JUDAS and ERIKA

3 LLB

“Heirs as Interested Persons/Substitutes”: Since the administratoris only a representative of

the estate or the heirs, the heirs can do what the administrator is authorized to do. Further,
the Rules of Court specifically requires that the lawyer handling the case notifies the court of
the demise of a party and submit to the court the names of the heirs or executor or the
administrators. Once a case is filed and the cause of action survives the death of a party, that
cause of action is part of the transmissible rights which immediately becomes vested in the
heirs at the moment
of death of the party. Substitution will not be prevented by the failure of the heir in the
meantime to institute the proper settlement proceedings.

DE BORJA v. VDA. DE BORJA

46 SCRA 577 (1972)

FACTS: Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa,fi led for the probate of her will.
When the will was probated, Francisco was appointed as executor and administrator and
herein appellee, Jose de Borja, their son was appointed as coadministrator.Subsequently,
Francisco took upon himself, a secondwife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda. De Borja). Even before
the estate of Josefa was settled, Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings
wherein she was appointed special Administratrix. The relationship between the children of
the first marriage and the second wife, Tasiana had been plagued with numeroussuits and
counter-suits and in order to put an end to all theselitigation, a compromise agreement was
entered into betweenJose, in his personal capacity and as administrator of the Testate Estate
of Josefa, and by Tasiana, as the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco. Pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay Tasiana the amount of P
800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the
estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estateof Josefa, and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.” When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court
approval with the CFI of Rizal (probate of will of fi rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija
(probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana opposed in both instances. She claims among others,
that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without fi rst probating the will of
Francisco de Borja.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid?

HELD: In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this Court’s decision in
Guevara v. Guevara wherein the Court held the view that presentation of a will for probate is
mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estateon the basis of intestacy
when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. However, the doctrine in
said case is not applicable to the case at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or to
distribute the estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The
clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. Since a
hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of
course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated
to the vendor heir.
“Cross as a Signature”: A cross cannot be likened to a thumb mark since it can be easily
written by some other person whereas a thumb mark may only be placed by the testator
himself. Unless it can be proven that the testator’s customary signature is a cross, then the
will cannot be considered to have been signed by the testator himself.

SUROZA v. HONRADO
110 SCRA 381 (1981)

FACTS: Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will in July 1973 when she was 73
years old. The will, which was in English, was thumbmarked by Marcelina, who was
illiterate. Upon her death, the will which bequeathed all her estate to a supposed
granddaughter was presented for probate. Opposition to the probate was made by Nenita
Suroza, the wife of the alleged adopted son of Marcelina on the ground of preterition of said
son, Agapito, and on the ground that the will was void because Marcelina did not appear
before a notary public and because it is written in English which is not known to Marcelina.
The presiding judge denied the opposition of Nenita Suroza and admitted the will to
probate.

ISSUE: Was there sufficient evidence on record to show that the will on its face was void?

HELD: Upon perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumb
marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, respondent Judge could have readily perceived
that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That
could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code
that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will
written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void (Acop v. Piraso, 52
Phil.660).

GARCIA v. LACUESTA
90 Phil 189 (1951)

FACTS: The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and containsthe following attestation
clause:“We, the undersigned, by these presents do declare that the foregoing testament of
Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation
clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of
this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood
by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three
pages and all them were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the
witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and
each and every one of us witnesses.” The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by “A reugo del
testator” and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a
cross immediately after his name.

ISSUE: Was the will in compliance with Article 805?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court in affi rming the ruling of the Court of Appeals held that the
attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner argues, however, that there
is no need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a
sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner’s
theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held
sufficient by this Court in the cases of De Gala v. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar v.
Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra v. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and
Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is
the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name.
After mature refl ection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a
thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

Meaning of “in the presence of” : Presence of the witnesses depends upon the opportunity of
the witnesses to see the execution of the will. “In the presence of each other” does not
depend upon proof of the fact that the eyes of the witnesses were precisely cast upon the
instrument at the moment of each and every subscription. “In the presence of each other”
depends on existing conditions and positions of the witnesses in relation to each other such
that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction, they could have seen each other
sign, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions.

“What constitutes a Signature”: A complete signature is not essential to the validity of a will.
Perhaps to provide for greater authenticity, what should be found at the end of the will is the
testator’s customary signature. However, since the law does not require his full signature,
the initials or even a thumb mark by the testator may be deemed sufficient to comply with
this requirement. A thumb mark at the end of the will may be considered as a valid
signature especially when a testator cannot affix his signature due to some medical
condition such as paralysis.

MATIAS VS. SALUD, et al.

(June 29, 1957)

Doctrine:
Appointment of Basilia as “special administrator”, when she was obviously unfit foresaid
office due to her advanced age of 80 and blindness, amounts to grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent judge.
Nature:
petition for certiorari to annul orders of CFI Judge Gonzales

FACTS: May 1952, Aurea Matias initiated special proceeding with petition for probate of
document purporting to be the last will of her aunt, Gabina, Raquiel, who died single on May
8, at age 92. The heir to entire estate ( except properties bequeathed to other nieces and
nephews) is Aurea Matias who is also named “executrix”.
Basilia Salud, first cousin of deceased, opposed probate. Probate court sustained
opposition and denied probate. So Aurea Matias went to SC, where it is now pending
decision. Meanwhile, on Feb 1956, Basilia Salud moved for dismissal of Horacio Rodriquez
as special administrator of estate and the appointment of Ramon Plata. Rodriguez, although
notified of hearing, did not appear but instead filed an urgent motion for additional time to
answer charged against him by Basilia. Motion was not granted and Basilia introduced
evidence against him, and Judge eventually found him guilty of abuse of authority and gross
negligence so he was relieved of his post as special administrator and granted the motion of
Basilia, consequently, Victorina Salud (niece of Basilia, ordered to help Basilia and be her
adviser, as she is very old and disabled) and Ramon Plata were appointed
administrators.Aurea Matias, asked that order be set aside and that she be appointed co-
administratrix with Horacio Rodriguez upon the ground that Basilia is over 80, totally
blind and physically incapacitated to perform duties, and said movant is the universal
heiress of deceased and the person appointed as executrix in her alleged last will. But the
motion was denied.

March 17, 1956, Basilia tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason of her
old age and disability, and recommending Victorina Salud in her place. Aurea
sought reconsideration of order confirming the 3 administrators and expressed conformity
with resignation of Basilia. However, she objected to the appointment of Victorina on
account of her antagonism towards Aurea. Victorina was the principal and most interested
witness for opposition to probate of alleged last will. Aurea proposed administration be
entrusted to PNB, Monte de Piedad, BPI or similar institutions, should the court
be reluctant to appoint her.

Soon after, Plata and Victorina requested authority to collect rent due to estate and produce,
as well as permission to sell palay belonging to estate. Judge granted both.
Aurea Salid instituted present action against Judge, Victorina and Plata for annulling orders
of judge on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES: WON judge committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in appointing Victorina and Plata
and issuing such orders?

RULING: Yes.We can’t fully sanction the acts of judge for the following reasons:
1. Although Horatio Rodriguez had notice of hearing of motion for his removal, he
received copy of motion the date after the set date for hearing.
2. Aurea had no notice of hearing for removal of Horacio Rodriguez and Basilia’s motion
to appoint Plata. She also had no notice that her main opponent, Basilia and Victorina would
be considered for management of estate. She therefore had no opportunity to object.
3. Order appointing Basilia was issued with evident knowledge of her physical
disability, Judge having said that she “should be assisted and advised by her niece
Victorina” and that the latter“shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia
Salud”.
4. Judge in effect appointed 3 special administrators of the estate,namely Basilia,
Victorina and Plata.
5. Soon after institution of estate proceedings, issue arose between Aurea and Basilia
regarding the person to be appointed special administrator. Former proposed Horacio
Rodriguez while the latter recommented Victorina. The then court, presided over by Judge
Bernabe, appointed Rodriguzed because unlike Victorina who was employed and lived in
Manila, Rodriguez was a lawyer, former public prosecutor and mayor and a resident of
Cavite. Judge Gonzales’ order
was therefore a reversal of Judge Bernabe’s order.
6. Although probate was denied by respondent Judge, this is not yet final as it is
pending appeal. Aurea, therefore, still has a special interest to protect during pendency of
her appeal.
7. As there are at least 2 factions among heirs and lower court deemed it best to appoint more than 1
special administrator, it is only just that both factions be represented in the management of
the estate.The rule, laid down in(Roxas vs. Pecson,supra.)
to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of
the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court
appointed therein one specialadministrator for some properties forming part of said estate,
and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate
and independent specia ladministrators. In the case at bar there is only one (1) special
administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In
short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the
power of courts to appoint several special co-administrators.
Therefore orders of respondent judge are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Lower court should
re-hear matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of special administrators,
after due notice to parties. Costs against Victorina and Plata.

JAVELLANA VS. LEDESMA

G.R. No. L-7179

FACTS: 1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased
Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and
May 1952. The contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She
appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with
law. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. On the other hand, the codicil
was executed after the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be
acknowledged before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be one of the
instrumental witnesses, asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San
Pablo hospital, Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea,
however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and sealing was done
afterwards.
One of the allegations was that the “certificate of acknowledgement” to the codicil was
signed somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The signature of the testatr ix and the
witnesses were procured at the hospital, and was signed and sealed by the notary only
when he brought it in his office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the
testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will.

RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing
of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be accomplished in ONE single act. All that is
required is that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor
of the testamentary act. Their separate execution out of the presence of the testator and the
witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be completed without
interruption.

CRUZ VS. VILLAZOR

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging
that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence.
He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having
been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with
law. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will
was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to
probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the
NCC.

HELD: NO. The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same
time. To “acknowledge before” means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent,
admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation
would be absurd. Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the
attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he
would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

NERA v. RIMANDO
18 Phil 450 (1911)

ISSUE: Whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it
was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached
their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a
large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

HELD: The particular subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the
instrument. Hence, the will complied with the requirement of “in the presence.” Had this
subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time when the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in
the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the
attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done “in the presence” of the
witness in the outer room. This is because the line of vision from this witness to the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain
separating the inner from the outer one “at the moment of inscription of each signature.”
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each
other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature. The
position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. The
question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their
eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them,
but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other
were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all
manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this
particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a
will.

“Subscribing” v. “Attesting” Signature: The placement of the signature of the testator at the
end of the will is crucial to its validity while the placement of the signature on each and
every page on the left margin will not invalidate the will. The difference lies in the purpose
of the signature, the signature as required in the first paragraph of Article 805 is to attest,
declare, and confirm that all the dispositions above it are of and by the testator whereas the
signature as required in the second paragraph of the same article is merely to identify each
and every page of the will. As such, an attesting signature must be found below the
dispositions in the will as a matter of necessity while an identifying or subscribing signature
may be placed anywhere in the will, preferably on the left margin as a matter of style.
“Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is that act of the senses, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest
a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute
an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write
on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.
(Caneda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993)

VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979, 11 S 422, June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate
of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased. Petitioner also filed a motion for the
admission ofan amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will
executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate which he allegedly found only after the filing of the petition.

Respondent then filed her opposition; and she petitioned to have herself appointed as a
special administrator. The records
show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of
the petition consists of five pages. While signed at the end and in every page, it does not
contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three
thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed
by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three of the original, admits that
he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that was
signed in his presence.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures
of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same
occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine,
they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the
testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who
will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of one of the instrumental witnessess‘ signature on a
page of the original copy of the will is fatal where the duplicate has the complete signatures
of the testator and all witnesses on every page.

RULING: The Court held that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the
will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary
publicwho acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents.
Moreover, there is no adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some
heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither.

The failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only by the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing
the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was
ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.

Furthermore, that the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely
through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of
the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease
opposed the allowance of the will alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties
he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the
said last will and testament. Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.

Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Panñ ares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the
Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to
simpler terms, the question was attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of each other, considering that the three attesting
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third
witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will.

On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed
executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three attesting
witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them.

ISSUE: Whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second
requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.

RULING: After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, the Court
sustained that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot
be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v.
Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. (The New
Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New
Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International
Dictionary 2d. p. 245.)

Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because
he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be
interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity
of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of Code Commission p. 106-107),
would be thwarted.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the probate
of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz is declared not valid and hereby set aside.

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,

AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS
CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA
RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA *
ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS
CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of
his life, executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano
Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. It was declared therein, among other
things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo,
Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the
testator.

The petitioners contend that the attestation clause, in contravention of the express
requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses,
fails to specifically state the fact that the the testator signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the witnesses and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the
late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article
809, of the Civil Code

HELD: YES. Article 805 provides that the attestation clause should state (1) the number of
the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly
caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting
witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the
will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another. Failure to state the said facts shall invalidate
the will.

In the present case, the attestation clause, while it recites that the testator indeed signed the
will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance
that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

Under Article 809, the defects and imperfections of a will, with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein, would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805.
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact
that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language
of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805
to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.

TABOADA v. ROSAL
118 SCRA 195 (1982)

FACTS: Petitioner Taboada presented for probate the alleged last will and testament of the
late Dorotea Perez. Written in Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of 2 pages. The first
page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the
page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the 3 instrumental witnesses. The
second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the
end of the attestation clause by the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix. The respondent Judge denied probate of the will for want of formality in its
execution, that is, that the 3 subscribing witnesses did not sign at the same place or at the
end of the will as the testator did.

ISSUE: Does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the
testatrix and of one another?

HELD: It must be noted that Article 805 uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation
consists in witnessing the testator’s execution of the will in order to see and take note
mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and
that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses’ names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of
such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. Insofar as the requirement of
subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will was subscribed in a
manner which fully satisfies the purposes of identification. The signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the fi rst page of the will attested not only to
the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clauses. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be
desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where
the authenticity of the will is not assailed. The objects of attestation and of subscription
were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at
the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially
so when the will was properly identified by the subscribing witness to be the same will
executed by the testatrix.

“Placement of Attesting Signature”: The attesting signature of the testator must be found at
the logical end of the will, otherwise the will is void. The attesting signature of the witnesses
must be found at the end of the attestation clause, otherwise the will is void.

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido
Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO
LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate
Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 74695, 226 S 347, September 14, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: Seventy nine year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling
Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate. As testified to by the
three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were
present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead,
private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same
aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them. Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to
probate on 9 December 1977.

On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido
Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the
disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will,
the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private
respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the
reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death
on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition.
Subsequently, a Probate Order was issued. Upon appeal, it was contended that the deceased
was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code
was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should
have been denied.

The Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that
Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that
assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied
with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective
copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was
not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making
known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was
served.

ISSUE: Was the double-reading requirement of Article 808 complied with?

RULING: Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be
read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the
incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an
opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged
will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only
once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the
single
reading suffices for purposes of the law. The Court sustained private respondent's stand.
The
Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions.

Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and
petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently
made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling
Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth
and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is
that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his
expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's
residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has
remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969

FACTS: Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a
language she knew an spoke. The other will was executed in December 1960
consisting of only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will
declared that the will was first read 'silently' by the testatrix before signing it. The
probate court admitted the will.
The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the “eyesight” of the deceased
was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code
(NCC) should apply. If the testator is blind or incapable of reading, he must be
apprised of the contents of the will for him to be able to have the opportunity to
object if the provisions therein are not in accordance with his wishes.
The testimony of her Opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation
to remove her cataract and being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her
vision. Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading.
There was no evidence that her vision improved at the time of the execution of the
2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will
to probate is therefore erroneous.

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:

FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been
executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal
beneficiary and executrix. The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein
petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following
grounds: 1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative; 2. that the same was not
executedand attested as required by law; 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the
purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and
in the second alternative; That the purported Will was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some
other person for her benefit.

The trial court disallowed the will. On appeal, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to
probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed and attested as required by law

RULING: The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined

by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that
said
witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible
that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a
witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony."

In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be
shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of
belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on
record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest
and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such
unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses
must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the
probate of the will they have attested.

We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have
introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible
witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable.

Guerrero vs Bihis
G.R. No. 174144. APRIL 17, 2007
CORONA, J.;

FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and

respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC Quezon City.
Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister‘s petition on the following grounds: the will was
not executed andattested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did
not comply with the requirement of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by
fraud and petitioner and her children procure the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence.

Petitioner Guerrero was appointed special administratix. Respondent opposed petitioner‘s

appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate
of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the was
acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix‘s residence at No. 40
Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary
public for and in Caloocan City.

ISSUE: Does the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under
Article 806 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. one of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of
a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.

The notarial law provides:

Section 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
coextensive in the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be
coextensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond
the limits of his jurisdiction.

The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the
interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the
testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Paz Samaniego-Celada vs. Lucia D. Abena G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008

FACTS: Herein petitioner is the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayora while
respondent is the decedent’s companion since 1929. Margarita died single on April 27, 1987
without any ascending nor descending heirs and she was survived by her first cousins. On
February 2, 1987, prior to her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament wherein
she bequethed to respondent and other devisees her real properties, left all her personal
properties to respondent whomshe likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration while respondent filed for a petition
for probate of the will; the 2 cases were then consolidated. RTC probated the last will and
testament.On appeal, CA affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for
failure to comply with the formalities required by law.

HELD: Petitioner posits that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation
clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will
consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not apart of the notarial will, the
same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the
court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate
the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some
of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is
the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code. In fine, the court finds that
the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the
notarial will presented tothe court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all
the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have
been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.

Casiano v. CA
158 SCRA 451

FACTS:

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will
and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of their aunt’s estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending
the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of
extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate. The agreement provided for the division of the
estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial
settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.

3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana’s counsel, the late Atty.
Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento),” dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was
going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The
document was submitted to the clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and
Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue
of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives
devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in
the same court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was denied by
the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition
and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the
appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA
found that the will to be probated had been revoked by the burning thereof by the
housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.

HELD:

No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute
an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the
presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must
be the will itself.
“Animus revocandi” is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a
last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical
act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction.

There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning
was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating
that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.

The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that the
document burned was indeed Adriana’s will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she
destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the
other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because
Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.

It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken
to its very foundations.

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE
MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS: Juana Juan Vda. de Molo sought the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition
filed by the respondents, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside
and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence,
the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the
petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.

Petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
August 17, 1918. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on
three grounds:

(1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that
said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been
subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for
liberation came and therecords of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for
reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible because neither petitioner
nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its reconstitution. As a result,
petitioner filed a new petition similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an
opposition based on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition.
The court issued an order admitting the will to probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased which
was denied probate is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.

HELD: MIt is void. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that
it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and
would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the
testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he
executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.

BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
G.R. No. L-58509 7 December 1982
RELOVA, J.:

FACTS: This is a consolidated petition filed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
Treyes, Expidite Bonilla Frias, and Ephralm Bonilla, the oppositors and appelles herein,
opposing the petition filed by Marcela Rodelas, the petitioner and appellant herein, for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters of testamentary
in her favor. The latter presented in court an alleged copy of the said holographic will.

The probate court ordered the dismissal of appellant‘s petition for the allowance of the
holographic will of deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla on the ground that the alleged photostatic
copy of the will which was presented for probate, cannot stand in lieu of the lost original, for
the law regards the document itself as the material proof of the authenticity of the said will.
ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will that was lost or cannot be found be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.

RULING: The court held that if a holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in the said will as it is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. However,
a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962
DIZON, J.:

FACTS: The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action
for partition against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel
St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that
Singson owned onehalf pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino
owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dnñ a. Leona
Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made
demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus
compelling them to bring action. It is admitted that Dnñ a. Leona Singson, who died single on
January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July
31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No.
453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No.
3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her
brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad,
and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino. The lower courtrendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendant appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called substitucion
vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.

RULING: The last will of the deceased Dnñ a. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be
effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after
that of the testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made
of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee,
during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to
her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated,
it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of
the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.The appealed
judgment is affirmed, with costs.

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, PETITIONERS,

VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN
CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, AND TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-24742 OCTOBER 26, 1973

FACTS: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2)
minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco
Gonzales.

On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration,
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February
1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an
order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to
all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA
PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said
Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as
executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No.
Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

The Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in
his testament.

RULING: The Court holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the
record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is
noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the
Cebu court's order of April 10, 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon
City court, thus leaving the latterfree (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to
exercise jurisdiction and admit thedecedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate
and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in
the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction. Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the
Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a
special civic action of prohibition.
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA
PATIGAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. They claimed
that the deceased Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when
she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and
duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for probate,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives
an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of
Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. They argued that the repeated
dates
incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the
deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature
should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every
disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery. Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and
various documentary evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that
at least three witnesses explicitly declares that the signature in the will is the genuine
signature of the testator is mandatory.

RULING: In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the
Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the
probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that
the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.

The Supreme Court is convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. It ruled that "shall" in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who
for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde
Senñ o vda. de Ramonal.

POLLY CAYETANO v. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, GR No. L-54919, 1984-05-30

Facts: Adoracion C. Campos died... leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and
her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina
as the surviving heirs.

Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion
Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner... it has been...
established that Adoracion C. Campos... in her lifetime, was a citizen... of the United States of
America... with a permanent residence... that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines,
Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila... leaving property both in... the Philippines
and in the United States of America

Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Canpos is hereby admitted to and allowed
probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or
in excess of his jurisdiction when

He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of
death was a usual resident of Dasmarinñ as, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case

Issues: respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.

Ruling: the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court... it is provided that:... his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled... if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania,... United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by
the petitioner.

Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he
died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been
estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were
married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his
estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May
13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the
testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the
respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise
in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision.

HELD: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will
to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made
between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because
the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage.

Legitimate Parents and Ascendants

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole,
universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

HELD: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition ―consists in the omission in the testator‘s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited‖. Disinheritance, in turn, ―is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

WHEREFORE, upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under
review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI,
Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be

the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her
sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging,
in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions
without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article
814 of the Civil Code.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alterations, insertions, and/or additions in the will affect its
validity.

RULING: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by

the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason
that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as
first written should be givenefficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245

FACTS: Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the
estate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon
stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a “letter-will”
entirely written and signed in deceased’s handwriting. The will is dated “FEB./61 ” and
states: “This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer.
Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased,
identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that
it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a
holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.

ISSUE: W/N the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

Valid date. This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The
underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists
in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the
exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56
Phil. 282).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although
compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished
by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v.
Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. …

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of

two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day
on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in
this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and
fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no
question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is
also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix
agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by
the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective
because the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of
its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only
issue is whether or not the date “FEB./61” appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,

vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that
he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the
petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an
order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and
was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give
this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the
subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound and
disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that
petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he
was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing it. Petitioner has no
compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia
corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee and devisee of
petitioner's properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2
million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such
without a bond.

After the death of the testator, on April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a
motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and
Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for
the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not a nephew is a compulsory heir of the deceased

HELD: No. The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of
all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first
time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records
show, not supported by evidence.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
"heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator.

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.

QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not
married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within
the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals
on May 16, 1989.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 setting aside the final and executory Order
dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in
an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?

HELD: No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened
no matter how erroneous it may be. It should be noted that probate proceedings deals
generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three
aspects:
- whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
- compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
- the testamentary capacity of the testator; and
- the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will
and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. The only instance
where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the
will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only
heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of
the testator, thesame constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the
probate proceedings.

Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would
amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when
the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear from the
executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according
to the laws of intestate succession.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will
must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from
the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can
be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If
the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity
thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial
court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994
PUNO, J.:

FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound
and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located
in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by
decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's
will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
814 of the New Civil Code

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be admitted for probate

RULING: Respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the
New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will.
This is erroneous.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of
the New Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Thus, unless the
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with
respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan
del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent
Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran
property. No costs.

LOPEZ v. CA G.R. No. 157784 December 16, 2008 Ponente: TINGA

FACTS: On 23 March 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will,whereby she expressed that she
wished to constitute a trust fund for her paraphernal properties, denominated as
Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano (Fideicomiso), to be administered by her husband. If
her husband were to die or renounce the obligation, her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to
become administrator and executor of the Fideicomiso. Two-thirds (2/3) of the income
from rentals over these properties were to answer for the education of deserving but needy
honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses and fees of the
administrator. As to her conjugal properties, Juliana bequeathed the portion that she could
legally dispose to her husband, and after his death, said properties were to pass to her
biznietos or great grandchildren. Juliana initiated the probate of her will five (5) days after
its execution, but she died on 12 August 1968, before the petition for probate could be
heard. The petition was pursued instead in Special Proceedings (S.P.) No. 706 by her
husband, Jose, who was the designated executor in the will. On 7 October 1968, the Court of
First Instance, Branch 3, Balayan,Batangas, acting as probate court, admitted the will to
probate and issued the letters testamentary to Jose. Jose then submitted an inventory of
Juliana’s real and personal properties with their appraised values, which was approved by
the probate court. Thereafter, Jose filed a Report dated 16 August 1969, which included a
proposed project of partition. Jose proceeded to offer a project of partition.Then, Jose listed
those properties which he alleged were registered in both his and Juliana’s names, totaling
13 parcels in all. The disputed properties consisting of six (6) parcels, all located in Balayan,
Batangas, were included in said list. On 25 August 1969, the probate court issued an order
approving the project of partition. As to the properties to be constituted into the
Fideicomiso, the probate court ordered that the certificates of title thereto be cancelled, and,
in lieu thereof, new certificates be issued in favor of Jose as trustee of the Fideicomiso
covering one-half (1/2) of the properties listed under paragraph 14 of the project of
partition; and regarding the other half, to be registered in the name of Jose as heir of Juliana.
The properties which Jose had alleged as registered in his and Juliana’s names, including the
disputed lots, were adjudicated to Jose as heir, subject to the condition that Jose would settle
the obligations charged on these properties. The probate court, thus, directed that new
certificates of title be issued in favor of Jose as the registered owner thereof in its Order
dated 15 September 1969. On even date, the certificates of title of the disputed properties
were issued in the name of Jose. The Fideicomiso was constituted in S.P No. 706
encompassing one-half (1/2) of the Abra de Ilog lot on Mindoro, the 1/6 portion of the lot in
Antorcha St. in Balayan, Batangas and all other properties inherited ab intestato by Juliana
from her sister, Clemencia, in accordance with the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 706.
The disputed lands were excluded from the trust. Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a
holographic will disposing of the disputed properties to respondents. The will was allowed
probate on 20 December 1983 in S.P. No. 2675 before the RTC of Pasay City. Pursuant to
Jose’s will, the RTC ordered on 20 December 1983 the transfer of the disputed properties to
the respondents as the heirs of Jose. Consequently, the certificates of title of the disputed
properties were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of respondents. Petitioner’s
father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of Juliana’s estate. On 30 August 1984,
the RTC of Batangas, Branch 9 appointed petitioner as trustee of Juliana’s estate in S.P. No.
706. On 11 December 1984, petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of
land with sum of money before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas against respondents. The
complaint essentially alleged that Jose was able to register in his name the disputed
properties, which were the paraphernal properties of Juliana, either during their conjugal
union or in the course of the performance of his duties as executor of the testate estate of
Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the disputed properties were included in the
inventory as if they formed part of Jose’s estate when in fact Jose was holding them only in
trust for the trust estate of Juliana. The RCT dismissed the petition on the ground of
prescription. The CA denied the appeals filed by both parties. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when Jose,
the trustee, registered them in his name.

HELD: The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso at the outset. Jose
registered the disputed properties in his name partly as his conjugal share and partly as his
inheritance from his wife Juliana, which is the complete reverse of the claim of the
petitioner, as the new trustee, that the properties are intended for the beneficiaries of the
Fideicomiso. Furthermore, the exclusion of the disputed properties from the Fideicomiso
was approved by the probate court and, subsequently, by the trial court having jurisdiction
over the Fideicomiso. The registration of the disputed properties in the name of Jose was
actually pursuant to a court order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed
properties to Jose created a mere implied trust of the constructive variety in favor of the
beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso.

JOSE RIVERA petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio
Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of
the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's
estate.

It was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later
appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose
Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married
to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria
Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this
estate because the decedent was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to
probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decedent‘s holographic wills may be admitted for probate.

HELD:Yes. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in petitioner‘s argument is that, as already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of
the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he
had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal
effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr.,
who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was
sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioner.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate
T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another
child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and
his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an
Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.

ISSUE: Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.

HELD: No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession
provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of
the same law.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-inlaw.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA EXECUTOR-APPELLEE, VS. ESTRELLA DIZON ET AL. ,

OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
No L-24561 30 June 1970
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
FACTS: The testator, Agripina J. Valdez died in Angeles, Pampanga and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,
Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon,
a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.

The deceased testator left a will written in Pampango dialect. In her will she named her
compulsory heirs with seven other legitimate grandchildren as her beneficiaries, amounting
to P1, 801,960.00. She divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties. The
distribution is as follows: (1) Estela Dizon-P98,474.80; (2) Angelina Dizon-P106,307.06; (3)
Bernardita DizonP51,968.17; (4) Josefina Dizon-P52,056.39; (5) Tomas Dizon-P131,987.41;
(6) Lilia DizonP72,182.47; (7) marina Dizon-P1,148,063.71; (8) Pablo Rivera, Jr.-
P69,280.00; and (9) Lilia Dizon and the other grandchildren-P72,540.00, having a total
value of P1,801,960.01.

The last will and testament was admitted to probate, and Marina Dizon was appointed
executor. She filed the project of partition; however, oppositors Tomas Dizon and the others
filed a counter-project of partition. The lower court approved the partition filed by Marina
Dizon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator is correct in her distribution of properties to her
compulsory heirs and grandchildren.

RULING: Yes, the institution and partition made by the testator is correct. The testator
expressly provided for in her will that her property be divided in accordance with her
dispositions, where she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom
she bequeathed the same. Such was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that ― Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.‖

Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)

Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She diedintestate.
When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointedadministratrix and
filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on theground that certain properties
donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of
Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is notdisputed. The TC issued an order in favor of
Buhay because when Candelariadonated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of
Donation “sa pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC
interpreted as a prohibitionto collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were
not impaired. Onappeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable
not anexpress prohibition to collate.

Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, mustbring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have receivedfrom the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any othergratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of thelegitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a).
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor shouldhave so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unlessthe donation
should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and
that it merely described thedonation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable
does not necessarilyexempt the donated properties from collation as required under the
provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent
donorwould have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the
donor’sintention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemptionshould
be applied.

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN,et al.,

petitioners, vs. The CA, JOSE JAUCIAN, et al., respondents.

Facts: Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will andTestament instituting his wife, Catalina
Jaucian Locsin,as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. Thespouses being
childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died shouldrevert to
their respective sides of the family, i.e.,Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin
relatives"(i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), andthose of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives."Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14,1948 after a lingering
illness. In due time, his will wasprobated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of
Albaywithout any opposition from both sides of the family. DonMariano relied on Donñ a
Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in
obedience to his voice from the grave, and fullycognizant that she was also advancing in
years, Donñ aCatalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as
well as her own,properties to their respective nephews and nieces. Shemade the following
sales and donation of propertieswhich she had received from her husband's estate, to
hisLocsin nephews and nieces:Four years before her death, she had made awill on October
22, 1973 she had made a will affirmingand ratifying the transfers she had made during her
lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives.After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed thatthere was no need to submit it to the court for probatebecause the
properties devised to them under the willhad already been conveyed to them by the
deceasedwhen she was still alive, except some legacies which theexecutor of her will or
estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,proceeded to distribute.In 1989, some of her Jaucian
nephews andnieces who had already received their legacies andhereditary shares from her
estate, filed action in theRTC-Legaspi to recover the properties which she hadconveyed to
the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging thatthe conveyances were inofficious, without
consideration,and intended solely to circumvent the laws onsuccession. Those who were
closest to Donñ a Catalinadid not join the action.After the trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed thesaid decion,hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Donñ aCatalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled
to inherit theproperties which she had already disposed of more thanten (10) years before
her death.

Held: NO. They are not entitled since those properties didnot form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the propertyand transmissible rights and obligations existing at thetime of (the
decedent's) death and those which haveaccrued thereto since the opening of the
succession."The rights to a person's succession aretransmitted from the moment of his
death, and do notvest in his heirs until such time.Property which Donñ a Catalina had
transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her
estate at the time of her death towhich her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate,only
the property that remained in her estate at the timeof her death devolved to her legal
heirs.Even if those transfers were, one and all, treatedas donations, the right arising under
certaincircumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's
gifts inter vivos does not inureto the respondents since neither they nor the donees
arecompulsory (or forced) heirs.

Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs,and it is not pretended that she had any
such, hencethere were no legitimes that could conceivably beimpaired by any transfer of her
property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancythat in nowise
restricted her freedom to dispose of evenher entire estate subject only to the limitation set
forth inArt. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, therespondents may not invoke:
“Art. 750. The donationmay comprehend all the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or inusufruct, sufficient means for the
support of himself, andof all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of thedonation, are
by law entitled to be supported by thedonor. Without such reservation, the donation shall
bereduced on petition of any person affected”.Petition for review is granted.

MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO

MANONGSONG, petitioners,
vs.
FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ,
CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ,
JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR.,
AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA
CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003

FACTS: The disputed property is a parcel of land owned by Spouses Agatona Guevarra
(―Guevarra‖) and Ciriaco Lopez who had 6 children. Subject parcel of land however was
unregistered but with improvements thereon in the name of one of the children, Filomena.
Milagros Manongsong, granddaughter of decedents, (―petitioners‖) filed a complaint
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property.
Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code, petitioners prayed for the partition and award to
them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value,
and for damages.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra‘s
death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring,
there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including
Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente
Lopez‘ sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father‘s 1/5 share in the Property by
right of representation. Most respondents, aunts, uncle and cousins of respondent, entered
into a
compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement dated 12 September 1992 (―Agreement‖), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela
Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property.

The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this
effect and prayed further that ―those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be
reduced so that those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and
proper portion.

The Jumaquio sisters, daughters of Felomina on the other hand presented a

notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA executed by their great great grandmother in
favor of their mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged sale is valid and thus binds the co-heirs
RULING: Yes. The Court finds no basis for the trial court‘s declaration that the sale
embodied
in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to
a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable
consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that
is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.

SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES

JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA
JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL
JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD
ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES
ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE
JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
executed by defendant parents in favour of their co-defendant children. The plaintiff
children are claiming that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were made and
that the purported sale was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

ISSUE: Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid? Yes.

RULING: The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is
merely inchoate and vests only upon the parents‘ death. While still alive, parents are free to
dispose of their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right
commences only from the moment of death of the decedent. There can be no legitime to
speak of prior to the death of their parents. In determining the legitime, the value of the
property left at the death of the testator shall be considered. The legitime of a compulsory
heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will show that the Deeds of
Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. Petitioners failed to show that the prices
in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry
greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will
not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing that the findings of
the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.[20]

In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in
their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the
seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.

ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,
- versus -
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual.

During his lifetime, he donated a parcel of land to his sister Amelia. Upon his death, his
siblings filed a petition for ―Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters
of Administration,‖. The also questioned the validity of the donation of the parcel of land
made by the decedent in favor of their sister. They prayed that the same be considered as
an advance legitime of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property of the donation is a valid donation inter vivos

RULING: Yes, The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a ―stranger,‖ chargeable against the free portion of
the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
to collation.

ROLANDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA

FACTS: Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are half-blood siblings both asserting
their claim over a 39-square meter lot in Manila. It was registered in the name of their father
who died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime, Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which
the latter accepted. By virtue of the deed of donation annotated on Gregorio's title, a
transfer certificate of title was issued in Rolando's name. In 1991 Constancia Santos filed
with the RTC of Manila a complaint for partition and reconveyance against Rolando alleging
that during the lifetime of their father, he denied having sold the subject lot to petitioner;
that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was
deprived of her legitime. Rolando countered that respondent's suit is barred by prescription
considering that she is aware of his possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10)
years; and that the lot was sold to him by Gregorio. Hence, respondent can no longer claim
her legitime. Affirmed on appeal are the findings of the trial court which declared as invalid
contract the Deed of Absolute Sale since it was not signed by the parties nor registered in
the Registry of Deeds and sustained as valid the deed of donation as it was duly executed by
the parties and registered.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the donation is inofficious

(2) Whether or not action of respondent is barred by prescription
RULING: (1) Yes. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Civil Code, a donation is inofficious if it
exceeds this limitation - no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he
may give or receive by will. Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. At the
time of his death, he left no property other than the entire lot he donated to petitioner and
that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and
compulsory heir. The donation is therefore inofficious as it impairs respondent's legitime
which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate
of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will
inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.

(2) No. "Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of
legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period,” as held in
Imperial vs. Court of Appeals but by ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to
the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code,
to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The case of Mateo vs. Lagua,
which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized
that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent,
since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined. Since Gregorio died in 1986, respondent had until 1996 within which
to file the action. She filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and RAMON G. NICOLAS,respondents
G.R. No. 118449 ; February 11, 1998
FRANCISCO, J:.

FACTS: Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of
spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud
are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida,
and their four children.
EW892805 - Alyce Petit
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq.
m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela
property was ISSUEd to Estrellita. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela
property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu. In June of the same year,
Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at
Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paranñ aque using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela
property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance
was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and her
two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly
known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI
reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein
petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer,
petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an
"Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver
of Shares", with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided
for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and
spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paranñ aque
property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in
the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00). The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank
deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0
under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount.

The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paranñ aque property and the
car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heirs" in the said properties.

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES,MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR.,EVELYN

SUAREZ-DELEON AND REGINIO I. SUAREZ, PETITIONERS,VS.THECOURT OF APPEALS,
VALENTE RAYMUNDO,VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA.CONCEPCION VITO ANDVIRGINIA BANTA
RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 94918, September 02, 1992