G.R. No.

159467 December 9, 2005

SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, Petitioners,

vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC.

Facts:
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with
Alternative Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe in
whose possession and custody the mortgaged property may be found. 3 It alleged that
petitioners, for value, jointly and severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note 4 in the
amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in monthly installments per schedule indicated therein. To
secure payment of the Promissory Note, petitioners executed a Chattel Mortgage 5 over a motor
vehicle
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of
the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly installments on the
Promissory Note. Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition,
of the mortgaged motor vehicle,
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch Sheriff to seize the
vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to respondent. 11
after service upon petitioners of the copy of the summons with the complaint and annexes,
affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this case was repossessed by the
sheriff upon issuance of the corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was
delivered to respondent.12
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, 13 petitioners specifically denied the allegations
in the Complaint. They maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not and never
executed a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they
bought the car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice 14 of Toyota
Balintawak,.
Though petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted that the signatures in the Promissory Note and
Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of
Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part, denied signing said
documents. She claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are forgeries since she was in
Australia when said documents were executed.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract of Loan between it
and petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle involved in this
case
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they entered into a
transaction with respondent based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite
petitioner Rolando Saguid’s explanation of the circumstances surrounding his signing thereof,
and in not holding that these documents are not valid and binding on them.
Issue:
WON the admission made by petitioners that he signed the promissory note is binding
Held:
No. We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the
clarification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission.
The rule that an admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the
circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not follow that the admission of the signatures
carries with it the admission of the contents of the documents especially when the person who
affixed his signatures thereon questions its execution and the veracity of the details embodied
therein. Petitioners could have been bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory note
and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted not only his signatures but also as
to what are contained therein. This is not to be in the case before us. Petitioners can therefore
adduce evidence that would nullify or invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel
mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements of the contract of loan are wanting.

[G.R. NO. 148273 : April 19, 2006]

MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners, v. GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
DECISION

Facts:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her husband, Liborio Balatico
(petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that: on September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a
loan from him in the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage 2 over her
paraphernal property, Milagros defaulted in the payment of the loan and repeated demands for
payment went unheeded, prompting the filing of a case in court.3
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros
never transacted any business with Edgar and she did not receive the consideration of the
alleged mortgage.4
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court, 6 petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia), claiming that they duped Milagros to
part with her title and sign the mortgage documents without giving her the consideration and
refusing to return her title when demanded.7
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon proper motion, 10 the
RTC ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas (respondent), as plaintiff. 11
On April 15, 1998, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent Motion
for Postponement since he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming elections. 13 There
being no objection from respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998. 14
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court. The RTC reset the
hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to appear on said
date, they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence. 15
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners were present. Milagros
informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel. In view thereof,
the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of another counsel and the hearing was reset
to June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present evidence at said
hearing, they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence. 16 On
June 23, 1998, Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants
with the conformity of Milagros.17
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to August 12, 1998 due to
conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more
time to study the case since he had just been retained.20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of the hearing for
presentation of petitioners' evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC directed
petitioners to secure the services of a counsel of their choice to represent them in the said
hearing considering that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over the
vigorous objection of the respondent due to failure of petitioners' counsel to appear for three
successive times. It warned petitioners that in case they would be unable to present evidence in
the next scheduled hearing, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present
further evidence.21
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the Urgent Motion to Reset
filed by petitioners' counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondent's counsel on the
ground that the case has been postponed several times at petitioners' instance, the RTC denied
the motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence.
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and she
received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00;
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they were
denied due process when the RTC decided the case without petitioners' evidence. 25 On October
16, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given
ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce evidence, which they took for
granted and they should bear the fault.26
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. 27 The CA ruled that petitioners were not denied due process since they
were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and present evidence to substantiate their
defense but they forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at
the scheduled hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity
and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7,
1995, absence of consideration is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount
of P220,000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners
slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and preserve their
alleged rights and interests; and that the mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the
exclusive property of Milagros which she could validly dispose of or encumber without her
husband's consent.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE:
 WON RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE
WHAT WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS EXECUTION;

HELD:
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed and there was lack
of consideration but material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated because the RTC
denied petitioners' motion to reset the hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the
due execution of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence. They further
insist that the mortgaged property is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could
not dispose of or encumber without her husband's consent; and the CA disregarded Article
9930 of the Family Code which provides that all the property owned by the spouses at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter forms part of the community property.
As to the effect of petitioners' admission of the due execution of the real estate mortgage
during the pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 53 this Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document simply means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time
it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying
upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a
seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. However, it does
not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise,
payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are
not barred from presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of consideration.
It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent scheme
perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out in a proper
trial. To deny petitioners their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of due process,
since there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.

JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR,

- versus - JOSEFINA M. HALASAN and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
March 31, 2006 G.R. No. 165987

Facts
The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint
for Partition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs
were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor. Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention
claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Teresita testified before the RTC narrating
that while she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to her but the two did not live together as husband and wife.

Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order denying the motion and dismissed her
complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. Josefina filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
admission need not be proved.

Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging
that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose. In its Decision the CA
reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally
and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129
of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof. Because of the
adverse decision, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling
of the appellate court.

Issue
Whether or not the admission made by Cecilia Alferor is sufficient to prove that Jose
Alfelor is previously married to one Josefina Halasaan

Ruling
Yes, The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the
RTC. Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another. This admission constitutes a deliberate, clear
and unequivocal statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such
statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof. A judicial admission also
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT,

Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
FACTS:

Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry
of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract
with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year. Respondent was terminated for not passing
the probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied
respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair. Respondent
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her
$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract. ATCI appealed
Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied petitioner
ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their principal being a foreign
government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.

Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment
Agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment
of an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners need to prove foreign laws as to be admitted in Philippine courts as
evidence

HELD:
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi
Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci
intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes
into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Grace J. Garcia, Petitioner vs. Rederick A. Recio, Respondent

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. Afterwards,
the couple moved and lived in Australia. On May 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. The respondent then became
an Australian through naturalization and married the petitioner, Grace Garcia. In 1998, Garcia
filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the grounds of bigamy: That the respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time of their marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether the divorce between the Recio and his first wife was proven:

HELD/DECISION:

The case was remanded for the purpose of receiving further evidence to conclusively show
respondent’s legal capacity to marry the petitioner.

Under Article 3, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. However, the
provision only applies to Philippine Law, as foreign laws, which include divorce, do not prove
themselves in the Philippines. They must be proven as fact based on the evidence provided. On
the case of Garcia vs. Recio, the respondents claim that they he is fact divorced with his first
wife should be proven based on documents and evidence. Respondent provided that Australian
divorce decree is a public document and therefore authenticity and due execution should not
be questioned. Due to the petitioner’s lack of objection regarding the decree, the court ruled
that the decree is admissible evidence. The respondent, as an Australian citizen is no longer
subject to Philippine Laws.

People v. Umipang
G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012

FACTS:
On April 1, 2006 at around 6PM, a buy-bust team from the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City Police descended along Cagayan de Oro
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City after a confidential informant reported a certain “Sam”
was selling drugs upon aforesaid place. PO2 Ruchyl Gasid acted as poseur-buyer and was given
PHP 500 marked money. PO2 Gasid and confidential informant, upon finding “Sam”, asked the
latter if they could buy PHP 500 worth of drugs. “Sam” then took out 3 plastic sachets
containing a white crystalline substance with various price tags – 500, 300, 100. After making
the choice PO2 Gasid paid “Sam” PHP 500. Upon receipt of money, PO2 Gasid took of his cap as
pre-arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Sensing danger “Sam” attempted to
flee the scene but was promptly accosted by the other members of the buy-bust team. Five
more marked sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered from
“Sam” and promptly marked “SAU” (Sammy A. Umipang) by PO2 Gasid. For the sale of the
sachet of 0.05 gram of shabu, which violates Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the RTC of Pasig City
sentenced accused-appellant to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000. For possession of 5
sachets of shabu wih a total weight of 0.23 gram, which is a violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA
9165, the same court sentenced accused-appellant to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 12 years and 1day minimum to 14 years, 21 days as maximum and fined PHP
300,000.

On appeal, CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC and the CA err in finding the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses as
sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the alleged sale and possession of
methylamphetamine HCL, which are violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165 respectively?
RULING:
No, the Court reiterates once again that buy-bust operations, although proven to be an efficient
way to flush out illegal transactions, are also susceptible to police abuse. Hence, strict
adherence to procedures laid down by RA 9165, specifically Sec. 21, Art. II must be followed. It
is evident that said section was blatantly disregarded by the buy-bust team when no proper
inventory was done, no photographs taken and no representatives from the media, the DOJ,
and any publicly elected official were present. Section 86 of RA 9165 was also not followed as
the PDEA was not contacted with regards to the operation. Although failure to follow Sec. 21,
Art. II of RA 9165 ipso facto is not fatal to the prosecution’s case, it must be shown why such
was not carried out by (1) justifiable cause and (2) preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were guaranteed. Court maintains that presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions cannot overrule the step- by-step procedure outlined in RA
9165 as it is a matter of substantive law.

The court further asserts that the conduct itself of the buy-bust team was defective for
the following reasons: (1) material inconsistencies in the marking of the evidence. This is shown
by the admission of PO2 Gasid, who marked the seized items with the accused-appellant initials
“SAU” (Sammy Abdul Umipang) allegedly at the scene of the operation. However, PO2 Gasid
admits that prior to the operation he did not know of the identity or full name of the accused,
the latter being only known as “Sam.” It was PO2 Saez, in the police station, who got “Sam’s” full
name. (2) SAID-SOTF did not show genuine and sufficient third party representatives
enumerated in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 as evidenced by PO2 Gasid’s admission during cross-
examination that no effort was made to contact the barangay captain or any barangay official of
Brgy. Maharlika. (3) SAID-SOTF did not properly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory. PO2
Gasid, who prepared such document, did not sign it.

Court sets aside the decision of the CA affirming the July 24, 2007 RTC decision and
acquits Sammy A. Umipang of the crimes charged herein and ordered released immediately.