234.

Liguez v CA

G.R. No. L-11240 December 18, 1957

Facts: Petitioner-appellant Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the widow and heirs
of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land. Liguez averred to be its legal
owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land, executed in her favor by the late
owner, Salvador P. Lopez. The defense interposed was that the donation was null and
void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff’s entering into
marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been
adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said parcel of land belongs to the widow and heirs of
Salvador?

HELD: Yes. The CA ruled that the deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void

because Lopez had no right to donate conjugal property to Conchita; the donation was

tainted with illegal causa or consideration. The CA also rejected Conchita’s claim based
on

he rule “in pari delicto non oritur actio,” as embodied in Art. 1306 of the 1889 Civil Code.

Thus, the said parcel of land belong to the heirs of Salvador.

235. Del Val v Del Val

G.R. No. L-9374

February 16, 1915

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the complaint with costs. The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at
law and next of kin of Gregorio del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator was
appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed.
During the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of
P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After his death, the
defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to
redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to
repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant
in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor. Andres,
on death of the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property and that he
has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.

Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the
deceased and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not
only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The
complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased,
and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally
among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of deceased.

The defendant’s claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made
in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his
knowledge or consent. He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds
of the insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was
and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property.

The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the
argument that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec.
183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which
partition is demanded.'

ISSUE:
Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?

HELD:

No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his
individual and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong
exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured,
and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and
not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. The
doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:

“The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the
contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs
or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of
the former.”

The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:

“An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must
bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the
deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration,
in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.”

They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are
not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."

The court didn’t agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the
destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that
subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-
insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the
Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to
the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasn’t agreed upon by the court
unless the facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other
heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate.

236. PECSON VS MEDIAVILLO

G.R. No. 7890

September 29, 1914

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Disinheritance

FACTS:

The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law,
opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed
by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir
(judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the
provisions of law, and denied the opposition .

Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion

averring:

• That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson

• That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will,

because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand
against him

Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate
daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter,
Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will
that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.

• That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was
due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from
which she now suffers in periodical attacks.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario)
also died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator.

The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895,
when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was
previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him.
But since she was 14 years old, and shortly afterwards became insane, she was not
responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside
for being of no force or value whatever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the
cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such
disinheritance.

HELD:

Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one
of the causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the
legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the
causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be
supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement
of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall
annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years
of age, she had received some attentions from a young man – that she had received a
letter from him – and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about
the relations between her and the said young man. It was upon that occasion when the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for
her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event, she lost the
use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief
periods, up to the present time.

The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was
probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather
in the year 1894 or 1895.

237. Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor

89 SCRA 493

FACTS:

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at

Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was
made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of
his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to
this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate
court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman
Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in
the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a
devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence
of the qualified devisee?

HELD:

It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs.
Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who
deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not
claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest
male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not
the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was
not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for
reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew,
Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.

Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a

seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that
the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no
more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).

Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the

testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the
said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when
his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested,
rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie
la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born
after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a
broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his
bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade
school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of
Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the
moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship
would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator
in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is
untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not
support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in
the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only
when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest,
had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those
in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto
se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de
acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands
the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the
testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

238. PISALBON vs. BEJEC

G.R. No. 48430

January 30, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:

Hipolito Manuel, who dies on April 26, 1926, left two widows and a homestead. The
widows are Floretina Pisalbon and Placida Bejec, whom he married on June 23, 1903,
and November 9, 1914, respectively. In his homestead application which was filed on
September 3, 1917, and approved by the Director of Lands on August 23, 1918, Hipolito
Manuel named Placida Bejec as his lawful wife; and in fact he and she were the ones
who cleared and worked in the land from the date the homestead application was filed
until the death of Hipolito Manuel on April 26, 1926. In view of the conflicting claims of the
two widows, the Director of Lands, on August 23, 1934, ordered that the homestead
patent be issued in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel, and accordingly the register of
deeds of Pangasinan subsequently issued original certificate of title No. 1749 in favor of
the heirs of Hipolito Manuel. No child was born to the second marriage, but a daughter
was born to the first, namely, Margarita Manuel, one of the original plaintiffs herein, who
died on August 17, 1939, during the pendency of this action, leaving two children named
Cristeta and Esmedia Ancheta. This action was instituted on June 28, 1938, by Florentina
Pisalbon and her daughter Margarita Manuel, the latter assisted by her husband Pedro
Ancheta, against Placida Bejec to recover from her the ownership and possession of the
homestead above mentioned. Upon a stipulation of facts the substance of which has been
set forth above, the trial court held that in view of the fact that Placida Bejec together with
Hipolito Manuel cleared and worked the land in question, and considering that
homesteads are granted to actual occupants of the public land, she is entitled to the
homestead both in law and in equity, and dismissed plaintiffs' action with costs against
the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
WON the doctrine laid down in Lao and Lao vs. Dee Tim (45 Phil,. 739),won their prayer
"that the decision of the lower court be reversed and another entered in lieu thereof
declaring that the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to and own one half (½) pro indiviso of
the land described in homestead patent title No. 1749 issued by the registered of deeds
of Pangasinan in the name of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel.

HELD:

This Court, applying the Laws of the Partidas, held that where two women innocently and
in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will
be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one half of the estate
of the husband upon the distribution of his estate. Under that doctrine, the half of the
homestead in question corresponding to Hipolito Manuel belongs to his heirs, Cristeta
Ancheta and Esmedia Ancheta, the children of his now deceased legitimate daughter
Margarita Manuel, subject to the usufruct of the two widows over one third thereof. (Article
834, Civil Code.) The right to usufruct of the defendant Placida Bejec may equitably be
considered compensated by the legitimate claim of the plaintiffs for one-half share in the
products of the homestead in question from June 28, 1938, the date of the filing of the
complaint.

239. RIOSA vs.ROCHA

G.R. No. L-23770

February 18, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first
and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago,
Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father,
Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore
him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased,
married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter
therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two
children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described
in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife,
Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. It appears that the eleven parcels of land described in
the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano
Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his
mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land
are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still
belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold
by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears
that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the
line from which this property came. This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom
the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to
reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10
and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was
included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

ISSUE:

WON that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reserves.

HELD:

As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by
the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal
provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these
rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a
reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the
reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is
extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one
when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the
widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has
been in his possession free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages
also affect differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold
during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred
to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is,
when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the
reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason
why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or
before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value
of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation
may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made
may be assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the
reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the
Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the
value of the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed
spouse to secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming
reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the
ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be
analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case
of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, it cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it
is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable
character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by
the appellant as to her are decided.

240. Rodriguez vs Ravilan

17 PHIL 63
G.R. No. 5343

September 16, 1910

FACTS:

The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel
of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a
ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa Manlili, on the south by
that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that of
Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same
pueblo, of an area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded
on the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio
Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza,
respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio and of and an area
required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street
leading to Talamban, on the south by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley,
and on the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.

That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands,
other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area
usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by
property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuñez, and Feliciano
Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas
of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by
the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west
by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10
gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by the lands of Ciriaco
Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the
same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug,
and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the
north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another
parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and
west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto
Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid
pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east
and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton
Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded
on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of
Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of
Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south,
east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and
Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four
head of cattle, acquired by the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against
Laureano Soliano, secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the
pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a
partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that
may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct
enjoyed by the defendant?

HELD:
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and
sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and
are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition
was made among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death,
and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be
possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the
same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which
was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the Civil Code provides "A
division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
which may have been awarded to him."

Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been
shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the four brothers and
sisters aforementioned, there would have beenprima facie proof that they were and
certainly are the owners thereof.

241. ROSALES v. ROSALES

148 SCRA 69

February 27, 1987

FACTS:

- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2
children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased
has an estimated gross value of about P30,000.
- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following
individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the
estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4;
and Antonio (son), 1/4.

- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse
of the late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.

HELD:

NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.Intestate or legal

heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those
who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either
by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the
right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.

- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision
which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law
either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate
heir. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art 887.
The provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.

- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. The estate
contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The subject matter of
the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the
mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of
the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art 981.

- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of
his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation
by blood with her mother-in-law.

- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate
or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it
may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox who succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed
from his deceased father Carterio.

242. Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Ituralde

G.R. No. L-2599

October 27, 1905

Facts:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte y Iturralde asked
that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no
legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of
succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant — that is to say,
as the legitimate niece of the deceased which was granted by the court. But later, Carmen
Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the
deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana
Ugarte yIturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which
this new relative did not deny — be required to render an account of the property of the
estate. The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as
Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde. The court entered judgment declaring that the petitioner
had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde,
and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time,
from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate
distributed. Maria Juana Ugarteexcepted to the judgment and has brought the case to
this court.

Issue:

Whether or not grandniece is entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is
entitled to.

Held:
A grandniece is not entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to.
The court holds that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the
more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation
does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have
been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

243. Sarita vs. Candia

G.R. No. L-7768

November 14, 1912

FACTS:

The spouses Apolinario Cedeño and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a
piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted
fruit trees. Apolinario Cedeño died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. Andres Candia
was holding and cultivating the said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so
merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that,
from May, 1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land,
appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took possession
of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of furniture which were in the house
erected on the said land — a house worth 50 pesos —which he also seized and claimed
as his property. Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa as the son of her sister
said Apolonio Cedeño, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeño, was a cabeza de barangay
of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under
his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa, who held
it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such
possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom
witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parties are entitled to the estate by way of order of succession?

HELD:

First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D,
there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit
to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot
represent his grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of
representation can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not
in favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia
Cedeño who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo Cedeño.

Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate
succession of Apolinario Cedeño, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta
Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño, and those of Domingo Cedeño, but not by
Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote,
excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from which it
is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño and
those of Domingo Cedeño, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed
that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel
Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeño, of a more remote degree.
Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could
be given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the
widow of Apolinario Cedeño, Roberta Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased
husband that she be allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of
the family; inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it
and, besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to
the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her
part of usufruct, this half of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of
usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)

Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of
such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not
owned by him, it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established
by the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such
alleged inheritance, cannot exist.

244.

Prasnick vs RP

G.R. No. L-8639

March 23, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: Adoption of Acknowledge Natural Children

FACTS:

Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage was
dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the Circuit
Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and out of this relation four
children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is his
intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine citizenship for which
he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that no one
of his relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with
his former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.

The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new Civil
Code which provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt
and considering that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his children,
he contends that he is disqualified from adopting them under that article.

ISSUE:

Whether person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt.

HELD:

We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that article
for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be adopted. A
cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the
adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it
does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has acknowledged them as
his natural children.

It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary

because there already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity and
filiation which is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal
fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are
much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the
latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this view is in
keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted precisely
to encourage adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this
modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity
and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that
adoption is now defined as “a juridical act which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation”.

245. LLORENTE VS. RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

10 PHIL 585, No. 3339

March 26, 1908

Topic/Doctrine:Right of Representation

FACTS:

Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named
Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will
executed by her, she instituted as her sole and general heirs, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin,
and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente. Jacinta died
prior to the testatrix, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of y Llorente,
and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.

Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the
proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the
said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive
heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente,
absolutely cannot be a party thereto.
ISSUE:

Whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate
daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of
her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa
Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.

HELD:

From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who
acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does
not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to their
legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother
who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in the succession
to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear
among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.

If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from
her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente,
would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which
the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own
right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she
has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is
no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should
inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to inherit
from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother,
is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.
246. Oyao vs. Oyao,

94 Phil. 204, No. L-6340

December 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Natural children have no right to represent their natural father or mother
in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter.

FACTS:

This is an action to recover a piece of land alleged to have been inherited by plaintiffs
from their maternal grandfather, Aniceto Oyao, and to have been usurped by defendant.
Defendant denies the alleged usurpation and claims ownership of the land, one-half of it
as an inheritance from his deceased father, Abundio Oyao, brother of Aniceto Oyao, to
whom it had been donated by the latter, and the other half by purchase from Aniceto Oyao
himself.

There is no question that the disputed property formerly belonged to Aniceto Oyao, who
died intestate. Aniceto had two legitimate children, Simeona and Eulalia, both of whom
died before him but were survived by their recognized natural children, the plaintiffs
herein, who now lay claim to his hereditary estate in representation of their deceased
mothers and dispute the validity of the donation in favor of Abundio Oyao and the sale in
favor of defendant. Being of the opinion that plaintiffs, as mere natural children could not
represent their respective mothers in the inheritance of their grandfather Aniceto Oyao.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff’s has the right of claim to the hereditary estate, as natural children
in representation of their deceased mothers.

HELD:

There can be no question on the proposition that natural children have not the right to
represent their natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of
the latter. This has been made clear in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez et al., 10 Phil.
585.

In that case Rosa Llorente, a natural daughter of one of the legitimate children of the
deceased Martina Avalle, tried to intervene in the settlement of the estate of the said
deceased in representation of her father, a legitimate son of said Martina Avalle, who had
predeceased the latter. But Rosa Llorente was not allowed to intervene because, as a
natural child of one of Martina Avalle's legitimate children, she had no right to the
inheritance. Plaintiffs in the present case are in that same position. Their claim to their
grandfather's inheritance is, therefore, without legal basis.

247. Grey Vs Fabie

GR. No. L-45160

May 28, 1939

FACTS:

After the death of Rosario Fabie y Grey, her alleged will was presented to the court for
probate. It was assailed by Serafin Fabie and Jose Fabie, the court, held that, they could
not inherit intestate from Rosario Fabie , had no interest in the will in question, hence,
they have no right to impugn it, whereupon, it ordered the continuation of the probate
proceedings without the intervention of the said oppositors.

The oppositors contend that they do not attempt to succeed their cousin by their own right
but by the right of representation. If Ramon Fabie were living, so they say, he would
undeniably be entitled to succeed his niece Rosario Fabie y Grey, in which case, upon
the death of Ramon Fabie, his natural children, the herein oppositors would succeed him,
because Ramon Fabie had no legitimate children. They cited article 924 and 925 of the
Civil Code to support their contentions.

After trial, the court probated the said will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, and
appointed the petitioner, Jose Grey, executor upon filing a bond for P10,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositors-appellants are entitled to inherit from their natural cousin
Rosario Fabie y Grey

HELD:

No, they are not entitled to inherit even through the right of representation because they
don’t have such right. The oppositors-appellants are not children of brothers or sisters of
the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, but of the latter's uncle, Ramon Fabie, hence, it is
unnecessary to state that the right of representation does not lie in this case. From this it
inevitably follows that the oppositors have no interest whatsoever in the will of the
deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, wherefore, they are not entitled to intervene in the
proceedings for the probate of the said will.

248. Anuran Vs Aquino

GR. No. L-12397

April 02, 1918

FACTS:

The plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, to whose estate the
property described in the complaint belongs. The defendant, Ana Aquino, is the natural
child of a sister of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, that on the death of Ambrosio Aquino,
one Norberto Capiña was appointed administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance
of Ana Aquino, acting collusion with the administrator fraudulently represented to the court
that Ambrosio Aquino, had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino, a
daughter of his deceased sister. At the time when these representations were made, both
Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, was the
surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, and that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a
natural daughter of the deceased sister of Ambrosio Aquino. Without notice to the widow,
Ana Aquino, acting in collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance,
fraudulently procured the entry of an order in the administration proceedings dated March
12, 1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of all property of the
estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in this suit, and that the motion
of the administrator on which this order was based was supported by the affidavit of Ana
Aquino, setting forth the false and misleading statement of the alleged facts as
hereinbefore indicated.

The widow, Florencia Anuran, who was not a party of record in the administration
proceedings, did not discover that this order had been entered until about the 14th day of
February, 1914, when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration
proceedings and moved that the order be set aside, and that she be declared the sole
heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants, or
descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, the widow of Ambrosio Aquino be declared
the sole heir of the deceased
HELD:

Yes, In the light of the facts presented, there is not and cannot be any substantial question
as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband as his sole heir
under the provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as
follows:

A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of the whole blood
or not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant.

249. FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-7760. September 30, 1955.]

Intestate estate of the deceased GAVINO REYES. MARIANO RODRIGUEZ, MARTA

RODRIGUEZ and CONCEPCION RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ZOILO
REYES, respondents-appellee.

Facts: Spouses Gavino Villota y Reyes and Rosa Venal had acquired during their
marriage certain properties among which were lots Nos. 5976, 43, 44 45 and 46 and 200
of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya, Quezon province. The husband Gavino Villota y
Reyes having died intestate on April 20, 1953, without leaving issue, his widow Rosa
Venal, without judicial settlement of her husband’s estate, sold the aforesaid lots to the
appellants Rodriguez sometime in the year 1939.
On June 28, 1948, appellee Zoilo Reyes, allegedly a nephew of the late Gavino, instituted
proceedings in Court for settlement of the latter’s estate, and was appointed Administrator
(Special Proceedings No. 3029). In that capacity Zoilo filed an inventory of the estate of
the deceased, and included therein the lots sold by the widow Rosa Venal to appellants
Rodriguez. Later, the administrator petitioned the Court to declare as heirs of the
deceased Gavino, his alleged nephews Zoilo and Andres Reyes (children of the late
Luciano de los Reyes) and Martin Macatangay (son of Luciano’s daughter Josefa Reyes,
a predeceased sister of Andres and Zoilo Reyes).

ISSUE: Whether or not the children and grandson of Luciano de los Reyes be declared
as heirs of the deceased Gavino?

HELD: No. Luciano could not succeed to the estate of Gavino Villota y Reyes, in view of
Article 943 of the Civil Code of 1889 (later clarified by Article 992 of the new Civil Code.

"ART. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestate legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural child."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 992. (New Civil Code) An illegitimate child has no right to inherit an intestate from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."cralaw virtua1aw library

And the disqualification of Luciano to succeed gavino Villota extended under these
articles to Luciano’s own progeny, Zoilo and Andres and Martin Macatangay, since they
could not represent him.

250. CUARTICO v CUARTICO No. 11190-R, 16 November 1955 52 O.G. 1489 TOPIC:
XX. Intestate Succession, Art 960, 1027, 1028, 1032; F. The Iron Curtain, Art 992, 995

DOCTRINE:

Cuartico explains the reason for the barrier in Article 992. The reason behind the absolute
prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family.

NATURE:

Appeal

PONENTE:

Hernandez, J.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Tranquilino Cuartico was named administrator of the Intestate Estate of said
deceased. After all money claims against the estate had been settled, the administrator
and his co-petitioners moved that they be declared the exclusive heirs of the deceased.
2. The oppositors filed a similar motion praying that they, along with the petitioners, be
declared heirs of the deceased. After trial, the court below, as aforestated, declared the
petitioners and oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla whereupon the petitioners,
unsatisfied with the ruling, interposed the present appeal. 3. It appears indisputably clear
between the parties that Patricia Clavecilla (decedent in this case) died single and ab
intestato and that she left an inheritance of six parcels of land and houses. The
petitioners-appellants named Tranquilino, Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio and Pancrasio all
surnamed Cuartico are the legitimate children of Macario Cuartico and Maria Clavecilla,
now both deceased. The oppositors-appellees along with the appellants' father Macario
Cuartico, are the children of Eleno Cuartico and Susano Germodo, both deceased. 4. The
evidence for the appellants tends to show that their mother Maria Clavecilla together with
Patricia and Romana Clavecilla were children by different women of a Chinese named
Juan Clavecilla; that Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano who, after Maria's birth, married
one Benigno Martinez; that Patricia's mother is Susana Germodo who upon Patricia's
birth, married Eleno Cuartico from which wedlock were born the appellees Feliciana,
Gregorio, Paula, Macario the appellant's father, and Macario now deceased but
represented by a daughter named Generosa; and that Ramona's mother is a woman
named Bonifacia with an unknown surname. Romana died at an early age, single and
without issue. Maria's death occurred in 1925 while Patricia as above indicated died on
October 4, 1940. 5. The appellants claiming to be natural nephews of Patricia Clavecilla
aver, moreover, that their mother Maria Clavecilla is a natural sister of Patricia Clavecilla
and that both women were recognized natural daughters of Juan Clavecilla, mainly on
the strength of a private instrument supposedly executed by the latter on June 26, 1896.
6. Upon the other hand, the appellees contend that Juan Clavecilla was legally married
to Bonifacia Cardente on July 13, 1969 as evidenced by the parochial church records of
Malabuyoc, Cebu; that from said marriage, Romana Clavecilla was born; and that
Bonifacia Cardente died on March 6, 1900 followed shortly by Juan Clavecilla who died
in 1903. The appellees further maintain that Patricia Clavecilla and Maria Clavecilla,
assuming that the latter was a child of Juan Clavecilla, were both adulterous children and
could not have been validly recognized by Juan Clavecilla who, during their conception
and birth, was legally and validly married to Bonifacia Cardente.

ISSUE:

Who is entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla.

HELD:

7. In the trial below, the appellees tried to prove that Maria Clavecilla was neither a natural
nor an adulterous daughter of Juan Clavecilla but was merely a maid of the latter; that
Maria's real name was Maria Romana; and that she was born of the wedlock between
Sinforosa Romano and Benigno Martinez. Appellees admit that Maria Clavecilla was
legally married to their brother, Macario Cuartico; that from said marriage, the herein
appellants were born and that consequently, appellants are

entitled to inherit from Patricia Clavecilla namely in representation of appellants' father,

Macario, as ostensibly held by the trial court. 8. No dispute exists that the appellees are
the children of Eleno Cuartico and Susana Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural
mother of Patricia Clavecilla, it results therefore, that the appellees are natural half-
brothers, half-sisters and half-niece respectively of Patricia Clavecilla. 9. We begin with
an inquiry into the alleged rights of the appellees to be declared heirs of and to succeed
Patricia Clavecilla. During the trial, petitioners adduced in evidence a certificate issued by
the parish of Alegria, Cebu attesting to the marriage between Eleno or Lino Cuartico and
Susana Germodo, parents of the herein oppositors. Said marriage purportedly took place
in Alegria, Cebu on June 1, 1880. 10. Remarkably, the oppositors proffered no objection
to the admission of said exhibit which explicitly shows that the oppositors' parents were
legally married and inferentially that said oppositors were legitimate children. 11. It is
plainly evident, therefore, that the oppositors who are illegitimate children of Susana
Germodo and Lino Cuartico are seeking to inherit ab intestato from their half-sister,
Patricia Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under Article 943 of the
Old Civil Code which provision is substantially reproduced as Article 992 in the New Civil
Code. Article 943 reads: Art. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestato the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural child. 12. The reason behind the
absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and
incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family.
13. In the words of Manresa: Among the natural son and the legitimate relatives or parent
the reconcio denies all the code succesoria relationship. Cannot be said relatives and are
not entitled to inherit. There is of course a link blood, but this link does not recognize the
alleged facts and will stakeholders, the natural child is looked down upon by family
legitimate, the family is legitimate, however, hated by the natural son this considers that
the privileged situation and the resources for it is deprived, that instead, just go in the
natural son of the product vice, the living proof of a barron family. Every relationship is
broken ordinarily in life, the law does nothing to recognize truth, avoiding new grounds for
resentment. The hojos relatives and legitimate parent who recognized natural child,
relatives are all in a straight line ascending or descending, or collateral line. The family is
legitimate completely separate from the natural, or individuals to inherit ista Aquila, nor
that individuals can inherit those of ista. (p. 127 Comments to the Civil Code.) 14. The
appellants, on the other hand, pretend to succeed Patricia Clavecilla by reason of their
alleged status of natural nephews of the latter. The appellees attempt to refute appellants'
claims by alleging that Maria Clavecilla was merely a maid and not a child of Juan
Clavecilla and could not have been, therefore, a relative of Patricia Clavecilla who was
admittedly a daughter of Juan Clavecilla. Moreover, appellees claim, that assuming that
Maria was a child of Juan Clavecilla along with Patricia Clavecilla, neither Maria nor
Patricia could have been recognized as natural daughters by Juan Clavecilla who was,
at the time of their (Maria's and Patricia's) birth legally and validly married with Bonifacia
Cardente. 15. In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the appellants nor the
appellees are entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla,
it behooves us to call upon the State to succeed. 16. Wherefore, the appealed order
should be, as it is hereby, revoked and the court a quo is hereby instructed, when this
decision becomes final, to furnish the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental a copy of this
decision for such action as may be proper pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of Court. No
special pronouncement as to costs in this instance
251. Diaz vs Pamuti

GR L-66574

Feb. 21, 1990

FACTS:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisa’s mother Juliana werethe only
legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of
their union were born Felisa and anotherchild who died during infancy; Simona is the
widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at
the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and sixminor natural children:
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and twominor children with Felixberta. 1976 –
Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona. Petitioners
Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor childrenfile for opposition and motion
to exclude Felisa from further taking part orintervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona. 1980 – Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further
takingpart or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona. Felisa’s motion for
recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate Appellate Court declaring
her as the sole heir of Simona.

ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo) Felisa?
HELD:

The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simon because of the barrier provided for
under Art. 992 of the Civil CodeArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child. Pablo is a
legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.

Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely asuccession ab
intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. Theymay have a natural tie of blood, but this is
not recognized by law for thepurposes of Art. 992.

An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and relatives of
his father and mother.