G.R. No.

78252 April 12, 1989

PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO KING, KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE SARINO and
DOMINGO K. LI, respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Simeon C. Sato for respondent Domingo K Li.

Syquia Law Offices for respondents King, Ken Suy Wat, Calderon and Ferrer, Jr.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases, the service of
summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. 1 Such service of summons may be made at the
defendant's dwelling house or residence or at his office or regular place of business. The essence
of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself.

However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. 2

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted
service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common
law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. 3

The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review by certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386 entitled "Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs.
Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al." dated January 27, 1987, and its resolution dated April 22,
1987. 4

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private
respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market placements through
certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of
the Corporation Code 5 which provides as follows:

Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and
other persons.

Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th
Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, Metro Manila, which is the stated office address
of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who
acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited
in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11, 1983.

On May 24, 1983, the law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension
of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The said motion was signed by Atty.
Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for the defendants. The motion was granted in an order dated
May 26, 1983 giving the defendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the
reglementary period within which to file the responsive pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June
13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period
of sixty (60) days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement
of the case between the parties. The motion was denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed
a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer. This motion was granted in an
order dated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a
compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It reads as follows:

1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with the plaintiff as of
June 15, 1983, in the sum of P707,500.01 with 20% interest per annum as follows:

P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983

100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983

100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984.

2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against the defendants.

3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the defendants provided that in
case the latter fail to pay, jointly and severally, two or more successive monthly installments, the
plaintiff is entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for the collection of the unpaid account
of the defendants. 6

On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said Compromise
Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions embodied therein.
Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to
make the other payments, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment.
The trial court granted the motion on December 16, 1983.

On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking
a correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise
Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January
17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy
of the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-
in-fact of MFC only, and praying for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for
clarification was denied on January 20,1984.

On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng
Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside the decision dated July
18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution dated December 21, 1983 on the
ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the
corporation was not their address as they were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones
had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not
served copies of the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being
executed; and that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction.

On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from judgment with
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging therein that there was no service
of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones was not authorized to represent him or to enter into
the Compromise Agreement. After an opposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower
court denied the same in its order dated April 6, 1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by
the private respondents were also denied on May 4,1984.

Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiterating that there was
no service of summons upon each of them as service of summons was made at the address of the
firm with which they had severed connections; that the counsel of record of MFC has no authority to
represent them in the case and in the Compromise Agreement; that they have not ratified the same
by a partial payment of the compromise judgment; and that they were no longer connected with MFC
at the time they were sued. In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on January
27, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellants need not be resolved:
Wherefore:

(1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromise agreement rendered by the lower
court as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto as against appellants Angelo King,
Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., and Domingo Li are hereby SET ASIDE; and

(2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby ordered to direct proper service
of summons on the aforesaid individual appellants at their respective correct addresses and
thereafter to proceed in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED. 7

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court
on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition predicated on the following grounds:

(A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEAL FROM ORDER OF TRIAL
COURT DATED APRIL 6,1984, DENYING (i) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S
'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25, 1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO
SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION FILED
JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN
CALDERON and JOSE FERRER, JR. and (b) DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROM TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

(B) THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE BASIC

QUESTION OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON AND
JOSE FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OF TIME.

(C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
OF MFC WERE PROPERLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC, they are,
nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the
complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in
that summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the
same, by tendering it to them.

The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons
was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not appear to
be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation
then. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown
in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff
effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of MFC
at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no
longer connected. Such substituted service is not valid. There was no compliance with the
requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the
same before substituted service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly
served with summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.

It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private respondents,
sought an extension of time to file an answer or a responsive pleading, and a suspension of the
proceedings pending a possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise
Agreement in behalf of MFC and private respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis
of which a compromise judgment was rendered; that said judgment was partially complied with but
upon default in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by the
trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the court that he committed an
oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of private respondents when it was
only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf of the
defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings
and the Compromise Agreement would constitute a waiver of the defect in the service of summons.
However, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the resolution of
the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of said counsel was in behalf of said
corporation only and not in behalf of the private respondents.

Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of the private respondents
without their authority, the same is null and void in so far as they are concerned. By the same token,
the compromise judgment is also null and void as to private respondents. The ruling of the lower
court that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed
beyond the reglementary period is untenable. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does
not prescribe. 8

One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the performance
of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He represented himself to be the counsel for
the defendants including the private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the
Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only after the writ of execution of the compromise
judgment was being enforced that he perked up by saying that he committed an oversight and that
he was not authorized by the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the
Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing
lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression of this imperative. Counsel
should be made to account before his peers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, report and recommendation on Atty.
Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118584 October 24, 1995

AURELIA S. GOMEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamis City; COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In our resolution of 31 May 1995 dismissing this petition for "utter lack of merit," we required attorneys
for petitioner to show cause "why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for impeding the
execution of the judgment in Criminal case No. 85-49 and for misusing the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice in violation of Rule 10.03, Canon 10 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility." The backdrop of our order is summarized in the resolution in this
wise:

The petitioner seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and mandamus to annul and
set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case
No. 85-49, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482,
and the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 108331; and to order the Court of Appeals to give due
course to the petitioner's appeal upon the filing of appellant's brief.

The Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General reveals the following procedural antecedents,
some of which are suppressed in the petition.

In spite of its resolution of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482 dismissing the petitioner's
appeal from the RTC decision in Criminal Case No. 85-49 for failure to file the appellant's brief, the
Court of Appeals accepted her Memorandum of 28 September 1990 wherein she raised the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court. On 8 April 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee's Brief refuting all the assigned errors. Since no reply brief was filed by the petitioner, the
Court of Appeals, in its resolution of 21 June 1991, resolved to consider the case submitted for
decision without the said brief.

On 9 June 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aurelia Gomez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel, defined and penalized under Article 355, in relation to Article
355 (sic) end 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present, she is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, to pay the offended party Marieto M. Tan, Sr. the amount of P70,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, the petitioner
elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No.
108331. This petition was, however, denied for non-compliance with Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.
Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this Court, in the resolution of 31 March 1993,
reinstated the petition but denied it nonetheless "for being factual and for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment." Petitioner's motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 31
March 1993 were denied with finality.

On 28 June 1993, this Court noted without action the petitioner's letter requesting that the issues
raised in the supplemental motion for reconsideration be given due consideration.

In the resolution of 23 August 1993, this Court denied the petitioner's motion to admit second motion
for reconsideration and the second motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331
was accordingly made on 8 September 1993.

The petition further discloses that this Court denied the petitioner's petition (G.R. No. 116398) to set
aside the RTC's denial of her application for probation. The motion for reconsideration met the same
fate. Upon the prosecution's motion for execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the
trial court issued a warrant of arrest.

In the final analysis then, the instant petition is to annul and set aside this Court's final resolution in
G.R. No. 108331. The attorneys for the petitioner know, or ought to know, that the special civil action
for certiorari will not lie against a final judgment of this Court. Even granting for the sake of argument
that it could, this petition must fail for being filed one (1) year, four (4) months, and nineteen (19)
days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 or long after the jurisprudentially established
"reasonable time" prescribed for the remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As this Court sees it, the instant petition is a clever ploy to further delay the execution of the judgment
in Criminal Case No. 85-49.

In their Explanation dated 21 June 1995 submitted in compliance with the above show-cause order,
attorneys for petitioner, namely: Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and
Antonio A. Ligon, averred:

Counsel for petitioner beg the indulgence of this Honorable Court in asking for the extraordinary
relief of seeking a declaration of mistrial of the libel case tried in the lower court through the special
civil action for certiorari as they were impelled by their conviction that petitioner performed a moral
and legal obligation in writing the letter which was the basis for libel, as she did, which disclosed the
price fixing and price rigging of oil products by the private complainant, Mr. Marieto Tan, for his
private benefit (in Criminal Case No. 85-49, RTC-Ozamiz City).

While counsel for petitioner are aware that their first bounden duty as officers of the Court is to honor
and follow Court rules issued for the orderly and efficient administration of justice (Banogon vs.
Zerna, 154 SCRA 593; Toledo vs. Burgos, 168 SCRA 513), they are equally burdened by their
foremost obligation to prevent any miscarriage of justice in accordance with their convictions. Herein
counsel had perused the available pleadings and court processes in the libel against petitioner, and
were fully convinced thereof and impelled by their desire to legally assist the latter to substantiate
her innocence for the crime of libel. If they had overstretched the parameters of the conduct required
of lawyers in trying to protect their client's liberty by resorting to this judicial process of certiorari,
herein counsel had acted in good faith and beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable Court for such
action.

Contrary to the representations of the Office of the Solicitor General, herein counsel were candid in
the presentation of the factual and procedural antecedents based on pleadings given to them by
their client. Counsel disclosed in the petition in page 10 thereof that there is already an Entry of
Judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.

Herein counsel similarly disclosed that —

Moreover, up to this date, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the aforementioned case,
so that accused-petitioner experienced extreme difficulties in filing the instant petition. And
consequently, accused-petitioner stands helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of all
orders, judgments, and other processes of the trial court, Court of Appeals, and that of this Honorable
Court, all of which were addressed to Atty. Rodolfo
Pactolin. . . .

Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented on the procedural antecedents in
this case.

Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking the equity jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court such that procedural rules be set aside to serve the ends of justice, as the
liberty of a person is at stake.

Herein counsel comprehend the difficulty in questioning procedural parameters for the efficient and
orderly administration of justice in strictly following Court orders and jurisprudence implementing
thereof, but equally compelling is their sworn duty to protect a client who has been innocently
charged and stands to suffer deprivation of liberty should counsel omit to resort to the extraordinary
relief they sought in this petition.

In the resolution of 9 August 1995, we then required the aforenamed lawyers to inform the Court if
they were willing to submit the disciplinary matter for resolution on the basis of their Explanation. In
compliance therewith, on 8 September 1995, they filed a Manifestation wherein they expressed that
it had not been their intention to violate the Code of professional Responsibility and likewise
apologized to the Court "for whatever inconvenience the filing of the instant petition may have
entailed."

We find the explanation proferred unsatisfactory and the justification set forth for their action flimsy.

As to the charge of suppression of factual and procedural antecedents, we cannot lend credence to
the gossamer claim of petitioner's counsel that they were "candid" in their presentation of these
antecedents as evidenced by their disclosure, on page 10 of the petition, that there already was an
entry of judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither can we find tenable the allegation that up to
the date the petition was filed, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the case, for which
reason, petitioner stood "helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of all orders,
judgments, and other processes of the trial court, Court of Appeals and that of this Honorable Court,
all of which were addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin."

In the first place, attorneys for petitioner do not even claim that Atty. Pactolin unreasonably refused
to turn over the records to petitioner; ex hypothesi, he could have legitimately retained them pursuant
to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court until petitioner paid him his lawful fees. In any event,
Attorneys Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza, and Ligon were fully aware of the existence of their client's
(petitioner's) case with the trial court, Court of Appeals, and this Court, and had unhampered access
to the records thereof, especially those of the Court of Appeals and this Court since their office is
located near said Courts. In less than half a day, any one of them or their authorized representatives
could have personally sought the information they wanted from said Courts. Anent the records of the
criminal case in Ozamiz City, if for whatever reason petitioner could not personally secure
photocopies of pertinent pleadings, orders, decisions, and other processes therein, counsel could
have merely requested the Clerk of Court thereof for the necessary information. As a matter of fact,
the annexes attached to the petition showed beyond cavil that counsel could have, without exerting
undue effort, obtained the requisite information with respect to the cases before the trial court, the
Court of Appeals, and this Court.

Obviously then, the suppression of vital facts by counsel for petitioner, exposed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, was not due to the unavailability of such facts to counsel nor the difficulty of
obtaining them; in legal contemplation, excusable negligence was not present in the instant case.
Plainly, the concealment resorted to was nothing but a stratagem to give the petition a semblance of
a valid grievance or a viable cause of action. Petitioner's counsel knew, or were reasonably expected
to know, the hopelessness of their client's cause since the petition was filed, it bears repeating, one
year, four months, and nineteen days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 — long after
the lapse of the jurisprudentially established measure of "reasonable time" prescribed for the remedy
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Howsoever viewed, the filing of the instant petition was nothing but a scheme to frustrate and further
delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither could a claim of denial of
due process save the day for petitioner as the judgment of the trial court was affirmed only after due
proceedings by the Court of Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost liberality to
petitioner who failed to file her Brief. Said judgment was ultimately sustained by us in the resolution
of 31 March 1993 in G.R. No. 108331, which had long become final, with the entry of judgment made
on 8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no depth of honest belief as to the innocence of the accused could
alter the final verdict. Petitioner's counsel, if they are so minded, can only seek to relieve their client
from the effects of the judgment from another forum, e.g., they may consider executive clemency.

Counsel's gambit is condemnable for it clearly disregards a lawyer's duty to maintain absolute
candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility). In
Santos vs. Paguio (227 SCRA 770, 779 [1993]), we declared, in no uncertain terms, that this Court
can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which
would have a bearing on its initial action.

We stress once again what we said before, that litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for
constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong
it (Lim Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and sound practice demand that
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium (Tolentino vs. Ongsiako, 7 SCRA 1001
[1963]; Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 [1968]). And for lawyers who disregard these postulates,
we stated in Banogon vs. Zerna (154 SCRA 593 [1987]), reiterated in Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals
(199 SCRA 1, 15 [1991]), that:

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients
by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of their rights; and the exertion of their utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing
be taken away or be withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15, Canons
of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice (Canon
12, Canons of Professional Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).

As a final point, we wish to state that the apology contained in the Explanation is misplaced. Counsel
ought to know that they were not required to show cause for the inconvenience the filing of the
petition caused this Court. The apology insinuates, rather smartly, that we required them to show
cause out of our whims or caprice, which, of course, is baseless, as demonstrated by our
observations in the resolution of 31 May 1995, particularly on the suppression of vital facts by the
attorneys for petitioner.
We do not then hesitate to declare that counsel for petitioner, Attorneys Alvin C. Go, Fernando C.
Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon have breached the foregoing Canons and
Rules.

WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO, FERNANDO C. COJUANGCO, VIGOR D. MENDOZA, II,

and ANTONIO A. LIGON are hereby CENSURED and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court.”

Facts:

SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said
case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from
the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during
World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement
on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of
plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact,
but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to
those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and
invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Issue:
Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues stated above.

[case is ongoing]

Dissenting Opinion:

(1) Serreno, J.

This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law Faculty’s
statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded by
the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received
by the public is well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP
Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity
and competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is
honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities other than
the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty when
it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second
paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded
it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it says:
“The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph,
it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any
and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.”

Carpio Morales, J.

The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly
be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face,
since this judicial act is the one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced
vigilance.”

Tiongco v. Aguilar Facts: 1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He characterized the decision of
respondent Judge as “having been crafted in order to fool the winning party”; as a “hypocritical
judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one with “perfidious character.”
2. Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer Ruling: 1. The duty contemplated
in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow
in the lawyer’s oath “to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts,” his duty under
Sectio
n 20(b) of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers,”
and his duty under the first canon “to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance. 2. The use of unnecessary /offensive and abusive/abrasive and offensive language
which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of the
Court and to degrade the administration of justice by the Court. 3. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds
of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation against this Court. Such could
only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only
come from one who seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with
law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice
whatever does not accord with his views. 4. Tiongco was ordered to pay fine of Php 5,000 plus
warning. Maglasang v. People Facts: 1. The legal fees ascribed by Circular No. 1-88 of the Court,
amounting to Php 316.50 were not paid thus the case Maglasang v. People was dismissed. 2. Atty.
Marceliano Castellano, counsel for petitioner, moved for reconsideration. It was denied with finality.
3. Due to it, Castellano, acting as counsel for Maglasang, accused all
the 5 justices of the Court’s 2
nd
division of biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution.
When cited for contempt, he reasoned that said constructive criticism intended to correct in good
faith the erroneous and strict practices of the justices concerned. Ruling: 1. Atty. Castellano sought
to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before
his client. Said action is grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better
than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. 2.
While a lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnest
and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation
and innuendo. 3. Castellano was found guilty of contempt of court and improper conduct. He was
ordered to pay Php 1,000 within 15 days or suffer 10 days imprisonment. He is likewise suspended
for 6 months. Bautista v. Gonzales Facts: 1. Ramon Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit,
gross
misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath by Angel Bautista.
2. In the case Gonzales handled, he agreed with his clients (Fortunado) to pay all expenses
including court fees for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of property in litigation. He acted as
counsel for the other party (Fortunado) and without said case being terminated, acted as counsel for
the Lopez. He had transferred to himself ½ of the properties of the Fortunados while the case was
still pending.

3. He induced complainant, his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the development
into a residential subdivision of the land involved in the case. Gonzales knew that the property was
already sold at public auction. He submitted falsified documents and harassed complainant by filing
several complaints without legal basis. Ruling: 1. Respondent committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by this court of its disciplinary powers. 2. A lawyer may not properly agree with
a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith advance the
expenses of litigation, same should be subject to reimbursement. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such
agreements are against public policy especially where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action
at his expenses in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. 3. Suspended
for 6 months

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF
FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-

OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS,
CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and
petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987
in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the
pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional
shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash
in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards
with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might
be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were
maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the
opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San
Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of
Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs.
Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to
appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why
they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record
of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for
the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise
manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and
that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the
circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was
actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern
Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor
Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of
their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has
always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied
with on July 17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the
sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this
Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should
not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently
resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future
similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to
pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled
to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the
standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies."4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest
in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the
respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of
the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within
the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course
of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore,
rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when
his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal
profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a
continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no
demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or
the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. MTJ-94-894 June 2, 1995

ATTY. FELIXBERTO N. BOQUIREN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE EMPERATRIZ DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ; CLERK OF COURT MELINDA D. GATDULA; and
ATTY. SATURNINO V. BACTAD, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

This administrative complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 111 entitled Alex Boquiren, et. al. vs.
Mariano Gutierrez, for ejectment and damages, where complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren was
the plaintiff's counsel. Atty. Saturnino V. Bactad, the defendant's counsel and the incumbent vice-
governor of the province, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty. Melinda D. Gatdula, the
judge and clerk of court respectively of the Municipal Trial Court, San Antonio, Zambales where the
aforementioned civil case was docketed. Judge Cruz dismissed the ejectment suit due to plaintiff's
lack of cause of action which complainant, Atty. Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the Regional Trial
Court Branch 70 of Iba, Zambales. On July 5, 1993 Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious nonfeasance, culpable
dereliction of duty and ignorance of the law relative to the disposition of civil case no. 111.

On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by the complainant with false
representation and employing scheme to defeat the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure the latter alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss
is an allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.

On January 26, 1994 the Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of an
administrative case at the proper time, it appearing that the case is on appeal with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales where relief is available". On February 18, 1994 complainant Atty.
Boquiren filed a motion for its reconsideration.

On March 2, 1994 the Court dismissed the complaint for not having been verified and for its failure
to show prima facie case against respondent Atty. Gatdula. In reaction thereto, complainant Atty.
Boquiren filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 26, 1994.

We find these two motions for reconsideration devoid of merit.

Civil Case No. 111 from which the subject administrative complaint stemmed has distinct facts from
the latter but the subject administrative complaint can hardly be taken into isolation. We deemed it
proper, as we had properly resolved in our January 26, 1994 Resolution, to dismiss the subject
administrative complaint without prejudice since Civil Case No. 111 is now on appeal with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales. Necessarily, the appeal of Civil Case No. 111
includes all incidents that occurred from the initial filing of the complaint for Forcible Entry and
Detainer on June 5, 1992 up to the MTC Decision dated February 26, 1993 dismissing said
complaint. In fact, a cursory reading of Atty. Boquiren's appeal before the Regional Trial Court shows
that he devoted at least twenty pages in his twenty-six page appeal statement detailing the incidents,
perceived improper conduct, orders, proceedings, misrepresentation, misapprehension of facts,
ignorance of the law and rules of procedure allegedly all evidencing the culpability of the Judge, the
Clerk of Court and the defendant's counsel for administrative offenses. We note that these are the
same grounds that now constitute the bases of the subject administrative complaint. The issues and
matters raised therein were purely judicial in nature which an appeal can adequately and properly
address. The alleged errors committed by Judge Cruz relative to the disposition of a case are at best
errors of judgment and can be amply remedied by any aggrieved party without recourse to the
subject administrative complaint. Besides, it is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts are erroneous (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]). More
important, any finding that this Court would make relative to the administrative complaint would
undoubtedly influence and affect the outcome of Atty. Boquiren's appeal. Needless to say, this would
constitute an unwarranted judicial interference and sway the Regional Trial Court's dispensation of
the appeal which we cannot allow to happen.

The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty. Boquiren in his Motions
for Reconsideration describing the Court's Resolutions as: "highly questionable"; "based on
insufficient or incorrect reasons"; "a classic arbituarily concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics"; "pregnant with aptness to mislead, deceptive or delusive quality";
"patently erroneous"; "a BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY OF JUSTICE" "classic carelessness,
inefficiency, if not lack of industry on the part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the 3rd Div. and/or to the adjudication officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating Tribunal's and/or
its staff's BRAZEN MOCKERY OF JUSTICE with their gross violation of the PUBLIC INTEREST
POLICY of the State" [Emphasis in the original]

It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at seriously undermining the integrity of
this Court. Complainant seems to have forgotten his duty, as a lawyer and as an officer of the court,
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers (Canon 11, Code of
Professional Responsibility).

ACCORDINGLY, finding the motions for reconsideration without merit the same are hereby
DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren, however, is hereby ordered to explain within
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be cited for contempt and/or subject
to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.

VICTORIA C. HEENAN vs. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013 VELASCO,
JR., J.: FACTS: Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother,
Corazon Eusebio. Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer
in need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from
Victoria. Shortly thereafter,
Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to
distrust
the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to accommodate Atty. Espejo and there
and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty.
Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two
hundred seventy-five thousand pesos covering the loan amount and agreed interest. After a couple
of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was
already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the interest which accrued due to
the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the
check bounced due to
insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands.
Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to
her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, the said check was also dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds. Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order directing
Atty. Espejo to submit her
Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint failing whic
h would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer.
On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala notified the parties to appear for a
mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the
parties shall be deemed a waiver of her right to participate in further proceedings. which only Victoria
appeared. In its Report and Recommendation The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for
disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer,
which deserves disciplinary sanction. Moreover, respondent
’s
acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands she failed to comply
with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit
her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute
grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent. On December 14, 2012,
the Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD
with the modification lowerin
g Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5)
years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand
was made. On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution.
Court’s Ruling : We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the tr
ust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character
as to render her unworthy of public confidence.

ISSUE: WON, He Violated Canon Codes of Professional Responsibility in his Acts that Violates also
BP 22. Ruling:
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon
7,
Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide: CANON 1
–
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01.
–
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7
–
A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03
–
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. CANON 11
–
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Atty. Erlinda B.
Espejo found guilty of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Suspending the respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.

A.C. No. 217 November 27, 1968

NIEVES RILLAS VDA. DE BARRERA, complainant,

vs.
CASIANO U. LAPUT, respondent.

CONCEPCION, C. J.:
Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput,
upon the ground that, being her counsel, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Macario
Barrera, in Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had
misappropriated several sums of money held by him in trust for said estate and tried to appropriate
two (2) parcels of land belonging to the same, as well as threatened her, in a fit of anger, with a gun,
into signing several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.

In his answer, respondent admitted his former relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client
and, apart from denying the main allegations of her complaint, averred that the filing thereof was
"part of a scheme to beat off" his claim for attorney's fees in said Special Proceedings No. 2-J.

The matter was, pursuant to the Rules of Court,1 referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, to the Solicitor General, who after appropriate proceedings, recommended the
dismissal of all the charges preferred against the respondent, for insufficiency of the evidence except
as regards the alleged act of coercion on his part, for which said Officer filed the corresponding
complaint alleging, inter alia:

3. That while being such counsel for the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera, and of
the estate, the respondent Casiano U. Laput on January 10, 1955 presented to the complainant
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera at her residence at 854-D D. Jakosalem St., Cebu City, certain
pleadings for the latter's signature in the aforementioned administration proceedings;

4. That the complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera declined to sign said
pleadings but requested respondent to leave the papers in order that she may first ask somebody to
translate the same for her;

5. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of acceding to her (his) client's request
became angry and told complainant to sign the papers, at the same time drawing his revolver from
its holster and placing it on his lap with the evident purpose of intimidating the complainant, an old
woman of 72 years old, into signing the papers or pleadings presented for signature;

6. That complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera intimidated by the threat
aforementioned was compelled to sign as in fact she did sign, said pleadings against her will;

and praying that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

In his answer, respondent denied having committed the acts imputed to him in this complaint of the
Solicitor General and alleged, in substance that the papers he caused Mrs. Barrera to sign, on the
occasion referred to in said pleading, was a "Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition
of Estate"; that this "notice" was legally unnecessary and useless; that he, however, caused it to be
prepared in order to impress upon Mrs. Barrera the necessity of filing her final accounts in the
aforementioned proceedings and, closing the same, because she was reluctant to do so; that Mrs.
Barrera had, also, filed against him a criminal complaint for coercion with the office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu, based upon the same allegations made in her administrative complaint herein; and that,
after due investigation, said criminal complaint was dismissed by the City Fiscal.

From the evidence on record, we gather that, prior to January 10, 1955, Mrs. Barrera was not inclined
to cause the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Macario Barrera to be closed; that, upon
the other hand, respondent wanted to put an end to said proceedings — since there was nothing
else to be done therein — so that he could collect his fees for services rendered to Mrs. Barrera as
administratrix of said estate; that he, therefore, prepared a petition for the declaration of Mrs. Barrera
as the universal heir of her deceased husband, for the delivery to her of the residue of his estate and
the termination of the proceedings; that he, moreover, caused to be prepared a notice "for the
rendition of the final, accounting and partition" of said estate; that his purpose in preparing said
petition was to induce her to virtually agree and promise to submit her final accounts by signing this
notice; that respondent presented said petition and notice to Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955, for
her signature; that she, however, refused to do so and suggested that the papers be left with her so
that she could have them read by somebody else; that, annoyed or angered by this open
manifestation of distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by putting his revolver on his
lap; and that, although he did not point the firearm at her, its display attained the intended effect of
intimidating Mrs. Barrera, who, accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and the notice
aforementioned.

Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, they become more so when we consider that
they were performed by a man dealing with a woman 72 years of age. The offense in this case is
compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the
offender should have set the example as man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. Worse
still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender was pledged to defend
and protect — his own client.

There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he
evidently considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated because she clearly
indicated her lack of confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the
papers to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless. Still, it cannot be denied that
his intent in placing the gun on his lap was to intimidate his client.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent herein is hereby found guilty
of gross misconduct in office and accordingly suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, beginning from the date of entry of judgment in this case. It is so ordered.

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,

Present:

Panganiban, J.,

Chairman,

- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona, and

Carpio Morales,* JJ

Promulgated:

Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,

Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to
those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

__________________

* On leave.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint
was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and
1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of
the complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing

several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding
the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents
in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers
in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered
the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither
did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the
affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial
register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option
to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-
bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends
of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred
that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to
the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the
hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the
assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support
of his allegations, he submitted Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him,
because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were
sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only
complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the
Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent.
The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants
Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17]
dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case
was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file
any.

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19]
approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such
certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP
Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a
warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to
1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and
to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They
are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not
apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the
Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away
with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit
of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits
relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against
the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in
the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification
requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or
justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by
respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a
penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the
infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of
Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and

the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their
relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts
as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of
the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke
unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they
cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and
if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the
lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels
for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely
have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor
of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by
law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are
at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the
charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from
the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according
to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected
to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair
and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the
end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation
which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from
the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless
and expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is
not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the
police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., COMPLAINANTS,

VS.

ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. The Spouses Federico and Victoria
Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag before the RTC
for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The
spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City
Ordinance which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm of
Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered
a decision in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm,
appealed to the CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original
period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of
time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as
well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA
resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as
members of the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence
in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent
had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and
to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
(Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court
not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons
of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo

A.M. No. 7006

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the Criminal case proceeding originally raffled
to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser. Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the
crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. The counsel of the defense filed a Motion to fix the
amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty Bagabuyo, then Senior state Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject of bail under the Rules of Court.

Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

Respondent appealed to the CA. Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent
caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting to the accused in the issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambast Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out.

The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of the article to appear in court to explain
why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which
degrade the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statement in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For
his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Prosecutor Bagabuyo violated the canons and his oath as a lawyer?

Held: YES
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states
that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress
of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the
court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong
aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica
held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according
to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions
which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.