whatever he found available in the environment.
There was then a perfected contract of sale between the parties; there had been
a meeting of the minds upon the purchase by Agcaoili of a determinate house and
lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal at a definite price
payable in amortizations at P31.56 per month, and from that moment the parties
acquired the right to reciprocally demand performance.13 It was, to be sure, the duty
of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its
enjoyment by the buyer for the purpose contemplated, 14 in other words, to deliver
the house subject of the contract in a reasonably livable state. This it failed to do.
It sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to immediately occupy it under
pain of cancellation of the sale. Under the circumstances there can hardly be any
doubt that the house contemplated was one that could be occupied for purposes of
residence in reasonable comfort and convenience. There would be no sense to
require the awardee to immediately occupy and live in a shell of a house, a structure
consisting only of four walls with openings, and a roof, and to theorize, as the GSIS
does, that this was what was intended by the parties, since the contract did not
clearly impose upon it the obligation to deliver
__________________
13 Art. 1475, Civil Code; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 37
SCRA 685.
14 Lim v. de los Santos, 8 SCRA 798.
7 therefor, would not be quite fair. The cost to the GSIS of completion of construction
VOL. 165, AUGUST 30, 1988.
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
a habitable house, is to advocate an absurdity, the creation of an unfair situation.
By any objective interpretation of its terms, the contract can only be understood as
imposing on the GSIS an obligation to deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably habitable
dwelling in return for his undertaking to pay the stipulated price. Since GSIS did
not fulfill that obligation, and was not willing to put the house in habitable state, it
cannot invoke Agcaoili’s suspension of payment of amortizations as cause to cancel
the contract between them. It is axiomatic that “(i)n reciprocal obligations, neither
party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
Nor may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award to Agcaoili
by the claim that the latter had not complied with the condition of occupying the
house within three (3) days. The record shows that Agcaoili did try to fulfill the
condition; he did try to occupy the house but found it to be so uninhabitable that he
had to leave it the following day. He did however leave a friend in the structure,
who being homeless and hence willing to accept shelter even of the most
rudimentary sort, agreed to stay therein and look after it. Thus the argument that
Agcaoili breached the agreement by failing to occupy the house, and by allowing
another person to stay in it without the consent of the GSIS, must be rejected as
devoid of merit.
Finally, the GSIS should not be heard to say that the agreement between it and
Agcaoili is silent, or imprecise as to its exact prestation. Blame for the imprecision
cannot be imputed to Agcaoili; it was after all the GSIS which caused the contract
to come into being by its written acceptance of Agcaoili’s offer to purchase, that offer
being contained in a printed form supplied by the GSIS. Said appellant having
caused the ambiguity of which it would now make capital, the question of
interpretation arising therefrom, should be resolved against it.
It will not do, however, to dispose of the controversy by simply declaring that
the contract between the parties had not been validly cancelled and was therefore
still in force, and that Agcaoili could not be compelled by the GSIS to pay the stipu-
______________
15 Art. 1169, last paragraph, Civil Code.
8
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
lated price of the house and lot subject of the contract until and unless it had first
completed construction of the house. This would leave the contract hanging or in
suspended animation, as it were, Agcaoili unwilling to pay unless the house were
first completed, and the GSIS averse to completing construction, which is precisely
what has been the state of affairs between the parties for more than twenty (20)
years now. On the other hand, assuming it to be feasible to still finish the
construction of the house at this time, to compel the GSIS to do so so that Agcaoili’s
prestation to pay the price might in turn be demanded, without modifying the price
7 at present prices would make the stipulated price disproportionate, unrealistic.
47
 The situation calls for the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, to the
end that it may render complete justice to both parties.
“As we x x reaffirmed in Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations(83 SCRA
579, 589 [1978]). ‘(E)quity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and
do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and
want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and
not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts. . .’ ”16
In this case, the Court can not require specific performance of the contract in
question according to its literal terms, as this would result in inequity. The
prevailing rule is that in decreeing specific performance equity requires17—
“x x not only that the contract be just and equitable in its provisions, but that the
consequences of specific performance likewise be equitable and just. The general
rule is that this equitable relief will not be granted if, under the circumstances of
the case, the result of the specific enforcement of the contract would be harsh,
inequitable, oppressive, or result in an unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff x
x.”
________________
16 Cristobal vs. Melchor, 101 SCRA 857, 865.
17 71 Am. Jur. 2d, 101.
9 condition, as one form of relief to the plaintiff Agcaoili, no longer appears to be a
VOL. 165, AUGUST 30, 1988.
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may adjustthe rights of parties
in accordance with the circumstancesobtaining at the time of rendition of
judgment, when these aresignificantly different from those existing at the time of
generation of those rights.
“The Court is not restricted to an adjustment of the rights of the parties as they
existed when suit was brought, but will give relief appropriate to events occuring
ending the suit.18
“While equitable jurisdiction is generally to be determined with reference to the
situation existing at the time the suit is filed, the relief to be accorded by the decree
is governed by the conditions which are shown to exist at the time of making thereof,
and not by the circumstances attending the inception of the litigation. In making
up the final decree in an equity suit the judge may rightly consider matters arising
after suit was brought. Therefore, as a general rule, equity will administer such
relief as the nature, rights, facts and exigencies of the case demand at the close of
the trial or at the time of the making of the decree.”19
That adjustment is entirely consistent with the Civil Law principle that in the
exercise of rights a person must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.20 Adjustment of rights has been held to be particularly
applicable when there has been a depreciation of currency.
“Depreciation of the currency or other medium of payment contracted for has
frequenty been held to justify the court in withholding specific performance or at
least conditioning it upon payment of the actual value of the property contracted
for. Thus, in an action for the specific performance of a real estate contract, it has
been held that where the currency in which the plaintiff had contracted to pay had
greatly depreciated before enforcement was sought, the relief would be denied
unless the complaint would undertake to pay the equitable value of the land.”
(Willard & Tayloe[U.S.] 8 Wall 557, 19 L. Ed 501; Doughdrill v. Edwards, 59 Ala
424)21
________________
1830C.J.S. 929.
1927 Am Jur. 2d. 818.
20 Art. 19, Civil Code: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
and good faith.”
21 71 Am. Jur. 2d, 120.
10
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agcaoili vs. Government Service Insurance System
In determining the precise relief to give, the Court will “balance the equities” or the
respective interests of the parties, and take account of the relative hardship that
one relief or another may occasion to them.22
The completion of the unfinished house so that it may be put into habitable
9 feasible option in view of the not inconsiderable time that has already elapsed. That
would require an adjustment of the price of the subject of the sale to conform to
present prices of construction materials and labor. It is more in keeping with the
realities of the situation, and with equitable norms, to simply require payment for
the land on which the house stands, and for the house itself, in its unfinished state,
as of the time of the contract. In fact, this is an alternative relief proposed by
Agcaoili himself, i.e., “that judgment issue x x (o)rdering the defendant (GSIS) to
execute a deed of sale that would embody and provide for a reasonable amortization
of payment on the basis of the present actual unfinished and uncompleted condition,
worth and value of the said house.”23
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo insofar as it invalidates and
sets aside the cancellation by respondent GSIS of the award in favor of petitioner
Agcaoili of Lot No. 26, Block No. (48) 2 of the GSIS low cost housing project at
Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, and orders the former to respect the aforesaid award and
to pay damages in the amounts specified, is AFFIRMED as being in accord with the
facts and the law. Said judgments is however modified by deleting the requirement
for respondent GSIS “to complete the house in question so as to
________________
22 Am. Jur. 2nd 628-629: “There is a general principle that a court of equity will
balance the equities’ between the parties in determining what, if any, relief to give.
x x Thus, for example, where the effect of the only relief which can be granted to
protect the plaintiff will be destructive of the defendants’ business, which would be
lawful but for the harm it does to the plaintiff, relief may be refused if, on a
48
balancing of the respective interests, that of the defendant is found to be relatively
important, and that of the plaintiff relatively insignificant. x x.”
23 Record on Appeal, p. 5; Rollo, p. 13.
11
VOL. 165, AUGUST 30, 1988.
Republic vs. CFI of Manila, Branch XIII
make the same habitable,” and instead it is hereby ORDERED that the contract
between the parties relative to the property above described be modified by adding
to the cost of the land, as of the time of perfection of the contract, the cost of the
house in its unfinished state also as of the time of perfection of the contract, and
correspondingly adjusting the amortizations to be paid by petitioner Agcaoili, the
modification to be effected after determination by the Court a quo of the value of
said house on the basis of the agreement of the parties, or if this is not possible, by
such commissioner or commissioners as the Court may appoint. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
VOL. 646, MARCH 23, 2011
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
formation that the public officer or employee stated or failed to state in his
SALNs and remind him of it.
Same; Same; Same; The law expects public officials to be accountable to the
people in the matter of their integrity and competence—the Court cannot interpret
the Review and Compliance Procedure as transferring such accountability to the
Committee.—The purpose of R.A. 6713 is “to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the
people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and
uphold public interest over personal interest.” The law expects public officials to be
accountable to the people in the matter of their integrity and competence. Thus, the
Court cannot interpret the Review and Compliance Procedure as transferring such
accountability to the Committee.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the dismissal of a department undersecretary for failure to
declare in his Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) his
wife’s business interests and financial connections.
The Facts and the Case
On December 19, 2002 the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
received an anonymous letter-complaint1 from alleged employees of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The letter accused DPWH Undersec-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 83-89.
298
11 298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
retary Salvador A. Pleyto of extortion, illicit affairs, and manipulation of DPWH
projects.
In the course of the PAGC’s investigation, Pleyto submitted his
1999,2 2000,3 and 20014 SALNs. PAGC examined these and observed that, while
Pleyto said therein that his wife was a businesswoman, he did not disclose her
business interests and financial connections. Thus, on April 29, 2003 PAGC charged
Pleyto before the Office of the President (OP) for violation of Section 8 of Republic
Act (R.A.) 6713,5 also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees” and Section 7 of R.A. 30196 or “The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.”7
_______________
297
2 Id., at p. 92.
3 Id., at p. 90.
4 Id., at p. 91.
5 Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.—Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the
public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure.—
All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath
their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses
and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
6 Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities.—Every public officer, within
thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of
his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare
and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a
Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the
President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees
thereof, with the Office of the Secre-
299
VOL. 646, MARCH 23, 2011 299
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
49
 Pleyto claimed that he and his wife had no business interests of any kind and
for this reason, he wrote “NONE” under the column “Business Interests and
Financial Connections” on his 1999 SALN and left the column blank in his 2000 and
2001 SALNs.8 Further, he attributed the mistake to the fact that his SALNs were
merely prepared by his wife’s bookkeeper.9
On July 10, 2003 PAGC found Pleyto guilty as charged and recommended to
the OP his dismissal with forfeiture of all government financial benefits and
disqualification to re-enter government service.10
On January 29, 2004 the OP approved the recommendation.11From this, Pleyto
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration12claiming that: 1) he should first be
allowed to avail of the review and compliance procedure in Section 10 of R.A.
671313 before he is administratively charged; 2) he indicated
_______________
tary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office
less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements
in the following months of January.
7 Rollo, pp. 93-95.
8 Id., at pp. 96-101.
9 Id., at pp. 108-109.
10 Id., at pp. 124-132.
11 Id., at pp. 133-138.
12 Id., at pp. 139-152.
13 Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure.—(a) The designated
Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the review
of statements to determine whether said statements which have been submitted on
time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is made
that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the
reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
“NONE” in the column for financial and business interests because he and his wife
had no business interests related to DPWH; and 3) his failure to indicate his wife’s
business interests is not punishable under R.A. 3019.
On March 2, 2004 PAGC filed its comment,14 contending that Pleyto’s reliance
on the Review and Complicance Procedure was unavailing because the mechanism
had not yet been established and, in any case, his SALN was a sworn statement,
the contents of which were beyond the corrective guidance of the DPWH Secretary.
Furthermore, his failure to declare his wife’s business interests and financial
connections was highly irregular and was a form of dishonesty.
On March 11, 2005 Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita ordered PAGC to
conduct a reinvestigation of Pleyto’s case.15 In compliance, PAGC queried the
Department of Trade and Industry of Region III–Bulacan regarding the businesses
registered in the name of Miguela Pleyto, his wife. PAGC found that she operated
the following businesses: 1) R.S. Pawnshop, registered since May 19, 1993; 2) M.
Pleyto Pig-
_______________
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated
Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power within their respective
jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons
covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of
the majority of the particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual
involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts
in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in
this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections
(a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.
14 Rollo, pp. 153-162.
15 Id., at p. 163.
301
VOL. 646, MARCH 23, 2011 301
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
gery and Poultry Farm, registered since December 29, 1998; 3) R.S. Pawnshop–
Pulong Buhangin Branch, registered since July 24, 2000; and 4) RSP Laundry and
Dry Cleaning, registered since July 24, 2001.16
The PAGC also inquired with the DPWH regarding their Review and
Compliance procedure. The DPWH said that, they merely reminded their officials
of the need for them to comply with R.A. 6713 by filing their SALNs on time and
that they had no mechanism for reviewing or validating the entries in the SALNs
of their more than 19,000 permanent, casual and contractual employees.17
On February 21, 2006 the PAGC maintained its finding and recommendation
respecting Pleyto.18 On August 29, 2006 the OP denied Pleyto’s Motion for
Reconsideration.19 Pleyto raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA),20 which on
December 29, 2006 granted Pleyto’s petition and permanently enjoined the PAGC
and the OP from implementing their decisions.21 This prompted the latter offices to
come to this Court on a petition for review.22
Issues Presented
This case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding Pleyto’s failure to indicate his
spouse’s business interests in his SALNs a violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6713.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that under the Review and
Compliance Procedure, Pleyto should have first been al-
50
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 164-172.
17 Id., at p. 173.
18 Id., at p. 174.
19 Id., at pp. 175-184.
20 Id., at pp. 185-228.
21 Id., at pp. 60-82.
22 Id., at pp. 32-59.
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
lowed to correct the error in his SALNs before being charged for violation of R.A.
6713.
The Court’s Rulings
This is the second time Pleyto’s SALNs are before this Court. The first time was
in G.R. 169982, Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG).23In that case, the PNP-CIDG filed on July 28, 2003
administrative charges against Pleyto with the Office of the Ombudsman for
violating, among others, Section 8 of R.A. 6713 in that he failed to disclose in his
2001 and 2002 SALNs his wife’s business interests and financial connections.
On June 28, 2004 the Office of the Ombudsman ordered Pleyto dismissed from
the service. He appealed the order to the CA but the latter dismissed his petition
and the motion for reconsideration that he subsequently filed. Pleyto then assailed
the CA’s ruling before this Court raising, among others, the following issues: 1)
whether or not Pleyto violated Section 8(a) of R.A. 6713; and 2) whether or not
Pleyto’s reliance on the Review and Compliance Procedure in the law was
unwarranted.
After threshing out the other issues, this Court found that Pleyto’s failure to
disclose his wife’s business interests and financial connections constituted simple
negligence, not gross misconduct or dishonesty. Thus:
“Neither can petitioner’s failure to answer the question, “Do you have
any business interest and other financial connections including those of
your spouse and unmarried children living in your household?” be
tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of
petitioner’s 2002 SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a
businesswoman, and it can be logically deduced that she had business
interests. Such a statement of his wife’s occupation would be inconsistent
with the intention to conceal his and his wife’s
_______________
23 November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 534.
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Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
business interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had business interests
is thus readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing
particulars may be subject of an inquiry or investigation.
An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and
for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross
misconduct, and is merely simple negligence. Thus, at most, petitioner is
guilty of negligence for having failed to ascertain that his SALN was
accomplished properly, accurately, and in more detail.
Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is
negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the
obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable. Both Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and Section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees require the accomplishment and submission of a
true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities. Petitioner was
negligent for failing to comply with his duty to provide a detailed list of
his assets and business interests in his SALN. He was also negligent in
relying on the family bookkeeper/accountant to fill out his SALN and in
signing the same without checking or verifying the entries therein.
Petitioner’s negligence, though, is only simple and not gross, in the
absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part, and in
consideration of the fact that his SALNs actually disclose the full extent of
his assets and the fact that he and his wife had other business interests.
Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious charges which warrant the
removal or dismissal from service of the erring public officer or employee,
together with the accessory penalties, such as cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Hence, a finding that a
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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
public officer or employee is administratively liable for such charges must
be supported by substantial evidence.”24
The above concerns Pleyto’s 2001 and 2002 SALN; the present case, on the
other hand, is about his 1999, 2000 and 2001 SALNs but his omissions are identical.
While he said that his wife was a businesswoman, he also did not disclose her
business interests and financial connections in his 1999, 2000 and 2001 SALNs.
Since the facts and the issues in the two cases are identical, the judgment in G.R.
169982, the first case, is conclusive upon this case.
There is “conclusiveness of judgment” when any right, fact, or matter in issue,
directly adjudicated on the merits in a previous action by a competent court or
necessarily involved in its determination, is conclusively settled by the judgment in
51
such court and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is
the same.25
Thus, as in G.R. 169982, Pleyto’s failure to declare his wife’s business interest
and financial connections does not constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct but
only simple negligence, warranting a penalty of forfeiture of the equivalent of six
months of his salary from his retirement benefits.26
With regard to the issue concerning compliance with the Review and
Compliance Procedure provided in R.A. 6713, this Court already held in G.R.
169982 that such procedure cannot limit the authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct administrative investigations. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as “The
Ombudsman Act of 1989,” intended to vest in the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority.27 Here,
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 586-588.
25 Abelita III v. Doria, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 230.
26 Pleyto v. Philippine National Police-CIDG, supra note 23, at pp. 595-596.
27 Id., at p. 593.
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Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
however, it was the PAGC and the OP, respectively, that conducted the
investigation and meted out the penalty of dismissal against Pleyto. Consequently,
the ruling in G.R. 169982 in this respect cannot apply.
Actually, nowhere in R.A. 6713 does it say that the Review and Compliance
Procedure is a prerequisite to the filing of administrative charges for false
declarations or concealments in one’s SALN. Thus:
“Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure.—(a) The designated
Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for
the review of statements to determine whether said statements which
have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the
event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the
appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct
him to take the necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the
designated Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power
within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting
this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance
to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House
concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other
individual involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance
of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject
to any sanction provided in this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in
subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are
concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case
of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
in the case of the Judicial Department.”
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306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
The provision that gives an impression that the Review and Compliance
Procedure is a prerequisite to the filing of an administrative complaint is found in
paragraph (b) of Section 10 which states that “The individual to whom an opinion
is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual situation, and
who, after the issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall
not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.” This provision must not,
however, be read in isolation.
Paragraph (b) concerns the power of the Review and Compliance Committee to
interpret the law governing SALNs. It authorizes the Committee to issue
interpretative opinions regarding the filing of SALNs. Officers and employees
affected by such opinions “as well as” all who are similarly situated may be allowed
to correct their SALNs according to that opinion. What the law prohibits is merely
the retroactive application of the committee’s opinions. In no way did the law say
that a public officer clearly violating R.A. 6713 must first be notified of any
305
concealed or false information in his SALN and allowed to correct the same before
he is administratively charged.
Furthermore, the only concern of the Review and Compliance Procedure, as per
paragraph (a), is to determine whether the SALNs are complete and in proper form.
This means that the SALN contains all the required data, i.e., the public official
answered all the questions and filled in all the blanks in his SALN form. If it finds
that required information has been omitted, the appropriate Committee shall so
inform the official who prepared the SALN and direct him to make the necessary
correction.
The Court cannot accept the view that the review required of the Committee
refers to the substance of what is stated in the SALN, i.e., the truth and accuracy of
the answers stated in it, for the following reasons:307
VOL. 646, MARCH 23, 2011 307
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
First. Assuring the truth and accuracy of the answers in the SALN is the
function of the filer’s oath28 that to the best of his knowledge and information, the
data he provides in it constitutes the true statements of his assets, liabilities, net
worth, business interests, and financial connections, including those of his spouse
and unmarried children below 18 years of age.29 Any falsity in the SALN makes him
liable for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Second. The law will not require the impossible, namely, that the Committee
must ascertain the truth of all the information that the public officer or employee
stated or failed to state in his SALNs and remind him of it. The DPWH affirms this
fact in its certification below:
52
 “This is to certify that this Department issues a memorandum every
year reminding its officials and employees to submit their Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) in compliance with R.A. 6713.
Considering that it has approximately 19,000 permanent employees plus a
variable number of casual and contractual employees, the Department
does not have the resources to review or validate the entries in all the
SALNs. Officials and employees are assumed to be accountable for the
veracity of the entries considering that the SALNs are under oath.”30
Indeed, if the Committee knows the truth about the assets, liabilities, and net
worth of its department’s employees, there would be no need for the law to require
the latter to file their sworn SALNs yearly.
In this case, the PAGC succeeded in discovering the business interest of Pleyto’s
wife only after it subpoenaed from the Department of Trade and Industry—Bulacan
certified copies of her business interests there. The Heads of Offices do not
_______________
28 Republic Act 6713 (1989), Sec. 8.
29 Pleyto’s SALN Form, Rollo, p. 113.
30 Rollo, p. 173.
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Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) vs. Pleyto
have the means to compel production of documents in the hands of other
government agencies or third persons.
The purpose of R.A. 6713 is “to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people
and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public
interest over personal interest.”31 The law expects public officials to be accountable
to the people in the matter of their integrity and competence. Thus, the Court
cannot interpret the Review and Compliance Procedure as transferring such
accountability to the Committee.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition but finds petitioner Salvador
A. Pleyto guilty only of simple negligence and imposes on him the penalty of
forfeiture of the equivalent of six months of his salary from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion,** Peralta and Bersamin,*** JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal, a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes
on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. (Pelayo
vs. Perez, 459 SCRA 475 [2005])
——o0o——
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido
and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discov-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 20-22.
2 Id., at pp. 27-29.
3 Id., at pp. 21-22.
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VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 117
Republic vs. Orbecido III
ered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that
53
is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated
_______________
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree,
_______________
7 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
8 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364
SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November
1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
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VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 119
Republic vs. Orbecido III
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity
to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how
this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
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120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
54
 1. 1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced
will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
2. 2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even
for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can
re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil
_______________
9Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
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VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005
Republic vs. Orbecido III
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according
_______________
10No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
11G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. 1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
121 citizen and a foreigner; and
2. 2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
_______________
12 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100
Phil. 850, 855.
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VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5, 2005 123
Republic vs. Orbecido III
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
55
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
_______________

13 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33,
38.
14Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15Id., at p. 451.
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124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside.
Note.—The accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
(Diego vs. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67[2004]).

56