Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Bernard D. Cole
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Energy in Asia
Notes
Bibliography
Much has been written about the evolving energy situation in the world, a
situation that affects practically all contentious international situations in the
world. In Asia, energy resources and demands are vital issues to Russia,
Japan, the Koreas, China, the nations of Southeast Asia, and those of the
subcontinent. Central Asia promises to be a future energy breadbasket, while
Africa is looming large in that respect.
With the increasing prominence of energy supply and demand come issues of
energy security. The availability and affordability of energy resources have
hitherto been concentrated in Southwestern Asia and the Middle East, long
distances from the primary customers in East Asia. These distances are
traversed by seagoing tankers steaming over sea lines of communications
(SLOCs).
These sea lines offer much risk of interruption from many different sources.
Negating these threats and securing the SLOCs is a traditional naval mission,
one that has in recent history been carried out by the U.S. Navy. The United
States is increasingly absorbed in the global war on terror, however, and its
navy is shrinking in size, just as China grows in power and the issue of energy
security grows in importance. Hence, most Asian nations are expanding and
modernizing their naval forces, led by Japan, South Korea, China, and India.
This book addresses energy security from these two perspectives: the
increasing importance of energy security to the nations of Asia, and the
regional drive to develop the naval power to ensure that security.
The author relied heavily on government, industry, and press reports, as well
as on interviews with Asian and U.S. civilian officials, naval officers, and
energy industry representatives. Conclusions are based on multiple sources in
most cases and wherever possible.
Civilian, military, and industry officials who discussed energy and naval issues
with the author are not named, to protect their anonymity. I owe a great debt
to the colleagues, scholars, and experts who read all or parts of this
manuscript. At the risk of unintentionally omitting some of them, I must in
particular note the assistance of Dr. William Hill, Dr. Philip Saunders, and Ms.
Susan Sherwood of the National Defense University. Dr. Sarah Mikel and her
wonderful staff at the University's superb library were untiring in their
assistance. Dr. Paul H.B. Godwin, despite his emeritus status, continues to
serve as my academic “sea daddy,” while retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon
surveyed the manuscript with his unsurpassed editorial eye. Valuable advice
was also offered by two former students, Colonel William Barnett, USA, and Mr.
Stephen Schwartz, as well as by Mr. Gabriel Collins, Ambassador Chas.
Freeman, Mr. Roy Kamphausen, Dr. Robert Sutter, and Dr. Stanley B. Weeks.
Dr. Cynthia Watson provided invaluable advice and friendship.
Anti-Aircraft Warfare
ADB
AFP
AMW
Amphibious Warfare
APEC
ARF
ASEAN
ASROC
ASUW
Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Bbbl
Billion Barrels
Bbl
Barrel
Bcf
BSP
BTM
BTU
CLCS
CNOOC
CS
Continental Shelf
CSI
CSIST
CTAP
CTTF
CZ
Contiguous Zone
DOA
DWT
EEZ
EW
Electronic Warfare
EWG
FAO
FPCC
FTA
GCC
GDP
Grafimar
GTCL
Gas Transmission Company Ltd.
GWOT
HP
Horsepower
ICBM
ICC
ICPO
IGTS
IHO
ILO
IMB
IMO
INTERPOL
ISA
International Seabed Authority
ISPS
ITLS
ITS
JDA
JI
Jemaah Islamiya
JMSDF
KCG
Km
Kilometer
KNOC
KOGAS
Kt
Knots
LCM
Landing Craft Mechanized
LCU
LNG
LPD
LSD
LST
MANPADS
MBTU
Million Btus
Mcf
MILF
MIW
Mine Warfare
Mmbbl
Million Barrels
MSEG
Maritime Security Experts Group
NATO
NIDS
NKN
Nm
Nautical Mile
OPEC
OPIC
PETROBANGLA
PGU
PK
PetroKazakhstan
PLA
PLAAF
PLAN
People's Liberation Army-Navy
PRC
PSI
ReCAAP
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
RMAS
RMSI
ROC
Republic of China
SAARC
SAR
SEANFZ
SEATO
SELB
SLOC
Sea Line of Communication
SOLAS
SOM
SSM
SSR
STAR
Su
Sukoi
TAPI
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
Tcf
TCG
TPTWG
UAE
UN
United Nations
UNCLOS
VSP
Vietsovpetro
VSTOL
WCO
WMD
This work is being written from a naval perspective; the role of naval force on
the seas provides the primary vehicle from which the question of the military
security of Asia's energy supplies is viewed. Hence, some definitions are in
order. First, naval missions are usually categorized as forward naval presence,
power projection, maritime security operations, crisis response, sea control, or
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deterrence.
Maritime security operations are not only flexible and far-ranging, but also
expensive. Furthermore, the technological advances impacting naval and
commercial maritime forces in the twenty-first century provide a degree of
globalization that argues for multilateral efforts to strive effectively for the
degree of energy security demanded by the Asian nations. The threats to the
sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are real, but amenable to amelioration.
This discussion defines Asia as those nations with a coastline, extending from
Russia south and then west to Pakistan. The role played in the Asian energy
and maritime calculus by Iran, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), and the Central Asian nations is certainly significant, but does not
directly concern this work's conclusions.
Asia in 1945 was largely an economic wreck. Russia had suffered huge
personnel losses and expended enormous material resources in the recent war.
Japan was literally a smoking ruin, as was much of eastern China, a nation
enjoying only a brief hiatus in a near-half-century of civil warfare. Southeast
Asia, with the exception of Thailand, had been victimized by more than four
years of war and hostile occupation, only to be reinvaded by its former colonial
masters at the end of the war. South Asia likewise was in the midst of a
struggle to escape from colonialism.
The region's economic progress during the remainder of the twentieth century
is often described as a “miracle,” with Japan and others labeled “Asian tigers.”
Without taking away from the efforts of the peoples of the region states, some
easily identifiable factors contributed mightily to their success. These included
the security blanket spread over much of Asia by the United States during the
Cold War that occupied the half-century most crucial to the national economic
“miracles,” from approximately 1947 to 1989.
The United States also was the primary architect of the unique post–World War
II global economic infrastructure. This was anchored by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, among other institutions, the viability of
which rested on Washington's willingness to make export capital readily
available. The United States also provided a remarkably open market for the
developing Asian economies. Associated with these policies was the important
fact that the U.S. Navy, to a great extent, guaranteed the freedom and safety
of seaborne commerce so crucial to this intensely maritime region.
As the nations of the region recovered from the ravages of World War II and
with the end of the Cold War gained even more freedom from the threats of
international conflict, they naturally turned their attention to building the
military forces thought necessary to defend their national security interests. In
all the maritime Asian states, this included a range of interests, from maritime
border defense and coast guard functions, to projecting power at sea and in a
few cases ashore.
One common factor in the rapid development of the Asian economies during
the second half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first
centuries, and the modernization of naval forces that accompanied or followed
that growth, has been a steadily and dramatically increasing dependence on
imported energy supplies. Some nations, such as Japan, have almost no
indigenous sources of energy and hence have been long-term importers;
others, such as China and Indonesia, do possess very significant native
supplies of petroleum, natural gas, and coal, but so fast has been their
economic growth and so inefficient their use of energy resources that they too
have become dependent on imported energy to maintain economic vitality.
The value of petroleum as fuel for lighting and power generation in industry,
transportation, and for military applications had become apparent to military
strategists by the first decade of the twentieth century. Led by Admiral Sir
John Fisher, the Royal Navy began conversion from coal to oil to power its
globally dominant warships early in the twentieth century; Germany and other
naval powers also followed this path. The conversion decision was remarkable
for the expense and operational changes involved, especially at a time of
British alarm about German naval expansion. This important military effect
had direct political and foreign policy implications.
The secret diplomacy of the World War I period addressed these concerns, as
did the events that marked the breakdown of U.S.-Japanese relations leading
to the 1941–1945 Pacific war. The role played by Japan's increasing thirst for
oil during the period between World War I and the early years of World War II
only increased with the dramatic entry of the United States in December
1941; Tokyo's inability to satisfy that thirst drove its gratuitous aggression and
marked the first instance of energy resources as a major strategic cause of war
in Asia.
For the United States, oil played a prominent war-fighting role in both the
Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Diplomatically, increasing recognition of its
importance led to greatly intensified interest and diplomatic efforts in the
Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. In the words of Daniel Yergin,
“American policymakers arrived, belatedly, at the same conclusion that had
directed British oil policy ever since the end of World War I—the centrality of
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the Middle East.” The advent of the Cold War and the end of the British Empire
as a leading international force in the late 1940s, especially in the Middle East,
coincided with and contributed to the United States’ replacing the European
9
nation as the predominant Western power in the Middle East.
The Cold War defined the second half of the twentieth century, and a major
event in its first decade was the early 1950s revolution and counterrevolution
in Iran. The first phase of this conflict included the assassination by Islamic
terrorists of Iran's prime minister; his democratically elected replacement,
Mohammed Mossadegh, was a French-educated lawyer who tried without
success to maintain a strong nationalistic stance, which included
nationalization of the giant Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh's tenure in
office ended in 1953 when he was overthrown in a military coup supported by
U.S. and British intelligence officers led by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). This made Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi the nation's ruling
dictator, a bit of Cold War legerdemain, the unanticipated results of which are
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still echoing in the halls of global energy relations.
Much less immediately effective than the Iranian intervention was the Western
powers’ failed attempt to reverse the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal
by Egypt's President Gamal Nasser. This Western fiasco closed the Suez Canal
only briefly but demonstrated the vital importance of the maritime transport of
oil. The 1956 canal closure underlined the importance of maritime energy
security, but paled in comparison to the closure that resulted from the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, when it was out of operation for more than six years, until
reopened in 1974 as part of the peace settlement following the 1973 Arab-
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Israeli conflict. This much longer closure shifted the oil logistics burden to
increasingly larger seagoing carriers, with the “super tanker” increasing the
efficiency of transporting petroleum by ship—and eventually leading to the
energy security ramifications of large-scale oil pollution disasters.
The 1967 war caused an Arab oil embargo against the Western industrial
nations that supported Israel, also lasting approximately six years. The
experience spurred exploration and development of new energy sources
around the world, as the major consuming nations sought to lessen their
dependence on Middle Eastern oil reserves. It also might have been expected
to have heightened the importance of strategic oil reserves being established
12
on either a national or a regional basis.
That this did not occur to a significant extent speaks more to the governmental
and industrial shortsightedness than to the logic of the step, increasingly
recognized today. The rapid, near-total Israeli victory in the 1967 war, the
canal closure, and the 1973 war all failed to weaken an apparently blasé
American belief described imaginatively by Yergin as “Hydrocarbon Man
13
continued to take his petroleum for granted.”
The events of 1967–1973 did provide an “oil shock” to the world and raised in
the popular mind the issue of energy security, in terms of price and
availability. Furthermore, the decade of the 1970s marked the end of classic
supply and demand as the energy industry's ruling paradigm. The stature of
major global oil suppliers, organized into the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, became formidable as a result of these
developments and henceforth would no longer have to invoke embargos to
control the balance of demand-supply-cost.
Two other seminal events marked the 1970s. First, the United States for the
first time became just another consumer on the international oil market (albeit
the largest one); second, by the end of the decade, China had begun its run to
economic modernization and status as a world-class energy consumer.
The twentieth century was one of almost continuous war, both hot and “cold,”
both local and global; energy security was a continuing element in the
causation, conduct, and settlement of that long period of warfare. The coal
mines of central Europe; the oil reserves in Central Asia (Azerbaijan), Persia
(Iran), Mesopotamia (Iraq), the sultanates and kingdoms of the Persian Gulf,
and Southeast Asia were objectives that Great Britain, France, Germany,
Japan, and the United States led the way in trying to obtain, even to the point
of war.
National and international concerns often are not clearly delineated, however,
particularly as the global energy situation becomes more and more
internationalized, as has dramatically occurred since the end of World War II in
1945. Japan, China, and India lead the way in recognizing that globalization is
a factor that must be dealt with as they seek to gain control of international
energy resources from discovery through consumption. All apparently view
this general policy as key to attaining energy security.
As Asia's largest nation and consumer of energy, with the world's fastest
growing economy and concomitant energy requirements, China is a major
participant in the energy equation, whether focused globally, regionally, or
nationally. Japan and India are similarly positioned, although primarily as
consumers, while Russia's major stature is as supplier rather than consumer of
energy resources.
Japan currently consumes more energy than any Asian state except China;
India exceeds Japan and is second only to China as a potential dominating
energy consumer in Asia. The rapidly increasing Chinese and Indian energy
demand results both from their very large populations, each exceeding one
billion, and from their rapid rates of economic growth rates. Japan remains a
vitally important economic force in Asia, but its geographic limitations, aging
population, and economic slowdown since the early 1990s have contributed to
slowing its potential for dramatic growth in energy demand. Other Asian
nations run a wide range of energy requirements, domestic availability, and
reliance on international sources.
The world's largest ocean, the Pacific, exemplifies the expression of “oceanic
commons,” described by one analyst as a “resource to which no single decision-
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making unit holds exclusive title.” This more modern expression of “the high
seas”—historically the seas lying more than 3 nautical miles (nm) from land,
but now defined as the seas lying more than 12 nm from land—refers to ocean
areas open to all nations for purposes of navigation, fishing and other
16
resources recovery, and communications.
This concept of seas open to all has been brought into renewed question by
several factors dating to the late twentieth century. First is the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an unintended
consequence of which has been to significantly reduce the “high seas” as a
result of the expanded territorial waters, and creation of national Economic
Exclusion Zones (EEZ) and Continental Shelf (CS) areas. These new
demarcations have led many nations—China, for instance—to aspire to exert
17
sovereign rights to at least 200 nm and possibly 350 nm from their coasts.
Third, while criminal and environmental threats have always been present in
the maritime realm, the increase of terrorism as a favorite instrument of
dissident groups, and governance problems in countries such as the Philippines
and Indonesia have raised the level of threat to the use of the seas by all
nations.
Fourth, the dramatic increased need for energy resources transported by sea
has equally increased the need for secure SLOCs. The degree of security
established for the sea-lanes has serious military, economic, and political
implications; these elements also must be part and parcel of attempts to
eliminate or at least reduce threats to that security.
Energy security is a vital national security interest to all nations, and Chapter
3 examines the role and importance of energy in East Asia, with a focus on
each of the region's nations. A concise description of each country's energy
situation is presented, to include proven and estimated energy reserves,
current and projected energy imports, current and projected energy
consumption, strategic reserves in operation or planned, and government
attitudes and policies for the energy sector.
Chapter 4 looks at the pipelines; in some respects, this is the most far-
ranging and inclusive chapter, since pipeline construction and plans extend and
affect the energy pictures from Sakhalin Island northwest of Japan, to the
Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea areas. Chapter 5 focuses on the merchant fleets
of the region that transport energy supplies. Energy carriers are of particular
interest; this chapter includes examination of national maritime
infrastructures, to include shipbuilding capabilities and port facilities.
In Chapter 6, threats to the SLOCs that form the arteries of the region's
economies are examined. Piracy, terrorism, navigational hazards,
environmental dangers, and political disputes all affect the security of the long
SLOCs stretching from the Arctic to the limits of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf
of Aden. Potentially most dangerous, however, are the more traditional great
power factors of conflicting sovereignty claims and outright war over disputes.
The UNCLOS delineates four areas of national maritime rights, all measured
from a state's coastline:
1. 12 nm: Territorial Sea, in which the state exercises full legal sovereignty
2. 24 nm: Contiguous Zone (CZ), in which the state exercises limited legal
sovereignty
3. 200 nm: Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which the state exercises full
economic sovereignty
4. 350 nm (maximum): Continental Shelf (CS), in which the state exercises
limited economic sovereignty
Just south of Taiwan lie the disputed land features—islands, reefs, rocks—of
the South China Sea. These are claimed in their entirety by China (and
Taiwan) and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. The importance of the various bits of land is not as important, or
ominous, as their possible legal qualification as “islands” under international
law: if so qualified, they would possess the various rights under the UNCLOS,
including an EEZ of up to 200 nm. That would create a legal jigsaw puzzle of
conflicting claims that would almost certainly lead to naval conflict, should
significant energy reserves be discovered.
Farther west, disruptive conflicts in the Indian Ocean would more likely result
from traditional international conflict than from territorial disputes. Thailand,
Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka suffer from armed insurgencies and
unstable governments. India and Pakistan maintain a state of enmity that has,
since their creation sixty years ago, thrice broken out into active warfare.
Discussion of political, economic, and military futures includes the role of non-
Asian nations in that region's security: the United States is the most important
of these, but mention is also made of European Union members, as well as
those Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries that play a
significant role in Asian energy security. The emphasis is on energy-centric
issues and disputes with the potential to generate international conflict.
While Mackinder had been influenced by the Crimean War and the lesser wars
of the second half of the nineteenth century, which were relatively localized
conflicts, Spykman lived from 1893 to 1943 and was a product of global war.
Both, however, were focused on control of the Eurasian supercontinent, home
to many of the world's leading industrial and energy consuming countries
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Asia
[Source:http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/reference_maps/asia.html]
Spykman was a political scientist by training, but believed that geography was
“the most fundamentally conditioning factor because of its relative
permanence” and should be considered a prime motivator of a nation's
3
national security strategy. During the Cold War (1947–1990), the United
States led an anti-Communist strategy of containment that focused on the
Soviet Union; it was described by the leading American historian of that
strategy as a Western attempt to use the Rimlands to control the Heartland,
4
which was dominated by Russia and China.
This Cold War construct may accurately be rephrased for the twenty-first
century as using sea power to control land power. The Eurasian supercontinent
today remains dominated by Russia and China, with India a rapidly rising force
on that same gigantic landmass. Japan is the leading Asian maritime nation,
together with the insular countries of Southeast Asia: Taiwan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the small island
states of the South and Southwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean states,
including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Perhaps most important
from an Asian perspective is that the United States, although not
geographically an “Asian” nation, is so powerful a maritime power that it
dominates the “Rimlands.”
This position as the dominant power certainly is neither limitless nor timeless.
China's rise as a naval and commercial sea power is a fact of the twenty-first
century; similar modernization and the potential expansion of India's maritime
presence may finally be reaching maturity. Japan is already a sea power, while
Russia retains the resources to reemerge as an Asian maritime power, should
Moscow decide to pursue that path. Meanwhile, the United States
preoccupation with the so-called global war on terror and economic
perturbations, along with shrinkage of its naval and merchant fleets, all
indicate the limits and even fragility of American power.
As the twentieth century dawned, the United States debuted as a world power
with the vanquishing of Spain; the century ended with the United States
established as a superpower stronger than any in the history of the world. The
twenty-first century has begun with a revitalized and prospering Asia; the
economic “tigers” that developed during the later part of the previous century
were severely damaged by the vicissitudes of the 1990s, but remain important
economic and political actors. They have been overshadowed, however, by
China's unprecedented economic growth during the past quarter-century. Only
Japan, and possibly India, today is capable among Asian nations of matching
China in economic and military terms. Both are crucial participants in the
Asian energy calculus of availability, affordability, and security.
China and Russia alone among the Northeast Asian states possess significant
indigenous energy supplies of oil, natural gas, and coal and have been
developing their huge energy reserves. Japan and South Korea possess very
limited energy resources, even as their need for greatly increased energy
supplies increases. India's accelerating economic development increasingly
positions it with Japan and China among the world's most voracious energy
consumers. All are located in a region usefully described as a continental
“heartland” bordered by a maritime “rimland.”
The Ryukyus are Japan's southernmost island group, stretching toward Taiwan.
Their area of 2,200 square miles is concentrated on Okinawa, Miyako, and
Ishigaki, as is the population of approximately 1,318,000. The Ryukyun
kingdom was a Chinese tributary state from 1372 to 1609, when it was seized
5
by Japan and, in 1869, annexed by Tokyo. The Ryukyus’ Japanese sovereignty
is not formally challenged, despite this history and the possibility of a Chinese
claim.
Next, the Philippine archipelago lies south of Taiwan, beyond the Luzon Strait.
Although this strait extends 200 nautical miles (nm) from the southernmost
tip of Taiwan to the main Philippine island of Luzon, it is divided into a series of
channels by the Batanes and Babuyan island groups. The main channels are
the Bashi in the north, Balintang in the center, and Babuyan in the south of
the strait. The Republic of the Philippines includes over 7,000 islands
extending 1,200 nm to the south, ending in the disputed state of Sabah on the
island of Borneo, which is also claimed by Malaysia.
The Philippines form the eastern boundary of the South China Sea, separating
it from the Philippine Sea and the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. Several
important straits link the two bodies of water; the most notable of these, from
north to south, and running west to east, are first the San Bernardino Strait
opening to the Pacific between Luzon to the north and Samar to the south,
reached after first circumnavigating Mindoro to gain access to the heart of the
archipelago. Second is the Surigao Strait, running between the islands of
Leyte to the north and Mindanao to the south to reach the Pacific after first
transiting the Bohol Sea south of the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Bohol. The
third main transit route through the Philippines runs through the Sulu and
Celebes Seas, south of Mindanao through the Sarangani Strait or farther
6
offshore to reach the Pacific.
Northeast Asia
Southeast Asia
[Source:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/reference_maps/southeast_asia.html.]]
West of the Malacca Strait lies the Indian Ocean, the third largest body of
water in the world, after the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is bounded on the
east by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesa, and Australia; on the north by the
8
Indian Table 2.1 Distances between Ports
subcontinent and other South Asian nations; on the west by the Arabian
9
Peninsula and Africa; and on the south by Antarctica and its associated ocean.
The Indian Ocean's littoral is divided into the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal,
Arabian Sea, the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, the Red Sea and the Persian (or
Arabian) Gulf, and smaller associated bodies of water.
This great Asian maritime reach from the far northwest Pacific Ocean to the
Red Sea includes more than one-half of the earth's surface. Seaborne
commerce dominates its international economic life, both in the bulk cargo
now largely carried in containers, and in the Southeast and Southwest Asian
energy supplies so increasingly crucial to the economic powers of East Asia.
The distances of the SLOCs that cross these seas are impressive, as shown in
Table 2.1.
In addition to their length, the SLOCs of the Asian maritime theater traverse a
very complex geographical environment. This includes many narrow transit
points constraining the sea-lanes; despite the great distances involved, few
10
areas of the Asian seas are remote from continental or insular landmasses.
The length and geographical complexity of these SLOCs pose severe challenges
to both their defense and attempts to intercept their merchant traffic. The
sensitivity of the attendant navigational chokepoints are due not solely to their
width—although all are much narrower than the seas or other bodies of water
they connect—but also by their location on major SLOCs.
SEA OF JAPAN
Immediately to the south-southwest, the Soya (La Perouse) Strait lies between
the northernmost Japanese island, Hokkaido, and the Russian island of
Sakhalin, marking the northern boundary of the second major Asian maritime
11
basin, the Sea of Japan. This strait will increase in importance as the natural
gas fields in the waters around southern Sakhalin Island become increasingly
productive, with Japan as the future primary customer. The Sakhalin project is
planned for six phases of development, with Korea, possibly China, and other
nations eventually sharing in the vast natural gas reserves that lie in the
waters off the long island. Some energy is already being produced in Phase
One of the project, but major benefits to Japan are unlikely to be realized
12
before 2011.
South of Hokkaido, between that island and the Japanese main island of
Honshu is the Tsugaru Strait, connecting the Sea of Japan and the North
Pacific Ocean. The Tsugaru is a primary SLOC for merchant shipping following
the Great Circle route from the west coasts of the United States and Canada to
Korean and Russian ports, as well as to ports on Japan's west coast. It is a
sensitive military chokepoint from Tokyo's perspective, guarding the country's
northern islands and the Sea of Japan.
The southern boundary of this sea is pierced by the Tsushima Strait, lying
between the southern Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula. It
is divided by Tsushima Island, as well as by a very small group of land
features. This bit of disputed territory—little more than a collection of rocks—is
called Dokdo by Korea and Takeshima by Japan, and lies just north of
Tsushima. Korea, as noted previously, disputes the very name of this sea,
insisting on calling it the East Sea. From South Korea's perspective the
Tsushima Strait also serves as an obstacle to renewal of the deeply despised
Japanese aggression and the colonization early in the twentieth century.
The Yellow Sea also continues to be the scene of significant disputes between
North Korea and South Korea. These include national boundaries, fisheries,
and defense concerns that occasionally degenerate into naval clashes, with a
record of death and destruction inflicted on both sides. Seoul and Pyongyang
continue to disagree on this sea border; although the most recent clash
between the two navies occurred in 2002, recent negotiations “ended
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fruitlessly.”
The East China Sea is maritime basin lying south of Korea, southwest of Japan,
and west of the Ryukyus, between the Yellow and the Philippine Seas. The East
China Sea stretches south from Tsushima to Taiwan, which is separated from
the Asian mainland by the strait of that name. The legal status of this channel,
no more than 100 nm at its widest point, is part and parcel of the Taiwan
issue. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for the international
community, is the question of China's position on the status of the Taiwan
Strait as international waters. The (United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea) UNCLOS not only states clearly that ships have the right of innocent
passage through such straits (Article 45), but also empowers states bordering
such straits with rights and responsibilities that provide rationale for
14
controlling or limiting such free passage (Articles 37–44).
Beijing has intimated, however, that it views the Taiwan Strait as sovereign
territorial water, or possibly even internal waters, as defined in Article 8 of the
UNCLOS. China would presumably advocate this position by claiming a straight
baseline from a point on its mainland to the northern end of Taiwan, and from
the island's southern end back to the mainland, or perhaps directly to the
island of Hainan, which lies at the northern end of the South China
15
Sea. While such a claim would still require China to grant innocent passage
(Article 17), it would empower Beijing to apply stricter measures of control,
under the UNCLOS Article 19 qualifier that “passage is innocent so long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”
The North Pacific Ocean is the name given to the swath of the Pacific lying to
the east of Japan and the Kurile Islands, and extending northward to the
Kamchatka Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands chain. The western Pacific
Ocean south and east of the Ryukyus and Taiwan is the Philippine Sea. It
stretches eastward to a line approximately 2,000 nm from the Asian mainland
and its important archipelagos. This sea thus includes the United States’
Marianas Islands, and the semi-independent island states of Micronesia.
At the southern boundary of the South China Sea, three primary north–south
routes penetrate the Indonesian archipelago. They are more heavily traveled
than the Philippine passages, especially the Sunda Strait, deeper than the
primary southwestern point of entry and egress to and from the southern
South China Sea: the Singapore and Malacca Straits, between Indonesia and
Singapore-Malaysia.
The Strait of Malacca is the most important shipping lane in the world, more
important than either the Suez or Panama Canals in terms of both geopolitical
significance and because of the numbers of ship and amount of tonnage that
pass through it. Malacca is the main ship route between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, directly linking Southwest, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia,
including India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and China.
Fifty thousand transits by seagoing vessels are made through the strait
annually, carrying almost 25 percent of the world's maritime trade. This
includes more than 25 percent of the world's shipborne oil, gapproximately
11.7 million barrels daily in 2004, an amount that will increase in direct
16
proportion to increasing Asian energy consumption. Such narrow straits
obviously increase the risk of ship collisions or groundings; forty-four of the
former and fifteen of the latter occurred between 1995 and 2005, with one
observer estimating that this number will “increase dramatically” as the
94,000 ships transiting the Malacca and Singapore Straits in 2004 to increases
to an estimated 141,000 ships in 2020. Such a startling figure underlines the
17
straits’ importance as security, economic, and environmental issues.
The more than 400-nm-long Malacca Strait narrows to 1.5 nm near Singapore,
creating one of the world's most significant navigation chokepoints. It is
actively threatened by piracy and terrorism; its geopolitical importance means
that it is potentially at risk in the event of major military conflict anywhere
along the Asian rimland.
INDIAN OCEAN
The Malacca Strait empties to the west into the Andaman Sea, bounded by
Thailand and Malaysia to the east and Burma to the north. The sea contains
the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands, two small Indian archipelagos that
provide New Delhi with naval outposts close to the Malacca Strait.
The Andaman Sea serves as entry to the easternmost of the two great basins
into which the northern Indian Ocean is divided. This is the Bay of Bengal,
lying north and west of the Andaman Sea, and framed by India to the west,
Bangladesh to the north, and Burma to the east. This is a tragic ocean basin,
heavily trafficked by small merchant and fishing vessels that all too often fall
victim to the massive cyclones that devastate the bay. The Indian Ocean's
other ocean basin is the North Arabian Sea, which lies to the west of the
subcontinent. This sea leads to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz
and to the Red Sea (and the Suez Canal) through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Lying directly south of India is the Chagos Archipelago, with Diego Garcia the
group's major atoll. Although claimed by both the Seychelles and Mauritius,
these small islands are administered by Great Britain, which has, de facto,
provided them to the United States as a naval facility, logistics hub, and
strategic air base. Their value to the American employment of military force in
Southwest Asia cannot be overestimated.
The Indian Ocean contains several insular nations. Sri Lanka lies less than 30
nm off India's southeast coast; it remains torn by a vicious, decades-old civil
war, a conflict even direct Indian political and military intervention was unable
to resolve. The island nation of the Maldives lies 348 nm southwest of Sri
Lanka. The Seychelles, Mauritius, the Comoros, and Madascar are the other
island states of this maritime region, located far to the south. The former two
states are in the central Indian Ocean, while the latter pair lie just off the East
African coast. None of these island states possesses significant economic
potential or military strength, but all have energy security concerns and play a
role in Indian Ocean geopolitics.
Northwest Indian Ocean
Two of the world's most important navigational chokepoints connect with the
Arabian Sea, the northern Indian Ocean's second major maritime basin. The
Strait of Hormuz narrows at one point to less than 18 nm and is bounded on
the north by Iran, with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the
south. Hormuz is the only route for seaborne oil transport from the rich
oilfields of the Persian Gulf nations, including Iraq and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia
also ships most of its oil from its Persian Gulf ports, but also borders the
eastern side of the 1,000 nm-long Red Sea, which the 14 nm-wide Bab el-
Mandeb connects to the North Arabian Sea, between the Arabian Peninsula to
the northeast and the African continent to the southwest. Although the major
Saudi Arabian oil port of Yanbu is located on the Red Sea, that body of water is
chiefly important as the waterway that connects Asia to Europe, through the
Indian Ocean, Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea.
The Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are further constricted by small
islands in their courses. These both complicate sovereignty disputes in the
area and provide potential military bases for organized militaries and non-
state groups seeking to disrupt the flow of oil from the area to East Asia.
CONCLUSION
This great maritime expanse from the northeastern to the southwestern
extremities of the Asian continent is marked by many of the world's most
important navigational chokepoints: the straits at the Kuriles, La Perouse,
Tsugaru, Tsushima, Taiwan, Luzon, San Bernardino, Surigao, Torres (between
Australia and New Guinea, east of Indonesia), Sunda, Lombok, Malacca,
Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. All are heavily traveled by seaborne traffic; most
of them are vital to the flow of petroleum from the world's center for those
energy reserves in Southwestern Asia to the South and Northeast Asian
economic giants of India, China, Japan, and Korea.
Commercial sea power is even more important at the beginning of the twenty-
first century than it was at the end of the nineteenth, when petroleum began
gaining world prominence. The reason for this is simple: energy. The United
States uses approximately one-quarter of daily global petroleum production,
but the rapid rise of China as a global economic power rivaling Japan has
already constrained U.S. influence over the price and supply of energy.
Southwest Asia remains the world's petroleum “breadbasket,” a situation
unlikely to change before the mid-century (at the earliest) realization of the
potential contained in Russian Siberia and the multinational Caspian Basin in
Central Asia. And the Southwest Asian energy supply depends on seaborne
transport to reach its global markets. The same dependency applies to African,
Canadian, and Latin American oil; Southeast Asian natural gas; and Australian
and North American coal.
This chapter will survey the Asian energy picture on a nation-by-nation basis,
focusing on the maritime countries: Japan, Russia, the Koreas, China
(including Taiwan, separately described), the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, Burma, and the
Indian Ocean Nations: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Estimates of
hydrocarbon energy reserves—coal, oil, and natural gas—typically vary widely
for a specific region, depending on the source of the estimate. This may result
not only from objective scientific differences of opinion, but also from the self-
interest of energy companies, energy-hungry nations, and the interests of
international agencies concerned with energy reserves. The most accurate
data is usually that provided by the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy
Information Agency (EIA), which furnishes most of the data on which this
discussion is based.
JAPAN
Japan has almost no indigenous energy resources and is—except for its
nuclear power plants—completely dependent on imported crude oil and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) to meet its energy requirements. This has led the
Diet, Japan's legislature, to pass laws requiring Japanese refineries to maintain
a sixty-day supply of petroleum to meet a national emergency. Tokyo also
attempts to budget its power supplies, to maximize the efficiency of its
1
electrical production, and minimize LNG demand growth.
Japan leads the world in LNG imports: 6 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day, in
2
addition to approximately 5.4 million barrels (mbbls) of oil. These energy
imports continue to increase, with the amount in 2003 rising 23 percent over
that in 2002, further emphasizing Japan's dependence on imported energy
3
supplies. The country imports approximately 90 percent of its oil from the
Middle East, with Persian Gulf countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran—leading the way. Overseas energy acquisition
is under the Japan National Oil Company (JNOC), established by Tokyo in
1967. Private sector Japanese oil companies are also actively seeking reliable
sources of energy overseas.
Japan covets eastern Siberian oil and gas reserves. Recovery of these
resources has not been realized, due largely to the difficult climate, lack of the
technological know-how, personnel necessary to extract them efficiently, and
Moscow's reluctance to conclude an agreement with Tokyo. For much of the
past half-century, Japan has often been viewed as the nation most suitable in
terms of location, expertise, and financial wherewithal to turn Siberia's
potential into reality.
At the June 2007 Group of Eight summit meeting, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Tokyo “help
Russia speed up social and economical development” of Siberia, with the
implied quid pro quo of resolving the Kurile Islands dispute. Putin described
the proposal as “attractive and constructive” and promised a reply after
5
studying the details of the proposal.
RUSSIA
Russia is the world's third-largest producer of petroleum, producing 348
million metric tons (mmt) of oil in 2006, behind Saudi Arabia (536 mmt) and
the United States (418 mmt). It is also the world's second-largest energy
producer and a leading energy exporter in the global energy market. Russia is
already the world's largest supplier of natural gas, and may vie with Saudi
Arabia for the global lead in oil extraction and production during the twenty-
6
first century.
Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) depends on its energy exports, which
represent up to 25 percent of that statistic and approximately 50 percent of its
7
budget revenues. These figures highlight the importance and caution with
which Moscow is treating decisions about the sale and distribution of its oil and
natural gas. The chairman of Russia's Central Bank emphasized the
importance of energy production in 2003, when he cited oil prices as “the very
8
basis of the Russian economy.” Moscow has also declared that “all oil pipelines
under construction in Russia would remain state property,” underlining the
government's belief that energy production and its transportation are matters
9
of national security.
China might be key to the future direction of Russia's energy exports. The
present focus is to the West, to Europe, but government and industry
spokesmen in a series of announcements since 2005 have given weight to
previously contradictory statements from Moscow and Beijing about fulfilling
agreements for the sale of huge amounts of oil and natural gas to China.
These agreements are still tenuous—due in part to Beijing's concern about
Moscow's high prices, the availability of sufficient reserves to make some of
the more grandiose pipeline projects profitable, and Russian concern about
12
Chinese commercial challenges.
Sakhalin
Sakhalin Island, located off the east coast of Russia and to the north of Japan,
and its coastal waters hold vast hydrocarbon resources. Oil reserves are
estimated at almost 12 billion (bbbls), and natural gas reserves at
approximately 90 trillion cubic feet (tcf). These resources have been described
13
as “a gas station right on the Pacific Rim.” Two projects, Sakhalin 1 and
Sakhalin 2, are in progress, with Sakhalin 3 and Sakhalin 4 on the drawing
14
board.
The Sakhalin 1 project is led by the joint U.S.-Russian effort, Exxon Neftegaz,
with Japan's Sakhalin Oil Development and Exploitation Company (SODECO),
India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh (ONGC), and two Rosneft
(Russian) subsidiaries (Sakhalinmorneftegaz and RN Astra) as consortia
members. Total capital expenditure for the project was set at $12.8 billion in
2003, with the first phase of the project involving $6.5 billion. An estimated
$5.7 billion had been spent by April 2007.
Sakhalin 1 is selling natural gas to local markets, but the final form of this
product has not been chosen. ExxonMobil would like to send the natural gas to
the south via pipeline to China, but other shareholders and Gazprom prefer
marketing natural gas as LNG via Sakhalin 2, requiring an expansion of the
facilities there.
Shell estimated in July 2005 that recoverable reserves at 17.3 tcf of natural
gas and 1 Bbbls of petroleum were contained in Sakhalin 2, a reserve that has
been producing 80,000 bbl/d of oil during ice-free summer months, since July
1999. Phase II of the project should lead to full-year oil production of about
180,000 bbl/d by late 2007. Construction of an associated 9.6-million-tons-per
year LNG conversion facility began in early 2003; Shell anticipates LNG sales
beginning in 2008.
Sakhalin Island
Sakhalin 2 is expected to supply natural gas to the United States, Japan, and
South Korea. Contracts were signed in 2004 with Shell Oil's North American
gas marketing company, Coral Energy, to supply 1,800 billion cubic feet (bcf)
of LNG over twenty years to a power plant on the border of California and
Mexico; and with the Tokyo Gas and Electric Power Company (TEPCO) for the
annual sale of 300,000 tons of LNG starting in summer 2008. In July 2005, a
twenty-year sales agreement of 1.6 million tons per year of LNG to Korea
Natural Gas (KOGAS) was announced.
The delay in year-round oil and LNG production until at least 2008 is due to
concerns about disturbing the gray whale population. The consortium
announced in 2005 that it would be rerouting some of the pipelines, which
lead from the platforms to the shore-based processing facilities. Shell may
genuinely be concerned about this very endangered species, but the Russian
government is more likely using “environmental concerns” as a pretext for
16
pressuring the consortium to yield a controlling interest in the project.
An auction for three of the four blocks in the Sakhalin 3 project (estimated to
contain 5.1 bbbls of oil and 46 tcf of natural gas) was scheduled for late 2007,
but had not occurred as of early December. Moscow will determine which
companies will be allowed to bid. Its decision will be based on ensuring Russian
control of the project.
The fourth block, with estimated oil reserves of 1.2 bbbls and 9.1 tcf of gas,
was allocated to a Russian-Chinese consortium in February 2006, operating as
Venineft. The former's members, Rosneft and Sakhalinskaya N.K., will have a
74.9 percent stake in the project, with Sinopec holding the remaining 25.1
percent. They were given these rights when Moscow cancelled the 1993
17
agreement with an ExxonMobil-led consortium.
These phases aim to develop the northernmost fields lying offshore Sakhalin
Island; significant oil and natural gas reserves are expected but not proven. BP
and Rosneft have begun drilling in weather conditions that limit their
18
operations to the “four summer months.”
Full development of the Sakhalin project will make great amounts of energy
resources available to Asian nations, especially those on the Pacific rim.
Recovering those resources will continue to pose many challenges, however,
including unforeseen expenses, geophysical problems, ecological concerns, and
most acutely, Moscow's determination to maintain firm control over the
19
project, for both economic and strategic reasons. As stated by one observer,
“The question remains as to what will come first to Sakhalin—wealth,
ecological disaster or the usual stagnation caused, as one local put it, by ‘three
20
great Russian diseases,’ greed, graft and red tape.”
SOUTH KOREA
South Korea has no domestic oil reserves and must import all of its crude oil,
which makes up the largest share of its total energy consumption—2.6 million
bbls/d in 2006. The country is the world's ninth largest oil consumer and fifth
largest net oil importer. Most of these imports come from the Persian Gulf
region, with Saudi Arabia supplying about one-third of the requirements in
21
2005. The state-owned Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) is pursuing
equity stakes in oil and gas exploration around the world, with nineteen
overseas exploration and production projects in twelve countries, including
Vietnam, Indonesia, Yemen, Argentina, Peru, and the North Sea. Areas
22
offshore Korea are also being explored.
South Korea currently relies on imported LNG for most of its natural gas
requirements, though it began producing a small quantity of natural gas from
one offshore field in early 2004. Imports of LNG began in 1986, after the
founding of the state-owned monopoly LNG importer Korea Gas Company
(KOGAS). South Korea currently gets most of its LNG from Qatar, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Oman, with smaller volumes coming from Brunei and Australia,
and occasional spot cargoes from elsewhere.
In fact, South Korea is the second largest importer of LNG worldwide and for
the past three years had the highest growth in the world. Natural gas
consumption has increased dramatically, from near zero in 1985 to 1.077 bcf
24
in 2005. Russia may serve as the primary future LNG source: Moscow and
Seoul signed a twenty-year agreement in 2005 for the delivery of LNG from
25
Sakhalin, beginning in 2008, initially by ship.
South Korea's limited energy resources and dependence on imports over long
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) makes it an avid aspirant for Russian
energy reserves. It should be able to take advantage of the oil and gas
production of the Sakhalin projects; another pipeline under discussion would
transport Siberian natural gas from the Kovykta gas field near Irkutsk to
27
China's gas grid, with Seoul as a copartner.
The Kovykta field is estimated to hold 840 million tons of natural gas, enough
to provide Korea with almost half of its annual requirement. This project has
been discussed by Russia and South Korea since 1997, but no development
28
has occurred. The pipeline would be very expensive, with an estimated cost
29
of $11 billion. South Korea's participation in the Kovykta Gas Field
production would be less expensive, however, if the supplying pipeline ran
through North Korea instead of via an undersea route direct from Russia or
China.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea relies on two domestic sources of commercial energy—coal and
hydropower—for most of its energy needs. In 2003, coal accounted for more
than 80 percent of primary energy consumption and provided one-third of its
electric-generating capacity. Hydroelectric plants produced the other two-thirds
of electrical generation capacity, but many of these are believed to remain out
of operation due to damage from major flooding in 1996. The country's total
electricity consumption in 2000 was only 65 percent of what it had been in
1991. As a result of the electricity shortage, North Korea has resorted to a
rationing system. The country often experiences extended blackouts and
power losses due to its antiquated transmission grid.
Despite the paucity of energy sources, Pyongyang apparently does not support
the trans-Korean pipeline from Kovykta, perhaps fearing the reliance on a joint
venture with Seoul. Although there is no evidence of North Korean petroleum
reserves, the West Korea Bay may contain hydrocarbon reserves, as it is a
geological extension of China's oil-rich Bohai Bay. Companies from Sweden,
Great Britain, and Australia have been granted oil exploration concessions for
offshore blocks, while a Singapore company has been granted an onshore
exploration concession for an area in the Tachon-Rajin region near the Chinese
border. In September 2002, the company reported that initial seismic survey
results had indicated probable oil and natural gas deposits of modest size, but
30
production has not started.
In the meantime, North Korea imports all of the petroleum it consumes, which
accounts for approximately 6 percent of total energy consumption. Most
petroleum is imported as crude oil and processed at domestic refineries.
Pyongyang has not been a direct, open participant in discussion concerning
Northeast Asian pipelines, but given the country's heavy reliance on imported
energy supplies, is very concerned about the continued availability of energy
resources.
CHINA
China's GDP increased by 9.9 percent in 2005, 10.7 percent in 2006, and
31
averaged 11.5 percent during the first three quarters of 2007. This strong
economic growth is accompanied by increasing energy demands. Oil
consumption increased by almost 500,000 bbls/d in 2006, which was
32
approximately 38 percent of the total growth in world oil demand. The “trade
value” of the country's energy imports and exports increased by an amazing
330.5 percent between 2001 and 2006, from $23.27 billion to $100.19
33
billion. This trend has continued into 2007; in the first quarter, imports of
34
crude oil increased by almost 11 percent over the same period in 2006.
China is an important factor in world oil markets as the world's second-largest
consumer of oil, behind only the United States, and the world's third-largest
35
net importer of oil, behind the United States and Japan. Between January
and May 2006 China received 46 percent of its crude oil imports from the
Middle East and 32 percent from Africa, while its Asia-Pacific neighbors
36
supplied only 5 percent of its imports.
Recent oil exploration efforts have centered on developing oil and natural gas
fields in the western provinces of Sichuan and Gansu, and autonomous regions
of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as well as offshore fields in the Bo Sea, Pearl
River Delta, and the South China Sea. A particularly large find was announced
in May 2007, when CNPC reported discovering an oilfield in Hebei Province,
partly offshore, with an estimated reserve of 7.35 bbbls. If proven, this would
37
indeed be a major find.
China's increasing dependence on oil imports has led its major energy
companies to acquire interests in exploration and production abroad. The CNPC
has exploration and production interests in twenty-one countries spanning four
continents, and in 2005 announced its intentions to invest a further $18 billion
in foreign oil and gas assets by 2020.
Sudan has been a particular target of CNPC's efforts, receiving more than $6
billion, including investments in a 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea. This has
drawn widespread criticism from the United States and other nations, who
accuse China of supporting genocide through its economic, political, and
38
military support of the Sudanese dictator, Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir.
Beijing argues that its investments in Sudan in fact help ameliorate the harsh
political conditions in that strife-torn nation. Additionally, several other
nations, including India and Malaysia, are also significant investors in Sudan's
39
petroleum sector.
Major Chinese energy investment efforts have also been made in Kazakhstan,
where in October 2005 CNPC finalized the purchase of PetroKazakhstan, with
assets including eleven oil fields and licenses to seven exploration blocks. This
purchase was complemented in December 2005 by completion of the 600-mile
Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline, with a design capacity of delivering 200,000 bbl/d of
crude oil to China. No more than one-half of this amount was being
transported in 2007, however, apparently due to inadequate production in the
40
Kazakh fields and oil pricing disputes.
Historically, natural gas has not been a major fuel in China, but its share in
the country's energy mix is increasing. In 2004, natural gas accounted for only
around 3 percent of total energy consumption in China, although this figure is
expected to rise in the coming years. Proven reserves of natural gas stood at
53.3 tcf as of January 2006. China's consumption in 2004 of 1.3 tcf of natural
47
gas was double the figure for 1999, a trend that is continuing.
This contributes to Beijing's drive to secure energy supplies at the source. The
drive for foreign energy assets combined with a strong interpretation of the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (notably not interfering in the
internal affairs of another country) has led China to support some of the
world's most abusive governments, such as those ruling Burma, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe, as Beijing places access to energy resources near the very top of
51
its list of international priorities.
TAIWAN
Taiwan has very limited domestic energy resources and relies on imports for
almost all of its energy requirements, equating to 973,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006.
This followed 2005 energy consumption, which consisted of imported
petroleum, 51.3 percent; coal, 31.9 percent; natural gas, 8.0 percent; nuclear,
60
7.3 percent; and hydropower, 1.5 percent.
Taiwan's national oil company, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), is the
dominant player in all sectors of the island's petroleum industry. Significant
competition did begin in July 2000 when the privately owned Formosa
Petrochemical Company (FPCC) opened a refinery at Mailiao. Taiwan's
legislature then passed the Petroleum Administration Law in October 2001,
which reduced CPC's near-monopoly, with the goal of eventually privatizing
the firm.
CPC is also active in overseas oil exploration and production projects through
its overseas arm, the Overseas Petroleum Investment Corporation (OPIC).
OPIC currently holds equity stakes in eight overseas oil fields in Australia,
Indonesia Ecuador, Venezuela, and the United States. The government of Chad
awarded a joint oil exploration contract to OPIC in January 2006 for a 10,000
square mile area, but after reaching the agreement, the Chadian government
suspended diplomatic recognition of Taipei. CPC officials have declared that the
61
move would not affect OPIC's contract.
Taiwan has very limited domestic natural gas reserves, 2.6 tcf as of January
2006. It consumed 352 bcf of natural gas in 2004, while producing only 30 bcf.
CPC anticipates an increase in natural gas demand because of the construction
of additional natural gas-fired power plants and rising LNG imports. Taiwan has
nine onshore natural gas producing fields on the western side of the island, as
well as three modest offshore platforms. Indonesia and Malaysia provide most
of the island's LNG.
Taiwan has very limited coal resources, and domestic coal production stopped
in 2000. Sixty-three million short tons (mmst) were consumed in 2004, an
increase of 27 percent since 2000. All of Taiwan's coal is imported, primarily
from Indonesia, Australia, and China.
In sum, for a land facing a very large security threat across a narrow strait,
Taiwan is doing remarkably little to reduce its almost total dependence on
seaborne energy imports. Domestic politics and lack of will appear contributing
factors to Taipei's inability to develop additional nuclear and other
nonhydrocarbon sources of energy. The lack of strategic energy reserves is
62
also notable and difficult to understand.
THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines had 138 mmbbls of proven oil reserves in January 2006, but a
history of very limited production. In fact, there was no oil production at all
between 1996 and 2000. Following development of offshore reserves,
production reached just over 25,000 bbl/d in 2006. This is far short of daily
63
consumption, however, which was estimated at 349,000 bbl/d for 2006.
The Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) has historically dominated the
country's oil sector, but the government has attempted to open the market to
foreign companies. Deregulation began in 1998 and has allowed several
private companies to enter the oil exploration and development market in the
Philippines. PNOC remains the primary player in upstream oil market
activities, although it frequently partners with foreign companies on its major
projects.
The Philippine Department of Energy had granted at least eleven licenses for
such consortia by the end of 2005, all of them focused on offshore energy
fields, in the Mindoro, Salawan, and Sulu Sea basins. Exploration activities in
the South China Sea remain constrained by the sovereignty disputes, but
PNOC, CNOOC, and PetroVietnam have signed an agreement to jointly explore
64
an area located within 100 nm off the Philippine island of Palawan. The
65
Malaysian company, Petronas, joined international efforts in 2007.
The Philippines has recoverable coal reserves of 260 mmst, but production was
only 2.9 mmst in 2004, while consumption was 10.1 mmst. This represented a
45 percent increase in coal usage since 1999. The shortfall is made up by
imports, primarily from Indonesia, China, and Australia. In fact, the relatively
plentiful domestic supply of various energy resources has been seriously
underexploited by successive Philippine governments, resulting in
unnecessarily heavy dependence on energy imports.
INDONESIA
Indonesia joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in 1962, but became a net importer of oil in 2004. The nation was
credited with 4.3 bbbls of proven oil reserves as of January 2007, but
production has decreased steadily since 1996. Production averaged 1.1 bbl/d
in 2006, a reduction of 32 percent since 1996.
The state oil company, Pertamina, was forced by the government in October
2001 to relinquish its monopoly position in the petroleum sector, and a new
regulatory company, BP Migas, was established. Indonesia's oil sector is now
dominated by several international oil companies, including Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil (United States); BP (United Kingdom); CNOOC
and PetroChina (China); and Total (France); even Iran has agreed to build an
67
oil refinery in the country.
Indonesia cannot meet its current OPEC crude oil output quota of 1.45
mmbbl/d; in fact, daily oil consumption requires importing 1.2 mmbbl. Ongoing
exploration does not appear likely to reverse this trend.
Indonesia produced 2.6 tcf of natural gas in 2004, of which half was consumed
domestically and half exported as LNG to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This
made Indonesia the world's largest exporter of LNG in 2005, exporting 1,123
bcf of LNG, about 16 percent of the total world annual production. The
government has a plan for increasing domestic natural gas consumption to
replace declining oil supplies, but Indonesia's inadequate natural gas
transmission and distribution network is limiting implementation of this
program.
One promising LNG project is the BP-led Tangguh project in Papua Province,
with 14.4 tcf of proven natural gas reserves onshore and offshore. BP (37
percent) heads a consortium of Japanese (36 percent), Chinese (17 percent),
and German (10 percent) companies that is developing this field.
Indonesia also has an estimated 5.5 bsts of recoverable coal reserves, about
two-thirds located in Sumatra. Production in 2004 of 142 mmst was an
increase of approximately 68 percent since 2000. Domestic consumption has
remained relatively flat, at 24 mmst in 2004, while the country has become
the world's second largest net exporter of coal in the world after China,
69
shipping approximately 118 mmst that same year.
Indonesia is attempting to gain the maximum benefit from its large natural gas
and coal reserves, especially in view of the declining petroleum picture, but in
70
the process is ceding majority control to foreign companies. This policy has
apparently contributed to limiting benefits from these resources accruing to
the domestic population. Meanwhile, Jakarta has moved to make large
investments in modernizing its navy, although as a motivation for this
program, energy security seems secondary to increasing domestic political
stability and the security of the nation's extensive littoral waters.
BRUNEI
Brunei's small, wealthy economy depends almost entirely on exports of crude
oil and natural gas. These revenues account for nearly half of GDP and 80
percent of total government revenues. Brunei consumes little energy
domestically, with the bulk coming from natural gas.
Brunei's oil reserves are declining, standing at 1.1 bbbls of proven reserves in
January 2007. Approximately 220,000 bbl/d were produced during 2006, of
which 198,000 bbl/d was crude oil and the remainder natural gas liquids. The
government has deliberately limited oil production since 1979, in an effort to
conserve its limited reserves. The industry is dominated by Brunei Shell
Petroleum (BSP), a joint venture between Shell and the government. Despite
Brunei's status as a net exporter of oil, the country imports about half of the
refined petroleum products that it consumes. This results from the country's
limited refining capacity and increases its dependence on secure SLOCs.
Neither onshore nor maritime areas are estimated to contain significant new
supplies of oil for Brunei. Most promising are some deep-water areas in the
South China Sea, but these are disputed with Malaysia. July 2007 negotiations
between the Brunei and Malaysian heads of state were promising, with Kuala
Lumpur proposing a joint venture, but Brunei has not been willing to
renegotiate its contracts with other foreign companies to reach agreement
71
with Malaysia.
Brunei became the first Asian exporter of LNG in 1972 and remains an
important producer, with 333 bcf exported in 2005. It held 13.8 trillion cubic
feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2007; production of 406
bcf in 2004 included 71 bcf for domestic consumption and 357 bcf for export.
Japan received 92 percent of these exports, with the remainder going to South
Korea. BSP dominates natural gas production, while LNG activities are
conducted by a Brunei (50 percent)-Japan (Mitsubishi, 25 percent)-Shell
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(international, 25 percent) joint venture.
VIETNAM
Much of Vietnam's large rural population relies heavily on noncommercial
biomass energy sources such as wood, dung, and rice husks, which means that
Hanoi is able to concentrate on the commercial sector, with relatively little
concern for the effect of energy security on domestic tranquility.
Vietnam claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea land features;
while this claim is contested in part by the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia,
China is the most important and dangerous counterclaimant. Beijing seized the
Paracel Islands and some of the Spratly Islands after brief naval battles with
Vietnamese forces in 1974 and 1988, respectively. Vietnam, China, and the
Philippines did agree in March 2005 to exchange seismic survey information
about potential oil and natural gas reserves in some of the areas they dispute,
but this agreement does not address sovereignty issues. It is noteworthy that
the last significant clash occurred over twelve years ago, when China occupied
Mischief Reef off Palawan.
Vietnam has 600 million barrels of proven oil reserves, with promising offshore
fields still being explored. One promising offshore discovery, of 100 million
bbls, was made in 2004 by a joint venture comprised of American
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Technologies, Petronas, Singapore Petroleum, and PetroVietnam.
Vietnam's natural gas production and consumption have been rising rapidly
since the late 1990s, as proven gas reserves of 6.8 tcf are exploited. Natural
gas is currently produced entirely for domestic consumption, from fields
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offshore the Mekong Delta. Vietnam has also greatly increased exploitation
of its estimated 165 mmst of coal reserves since 1996. Production of more
than 18 mmst in 2003 allowed the export of 7 mmst, most of it to Japan and
China.
CAMBODIA
Cambodia has significant hydroelectric potential and indications of oil and
natural gas reserves offshore, as well as coal deposits. An April 2007
announcement by Chevron indicated that Cambodia might possess “huge
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deposits [of oil] off the southern shore.” The World Bank estimated the six
fields identified as containing perhaps two Bbbls, while the UN Development
76
Program “confirmed” Cambodia's reserves as 700 mmbbls. The nation
remains in such a state of economic disarray, however, that all commercial
fuels currently are imported. Cambodia will probably be unique in its
77
dependence on wood energy well into the twenty-first century.
MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a significant Southeast Asian producer of oil and natural gas,
although proven oil reserves have declined in recent years. It contests
ownership of some of the Spratly Islands and other South China Sea land
features with Brunei, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Several of
Malaysia's natural gas fields in offshore Sarawak and Sabah lie in waters that
may also be claimed by China.
The state-owned oil company, Petronas, dominates the country's oil sector. It is
also the single largest contributor of government revenues, holding exclusive
ownership rights to all exploration and production projects; all foreign and
private companies must operate through contracts with Petronas. ExxonMobil
is the largest foreign oil company operating in Malaysia, but there are
numerous other foreign firms also working with Petronas.
Malaysia was credited with proven oil reserves of 3.0 bbbls as of January
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2007, a decrease from 4.6 bbbls in 1996. Most of these are located in
offshore fields. The decline in proven oil reserves is expected to continue, with
a 13 percent decrease from 2006 to 2008 forecast. Petronas is pursuing two
tracks to offset this decline: first, domestic exploration; and second, energy
projects in twenty-nine foreign countries.
Most of Malaysia's estimated 75 tcf of proven natural gas reserves are located
offshore, particularly in the South China Sea near Sarawak. Production rose
47 percent between 2000 and 2004, reaching 2.2 tcf, while domestic natural
gas consumption also increased, rising 61 percent between those two years, to
1.2 tcf in 2004. The Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) in the
lower part of the Gulf of Thailand is a prime area for future natural gas
exploitation, with an upper estimate of 24 tcf of proven and “speculated”
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reserves.
Malaysia is one of the world's leading exporters of LNG, selling more than one
tcf in 2005, which was 15 percent of total world LNG exports. Most of these
exports went to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, Malaysia's
International Shipping Corporation owns and operates twenty-three LNG
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tankers, the largest LNG fleet in the world by volume of LNG transported.
Kuala Lumpur has also announced construction of a large crude oil depot
designed specifically to serve tankers transiting the Malacca Strait. The joint
project with German and Belgian companies, will further position Malaysia as a
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competitor to Singapore, which currently owns the only depots on the strait.
The offshore location of the majority of its petroleum and natural gas reserves,
its location as one of the nations delineating the Malacca Strait, and its
modernizing navy all contribute to Malaysia viewing maritime energy security
as a vital national priority.
SINGAPORE
Singapore's viability as a nation-state depends on imported energy resources,
since the country has no domestic reserves, but the city-state consumed
763,000 bbl/d in 2005 and drew 80 percent of its power generation needs
from natural gas. It is also a leader in petroleum refining, with three refineries
operated by ExxonMobil (605,000-bbl/d), Royal Dutch Shell (458,000-bbl/d),
and the Singapore Petroleum Company (273,600-bbl/d).
Natural gas use is rising rapidly, as the government promotes policies aimed at
reducing carbon dioxide and sulfur emissions, ensuring energy security, and
promoting the country as a regional hub for an integrated gas pipeline
network. All the natural gas Singapore consumes is imported, 233 bcf in 2004.
Currently all natural gas imports arrive via undersea pipelines from Indonesia
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and Malaysia.
THAILAND
Thailand has limited domestic oil production and reserves, so imports make up
a significant portion of the country's oil consumption. Approximately 85
percent of crude oil production comes from offshore fields in the Gulf of
Thailand. Thailand produced an estimated 336,000 bbl/d of oil in 2006, while
consuming 922,000 bbl/d, requiring 586,000 bbl/d of imports, second largest
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among Southeast Asian nations. Exploitation of Thailand's 290 million
barrels of proven oil reserves is dominated by PTT, the state-owned oil and gas
company.
Although foreign companies may operate in the oil sector, they usually do so
through joint ventures with PTT. In fact, foreign companies provide most of
Thailand's domestic oil production, with Chevron accounting for more than
three-fourths of the country's crude oil production in 2006. PTT is seeking
energy supplies overseas, with most of its investments among its neighbors
(Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia), but also in Algeria, Iran, and
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Oman.
Thailand has large proven natural gas reserves, but while production has
increased since 2000, imports are still required to meet growing demand. The
14.8 tcf of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2007, are almost all
located offshore in the Gulf of Thailand. The 790 bcf produced in 2004 was not
enough to satisfy the 1,055 bcf consumed domestically and most of the net
265 bcf difference was imported by pipeline from Burma. This relationship
constrains Thailand's ability to deal with the politically repressive Burmese
regime, either bilaterally or through the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). It is a clear case of energy security driving national foreign
affairs policy.
Thailand's future ability to satisfy domestic natural gas demands will depend
on the JDA in the Gulf of Thailand being developed with Malaysia. A new
pipeline—the second of three planned—to bring JDA resources into the
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domestic infrastructure began operating in June 2007.
AUSTRALIA
Australia is rich in petroleum, natural gas, and coal reserves. Its huge coal
reserves are the world's fourth largest, estimated at 86.5 billion tons in 2007.
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Production has grown by 36 percent since 1996 and continues to expand.
Domestic energy consumption is dominated by coal, which fuels most of the
country's power generation plants.
Australia is also the world's largest net exporter of coal, with 29 percent of
global exports, representing 60 percent of its annual coal production. Japan
buys almost two-thirds of these exports, a status likely to be challenged by
China, if its economy and need for raw materials continue to grow. These coal
sales result from Australia's wealth in that mineral, of course, but also reflect
China's inadequate transportation infrastructure: it is often less expensive to
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import coal from Australia than to purchase and ship it domestically.
Most of Australia's 1.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves are located
offshore, primarily off the western coast and in the Bass Strait, between
southern Australia and the island of Tasmania. The country is not rich in crude
oil deposits—39 percent of consumption in 2006 came from imports—and
production will continue to fall, barring success in ongoing exploration for
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additional offshore fields.
Australia is credited with 30.4 tcf of proven natural gas reserves, with the
possibility of an additional 100 tcf of reserves, most of them offshore the
continent's northwest coast, with significant fields also located in the Bass
Strait area. Natural gas production increased from 930 bcf to 1,300 bcf
between 1994 and 2004, with consumption growing from 660 to 931.3 bcf;
Canberra expects to maintain natural gas self-sufficiency.
Two foreign relationships will significantly affect the future Australian energy
picture. First and most important is the increasingly close economic
relationship with China, based on the sale of energy resources and other raw
materials, and one that is disturbing to some Australian and United States
security strategists. The two nations announced “Australia's biggest ever single
export deal” in September 2007: the sale of $45 billion worth of LNG to
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China. A conflict between political and economic priorities—between
Australia's mutual defense treaty obligations with the United States and
Australia's economic obligations with China—may well affect the Asian political
and economic scene.
Second is Australia's dispute with Timor Leste over natural gas deposits in the
Timor Sea, discovered in September 2005 by American (ConocoPhillips) and
Australian (Santos) companies. Ownership of these resources has been
contested between the new, extremely poor nation of Timor and Australia,
particularly over the area called the “Timor Gap.” This maritime area lies closer
to the former than to the latter, but the distances involved—no more than 100
nm separate Timor from its larger neighbor to the south—make the
sovereignty issue a classic example in which the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not provide a solution to the dispute.
Negotiations led by the United Nations (UN) produced the Timor Sea
Agreement 2003, however, creating the Timor Joint Development Area (TJDA)
and dividing of royalties from the disputed area's energy resources 90 percent
to 10 percent in Timor's favor.
The major natural gas lying completely within the TJDA, the Bayu Undan,
began operation in February 2004 with an estimated 3.4 tcf of natural gas.
Only 20 percent of the Greater Sunrise field, which is estimated to contain
almost three times as much natural gas (9.3 tcf) lies within the TJDA, which
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leaves a significant majority of Timor Sea reserves in dispute.
BURMA
Burma possesses extensive sources of energy, including hydropower, coal,
forest products, petroleum, and especially natural gas. Because of political
heavy-handedness and economic disarray, however, the country has yet to
position itself even to begin garnering full benefit from these abundant
resources. Instead, the military junta that has been misgoverning the country
since the late 1980s seems intent on continuing to sell off its considerable
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energy riches to China, rather than develop them for its people's benefit.
Additionally, Russia, the United States, Vietnam, Thailand, and India are just
some of the many countries that would like to access Burmese energy
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reserves.
South Asia contains proven reserves of only 6.2 billion barrels of oil, just 0.5
percent of total world reserves; the region consumed 3.09 million bbl/d in
2005, but produced approximately 0.93 million bbl/d, almost all of it from
Indian offshore fields. This shortfall is made up for the most part by Middle
East imports of approximately 2.2 mmbbl/d.
The South Asian natural gas picture is not much better. Proven reserves in
January 2006 were estimated at 62.1 tcf, just 1 percent of the world total.
Indian and Pakistani reserves are 38.9 tcf and 28.2 tcf, respectively;
Bangladesh, with 5.0 tcf is the only other South Asian country which has
proven gas reserves. All current natural gas production in South Asia is
consumed domestically, reflecting a two-thirds increase in consumption
between 1993 and 2003.
Even if additional natural gas reserves are found in the region, it will have to
overcome a rudimentary domestic infrastructure. International pipelines or
LNG facilities would have to be built, not an easy task in such a politically
disrupted region.
South Asia's coal reserves of 105.3 billion short tons are approximately 11
percent of the world total, and coal accounts for 44 percent of total energy
consumption. Nearly all of that is produced and consumed by India, however;
coal plays a relatively minor role in Pakistan's energy mix (6 percent in
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2003).
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh has just 28 mmbbls of proven oil reserves and is a net oil
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importer. Its only significant source of commercial energy is natural gas,
estimates of which vary widely. The Ministry of Finance in 2004 estimated 20.5
tcf of recoverable reserves; earlier, in June 2001, the U.S. Geological Survey
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had added an estimated 32.1 tcf of “undiscovered reserves” to this number.
The government estimates that natural gas accounts for 80 percent of the
country's commercial energy consumption and 463 bcf were produced in 2004,
up from 429 bcf in 2003, and more than doubling the 1994 level. Given the
uncertain size of the country's natural gas reserves, the government has been
reluctant to export this product and has instead restricted it to domestic
energy requirements.
INDIA
India has become a significant consumer of energy resources as its economy
rapidly expands and modernizes, ranking as the world's fifth-largest consumer
of oil in 2006. Its 5.6 bbbls of proven oil reserves as of January 2007 are the
third largest in Asia, after Russia and China. Much of it is located offshore the
western coast, although substantial undeveloped reserves are estimated to lie
in the Bay of Bengal. Production levels have not been able to keep up with
increasing oil consumption, and imports are increasingly necessary. In 2006,
846,000 bbl/d were produced but 2.63 million bbl/d were consumed. The latter
figure represented an increased oil demand of 100,000 bbl/d, a trend likely to
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continue.
As is the case with its oil reserves, India's 38 tcf of proven natural gas
reserves are for the most part found offshore the country's west coast. These
fields produced 996 bcf of natural gas in 2004, but the nation consumed 1,089
bcf, requiring 93 bcf of imported LNG, which came from Qatar. Reliance on
imported natural gas is expected to continue and New Delhi is investigating
various LNG and pipeline projects to ameliorate this dependence. Proposed
projects would access energy resources from Burma and from Central Asia,
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including Kazakhstan and Iran.
India began receiving LNG shipments in January 2004 with the startup of the
Dahej terminal in Gujarat state, in western India. Two terminals are currently
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in operation, through which 222 bcf were imported in 2005. In sum, India's
economic growth must deal with a marginal energy situation; the abundance
of coal will likely not be able to compensate for oil and natural gas shortfalls.
Maintaining energy security for New Delhi will require astute international
political and economic diplomacy.
India is the world's third largest coal producer, after the United States and
China. Approximately 70 percent of India's coal consumption is used for power
generation. New Delhi was “readying” an energy security plan in early 2007,
designed to increase use of nonfossil fuels and renewable energy sources. The
plan also addressed pursuit of the new strategy in cooperation with the other
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nations of the non-aligned movement.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan is increasingly reliant on oil imports from the Middle East, a situation
exacerbated by the country's inadequate refining capacity, which means
having to import petroleum products as well as crude oil. Proven oil reserves
of only 300 mmbbls are mostly located in the southern half of the country, and
imports are required to satisfy domestic demand, with Saudi Arabia the leading
supplier.
Pakistan has failed to take advantage of its estimated 3,362 mmst of proven
recoverable coal reserves. Just 3.5 mmst were produced in 2004 and
additional coal was imported to meet domestic demand. An additional 1,929
mmst of high quality coal reserves in Sindh Province have attracted both
domestic and foreign development interest. Apparently due to Pakistan's rigid
negotiating position, however, China, which had proposed developing the new
coalfields and building a series of power-generating plants in the area, has
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reportedly abandoned the proposal.
CONCLUSION
China looms largest among Asian national energy profiles, but other states are
also important, on a global scale. Beijing's energy requirements are second
only to the United States; Japan's are third. But India, at number six in the
world, has the potential to match both of the Northeast Asian economic giants,
while Australia and Indonesia are vitally important sources of energy supplies
in the region.
Russia apparently has the necessary resources and may well aspire to become
the dominating source of energy for Asia. Siberian resources, both crude oil
and natural gas, may be among the world's largest untapped sources of
energy. Their recovery has begun, but full exploitation remains problematical.
The chief claimants of these resources are Japan and China, although both
North and South Korea will eventually benefit from Russian energy reserves.
Russia already serves as the major source of natural gas to Central and
Western Europe; the addition of eastern customers would indeed place Moscow
in a dominant position in the Eurasian energy infrastructure.
Japan may eventually draw from the Sakhalin gas fields as a primary source,
but currently is continuing to rely on LNG arriving by sea as the main form of
gas used for energy needs. Although piping Sakhalin's natural gas directly to
Japan would seem to be more efficient than LNG, existing LNG infrastructure
offers advantages not easily replaced by the building of a similar infrastructure
for piping natural gas.
In any case, Japan's almost complete lack of domestic energy resources casts a
strong shadow across its foreign policies. The availability of Iranian oil and
natural gas, for instance, has driven Tokyo to ignore U.S. policy wishes against
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that nation and to pursue agreements to access those reserves.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a tour of the Middle East in April
2007, visiting Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, reflecting
Japan's dependence on energy imports from the Middle East and Southwest
Asia—which provide 70 percent of the nation's oil and natural gas. No nation is
more concerned with the security of sea lines of communication, especially
focusing on the main routes through the South China Sea, Singapore and
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Malacca Straits, and the Indian Ocean.
South Korea is in a position similar to that of Japan but has the advantage of
possible continental connections to Siberian reserves. North Korea is so
isolated from the international community that as of 2007 only China is a
reliable source of the energy imports that are vital to Pyongyang. North Korea
has of course periodically received shipments of fuel oil as part of various
attempts to bribe the regime to halt its development of nuclear power. These
began in 1994 and in 2007 were resumed by South Korea, with a first
shipment of 50,000 tons of oil sent by sea. Plans for additional energy
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assistance to North Korea were also in place by December 2007.
China has been a net energy importer since 1993, but its huge coal reserves—
third in the world, but reportedly superior in quality to those of Russia and the
United States—provide a significant security margin for the nation's energy
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future. The rapidly developing economy has meant an even more rapidly
growing requirements for energy. China's role as one of the world's three
largest importers of energy resources makes it a crucial player in global
energy security determinations, particularly in Asia.
Taiwan remains very much a province of China in terms of energy availability
and distribution. The island is no better off for indigenous energy resources
than is Japan. Almost incredibly, Taipei has made nearly no provisions to
ensure the availability of sources independent of Beijing's influence. Even the
construction of nuclear power plants has, since 2000, been hampered by the
“green” concerns of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government.
History demonstrates that nations will pursue policies and take action,
including military action, which might seem counter to economic logic, if
deemed necessary in the pursuit of national security. Hence, as an exemplar of
Asian energy issues, and one of the dominant—and the most expansive—of the
region's nations, China, in its aggressive and expansive approach, may well
hold the key to the role that the pursuit of energy security will play in future
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Asian developments.
GETTING THE OIL: PIPELINES ASHORE
One way to facilitate the undoubted economic benefits from the increasingly
huge tankers that are discussed in the next chapter is to use them only on the
high seas, with pipelines to transfer their cargoes across isthmuses and around
navigational chokepoints. This also ameliorates the threats to the security of
the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) over which tankers travel. A
widespread program of pipeline construction is underway in Asia on both a
regional and a national basis. The transportation issue goes directly to a
central question of energy security: ensuring reliable access to energy
resources.
SIBERIA
The United States is concerned about the fate of Siberian resources for
1
economic and political reasons. First, U.S. energy demand remains the largest
in the world and is constantly increasing. Second, Washington has an economic
and political interest in the two primary alternatives under consideration for
routing the major pipeline from interior Siberia; these are from Angarsk in
Russia to either Daqing in China, or Nakhodka, a Russian port city on the Sea
of Okhotsk. The first route would transport Russian oil south of Lake Baikal
directly to China (although a route through Mongolia has also been proposed);
the second would transport the oil north of Lake Baikal and keep the pipeline
entirely in Russia, with distribution at Nakhodka to China, Japan, South Korea,
or other Pacific nations. Significant political-military considerations are
associated with the route selected for a pipeline or pipelines constructed to
exploit the vast, but difficult to access, eastern Siberian energy reserves.
This territory, as well as the entire Kurile Island chain, was occupied by
Moscow in 1945, at the end of World War II. Tokyo does not actively dispute
Moscow's sovereignty over Sakhalin or the central and northern Kuriles, but
does maintain that the southern Kurile Islands—Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir,
and Etorofu—are Japanese. The two nations reestablished diplomatic relations
in 1956 and signed a major trade agreement in 1957, but they have never
signed a treaty formally ending their World War II state of hostilities. The
status of these islands remains a sensitive subject in Japan's domestic politics,
while retention of all the Kuriles is an equally sensitive issue of national pride
in the much-reduced, post-Soviet Russia.
One way around this conundrum might be a quid pro quo whereby Japan
would furnish the economic and technological wherewithal for developing
Siberian resources in exchange for the return to its sovereignty of the four
southern Kurile Islands. This possible settlement has been discussed
periodically by Japanese and Russian leaders, at least since President Mikhail
2
Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo in 1991, but the dispute remains unresolved.
Siberian Russia covers 2.4 million square miles, but has a population of just 8
million people, less than that of Moscow. According to the Russian government,
Siberia has proven oil and gas deposits that could make it a near equivalent of
Saudi Arabia in terms of energy resources. This estimate may reflect national
pride as much as geologic fact—in 2004, for instance, Moscow quintupled its
estimate of Siberian oil and natural gas reserves—but the reserves that are
3
present are almost certainly of global significance. Several problems have
delayed development of Siberia, including the lack of transportation and
communications, underpopulation, difficulty in retaining skilled workers due to
the harsh climate, poor housing, low wages, and the estimated $15 billion cost
4
“on the exploration and other preparatory work” reportedly required. Russia
lacks the financial and technological resources necessary to exploit Siberia's
mineral wealth without foreign assistance.
Despite its long record of disregard for the environment, Moscow has not
hesitated to use environmental concerns as a rationale for decisions and
7
delays, much more likely driven by economic or political reasons. Most
recently, financing and construction of the six-phase project to exploit
Sakhalin's natural gas reserves have been delayed by decisions, which Moscow
8
claims are based on environmental concerns.
While Siberia is a potential major source of crude oil and natural gas imports
for both China and Japan, so far there has been more talk than action. The
Russian government has been holding regular bilateral discussions with the
Chinese and Japanese governments on the feasibility of pipelines to make such
exports possible. Moscow's desire for the financial return from selling these
resources to Japan is shadowed by the Kuriles controversy; selling to China is
shadowed by historic Russian suspicion of Chinese demographic, economic, and
military threats.
The cost of this latter project has been estimated at $10 billion, and a
feasibility study is ongoing. Russian participation in building this pipeline would
reportedly make GazProm “Russia's largest trade and economic establishment
14
in the Chinese capital,” where it has opened a “permanent office.”
Russia has also continued to negotiate with Japan about building a pipeline
from Angarsk to Nakhodka, a seaport on the Sea of Japan, with a branch
pipeline to Daqing, in northeastern China. That would facilitate the shipment
21
of Russian oil both to Japan and to other Pacific nations.
The economic and engineering grounds for selecting one or the other of these
pipeline routes is straightforward: a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing, the
Chinese preference, would cost about half as much and run about half the
distance of a pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka, the Japanese choice.
Furthermore, the Nakhodka pipeline would need to carry at least 50 million
tons of oil annually to be financially viable, while the shorter (Chinese) route
24
to Daqing would require only 20 million tons a year. The Angarsk-Daqing line
would cover approximately 1,600 miles and cost $1.8 billion; the pipeline from
25
Angarsk to Nakhodka would be 2,500 miles long and cost $4 billion.
Significant military considerations affect this route selection. As demonstrated
by T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East during World War I, and currently by the
Ejército de LiberacioÓn Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, and antigovernment forces
in Iraq, aboveground pipelines are particularly difficult to protect. Domestic
pipeline security concerns are being addressed by Beijing; the West-East
Pipeline's origin in Xinjiang makes it vulnerable to Uighur separatist or other
terrorist attention; one Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official has stated that
“the pipeline is going underground to escape both the extreme climate and its
26
potential as a target for terrorist attack.”
Moscow's decision will almost certainly be made for political rather than more
“practical” reasons. Building the pipeline to Nakhodka offers Moscow strategic
advantages that will likely be decisive. First, it would run entirely in Russian
territory, affording a simpler defense task. Second, Russia would retain the
ability to stop and start the flow of energy resources to its customers, rather
than having Beijing in a position to at least share in those decisions. Third, a
pipeline to Nakhodka positions Moscow to sell its resources to the highest
bidder: China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, or any other customer
within reach of the tankers carrying the Russian oil and natural gas.
The on-again, off-again Russian game with China and Japan continues,
although the now enduring strategic play between Moscow and Beijing
indicates a future decision in China's favor. Or, at least, the state of the
relationship among the three nations indicates that any pipeline carrying
significant Russian energy reserves eastward, away from its primary Western
Market, in Europe, will include China as a primary customer. That country
offers a potential customer population of 1.3 billion, after all, compared to
27
Japan's 127.8 million (and declining) population.
CHINA
China has an extensive domestic pipeline system and the national oil
companies are working to establish an even more integrated and complete
network to better satisfy growing demand. CNPC's subsidiary, PetroChina,
currently owns and operates more than 6,000 miles of crude oil pipelines and
more than 1,200 miles of refined product pipelines, with plans to build several
new systems in the coming years. In 2005, less than half of the crude oil
transported domestically by CNPC traveled via pipeline, while the rest typically
traveled by rail.
In July 2006, China began receiving crude oil imports from its first
transnational oil pipeline. The 620-mile line connects Atasu in northern
Kazakhstan with Alashankou in Xinjiang. It was developed by the Sino-Kazakh
Pipeline Company, a fifty-fifty joint venture between the CNPC and
Kazakhstan's KazTransOil. The project has an initial capacity to transport
200,000 bbl/d of crude oil, with plans to double the capacity by 2010. Half of
the imported oil comes from Kazakhstan and half from Russia, however,
reflecting production shortfalls in the Kazakh fields.
This pipeline will serve several purposes. First, it will allow Chinese energy
imports traveling by sea from Middle Eastern and African sources to avoid
transiting the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, thus bypassing potential
navigation, criminal, terrorist, and other hazards. Second, although Burma
apparently does not possess large reserves of crude oil, it may contain
“Southeast Asia's largest natural gas reserves,” which is why CNPC has signed
an agreement with that nation's Ministry of Energy to explore three promising
34
deep-water blocks off Burma's coast.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The TAGP concept relies on using existing national grids and bilateral pipeline
connections “to ensure greater security of gas supply at a gas price that is
competitive to alternative fuels within Member Countries.” The ASEAN Council
on Petroleum is developing an implementation plan, and has formed four
“expert working groups” to examine the project, focusing on the following:
The TAGP concept is a valuable planning tool, and reflects its sponsoring
nations’ concern with increasing energy security, in terms of availability and
affordability; however, military threats from terrorism and from potential
national conflicts, are acknowledged but not adequately addressed:
“Appropriate measures to ensure security and safety of the pipelines and the
uninterrupted flow of contracted natural gas for transmission through the
pipelines including a framework for cooperation in the event of a serious
44
disruption of natural gas supply, subject, however, to mutual consultations.”
ASEAN's TAGP plan includes a key role for Indonesia as the main gas supply
hub. Both APEC and ASEAN assume (almost certainly correctly) that regional
gas demand will continue increasing, especially given the trend demonstrated
in the Malaysian and Thai power sectors, in which natural gas fuels 60 percent
of power generation, and also meets the demand from Malaysian, Thai, and
Singaporean petrochemical industries.
SINGAPORE
As a city-state, Singapore draws on its neighbors for all of its energy
requirements. In January 1999, the Singaporean consortium, SembGas,
signed an agreement to purchase West Natuna natural gas from the
Indonesian state energy company, Pertamina. Indonesian natural gas to
Singapore comes via pipelines from two separate fields, in West Natuna and
Sumatra. Another pipeline from Sumatra is planned to deliver natural gas to
Singapore's planned Island Power station, but the project has experienced
numerous delays.
Singapore's Senoko Power currently imports natural gas through a pipeline
from the Malaysian national oil and gas company, Petronas. The Senoko-
Petronas deal is set to expire in mid-2008, though news reports suggest the
46
two firms are working to extend the contract. To transport the natural gas,
Keppel and Petronas are jointly constructing a 2.5-nm pipeline between
Plentong in the southern Malaysian state of Johor to the Senoko area in the
north of Singapore.
MALAYSIA
Malaysia has one of the most extensive natural gas pipeline networks in Asia,
owing to the multiphased Peninsular Gas Utilization (PGU) project that was
completed in 1998. The purpose of PGU is to create and expand a natural gas
transmission infrastructure on peninsular Malaysia. It covered 880 miles by
2006 and is able to transport two bcf/d of natural gas. The PGU's completion
has led to the planned increase of domestic natural gas consumption and has
expanded Malaysia's role as a hub in regional natural gas distribution.
INDONESIA
Indonesia's natural gas distribution company, Perusahaan Gas Negara (PGN),
operates more than 3,100 miles of natural gas distribution and transmission
lines, organized into nine regional networks. These have limited
interconnectivity, however, which has hampered increasing natural gas
consumption. Indonesia began exporting natural gas via pipeline in 2001,
when it opened the 348-nm, 325-mmcf/d subsea pipeline from West Natuna to
Singapore. A second subsea pipeline began delivering natural gas to Malaysia
in 2002, and then, another natural gas connection to Singapore was opened in
2003, this one originating in South Sumatra. Full operation was achieved in
47
2006, when Singapore signed a twenty-year contract with Indonesia.
THAILAND
Bangkok's “Natural Gas Pipeline Master Plan III” is based on the country's
natural gas demand projections and was announced in 2001. It was approved
by the Thai government with an estimated cost of $2.32 billion and focuses on
both domestic gas distribution and offshore access pipelines. A third pipeline
from Gulf of Thailand fields was included and was in fact completed in 2006;
three additional offshore gas pipelines, including one from the JDA, are
50
scheduled for completion in 2009.
In 2003 Bangkok adopted a new “Strategic Plan for Thailand,” which included
the ambition for the country to become the “Regional Energy Center” of
Southeast Asia. The stated goal is to enhance energy security of the country
by contributing to assured access to energy supply, thus reducing the risk of
energy supply disruption. The plan proposes to take advantage of the following
factors:
1. Geographical advantage
2. Existing large-scale domestic energy market and expertise in energy
business
3. Existing energy infrastructure, with considerable idle capacities
4. Opportunities to expand energy trade to other countries in the ASEAN
53
region and to southern China
Bangkok has proposed building a canal or a pipeline across the Kra Isthmus to
54
bypass the Malacca and Singapore Straits. These projects aim to make
Thailand the primary Southeast Asian oil-trading center by building a Strategic
Energy Land Bridge (SELB) linking Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian oil
suppliers with Northeast Asian customers. The $7 billion dollar project would
include construction of deep seaports, 155 miles of pipeline, oil refineries, and
two 16-mmbbl oil depots, one on each coast of the Kra Isthmus. The pipeline
would stretch from the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand, thus bypassing
55
the Malacca Strait.
The SELB project was adopted by the government in 2004 with a completion
date of 2010 and with China, Japan, and South Korea envisioned as primary
customers—and as investors. Once completed, the project would be able to
transport 1.5 bbbl/d of oil across the Kra Isthmus. The cost of transshipping
the oil across the isthmus was an estimated one-third more per barrel than
shipping direct, however, and while the trans-Kra pipeline would eliminate the
Malacca Strait chokepoint, the project remains in the proposal stage and the
56
increased cost makes its completion problematical.
At least three additional proposals have been made—and one reportedly
approved—for a pipeline to bypass Malacca. One of these is Bangkok's 2003
proposal to build a pipeline from Thailand's coast on the Gulf of Thailand,
57
probably at Sattahip, north to China's Yunnan Province.
AUSTRALIA
Australia has a well-developed oil and natural gas pipeline network. The
Australian Pipeline Trust is the largest operator, with 4,350 miles of pipeline.
Epic Energy is the second largest, with 2,500 miles of pipeline
Australia's present natural gas pipeline system is designed to carry the product
from centrally located fields to coastal cities like Sydney and Melbourne. The
prospect of natural gas recovery shifting to offshore fields means that a large
investment in the country's pipeline network will be required to bring the
resource to its customers. Canberra estimates that this will require a ten-year
investment of $5.5 billion. Elements of this plan are underway, including
pipeline projects from natural gas fields offshore southwestern and
61
northwestern Australia.
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh's domestic natural gas pipeline network is operated by the Gas
Transmission Company Ltd., (GTCL), a subsidiary of the national energy
company, the Bangladesh Oil, Gas, and Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla).
GTCL currently operates 480 miles of pipelines and is the sole natural gas
transmission company in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has been negotiating since 1997 for an agreement with Burma and
India to serve as the entrepot for a 560-mile pipeline to transport natural gas
from the former to the latter. Dhaka conditionally approved the project in
January 2005, stipulating that Burma and India had to meet certain
conditions, including trade concessions. This stance stymied the plan, however,
as New Delhi has not accepted the Bangladeshi demands.
INDIA
India has been touted as a probable world economic superpower almost since it
achieved modern independence in 1947. This potential has yet to be fully
realized, but as the twenty-first century reaches the end of its first decade,
India is making very significant economic progress, which brings with it equally
significant increased energy demands. New Delhi is considering several
massive projects as it seeks to ameliorate energy shortfalls. With the trans-
Bangladesh pipeline planning in hiatus, the Gas Authority of India (GAIL), the
state-owned pipeline operator, completed a feasibility study in June 2006 for
an 870-mile pipeline from Burma that would bypass Bangladesh. This option
would be longer, which would significantly increase the cost of delivering
natural gas from Burma, and possibly less secure, since it would have to travel
through unstable areas in northeastern India. Recent plans include
construction of two undersea pipelines to ease the distribution difficulties
caused by the country's inadequate transportation infrastructure and tanker
63
resources.
The most prominent and contentious such project is the proposed Iran-
Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, which has been under discussion since 1994. The
plan calls for a 1,600-mile pipeline from Iran's South Pars fields to the Indian
64
state of Gujarat at an estimated cost of $7 billion. While Iran is eager to
export natural gas and India needs that energy resource to meet its growing
domestic demand, economic and political issues have delayed and continue to
trouble the project.
Indian officials have made it clear that any import pipeline crossing Pakistan
would need to be accompanied by a security guarantee from Islamabad. These
security concerns are paramount, but another problem is the inability to agree
on pricing the natural gas, following failure of tripartite talks in December
2006. Both Indian and Pakistani officials refused Iran's proposed price of $8.00
per million btu (mbtu), insisting on a maximum price of $4.25/mbtu, a
significant gap. In 2007 Islamabad reportedly asked Moscow to take on the
project, but this likely was just a Pakistani attempt to pressure Iran into
65
lowering its price. Negotiations continued into the winter of 2007, without
66
agreement among the three nations.
This plan still faces several significant hurdles. In addition to the security
concerns for a pipeline that would cross both war-torn Afghanistan and
unstable Pakistan, there are doubts about the adequacy of Turkmen natural
70
gas supplies to meet its proposed export commitments to TAPI customers.
Additional proposals are under discussion in India for increasing natural gas
imports, but India's limited domestic transmission network may not be
adequate to handle increased natural gas volume. GAIL's domestic
transmission system is presently concentrated in the country's natural gas
production centers, with minimal regional interconnection. GAIL has
announced an ambitious long-term plan to increase this network from
approximately 1,900 to 6,200 miles as a National Gas Grid, but only a handful
74
of actual expansion projects are even in the planning stage as of 2007.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan's government is hoping to build the IPI pipeline, which would bring
access to Iran's massive natural gas reserves and large transmission fees from
India, perhaps as much as $70 million annually. The project's success is much
in doubt because of U.S. opposition, Indian uncertainty about the security
situation in Pakistan, and Iran's excessive pricing demands. Iran and Pakistan
extended a previously signed memorandum of understanding in August 2006;
this was scheduled to expire at the end of 2007, but negotiations are
continuing. Tehran has offered to finance 60 percent of the pipeline's
construction costs and Islamabad has stressed Pakistani ability to maintain
pipeline security.
Islamabad is also considering a planned natural gas link from Qatar's North
Dome field to Pakistan via an ocean-bottom pipeline from Oman. A preliminary
agreement to purchase natural gas from Qatar has been signed, but
completion of this project remains far in the future.
Pakistan is also concerned about the serious obstacles confronting the TAPI,
including Indian distrust, the lack of security in Afghanistan, the price
Turkmenistan would charge for the natural gas, and the doubtful sufficiency of
the product to make the pipeline economically viable.
Islamabad is moving to improve its capabilities to import and export seaborne
energy supplies, relying on Chinese financial, engineering, and construction
assistance and aid. The focus of these efforts has been the port of Gwadar, a
city on the North Arabian Sea coastline just 110 nm east of the Iranian border
and close to the Strait of Hormuz. Effective utilization of this port facility may
be hindered by its location in the unstable Baluchistan Province, and by the
questionable stability of the Pakistani government itself.
CENTRAL ASIA
There are two regions of this amorphously described area that offer Asian
customers good pipeline possibilities. The first is Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan.
These former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) are in a tenuous geopolitical
situation; they are located in the midst of the energy interests of their former
ruler, Moscow; the European nations and the United States, which hopes to
export the area's oil directly to the West; and their would-be exploiter, Beijing.
China has also agreed to import natural gas from Turkmenistan. While Beijing
signed an April 2006 agreement with Ashgabat to buy 1 tcf of natural gas
annually from Turkmenistan, and a July 2007 agreement to build the pipeline
84
to bring that product to Xinjiang remains in the proposal stage. Furthermore,
since China does not share a common border with Turkmenistan, the pipeline's
construction would have to be supported by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and/or
85
Uzbekistan.
China wants to be a primary destination for the Caspian Basin energy reserves
but is competing with a less expensive and easier route to the West for these
reserves. That is, Beijing apparently wants nothing less than to shift the
general flow of Central Asian energy resources from West—toward Europe—to
East, a stunning ambition.
The Kazakh government has previously agreed to sell all its exports to Russia
until 2012, just as Turkmenistan's gas exports are under contract to Moscow
until 2009, and most of Uzbekstan's transit pipelines have been booked by
86
Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy company, until 2010.
The countries of the Caspian Sea region remain relatively minor oil and
natural gas producers, struggling with difficult national economic and political
issues. Caspian regional oil reserves are estimated at between 17 and 49
bbbls, an amount comparable to OPEC members Qatar on the low end, and
Libya on the high end.
The Caspian Sea region's natural gas potential may be more extensive than its
oil reserves, with proven natural gas reserves estimated at 232 tcf. Production
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in 2005 totaled
just 5.2 tcf, about 75 percent of Canada's production.
Gas production from the Caspian area has been inconsistent since 1990, with
modest annual increases registered. A particular issue is this production's
competition with natural gas produced by Gazprom, the Russian state natural
gas company. Since the major pipelines connecting the Caspian area to world
markets are owned by Gazprom and routed through Russia, Moscow has been
89
able to exert considerable control over the market. And Moscow seems
determined to continue dominating the Central Asian and the European
natural gas markets.
CONCLUSION
The movement of energy supplies throughout Asia, including shipments from
Southwest and Central Asia is a core issue of energy security. The primary
method remains seaborne, tankers sailing well-known SLOCs among ports and
fueling stations throughout the region's great sweep, south, and then west
from maritime Russia into the Persian Gulf.
The frailties of reliance on shipborne transport are recognized, which has given
rise to major efforts to construct domestic and international pipelines to
reduce the dependence on tankers. These are sometimes discussed as part of a
construct that would include the entire region, with pipelines reaching from
Sakhalin to Australia, and from Japan to the Caspian Sea basin.
This Pan-Asian Energy Bridge remains more ideal than reality as a coherent
construct. More immediate are the national and relatively limited multilateral
projects that have been constructed during the past quarter-century, are
under construction, are planned, or are under discussion.
Some of these reserves, the natural gas fields located offshore of southern
Sakhalin Island, are already being accessed by pipeline. The construction of
this multiphase project evidences a not uncommon characteristic of the
international pipelines being planned and built in Asia: maritime pipelines
routed along the sea bottom.
Japan should become the most direct beneficiary of Sakhalin pipelines, but
both North and South Korea hope to gain energy supplies from both the
Sakhalin and Siberian lines, and also from a planned project that would pipe
90
natural gas to them from Russian fields at Kovykta.
China is leading all Asian nations in the comprehensiveness and extent of its
energy pipeline construction programs. Domestically, Beijing has since the turn
of the century already constructed impressively long pipelines throughout the
country, both north-south and east-west, many to bring the energy resources
of the underpopulated western sections of the nation to the heavily populated
and economically advanced eastern Chinese areas.
Second, every nation in Asia fields ground forces, both army and police. These
vary widely in size and capability, of course, but are designed to achieve each
nation's national defense priorities, which in every case includes security
required for energy resources. Relatively few nations deploy significant
maritime forces, however, navy or coast guard. While Japan, China, and India
are well able to defend at least coastal SLOCs and offshore energy fields to an
appreciable degree, almost none of the remaining Asian nations possess that
capability. And building naval forces is far more expensive than building land
forces, in terms of equipment, personnel, and even the energy resources
necessary for those forces to operate.
The ability to deliver energy supplies reliably from origin to customer is key to
energy security. The two primary methods of delivery are via pipeline or by
seagoing tanker. Relatively insignificant energy supplies are also transported
by truck or train.
Coal may be carried in a variety of bulk cargo ships, although the installation
of special fire detection and fighting equipment is required. Petroleum, both
crude oil and refined products, is routinely transported by large tankers, some
displacing hundreds of thousands of tons. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) requires
the most specialized shipping of all, since the liquefaction process for natural
gas requires very low temperatures, not above −260°F (−162°C), at which the
liquid product must be maintained for safe shipment. Liquefaction was first
developed by German scientists in the 1870s; American engineers built the
first commercial LNG plant in 1912; and the first ship designed to transport
LNG, SS Methane Pioneer, began operating in 1959.
Petroleum tankers made up more than a third of this fleet and increased in
number by 5.4 percent, while LNG carriers increased by 7.5 percent and
4
“miscellaneous tankers” rose by a remarkable 26 percent. The total number
5
of tankers increased from 2,516 in 1980 to more than 10,400 in 2006.
The great majority of these ships are in almost constant use, with less than 1
percent classified as “surplus tonnage.” Oil tankers are especially busy, with
the overall volume of crude oil transported by sea increasing by 4.5 percent
annually. About 77 percent of all tankers carry crude oil, while the remainder
carries petroleum products. Another measure of the importance of petroleum
in world maritime trade is that of “ton-miles.” Energy resources counted for
more than half of the world's total of 29,045 btm that all cargo carrying ships
steamed in 2005: petroleum accounted for 11,705 btm, while coal measured
6
another 3,140 btm.
Asia's increasing energy demand is also reflected in the amount of crude oil it
imports: 53.7 percent of the world's total, which comprises 39.7 percent of
total global petroleum shipped by sea. This shipping dependency is
demonstrated even more impressively in ton-miles: Asia's seaborne trade in
crude oil, petroleum products, and coal accounts for over half (51 percent) of
11
global ton-miles of total seaborne trade.
SHIPBUILDING
Asian nations dominate the global shipbuilding industry. The region's shipyards
build more than 86 percent of the world's merchant shipping of more than
1,000 tons displacement, with South Korea, Japan, and China alone producing
12
more than 75 percent of the world's total, including tankers. Asian shipyards
build almost all of the world's new oil tankers, with orders in that region
accounting for an impressive 97 percent of the world's total new tanker orders
13
in 2005. New ship orders during the first six months of 2006 increased by 43
14
percent over those for the same period in 2005. These new ships are for the
15
most part petroleum carriers, including LNG tankers.
Furthermore, twelve of the world's largest twenty container ship owners are
Asian, and six of the largest ten container ports are in Asia, including Hong
Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Kaohsiung.
Minimizing the transit time between cargo origin and destination is the
primary criterion for evaluating shipping routes. For oil cargos, these are
determined primarily by maritime geography, especially by the location and
depth of passage of the navigational chokepoints that mark the world's sea-
lanes.
Tankers of more than 300,000 dead weight tons require a water depth of more
than 60 feet (10 fathoms) for safe navigation. By way of comparison, a
modern aircraft carrier displaces approximately 98,000 tons and draws just 37
16
feet of water.
The largest ship ever built is Knock Nevis, a ULCC of 647,955 dwts and able to
carry approximately 4.1 mmbbl of petroleum. It draws 81 feet of water when
fully loaded, which makes it impossible for the ship to navigate either the
18
Malacca Strait or the English Channel, let alone the Suez or Panama Canals.
The primary reason for this dramatic increase in size was tanker owners’
realization of the benefits of economies of scale. Crude oil tankers are
relatively unsophisticated and fairly simple to build. The larger ship is less
expensive to build on a comparative carrying capacity basis, since the amount
of steel required basically determines the cost of construction; using four times
as much steel produces eight times as much cargo capacity in the ship.
Hence, oil tankers have grown enormously in size since the 1960s. While
25,000-dwt tankers were common in the 1950s, tankers of 80,000 dwt were
being built in the 1960s, and ships of 350,000 dwt were operating in the mid
1970s. This rapid increase in size was sparked by the 1967 closure of the Suez
Canal, which forced Europe-bound tankers from Southwest Asia with cargoes
for Europe or the Western Hemisphere to proceed around the Cape of Good
Hope, a much longer transit that emphasized the benefits gained from the
economies of scale noted above.
Fuel costs are also proportionately lower for larger tankers. A 60,000-dwt ship,
for instance, typically requires approximately 16,000 horsepower (hp) to
operate at 15 knots (kts), while a 260,000-dwt ship requires 42,500 hp. This
equates to using 2.7 times as much energy to transport 4.3 times as much
cargo.
There are factors, however, that limit the economical size of a tanker. First,
there are a limited number of shipyards capable of building the larger ships
and the number of ports able to service them is similarly limited. Second,
several of the world's most important shipping routes are too shallow for the
very large and ultralarge ships. The Suez Canal is limited to fully laden ships
of 70,000 dwt; the Malacca Strait is too shallow for loaded tankers greater
than 260,000 dwt. Larger ships proceeding from the Middle East to Northeast
Asia have to transit the Lombok Strait, which adds an additional 956 nautical
miles (nm) to the voyage. Many other important routes around the world,
including the Strait of Dover and the Bosporus, also present navigational
difficulties to large ships.
Overall, however, developments since the late 1960s have encouraged ship
owners to build increasingly large tankers. At the same time that the Suez
Canal was closed in 1967, world trade was booming, and the United States
only recently had become a major oil importer instead of exporter. Shipping
rates and profits both soared. The cost of a new VLCC of more than 200,000
19
dwt could be paid off in less than two years.
Thus, the past forty-year boom in tanker building and size is not surprising.
Shipyards in Japan, South Korea, and more recently in China have led the
tanker-building surge, with ships of dramatically increasing size. The increase
in the number and size of newly constructed tankers has not been continuous
since the early 1970s, however, as world demand and events have created
imbalances between supply and demand; overall, however, a remarkable
expansion of seaborne trafficking in energy supplies has occurred during the
past few decades.
The tanker market has been increasingly volatile during the last few years,
affected by different influences at different times. Overall, however, the
average age of the tanker fleet is declining. Only some 4.5 million dwt of
tankers were decommissioned in 2005, but the tanker fleet increased by some
7 percent as some 30 million dwt of tankers were delivered. After a ten-year
period with a fairly steady tanker fleet until 2002, the fleet is now increasing,
as it will likely do until at least 2009. In fact, between 2004 and 2008 the
tanker fleet is expected to increase by 25 percent, from 335 million to 415
million dwt.
During 2003, 697 tankers with 49.9 million dwt were added to the order book,
including 574 oil and oil product tankers totaling 46.6 million dwt. This was an
exceptionally high increase over 2002, and was part of a continuing trend of
large tonnage deliveries to tanker fleet owners.
As of January 2004, in fact, more than 1,100 tankers of 300 gross tons or
20
more were on order, the highest level since 1975. This number consisted of
925 oil tankers totaling 71.3 million dwt, 100 chemical tankers of 1.4 million
dwt, and 106 liquid gas tankers of 7.5 million dwt. This represented 22.6 per
cent of the world's total tanker tonnage.
Asia's global shipbuilding lead is increasing, as South Korea, Japan, and China
continue to increase their capacity. The latter's shipbuilding industry reported
a 113 percent rise in the first six months of 2006 over the same period for
2005. This is approximately 17 percent of global shipbuilding and reflects
Beijing's “Medium- and Long-Term Plan of the Shipbuilding Industry,” which
stipulates Chinese acquisition of “more than 25 percent of the world
21
[shipbuilding] market.”
Most of these ships are being built in East Asia, as the predominance of the
region's shipyards is reflected both in the number of ships on order and in the
world's operational tanker fleet. Asian ports also dominate seaborne energy
22
commerce, with South Korean facilities overtaking Japanese ports in 2004.
In 2005, 140 crude oil tankers totaling 19.8 million dwt entered the global
fleet. For the period 2002–2006, the crude oil tanker fleet expanded from 233
million to 257 million dwt. The large number of recently delivered new ships
has lowered that fleet's average age from more than twenty years in 2002 to
23
just over seventeen years in 2006.
The total tanker fleet still relies heavily on smaller ships, however; at the
beginning of 2006, 7,635 ships—73.4 per cent of all tankers—had a capacity of
less than 40,000 dwt. The fleet included 471 VLCC tankers (200,000–320,000
dwt) and 10 ULCC tankers (320,000 dwt and above). The VLCC and ULCC
ships had an average age of 9.3 years, with six of the ULCC ships less than
five years old. The trend toward the larger tankers continues with thirty-one
VLCC/ULCC tankers (above 200,000 dwt) totaling 9.5 million dwt on order at
the beginning of 2006.
Although the goal was for 109 million dwt of single-hull tankers to be phased
out by 2005, this objective is unlikely to be met before 2015 because of
construction limits, states refusing to ratify the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) regulations, and single-hull tankers being shifted to non-
25
oil carriage. This means that single-hull tankers with a capacity of about
12.3 million dwt which should have been phased out by the end of 2005 are
still operating, posing an increasing danger to the environment as they age.
In fact, among Middle Eastern oil producers, only Saudi Arabia ratified the
international maritime requirements for double-hulling tankers, in 2006.
Single-hull ships will also be able to trade under Panamanian or Liberian flag.
In fact, however, many national administrations have still not clarified their
position on the special provisions contained in the international law, which will
extend the trading life of newer single-hull tankers past 2010 to twenty-five
26
years operational life or 2015, whichever is earlier.
The tanker fleet has political as well as economic weight; a current case
illustrative of the importance of tankers to nonenergy related international
issues is the ripening relationship between China and Venezuela. As discussed
earlier, Venezuela has huge reserves of bitumen which can be processed into a
27
more liquid form called orimulsion. Recent visits to China by President Hugo
Chavez Frias have led to announcements that Venezuela would double its
energy exports to China, and had agreed to purchase eighteen oil tankers from
28
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation for a price of $1.3 billion.
Uncertainty about future fleet composition increases after 2008, and is marked
by the fact that 2010 is the last year that single-hull tankers can trade to the
environmentally harder-line countries in the European Union, as well as with
Australia, Canada, and the United States. Accomplishing a total ban on single-
hull tankers by 2010 would require the phaseout of approximately 65 million
dwt of single-hull tankers in that year alone, an eventuality almost certain not
to take place.
LNG SHIPPING
The LNG shipping fleet deserves special attention. This is due to both the
advanced technology required to manufacture and operate these ships, and
their potential attractiveness to terrorists as targets with which to attack
major seaports. LNG-laden ships and terminal storage tanks do possess the
potential to create large fires and explosions, if explosively breached, but their
31
susceptibility for this potential is more storied than real.
The global LNG fleet numbered over 150 tankers at the end of 2003. These
ships ranged in capacity from under 50,000 to more than 120,000 cubic
meters (m3), with the newer ships at the larger end. Fifty-five ships were
under construction in 2004, with forty-six capable of carrying at least 138,000
32
m3 of LNG (equivalent to 2.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas).
Construction of even larger LNG carriers, with up to 250,000 m3 of capacity
(5.3 bcf of natural gas), is under way in East Asian shipyards, and existing
LNG terminals will have to be expanded to accommodate the larger ships.
The LNG carriers built since 2003 have raised total global capacity by 44
percent, from 17.4 million m3 of liquid (366 bcf of natural gas) in October
2003 to 25.1 million m3 of liquid (527 bcf of natural gas) in December 2006.
Further expansion of the LNG fleet is limited by the fact that only eight
shipyards in the world currently build large LNG tankers: three in Japan; three
in Korea; and two in Europe, but India and China have also constructed
33
shipyards capable of building the larger LNG tankers.
Most petroleum carriers are built on speculation, but LNG ships have
traditionally been built for specific routes or projects. Recently, however, the
British Petroleum (BP), Shell, and Tokyo Gas companies have ordered LNG
ships not already obligated to a particular project prior to construction
beginning.
Asia leads the world in LNG imports, as noted; on the other side of the coin,
Malaysia is one of the world's leading exporters of LNG, exporting 21.2 million
metric tons (mmt), approximately 1,031 bcf of natural gas, in 2005, which
amounted to 15 percent of global LNG exports. Most of Malaysia's LNG went to
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Malaysia International Shipping
Corporation (MISC) transported most of this, utilizing its twenty-three LNG
tankers, the single largest LNG tanker fleet in the world by volume of LNG
carried.
About 775 metric tons (mt) of hard coal was traded internationally in 2005, 90
percent of which was seaborne. Coal transportation is expensive, in some
34
instances acounting for up to 70 percent of the delivered cost of the coal.
Ships are used for long distances; because of the expense, only higher quality
coal is usually traded internationally. Lignite and subbituminous (“soft”) coal is
traded regionally but is too expensive for shipment over longer distances,
because of its low energy content compared to harder coals.
CONCLUSION
According to official data, Chinese-owned ships carried only 9 percent of the
crude oil the country imported in 2005. For its overall market size, China's
tanker fleet is relatively small, with eighteen VLCCs, most of them among the
oldest in the world's tanker fleets. Chinese planners reportedly want to expand
the country's energy carriers as a step toward ensuring security of supply. This
effort reportedly aims to build a fleet of seventy-five tankers by 2012, with an
eventual goal of providing a ninety-tanker fleet by 2015, capable of carrying
36
50 percent of the nation's energy imports. This massive, $7-billion-plus plan
not only reflects Beijing's concerns about energy security, but also appears to
conflict with the conventional wisdom of the international energy business
37
community.
That so much of the global energy fleet flies flags of convenience is not
especially significant, despite Beijing's apparent belief otherwise. The ocean is
indeed a great commons, offering energy arteries so valuable that no effort to
interdict them would be able to endure in the face of international demand.
The new century will certainly witness traditional international conflicts and
disputes. Navies will continue to modernize and expand as the weaponry
under, on, and above the sea continues to grow in technological capability and
sophistication. So long as dependence on hydrocarbon energy sources
continues, securing the tankers that carry energy across the seas will continue
to be a vital security interest.
THREATS TO THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION
INTRODUCTION
Each of these threat categories will be addressed below. Military threats to the
Asian SLOCs are relatively slight. None of the regional states currently hold
any apparent strategic objectives that would involve interdicting SLOCs,
although China might do so, at least for a short period of time, should active
military conflict develop over Taiwan's status. Similarly, the conflicting claims
to sovereignty over the South China Sea land features might lead to a
situation involving opposing military forces.
Finally, unintended escalation between two or more opposing naval and air
force units might lead to an armed clash.
The other, essentially nonmilitary threats to the SLOCs are more likely to
occur; in fact, to a degree they are already occurring. Natural disasters,
international crime, and conflicting sovereignty claims are all facts of
international maritime life. Examples include the 2004 tsunami in Southeast
Asia; the incidents of maritime crime that characterize some of the waters in
proximity to the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well in the Bay of Bengal
and western Arabian Sea; and the territorial claims held by the different states
bordering on the South China Sea. It must also be noted, however, that most
of these situations are currently being dealt with peacefully, on a multilateral
basis.
While potential for major combat operations at sea remains, terrorism has
significantly increased the presence of “nonmilitary” and multinational threats
in the maritime domain. These threats present challenges difficult for maritime
nations to counter. They present situations in which threats and adversaries
are neither clearly defined nor perhaps even readily identifiable by source.
Additionally, defeating these threats will require more than purely military
instruments and processes. Similarly, defeat may well not be satisfactory:
resolving their causative bases will be necessary to ensure lasting peace at
sea.
SLOCs crossing the Indian Ocean from west to east offer various routes,
although common sea lines pass through the One and Half Degree, Six
Degree, or the Nine Degree Channels, which offer different passages between
the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean archipelagoes. These are not as
vulnerable as either Bab el-Mandeb or Hormuz as navigational chokepoints,
and they pale in significance next to the primary access and egress to the
eastern Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which connects
the Andaman and South China Seas.
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
TERRORIST THREATS
Terrorist threats have become notably more important at sea, in terms of both
range and impact. This is due in part to the oceans’ role as the world's
commons, presenting opportunities for global movement and relative
covertness: despite satellites and other modern detection systems, the oceans
remain capable of hiding even large vessels and embarked terrorists.
The maritime commons also eases access to a broad array of potential targets
suitable for terrorists to maximize the ability of their disruptive activities to
cause mass casualties and catastrophic economic damage. The terrorist threat
cannot be neatly described or enumerated, and may grow in method and
capability; however, sources can be broadly categorized as nation-states,
terrorists, and transnational criminals and pirates.
In both cases, the ships were stationary; in the latter case, no special state of
7
alert was in effect. Two terrorist incidents of note have also occurred in
Southeast Asian waters. The Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
attacked a coastal freighter, Our Lady Mediatrix, in 2000, killing forty and
wounding fifty people. Even more serious was another attack in Philippine
waters, reportedly committed by the ASG in 2004, when a bombing attack
8
againstSuperFerry 14 sank the ship and caused 116 deaths.
The Asian terrorist groups currently posing the most active maritime threats
are located in the Philippines and Indonesia. Also notable, however, was the
extent of terrorist cells found in Singapore and Malaysia during post-9/11
10
investigations. These groups’ ability to exploit inherently open maritime
borders challenges the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations and
increasingly threatens regional peace and stability; since successful maritime
attacks may disrupt regional and global economies out of proportion to the
attack itself, as shippers and insurers react to the danger. Furthermore,
maritime avenues serve terrorist groups admirably for personnel and logistics
carriage, and often offer a target-rich environment with escape routes readily
11
at hand.
Piracy in Asian waters has a recorded history dating at least to the fifth
century. Chinese dynasties suffered from the problem, as did Western traders
who entered the region. Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, and other
13
outsiders all tried to deal with the problem, but with inconsistent success.
Today's pirates are different from the classic picture—except in the shared
commonality of ferocity. They are often well organized and well equipped with
advanced communications, weapons, and high-speed craft. The capabilities to
board and commandeer large underway vessels, although difficult and
occurring in only a few piracy incidents, could also be employed to facilitate
terrorist acts.
In fact, Southeast Asia is one of the world's two most frequent scenes of pirate
attacks against seagoing vessels, 25 percent of these occurring in Indonesian
14
waters in 2003 and 2004. Most of these attacks are small-scale, perhaps
following the fictional but applicable description: “It is just as occasion offers . .
. In the South China Sea, by all accounts, the rule is to take anything you can
15
overcome, and avoid or trade with anything you cannot.” Despite 2004 data
indicating that less than one-half of 1 percent of all seaborne traffic transiting
the Malacca Strait was attacked, the piracy medium offers too tempting a
vehicle for would-be terrorist groups for the region's navies to ignore the
threat. Particularly nefarious are probable financial and other support links
16
between pirate bands and terrorist groups.
There was an average of fewer than sixty reported piracy incidents annually
during the 1980s and 1990s, but this number increased dramatically following
the 1997 economic crash that swept the region, reaching 161 in 1999 and 242
in 2000. The number of reported pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters
further increased to 445 in 2003, 170 in the Malacca Strait alone.
Furthermore, pirate attacks are probably underreported; some authorities
estimate that no more than one-half of such attacks are reported to national
authorities, while a regional antipiracy conference in Singapore in late 1999
estimated that “as few as one in eight attempted or actual incidents were
18
reported.”
Piracy attacks have been significantly reduced, however; in fact only twelve
“armed- robbery and piracy incidents” were reported in the first quarter and
no pirate attacks were reported in the Malacca area for the second quarter of
19
2007. This reduction is likely due to greater awareness, improved economic
conditions, and to the increasingly cooperative efforts of the area's naval,
coast guard, and police units. This multilateral effort is commendable, but
could not have occurred without the help of Japan, the United States, India,
and other extraregional nations, lending verbal and material support; despite
20
Malaysia's unhelpful sense of nationalism.
The situation remains unsettled, however, as the local and user states attempt
to reach an equitable agreement for enforcing and resourcing antipiracy and
other security programs for the straits area. The security issue involves legal,
economic, and nationalism issues that will continue to figure actively in the
21
ongoing international efforts to increase the security of these crucial SLOCs.
The definition of “piracy” is one factor muddying the statistical picture. The UN
defines piracy as “an attack taking place in international waters,” while the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an agency of the International Chamber
of Commerce, uses a much broader definition, including any “act of boarding
or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or
any other crime…regardless of whether the target vessel is berthed, at anchor,
22
or underway in national or international waters.” This is a crucial difference,
since a relatively small portion of Southeast Asian waters lie outside any
nation's territorial sea (extending 12 nm to seaward from its coast or until
meeting a neighboring territorial sea).
The IMB on the other hand has established four categories of piracy. The first
and largest is “opportunistic boarding aimed at theft or robbery” from a ship,
after which the robbers escape with their loot. Many of these attacks are
conducted against ships at anchor or berthed at a pier, usually with few
crewmembers onboard and a low level of watchfulness. Boardings at sea,
although still falling within this relatively straightforward category, are far
more dangerous both to ships’ crews and the pirates. In these cases, the
pirates actually take control of vessels that are underway, perhaps for several
hours, before fleeing with crewmembers’ valuables, ship's funds, and other
high-value items such as navigation equipment. An easier and more often
employed method is to “plant” a pirate onboard as a crewmember, a process
greatly facilitated by the fungibility and lack of accountability that prevails in
merchant ship crewing processes.
The IMB's second category of piracy occurs when a specific ship is targeted and
hijacked because of its cargo. Petroleum products have typically been the
cargo of choice in such cases. The third category of piracy involves the pirates
replacing the crew, repainting and renaming the ship, and then selling the
cargo (and even the ship) on the international market. This category is the
most dangerous to crewmembers, since in some cases they have been
murdered by the pirates.
This degree of ruthlessness has seldom occurred, however, and the hijacking of
tugboats and their towed barges has become more common. This in turn has
given rise to a fourth category of piracy: the kidnapping and holding for
ransom of crewmembers, especially officers. This crime has most often been
committed in and around the northern end of the Malacca Strait, where the
Free Aceh Movement has been active. This criminal activity is very likely the
most seldom reported by ship owners, who do not want to be blamed by the
industry either for paying ransom to pirates or for sacrificing their
crewmembers.
The IMB has also been one of the most important participants in the
international effort to reduce piracy, however defined. It not only played the
primary role in establishing the Anti-Piracy Reporting Center in 1992, but also
recently established a “Maritime Security Hotline” to improve reporting of
23
criminal incidents at sea, better to alert mariners. The center has reporting
agreements with Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and
Vietnam. It enhances regional cooperation to improve maritime security by
sharing information, increasing law and order at sea, and by establishing
24
cooperative agreements among maritime nations.
The narrow waters of the Malacca Strait bounded by Indonesia, Singapore, and
Malaysia certainly provide pirates with good opportunities, especially at the
strait's eastern and northern ends, as ships have to slow down to maintain
safe navigation. However, the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong has emerged as
the most dangerous port in Asia, and possibly in the world, with Lagos,
25
Nigeria, ranked the second most dangerous, and Chennai, India, the third.
Linkage between pirates and terrorists is suggested by the attention al-Qaeda
and Jemaah Islamiya have paid to maritime operations. Not only did the
former conduct the attacks against USS Cole and SS Limburg, but also
reportedly owns several old steamers; these may be used for logistics
purposes, but could also serve to launch large-scale attacks on other ships or
against port facilities. Jemaah Islamiya sank the Philippine SuperFerry 14, and
uses Philippine waterways for logistics and for personnel attack and withdrawal
26
routes.
Despite such evidence, not all the nations of the region apparently believe that
piracy–terrorism links exist. Malaysia in particular has been reluctant to
acknowledge linkage, despite joining in multilateral antipiracy patrols,
27
protesting the lack of any “credible link” between pirates and terrorists.” That
said, behind the scenes Kuala Lumpur has been willing to join in cooperative
efforts, even with the United States, in July 2006 signing an agreement to
28
cooperate against “corruption, terrorism, and people smuggling.” Most
effective has been the trilateral agreement among Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Singapore to conduct sea and air patrols to counter piracy; Thailand joined this
29
arrangement in 2005.
NATION-STATE THREATS
Less obvious than North Korea's disruptive activities are other individual states
that provide safe haven to criminals and terrorists, who use these countries as
bases of operations to export illicit activities into the maritime domain and into
other areas of the region. In East Asia, the limited governing ability of some
governments, notably the Philippine and Indonesian, has created havens for
international terrorist groups. That these groups have almost invariably had
origins in previous national insurgent movements is both testimony to the
weakness of the host governments and the difficulty of rooting out such
groups: their indigenous origin owes much to the disfunctionality of the
national governments and the economic, political, and socioreligious
differences and inequalities that form the basis of their appeal to potential and
actual supporters.
The unfortunate conditions in the Philippines and Indonesia have given rise to
numerous groups so dissatisfied as to resort to armed insurgency. Some of
these groups have sought and received support from international Islamic-
based terrorist organizations. Since both of these nations are archipelagic and
hence intensely maritime, they are prime potential sources of international
maritime disruptive actions, ranging from religiously motivated terrorism to
piracy both for profit and for causing breakdowns in the flow of seaborne
merchant traffic so critical to the Asian nations.
Malaysia and Thailand also suffer from insurgent movements possibly linked to
international Islamic terrorist groups, but appear so far to be containing the
ability of these movements to disrupt the maritime arena. This does not lessen
the potential dangers to Thailand and Malaysia from these groups, but
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have so far demonstrated awareness of the
dangers and the will to move against them.
SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS
Many wars have been sparked by sovereignty disputes between two or more
nations, and Asia is rife with such maritime disputes. These disputes involve
the nations with the most serious maritime interests and the strongest naval
forces to enforce their claims. Hence, these maritime sovereignty disputes
pose a significant potential for armed conflict.
Sovereignty disputes in Northeast Asia exist between Japan and Russia, Japan
and South Korea, and Japan and China. But the most serious dispute in Asian
waters is Taiwan's unresolved status. Beijing insists that the island is a Chinese
province; the current government in Taipei insists it is an independent state.
The danger of this dispute is due in significant part to potential U.S.
31
intervention to ensure that resolution of Taiwan's status occurs peacefully.
The most direct effect on SLOC security may be that this dispute over Taiwan
exacerbates disputes with Japan and complicates maritime cooperation
prospects with the United States. Thus it is a hindrance to potential maritime
cooperative efforts.
More than thirty territorial disputes mark Southeast Asia, but almost all are
relatively minor, with the only ones of immediate concern those of the South
China Sea land features—islands, rocks, reefs—and ocean areas contested by
32
China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
The South China Sea disputes are particularly ominous, since control over the
waterway would place a potential chokehold on East Asia's primary SLOCs to
the energy resources of the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States has
stated that any attempt to declare the South China Sea as sovereign territory
—and China is the only likely claimant—would be considered a violation of the
principle of the freedom of the seas and unacceptable. Beijing has not
threatened to interrupt navigation in the South China Sea or elsewhere—
including the Taiwan Strait—seeming to recognize that China's interests would
not be served by such an imprudent move.
Among the most basic but effective steps that the nations of the region will
have to take, in addition to the willing exchange of information on a real-time
basis, is to follow the procedures of agreed-upon international cooperative
frameworks, ranging from the UNCLOS to the trilateral antipiracy patrols
conducted by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The rough edges of the lack of agreement about the importance of various
threats will have to be smoothed over to facilitate more effective allocation of
resources and procedures at sea. This will require correcting or at least
significantly ameliorating the lack of political will, a lack of trust between
countries, difficulties in exchanging classified information, and a lack of
resources in terms of information and data.
Some major initiatives have been launched, primarily with U.S. sponsorship,
perhaps most notably the CSI, a technology-intensive program with very
ambitious goals. Because of its dependence on technology, the CSI offers a
viable path to increasing the security of the evermore ubiquitous maritime
shipping containers that have already been used by terrorist organizations to
33
transfer personnel and material.
CONCLUSION
One serious threat to energy security in East Asia is for all practical purposes
out of the control of the region's nations: the political instability and ongoing
armed conflict in Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian oil-producing nations.
Sudan is a genocidal military dictatorship teetering on the edge of UN
intervention. China remains the nation's largest oil customer, and Beijing has
expressed only the mildest reservations about Khartoum's status as the world's
greatest humanitarian disaster, clearly setting oil supply as a higher priority
than both the humanitarian issue and the condemnation it is receiving from
35
Washington and other capitals. This prioritization seems to reflect the role
energy security may play in matters affecting even a country's international
reputation.
The U.S. war in Iraq, possessor of the world's fourth largest oil reserves,
36
continues to negate almost completely that nation's oil producing ability. The
other Persian Gulf nations are on the edge of Iranian dominance, where the
post-1979 Islamic revolution continues to hold sway, at its most extreme
trying to impose seventh-century social mores on a twenty-first-century
nation. China, Japan, and other nations work to maintain relations with Iraq
and Iran and other regional oil-producing nations, in order to promote access
to oil, once more reflecting the pivotal role of energy and SLOC security in
bilateral relations and international conduct.
East and South Asian access to Caspian Basin and other Central Asian
petroleum reserves remains largely in the future, and will depend on the
construction of pipelines through the politically unstable nations of the region,
ranging from Kazakhstan to Pakistan. Future Asian energy needs will perhaps
be satisfied by the huge oil reserves located in Siberian Russia; indeed, Japan
and China have for the past decade or more been engaged in a competitive
struggle to secure at least Moscow's agreement to make these reserves
available. Delivery remains somewhat problematical, however, as Russia
continues to struggle with resolving production, environmental, and political
problems associated with the reserves. This perpetuates the importance of
energy supplies by sea.
Looking at the obverse of this issue, the common desire for energy security
could become a unifying factor in bilateral and international relationships,
particularly with respect to ensuring the security of the SLOCs. Thus, the
common goal of achieving energy security might play a positive role rather
than serving as a divisive factor.
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
Despite near-universal agreement with the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and wide adherence to most of its concepts and
definitions, the world is rife with maritime disputes, with Asia the scene of
particularly acute disagreements. Maritime sovereignty disputes have the
potential to jeopardize the flow of commerce over sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) either indirectly through the fostering of instability or directly through
armed conflicts over conflicting claims.
They are bilateral, ranging from disputes over annual fisheries allocations to
the status of Taiwan and multilateral, including the South China Sea and the
safety of the Malacca Strait. Although none of the existent maritime disputes
currently seem to threaten the near-term use of military force, future
developments could result in open warfare. The more than thirty maritime
disputes in which Asian nations are claimants all provide security concerns to
1
those states.
NORTHEAST ASIA
This area has long been the scene of economic, political, and military conflict
among its constituent nations. Several bitter wars have been waged during the
past century and a quarter between Japan, China, Korea, and Russia,
sometimes with out-of-area allies. These wars have left a legacy ranging from
simple hatred of past foes to occupation of conquered territories.
The Kurile Islands are a chain of barren land features reaching from the
northern major Japanese island of Hokkaido to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula.
Russia occupied all of this chain in 1945 as spoils of World War II. Japan
maintains a sovereignty claim over the southern Kurile Islands of Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group. These are called the Northern
Territories by Tokyo and the Southern Kurile Islands by Moscow.
The islands are of little intrinsic value but have been important to Russia for
reasons of national pride. During the Cold War and its attendant mutually
assured destruction standoff with the United States, however, the Kuriles were
viewed as a geographic barrier between the Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk, an
almost enclosed Russian “lake” used by Moscow as a primary operating area
for its submarines armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Hence, the Kuriles were viewed as important to the Soviet Union's strategic
nuclear deterrent capability.
Japan's demand for the return of the southern islands to its control is based
largely on national pride and cultural values. The disputed islands were long
used by Japanese fishermen and are the location of Japanese cemeteries.
Periodic negotiations between the two nations over the islands’ sovereignty
have been unproductive. The most recent Japanese attempt to engage Russia
over the islands’ status was rebuffed out of hand by Moscow, and the dispute
2
continues as a point of contention between the two nations. Any sovereignty
dispute that threatens Russo-Japanese relations casts a shadow of doubt over
the effective recovery and distribution of the enormous oil and natural gas
reserves in the Sakhalin and Kamchatka energy fields.
Then South Korean President Syngman Rhee declared in January 1952 that
Dokdo was Korean territory. There have been several confrontations between
Japan and South Korea over the islands since then, including national ships
firing on each other. Even when the two countries signed their Basic Treaty in
June 1965, the issue of Takeshima/Dokdo was described as an unresolved
dispute.
Washington's influence in the region has eroded since the end of the Cold War
and the American focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which have
engendered doubts about the durability of the U.S. military presence and
commitment. Hence, Seoul and Tokyo both feel the need to assert their
interests more independently, resulting in appeals to nationalism.
Tokyo and Seoul should both feel that the need to contain and roll back
Pyongyang's nuclear threat, and to resist Beijing's bid for regional hegemony,
is motivation for at least not escalating the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute. The
spring 2006 near-confrontation over Japan's planned maritime survey and
acrimonious Korean reaction demonstrated the depth of mutual suspicion in
Seoul and Tokyo, however, as well as the general enmity of Korea toward
Japan. These may well be the determinant factor in South Korea's possible
decision to forge closer relations with Beijing and Pyongyang in the future.
The strategies of the two sides in advancing their claims are determined by the
fact that Seoul controls the islets. As the power that wants to maintain the
status quo, South Korea has resorted usually to “low-key diplomacy” in an
effort to keep the dispute from escalating to the point at which pressures
would appear to have it resolved by an international body. Tokyo, in contrast,
has pressed for a judicial settlement.
Neither Japan nor Korea wanted further confrontation at sea after the events
in 2006 and they began negotiations in Seoul on April 21 of that year. A
provisional agreement was reached, in which Tokyo agreed to suspend the
survey in return for Seoul's promising not to submit Korean names for the
seabed features at the June International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
meetings. Both sides agreed to meet in May 2006 to negotiate their EEZ
boundaries. The April agreement was not received favorably in South Korea
where it was seen as a concession to Japan. Under heavy public pressure, the
South Korean president promised to keep Dokdo/Takeshima under Seoul's
control “at any expense or sacrifice.”
No significant energy deposits have been found in the contested area, but the
dispute does not appear near settlement and demonstrates the potential for a
maritime sovereignty dispute affecting SLOC security. Seoul is unwilling to
back down for historical and domestic political reasons; Tokyo is no doubt
concerned that if it is too conciliatory in the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, it will
lose traction in sovereignty disputes with Beijing and Moscow, in the East
China Sea and in the Sea of Okhotsk respectively. The United States tries to
remain neutral in this dispute between allies, concerned about maintaining
their full cooperation in the more important issues of North Korean threats and
Chinese military modernization.
YELLOW SEA
With an area of about 400000 square kilometers, the Yellow Sea is formed by
Korea on the east and by China on the west and north. Its basin has been
estimated to contain anywhere from 1 to 10 bbbls of oil. Moreover, it is one of
the rare bodies of water in which commercial fishing may be profitably pursued
year-round.
Disputes in the Yellow Sea arise from different demarcations of the continental
shelf between China and North Korea, and between China and South Korea.
The sea is shallow, with depths averaging just 30 fathoms (180 feet) and
3
nowhere exceeding a bit over 68 fathoms. This shallow basin is probably a
factor in the good fisheries in the sea, but also severely limits its utility as a
naval operating area, especially for submarines. A rule of thumb is that safe
4
submarine operations require at least 100 fathoms depth of water.
China claims most of the intervening Yellow Sea continental shelf based on the
5
principle of “the natural prolongation of land territory.” This in turn is based
on the huge amounts of silt deposited in the Bohai (the Bo Sea is really a large
bay extending to the west from the Yellow Sea) by China's Huang He (Yellow
River). Beijing specifically claims a continental shelf in the Bohai based on the
farthest “silt line” created by this runoff. Where this silt line cannot be
demarcated, in the Bay of Korea in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, China
agrees to a maritime boundary based on an equidistant line between the two
countries.
This is in accord with both North and South Korea's adoption of the median
6
line principle for seabed demarcation between their claims. North Korea cited
this principle in 1977, when it claimed a 200 nm EEZ, as delineated in the
UNCLOS. South Korea also cited the median line principle when unilaterally
declaring its sovereignty over four oil fields in the Yellow Sea seabed.
Oil exploration is proceeding on both sides of the median line between China
and North Korea in the Bohai, in which both nations have discovered oil and
natural gas on their sides of the line. The North Korean discoveries are within
approximately 26 nm of the western extension of the military demarcation line
with South Korea—the Northern Limit Line—which, however, makes recovery
of the resources a military issue.
The eastern Yellow Sea is already producing both oil and natural gas in
commercially profitable quantities to China's benefit. From a legal point of
view, the disputes in the Yellow Sea should be relatively easy to resolve. The
geographical circumstances are straightforward, and Chinese-North Korean
relations are good. However, the situation is complicated by the continuing
North–South Korean animosity, although Beijing's growing relationship with
Seoul should facilitate settlement.
Japan claimed the islands as official Japanese territory in 1895, having made
surveys as early as 1885 that showed that the Senkakus had been
uninhabited, with no physical evidence of Chinese control. Based on this
conclusion, Tokyo formally incorporated the Senkakus into the territory of
Japan.
They were not specifically included with Taiwan and the Pescadore (Penghu)
Islands as territory ceded to Japan by China's Qing Dynasty in the 1895 Treaty
of Shimonoseki, ending the Sino-Japanese War. Accordingly, the Senkakus are
not included in the territory renounced by Japan as part of the 1952 San
Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the World War II between Japan and the
United States (and its allies, including the Republic of China).
The Senkakus remained under U.S. control after World War II and were only
returned to Japan in 1971, as part of the Ryukyu Islands. Neither China nor
Taiwan has ever conceded that the Diaoyutais are Japanese territory. Both cite
Chinese historical records detailing the discovery of these islands in 1403,
after which they were traditionally administered as part of Taiwan and used as
a base by Chinese fishermen. If part of Taiwan, the Diaoyutais should have
been included in that island's return to China at the end of World War II in
1945, based on the 1943 agreement of the “big three” in Cairo.
Tokyo classifies the islands as part of its Southwest Islands. The People's
Republic of China (PRC) bases its claim not just on the historical record, but
also on the fact that the islands sit on the edge of the continental shelf of
mainland Asia, and are separated from the Japanese Ryukyu Islands by the
sea trench known as the Ryukyus Slough. Tokyo, however, argues that the
continental shelf stretches to the much deeper Nansei-shoto Trench to the
east, and that the Senkakus and the Ryukyus are on the same continental
shelf.
The dispute over where the mainland Asian continental shelf ends also
influences the Sino-Japanese dispute over seabed energy resources in the East
China Sea. Beijing insists that its mineral rights extend to continental shelf
limit in accordance with the UNCLOS definition. Tokyo, however, also cites the
UNCLOS (the provision for resolving such disputes), insisting on using a
median line between the different continental shelf limits argued by the two
7
nations.
A 1968 survey found oil fields in this area. The Republic of China government
in Taipei then formally claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyutais in 1971,
matching Beijing's claims, as it has always done in the South China Sea
territorial disputes. This underlines the importance of the disputes over these
areas—both islands and seabed—as nationalistic as well as economic in
character.
China's most important maritime issue lies just south of these islands, where
the Taipei government has established de facto independence for Taiwan and
several outlying islands, including Kinmen, Matsu, and the Penghus in the
Taiwan Strait, and Pratas and Ittu Aba in the South China Sea. Beijing insists
Taiwan remains a Chinese province, while the current Taipei government
insists that the island is an independent country.
All of China's insular sovereignty claims have a creditable basis in the law of
the sea, with respect both to historical precedent and claims, as described in
the 1982 UNCLOS. Beijing signed and ratified the treaty in 1996, but
9
expressed five “reservations” in the process. These reserved China's right to
reinterpret important provisions of the UNCLOS, most notably in the clauses of
the treaty describing national sovereignty provisions for the EEZ and
Continental Shelf (CS) regimes.
Under the UNCLOS, a nation may claim an EEZ to a maximum distance of 200
nm seaward from its coastline. A CS is a geological phenomenon defined by
the gradient of the ocean floor and a nation may define its CS at a maximum
10
distance of 350 nm seaward from its coastline. These areas are delineated by
the UNCLOS almost entirely for economic purposes, and neither confers
sovereign rights on the claiming nation. But it is precisely this tenet about
which China issued reservations and which Beijing has seemed to claim on
several occasions, most notably in April 2001, during the EP-3 incident.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The maritime disputes discussed above are the most important in Northeast
Asia. Southeast Asia is the scene of more complex but less serious maritime
sovereignty disagreements. Most of the sovereignty disputes in this subregion
concern the archipelagos that spot the South China Sea. This relatively small
body of water measures no more than 1200 by 600 nm, and is almost
completely enclosed by the landmasses of China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippine Islands, with Taiwan sitting like a cork at its top.
The Gulf of Tonkin contains rich resources, including petroleum and fish stocks.
China has proposed establishing a rectangular “neutral zone” in the gulf's
center, which would remain free from exploitation until the two countries could
reach an agreement on the delimitation. Vietnam has never formally accepted
this proposal, but like China has halted exploration for oil in the proposed joint
development zone.
Although Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement on settling their land boundary
in 1993, their maritime boundary dispute remains unresolved, although
Vietnam is recovering significant energy reserves from some of the disputed
12
fields. Negotiations have occurred, and resolution should occur peacefully.
The other disputes in the South China Sea involve six countries: China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. The disputes
embrace the sovereignty issue over the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands,
and the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the sea areas adjacent in the
13
southern part of the South China Sea. This sea is a deep basin with a steep
gradient that leaves “virtually no continental shelf along the Philippine side.…
Only on the side of the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and, to a lesser extent,
14
Vietnam, is there some breadth of continental shelf.” This topographical
feature seriously complicates applying UNCLOS criteria to the disputes.
Since China occupied all of the Paracel Islands, in the northern South China
Sea, after a brief naval battle with Republic of (South) Vietnam forces in 1974,
the most contentious claims are those concerning the Spratlys, further to the
south. China maintained occupation of several of these islands after a similar
battle with Vietnamese naval units in 1988. The Spratlys include more than
400 land features—islands, reefs, shoals, and atolls. Among them, only thirty-
three rise above the sea, and only seven have an area exceeding 0.3 square
miles. They are scattered over an area that is 400 nm from east to west and
500 nm from north to south.
The area is rich in fish and may contain significant oil and other energy
resources. Chinese surveys indicate that about 25 billion cubic meters of gas
and 105 billion barrels of oil exist in the continental shelf around the Spratly
Islands, but U.S. surveys are not nearly so optimistic. In fact, unsuccessful oil
prospecting in the South China Sea dates back at least to Japanese efforts in
the mid-1930s. Total 1998 production in the sea was just over 1.3 mmbbl/d,
from proven reserves of approximately 7.5 bbbls, but almost all of this came
from the northern fields in the Tonkin Gulf or in the Vietnamese-claimed EEZ,
or from southern fields in the Indonesian, Brunei, and Malaysian littoral.
There are no proven reserves for the Spratly or Paracel Islands in the sea's
central area, and no commercially recoverable oil or gas has been discovered
there, although efforts continue. Geologists and analysts disagree on the
presence (and recoverability) of petroleum reserves near these islands, with
15
widely varying estimates. The level of rhetoric over these territorial disputes
has lowered significantly since the signing of the 2002 “Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” This nonbinding agreement
encouraged the claimants to peaceful resolution of disputes, but neither
resolved any of the disputes nor included a provision banning future
construction of facilities on occupied land features. This was a notable failing,
since the other Southeast Asian states were concerned about China's
militarization of Mischief Reef after occupying it in 1995. This reef is also
claimed by the Philippines, lying less than 100 nm off that nation's Palawan
Island.
The Spratly Islands are also of strategic military significance, because of their
central position in the South China Sea, astride vital SLOCs. These are the
main transit routes from Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean and Northeast
Asia and the Pacific Ocean.
Almost all of the various land features in the South China Sea are claimed by
China and Vietnam, while the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei
claim particular bits of land, based on various historical, geographical, and
legalistic grounds. Except for the latter two countries, all the claimants have
established a military presence on one or more of the disputed land features,
increasing tension and the chances of military confrontation. As of 2006,
Vietnam has occupied twenty-seven of the land features; the Philippines,
eight; Malaysia, nine; China, seven; and Taiwan, one.
The South China Sea is thus crisscrossed by overlapping sea boundaries. The
most contentious claim is China’s, exacerbated in 1992 when Beijing reissued
a map that shows a nine-dashed intermittent line encompassing almost all of
the South China Sea, implying that the entire body of water and its land
features are sovereign Chinese territory. Hanoi issued a similarly
comprehensive claim in 1977.
The latter also disputes seabed mineral rights in this sea with Australia; the
two nations have agreed to defer delineation of the maritime boundary for fifty
years, while sharing oil revenues. Additionally, Indonesia and Timor Leste
contest the sovereignty of the uninhabited coral island of Pulau Batek/Fatu
19
Sinai, which delays resolution of their maritime boundary disagreement.
West of the Malacca Strait, India has disputed maritime boundaries with
Bangladesh and Pakistan. The first of these disputes has little political
meaning, and should be resolved through negotiation of geoeconomic issues.
The latter dispute, however, is part of the political enmity between the two
nations and is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.
Several maritime boundary disputes continue to roil Persian Gulf waters. Iraq
and Iran have yet to agree on their boundary seaward of the mouth of the
Shatt Al Arab, at the northern end of the Persian Gulf; Iran and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) dispute ownership of Tunb and Abu Musa Islands. These
are also claimed by Iran, which has stationed armed forces on them; this
would enhance Tehran's ability to interdict the flow of merchant ships through
the Strait of Hormuz, should it so decide.
CONCLUSION
Sovereignty disputes over maritime energy fields are complicated by the
international character of the search for energy resources in Asia. An example
is the sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over maritime areas in
the southern South China Sea, unresolved as of December 2007. Both
countries awarded production-sharing contracts for the same waters not only
to their national companies but also to companies from Australia, France,
20
Japan, Shell, and the United States.
With the exception of the Taiwan issue, none of the many maritime
sovereignty disputes in Asian waters would normally be considered serious
enough to threaten military conflict. Many of the disputes are dynamic; in the
age of increasing dependence on imported energy, when almost any maritime
dispute may escalate to the point of affecting the security of energy flows at
sea, the potential for conflict remains. The multifaceted South China Sea
dispute is notable for the number of nations involved, the extreme importance
of that body of water to the entire global maritime community, and China's
refusal to engage in negotiation over the dispute.
That said, Beijing's claim to the South China Sea's land features is at least as
convincing, and perhaps more so, as any other claimant’s. The real issue is not
whether China possesses or even installs land garrisons on the disputed
islands, reefs, and rocks but whether Beijing claims the surrounding waters—
those within the infamous “Nine-dashed Line”—as sovereign waters. The
meaning of this line is not clear. It might simply delineate all of the land
features claimed by China, or it might mean that Beijing claims all of the
ocean areas of the South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory. The 1992
law indicates that the latter is the case, although Beijing has never stated that
claim in a public forum. If it were to do so, its claim would immediately
generate an international crisis with almost guaranteed naval intervention by
21
the United States.
Japan has maritime disputes with Russia, Korea, and China; China also has
disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia; these
nations share disputes over various small islands and the delineation of
maritime economic interests; Australia has disputes with Indonesia and with
East Timor, which also has a dispute with Indonesia; India has disputes with
Bangladesh and Pakistan; Iran has disputes with the UAE and with Iraq.
The United States plays no direct role in any of these disputes, but is
ineluctably a party to all of them, given its dominance in the world energy
market and its naval power throughout Asia. Furthermore, Washington has a
syllogistic policy view of Asia's maritime disputes: the United States does not
favor any one claimant or claimants over another, urges that all such disputes
should be resolved peacefully, but stipulates that any attempt to interfere with
freedom of navigation will evoke immediate American action to restore that
freedom.
This means in practical terms that the United States has assumed the role of
final arbiter of maintaining the freedom of the sea lines of communication
throughout the region. That is more understood than agreed to by the region's
nations. Following chapters will examine the position of Japan, Korea, China,
and India, among others, with views of their energy dependence, maritime
economic dependence, political views, and naval capabilities.
More to the point, the United States is a party in mutual defense treaties with
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. A near-equivalent
relationship exists with Thailand, based on the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Agreement
and the treaty that formed the basis for the now defunct Southeast Treaty
Organization. The Taiwan Relations Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979
places that island in a unique American focus; the U.S.-Singapore relationship
22
also has a strong “mutual defense” character. It is difficult to imagine any
maritime sovereignty dispute in Asia erupting into crisis without drawing
immediate U.S. attention and probably direct naval involvement.
MARITIME STRATEGIES IN ASIA
The application of maritime strategy is governed by national capabilities and
priorities, and by international law. History, since Grotius, is replete with
attempts to structure and impose maritime rules of behavior to limit
1
competition and conflict at sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) is the current such effort, but its limits and privileges are
not absolute, since many of the signatory nations expressed written
reservations about specific provisions. In other words, many signatories
disagreed with parts of the treaty, which guarantees disputes.
Great Britain's Sir Walter Raleigh once observed, “Whosoever commands the
sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world
commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”
Unimpeded sea lines of communication are as important to the Asian nations
today as they were to Raleigh at the turn of the seventeenth century and to
his successors, who created a mercantile empire sustained by the Royal Navy's
control of the sea lines of communication linking England, its colonies, and its
trading partners in Asia. More than 80 percent of global trade still moves by
sea, and Asia depends on the free and unimpeded movement of its share of
that commerce.
Three primary naval roles may be identified as comprising the naval element
of maritime power:
In the early 1950s, the political scientist Samuel Huntington reviewed the
dilemma of the post–World War II U.S. Navy and posed the question, “What do
4
navies do when they have an undisputed command of the sea?” Today, navies
must be able to answer similar strategic questions: in the absence of active
conflict, what is the justification for a national command authority to make the
very large investments necessary to deploy a formidable navy; what is its
mission; and why is it necessary?
Littoral waters are defined as the areas to seaward of the coast, which are
susceptible directly to influence or support from the land; and the areas inland
from the coast, which are susceptible to influence from the sea. This area of
maritime concern and operations may also be referred to as “coastal waters”
or “brown water.”
Sea power offers the capability to maintain position for extended periods near
a crisis area while political options are considered, which provides a nation
with a powerful but peaceful avenue for resolving potential conflict before it
erupts. Ships are able to stand by to evacuate a nation's nationals from a
potential or active conflict zone; they are also able to send strong political and
military signals to potential belligerents. The many variations in the
application of sea power emphasize its utility as a primary element in major
national security strategy, particularly as a continuation of politics in time of
either peace or war.
An effective maritime strategy requires air, sea, and land forces operating
jointly to influence events in the littoral, and at least the potential to influence
events farther out to sea. Implementing a maritime strategy requires these
forces and a sensible naval strategy, but also must be based on realistic
operational constructs, which provide the ability to influence events in the
littoral, as well as in blue-water maritime areas vital to the nation. Many
aspects of the international military, sociopolitical, and economic environments
have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, but the classic
concepts of sea denial, sea control, and power projection remain important
tenets of maritime strategy in the twenty-first century:
Sea denial aims to prevent the use of the sea by another nation's navy for
a given period of time. It emphasizes defense, with the initiative perhaps
lying with the intruding power. The current Chinese strategic concept of
“offshore defense,” however, notes that a strategy of sea denial includes
seizing any opportunity for offensive operations against the enemy.”
Sea control is defined as that condition which exists when a nation is able
to use a maritime area for its own purposes for a set period of time, while
denying similar use to an opponent.
Land forces are an essential part of a modern maritime strategy; air combat
and strike capability to a very considerable degree are essential to sea power,
to allow fleets to deploy and operate. There is no clearer argument for the
absolute necessity of joint military capability than in the synergistic effect
resulting from, and required by, the exercise of national military power at sea.
The writings of Mahan and Corbett still provide a clear conceptual linkage
7
between sea power and a nation's well-being. Mahan built a construct of
national power with sea power as a vital element, while Corbett more usefully
illustrated the connection between naval strategy and national security policy.
The importance of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to achieving energy
security support the applicability of Mahan's and Corbett's theories to Asia.
Indeed, the protection of sea-lanes and ports is a strategic imperative for any
maritime nation, particularly in the modern, highly interdependent world of
the twenty-first century. The oceans are too important as sources of economic
wealth and commerce not to be national strategic issues. Command of the sea
and the maintenance of rights of free passage on Mahan's “great highway” or
10
“wide common” are key to national survival and economic development.
Mahan and Corbett's greatest contribution to maritime and national strategic
thought at the turn of the twentieth century was to provide a coherent
framework for naval officers and political leaders to think about maritime
strategy, different from the derivative theories of land warfare on which they
had previously relied. The two contemporaries described the connection
between the maritime strategic realm and national security requirements,
although their audiences often listened selectively.
Julian Corbett also stressed the utilitarian nature of the maritime dimension
in supporting the primacy of politics. More than Mahan, however, Corbett
viewed sea power as merely a means to a higher strategic end. He believed
that economic power was more important than military power. In Corbett's
view, the navy is but one element of maritime strategy—which is just one
element of the national security strategy.
Both theorists focused on command of the sea. Mahan thought that this was a
determinant value, necessary to preclude an enemy from achieving victory at
sea. He noted the need for acquisition of a superior fleet of capital ships, which
in his day meant battleships, to achieve command of the sea by seeking out
and annihilating the enemy's similar fleet: winning this “decisive battle” at sea
11
should be the navy's primary focus. Corbett, however, stressed the
omnipresent unknowns in naval warfare, summed up by the British Admiral,
Horatio Nelson, arguably the most famous admiral in Western history, in the
phrase that “nothing is sure in a sea fight,” and what Karl von Clausewitz
12
might have termed “friction at sea.” Corbett advocated a primary naval
mission in wartime of gaining “working control of the sea,” necessary to secure
communications—guaranteeing free use of the SLOCs. He considered
“command of the sea,” a relative concept limited in time and space, not an
13
absolute state of affairs. Corbett also placed less emphasis on a decisive
battle at sea than he did on power projection, noting the important role played
by land forces and the employment of amphibious operations in winning a
maritime conflict. He viewed maritime power as one of many instruments of
statecraft in wartime; victory at sea was certainly desirable, in his view, but as
a means to an end.
In addition to the six “national characteristics” noted above, Mahan named five
geographic key points, the possession of which was crucial to global maritime
power:
1. Straits of Dover
2. Gibraltar
3. Singapore/Malacca Strait
4. Cape of Good Hope
5. The Suez Canal
All of his key geographic points directly affected seaborne traffic between
Europe and East Asia. More important than the two lists recounted above,
Mahan's general theory relating maritime and national power held direct
relevance for Asia: he noted the importance of clearly defining national
interest, the importance of SLOCs, the composition of fleets, logistical
requirements, and “most importantly, the uses of navies as instruments of
national policy.” It was no coincidence that the American president who
dispatched the Great White Fleet on its epic voyage through Asia in 1907 was
one of Mahan's biggest supporters; Theodore Roosevelt was determined to
establish the United States as a global naval power. A similar effect was made
on the German Kaiser, who reportedly stated that he had “memorized” Mahan's
work and ordered a copy for every German ship's wardroom, stating that “I am
just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book.…It is on board all
14
my ships.…” In Great Britain, where he traveled shortly after his masterpiece
was published, Mahan was hailed by the public and many government officials.
How have current Asian governments translated their national priorities and
energy security concerns into maritime strategies?
RUSSIA
The once formidable Pacific Fleet built by the Soviet Union lies pier side, as
Moscow struggles to build a twenty-first century state. First, Russia's economy,
including its energy sector, remains focused on Europe and not the Far East.
Second, Russia historically has been a land power, although at least once
during each of the past three centuries it has striven to deploy a modern navy.
In the early twentieth century, the Soviet “Young School” of maritime strategy
came to the fore, emphasizing coastal defense by a navy of small surface craft
and submarines. The Young School developed in the Soviet Union shortly after
World War I, based on conditions particular to postrevolutionary Russia:
1. A new regime that was under military and political attack by several
capitalist countries and had not completely quelled domestic fighting
2. A regime that expected to be attacked by capitalist nations, especially from
15
“the ultimate bastion of imperialism, the United States”
3. A navy that was in disarray, and almost entirely manned by captured
and/or defecting former enemy personnel
4. Budgetary shortages that limited the amount available to spend on
expensive naval systems
5. Lack of an industrial infrastructure to produce modern naval armaments
6. A maritime frontier hemmed in by unfriendly fleets and bases
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union seized upon
a much more ambitious maritime strategy, closer to Alfred Thayer Mahan
than to the Young School. Moscow built and operated a navy second only to
that of the United States. This navy operated under a maritime strategy
enunciated by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who commanded the Soviet fleet for
three decades, from 1956 to 1985.
Gorshkov built the modern Soviet navy and promulgated a strategy based on
traditional maritime missions, including naval presence, power projection, and
deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. The focus of these missions was
simple: to defend the Soviet homeland against the maritime threat posed by
the United States. This still required a defensive maritime strategy, in view of
American and allied naval and air power. The Cold War Soviet Navy was
centered on platforms and systems—submarines, ships, aircraft, and cruise
missiles—designed to prevent nuclear-armed U.S. naval forces from
approaching the Soviet homeland. This was a Cold War construct, and focused
on achieving strategic goals in the face of the balance of nuclear power with
the United States.
The Russian naval forces remaining in the Pacific in 2007 are marginally
capable of defending their homeland, although in the current absence of a
credible threat that level of capability is sufficient. Moscow retains an
important role in the maritime balance of power in Asian waters, however, as
the source of technologically advanced sensor and weapons systems. Russia's
vast energy reserves are also a strategic instrument, poised to affect future
Asian economic well-being and the balance of economic power in the region.
JAPAN
No country is more dependent than Japan on the long SLOCs between
Northeast Asia and the Middle East. And no country other than the United
States acted more seriously on the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Mahan himself thought that his works had been more widely translated into
16
Japanese than any other language. In 1902, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei paid
tribute to American's analytical skills, offering him a teaching post at Japan's
17
Naval Staff College. Mahan refused the offer, but Captain John Ingles, a
British officer, did teach at the Naval Staff College for six years at the turn of
the twentieth century; he stated that “Japanese naval officers are much
impressed with the advantage in a land war of superiority at sea. They have
been, I think, faithful students of the American naval historian, Captain
18
Mahan.”
Japan's legislature passed a “basic maritime law” in 2006, with the goal of
establishing a framework to improve the defense of national maritime
interests. The new law entered into force in July 2007; the framework creates
a “general maritime policy headquarters” in the cabinet secretariat, headed by
the prime minister, as well as naming a state minister in charge of maritime
policies, to promote national maritime policies. The basic law aims to ensure
that Japan's national security strategy is supported by appropriate maritime
24
policies, and that these policies are integrated and synergistic. During the
Cold War, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was equipped and
trained to control the strategically important Soya (La Perouse), Tsugaru, and
Tsushima international straits. SLOC defense was also a primary mission, given
Japan's dependence on seaborne commerce for almost all aspects of national
economic well-being.
The essence of Japanese defense in the maritime as well as other facets of the
country's national security rested, however, on the United States. American
aircraft carrier and submarine deployments provided the basis on which JMSDF
effectiveness depended. To this end, Japan's Cold War maritime strategy was
derived largely from that of the United States.
The JMSDF faced new challenges with the end of the Cold War. The strategic
nuclear threat and the operational challenges of Soviet submarine operations
faded rapidly, but the U.S. naval presence was also much reduced.
Furthermore, the rise of a modern, operationally expansive Chinese navy and
constantly increasing dependence on foreign energy supplies have all posed
new and heightened challenges confronting Japanese maritime defense forces.
China especially looms large in the view of Japanese maritime strategists and
naval planners. Politically, economically, and in terms of naval strength, the
former is growing rapidly in presence and influence in the East, Southeast, and
South Asian waters that lie between Japan and the vital energy resources of
the Middle East.
Japan's naval planners certainly understand that their forces, both navy and
coast guard, must be capable of both “war fighting” and “maritime operations
other than war.” Significantly, Japanese public opinion has changed to support
operations outside of a narrowly defined operational area around the Japanese
islands; this reflects a growing realization that protecting Japanese security
does not have a boundary at the limits of its sovereign territory, or even at the
limits of its claimed maritime areas. The deployment of JMSDF mine warfare
forces to the Persian Gulf in 1991, increased participation of Japanese military
forces in various UN peacekeeping missions, and the ongoing operation of
JMSDF forces in the North Arabian Sea—a naval deployment that has
continued for an uninterrupted six years, supplemented by the presence in
Iraq of Japanese engineering and other ground troops—all evidence this
seminal change in Japanese public opinion.
In nonconflict operations, Japanese maritime and air support for the 2005
tsunami relief operations in Southeast Asia, and support and operational
involvement in the campaign to cope with transnational threats in the Malacca
Strait area are examples of Tokyo's increased willingness to use the maritime
instrument of statecraft in the conduct of its national policies.
Most important for delineating a maritime strategy for Japan, however, is the
almost complete dependence on seaborne commerce, most critically for the
import of energy resources. Defending the long SLOCs on which Japan is so
dependent, has been the primary focus of Tokyo's maritime strategists since
they were first influenced by Mahanian thought. Their impact was increased
because it closely followed the late nineteenth century Meiji Restoration that
led to Japan's emergence as a modern nation.
While Tokyo has not promulgated a neatly packaged “maritime strategy,” the
political and economic concerns, naval and coast guard forces, and domestic
political developments in Japan all attest to coherent maritime strategic
thought: guard national sovereignty, protect the sea-lanes over which flows
the energy and other commerce vital to Japan, and act as a responsible and
active member of the world community.
SOUTH KOREA
Nonetheless, the ROK Navy has demonstrated the capability to defend its
nation's coasts, frequently intercepting North Korean seaborne attempts at
infiltration and other infringements of South Korea's sovereign waters. The
ROK Navy has also responded to national command authority direction with
respect to demonstrating, by naval presence, Seoul's claim to the island of
25
Dokdo as South Korean territory.
Seoul has promulgated a maritime strategy, first defining the navy's primary
mission as deterring war and “protect[ing] national and maritime sovereignty.”
Should war break out, the navy is tasked primarily with “protecting the sea
26
lines of communications, the life line of the country.” Then-President Kim
Dae-jung stated (during a speech to the naval academy graduating class in
March 2001) that South Korea was creating a “strategic mobile fleet” with the
capability to “protect state interests in the five big oceans and play a role of
27
keeping peace in the world.” It apparently is a plan for transforming the navy
from a primarily coastal force to one capable of extended operations
throughout the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and through the Korea Straits to
the East China Sea. Under “Defense Reform 2020,” promulgated in 2005, the
navy is directed to simplify its command structure, establish a separate
submarine operations command, a naval aviation operations command, and to
28
move naval headquarters from Jinhae to Busan.
The Modernizing South Korean navy's stated mission of securing littoral waters
and SLOCs may well have an underlying strategic tasking, however, which is
preparing to deal with future threats from Japan. The ROK Chief of Naval
Operations declared in 2007 that the navy's responsibility was to “prepare for
future warfare, [requiring that] we must construct operational units that can
carry out the joint operations and the mission of Network Centric Warfare and
Effects Based Operation, which requires jointness, integration, [and]
29
simultaneity.”
CHINA
Except for the Taiwan crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, and the enduring
concern about Taiwan and U.S. involvement, China's national security concerns
since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 have focused almost
entirely on internal security and continental threats, primarily from the Soviet
Union after 1960. Warfare was conducted against the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
India, South Korea, and the United States during that period, and none of
these wars involved significant Chinese naval participation. It has only been in
the past two decades that modern China has become navy-minded, and then
apparently only by a relatively small number of national security policymakers.
in the last 109 years, imperialists have repeatedly invaded China from the
sea.…470 times,…84 of these being serious invasions. The ocean has
become an avenue for the aggressors to bring in their troops and haul
away our wealth.…The ocean is not only the basic space for human
survival, but also an important theater for international political struggle.…
The better people can control the sea, the greater they have the sea
territorial rights [which have] become inseparable from a country's
sovereignty.…
This writer urged China to draw lessons from this experience, including that
China historically has been a continental rather than a maritime power, despite
possessing over 11,000 miles of coastline and more than 6,000 islands. The
analysis offered by two senior naval officers at the PLAN's (People's Liberation
Army-Navy) leading research institute is worth quoting at length:
The seas have become the new high ground of strategic competition
[including] rivalry over ocean islands, rivalry over sea space jurisdiction,
rivalry over marine resources, rivalry over the maritime strategic
advantage, [and] rivalry over strategic sea-lanes. . . . [W]e have to first
establish a solid coastal defense. . . . So expanding the defensive depth of
the naval battlefield is of crucial importance. . . . [T]he naval battlefield is
no longer limited to the traditional sea battle alone, rather gradually
developing in the direction of sea-control-of-the-land with the seas as the
base. . . . [S]ea space is no longer limited to the surface, rather being
“four-dimensional” space covering sea air, sea surface, the water itself, and
the seabed. . . . The seas are of crucial importance. . . . The developing
trends in maritime strategic competition . . . are likely to be characterized
as follows:
The most cogent, although very brief, Chinese description of China's maritime
strategy falls under the rubric of “Offshore Defense,” defined by the following
points:
1. Defensive strategy, but offensive operations
2. Not limited by space or time
3. No boundaries on offensive operations
4. Wait for favorable time and place to launch operations
5. Focus on enemy's weaknesses
6. Will use forces to eliminate enemy forces
7. Simultaneous offensive operations against the enemy to defend our
35
forces
The PLAN commander in 1996, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, did not describe
“offshore” as a geographic term, but as covering “a vast maritime space,”
which would allow China “to become a major naval power in [the] Asia-Pacific
36
within this century.” His successor, once removed, as commander of the PLAN
in 2007, Admiral Wu Shengli, argued that to “maintain the safety of the
oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy and resources,
ensure the jurisdiction of our nation to neighboring areas, continental shelf,
and exclusive economic zones, and effectively safeguard our national maritime
rights, we must build a powerful navy.”
Beijing is building the navy required to carry out this active maritime strategy,
a modern People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) capable of defending national
sovereignty on the mainland, enforcing insular claims, and operating
successfully at sea. Its strategy addresses coastal, regional, and global waters,
extending to concerns about the long SLOCs on which the nation is dependent
for energy and other commercial resources. It is a classically Mahanian
strategy, loosely defined: economic issues are its rationale and a large,
modern fleet and merchant marine its primary vehicle.
Taiwan is China's most important national security and hence maritime issue,
especially given the absence of viable foreign military threats to the
37
homeland. There are two general aspects to Taiwan's importance as a
strategic issue. First is the widespread belief among Chinese leaders that
Taipei's acquiescence to Beijing's suzerainty—some form of reunification—is
necessary to end the civil war that has remained unconcluded for most of the
last half of the twentieth century, and further as a sign that the Chinese
revolution (launched with the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911) is at last
complete.
This factor ties directly to the “four core roles” listed by Liu for the PLAN,
which he said must be capable of:
The difficulties in accomplishing the first of these roles have been noted by
Chinese naval planners. Defending the very long energy SLOCs on which the
country depends would require a PLAN capable of operating over those
distances; for example, the distance from Shanghai to the Strait of Hormuz is
5,600 nm. The PLAN's ability to defend or interdict those SLOCs would be very
limited geographically, given its almost complete lack of maritime
39
airpower. SLOC/chokepoint susceptibility is, nonetheless, much on the mind of
Chinese strategists. The “Malacca Dilemma” achieved media prominence in late
2003, when President Hu Jintao was erroneously credited with this phrase
40
noting that 80 percent of imported oil passed through that strait.
China's current naval modernization brings to mind the crucial question posed
by Mahan: As he stated in 1892, “All the world knows…that we are building a
44
new navy. . . . Well, when we get our navy, what are we going to do with it?”
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The region that includes the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca,
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar is arguably the world's most important region of
constrained navigation, based on geography and volume of merchant shipping.
It controls the South China Sea SLOCs, sea-lanes traversed by almost half the
world's merchant shipping and large percentages of Asian trade. Shipping
traffic through the Malacca Strait is several times greater than the traffic
through either the Suez or Panama canals.
Finally, because of oil spills associated with accidents in the Strait of Malacca,
the international community has considered regulating shipping for
environmental concerns and maritime safety. There is no way to separate the
issue of free commerce from the defense of U.S. interests in the South China
Sea and nearby waters, and defending these waters is an interest of U.S.
maritime strategy.
The nations of this region are linked economically through the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), militarily through the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), and politically through common interests and subregional
agreements. Eight of the ten ASEAN nations share the South China Sea as a
maritime boundary, while Burma borders on the adjacent Andaman Sea (as do
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Only Laos is landlocked.
These ties do not for the most part impose mandatory commitments on their
parties, but have proven effective in relation to various maritime issues. Most
significant has been the antipiracy cooperation among Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia. This effort has been notable in several ways. First, piracy has
45
reportedly been reduced. Second, these international efforts have extended
to antipollution and safety-of-mariners cooperative programs. Third, this
trilateral action has drawn political, military, and economic support from Asia's
leading naval powers, including the United States, Japan, China, and India.
Fourth, the Malacca and Singapore Straits multilateralism has moved the
ASEAN and ARF to a new substantive level; the long discredited Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) may finally be succeeded by a meaningful
regional body.
The Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam do not have explicit
maritime strategies, although they all have territorial claims in the South
China Sea that conflict with claims by China (and in some cases with each
46
other). Furthermore, all of these nations are deeply dependent on the
freedom to use the sea, from the fisheries that provide the majority of the
protein in their populations’ diet to the SLOCs that enable them to participate
in the regional and global economy.
Additionally, the Philippines and Indonesia are two of the world's most
completely archipelagic nations, each consisting of thousands of islands. This
heightens their dependence on seaborne transport of personnel and material
for political unity, military defense, and economic viability; it also places them
in a prominent position with regard to the vital energy SLOCs flowing through
47
the South China Sea and adjacent waters.
These economic, political, military, and sovereignty concerns should lead each
of ASEAN's nine maritime nations to develop and pursue a carefully conceived
and well-articulated maritime strategy as an essential—perhaps the most
important—part of its national security strategy. Yet, this is not the case.
Malaysia has made significant efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first
century to combat piracy and other international maritime crimes in its waters,
with a focus on international cooperation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
While these may be categorized more as police enforcement than naval
operations, they contribute directly to Malaysia's national security as well as to
regional maritime security. Kuala Lumpur also has major issues with the
sovereignty of various South China Sea land features, and the energy
resources that may be associated with those “islands.”
Brunei has promulgated a Maritime Master Plan, but this focuses on port
development and associated economic concerns. Its very small but modern
navy would be incapable of safeguarding the sultanate's maritime concerns,
consisting primarily of sea bottom energy resources, and has to depend on the
cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia to achieve maritime security. Cambodia,
with just one major seaport, Sihanoukville, has recently found proven sea
bottom energy reserves in its territorial waters. Phnom Penh continues to be
concerned about Vietnamese incursions into its territorial waters but like
Brunei will have to rely on ASEAN and the United Nations to defend its
53
interests at sea.
AUSTRALIA
Current Australian national security policy is very broadly outlined in a listing
of “strategic interests” in the Defense 2000 White Paper issued by Canberra.
In order of priority, these are to:
Two points about these tasks are particularly notable. First, defending
Australia requires a navy capable of enforcing sea denial, particularly to the
north of the continent, to prevent an aggressor from launching attacks.
Second, the order of the strategic tasks indicates their importance for building
military force structure.
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand's defense policy is built around five objectives:
This policy allows for possible operations outside of the country to support
peacekeeping efforts and participate in international coalitions.
A Maritime Force Review (MFR) was conducted in 2002, but it placed more
emphasis on trade and the economy than on military threat. The review
commented that: “assuming that there is no emergence of a military littoral
threat, which according to most strategic analysis seems highly unlikely, . . .
the major demands will continue to be in the areas of fisheries, customs and
57
marine safety including environmental protection.” The MFR also supported
the single Maritime Coordination Center (MCC) for combined management of
both information and operations for both military and civilian maritime
security.
INDIA
India is the fourth major nation in Asia with a maritime strategy and a long
maritime history, although in its case subsumed under Portuguese, French,
and British colonialism for most of the three centuries preceding modern
independence in 1947. Its improving economy and expanding economy have
created a correspondingly important need for additional energy supplies. The
Ministry of Defense Annual Report for 2006 noted that: “Energy security is
particularly crucial to India for two main reasons: the country's dependence on
the imports of fossil fuels and the physical proximity of the two energy rich
areas of the Gulf and Central Asia, where competitive access rivalries contain
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inherent tendencies towards conflict involving outside powers.” One Indian
analyst recently laid out the parameters for a twenty-first century maritime
strategy, addressing the need, “Through the use of appropriate maritime
forces:
1. In conjunction with other Armed Forces of the union, act to deter or defeat
any threats or aggression against the territory, peoples or maritime
interests of India, both in war and peace
2. Project influence in our maritime area of interest, to further the nation's
political, economic and security objectives
3. In cooperation with the Coast Guard, ensure good order and stability in
our maritime zones of responsibility
4. Provide maritime assistance (including disaster relief) in our maritime
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neighborhood.”
New Delhi is well into a program of modernizing its already impressive navy,
which includes submarines, aircraft carriers, missile-equipped surface
combatants, and both tactical and long-range aircraft. There is no navy in
South Asia capable of matching India's naval power.
The nation's maritime interests are defined by its location as a huge peninsula,
extending far to the south of the Asian mainland and effectively dividing the
20 million square miles of the northern Indian Ocean. It has maritime
boundaries with seven nations: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand,
Myanmar, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Geographically, it dominates much of the
Indian Ocean, which washes the shores of Australia, Mauritius, the Seychelles,
and all the nations of East Africa and of the Arabian Peninsula.
New Delhi's policies must address the full spectrum of maritime strategic
interests. Although the country's maritime boundaries are not in active
dispute, those with Pakistan and Bangladesh are not completely resolved. The
former nation, of course, is the primary perceived threat against which the
Indian navy is poised to defend its homeland.
Indian naval operations are also focusing on the western Indian Ocean,
intended to increase the security of the SLOCs in that region, which the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has cited for the world's highest incidence
of piracy. First, an intelligence-gathering station has reportedly been opened in
northern Madagascar, the island nation located off the southeastern African
coast. The post is intended to cooperate with two other listening stations on
India's west coast “to gather intelligence on foreign navies operating in the
region.” New Delhi has also formed strong naval relationships with
62
Mozambique and the Seychelles. Second, a task group composed of two
destroyers, two frigates, and a replenishment-at-sea ship made a deployment
63
to the “West Asian region” in August and September 2007.
The Indian Navy's moves east of Malacca and west to Africa are part and parcel
of a classic Mahanian maritime strategic approach, balancing economic and
maritime elements in a complex calculus. As part of this policy, India has
decided to establish a closer relationship between its navy and those of the
United States, the ASEAN nations, Japan, and South Korea. This expansion of
the previous reliance on first the Soviet Union and then Russia for assistance
in naval modernization will work to India's advantage by making its navy more
formidable; improving the nation's position vis-à-vis its most obdurate threat,
Pakistan; and in furthering its desired position as hegemon over the Indian
Ocean, from the Andaman Sea to the North Arabian Sea.
The Indian Navy commander noted in 2005 that the “Indian Ocean is now the
highway along which over a quarter of the world's trade and energy
requirements move,” a factor that “makes the Indian navy a key component of
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the nation's foreign policy.” New Delhi issued a national Ocean Policy
Statement (OPS) in 1982, as a preliminary step toward establishing a national
maritime strategy. The OPS addressed economic and environmental issues
only, however, to the exclusion of traditional maritime security concerns. This
is recognized by Indian strategists, but 2001 proposals to promulgate a
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national Maritime Security Policy (MSP) remain unfulfilled. Despite the lack
of a formal document, New Delhi and the Indian Navy appear to have a clear
strategic vision of maritime missions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with an
emphasis on homeland defense, increasing India's capability as an Asian
maritime power, and defending the energy SLOCs.
PAKISTAN
Seaborne trade is the backbone of Pakistan's economy, but the shipping and
shipbuilding industries are “in disarray,” and exploitation of offshore natural
67
resources is largely restricted to fisheries. The navy must rely on just two
major bases, at Karachi and at Port Ormara, 216 nm to the west. Karachi is
just 87 nm from the border with India and hence vulnerable to a no-warning
68
attack. Furthermore, the Ormara base is located in unstable Baluchistan
Province. Pakistan's strategists understandably have a continental mindset,
which leaves the navy in the unenviable position of planning to execute a
limited strategy designed to deny Indian (or presumably other hostile) naval
forces the ability to operate within missile range of Karachi and other littoral
69
targets.
UNITED STATES
Any discussion of Asian maritime strategies must include that of the United
States. In 2005, even as the decline in ship numbers was threatening the
navy's ability to dominate Asian waters, the U.S. government issued a
comprehensive, unrealistically ambitious National Strategy for Maritime
Security (NSMS), to cover all areas and issues of, on, under, relating to,
adjacent to, or bordering on sea, oceans, or other navigable waterways,
including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and
vessels, and other conveyances.
The U.S. Cold War maritime strategy so successfully written and managed
during the 1980s gave ground in the 1990s to the “From the Sea.…” series,
which never achieved the gravitas of its predecessor. Most recently, the navy
has attempted to formulate a new maritime strategy to bridge the very difficult
gap between traditional naval challenges and the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT), which has degenerated into a series of foreign ground campaigns that
leaves the navy in the difficult position of having to justify large, aircraft
carrier-centric fleets in the absence of a Soviet-style naval threat.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps then
promulgated a “Naval Operations Concept, 2006,” which, if not a complete
strategy, does delineate naval service missions and objectives. These are:
A de facto U.S. maritime strategy is very much in place for Asian waters. It
guides fleet operations to guarantee the freedom of navigation necessary for
global commerce, to counter terrorism and other international disturbances at
sea, defend U.S. interests, and provide support for allies and friends in the
region, particularly Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, Thailand, and Singapore.
Finally, Taiwan occupies a special place, less than an ally but more than just
another friend, under the aegis of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which states
that Washington will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
71
United States.” The most likely result of the maritime strategy being written
in 2006–2007 is dependence on what the Chief of Naval Operations has
72
termed the “1,000 ship navy.” This concept, renamed the “Global Maritime
Partnership” in 2007, is based both on the shrinking U.S. fleet and the
recognition that the early twenty-first century has and is likely to continue
seeing naval challenges more in the line of post-9/11 events than of a bipolar
contest at sea. Admiral Mullen has made it clear that he expects the U.S. Navy
73
to work seamlessly at sea with a wide range of coalition partners. Hence, the
Maritime Global Partnership would include the navies, coast guard forces, and
merchant fleets of the United States, allies and friends, and all nations whose
74
security requires secure SLOCs—and who elect to participate.
CONCLUSION
All of the Asian maritime nations, from Russia to Pakistan, share similar
concerns: homeland defense, to include the ability to safeguard their
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and other littoral waters; preservation of
national rights over maritime resources in the EEZ and Continental Shelf areas
delineated by the UNCLOS; guaranteed freedom of navigation on regional and
global seas; and prevention or at least minimization of transnational problems
such as piracy, terrorism, other crimes, and environmental degradation. Using
the sea as a venue for nuclear strategic deterrence has been limited to Russia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France; however, the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century will almost certainly see China deploy
operational submarines armed with nuclear tipped ICBMs, and the possibility
that India will do so, as well.
Despite these common concerns, few Asian nations have articulated a coherent
maritime strategy. Even fewer possess the maritime force—commercial, naval,
coast guard—necessary to achieve their strategic maritime goals. Only South
Korea, Japan, China, Australia, India, the United States, and arguably Russia
are in that position. Japan, China, and India are capable of exercising maritime
power in subregional as well as littoral waters. The JMSDF is tasked with
missions out to 1,000 nm from its bases, which means the ability to project
maritime power south to the vicinity of the Luzon Strait and north to the
Aleutian Islands. China's maritime power projection goals currently seem to
extend to what Beijing calls the “second island chain,” a line approximately
1,800 nm from its mainland, extending north to south from Japan through the
Bonin Islands, the Marianas, and Palau. Further ambitions are no doubt under
consideration, but there is little evidence that China had decided to develop
the maritime forces sufficient to extend its power into the North Pacific or
Indian Oceans.
India is modernizing its navy with the objective of exerting effective maritime
power throughout the Indian Ocean; near-term maritime concerns remain
focused on threats from an aggressive or failing Pakistan. Mid-term ambitions
in New Delhi also seem aimed at maritime power projection into Southeast
Asian waters. Meanwshile, the United States remains the only naval power in
Asia able to project that power throughout the entire region.
Almost all the Asian navies are modernizing, led by the Japanese, Chinese,
and Indian programs to deploy naval forces equipped with twenty-first-century
technologies and capabilities. As expected, those are among the nations with
the largest defense budgets: China, Japan, and India, in that order. All of these
pale by comparison with U.S. defense expenditures, of course, but they are
1
making serious efforts to improve their naval capabilities.
JAPAN
The most powerful Asian naval force on any given day is the Japanese
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). This extremely professional, well-
trained force includes approximately 46,000 personnel manning 146 major
warships, including 21 submarines, 55 destroyers and frigates, 33 mine
warfare ships and boats, 9 patrol craft, and 9 amphibious ships. It also flies
some 179 fixed-wing aircraft and 135 helicopters.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan was one of the world's
leaders in developing naval capabilities, including long-range submarine
missions and aircraft carrier operations. It demonstrated in the December
1941 attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor the dominance of the carrier as
the world's capital warship, a status this class of ship still enjoys. Currently,
the JMSDF is again moving to deploy a form of these formidable combatants.
Japan was the first foreign navy to receive this system from the United States;
the Kongo-class ships displace approximately 9,500 tons and feature eight
antisurface ship (SSM) Harpoon missiles, as well as up to ninety antiair (SM2),
2
and antisubmarine (ASROC) missiles. Guns and torpedoes also form part of
this class's formidable battery; the ships are further equipped with an
extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) suite of sonars and helicopters.
TheKongos have extensively computerized systems and the command and
control architecture necessary to participate in netcentric warfare with other
JMSDF and U.S. warships. A follow-on class of two “improved Kongos” is under
construction.
Japan's five Takanami-class destroyers are not equipped with the Aegis combat
system, but are armed with antiship missiles and are very capable
multimission destroyers. They are part of a fleet that includes more than thirty
additional modern destroyers and frigates.
The JMSDF does not include an extensive amphibious fleet, but does deploy
one of the world's most capable mine warfare forces. Some of its more than
thirty minesweepers proved their professionalism and capability while
sweeping hostile mines in the Persian Gulf following Operation Desert Storm.
Japan deploys two fast combat support ships for underway replenishment, each
displacing 13,500 tons.
Escorting this developing force of air-capable ships are warships designed for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a capability that is the pride of Japan's force of
over fifty destroyers and frigates. Supplementing the innate capabilities of
these ships is the demonstrated competence and professionalism of the JMSDF
crew and officers. Furthermore, these personnel are experienced in operating
with the U.S. Navy, at sea and under arduous conditions.
The JMSDF includes an impressive naval aviation branch. Its ships operate a
combination of American, Japanese, and British helicopters, while the navy's
shore-based force is composed of large helicopters and more than eighty U.S.-
designed P3C patrol aircraft, the latter capable of antisurface (ASUW) and
electronic warfare (EW), as well as ASW. The force also flies ten minesweeping
helicopters.
The JMSDF's command and control infrastructure and capabilities are its most
significant capability. In addition to a near state-of-the-art system onshore,
Japan's naval and air forces are able to operate “linked” with each other and
with the United States, and other ships equipped with the necessary electronic
5
capability. This allows JMSDF units operating at sea to gain synergistic
increases in effectiveness through their real-time ability to conduct
coordinated and integrated operations. Only the United States is similarly
capable in East Asia.
Japan's maritime power includes the coast guard, the renamed Maritime Safety
Agency. Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) duties include search and rescue,
hydrographic and oceanographic surveying, and maritime traffic management.
This force also is responsible as the maritime “first responder,” a role it has
performed admirably in the face of Chinese intrusions into Japanese-claimed
waters and outright North Korean aggression.
The JCG includes two “special forces:” the Special Security Force (SSF) and its
Special Security Team (SST). The SST was originally organized in 1985 as an
airport security team but is now Japan's official maritime counterterrorist unit,
with the mission of rapid response to domestic terrorist and hijacking incidents
involving any ships in Japanese waters.
The JCG's 12,000 personnel operate approximately forty lightly armed cutters
of more than 1,000 tons displacement, most capable of embarking helicopters.
Two dozen fixed-wing aircraft are employed for maritime surveillance. In 2001,
JCG ships intercepted a Chinese-flagged vessel believed to be North Korean in
origin, in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), west of Kyushu. When
the vessel failed to halt, the JCG opened fire, which the suspect vessel
returned. The unidentified vessel was sunk with all hands, but after it had
crossed into the Chinese EEZ. It was later salvaged by the JCG, and found to
have been carrying weapons and spy equipment, apparently for conducting
6
North Korean operations in Japan. The JCG has also adopted an international
role, participating in exercises with Chinese, Hong Kong, South Korean, United
7
States, and Indian counterparts.
The nine KDX-class ships are backed by thirty-seven older but still capable
corvettes and frigates, which while multimission capable, represent 1970s-era
naval technology. South Korea operates a large patrol boat force—more than
eighty craft, with a forty-boat building program in progress. These main-force
ships are supported by approximately eight fast-attack craft, soon to be
replaced by the forty new boats that will be equipped with Harpoon antiship
missiles.
The ROKN's amphibious force presently consists of eight LSTs and numerous
smaller landing craft. Notable is Seoul's program for building 13,000-ton
displacement LPDs, the first of which is scheduled for commissioning in 2007.
This ship will closely resemble Japan's Osumi-class and other navies’ helicopter
carriers.
The ROKN operates one minelayer and, surprisingly, just six mine hunters.
Finally, the ROKN is supported at sea by three small replenishment-at-sea
ships. These each displace just 7,500 tons, but each operates a helicopter for
vertical replenishment and each is capable of refueling two ships
simultaneously.
South Korea had no submarine force before 1992 when, acting contrary to
Washington's advice, Seoul launched a purchase and construction program
with Germany resulting in the acquisition of nine Type 209 (Chang Bongo in
10
the ROKN lexicon) conventionally powered submarines. A new three-boat
class of Type 214s is under development, with the first submarine launched in
2005. These are indigenously constructed and will be equipped with an AIP
engineering plant.
The ROKN deploys more than twenty French-designed helicopters aboard its
ships, while land-based maritime airpower is led by eight P-3C and eight old S-
2F ASW patrol aircraft. Additionally, the ROK Air Force's F-16 fighters are
capable of firing Harpoon antiship cruise missiles. Acquisition of eight
minesweeping helicopters is budgeted for 2008, with a reported 2010–2011
11
delivery.
The Korean Coast Guard (KCG) is responsible for maritime safety and control
of coastal waters. It was founded as the Maritime Police and is subservient to
the Korean military command; by law, its operations are limited to the nation's
EEZ. The KCG mans thirteen stations and over 300 other offices supporting a
force of vessels and aircraft dedicated to maritime patrol, environmental
pollution response, and fighting maritime crime.
The ROKN has benefited from long periods of operations with the U.S. Navy,
but the heart of its professionalism and dedication lies with its personnel's
determination in the face of the long-standing threat from North Korea. The
potential of South Korea's modernizing surface and submarine forces is
impressive, so much so that it may well be focused ultimately on Japan as its
likely future opponent, rather than the North Korean ragtag maritime force.
NORTH KOREA
The North Korean Navy (NKN) is led by approximately twenty old, Soviet-
designed Romeo-class submarines. They are conventionally powered and can
be armed with torpedoes or mines, but their current operational capacity is
“doubtful.” The Romeos are supplemented by more than thirty Sang-o class
minisubmarines of Yugoslav design. These may be armed with torpedoes or six
externally carried bottom mines, but are intended primarily to deliver special
12
forces personnel. They are slow, but capable of more than 2,000 nm range.
At least twenty additional midget submarines of varying capability are also in
the inventory, with the mission of infiltrating personnel into South Korea.
The North Korean surface force includes four old frigates. The one Soho-class
was commissioned in 1982 and is, at 1,600 tons displacement, one of the
world's largest catamaran warships. It is armed with a single 100-mm gun and
four CSS-N-2 antiship missiles of old but still effective Soviet design. The two
Najin-class frigates each displace 1,550 tons. Both classes are diesel-powered
and armed with antiship missiles; Soho has a helicopter platform but no
hangar.
The NKN also counts more than 200 patrol vessels of various size and
capabilities, ranging from 42 to 650 tons displacement; some are armed with
antiship missiles. In the frequent clashes that North Korea has provoked with
South Korea since 1950, the NKN has also employed armed fishing trawlers
and semisubmersible craft designed specifically for infiltrating armed agents
into the South.
North Korea operates a small amphibious force of 10 LSMs and nearly 100
smaller, Nampo-class, assault landing craft. Nineteen coastal minesweepers
13
comprise the mine warfare (MIW) force. The country apparently does not
operate a naval air force; coast guard functions are carried out by the regular
navy and by the Coastal Security Force, which operates approximately fifteen
small (eight-ton displacement) patrol craft.
CHINA
The People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) was established in 1949 and has
been modernizing slowly throughout its history. This pace was dramatically
affected by the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, however; the PLAN is now moving at
a stronger pace to become capable of defending China's maritime interests in
14
the twenty-first century.
The PLAN's greatest strength lies in its large, increasingly modern submarine
force. China's thirty or more Romeo-class conventionally powered boats are
copies of a 1950s Russian design; they are being retired as newer submarines
are commissioned. These include twelveKilo-class boats purchased from Russia,
ten of which are the more effective “domestic” vice “export” model. None of
China's three domestically produced submarine classes probably match the
Kilo's capabilities, but Beijing's efforts nonetheless are impressive.
The first of the Ming-class was operational in the early 1970s and at least
15
twenty have been built. They are little more than Chinese improvements on
the Romeo-class and will likely be retired as more of the new classes of
indigenously built submarines join the fleet. At least twelve of these Song-
class have been launched or are under construction. The initial Song was
commissioned in 1999, but the first two of this class suffered from serious
stability problems, causing long construction time (eight years) and radical
redesign of follow-on boats. This class reportedly is equipped with French-
16
designed sonars and German-designed diesel engines.
The PLAN unveiled a new submarine in August 2004, when it emerged from a
construction shed at the navy's Wuhan shipyard. Dubbed the Yuan-class by
Western observers, this boat initially was thought to be China's first AIP-
equipped submarine, but further study indicates inadequate hull length for this
technology. Yuan may be the first of a new class of submarines designed by
Beijing to replicate the Kilo-class, or it may be designed to serve as a test
platform for advanced submarine technology.
The replacement class for the Hans is the Type 093 or Shang-class, which
appears to be an improved version of the late 1970s Victor III-class designed
by the Soviets. Two of the Shangshave been launched and an additional
number no doubt will be built. Currently, the PLAN has organized its
submarine force so that all the nuclear-powered attack boats are stationed in
the same squadron of the North Sea Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao, in
18
Shandong province. This is convenient for maintenance and training
purposes, but limits their operational flexibility. As the PLAN amasses the
experience and logistics infrastructure to operate SSNs, they probably will be
assigned to each of the navies’ three fleets.
China in the early 1960s began building a nuclear-powered submarine armed
with ballistic missiles (FBM), called the Xia-class. The Xia has experienced
engineering problems throughout its life and, although still in commission,
apparently has never made an operational patrol. It is armed with twelve
JuLang 1 regional ballistic missiles, each carrying a single nuclear warhead and
capable of a 1,160 nm range. Only one missile has ever been successfully
launched by Xia, in 1988, and its flight probably was only partially
19
successful.
The current nuclear submarine building program includes a new FBM, known
as the Type 094 or Jin-class. This boat is undoubtedly being built with Russian
assistance, and probably uses the Type 093's hull lengthened to accommodate
twelve JuLang 2 missiles. These are the sea-going equivalent of China's
newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31, with a range of
4,320 nm, able to target the western United States. Two Jin hulls have
reportedly been constructed and, while the final number to be built is
unknown, U.S. practice would indicate construction in multiples of three.
The most significant factor in China's surface force modernization is the dual
acquisition process being followed. A few ships are purchased from Russia—
four Sovremenny-class DDGs—but China's indigenous shipbuilding industry
has demonstrated dramatic strides in capability. Indeed, the PLAN in 2006
began acquiring four new classes of surface combatants, all built in China.
Particularly significant is the apparent Aegis-like AAW systems with which at
least one of these new classes is equipped.
The PLAN seems to be investing little in mine warfare, the ability to place and
clear minefields. The minesweeping force remains composed of approximately
two dozen old T-43 ships and a half-dozen coastal craft of Soviet design and
approximately forty-five remotely controlled minesweeping boats (in the
reserve force). News reports in recent years have indicated that the PLAN has
at least begun exercising with modern, often autonomously operable sweep
23
gear. There is no reported evidence, however, that China is following the
United States’ lead in acquiring a helicopter-borne minesweeping capability.
Suitably equipped combatant ships are tasked with an annual training
requirement to demonstrate their minelaying capability, which would
supplement the PLAN's single dedicated minelaying ship.
The most limiting PLAN mission capability is the small size of its
replenishment-at-sea (RAS) force, although that is being improved. The PLAN's
inventory of ships capable of replenishing combatants and amphibious ships at
sea, while underway, is a critical indicator of China's naval ambitions. Until
2005, the PLAN included just three such ships and only one of these, the ex-
Soviet Komandarn Fedko, at 37,000-ton displacement, is large enough for
extended multiship operations outside of littoral waters. The other two oilers,
of the Fuqing-class, each displace just 21,000 tons.
In 2005, however, China built and commissioned two new Fuchi-class RAS
ships, each displacing 28,000 tons and capable of supplying the fleet with fuel,
ordnance, food, and other supplies. If Beijing uses these new RAS ships as
replacements for the two smaller units, it will indicate a continued lack of “blue
water” ambition on its part. If, however, each of China's three naval fleets—
North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea—acquires two or more RAS ships, then
more long-range intentions will be indicated for PLAN missions.
Naval Aviation
PLAN aviation is its weakest branch, although progress is being made. All
fixed-wing aircraft are based ashore, including the navy's two-dozen Su-30
fighter-attack aircraft purchased from Russia. This is the PLAN's only truly
modern tactical aircraft, although its 200 J8IIs are an indigenous attempt to
produce a contemporary fighter.
China's naval aviation force has reportedly increased and modernized its force
of B-6, Soviet-designed aircraft with a primarily mission of launching antiship
cruise missiles. New and more capable versions of the indigenously produced
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FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft are also joining the PLAN. The patrol and
ASW aviation force is relatively weak, with approximately two dozen aircraft;
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) apparently continues to provide China's primary
electronic warfare aircraft for maritime missions.
The PLA Navy's large force of missile boats is topped by the impressive new
Houbei class. Although limited in range, the antiship cruise missiles of this
force could be a formidable factor in a cross-Strait conflict.
Coast Guard
China organized a maritime militia in the early 1950s as part of the effort to
defend its fishing fleet and coastal trade against depredations by Kuomintang
(KMT) naval forces. It consisted largely of fishing trawlers armed with machine
guns and hand-held weapons. They were controlled by local Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) branches and when on a mission carried CCP
27
representatives.
China does not have a formally organized coast guard, but the functions
normally assigned to that service are the responsibility of various national,
provincial, and even municipal organizations. The Ministry of Public Security
operates the maritime police, the Ministry of Communications is responsible
for rescue and salvage and for maritime safety, fisheries fall under the Ministry
of Agriculture, and the State Ocean Administration conducts hydrographic
28
surveys and maintains aids to navigation.
The Customs Service employs a collection of more than 200 patrol craft of
various classes, some of them sea-going. Some of these paramilitary vessels in
the past were rumored to be involved in piracy and other illegal acts in China's
29
coastal waters. The State Oceanographic Bureau is responsible for research
and environmental protection, including enforcement of the “Marine
30
Environmental Protection Law of the PRC,” passed in December 1999. This
law assigns responsibilities as follows:
Other craft are in the Coastal Regional Defense Forces, which includes
approximately 25,000 personnel. This force is probably part of the Naval
Coastal Defense System, which includes a system of Coastal Observation Posts
along China's coastline, coastal cruise missile and artillery sites, coastal patrol
32
boat squadrons, and a network of coastal radar and communications stations.
Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is part of China, but deploys a
separate maritime security force that is a holdover from its time as a British
colony. The Marine Police are tasked with maintaining the integrity of maritime
boundaries and territorial waters; much of their efforts are devoted to
countering illegal immigration and smuggling. Sea-Air Rescue (SAR) and
casualty evacuation are other missions. The force's newest craft are six 105-
ton displacement Keka-class patrol vessels and approximately sixty other
patrol boats ranging from high-speed rigid inflatable boats to six 170-ton
35
displacement Protector-class command craft.
TAIWAN
Taiwan's navy has been slowly modernizing since the mid-1990s, although
seriously hampered by the dysfunctional nature of the island's post-2000
political system. Modernization has been based almost entirely on U.S.
assistance, albeit with the assistance of Taiwan's technologically advanced
defense industrial base.
During the past decade and a half the Taiwan Navy has acquired modern
frigates, destroyers, amphibious ships, aircraft, and missiles from the United
States and France. Some of these acquisition programs have included a phase
of indigenous construction; they have all been accompanied to a greater or
lesser degree by acquisition of shipboard weapons and other systems.
The navy operates four submarines. The two old Guppy-class boats were
acquired from the United States and their sixty-plus year-old age restricts
them to training missions and diving to no more than 200-foot depths. Even
the two newer submarines, the Hai Lung-class, are twenty years old, having
been acquired from the Netherlands in 1987. Despite the age of the
submarines, their personnel are highly dedicated and professional. The Taiwan
Navy has been studying the acquisition of new submarines since at least 2003,
a prospect much discussed since its inclusion in the package offered to Taiwan
36
in 2001 by the Bush administration.
Taiwan's surface combatants are led by the four Kidd-class destroyers acquired
from the United States in 2005 and 2006. These large (9,500-ton
displacement) ships are the world's most capable AAW combatants not
equipped with an Aegis radar and missile suite. Renamed the Chi Teh-class,
they are equipped with long-range antiaircraft, antisurface ship, and
antisubmarine missiles, as well as guns, torpedoes, and the capability to
operate two helicopters. The ships’ effectiveness is seriously degraded by the
Taipei government's decision to purchase the Kidds with only half the number
of AAW missiles they were designed to carry; furthermore, three of the four
did not receive the flight deck modifications required to operate the Taiwan
37
Navy's newest helicopters.
Taiwan's navy also includes almost seventy patrol craft of various capabilities,
some armed with antisurface ship missiles. Two ex-U.S. LSDs lead the
amphibious force, which includes two ex-U.S. Newport-class and twelve older
LSTs. These relatively large ships are supported by almost 300 smaller landing
craft.
The navy's mine warfare force is led by eight ex-U.S. minesweepers at least
fifty years old and four newer—built in 1991—mine hunters acquired from
Germany. Taiwan additionally deploys one combat support ship capable of
replenishing ships at sea and three troop transports.
The helicopters operated by these destroyers and frigates include nine old
U.S.-built MD-500 aircraft and two squadrons of U.S.-built S-70C helos
designed for ASW and ASUW. Other naval aviation assets include four E-2T
Hawkeye aircraft acquired from the United States and operated from ashore.
These are airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) that operate
primarily with Taiwan's air force aircraft. Finally, Taipei in November 2007
offered to acquire twelve P3C long-range, ASW, and ASUW aircraft made
available by the United States in 2001 to replace the twenty-six antiquated S-
2T antisubmarine aircraft.
Taiwan Coast Guard (TCG) is not an arm of the Ministry of Defense but is
assigned directly to the Executive Yuan. The TCG is responsible for the usual
coast guard missions—maritime safety, search and rescue, maintaining
environmental standards—but also garrisons several of the small islands
occupied by Taiwan and disputed by China. The TCG operates fifty-two patrol
boats, as well as seventy-one small, inshore patrol craft.
THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippine Navy is not a significant force, other than the small craft
operated by special forces units. Three twenty-five-year-old ex-British
Peacock-class corvettes form the core of the surface fleet. These displace 763
tons and are armed with a single 76-mm gun; they are overtasked and
underequipped to maintain watch over Philippine territorial waters.
ThePeacocks are augmented by a Cyclone-class patrol boat (acquired from the
United States in 2004) and eight patrol craft of dubious reliability.
As many as forty smaller patrol craft are operated by the navy and the
Philippine Coast Guard: the former operates seven small maritime surveillance
aircraft. Amphibious forces include five ex-U.S. LSTs. The recently reorganized
Coast Guard also deploys four new (2000)San Juan-class patrol craft displacing
500 tons and has an Australian-built class of six search and rescue ships under
construction.
VIETNAM
Vietnam's navy includes 9,000 personnel organized into four regional
commands; from north to south, these are Haiphong, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and
Can Tho. The naval service includes a Coast Guard formed in 1998 that is
responsible for enforcing customs regulations. The Vietnamese Navy is led by
five Petya-class “light frigates” acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1980s,
and since modernized. These 1,180-ton displacement ships are powered by
combined diesel-gas turbine (CODAG) engine plants and equipped for both
ASW and ASUW.
CAMBODIA
Cambodia has no navy other than a river patrol force of two Malaysian-built
Kaoh-class patrol boats, each displacing forty-four tons, and perhaps 170
40
“motorized and manual canoes.” Two modified Stenka-class torpedo boats
acquired from Russia are also operated.
Despite this very modest force, Phnom Penh is concerned about safeguarding
its maritime energy interests. A nascent marine corps has been established,
with the transfer of 1,000 troops from the army to the navy with the mission
41
to “protect maritime borders and, more especially, the offshore oil fields.”
INDONESIA
Indonesia has the largest navy in Southeast Asia. Its submarine force consists
of two, thirty-year-old Dutch-built boats; a program to acquire two additional
boats from South Korea is apparently on hold because of budgetary limitations.
A similar fate may meet acquisition of submarines recently offered by
42
Moscow.
The Indonesian Coast Guard (ICG) was organized in 2003 by combining the
43
Marine and Air Police, and the Directorate General of Sea Communications.
These units have long been suspected of corruption, however, and are of
44
questionable reliability.
BRUNEI
Brunei's maritime forces are led by three new (2005) Brunei-class corvettes,
each displacing 2,000 tons, fast (30 kts), and capable of a 5,000 nm cruising
range. They each operate a helicopter and are armed with eight Exocet
antiship missiles. Brunei also deploys six smaller patrol craft and four LCUs.
Three shore-based patrol aircraft operate with the navy and the police force,
which also deploys ten small (less than 100-ton displacement) patrol craft.
SINGAPORE
The Singapore Navy is part of Asia's most coherent defense force. It is focused
on defending the nation and safeguarding the Malacca Strait. Of particular
note is the decision to acquire a submarine force. Four, twenty-five-year-old
Challenger-class boats of Swedish (Sjoorman-class) construction have been
purchased; two of these are scheduled for replacement in 2010 by other old
Swedish (Vastergotland) submarines. Presumably, all these boats will be
replaced during the next decade by new submarines, but a meaningful mission
for this force will have to be developed and implemented to justify its cost in
financial and personnel resources.
Finally, the Singapore Navy is aided by the Singapore Police Coast Guard. This
force is responsible for maritime safety, navigation aids maintenance, coastal
security, and maintenance of law and order on the waterways surrounding
Singapore. The Coast Guard operates approximately 100 small craft of various
46
designs.
MALAYSIA
Other frigates include an older (1966) Yarrow-class, and two Kasturi-class, the
latter two displacing 1,700 tons. These began operating in 1984 and are
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scheduled for modernization to extend their service beyond 2010. Malaysia
also deploys a significant force of smaller patrol craft, some armed with
antisurface missiles. Most formidable are the Meko-class frigates, which
displace 1,650 tons and feature a helicopter flight deck and hangar. Six of
49
these ships are scheduled for acquisition by the end of 2008.
Kuala Lumpur has acquired eighteen rotary-wing aircraft for its frigates,
British- and French-built aircraft capable of executing ASW and ASUW
missions. The navy also operates four small maritime surveillance aircraft as
well as eighteen British- and American-built Hawk and F/A-18 aircraft, based
ashore and capable of launching Harpoon missiles in a maritime role.
The Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) force of more than eighty patrol
craft is responsible for law enforcement in territorial and riverine waters. It
conducts joint antipiracy patrols with Indonesia and Singapore, as well as joint
operations with Philippine and Thai units. Although responsible to the
Department of Interior, the RMMP participates in joint operations with civilian
police and military forces.
THAILAND
The Thai Navy also operates two ex-U.S. 960-ton displacement Mk 16 patrol
craft armed with Harpoon missiles, as well as over seventy other patrol craft of
varying size and capability, some armed with antiship missiles. Additionally,
the navy operates a riverine force of more than 100 patrol boats, employed
primarily on the Mekong River.
The Royal Thai Marine Police (RTMP) operate several hundred patrol craft in its
efforts to perform maritime and riverine law enforcement, safety,
environmental safeguarding, and other police, customs enforcement, and
fisheries patrol missions. The RTMP is supported by the Customs Service and
Fisheries Patrol Service.
The Thai Navy's shore-based fixed-wing aviation force includes eight Spanish-
built Matador (Harrier) VTOL aircraft assigned to Chakri Narubet, four U.S.-
built A-7E attack and three P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, five German-
built F-27 patrol aircraft, and approximately thirty other logistics aircraft.
Helicopter assets include twelve U.S.-built S-70B Seahawks and two UH-1
Hueys, and two UK-built Super Lynx 300 aircraft. The P-3Bs and some of the
F-27s are capable of launching Harpoon antiship missiles.
BURMA
This navy numbers, on paper, as many as forty-five patrol craft, but probably
only the sixHouxin-class guided-missile patrol craft acquired from China in the
late 1990s are fully operational. Burma's most significant maritime challenge
lies on its rivers, where it operates a large fleet of small amphibious and patrol
craft.
AUSTRALIA
The Australian Navy is led by six Collins-class, conventionally powered
submarines. These have been long in construction (begun in 1989), with
significant delays caused by the problems plaguing their weapons systems.
They are armed with torpedoes and eight submerged-launched Harpoon
missiles.
Finally, the patrol force includes fifteen Fremantle-class “large patrol craft”
displacing 245 tons. These are scheduled for replacement by the 270-ton
displacement Armidale-class; at least three of a planned twelve are in
commission.
The amphibious force also includes a 3,300-ton displacement “heavy lift ship,”
six heavy LSMs each displacing 509 tons, and four personnel landing craft.
Australia's mine warfare force features six Italian-designed Gaeta-class mine
hunters.
One Durance-class RAS ship is deployed, with four replenishment stations and
a hangar-flight deck configuration capable of operating an SH-3 Sea King
helicopter. A Sirius-class oiler is reportedly undergoing conversion to provide a
second RAS unit.
NEW ZEALAND
The past two decades of Labor governments in Wellington have redefined New
Zealand's navy from one designed to conduct NATO-level operations with
Australian and U.S. allies into a coastal defense force of limited capability. The
force consists of two Meko-class frigates, nearly identical to Australia's, and
four small—less than 100-ton displacement—inshore patrol craft. These latter
are being replaced by 340-ton displacement craft in 2007 and 2008. One
replenishment ship, the South Korean-built Endeavor, operates in support of
the navy. It is small (12,500 tons) and slow (13.5 kts), but adequate for New
Zealand's needs.
Under construction are two 1,600-ton displacement offshore patrol ships,
which will be capable of operating a helicopter. These are intended to patrol
New Zealand's EEZ and to assist various South Pacific nations in maritime
missions. Another unit scheduled to join the fleet in 2007 is a “multitask ship”
displacing 8,870 tons, capable of embarking an infantry company and its light
armored vehicles, and operating two SH-2G helicopters. This vessel is
designed for humanitarian and disaster relief operations, with a limited
capacity for peace and military support operations.
The navy has five SH-2 helicopters for shipboard operations. The New Zealand
Air Force operates six P-3K maritime patrol aircraft.
BANGLADESH
This small country is in a difficult geographic position, facing India across the
environmentally dangerous Bay of Bengal. In 2004 the Bangladesh Navy
announced that it intended acquiring a submarine force by 2012, but action in
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that direction had not occurred as of December 2007.
The navy also operates approximately forty smaller patrol craft of varying age
and capability, some armed with antiship missiles. Four ex-British River-class
and one Chinese-built T-43 minesweeper form the mine warfare force. Eleven
small amphibious craft support navy and army operations.
INDIA
India deploys one of the three most formidable navies in Asia, ranking with
China and Japan. Given the nation's position, bisecting the northern Indian
Ocean, this is a crucial force in Asia's maritime picture. India is successfully
54
pursuing its announced policy of “becoming a maritime power.”
The Indian Navy has historically focused on aircraft carriers, but currently
operates just one,Viraat, acquired from Great Britain. This 29,000-ton
displacement ship was built in 1959 and operates twenty-eight fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. It will almost certainly be placed out of service following
the commissioning of India's newer carriers, including its first indigenously
built ship of this type.
India's conventionally powered submarine force will be led in the next decade
by six French-designed Scorpene-class boats. The first of these submarines will
be constructed in France, with the remaining units produced in Indian yards.
The first Scorpene may join the Indian fleet in 2010, with one per year
delivered in succeeding years. Significantly, these boats will almost certainly
56
be equipped with AIP systems. The Indian Navy still operates two very old
Foxtrot-class submarines acquired from the Soviet Union; while refitted, they
are likely restricted to training status. More capable are four Type-1500 boats,
members of the globally popular Type-209 family of submarines produced by
Germany. Ten Soviet-built Kilo-class submarines were acquired between 1986
and 2000, including both models built for export as well as the more capable
design built for the Russian Navy.
The navy also operates a formidable and modernizing force of frigates, several
classes of which are armed with antisurface ship missiles. Three Godavari-class
ships commissioned in the mid-1980s as Indian versions of the British-
designed Leander-class frigate displace 4,200 tons, are steam-powered, and
operate a helicopter. The modernized Godavaris are armed with old (1950s)
but still dangerous SS-N-2D Styx antiship missiles of Soviet design.
More modern and capable are the three Talwar-class frigates, 4,000-ton
displacement ships that are CODAG-powered. The Talwars, commissioned in
2003 and 2004, were built in Russia and display stealth characteristics. One
helicopter is embarked and the ship's main battery is eight SS-N-27 Klub
antiship missiles, probably the most capable antiship cruise missile in the
world. India may order three more of these ships.
Even newer, and also armed with the Klub missile, are three Shivalik-class
frigates built in India. Two of these ships have been commissioned; the third is
scheduled to join the fleet in 2009. They are large for frigates, displacing
4,900 tons. The Shivlaks have CODAG propulsion plants and operate one
helicopter; they do not incorporate the stealth characteristics of theTalwar-
class.
India in fact still operates five Leander-class frigates, built in Indian shipyards.
These ships displace 3,000 tons, lack antiship or antiaircraft missile capability,
but may still be useful for ASW missions. The Indian Navy also operates
approximately forty-five corvettes and patrol craft, many armed with antiship
missiles.
The amphibious force consists of approximately twelve LSTs. These were built
in Indian shipyards, although of either British or Soviet design. Twelve Soviet-
built minesweepers lead the mine warfare force. Notable is the navy's force of
three underway replenishment ships, with future acquisition of a fourth “under
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consideration.”
Since most of India's destroyers and frigates operate helicopters, the navy
maintains a fleet of almost three dozen large ASW rotary-wing aircraft. Most of
these are U.S.-designed but British-built Sea King helicopters, although twelve
Russian-built Ka-28A Helix are also flown. Additionally, the navy employs nine
smaller Ka-31 Helix-B and approximately two-dozen much smaller French-built
Alouette III helicopters. India began building a version of theAlouette in 1984,
but the first two of these, named the Dhruv, did not become operational until
2003. Sixty-four had been delivered to the armed forces by 2006, twelve of
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them to the navy.
India's fixed-wing naval aviation force includes two German-built F-27 and
fifteen Dornier-228 maritime patrol aircraft; more capable are the three
Soviet-produced Il-38 May aircraft. The navy also flies eight Soviet-built Tu-
142 Bear-Fs for long-range surveillance, and eight British-designed Jaguar
tactical strike planes.
The Indian Coast Guard is the fourth service, tasked to guard the nation's
nearly 4,000 nm of coastline. It was created by the Coast Guard Act in August
1978, with direction to work closely with the navy and the Customs
Department. Coast Guard missions include SAR, countering piracy and other
maritime crime, and safeguarding the maritime environment. Its operations
are limited to India's EEZ.
The coast guard has a large number of fast vessels, including hovercrafts and
hydrofoils to patrol littoral and riverine waters, including Kashmiri lakes. These
craft include seventy-five ships and smaller patrol boats. The air arm operates
Dornier Do-228 airplanes, and forty-fourChetak and Dhruv helicopters.
PAKISTAN
Few nations possess Pakistan's combination of very difficult maritime strategic
situation and limited geographic maritime assets. Its coastline is less than 500
nm long, while Karachi and Ormara offer the only naval bases of significance.
The recently expanded and improved port of Gwadar has been the subject of
much press speculation, as a result of Chinese financial and engineering
assistance. As of 2008, however, the port is under the management of the
Singapore Port Authority and its utility to the Pakistani Navy remains to be
61
determined.
Pakistan's navy operates sixteen helicopters—three Lynx and six Sea King
aircraft built in Britain, and four French-built Alouette III units. All are
dedicated to shipboard operations and capable of multiple warfare missions.
The navy also flies thirteen land-based reconnaissance and patrol aircraft, led
by two P-3C Orions acquired from the United States. Twelve Mirage-IIIaircraft
were acquired from France and are operated by the Pakistan Air Force,
although capable of maritime strike with Harpoon missiles.
The Pakistani Coast Guard is operated by the army and is responsible to the
Ministry of the Interior. It includes five small patrol boats and the Customs
Service, which uses naval personnel to operate approximately twenty small
craft.
Pakistani's maritime forces are geostrategically limited, perhaps fatally so. The
navy operates a plethora of platforms and systems that must pose
maintenance and interoperability nightmares. The coast guard is under the
operational control of the army, so its ability to conduct effective operations
with the navy is problematical.
IRAN
Iran looms over the crucial Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Navy is a formidable
force, featuring three Kilo-class conventionally powered submarines acquired
from Russia. These capable ships, operating in the very difficult ASW waters of
the Persian Gulf, would offer a serious threat to opposing forces in the area.
Iran also operates a surface force of two 1,335-ton displacement Byandor-class
corvettes, sold to the pre-1979 Iranian government by the United States. They
will likely be replaced by 1,200-ton displacement corvettes reportedly under
construction in Iran. Three 1960s-eraAlvand-class frigates are also operational
and have been refitted with Chinese-built C802 antisurface ship cruise
missiles.
Patrol forces include well over 100 craft of varying displacement and capability,
many operated by the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards). Ten Chinese-built
Thondor-class craft of 171 tons displacement are armed with C802 antiship
missiles; similar armament is featured by the eleven or more, 249-ton
displacement Kaman-class.
UNITED STATES
Asian naval modernization is occurring in the shadow cast by the still
dominant U.S. Navy. American large-deck aircraft carriers and nuclear-
powered submarines remain the arbiters of the freedom of the seas in Asia.
The current American force, however, is shrinking in size and facing global
challenges that reduce its ability, on a day-to-day basis, to command the seas
of Asia.
The U.S. Navy's primary organization in Asia is the Seventh Fleet, home-
ported in Yokosuka, Japan, nineteen nm south of Tokyo. The fleet is built
around aircraft carrier strike groups (CVSG), usually featuring the carrier
home-ported in Yokosuka. An additional CVSG is usually under Seventh Fleet
operational control, en route between the U.S. West Coast and the Western
Pacific and Indian Oceans.
The U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, is responsible for much of the western
Indian Ocean, but is almost totally preoccupied with enforcing control of the
seas in the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. Furthermore,
this fleet has no integral assets, other than its flagship, a converted
amphibious vessel, and is assigned forces by other U.S. naval commands, as
events require. In 2007 these included one aircraft carrier, one large-deck
amphibious helicopter carrier, and supporting surface combatants, submarines,
aircraft, and logistics ships, totaling approximately twenty ships and 20,000
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personnel.
In addition to carriers, the battle groups usually include one cruiser, one–two
destroyers or frigates, one nuclear-powered attack submarine, and one or two
supply ships capable of replenishment-at-sea. Also homeported in Yokosuka
are three Aegis-armed cruiser/destroyers, two additional destroyers, and two
guided-missile frigates. This group is augmented by an amphibious assault
group homeported in Sasebo, Japan. Located on the southern Japanese island
of Kyushu, the city hosts an LHD, a very large amphibious assault ship capable
of launching helicopters, VSTOL fixed wing aircraft, and landing craft. This
minicarrier is accompanied by three additional amphibious assault ships, two
LSDs, and an LPD. Two mine sweepers are also homeported in Sasebo.
This means, on average, that operational U.S. naval strength in East Asian
waters is one or two carriers, seven or eight Aegis ships, three to five
submarines, and two RAS vessels. That is a formidable force, but one
responsible for missions throughout not only the Western Pacific Ocean, but
also the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.
CONCLUSION
The naval forces of the Pacific and Indian Oceans range from the powerful
navies of the United States, Japan, China, and India, to the small forces of
Southeast and Southwest Asia. All are characterized by modernization
programs and an increasing awareness of the necessity of maritime airpower.
Additionally, submarines are becoming more widespread, while antiship cruise
missiles are ubiquitous.
What is striking about the naval modernization that is ongoing throughout the
region is the dominance of certain countries of origin for the design and
manufacture of almost all new technologies being applied to naval systems.
The United States is the leader in the development and spread of naval
technology. This is not surprising, given the global lead of American scientific
and technological institutions and the spread of that technology is attributable
for the most part to conscious policy decisions by Washington.
Several European nations contribute to the spread of new naval systems, with
France the lead proliferator. French naval-armaments’ makers have attained
positions of global leadership in several areas of naval technology, especially in
the vital area of cruise missile development. Russia, despite the problems
suffered since it emerged in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, remains an important naval arms supplier, and China is rapidly
emerging as a notable contributor to the Asian naval armaments race. Beijing
is following Paris's lead in not conditioning arms sales on the purchasing
country's internal conditions, no matter its record of abusing human rights or
proliferating WMD (weapons of mass destruction).
Has the recent and still ongoing naval modernization in Asia contributed to
current or near-term instability in the region? Probably not, although the
spread of submarines is particularly troubling, since their stealthiness—their
chief characteristic, and most valuable war-fighting quality—almost completely
precludes the transparency that allows opposing navies and nations to make
the most rational decision in a crisis. This is a particularly sensitive area also
because of the region-wide move to acquire submarines, with an attendant
64
ASW arms race possible.
UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations (UN) remains the most important multilateral organization
in which the Asian nations participate. Its most important role in maritime
security to date has been delineating and promulgating the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This agreement had been signed and ratified
1
by 149 nations as of August 2005, including many landlocked states. Even
those who have not completed the ratification process—including the United
States—follow its dictates.
UNCLOS is administered by the UN's Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea (DOA); several important commissions have been established under
the DOA. Perhaps most critical are the deliberations of the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Its conclusions should directly affect
resolution of the sovereignty disputes between Japan and Korea, and between
Japan and China, among others.
The CLCS has met more than one dozen times since its first meeting in 1997,
but appears to have had little effect on clarifying CS issues that would lead to
resolution of sovereignty disputes. That status may well change in the near
future, as the CLCS continues its efforts to gain international agreement on
defining the outer limits of the CS, especially as pertaining to contested waters
3
and sovereignty issues.
Another UN body concerned with maritime issues is the Food and Agricultural
Organization's Fisheries Division. This division was founded in Rome in 1996;
its current manifesto summarizes the composition and role of various
international fishery bodies concerned with the conservation and management
of live maritime resources. At least thirty-five such fisheries organizations
operate around the world, all concerned with international disputes. The
division provides information for each of these organizations, to include
establishment data, area of competence, species covered, membership,
objectives, and activities. In many cases their coverage areas are depicted on
maps. Part one of the manifesto includes a comprehensive account of recent
events in high seas fisheries, with a view toward their effects on future
developments.
A potentially powerful body under the UNCLOS is the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLS), composed of twenty-one members elected for nine-
year terms by the member states. No two members may be from the same
nation and the ITLS must represent an equitable geographical distribution: at
least three members each from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America
4
and the Caribbean, and Western Europe/other states.
The ITLS's potential is limited by the fact that its opinions are advisory and its
cases must be voluntarily submitted for adjudication; it has no independent
jurisdiction, with one exception: it may entertain an application for the prompt
release of a detained vessel or its crew, providing that the detaining state “has
not complied with the provisions of the Convention for the prompt release of
the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial
security [and] if, within 10 days from the time of detention, the parties have
5
not agreed to submit it to another court or tribunal.”
The UN does not have an impressive record of settling maritime disputes. The
primary reason is disputants’ hesitancy to submit to an adjudication process
over which they have little control. The UN has an important role in assuring
maritime security, but its record to date contains as much frustration as it does
achievements. Nonetheless, it remains the only global venue for addressing
maritime security issues.
APEC has worked since its inception to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers
across the Asia-Pacific region, while boosting domestic economies, and
increasing exports. Key to achieving these objectives are the “Bogor Goals,”
adopted in 1994 with the objectives of “free and open trade and investment in
the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialized economies and 2020 for developing
9
economies.” APEC also works to create an environment for the safe and
efficient movement of goods, services, and people through continental and
maritime lines of communication.
To this end, the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) group was organized
at the Los Cobos, Mexico APEC meeting in 2002. The first STAR conference
was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 2003, and focused on how to advance trade
efficiency and trade security in Asia-Pacific. Representatives of all twenty-one
APEC members discussed how to advance trade efficiency and trade security in
Asia-Pacific. A “way ahead” was delineated for future STAR activities to address
maritime security, aviation security, passenger information processing
technology, capacity building, project planning and financing, and supply chain
security. Participants agreed that successful implementation of these measures
10
required strong partnership between government and business.
The second STAR conference took place in Viña del Mar, Chile, in 2004 and
formed four panels: (1) maritime security, which discussed the implementation
of the ISPS Code; (2) air transportation security, including the threat of Man-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MPADs) against civilian aircraft; (3) the mobility
of people including sessions on Regional Movement Alert System (RMAS); and
(4) the gradual establishment of Financial Intelligence Units.
Attendees included more than 300 senior business and government
representatives from APEC members. The meeting initiated five sets of
actions: (1) steps to advance compliance with the IMO's new Ship and Port
Security Standards; (2) financial contributions to the Asia Development Bank's
Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative; (3) progress in implementing
business mobility initiatives, including the Advance Passenger Information
system; (4) development of a Regional Movement Alert List System; and (5)
issuance of machine readable travel documents by 2008.
APEC members also agreed on instituting the International Ship and Port
Security (ISPS) code, and at the Chile conference urged member states to
implement ISPS requirements by the July 2004 deadline. Particular concern
focused on applying ISPS Code requirements to vessels carrying liquefied
natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and chemicals.
The code has two parts, one mandatory and one recommendatory. It takes the
approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is a risk-
management activity that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. It aims
to establish a standardized framework for evaluating risk to ships and port
facilities, to include determination of appropriate security levels and
11
corresponding security measures. The 2004 conference participants also
expressed significant interest in the Geographic Information System
(Grafimar) developed by the Chile Maritime Authority; Valparaiso has offered
12
to make information on Grafimar available to other APEC members.
The Third STAR conference met at Inchon, Korea, in 2005, with a continued
focus on developing trade while enhancing security, as well as cooperation and
capacity building through public–private partnership. Maritime security was a
central theme of this meeting.
The fourth STAR conference was held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2006.
Vietnam's Ambassador Tran Trong Toan, Executive Director of the APEC
Secretariat, chaired the meeting and described an ambitious future APEC
program for increasing security under the STAR initiative, including:
The IMO itself has been trying to coordinate international efforts to combat
piracy. After meeting in Malaysia in September 2006, the IMO issued the
“Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and
Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” addressing
development of “mechanisms and programs to facilitate co-operation in
keeping the Straits safe and open to navigation, including the possible options
for burden sharing.” This meeting was attended by Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and thirty other nations, including many from Europe. The
conference's transnational character was emphasized by the attendance of
nine international organizations, including several concerned with shipping
and with the oil industry.
The meeting agreed that the coastal states, user states, the shipping industry,
and other stakeholders should establish a system of voluntary funding for the
15
above projects, to include continued maintenance of aids to navigation.
Perhaps most significantly, APEC has generated a Counter-Terrorism Plan
which includes an effort to standardize electronic customs reporting developed
by the World Customs Organization (WCO), and implementation of the U.S.’
Container Security Initiative (CSI) throughout the Asia-Pacific area. The
Counter-Terrorism Plan also addresses port and shipboard security plans, as
well as cooperative actions to combat piracy.
The CSI was initiated in January 2002 to monitor and protect the global
trading system, particularly the ships traveling on SLOCs to the United States.
The program depends on teams of U.S. officers working with the host nation
counterparts to target all containers scheduled for shipment to the United
States.
In Asia, the CSI had by the end of 2006 been initiated in Kobe, Nagoya, Tokyo,
and Yokohama, Japan; Busan, South Korea; Hong Kong, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen, China; Kaohsiung and Keelung, Taiwan; Singapore; Port Klang and
Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Laem Chabang, Thailand; Colombo, Sri Lanka;
Dubai, UAE; and Port Salalah, Oman.
Structurally, APEC has two organizational groups that deal directly with
maritime security, both falling under the purview of the Senior Officials
21
Meeting (SOM). These are the Transportation Working Group (TPTWG) and
the Energy Working Group (EWG). The former includes a Maritime Security
Experts Group (MSEG) that is tasked with assisting APEC members in
improving maritime security, such as implementing the ISPS Code.
Member states meet at least annually, usually at the foreign minister level,
with security concerns only occasionally on the agenda. At ASEAN's 1976
summit meeting in Bali, the organization embarked on a program of economic
cooperation which floundered in the mid-1980s, began reviving in 1991 with a
Thai proposal for a regional Free Trade Area, was ineffective in dealing with
the Asian economic collapse in 1997, but has since resumed a positive trend.
The first ARF conference attendees urged their parent organization, ASEAN, to
“work with its AFR partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive
pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific.” ARF members are Australia, Brunei,
Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Timor
Leste, the United States, and Vietnam.
The second ARF meeting was held in Brunei in August 1995 and adopted “a
gradual evolutionary approach” to security cooperation. A three-stage process
was outlined:
These meetings and workshops have produced modest results, due to the
widely varying capabilities of the member states, the reliance on voluntary
participation in recommended programs, and other national concerns.
Nonetheless, ARF remains the only formally organized Asian subregional
organization with the stated goal of addressing security issues. For instance,
several ARF members have conducted exercises and antipiracy operations on a
bilateral or small-scale multilateral basis.
More meaningful language emerged from the Twelfth ARF summit meeting, in
Laos in 2005. The assembled ASEAN ministers at least “expressed continued
support for the activities of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement
Cooperation, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism, and
the International Law Enforcement Academy.” The ministers also urged
expanded efforts to promote maritime safety and security, noting “four key
areas for future cooperation”: multilateral cooperation, operational solution to
maritime safety and security, shipping and port security, and application of
technology for maritime safety and security.”
They noted the “ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight
Against Terrorism,” adopted at the Eighth ASEAN-plus-Japan Summit in Laos in
November 2004, and the signing of ASEAN “Joint Declarations for Cooperation
to Combat International Terrorism” with South Korea, New Zealand, and
Pakistan in July 2005. This meeting's minutes—admittedly words more than
action—also expressed concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) as “a serious security challenge of our time and the most
dangerous one as they might fall into terrorist hands.” Attending members
urged all nations to sign the “International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” and to continue combating terrorism, to include
immediate adoption of the “Comprehensive Convention on International
26
Terrorism.”
The ARF remains mostly a talking shop, but its advocacy for enhanced SLOC
security is important. The organization has the potential to serve as an
important vehicle for improving SLOC security throughout Asian waters, but its
most critical area of interest is the Malacca Strait. Any effective ARF actions to
increase the security of the SLOCs transiting the Malacca and other Southeast
Asian straits would have a direct effect on global energy security.
A notable gathering occurred in September 2007, when the first Asia Pacific
Intelligence Chiefs Conference convened in Kuala Lumpur, as the result of a
Malaysian-U.S. initiative. The meeting was attended by senior military
intelligence representatives from nineteen nations who focused on maritime
27
security, including terrorism, and disaster relief.
Several other less formal but associated groups are pursuing similar goals with
some effect. The Shangri-la Dialogue convened annually by the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is a prominent example of
Track II (unofficial) academic and commercial conferences, meetings, and
workshops where national representatives address the problems of piracy and
improving maritime security on the SLOCs.
Japan has been one of the Asian nations most active in trying to bridge the
gap between discussion and operational application. This results in part from
Japan's dependency on the SLOCs for approximately 80 percent of its energy
supplies, as well as for its economic well-being in general. Tokyo is especially
concerned about the security of East Asian SLOCs.
Tokyo took the lead in organizing two conferences in 2000 on piracy and
armed robbery at sea. The first of these produced the “Tokyo Appeal,” in which
the fourteen attending nations agreed to “cooperate, devise and implement all
possible measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships.” A
“Model Action Plan” to carry this out was issued at a meeting held the next
28
month, also in Tokyo.
This effort has been supported by the major Japanese think-tank, the National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), which in its annual Security Study for
2000 highlighted the importance of the “formation of a regional order” as key
29
to future Japanese security. A NIDS “security study” that same year spelled
out a possible international regime for “ocean-peace keeping and new roles for
maritime force.” The authors defined this concept as the use of maritime forces
to “assure the stable and sustainable development of the oceans.…to execute
the obligations stipulated in the UNCLOS, and [coordinate] maritime activities
by the regional maritime forces to assure the stable utilization of the oceans.”
30
Two particular points were made: first, “maintenance of regional stability”
depends on naval and coast guard involvement; and second, U.S. participation
31
is necessary.
The U.S. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise program
has become the most wide-ranging bilateral programs. Under this relatively
loose construct, begun in 1995, U.S. naval warships and logistics vessels
conduct a series of short duration exercises with Southeast Asian navies and
35
coast guards. For example, the U.S. and Thai naval forces conducted
exercises in mid-2007 during the Thirteenth Annual CARAT series. This two-
week training period included navy, Marine Corps, and coast guard forces, and
36
included exercises to counter interdiction of the SLOCs.
Asian nations also conduct exercises on a regular basis; the Royal Malaysian
Navy, for instance, operates periodically with the navies of Brunei, Indonesia,
Singapore, Thailand, in addition to participating in the CARAT program with
the United States under the 1972 Bilateral Talks and Consultative Group
(BITACG) agreement. Exercises with Australia are conducted under the
Malaysia-Australia Joint Development Program (MAJDP), while the Five Power
Defense Agreement (FPDA) provides the vehicle for Kuala Lumpur's
participation in military exercises with Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain,
and Singapore.
Additionally, the Malaysia Marine Police and Singapore's Police Coast Guard
have established “direct communications links,” while the Malaysia-Indonesia
Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement (MALINDO INCSEA) was signed in
37
2001. Recently, Malaysia's traditionally contentious relationship with the
Philippines has softened to the extent of the two nations’ navies conducting
38
joint maritime patrols.
The most recent exercise in this series, “Peace Mission 2007,” was conducted in
August 2007 in central Russia. This exercise involved all six SCO members,
but was dominated by the 1,600 Chinese and 2,000 Russian troops who
participated. Beijing described Peace Mission 2007 as “comprehensive” and
noted that it marked “the first time a Chinese head of state goes overseas to
42
observe a Chinese military exercise.”
The SCO members are certainly concerned about economic improvements and
fighting the relatively low incidence of cross-border infiltration by radical
Islamic groups that may be occurring; interests that Beijing repeatedly
describes as fighting “terrorism, extremism, and separatism,” the last a clear
43
reference to Taiwan. In the long term, Beijing and Moscow likely regard the
SCO as the latest version of “the Great Game,” as the two nuclear powers seek
44
to restore hegemony over the energy rich region.
Five CSCAP Working Groups have been formed, the most notable of which is
probably the Working Group on Maritime Cooperation (WGMC). The WGMC
46
met fourteen times, the last meeting taking place in Hanoi in May 2004. This
group is no longer active, but has been succeeded by the “Study Group on
Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” which first met in
December 2006 in New Zealand, focusing on the topic of “Roles of Maritime
Security Forces.” Six meeting objectives included to “explore the contribution
of maritime security forces to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,” and
to “identify ways and means by which cooperation between maritime security
47
forces might be enhanced.” This meeting included reports on the importance
of “safety, security, and environmental protection in the Malacca and
Singapore Straits,” and a maritime PSI exercise conducted in the Persian Gulf
in October 2006.
Concern about piracy and maritime crime was the initial reason for the
organization, but the second meeting also focused on improving information
exchange and disaster relief operations. The North Pacific Coast Guard
Agencies has similar membership, but focuses almost exclusivity on maritime
crime involving smuggling and illegal fishing.
The result was the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
(IOR-ARC), established in a meeting in 1997, also convened in Mauritius.
Eighteen states are now members: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the UAE, and Yemen. Egypt,
49
Japan, China, France, and the United Kingdom are “dialogue partners.”
The association disseminates information on trade and investment regimes,
with a view to enhancing those processes. Particular concerns are expanding
intraregional trade and addressing maritime security concerns. The
organization has not been notably productive, however, as decried at the most
50
recent (seventh) meeting in Tehran, in 2007.
The nations bordering the Malacca Strait understandably resent the fact that
more than 70 percent of the ships passing through these water ways do not
call at any of their bordering ports, while the world holds them chiefly
responsible for maintaining the safety and security of navigation for those
51
ships, as well as preserving the environment. This feeling is deepened by the
failure of the United States—alone among the nations concerned—to ratify the
UNCLOS. Furthermore, only Japan and China have offered monetary
52
assistance to the three strait states to assist in “straits management.”
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was established in 1988; it has
57
twenty-two member nations and four as observers. It convenes biannually,
with the goal of “bringing regional naval leaders together to discuss matters of
importance and interest that lead to enhanced regional security and
58
prosperity.” These include increasing transparency, promoting confidence and
enhancing cooperation among these nations. Member states began addressing
piracy and terrorist threats in May 2005, when Singapore hosted a major
exercise against those threats. The theme of the 2006 meeting, in Honolulu in
October–November, was “Maritime Security: Opportunities for Cooperation.”
WPNS meetings serve as useful venues for discussion among the heads of
navies in attendance and the organization conducted a significant maritime
exercise in May 2007 during International Maritime Defense Exhibition and
Conference (IMDEX) 2007 in Singapore, which included training sessions
ashore and at sea.
CONCLUSION
Maritime security during the Cold War was a fairly straightforward issue in
Asia. The Soviets and their minions—North Korea, North Vietnam, and China
at various times—were the enemy. The threat to the maritime arena was
serious, but the other side's intentions, ships, submarines, aircraft, and
policies were relatively well-known. How to counter that threat seemed equally
straightforward. That is no longer the case in the first decade of the twenty-
first century. Maritime Asia today is threatened by new enemies that are
transnational, often covert, often difficult to anticipate, and hence difficult to
prepare to counter. Terrorism, environmental attack, smuggling, the movement
of WMD, illegal immigration, piracy, and other forms of criminal activity at sea
are all part of the new maritime security paradigm.
The military aspect of energy security in Asia is for the most part a maritime
issue. The global economy continues to increase the value of the oceans’ role
as highways for commerce and providers of resources, while technology and
globalization have lessened their role as barriers. Thus, the maritime realm is
a ready medium not only for national security and commercial interests, but
also for terrorists, criminals, and other disruptive elements.
Maritime threats can cause conflict and regional instability among nations over
the control of marine resources. Preserving the safety and productive capacity
1
of the oceans is in the interest of all maritime Asian nations. While significant
regional efforts to accomplish this goal are underway, they are hampered by
differing national priorities, especially those concerning maritime sovereignty
claims, and are difficult to carry out.
More than 80 percent of the world's trade travels by water, forging a global
network of maritime links. The smooth operation of the global economy
depends on the free flow of shipping through straits used for international
navigation. Safe navigational chokepoints and shore facilities are necessary to
ensure the free flow of energy shipping; many more than half of each of those
in the world exist in Asia. About one-third of the world's trade and half of its
petroleum traverse the Strait of Malacca.
SLOCs by their nature cross national maritime boundaries. Hence, the ability
to safeguard them effectively requires multilateral cooperation, ranging from
the definitional agreements contained in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to compatible C4I systems and agreements among
maritime forces allied at least to the extent necessary to operate jointly in
defense of SLOC security.
The seaborne element of energy acquisition will remain dominant for the
foreseeable future, however, and means that the SLOCs over which so much of
the Asia's energy is transported must be kept secure. These SLOCs form the
arteries of the region's economies and are of national security concern to all
maritime nations. Piracy, terrorism, navigational hazards, and environmental
dangers all threaten the security of the long SLOCs stretching from the Arctic
to the limits of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden. Potentially most
dangerous, however, are the more traditional great power factors of conflicting
sovereignty claims and wars erupting over political disputes. These differences
also may hamper establishing cooperative maritime security efforts.
Nontraditional threats to the SLOCs are real in the post–Cold War world, but
normally do not possess the capability of interrupting the vital interregional
sea-lanes over which Asia's energy supplies are transported. Sinking or even
disabling a large ship underway at sea is difficult; in fact, no large modern
tanker moving at more than 20 knots (kts) speed is very easy to intercept by
terrorists operating in small boats. This is also a challenging mission for
conventional naval forces, even submarines, since they are effectively limited
to single-digit speeds during an attack phase.
Cruise missiles may pose a formidable threat at navigational choke points, but
of the several that mark the seas surrounding the Asian continent, only the
Strait of Hormuz poses a systemic threat to shipping, because it is bordered by
a contentious Iran. Even here, at least six or more missiles normally would be
2
required to stop a large tanker. Sea mines are a weapon available to terrorists
as well as to organized navies, but the tanker war of the 1980s and the 1991
war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the relative impunity of large ships to
3
mines.
This does not mean that the flow of seaborne energy supplies may not be
threatened, attacked, and even interrupted for a period of time by armed
force; significant, lasting intervention of the SLOCs would be difficult, however,
and would have to be carried out by a large naval power able “to dominate a
4
large area of water over a long period of time” in the face of opposition. In
Asia, only the United States is capable of carrying this out, although others—
Japan, China, India, perhaps Russia—could do so in their respective littoral
waters.
COUNTRY PROFILES
Each Asian nation faces differing conditions of energy resources, requirements,
and reliance on the SLOCs. Maritime capability and naval power also vary from
country to country. The following section will briefly review these conditions in
the major Asian nations, before returning to a regional analysis.
Russia
Russia possesses Asia's largest energy reserves, the sale of which has become
the mainstay of the country's economy. These reserves are primarily
continental, in eastern Siberia and central Russia, but the fields offshore
Sakhalin Island promise huge future returns for Moscow and important energy
supplies for Japan, Korea, and China.
This fleet on paper includes more than 100 surface combatants and nuclear-
powered submarines, but the number of these capable of full operations and
manned by trained crews, while unknown, is probably very limited. An
authoritative survey in 2007 credited the Russian Pacific fleet with three or
four Delta III nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines; eleven nuclear-
powered attack submarines, eight surface combatants
(cruiser/destroyer/frigate), and approximately forty smaller combatants and
7
minesweepers. A recent Russian exercise in the Sea of Japan was reported to
have included “over fifteen combat and auxiliary vessels,” which may represent
8
the number of warships actually ready for fleet operations.
In other words, the Russian fleet in the Pacific must be respected for its
remaining nuclear weapons capability, but as an operational force, appears
capable of defending only those SLOCs in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and
perhaps the North Pacific in the vicinity of its major naval base at
Petropavlask. Much greater capability is available through the long-range
aviation assets remaining in Russia's Pacific forces, but those units will have to
recover from almost two decades of resource shortfalls, inadequate personnel
training, and dubious maintenance efforts.
Japan
Japan lacks indigenous energy resources and its national security largely
means maritime security: the nation is dependent on the sea for political
integrity, economic well-being, and military defense. Tokyo is following two
paths to achieve maritime security: first with the mutual defense alliance with
the United States; second with a modern navy capable of defending Japan's
littoral waters and the SLOCs out to a distance of at least 1,000 nm. This
distance, formulated at the height of the Cold War, stretches from Tokyo almost
to the Luzon Strait; Japanese strategists have probably also decided that their
navy needs to be able to defend the SLOCs at least as far as the Malacca
Strait, a distance of approximately 3,000 nm from the home islands.
Modernization of the navy and the air force, creation of a cabinet-level defense
ministry, andde facto loosening of constitutional restrictions on deploying the
military are recent steps taken by Tokyo to increase its ability to use naval
power to safeguard vital national interests. The defense ministry has
reportedly adopted a slogan describing its maritime defense capabilities as the
9
nation's “First Line of Defense.”
Japan already deploys a naval escort force equipped with sensor and weapons
systems second only to those of the U.S. Navy; the JMSDF is also moving
toward resuming its place as one of the world's few aircraft carrier-centric
navies. This is not likely to result in huge, flat-deck, catapult-equipped
behemoths, but in the JMSDF acquiring ships of the size and capability needed
to operate increased numbers of helicopters and VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft.
Tokyo is trying to lessen its dependence on the very long SLOCs to energy-rich
10
Middle East by accessing Russian and Australian resources. The former
possibility is influenced by the Kuriles sovereignty dispute; Japan's reliance on
secure energy SLOCs will continue, and will likely outweigh other international
concerns. These would include its sovereignty dispute with Moscow,
humanitarian concerns in Sudan, and political concerns with Iran. Despite
Japan's current reliance on the United States for defense, these issues counter
U.S. policies and may well be a factor in the loosening of those ties.
South Korea
China
With almost all its currently imported energy supplies coming by sea, China is
both increasing its fleet of national-flag tankers and pursuing SLOC
alternatives. These include a plan to become the world's number one
shipbuilder by 2015, with enough tankers to transport a majority of its energy
14
imports.
Beijing is modernizing its navy with a possible mission of defending the SLOCs.
Chinese military think tanks and journals frequently address the need to
develop a maritime strategy; Taiwan is the immediate reason for increasing
naval capabilities, but security of the sea-lanes is also noted, as is the need to
defend maritime energy fields.
China's huge coal reserves provide Beijing with a certain freedom of action
regarding the resources dedicated to securing its SLOCs, but there is no
indication that the current naval modernization will slow, even following
resolution of Taiwan's status. Beijing's strategy of trying to “lock in” energy
supplies around the world, from locating foreign energy reserves to consuming
them, may not be efficient—the largest of China's energy companies ranks no
higher than thirty-first globally and China trades only 4 percent of the world's
crude oil output—but it has assumed a major role in the nation's foreign and
military policies.
The Chinese navy (PLAN) is being modernized in almost all warfare areas, with
particular attention to the submarine force. Most significant during the past
quarter-century of naval improvements has been the overhaul of personnel
accession, education, and training, as the PLAN strives to become a
competitive maritime force for the twenty-first century. Progress during that
time has been impressive; the navy in 2007 is capable of defending China's
littoral waters, threatening timely U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict,
defending some of its regional SLOCs, serving as a global diplomatic
instrument, and executing the traditional naval mission of presence.
Taiwan
Despite those unwelcome factors, Taipei has accomplished little to increase its
energy security, neither making a strong effort to deploy a modern navy nor
maintaining a meaningful strategic petroleum reserve. Despite acquisition of
four large guided-missile destroyers from the United States in 2005–2006, the
navy since 2001 has not been able to fully take advantage of Washington's
decision to make a wide range of modern weapons platforms and systems
available to Taiwan. As presently structured, the navy would not be able to
defend even coastal SLOCs against determined hostile action.
The problem lies not with the navy but with the often-dysfunctional
government in Taipei. Taipei is not likely in the long term to maintain its
present status, but will have to seek a mutually acceptable accommodation
with Beijing—although some Taiwanese and Americans consider that outcome
anathema.
Philippines
Vietnam
Vietnam's concerns for energy security are easily if not comfortingly defined in
a single word: China. Hanoi's is in the unenviable position of having to assert
its claims to offshore petroleum fields that are also claimed by China. Vietnam
also is a party to conflicting sovereignty claims over all the Paracels and some
of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, but these do not offer the
proven energy reserves found within Vietnam's territorial and contiguous seas,
17
and its claimed EEZ.
Indonesia
Energy security remains a high priority for Indonesia, and one inextricably tied
into domestic, foreign, and military policy decisions. Its security is most
seriously threatened by domestic problems, however, including ethnic and
religious confrontations and equitable distribution of energy industry benefits,
both product and profits.
Malaysia and Thailand occupy the Malay Peninsula, proximate to Indonesia and
separating the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as East and South Asia. The
peninsular nations share similar concerns and are following similar policies in
naval modernization and energy security. Both have joint access to significant
offshore reserves of natural gas, and are cooperating to maximize the benefits
from that resource.
The most compelling reason that energy security is a vital priority for these
two countries is that of satisfying domestic demand. Malaysia is balancing the
contrasting values of its democratic national regime and the Islamic
governments in two of its provinces. This is a difficult balance to maintain and
to a degree drives Kuala Lumpur's national priorities, to include ensuring that
the population has access to the electricity and other benefits of a satisfactory
20
energy sector.
Malaysia and Thailand are also modernizing their navies, nominally to increase
the security in their littoral and regional waters against pirate and terrorist
threats. The systems they are acquiring, however, including submarines and
frigates equipped for multiple warfare missions, are excessive to those
missions. Clearly, both nations are concerned about conventional naval conflict
in the future, or may be misusing resources on traditional naval power. More
importantly, modern naval power will not be directly effective in ameliorating
the domestic problems facing both countries.
Australia
The small, but capable Australian navy is modernizing, but at a very moderate
pace. A major step was revealed in June 2007, when Prime Minister Howard
announced the acquisition of three Aegis-equipped warships at a total cost of
US $6.5 billion. These will be delivered between 2014 and 2017. Two large
22
amphibious ships are also being acquired, at a cost of US $2.46 billion.
India
New Delhi is modernizing and expanding its navy, with a stated mission of
defending the long energy SLOCs that cross the Indian Ocean and enter the
South China Sea. India has deepened its economic and defense relationship
with the United States and is moving to do so with the ASEAN and other East
Asian nations; the Indian Navy is playing a prominent role in pursuing these
goals.
That navy is already one of the world's most capable, with the strongest naval
aviation force in Asia. New Delhi seems determined to maintain that status,
with an eye not only on SLOC defense, but also on traditional maritime
challenges, such as an attempt by Beijing to project naval power into the
Indian Ocean.
Pakistan
Pakistan's search for energy security includes recognition of the need for
maritime power, albeit in an inherently losing position against India. Islamabad
is attempting to reduce dependence on the SLOCs by seeking to acquire access
to Iranian and Central Asian energy supplies. Pakistan's navy is expanding and
modernizing, but the nation's short coastline and proximity to its likely enemy,
India, cast serious doubts on it ability to prevail in a maritime conflict.
Even more threatening to energy security is the fragility of the Pakistani state,
rife with internal dissent, corruption, and outright insurgency. Prospects are
not bright.
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
The development and possible eruption of maritime crises will remain a factor
in Asian international relations as naval modernization across the region
accompanies ever-growing dependence on imported energy supplies, the
majority of which will continue traveling by sea. Despite the importance of
these energy SLOCs, maritime sovereignty disputes offer the most likely
venues in which naval conflict might erupt. Most dangerous are unforeseen
issues and developments in long-standing disputes that might lead to
unintended military escalation over sovereignty or energy security issues.
The Taiwan issue is more serious, posing the potential of war not just between
China and Taiwan, but also between China and the United States, two nuclear-
armed powers. An even more dangerous situation exists between India and
Pakistan, where ethnic and religious divisions form the conflictive framework
within which more substantive issues—nuclear arms developments and the
status of Kashmir—separate the two nations.
Iran offers another potential nuclear problem, with its apparent determination
to dominate the Persian Gulf area and its support of international terrorism.
Especially troubling is Tehran's support of anti-American attacks in Iraq, which
might lead to a U.S. strike on Iran that could, in turn, evoke an attempt to
interrupt the flow of shipborne energy supplies from the Persian Gulf.
Should any of the sovereignty disputes in Asia break into actual military
conflict, escalation could occur that would almost certainly involve maritime
forces and would be equally certain to negatively affect energy security for the
entire region.
Procedures for resolving such disputes are contained in UNCLOS Articles 198
and 287. One calls for submission of conflicting sovereignty claims to the
International Court of Justice, a path that has occasionally been followed. A
notable success was resolution of the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia
over the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligatan, small islands located just
24
offshore eastern Borneo.
Additional venues for resolving disputes are the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea established in Annex VI, an arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII, and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
25
accordance with Annex VIII. All maritime nations are vitally concerned with
the UNCLOS, as the most successful international attempt to erect an effective
framework supporting law and order across the ocean commons.
MARITIME STRATEGY
Maritime strategic theory in the twenty-first century still owes a debt to the
classical theorists of a century ago, a relatively short list headed by Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. The writing of the former remains applicable
to the Asian international situation because of his emphasis on linking
maritime power and national power; the latter's writings are still germane
because of his emphasis on power projection and what would be termed today
“joint warfare.”
All Asian maritime nations have at least a de facto maritime strategy, but
surprisingly few Asian coastal states have a formally written, coherent national
maritime strategy. To be effective as a vehicle for the pursuit of national
security objectives, a maritime strategy must provide both operational
objectives and the justification for the naval forces required to achieve those
objectives.
NAVAL MODERNIZATION
As the demand for increased energy supplies is pervasive across Asia, so is the
process of naval modernization. The recent Sixth International Maritime
Defense Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX Asia 2007) held in Singapore
included visits by twenty-two warships from fourteen countries: Australia,
Bangladesh, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and the United
26
States. Analysts attending this event estimated that “Asian countries are
expected to spend about US $108 billion” on naval modernization during the
next decade, with amphibious forces a primary focus.
Japan, South Korea, China, and India are building modern naval and coast
guard forces. Others, including Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Pakistan are also making significant investments in modernizing their naval
forces but not on the same scale as the four countries noted above. This near-
region-wide modernization is significant and tied directly to concerns about
sea-lane and energy security, but the United States remains the region's
dominant naval power.
The Asian navies also differ in significant ways; first of course in size. It is a
truism but relevant that no matter how capable a single warship, it can only be
in one place at one time: numbers matter. The ability to project air power at
sea is also crucial. China has no aircraft carriers, for instance, but in specific
scenarios, such as one involving Taiwan, its ability to project maritime air
power from the shore compensates for that lack. Differences in mission also
matter, however, and if the Chinese navy's mission concerns not Taiwan but the
Malacca Strait area, then its efforts would be severely hampered by the lack of
air-capable ships. Japan and India deploy such vessels, which would enhance
both the operational range and power of their maritime efforts.
Additionally, a strong navy lacking supporting air power may not be able to
operate successfully in relatively constrained waters, such as the South China
Sea, bordered by states with modern land-based air forces. Navies without
airpower at sea are not capable of operating independently during times of
conflict in the twenty-first century.
The most important mission of navies in Asia, apart from homeland defense, is
safeguarding SLOCs. These may be categorized as littoral, regional, and
interregional. Almost all of the Asian nations have at least some capability to
guard their littoral SLOCs, those within 200 nm of their coastline. Very few—
only Japan and China—have navies capable of providing some degree of
regional SLOC protection throughout East Asia; only India deploys that
capability in South Asian waters. On the highest scale of SLOC defense, only
the United States possesses the naval force necessary to operate throughout
East and South Asian waters, although even the U.S. Navy would be hard-
pressed to safeguard those very long SLOCs with any degree of certainty.
The absence of a classic naval armaments race will not lessen competition
between Japan and China and between India and China in specific strategic
situations. Similar competition will continue between Taiwan and China,
between India and Pakistan, and between Iran and the other Persian Gulf
countries. U.S. naval strategists may see calamity in a navy of less than 300
ships, but compared to even the most modern Asian force, the American fleet
29
still poses the overwhelming maritime presence in Asian waters.
Not every Asian state is the victim of significantly inadequate energy security,
of course, and not every Asian state needs to deploy significant naval forces.
One vehicle for such countries to confront contentious energy and maritime
issues is with the assistance of other nations, through multilateral efforts and
international organizations. The most notable formal organizations active in
energy security and maritime issues include the UN, APEC (Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation), ASEAN, and the ARF. Less formal multilateral
organizations that focus on maritime security issues include the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT), and several others. The record of such organizations is inconsistent,
but their importance is likely to increase, especially as China has recognized
30
the viability of such organizations.
Energy security and naval capability in Asia are thus both important concerns
for the region's energy giants—Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Indonesia,
Australia, and India. No less concerned is the United States, which has long-
standing treaty commitments with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, and less formal but still significant military
relationships with Taiwan, India, Pakistan, and the most of the Persian Gulf
nations. A different role is being played by the Central Asian states, most of
them former Soviet republics. There, a sometimes enormous reserve of energy
is in a state of development slowed by domestic political instability and
international disagreement.
Future events are difficult to predict, but some scenarios may be surmised
based on current Asian energy security and maritime issues. Despite the
volatility of the China–Taiwan and India–Pakistan confrontations, a South
China Sea divided into a sovereign hodgepodge might well be the most likely
crisis to lead to restrictions on the freedom of navigation over some of the
world's most heavily traveled sea-lanes. Interruption of these SLOCs would be
unacceptable to the United States and would likely result in naval power being
used to maintain the free passage of energy cargoes.
Farther west, disruptive conflicts in the Indian Ocean would more probably
result from traditional international conflict than from territorial disputes.
Another Indian-Pakistani war might lead to the use of nuclear weapons; finally,
the stability of the Persian Gulf area, and most particularly freedom of
navigation through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, is threatened by
an aggressive Iran and war-torn, unstable Iraq.
The Asia energy structure includes some nations without any appreciable
energy resources of their own on which they are able to draw; the relatively
few supplier nations, those with energy resources extravagantly excess to
their own requirements; and those nations whose balance of energy resources
and requirements places them in a position of viable independence with
respect to energy security. This last group is not likely to provide the leaders
in either seeking greater energy security or in building modern naval forces to
defend their littoral waters or the SLOCs over which so much of Asia's energy
supplies flow.
All the region's countries are facing decisions demanded by two important
factors in the energy security calculus. First are the needs and costs of energy
security; second is the practicality and cost of modern naval forces. These
factors are different for each nation and the balance will be resolved to various
degrees of satisfaction.
History demonstrates that the answer to that question is obvious; nations will
pursue policies and take actions, including military action, which might seem
counter to economic logic, if deemed necessary in the pursuit of national
security. Hence, as an exemplar of Asian energy issues—increasing demand
and a modernizing navy—China may well hold the key to the role that the
pursuit of energy security will play in future Asian developments: conflict or
32
cooperation.
Asia enters the twenty-first century both dependent on imported energy and
concerned about the SLOCs over which so much of that energy flows. Pipeline
construction, international organization, and cooperative efforts are all
ongoing as efforts to ameliorate that concern. National considerations are also
driving naval expansion and modernization, however, as individual states seek
to provide themselves with their own instrument of energy security.
NOTES
Chapter 1
Sam Bateman, quoted in Dick Sherwood, “Oceans Governance and Its Impa
1.
Sherwood (eds.), Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy(St. Leonard's,
Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Tanking Up: The Commercia
2.
Fleet,” Geopolitics of Energy 29(8) (August 2007): 2. One barrel equals 42 U
Admiral Michael G. Mullen and General Michael G. Hagee, “Naval Operat
3.
Department, 2006): 11ff for the definitions of these terms.
Ibid.; See also Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP)-1, Ch. 4 (Washington, DC: D
4.
athttp://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/Documents/NDPs/ndp1/ndp1
United Nations (UN) Development Program, World Energy Assessment (New
5. Xuanli Laio, and Roland Dannreuther, “The Strategic Implications of China's
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002): 13.
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New Yo
6.
of the onset of the “hydrocarbon” age. The discussion that follows draws on
Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, NJ: Princet
7. valuable source of information about Japanese decision making leading to th
the importance that oil considerations played in that process.
8. Yergin, The Prize, 396.
U.S. early recognition of Israel in 1948 was contradictory to the State Depar
9.
Eastern nations, but reflected President Harry Truman's personal priorities.
See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots
10.
2003) for a dramatic view of this event.
See Cole Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge,
11. this crisis. Also see Wm. Roger Lewis and Roger Owen,Suez 1956: The Crisis
Press, 1991).
The United States had led the world when it established national oil reserves
12. emergency fuel supplies to the navy. Following the 1973 embargo, this reser
thus recognizing its much broader significance.
13. Yergin, The Prize, 558.
“International Energy Outlook: 2007 (Coal),” U.S. Department of Energy: En
14.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/coal.html.
15. Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organiza
16. One nautical mile (nm) equals approximately 1.15 statute miles.
China expressed five “declarations” when it signed the UNCLOS in 1996; the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Peop
17.
jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the c
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention
L. Talaue-McManus, Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the South Chin
18. cited in Pakjuta Khemakorn, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries
November 2006): 18; Cornelia Dean, “Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish S
See “Fishing Ban Starts on South China Sea,” Xinhua (June 6, 2006) at
19.
http://english.people.com.cn/200606/01/eng20060601_270336.htm
The majority of these incidents have occurred in the South China Sea, usual
boats, but see Don Kirk, “South Korea Navy Fires Warning Shot at North,” In
20.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/11/21/a5_23.php, for an incident
patrol boats who were chasing Chinese fishermen out of Korean waters!
“Reports Foreign Navies Fired at Vietnamese Boats,” http://www.radioaus
Pacific Command Virtual Intelligence Center (referred to hereafter as VIC) “A
21.
VIC site gathers information from all available unclassified news sources; tw
Highlights” and “Press Summary”—as are periodic “Special Reports.”
Chapter 2
Ship units of measurement are confusing. A long ton equals 2,240 lb; a met
rather its total internal volume, with this ton a unit of internal capacity of a
1.
the ship and everything in it is the displacement, measured in long tons of 2
and Stores—but not the hull or ship structure itself.
2. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA), “World
Data is from Review of Maritime Transport, 2006 (Geneva: United Nations C
2007),http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2006_en.pdf. A somewhat
3.
Implications of the International Expansion of China's Maritime Shipping Ind
Direction for China's Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corpor
4. Data in this section is from “Review of Maritime Transport, 2006,” Report by
5. Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipp
6. Ibid., Table 5, p. 18, does not differentiate between steam and coking coal.
See H.P. Wilmott, A Century of Sea Power: Volume I, 1900–1922 (Bloomin
7.
carried “three-fifths, perhaps as much as two-thirds, of all seaborne trade.”
8. Just 476 ships (of more than 1,000 tons displacement); see the CIA World F
9. UNCTAD, Table 16, p. 33. While U.S. citizens own these ships, most operate
10. UNCTAD, 13.
11. Ibid., 17 (also see Table 5, p. 18).
Speech by Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the Internation
12.
topic_id=847&doc_id=3624.
13. “Asian Shipyards Experience Boom,” Lloyd's List (October 18, 2005), http://
14. “China's Shipbuilding Industry Sees Rapid Growth,” Xinhua (August 31, 2006
15. “China to Produce Five More LNG Tankers to Cope with Rising Import Deman
16. The U.S.-built Nimitz-class; CVN-21 (USS Gerald R. Ford), now under constr
17. See Noel Mostert, Supership (New York: Penguin, 1976) for a fascinating a
18. Described at “Knock Nevis/ex-Jahr. Viking,” GlobalSecurity.org (November
See the discussion by Martin Stopford on tanker investment at http://www
19. section=&news_id=24612&title=Newbuilding+Prices+%96+Where+
market is provided by the International Association of Independent Tanker O
The reader is reminded that gross tonnage is not weight but rather a measu
20.
deductions for exempt spaces such as living quarters measured in hundreds
21. Reported in “China's Shipbuilding Industry Sees Rapid Growth,” Xinhua (Aug
This and preceding data are from the Institute of Shipping Economics and Lo
22.
2004,http://www.isl.org/products_services/publications/samples/C
See “World Tanker Fleet,” Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics (ww
23. 2VAJ:www.isl.org/infoline/index.php%3Fname%3DUpDownload%2
Tankers are scrapped when no longer capable of efficient operation. These n
24. International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulation, December 2003.
25. The double-hull requirement and implementation progress is available on th
26. This information is from “The State of the Industry,” The International Assoc
27. “Orimulsion” is a trade-marked product registered to Petroleos de Venezuela
Wenren Jiang, “China’ Energy Engagement with Latin America,” China Brie
28.
articleid=2373211.
29. “China and Venezuela Sign $11 Bn Oil Deal,” PetroleumWorld.com, in Ale
Tanker data in this section is from Christel Heideloff, Reinhard Monden, a
30.
ISL,http://www.isl.org/products_services/publications/pdf/COMM_
LNG characteristics and potential as a terrorist target are described in Eben
31.
2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/.
See “LNG Tanker History,” Global Security.org (June 9, 2006), http://ww
different units of measurement by different organizations and researchers. F
32.
trillion cubic feet (tcf). When referring to the capacity of LNG carriers, LNG u
natural gas, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.
33. Ibid.
34. Data from http://www.worldcoal.org/pages/content/index.asp?Page
35. See information at http://www.ts1.u.se/uhdsg/Popular/CoalBasics.p
David Laque, “China Begins Building Out Its Supertanker Fleet,” Internation
36.
article_id=14399&topicID=63.
37. Author's interviews with senior energy industry representatives: Newport, R
Chapter 6
Hugo Grotius, Freedom of the Seas or the Right That Belongs to the Dutch
1. of the 1633 Latin text by Ralph van Deman Magoffin, edited with an introdu
Press, 1916; reprinted in 2001).
Ken Booth, quoted in Dick Sherwood, “Oceans Governance and Its Impact on
2.
(eds.), Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy (St. Leonard's, NSW, Aust
Any discussion of maritime strategy must begin with mention of Dr. John Hat
“The Conceptual Foundations for Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century,” pap
3.
Naval Co-operation on August 9, 1994, at Nassau Centre, Cape Town, South
Africa,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/ADR18/Hattendorf.html.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” Naval
Defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (in J1-02: Dictionary of Military a
5. some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, o
and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to d
Mahan's book was republished by Dover Publishers of New York in 1987; Cor
6.
(Annapolis, MD, 1988).
A reading of the writings of Mahan and Corbett is enriched by reading Philip
Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclea
Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (eds.), Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proce
7.
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993)
From the Writings of Rear AdmiralAlfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis, MD: Na
on maritime strategy by Colin Gray and Jon Tsumida.
Quoted in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
8.
University Press, 1977): 175.
9. Discussed in Crowell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 451.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–178
10.
published in Boston by Little, Brown in 1890.
For a more thorough, intellectually rigorous view of Mahan's theories, see Jo
11.
Command: The Classic Works ofAlfred Thayer MahanReconsidered (Washin
The Nelson quote is in a “Memorandum,” dated October 9, 1805, which may
12.
http://www.wtj.com/archives/nelson/1805_10c.htm.
13. Julian C. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longman's, 191
14. “Imperial Mahan,” Time (May 1, 1939), http://www.time.com/time/mag
Vladimir Lenin, cited in Bruce W. Watson, “The Evolution of Soviet Naval S
15.
Future of the Soviet Navy: An Assessment to the Year 2000 (Boulder, CO: W
Cited in James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Japanese Maritime Thou
16.
(June 2006): 27.
17. Yamamoto later served as Navy Minister during the 1904–1905 war with Ru
John Curtis Perry, “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval P
18. http://www.jstor.org/view/00270741/di995012/99p0262f/11?
frame=noframe&userID=c64c5907@ndu.edu/01cce4405f00501c219
Akihiko Tanaka, “Japan as a Maritime State in the 21st Century,” Keynote Ad
19. “Foreign Policy of Japan as a Maritime State in the 21st Century” (Tokyo, Feb
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/symposium/outline0102.h
20. Panel Discussion at MOFA conference.
Usually described as a factor in economic development; see Barry Eichengr
21. Growth,” Foreign Affairs 77(2) (March/April 1998) at fareviewessay1379/bar
economic-growth.html.
I am indebted here to the article by Holmes and Yoshihara, “Japanese Mariti
22.
17,000 miles of coastline, in comparison to India (4,600 miles), China (11,0
23. At http://www.fas.org/news/japan/b06071997_bt295-97.htm.
“New Maritime Laws Well Overdue,” The Yomiuri Shimbu, Tokyo (April 21, 20
24.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20070421TDY04005.htm.
See John Chan, “Tensions between Japan and South Korea Heighten Over I
25.
athttp://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/may2006/japa-m03.shtml.
26. Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Web site: “Intelligence Resource Pro
Verbatim at “President's Web Page,” quoted in “Navy-South Korea,” GlobalSe
27.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/navy.htm.
Described in Yoo Jae Kun, “Korea's Management of Defense Budget and the
28. at Phuket, Thailand (September 2, 2006) at http://www.parliament.go.t
PHPSESSID=3ea390f740f4a4a9089ce271ff230f48.
29. Admiral Song Young-moo, “Inauguration Address” (November 17, 2007),
Quoted in Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, and Lyle Goldstein, “
30. paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Ass
Chinese language sources and is currently the clearest exposition on its subj
31. Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century (Aldersho
32. See Desmond Ball, “Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Interna
Chen Wanjun, “Interview with Sr. Capt. Yu Guoquan (Director of Division of
33.
Zhishi (Beijing) no. 7 (July 1995): 2–3, in FBIS-CST-96-014, p. 54.
Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing, “On Maritime Strategy and the Marine En
34.
Science] 2 (May 20, 97): 81–92, in FBIS-CHI-97-19.
Quoted in China's Navy 2007 (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence,
35. PLAN's role in China's military strategic tenet of “active defense;” the navy—
to launch offensive (i.e., active) operations in defense of China's interests. I
Quoted in “Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng on China's Offshore Defense Str
36.
FBIS-CPP20020824000062. It is not always clear in this report when Shi wa
37. “Taiwan” is used to include the other islands controlled by Taipei, such as Jin
38. Cited in Euan Graham, Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004 (London: Ro
39. Ibid., 207.
Cited in several reports, including Wen Han, “Hu Jintao Urges Breakthrough
40.
2004) in FBIS-CPP20040114000049.
Potential PLAN defense of the SLOCs is examined in David Zweig and Bi Ji
(September/October 2005): 34ff. Also see Ji Guoxing, “SLOC Security in th
41.
Security Studies (Honolulu, HI, February 2002) at http://community.mid
SLOC%20Security%20in%20/OpSloc.htm.
See Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's S
42.
2007): 7–13, for a clear explanation of these facts.
Eric A. McVadon, “U.S.-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Ha
2007),http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=
security think-tank asserted to this author [McVadon] in April that China is l
PLAN. He noted, however, that the task is too large for the PLAN and even fo
be required. (This unprecedented statement interestingly implies that the U.
prospective disrupter of oil flow to China.) Aware of U.S. Chief of Naval Oper
43.
commander Wu Shengli for China to join the “Thousand-Ship Navy”—a freef
chairman offered two minor caveats with respect to initiating exercises and o
favor beginning bilaterally, and then perhaps folding in Japan and South Kor
cooperate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operations would be a ste
By and large, the invitation seems to have been well received by the Chines
pending further discussion.”
44. Quoted in Crowell, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” 477.
See, for instance, Simon Montlake, “Hard Time for Pirates in Busy World W
athttp://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1030/p01s04-woap.html; and J
45.
Singapore,” Bernama (November 29, 2006) at http://www.bernama.com
“Pirates Not Having It All Their Own Way On the World's High Seas,” Taipei T
Taiwan agrees with China's claims. For a useful description of the claims situ
46.
Law, Military Law, and National Development (NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin
Both nations, but especially Indonesia, have disagreed with certain tenets of
47. States.” The full text of the UNCLOS may be found at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclo
Articles 49–54 all apply to the issue of archipelagic passages. Still germane
straits is John H. Noer, with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Econom
48.
Defense University (NDU) Press in cooperation with the Center for Naval An
Pub. 151, 10th ed. (Bethesda, MD: National Imagery and Mapping Agency (N
Cited in Kwa Chong Gwan, “Singapore,” in Positioning Navies for the Future
49.
Conference 2004 (Sydney, Australia: Halstead Press, 2004).
50. Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “New Policy Directions Announced,” Asian Ana
2007),http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?article
Naziry Khalid, “Maritime Economic Activities: Planning Toward Sustainable
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 2001),http://www.mima.gov/my/mima/htmls
51.
see Iskandar Sazlan Mohd Salleh and Captain Mat Taib Yassin, “Southe
Perspectives and Recent Developments,” Maritime Studies (137) (July/Augus
LTG Teerawat Putamanonda, “The Strategy of Conflict: A Royal Thai Army
52. National Defense University, Washington DC, n.d.,http://www.ndu.edu/in
%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch11.
Preap Prisey, “Hun Sen and the Upcoming Negotiations on the Border Issu
53.
Information Center (October 29, 2005),http://www.cambodia.org/blogs
Discussion of Australia's maritime strategy draws on Alex Tewes, Laura Ra
54. the 21st Century,” Australian Parliamentary Library Research Brief, no. 4, 20
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb04.htm.
Cited in Patrick Walters, “Australia Looks to Future Wars,” The Australian (
55.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21756162-3
“The Cost of Defense: ASPI's Defense Budget Brief,” Australian Strategic Poli
56. aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?
prod=82670&session=dae.27311983.1183301754.6MNNaX8AAAEAA
57. Ibid.
Quoted in C. Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker Than Oil,” in
58.
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 200
Mihir Roy, “Maritime Security in Southwest Asia,” Speech at the Society for
59. paper.pdf. Also see “Shaping India's Maritime Opportunities & Challenges,”
2005, http://indiannavy.nic.in/cns_add2.htm.
See, for instance, “Terror At Sea: Joint India-Russia Exercise to Help Weed T
www.dailyindia.com/show/137206.php; “Trilateral Naval Exercise in Pa
http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/17/stories/2007041703491300.h
60. U.S.,” AFP (New Delhi) (March 29, 2007),
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Indian_Plans_Naval_Wargames
Korea to Hold Joint Naval Exercise,” OutlookIndia.com (New Delhi) (May 3
gid=73&id=477589.
See reports at http://www.ipcs.org/India_articles2.jsp?
61. prtal=india&keyWords=EXTERNAL&action=showView&kValue=2361
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/article/4a.htm.
See Sudha Ramachandran, “India's Quiet Sea Power,” Asia Times (August 2,
62. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IH02Df01.html, for the
in the western Indian Ocean.
“Indian Warships Ready to Head to West Asia,” Times of India (August 1, 200
63.
http://timesofindia.com/India/Indian_warships_ready_to_head_to_W
Quoted in “India Unveils Blueprint for Indian Ocean Dominance,” Defense Ne
http://www.ocean.com/category.asp?CatID=148&locationid=6&tab
64. xfile=;data/subcontinent/2005/December/subcontinent_December6
Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi, India: ICW-Institute for D
See the op-ed, “Maritime Security: Evolve Holistic Policy,” The Tribune (New
65.
newsbehindnews.com/mycgi/asianewsagency/editorials/article/42
Aziz is quoted in “Maritime Deterrence,” The Nation on Web (March 9, 2005)
66.
2005/9/editorials3.php.
Raja R. Nawaz, “Maritime Strategy in Pakistan,” master's thesis, Naval Post
67.
http://www.stormingmedia.us/05/0589/A058924.html.
Tarique Niazi, “The Strategic Implications of the Baloch Insurgency,” James
68.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2
Raheel Junejo, “Pakistan Would Not Allow the Domination of the Indian Oce
69.
http://pakistantimes.net/2005/03/08/top5.htm.
Naval Operations Concept 2006 (U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps publication, 2
70.
filesource=c:%5CMCWL_Files%5CC_P%5CNOC%20FINAL%2014%2
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed in 1979, does not guarantee but imp
71.
may be found athttp://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_R
Probably first described by Admiral Michael Mullen, in an address at the Nav
72.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=2.
73. See comments at http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/07_Jun/web_
See Admirals John Morgan, Jr., and Charles Martoglio, “Global Maritime
74.
athttp://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,81652,00.html.
Chapter 9
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, I
and Security, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of
2007): Appendix, n.p., lists data for 2004 in US$ billion as U.S.-465, China-6
Japan-45.1, and India-19.6. This data should be treated as approximate, giv
1.
categorization used by the different countries. As good case can be made, fo
U.S. defense budget is actually double the amount provided by the Defense
costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are included; a similar multiplier a
applies to the Chinese defense budget.
A version of the Aegis system has also been furnished to Spain and Norway;
2. Australia will soon receive the system, while Great Britain, France, Russia, a
developing similar systems.
Unless otherwise specified, ship specifics used in this chapter are from Steph
3. Jane's Fighting Ships, 2005–2006 (London: Jane's Information Group, 2006)
(ed.), Combat Fleets of the World, 2005–2006 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval In
A good explanation of AIP technology is provided in Richard Scott, “Boostin
of the Non-Nuclear Submarine,” Jane's International Defense Review 32 (Nov
4.
50. Also see Carl O. Schuster and Erik R. Henderson, “AIP Primer,” Cubic
Center (April 4, 2005) at http://www.vic.distributor@vic-info.org.
The Canadian, South Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, Singapore, Brunei, Indone
5. Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Pakistani, Omani, Kuwaiti, and Bahrain nav
with some form of “link” capability, but they are not all necessarily compatib
See report of this incident, with charts and pictures, at
6. http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2003/special01/01_
andhttp://gunnzihyouronn.web.fc2.com/kousaku/kousakusenn.htm
For instance, see “Indian, Japanese Coast Guard Vessels Hold Joint Exercise,
(September 11, 2000)
athttp://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/09/print20011
Multinational exercises in Hong Kong's waters are described in James C. Wo
SAREX,” at http://forum.apan-info.net/summer99web/hksarex.html,
7.
exercise, and at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/pas_pr_200610260
2006 event. Most significant is the September 2007 “Malabar XII” exercise,
hosted conventionally and nuclear-powered ships from Australia, Japan, Sing
United States. See “India to Hold Biggest Ever Naval Exercise in Bay of Beng
13, 2007) at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00120070713
8. Author's conversation with U.S. Naval Attache to Japan and JMSDF officers,
A description of the JCG's developing role and equipment is provided in Rich
9. Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca,
University Press, 2007): 77–80.
Author's participation in pertinent discussions in the mid-1980s with senior U
10. officers. U.S. naval commanders thought the ROKN should focus on surface
capabilities, as well as on surface forces dedicated to combating possible Nor
aggression.
11. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 442.
Ibid., 429. The Romeos, most at least thirty years old, are a mix of Russian,
12.
Korean construction.
13. Ibid., 433–434.
A fuller discussion of the PLAN is provided in Bernard D. Cole, The Great W
14.
Navy Enters the 21st Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
Ming hull number 361 suffered a catastrophic engineering casualty in 2003 t
15.
its entire crew.
Author's discussion with James C. Bussert, a sonar expert who identified TS
2255 sonars in the Songs; see his “Chinese Naval Sonar Evolves From Forei
Magazine (December 2002) at
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_T
articleid=279&zoneid=73. Among the many reports of German-designed
Songs are Bussert, “Chinese Submarines Pose a Double-Edged Challenge,” S
16. (December
2003),http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Art
articleid=93&zoneid=22; Richard Fisher, Jr., “How May Europe Strength
Military,”International Assessment and Strategy Center 915 (January 2005),
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.61/pub_detail.asp
Class,” GlobalSecurity.org(November 15, 2006),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/song.htm.
A U.S. submariner described the Han's noise level to the author as “like two
17.
inside a tin can.”
Author's discussion with North Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff in May 2000. T
18. headquartered at Ningbo, in Zhejiang Province just south of Shanghai and th
headquartered at Zhanjiang, in Guangdong Province across from Hainan Isla
The best account of China's attempts to sea-base nuclear armed missiles rem
19. Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower (Stanford, CA: St
Press, 1984).
See, for instance, Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and
the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2005): 188. This is a “soft” number, h
many factors, including the amount and type of cargo to be carried by emba
duration and distance of the embarkation, and other factors. The LSTs and L
20. land troops during an opposed assault; the troop transports are more likely
administratively offload troops, pier-side. Also, during an amphibious assault
and LSMs would carry predominantly cargo—such as supplies and vehicles—
troops; others might be loaded only with troops.
See Wertheim, Combat Fleets of the World, 2005—2006, 118–119. The LPD
21. Amphibious Transport Dock 071 LPD” (November 14, 2006) at http://www
defense.com/forum/index.php?showforum=4.
22. Author's conversation with senior PLA officers (2006).
See Wang Shi K’o, “Cross-Strait Underwater Warfare: A Comparison of Mine
23. Minesweeping Strength,” Ch’uan-ch’iu Fang-wei Tsa-chih [Defense Internatio
FBIS-CPP20060504103001 (May 4, 2006).
For the B-6, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59(6) (November/December 2003): 77–
80,http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd03norris.
designation for B-6, that is, H-6, this article states, “Although increasingly o
strike bomber, the H-6 may gain new life as a platform for China's emerging
capability. The naval air force has used the H-6 to carry the C-601/Kraken a
missile for more than 10 years, and Flight International reported in 2000 th
24. would be modified to carry four new YJ-63 land-attack cruise missiles.” Also
athttp://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Badger.html. For the FB-7, see “J
Fighter-Bomber] [FB-7]/FBC-I,” Globalsecurity.org (April 27, 2005)
athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ china/jh-7.htm: “Ch
developing an improved version of the FB-7. The twin-engine FB-7 is an all-
medium-range fighter-bomber with an anti-ship mission. Improvements to t
include a better radar, night attack avionics, and weapons.” I am indebted to
for this information.
See pictures at http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/showthread.php?
25. discussion at MOSNEWS, “China Converts Russian Ship to Build Its First Airc
athttp://mosnews.com/news/2005/08/25/chinacarrier.shtml.
For instance, see “Senior Military Officer: China to Develop Its Own Aircraft
Wei Po (Hong Kong) (March 10, 2006) in FBIS: CPP20060310508004, and “
26. Procure 50 SU-33 Carrier-Borne Fighters from Russia,” Sankei Shimbun (No
U.S. Pacific Command Virtual Intelligence Center (VIC) Web site, November
atwww.vic-info.org.
27. John Moore (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1980–81 (London: Jane's Publishin
28. Briefing presented by U.S. Coast Guard Office of International Affairs (June
Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1999–2000 (London: Jane's Pu
144–146. See “State to Set Up 200,000-Strong Maritime Cruise Unit,” Xinhu
1996) in FBIS-CHI-96-236, for a report of a 200,000-man “maritime cruise
1996, to be manned by reservists and to assume coastal defense duties. A m
“Linhai City of Zhejiang Sets Up Sea-Borne Militia Unit to Ensure Boats for C
29. Able to Come at the First Call,” Zhongguo Tongxun She (May 6, 2000) in FB
CPP20000506000062, reporting that the “province's first armed forces depa
product oceanic administration and a seaborne militia unit was set up.” The “
oceanic administration” is not further identified, but presumably part of the
Administration.
Tang Min, “PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law Praised,” China Daily (A
FBIS-CPP20000403000020, reports that the “amended Marine Environment
came into effect on April 1, 2000. The complexity of coast guard-type respon
obvious, and is shown in “State Council Forms Marine Bureau in Shenzhen,”
27, 1999) in FBIS-FTS19991227000826, which reports that the “Shenzhen
formed [to carry out] marine supervision. It combined the previous “separat
30.
departments under the Shenzhen Government and the Ministry of Communi
bureau is responsible for “managing overseas ships sailing and anchoring in
space, abiding by the related international marine treaty, maintaining order
and transportation, supervising ships anti-pollution facility, handling water p
public navigation facilities and regulating the shipping economy.” No referen
other organizations which seem to have similar responsibilities.
Text of “Marine Environmental Protection Law of the PRC,” Xinhua (Decembe
31.
FTS20000207000268.
Author's discussions with senior PLA officers (1999–2000). Also see Xinhua (
FBIS-CHI-99-0327, which reported that “a three-dimensional border and coa
32. communications network … has been completed and become operational”; X
1999) in FBIS-CHI-99-0647, discusses the command and control structure fo
this coastal defense system.
“PRC Establishes 12 State Maritime Safety Administrations,” Xinhua (Decemb
FBIS-CPP19991228001478. An article in Xinhua (June 18, 1999) in FBIS-CH
that in 1999 the MSA dealt with 1,880 safety violations and “saved the lives
people” in marine waters and on the Yangzte River. The drive to improve ma
following the disastrous passenger ferry sinking in late 1999, was also indica
Steps to Ensure Navigation Safety,” Xinhua (February 21, 2000) in FBIS-CPP
33.
Also see Guo Aibing, “Chinese Transportation Officials Urge Sea Safety Meas
(January 28, 2000) in FBIS-FTS20000128000198, for the report that in 199
died in ship or boat accidents—a 26.9 percent increase over 1998,” as the re
sunk at a cost of more than $30 million. The MSA predecessor, the “Bureau o
Superintendency,” was responsible for antipollution and SAR efforts, includin
Coordination Centers.
“PRC Will Enforce Rules on Coastal Vessels 1 May,” Xinhua (May 29, 2000) in
34.
CPP20000329000034.
35. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 303–304.
36. Author's discussions with senior Taiwan officers (2004–2007).
Author's discussion with senior Taiwan officers (2007). The navy has request
37.
resources necessary to correct these shortfalls.
38. Author's interviews with senior Philippine officers (May 2003).
39. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2005–2006, 932.
40. Ibid., 86.
Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and the Interior Yim S
41. “Cambodia Boosts Navy to Defend Oilfields,” Upstream (August 10,
2007)http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article138795.ece.
Jane's Fighting Ships,2004–2005 (London, UK: Jane's Information Group, 20
42. Seeks Russian Technology for Joint Arms Production,” RIA Novosti (Septembe
2007),http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070905/76881095.html.
Mark J. Valencia and Derek Johnson (eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Sta
43.
Responses (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005): 137.
SeeMarian Wilkinson, “Smugglers Paid Coast Guard, Capsize Survivor Says
44.
2005) at http://sievx.com/articles/daoed/20050521MarianWilkinson
These were launched between 2004 and 2006; all should be in commission b
45. strong resemblance to Taiwan's French-built Lafayette-class and China's Jian
The first ship was built in France and the last five in Singapore.
46. Wertheim, Combat Fleets of the World, 2005–2006, 717–719.
See the report, “Netherlands: Submarine Proliferation” (Monterey Institute o
47. Studies: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006)
athttp://www.nti.org/db/submarines/netherlands/export.html.
48. Ibid., 456.
49. Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships, 2005–2006: 466.
50. Ibid., 797.
51. Ibid., 798.
52. Ibid., 45.
The author has not visited a warship in Bangladesh since 1989, but was stru
53. remains impressed by the Bangladeshi naval officers with whom he has inter
—by this professionalism.
Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, quoted in “India Aiming t
Power: Pranab,” Indo-Asian News Service (July 1,
54.
2007),http://www.ians.in/categorynewspreview.php?
topicid=6&topicname=Defence/Security.
55. Saunders, 2006–2007, 314, notes continued strong Russian influence in this
56. Ibid.
57. Two examples are the U.S. Garcia-class frigates and Soviet Sovremenny-clas
58. Saunders, 2006–2007, 333.
See description at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Dhruv#Developm
59. flights occurred in 1992.
1. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_
2. The Commission is described at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_ne
See the record of the “Nineteenth Session of the Commission on the Limits o
3. 2007” (April 27, 2007) athttp://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
OpenElement.
4. See http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html for a description of the ITLS c
ITLS Web site: http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Section II.f. A rece
authorities seized a Japanese fishing boat and crew. Moscow released the cre
5.
(see “International Court Orders Russia to Release Japanese Boat,” NHK (Au
athttp://www.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/index2.html.
6. See information at http://www.geocities.com/cdelegas/PIRACYWEBS
7. http://www.apecsec.org.sg/ is the APEC's home Web site.
Ibid. While China's dramatic economic growth during this period and the Uni
8.
in this increase, it remains impressive in view of the regional economic melt
9. See the APEC “E-Newsletter” 3 (August 2004) at http://www.apec.org/a
The STAR conference results are summarized at
10.
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups
11. Information at http://www.imo.org/Legal/mainframe.asp?topic_id=8
Apparently still pending: Chile listed Grafimar for installation between 2006
12. Plan,” presented at the APEC Counter Terrorism Task Force Meeting at Cairns
http://aimp.apec.org/Documents/2007/CTTF/CTTF3/07_cttf3_018.
13. Cited at http://www.apec.org/apec/news_media/speeches/240206_
The Statement is in an IMO report: IMO/KUL 1/4, September 20, 2006, at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1567
attendees were Australia, the Bahamas, Belgium, Brunei, China, Cyprus, De
India, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
14. Sweden, Thailand, the UK, and the United States. International organization
Shipping, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International As
Lighthouse Authorities, BIMCO, Oil Companies International Marine Forum,
Associations, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, Inter
Strait Council.
15. “International Maritime Organization Briefing 32” (September 22, 2006), ht
This information is garnered from “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact
16.
Homeland Security (DHS), at http://www.cbp.gov.
The DHS, in “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact Sheet” (March 29, 20
“approximately 90 percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo impor
prescreening,” but this figure does not match with information provided to th
17. in May 2006, who cited a figure for that port of approximately 30 percent. W
container shipping port in Asia, indeed in the world. An alternative, passive
University scientists: see John B. Stafford, “Does 1+1= terror? Using Math
3, 2006) at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2006/march8/m
See, for instance, “Palestinians and Al-Qaeda Bond through Ship Container”
18. Stephen Cohen, “Boom Boxes: Shipping Containers and Terrorists,” Researc
http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/RP7.pdf.
Author's discussion with CSI officials (2004–2006). The CSI is described at
19.
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activi
20. Found at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/en.html.
I am indebted to Chris Rahman, of the Center for Maritime Policy of the Un
me to use this information on APEC's activities described in his paper, “Intern
21.
Asia,” since published as a chapter in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Pirac
Routledge, 2007): 183–198.
Quoted in Sam Bateman, “Regional Responses to Enhance Maritime Securit
22.
Analysis XVIII(2) (Summer 2006): 36.
“Bali Concord II—Historic Step Toward Regional Integration,” Xinhua (Octobe
23.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/76827.htm.
24. The pact may be found at “ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism” at http:
Described in Desmond Ball, “Regional Maritime Security,” David Wilson an
25.
Maritime Security (St. Leonard's, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000): 72.
See the “Chairman's Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Region
26.
http://www.aseansec.org/17642.htm.
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, France, Great Britain, India, Indon
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United States,
Chiefs Urged to Share Terrorist Information,” International Herald Tribune (S
27. athttp://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/05/asia/AS-GEN-Malay
Chiefs Discuss Terror, Piracy in Inaugural KL Meet,”channelnewsasia.com (
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/29
but opted out at the last minute without giving any reason.”
28. Quoted in Rahman, “International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast
NIDS “1999–2000 Report on Defense and Strategic Studies,” Section III: 21
29.
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/other/studyreport/p
Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, “Ocean-Peace Keeping and New R
30. (March 2000): 1,http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/kiyo/
Rahman for bringing this paper to my attention.
31. Ibid., 75–76.
32. The Joint Communiqué may be found at http://www.aseansec.org/1564
Conference results are reported in “Progress Report on ASEAN-Japan Joint D
33. International Terrorism,” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo, June 2005
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/report0506.html.
Author's discussions with U.S. and Chinese representatives to various MMCA
34. Security Regime for Northeast Asia,” Northeast Asia Peace and Security Netw
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/seccurity/07065Vaencia.html.
35. Described at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/carat.htm.
Jessica M. Bailey, “Second Phase of CARAT Ends in Thailand,” Navy News (
http://www.news.navy.mil/local/clwp/. A detailed description of this e
36.
Thailand: Special Press Summary,” VIC (July 3, 2007) at http://www1.apa
info.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2007/07/070703-CARAT2007Th
37. Malaysia's multilateral naval efforts are addressed in Sazlan, Salley, and Yas
Roel Pareno, “RP, Malaysian Navies Conclude Border Patrol,” Philstar (June
38.
http://www.philstar.com/scripts/article_print.php?id=2007062911
This heavily reported naval exercise was summed up in Michael Richardso
Jitters,” New Zealand Herald (September 5, 2007) atwww.nzherald.co.nz/
39.
c_id=2&objectid=10461642&pnum=0. Also see Steve Herman, “Indian
(September 10, 2007) at http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-09-
The SCO Charter is at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t579
40. India Becoming Observers of Shanghai Grouping,” Pakistan Tribune (June 8,
http://paktribune.com/news/indes.php?id-108489&PHPSESSID=f38
See Martin Andrew, “Power Politics: China, Russia, and Peace Mission 2005
41. (September 27, 2005) athttp://jamestown.org/publications_details.ph
volume_id=408&issue_id=3474&article_id=2370274.
See “Peace Mission 2007,” Ming Pao (July 28, 2007) and “PLA Senior Colone
Capabilities,” Xinhua (July 30, 2007), both in VIC Daily Report (August 1, 20
42.
info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/vic, and “Peace Miss
2007), a series of articles at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/
See, for instance, “President Hu's Tour to Central Asia, Russia Fruitful,” Xinh
43.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/19/content_6561418.
The phrase was probably coined by Robert Conolly, an officer of the British E
century, and was popularized by Rudyard Kipling, in his novel Kim, and refer
44. nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for control of south-central Asia, e
See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central As
account.
45. Quoted in Ball, “Regional Maritime Security,” 75. The CSCAP Charter is at ht
46. An account of this meeting is at http://www.cscap.org/documents/WG
“Report of CSCAP Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the A
47. Security Forces,” in Wellington, New Zealand, December 15–16, 2006. I am
for making this report available.
See “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation,” Statement by
48.
http://www.doc.gov.lk/regionaltrade.php?mode=undern&link=ior.
See http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/iorarc.htm. Th
49.
2003.
“Statement by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad,” Seventh Meeting of the Council
50.
2007),http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07031511451003.htm
Mark J. Valencia, “Co-operation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: A Gl
51.
(December 12, 2006),http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/06103V
52. Ibid., 2.
53. Mark J. Valencia, “Ensuring Asia's Maritime Safety,” Far Eastern Economic R
For a useful summary of multilateral efforts at maritime regulation in Asia, s
Maritime Security in East Asia,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis XVII
54.
Sharon Squassoni, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” Congressional Resear
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/other_us/crs011405.
“China Considers PSI Participation,” Korea Times (November 15, 2006),
55.
http://times.hankooki.com/page/nation/200611521220011990.htm
56. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43
Members are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan,
57. Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United Sta
India hold observer status.
U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Gary Roughead, in “Hawaii to Host 10
58.
Fleet Public Affairs News Release (October 29, 2006),http://www.news.n
Rahman, “International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 196.
59.
and Other Threats to Security” (June 17, 2003) is athttp://www.aseanse
Chapter 11
This is not to say that North Korea, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, or ot
1.
not undertake deliberately to disrupt maritime safety and productivity.
The U.S. Navy conducted analyses in the early 1970s on the issues involved
large surface ships; the results indicated that a surprisingly large number of
even achieve a “mission kill” on a large ship; that sort of study is valid in so
“lucky hit,” and would have been of no comfort to HMS Sheffield, the British
2.
Argentine-launched Exocet during the battles in the seas around the Falklan
the U.S. Government Accounting Office Report, “Defense Acquisitions: Comp
Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defense (July 2000)
athttp://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00149.pdf.
In 1987–1988, the United States reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and escorted the
chaos of the Iran–Iraq war, in which both sides attacked neutral shipping. Fe
the U.S. escort commander, a cruiser commanding officer, ordered the larges
3.
the convoy through a suspected minefield, rightly confident that it would det
serious damage to itself (no mines were encountered). Two U.S. warships th
1991 Gulf War not only survived, but were only briefly unable to continue th
Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipp
4.
Affairs 86(3) (May/June 2007): 9.
Russia's “Energy Strategy Up to 2020” states that energy will be used as an
domestic and foreign policy,” a statement that was supported by Putin inRom
5.
Marriage of Energy and Security,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (February
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/7428f1aa-b0af-4262
Vladimir I. Ivanov, “Russia,” in Manjeet Singh Pardesi et al., Energy and S
6.
Energy in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Stu
Christopher Langton (ed.), The Military Balance: 2007 (London: Internatio
7.
Studies, published by Routledge, 2007): 195, 197.
See “Russia Starts Pacific Naval Exercise,” RIA Novosti (March 26, 2007) at
8.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070326/62613658.html.
9. Hiro Katsumata, “Japan,” in Pardesi, Energy and Security, 43.
See, for instance, “Woodside Signs Pluto Export Deal,” Upstream (August 24
10. http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article139395.ece, which repo
for the Australian company to sell LNG to Japan; sales will begin in 2015.
11. Chang Youngho, “South Korea,” in Pardesi, Energy and Security, 45, 47.
See Martin Woolacot, “At Least Korea Is United Over One Thing: Anger at
(December 20, 2002) athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0
12. especially Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the E
Naval War College Review LVI(3) (Summer 2003)
athttp://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/pdfs/USnorthKorea.pdf.
The 2020 plan is discussed in Jonathan E. Sinton et al., Evaluation of China
(Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, with the China Susta
13.
16, 2005): 1. Chinese electricity consumption is at “China: Country Analysis
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Full.html.
Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Tanking Up: The Commercia
14. China's Growing Tanker Fleet,” Geopolitics of Energy 29(8) (August 2007): 4
the forty-two VLCCs currently on order in Chinese shipyards are slated to fly
15. The author was personally involved in such efforts (1984–1986).
16. Author's discussions with senior Philippine officers (May 2003).
As described earlier, Territorial Seas are those within 12 nm of Vietnam's coa
17.
those within 24 nm, and the EEZ may be claimed out to 200 nm of the coast
See Stein Tonnesson, “Sino-Vietnamese Rapprochement and the South Ch
Dialogue 34(1) (March 2003)
athttp://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Tonnesson,%20Sin
18. Vietnamese%20Rapprochement%20&%20the%20South%20China%
these talks; present status is in “China and Vietnam in Joint Oil Exploration
22, 2006) in Alexander's 11(17) (September 11, 2006)
athttp://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts63788.htm.
Approximately 6,000 of them inhabited, according to the CIA World Factbook
19.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos
“Islamic Plan Unveiled for Malaysia,” BBC News (November 12, 2003) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3263785.stm describes the a
20. Malaysian Islamic Party. For the practical difficulties of the dual—Western an
currently existing, see Meena David, “Sharia Law in Malaysia,” Australia Ne
http://australianetwork.com/focus/s1991633.htm.
See George Wehrfritz, “Things Fall Apart: Thailand's Muslim Insurgency Is
21. Newsweek (August 20–27, 2007) athttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20
The three provinces—Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala—were acquired by Bangk
Text of Howard's announcement is at
22.
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2007/Speech24373.cfm.
23. Manjeet Singh Pardesi, “India,” in Pardesi et al., Energy and Security, 37.
“Press Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Indonesia]” (Decembe
http://www.geocities.com/kbri_amman/statements/statement1.htm
24. “International Court Finds That the Sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligatan Belo
Release ICJ/605 (December 17, 2002)
athttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/ICJ605.doc.htm.
25. Located at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/te
26. IMDEX 2007 information is at http://www.imdexasia.com/.
27. “International Maritime Defense Exhibition Asia Opens in Singapore,” People
2007),http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Regional_Navies_Launch_
“Asia to Spend Over US$108b for Regional Maritime Security,” Media Corp. N
http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070515/5/singapore276127.html. Also
28.
“Submarine Frenzy in Southeast Asia” (July 2007) at
http://www.adprconsult.com.my/Articles/ADD_Jul07_Commentry.p
The U.S. Navy numbered 278 ships and submarines, and approximately 4,00
August 2007. The navy's shipbuilding plan has been unfulfilled since the end
29.
little promise of being resurrected in the face of the emphasis on the war ag
costs of Iraqi and Afghan operations.
The United States has been the world's leading proponent of multilateralism
the other hand, only since the late 1990s has appeared to recognize the util
30. organizations. An important difference between the two nations is the Amer
informal groupings and joint efforts, while the Chinese seem hesitant to eng
structured organizations.
Cited in James Tritten, “Implications for Multinational Naval Doctrine,” in S
31.
Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2002): 265–
China's decision-making paradigm is addressed in Erica S. Downs, “The Ch
32.
Debate,” China Quarterly 177 (May 2004): 21–41.
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