1. UPSU V. LAGUNA ///
2. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS /// Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was stripped of power and
exiled through people power revolution during his presidency under the martial law era
in 1986. Now, he wishes to return to the country to die here but is barred by President
Aquino from returning as he is a threat to the National Security, public safety and order of
the country. He filed a petition for mandamus to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to the Marcoses and prohibition from barring their return by the president.
Issue: WoN the right to travel guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution includes
the right to return to the country
Ruling: The president under the Constitution has the obligation to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest and can bar the former president
to return to the country. Moreover, the Court iterated that the Right to Travel guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights includes the: (1) the Right to Travel WITHIN the country; (2) the
right to LEAVE the country. But it does not include the right to RETURN to the Country.
3. YAP V. CA /// Facts: Yap was convicted of 'estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts'.
After he filed for notice of appeal, he requested bail. This was denied by the RTC. Once the
records of the case were transferred to the RTC, he again filed for Motion To Fix Bail for
the Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114. SolGen suggested bail at 5.5M, after Mayor's certification of his
residence and a promise to remain there and cannot travel without prior notice to the
court and private complainant. Petitioner claimed that this was violative of his right to
bail on the grounds of it being excessive. Bail should be at 40k according to the 1996 Bail
Bond Guide.
Issue: W/N Right to Bail was effectively denied/ W/N Right to Travel were violated by the
bail conditions.
Ruling: Partially granted. Bail reduced to 200k. Imposing bail in an excessive amount
could render meaningless the right to bail (De la Camara vs. Enage). The SC will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after
holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory
sum or exacting unreasonable conditions (Villaseor vs. Abao). Purpose of Bail: to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial (Almeda vs Villaluz),or whenever so
required by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). The
amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose (Villaseor vs. Abao). Bail is
not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
4. MANOTOC V. CA /// Facts: Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., President of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc. was charged of six separate criminal
complaints for estafa when a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc
Securities, Inc. was suspected to be fake, In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail
in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety. Thereafter,
Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a "motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." Nevertheless, his motion was denied, both in RTC and
CA. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WoN the courts which granted him bail could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel
Ruling: Yes. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence is a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Nevertheless, Manotoc failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency and duration of his travel
and consent of the surety. Hence, he was not allowed to leave the country
5. RICARDO SILVERIO V. CA /// Facts: Ricardo Silverio Sr. was charged with violation of
Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty. More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent filed an
Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without
the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearing (RTC overruled opposition).
Issue: WoN that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing its Orders.
Ruling: No, He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear
before the Court when required. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of
the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
6. BPI V. CASA /// Facts: CASA Montessori International opened a current account with
defendant BPI. In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine
(9) of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990. It turned out
that Sonny D. Santos was a fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T.
Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA. Third party defendant voluntarily
admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks (violation of
right against self-incrimination?) On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint
for Collection with Damages against defendant bank, and the RTC rendered the appealed
decision in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue: WoN the the voluntary admission of Yabut is violative of her right against self-
incrimination
Ruling: No. The right against self-incrimination under Section 17 of Article III of the
Constitution, which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to all
other government proceedings -- including civil actions, legislative investigations, and
administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or penal aspect -- but not to private
investigations done by private individuals. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. When he freely and voluntarily
executed his Affidavit, the State was not even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be
admitted without violating his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Moreover,
Yabut is not even an accused here.
7. BALDOZA V. JUDGE DIMAANO /// Facts: Petitioner Dominador Baldoza charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees
of the Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data
in connection with the contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said
municipality. The respondent, avers that although the courts records are among the
public records that can be accessed by both parties directly and indirectly involved, yet
the same is always subject to reasonable regulations Respondent contends that
restrictions were imposed by the court for fear that some of the cases filed and decided
by the court after the declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the
stigma of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.
Issue: WoN the respondent judge abused his authority in refusing access to the court
records
 Ruling: We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. It has not been
shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The
access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on
matters of public concern. The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the
people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly
granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or
decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. However, restrictions on access to
certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil
insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger
that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
8. BELTRAN V. SAMSON /// Facts: Respondent Judge ordered Beltran to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was
given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified. It does not appear that any information was filed against the
petitioner for the supposed falsification, This was only an investigation prior to the
information and with a view to filing it. Petitioner assails the order stating that him
providing a sample of his handwriting tantamounts to self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether the order of respondent judge violates the petitioner’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Ruling: Yes. It is a well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition against self-
incrimination is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of
any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. The said privilege is not limited
precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. For the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
In the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is
precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means,
evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.
9. ROCO V. _________________________ /// Facts: Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the
business of buying and selling dressed chicken. As payment for his purchases of dressed
chicken from respondent Cals Poultry Supply,, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to
the store against his account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB),
Cals Corporation deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank
dishonored them for having been drawn against a closed account. Thereafter, Cals
Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa
Blg. 22 Thereafter, MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of
petitioners failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, the same court rendered a
judgment of conviction against petitioner.Petitioner went on appeal to the RTC,
contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right to due process. Agreeing with the
petitioner, the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the cases. However,
Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioners request on the following
grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial
in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will
only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
Issue: WoN the denial of petitioners request for the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum was a violation of his right to due process.
Ruling: No. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws
of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. In this jurisdiction, there are two (2)
kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The
first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. The subpoena duces
tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception
that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at
the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. Well-settled
is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied
that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test
of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be
readily identified (test of definiteness). A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain
whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced.
10. US V. TAN TENG /// Facts: Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim Oliva
Pacomio when he suddenly was filled with lust. He entered the victim’s house and put her
private parts all over her which caused her to develop gonorrhea. She reported to her
sister who likewise reported it to the police. At the line-up, Tan Teng was positively
identified. He was then made to strip whereupon it was discovered that he also had
symptoms of what seemed to be gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged with rape and was
convicted by the lower court. However, the defendant alleged that the said evidence
should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-
incrimination.
Issue: W/N a phyiscal exam is a violation of the right against self-incrimination
Ruling: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of
the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any
questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was
examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the
Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object
stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.
11. US V. ONG SIO HONG /// Facts: Ong Sio Hong was convicted by the trial court based on
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution who are members of the secret
service. His counsel raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to
be a witness of himself, in which the accused was forced to discharge the morphine from
his mouth.
Issue: WoN the forcible discharge of morphine tantamounts to self-incrimination
Ruling: The Supreme Court cited the case of U.S. vs. Tan Teng which states that, to force a
prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to
exhibit himself before the court or taking the substance from the body of an accused to
prove his guilt. The main purpose of the constitutional provision against compelling a
person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime. Forcing an accused to discharge morphine
from his mouth is NOT compelling him to be a witness against himself.
12. PEOPLE V. OTADORA /// Facts: Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon were charged with
the murder of the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora pleaded guilty, and
 was sentenced to life imprisonment, but Hilaria Carreon denied her guilt. However,
Hilaria was still found guilty by the court of inducing Otadora to do the killing. It was
corroborated by Otadora's possession of the pants of Francisco Galos (husband of Hilaria)
and his hat (Otadora asserts that Hilaria gave him the bolo, a pair of trousers of her
husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a flashlight a week before the killing). Francisco Galos
denied ownership of the pantsm so he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that
it fitted him perfectly.
Issue: WoN the fact of fiting the pants by Galos disregarded the constitutional protection
against self-incrimination
Ruling: No, the Court discovered in the record that no timely objection upon that specific
ground was made. And it is to be doubted whether the accused could benefit from the
error, if any. Furthermore, and this is conclusive, "measuring or photographing the party
is not within the privilege". "Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes.
Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done."
13. VILLAFLOR V. SUMMERS /// Facts: Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor,
nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey
the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.
Issue: W/n compelling a woman to be examined by a physician to determine if she is
pregnant is a violation of the constitutional prohibition that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Ruling: No. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. Corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible. It is a reasonable presumption that in an
examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed,
no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused
or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
14. PASCUAL V. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS /// Facts: Petitioner was charged for
immorality and malpractice by the respondents in an administrative proceeding. Counsel
of the complainants announced that petitioner will take the first witness stand on a
scheduled date. Petitioner objected, raising the defense of his right to self incrimination
and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Respondent answered that the
right against self incrimination can only be availed by a witness when he is asked
incriminating question, because he can object once he is in a witness stand.
Issue: WON the petitioner can be compelled to stand as a witness to testify against
himself and right against self incrimination is also available to administrative
proceedings
Ruling: Under the constitutional right against self incrimination, an accused may not be
compelled to take the witness stand and to testify against himself without his content.
The consent should be voluntary and of his free will. A mere witness who is not accused,
in order to avail himself of his right, it must first wait for the incriminating question. An
accused may refuse to be a witness altogether. On the other hand, the right against self
incrimination and to refuse not stand as witness against himself also applies to
administrative hearings. Although the proceeding is administrative in nature it is
analogous and similar to a criminal proceeding because it possess a criminal and penal
aspect (revocation of license as medical practitioner).
15. PEOPLE V. REPEZA /// Facts: Jerry Rapeza was found guilty of 2 counts of murder thru
his extra judicial confession. Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that
appellant wanted to confess to the crime. SPO2 Gapas found appellant, and invited him
for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to confess in the presence of a
lawyer. He was brought to the police station and the next day was found a lawyer but not
of his own choice, Atty. Roberto Reyes. SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the Custodial
Investigation at the house of Atty. Reyes. Rapeza is illiterate and was provided an
interpreter during the investigation, Bonifacio Abad. A complaint was filed against and
probable caused was found against Rapeza. In his defense, appellant presented a different
story during the trial. He alleged that he did not know the victim and that he was coerced
into the confession, he also alleged that no counsel assisted him in the MTC.
Issue: WoN appellant’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence to warrant the
verdict of guilt
Ruling: Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights in custodial investigation.
According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to
him that he would confess his participation in the killing. Appellant did not voluntarily
surrender to the police but was invited by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was
detained from 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his
extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been
informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect. And there is
no showing that appellant had actually understood his rights. Since comprehension is the
objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education,
intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing
investigation. Confession was also not made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel of appellant’s choice.
16. PP V. TAN LING UY /// Facts: Ochoa was found guilty of Malversation thru Falsification of
Commercial Document by the Sandiganbayan. He appealed such decision stating that,
among others, that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC
personnel. Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the
Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He
was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he
executed the affidavit.
Issue: W/N such extrajudicial sworn statement is admissible as evidence
Ruling: Yes. The guarantee of Sec 12 will only apply if a person is taken for custodial
invetigation. In this case, his statement was taken during the administrative investigation
of NPCs audit team and before he was taken under custodial investigation. As such, the
inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as
yet, no specific suspect.
17. PEOPLE V. MAQUEDA /// Facts: Mr. Barker was battered to death and Mrs. Barker was
knocked unconsious by the use of lead pipes.The accused were identified by the current
househelps Norie and Julieta as Rene Salvamante (former houseboy of victims) and his
co-conspirator Richard Malig. Later, Tabayan and Pacio (accused asked for directions
from them) identified one of the accused as Hector Maqueda (Putol) who with amputated
fingers which was also confirmed by the driver which identified the same as with only
three fingers. When Maqueda was arrested, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, according to him,
informed the former of his rights under the Constitution and made him sign a
Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Maqueda narrated his participation in the crime. Maqueda
 then filed a motion for bail. He then showed his willingness to be a star witness as he
claimed to be the least guilty among the accused where he also admitted his involvement
to the crime to prosecutor Zarate verbally.
Issue: WoN the sinumpaang salaysay signed and the admission of the accused admissible
in evidence
Ruling: The Sinumpaang Salaysay was inadmissible in evidence. When Maqueda signed
the Sinumpaang Salaysay after he was arrested, he was not informed of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel. His uncounseled narration of his admission to the
crime in the sinumpaang salaysay was also tantamount to a violation of his right to self-
incrimination. However, the verbal admission made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate
was admissible and can be used against him since he gave it voluntarily and freely. It was
for the purpose of him being a state witness and not in the course of investigation.
18. GAMBOA V. CRUZ /// Facts: Petitioner Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy, without a
warrant of arrest, by a Patrolman. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2,
Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with
several others. The following day, during the line-up of five (5) detainees, including
Petitioner, a certain complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said that he
was one of the companions in a robbery. An information for robbery was filed against the
petitioner. Petitioner was arraigned and defense counsel manifested to file a Motion to
Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up,
without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process.
Issue: 1. WoN petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel was violated (OR, specifically, is
the right to counsel exists during the ‘line-up’)?
Ruling: Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation, hence, petitioner is not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. Right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation. However, the SC cautioned the police saying that the moment there is a
move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
19. SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA /// Facts: Special Prosecution Officer III Teresita Diaz-
Baldoz filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information for the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds against Rosita C. Pada, Teresita B. Rodriquez, Rachel V. Torres, Lourdes A.
Enriquez and Salvador C. Sebastian. Among those offered as evidence by the prosecution
were the sworn statements made by all the accused, including that of petitioner. Said
exhibits were offered as part of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, prosecution witness.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights under Sections
12 as he alleges that the right to counsel, the right to remain silent and the right to waive
these rights in the presence of counsel were not complied with
Ruling: The rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked
only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation."
Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing
postage stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by Enrique G.
Saavedra, Chief Postal Service Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is merely an
administrative investigation. While an investigation conducted by an administrative body
may be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not
be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
20. PEOPLE V. BALOLOY /// Facts: GENELYN was found dead floating face down at the
waterfalls. It was JUANITO who informed Jose, father of Genelyn, that he saw a dead body
at the waterfalls, Thereafter, Jose reported the incident to the Barangay Captain
Luzviminda Ceniza. Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that he saw Antonio
Camacho hand over a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those
present as to who owned the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope,
Ceniza brought him away from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him. Now,
JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to
Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him
of his constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the
incriminatory information.
Issue: WoN his rights under custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon
Ruling: Yes. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is
arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So,
he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the
assistance of counsel. Judge Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that
neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The
fact remains that at that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police
authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before
Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements. And, while it is true
that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated
as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies
of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
21. PEOPLE V. TAWAT /// Facts: Felicito Tawat and Leo Tawat were found guilty of robbery
with triple homicide, sentencing Felicito to death and Leo to an indeterminate penalty.
The case arosed when Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that they
were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the night before they had killed an old
woman and two boys. Further, Felicito executed a confession before the chief of police of
Bagamanoc, Catanduanes where he stated therein that he wanted to get out of
Catanduanes because he was wanted by the police for the killing of three persons in
Barrio Agban, Baras. he had hidden himself in the hut of Ogalesco in Capipian.
Issue: WoNthe trial court erred in relying on that admission of Felicito in his confession
Ruling: No. The testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent evidence.
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
may be given in evidence against him" (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito
told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that
"any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent
to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.) "Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may
be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard,
understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the
accused."
22. PEOPLE V. ANDAN /// FACTS: Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias
"Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The crime was sensationalized
and earned the curiosity and interests of the media and the local government. When the
 Mayor visited the accused at the police station to where he was detained, the accused
appellant requested to privately meet with the Mayor. He then privately confessed to the
Mayor that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. The mayor opened the door
of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings were then photographed and videotaped with the consent of the
accused-appelant. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media
and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s constitutional right under Section 12 of Article
III was violated
RULING: Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. Appellant was already
under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two
bags recovered from appellant's house. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was
not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. The constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise
properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Clearly, appellant's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities.
23. PEOPLE V. ZUELA ///
24. PEOPLE V. GALIT ///
25. PEOPLE V. ENDINO /// Facts: Accused was charged of murder in Puerto Princessa but
was able to escape. He was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio
Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan
and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN
television station where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew
Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for
Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting.
Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas,
where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with
him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed
that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the
videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court found
Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession is admissible as
evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form
part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an
attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. However, because of the
inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place
them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television.
26. PEOPLE V. AYSON /// Facts: Felipe Ramos, a ticket clerk at Philippine Airlines (PAL), was
suspected of estafa. He was notified that an investigation would take place according to
PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between PAL and Philippine Airlines Employees’ Association (PALEA). Ramos
preemptively sent a letter, stating that he was willing to settle for the alleged
irregularities. However, PAL’s auditing team would not hear it first and they presented
him with their findings. Ramos admitted to keeping secret the tickets mentioned in the
reports, that he had indeed used the money for personal use and was not able to return
the money out of shame, and that he was willing to pay for the money in staggered
dividends, that he was willing to proceed with the investigation in the same venue, and
that he would affirm his statements by signing their written transcript. But no
compromise was agreed upon at the end of the day. He was charged with estafa to which
he pleaded ‘not guilty’. The prosecutors presented as evidence the statements he made
complete with his signature affirming the authenticity of his statements. Ramos’s counsel
objected, stating that he made those statements without being represented by competent
counsel. A few other documents were also presented and met with the same objections.
Judge Ruben Ayson denied the evidence on these grounds. Hence the petition now.
ISSUE: Is Judge Ayson correct in making inadmissible the evidence?
RULING: NO. “It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket
sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did
not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free
and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the
so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.”
27. PEOPLE V. ORDOO /// Facts: This case is on automatic review of decision of the RTC
finding respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. Herein
resondents extrajudicially confessed the commission of the crime without the presence of
counsel. They were read their constitutional rights prior to the admission and in the
presence of the Mayor, Priest, Chief of Police, Police Officers and their family and
relatives. The attendance of 2 witnesses were also present. The herein accused-
respondents separately and voluntarily confessed to the said persons. Further, they were
interviewed wherein they narrated the commission of the crime and such interview was
recorded. Later, the accused were brought to the PAO and the MTC wherein they
concurred with the extrajudicial confession by affixing their signature and thumbmark.
 However, on arraignment, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty. They contend that they
were forced, coerced and intimidated to admit the commission of the crime as well as to
affix their respective signature and thumb mark on their extrajudicial confessions.
ISSUE: Whether or not their extrajudicial confessions done without the presence of
counsel were admissible in evidence
RULING: If there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. If the lawyer's role is
diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit
an indication therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. By
allegedly admitting to the authorship of the crime after questioning, the admissions
obtained violated their constitutional rights against self-incrimination With regards to
the interview: The interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from
police officers and was done willingly by the accused. Statements spontaneously made by
a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence
28. PP V. LUGOD /// Facts: An information for rape with homicide was filed against the
accused, Lugod, stating that by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs,
Lugod have carnal knowledge with an 8-year old girl, Nairube Ramos and in order to hide
the crime he just committed, dumped the victim in the grassy coconut plantation area
which resulted to her death. Upon his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. 12
witnesses were presented by the Prosecution. RTC convicted him, but later appealed
contending that the trial court erred for convicting him on the basis of circumstantial
evidence which did not prove that he was the perpetrator and in holding that the accused
confession is admissible as it was not made in response to any interrogation.
Issue: Whether or not confessions made by the accused who was not informed of his
constitutional rights under Sec. 12 are admissible in court.
Ruling: The SC agreed to the submission of the accused and find that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Records reveal that accused was not
informed of his constitutional rights specified under Sec. 12, Art. 3, and there is no
evidence that he intended to waive these rights. Subsequently, his confession without the
assistance of a counsel cannot be used against him and in the same vein; his act of
pointing out the location of the body was also elicited in violation of his right to remain
silent. Even if he was not yet under interrogation, his acts subsequent to his apprehension
cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made and that he was even beaten up
and maltreated by the police officers. The rights provided under Sec. 12 are the basic
tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal
the crime committed may be. The decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside
and accused was ACQUITTED.
29. PEOPLE V. AMESTUZO /// Facts: Accused Bagas was charged with robbery with rape.
Four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together with accused Ampatin,
went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was
working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain Mario and searched the
first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at
the back of his neck with a gun. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-
appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, he
was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. From
the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas
appealed to this Court.
Issue: 1. WON Bagas was deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel
during his identification (In relation to Sec 12)
2. WON the open court identification of Bagas should be given weight
Ruling: 1. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he
was presented for identification by the complainants. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stages. During a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up. (In relation to Sec
12)
2. Complainants out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed as
to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test which lists the following
factors: xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification process. The out-of-court identification of herein
accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly
suggestive. The identification was practically suggested by the police themselves when
they announced to the complainants that accused-appellant was the person pointed to by
Ampatin. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior
to their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the
spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity.
30. PEOPLE V. PIEDAD /// Facts: Accused Niel Piedad eand Lito Garcia were convicted with
the crime of Murder by the lower court. Upon appeal, Piedad claimed that he was denied
his right of counsel during the most crucial stage of the police investigation - that is, his
identification as one of the assailants by eyewitnesses.
Issue: W/n the accused-appellants were denied of their right to counsel.
Ruling: No. The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then propound
questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.[19] The presence of counsel
during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false.[20] What is thus sought to be avoided is the evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him.[21] In the case at bar, however, accused-appellants did not make any
extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged.[22] While Niel
and Lito may have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police
authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Accused-
appellants were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Niel averred during cross-
examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on
the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.[23] Likewise, Lito
testified that he did not talk to any of the police officers nor sign any written statement at
the police station when he was invited.[24] Moreover, the rights accorded an accused
under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only against testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined, as was
done in this case - presented to the witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were
not thus denied their right to counsel

31. PEOPLE V. DAGPIN /// Facts: The Dagpin was charged with murder for assaulting and
killing with the use of a home-made shotgun one Nilo Caemare. The appellant was
arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. The version of the
prosecution alleges that after the day of the killing witnesses Randy, Rona and Rena went
to the police station and saw the appellant, whom they pointed to the police as the person
who shot their uncle. It was only then that they learned the name of their uncles assassin,
Quirico Dagpin. The appellant denied killing Nilo. He testified that he was from Sitio
Tamion which was adjacent to Barangay Sulangon. He knew Nilo because the latter had a
girlfriend in Sulangon, whose name was Reina. He disliked Nilos actuations because
although the latter was not from Sulangon, he acted as if he was the king of Saudi Arabia
every time he was there. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The appellant now assails the decision of the
trial court contending that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on
the basis mainly of his having been identified by Randy, Rona and Rena at the police
station on March 27, 1996. He was not assisted by counsel when the three pointed to him
as the culprit in the police station. Hence, according to the appellant, such identification is
inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: WoN the identification of the appellant without the assistance of a counsel in the
police station deprived his right under the Constitution
Ruling: The appeal has no merit. The evidence on record shows that even before the
killing of Nilo on March 26, 1996, Randy and Rona had already seen the appellant,
although they did not know his name. The appellants denial of the crime charged cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of prosecution witnesses Randy and Rona. The
appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel
because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was
identified by the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up.[16] Indeed, the appellant
even denied that there was no police line-up and that he was merely with the police
officers when the prosecution’s witnesses arrived in the police station.
32. PEOPLE V. NAVALLO /// FACTS: An information charging petitioner with having violated
Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First
Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte. Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of
Numancia National Vocational School found to have misappropriated public funds for
private benefit after a COA audit. (malversation of public funds) A warrant was issued
against Navallo, he was arrested but was able to gain temporary liberty because of bail.
The SandiganBayan found accused ERNESTO NAVALLO y GALON GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: He filed for a motion for reconsideration, the Issue pertinent to our class is WON
petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared by
State Auditing Examiner.
RULING: Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights
under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such
rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in
custody investigation,” which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination
is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to
be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation
of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime
appears to be belied by his own testimony.
33. PEOPLE V. ENDINO /// Facts: Accused was arrested in Manila in connection to a murder
charge filed in Palawan. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN
television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages
of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his
nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino,
they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for
Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself
up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program
TV Patrol. Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and
claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that
the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court however
admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police officers that no
force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his
confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any
semblance of hostility towards him.
Issue: W/N such extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled that the interview was recorded on video and it showed
accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not
given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness
from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have
easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
sympathetic with him. There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or
against his will.
34. PEOPLE V. GUILLERMO /// Facts: Guillermo admitted the killing victim and asked for
help in disposing the body, but Campos (guard) instead called for the police. The police
arrived after 10 minutes and Guillermo surrendered. The body of Keyser was severed to
seven parts using the carpenters saw and put the dismembered limbs to the boxes and
the head inside a cement bag. Accused was merely made to read Miranda on the wall
without any explaination. Guillermo also interviewed by the TV reporters on Broadcasted
nationwide, where he admitted to the interview the crime he did. The Trial Court
convicted him, because his defense was unbelievable and penalized by death, which was
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation of the police is admissible against him
Whether or not his confession to Campos and the TV reporters is admissible
Held: The Evidence gathered by the police is inadmissible, however the confession made
to Campos is admissible as part of the res gestae and does not partake as uncounseled
extrajudicial confession. The TV confession is likewise admissible as it is a confession not
to the police but to a private entity. The right of a person under interrogation to be
informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain
and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. The OSG explained the admissibility of the admission to Campos and
Confession to the TV reporters and must be treated as part of res gestae: First, he
admitted having killed his employer to the security guard, Campos, and even sought
Campos help in disposing of Keysers body. This admission may be treated as part of the
res gestae and does not partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession. Requisites: (1)
the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Second, the
 appellants statements before members of the media are likewise admissible in evidence,
according to the OSG, as these statements were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by police or other investigating officer. The OSG stresses that appellant was
interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he made free and
voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. Third, the OSG points
out that appellant voluntarily confessed to the killing even before the police could enter
the premises and even before any question could be posed to him. Furthermore, after the
police investigators had entered the factory, the appellant pointed to the place where
Keysers corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in time, appellant was
not yet under custodial investigation.
35. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. OLALIA, JR. ///
36. PEOPLE V. BAGNATE /// FACTS: Accused repudiated his confession given during
custodial investigation stating that, although he was Mirandarized in his dialect, the
counsel did not inform him of the consequences of such confession i.e. the penalty to be
served thus denying him of his right to competent and independent counsel.
ISSUE: WoN Appellant’s confession is admissible?
RULING: Assistance of the lawyer in the case is more than perfunctory contrary to
Appellant’s claim that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent counsel as
he failed to advise him of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of
committing; that, he was not aware of the consequences of his admissions.
Presence of counsel is intended to: (a) secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial
confession and assistance must be independent and competent (People vs Patungan), (b)
to protect the accused from being coerced to admit any that is untrue, not intended as a
deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires
(People vs Base), (c) to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate
him. The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the
crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant’s extrajudicial
confession. To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an
accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be: “willing to
fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418)
37. PEOPLE V. VALLEJO /// FACTS: In the afternoon of July 10, 1999, Nida Diolola sent her
9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario,
Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo, could help
Daisy with her lessons. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant and they
were looking for a book. After finding it, the victim and the accused went back to the
latter's hourse. Nida Diolola woke up at around 5:30 PM and she noticed that her
daughter was not yet home so she went looking for her. At about 10:00 AM the next
morning, June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found
tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river. Witnesses pointed to the accused Gerrico
Vallejo as the suspect for his suspicious conduct during the previous day when they saw
him. The barangay officers reported the incident to the police, fetched the accused and
took him to the brgy. hall. The policemen then invited Gerrico for questioning and he was
detained at the municipal jail. That evening, the Mayor visited him, heard his confession,
and offered him the services of a counsel which the accused accepted. Accused-appellant
claimed that, although he admitted to the Mayor and Atty. Leyva, the counsel, the
commission of the crime, he did so because the police had maltreated him. He added that
both the mayor and counsel were not present when he gave his confession to the police
and signed the same. The trial court found the accused guilty of rape with homicide.
Hence the present appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the alleged oral confessions of the accused are admissible in
evidence
RULING: As held in People v. Andan, the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. The
mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not an interrogation, but rather an act of
benevolence by a leader seeking to help his constituent. The oral confession made by
accused-appellant to the NBI Forensic Biologist was also admissible. The confession, thus,
can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is,
therefore, admissible as evidence.
38. TEEHANKEE V. ROVIRA /// Facts: Petitioner Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political
detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the
Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, dated December 29, 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No.
L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of this court (p. 50, ante). She is now confined in the
Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government
since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government. On October 4,
1945, the Hon. Antonio Quirino, one of the Associate Judges of the People's Court, upon
considering the said petition, required the Solicitor General "to file his comment and
recommendation as soon as possible." On October 5, 1945, the Solicitor General filed
recommendation in compliance with said order, stating: "that on the strength of the
evidence at hand, the reasonable basil recommended for the provisional release of the
petitioner be fixed at Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000)."
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail as of right under
subsection (16), section 1, Article III of the Constitution and section 3 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling: This statutory provision must be construed congruently with the provision of the
Constitution and in harmony with the existing laws on the subject, particularly sections 3
to 8 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Subsection (16), section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution provides as follows: (16)All persons shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Under the constitutional provision and the rules of Court above quoted, admission to bail
before conviction of all persons not charged with capital offenses is mandatory and not
discretionary with the court; they "shall be admitted to bail as of right." No statute can in
any manner impair that constitutional right. Therefore, the proviso in question to the
effect that the political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after due
notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail, even prior to
the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the court finds that there is
strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense, can only be construed to refer to
such political prisoners as may be actually or prospectively charged with a capital
offense; because if that statutory provision be construed to include political prisoners not
charged or chargeable with a capital offense, it would be unconstitutional, since under the
Constitution such political prisoners before conviction are entitled to bail as of right and
not in the discretion of the court.
39. BAYLON V. JUDGE SISON /// Facts: Judge Sison (respondent) is accused for malfeasance
in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given
notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15,
section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working
day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that
they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the
accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since
the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous
notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue:Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of
bail to the accused
Held: the Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in
granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday
and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the
prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied
in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law that bail is not a
matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense
which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge
should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an
outright grant of this motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes: . . The prosecution must first be
accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.
40. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. OLALIA JR. ///
FACT: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of
arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the
private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the
respondent judge subject to the conditions
ISSUE: Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
RULING: The standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard
of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. The standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear
and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
41. MEJIA V. PAMARAN ///
42. ROQUE V. OMBUDSMAN ///
43. 5
44. ALONTE V. SAVELLANO ///
45. 7
46. 8
47. PEOPLE V. AUSTRIA /// Facts: In the morning of August 10, 1975, the police dug out of
the ground in a sugarcane field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental, the lifeless body
of Tomas Azuelo. Found near his grave were the traces of blood and a bloodstained piece
of wood. Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police
working together with the Philippine Constabulary. One of the suspects was Pablo Austria
and the three other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement of the former
who imputed to his son Eduardo, his brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo
Abanilla, the commission of the crime. The Deputy Chief of Police of Sagay filed a
complaint for robbery with homicide against the 4 accused and after preliminary
examination, Judge Emilio Ignalaga, Acting Municipal Judge, issued a warrant of arrest
against herein appellants. No bail was recommended. All the accused pleaded not guilty
to the charge. However, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants of the
imputed crime based on testimonies and circumstantial evidence. Surviving appellant
Eduardo Austria appealed the decision of the trial court stating that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required for the conviction.
Issue: WoN there was proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict Eduardo Austria
Ruling: The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
appellant Eduardo Austria beyond reasonable doubt. Accused enjoys the presumption of
innocence and it is the duty of the State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said
accused had committed the crime. To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is needed. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence
with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring the innocence of the accused be duly taken into account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Sec. 5, Rule
133, there must. be (a) more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
48. CORPUZ V. REPUBLIC /// Facts: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said
Office. When his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of
Turnover revealed a shortage. After failing to meet several demands to pay the shortage,
an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against the petitioner with
the respondent court. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge. Petitioner
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Upon Reaching the SC, the petitioner further
invoked the equipoise rule of presumption of innocence, averring that that there was no
post-audit conducted.
Issue: WoN Equipoise Rule will apply
Ruling: Equipoise rule of presumption of innocence may not be applied.It may only be
invoked where the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced in which case presumption
of innoccence shall tilt in favor of the accused. Further, the absence of a post-audit is not,
as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the
filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has
already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
 authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his
nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused
must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be
affirmed
49. CORPUZ V. REPUBLIC /// Facts: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said
Office. When his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of
Turnover revealed a shortage. After failing to meet several demands to pay the shortage,
an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against the petitioner with
the respondent court. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge. Petitioner
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Upon Reaching the SC, the petitioner further
invoked the equipoise rule of presumption of innocence, averring that that there was no
post-audit conducted.
Issue: WoN Equipoise Rule will apply
Ruling: Equipoise rule of presumption of innocence may not be applied.It may only be
invoked where the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced in which case presumption
of innoccence shall tilt in favor of the accused. Further, the absence of a post-audit is not,
as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the
filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has
already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his
nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused
must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be
affirmed
50. DIZON-PAMINTUAN V. PP /// The house of the Encarnacion spouses was robbed and
after reporting the same to the Police, they were eventually informed by a police from the
tip they acquired from an informant that the stolen items were in China town area being
showcased in a stall and that they will conduct an entrapment with their participation.
The stolen items were recovered from the possession of the petitioner and she was then
charged for Violation of the Anti Fencing law. After conviction by the trial court, she
appealed to the CA contending her constitutional right to presumption of innocence. She
contends that she doesn’t have knowledge that the items were stolen and she only bought
it from a certain Fredo. As witness, she merely presented her brother to assail the proof
beyond reasonable doubt presented by the prosecution.
Issue: WON there is violation to her right to presumption of innocence and that there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt to warrant conviction of the crime charged
Ruling: Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) expressly provides that "[m]ere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the
petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her
possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no
other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the
presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. The petitioner failed to
show evidence to overcome the presumption of guilt against her because she relied solely
on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption,
and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and
sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo who was not even presented
as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or supplier of
jewelry. Hence, there was no violation of the right of presumption of innocence and the
accused is hereby convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
51. RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION ANGELES /// Facts: “Respondent was convicted
for violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse). The Court's Second Division approved all of these
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions
while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases. Respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the suspension order was wielded against her
without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of
SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Moreover, respondent
manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have,
therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is
tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. The prosecutor reiterated that due to her
conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion
that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Issue: WoN a case on appeal dissolves the presumption of innocence if the accused has
been convicted by the trial court
Ruling: When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary,
and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is
not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. Conversely, conviction in the
criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case.
Since the conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the
same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption
of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the
guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence
unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
52. PEOPLE V. BERNAS /// The accused assailed the decision of the lower court contending
that he was denied due process of law citing that the counsel specifically his right to
effective and vigilant counsel. The first counsel de officeio assigned to the accused hardly
pariticipated in the trial and inexplicably waived cross when a witness against the
accused, his wife whom he is separated from, and later asked to be relieved of her duties
as counsel. The second counsel de officio, who asked for continuance, failed to appear at
the scheduled hearing, the same as the third counsel.
Issue: W/N accused constitutional right to effective counsel was violated.
Ruling: Yes. The SC held that, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly
and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. Even prior to the advent of the 1935
Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has already been recognized under
General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all criminal
prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and that if he is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him. "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
 counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Procedure alone is not enough...it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time
to procure an attorney of his own. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a
mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. Tersely put, it
means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation. Case was remanded for rehearing.
53. PEOPLE V. TULIN /// On the evening of March 2, 1991, a vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation was suddenly boarded by accused-appellants armed
with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos, while sailing the coast of
Mindoro.
The accused-appellants took over the vessel and began the illegal operation of
transferring the cargo from the ship to theirs. This operation took place in Singapore in
the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong and eventually went back to the
Philippines where the vessel was held captive and where the accused-appellants were
arrested. Cheong San Hiong contends that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation against him was violated when the trial court
convicted as an accomplice even though he was charged as a principal to the crime.
Issue: W/N there is a violation of his right to be informed of the Nature and the cause of
the accusation against him
Ruling. No. The charge against him was as a principal, however, the trial court convicted
him as an accomplice was not a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and
nature of the accusation against him. The trial court found that there was insufficiency to
convict Hiong as principal, but this does not mean that his rights were violated. 'SECTION
4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery
brigandage. It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in
this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.'
54. PEOPLE V. LARRANAGA /// Separate appeals were brought before the SC from the
Decision of the RTC, Branch 7, Cebu City in a criminal case finding herein accused-
appellants guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Accused-appellants
allegedly kidnapped and raped sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong before killing
Marijoy on the night of July 16, 1997. Jacqueline remains missing. After almost ten
months or in May of 1998, one of the accused Rusia came forward and admitted to the
crime thus he testifed in court what had actually happened. The trial court then found the
accused-appellants guilty. The appellants argue over the following, before the Supreme
Court: (1) violation of their right to due process; (2) the improper discharge of Rusia as
an accused to be a state witness; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution;
and (4) the trial court's disregard and rejection of the evidence for the defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the following constitutional rights of the accused-appellants were
violated: (a) right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to
confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence on
their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial.
RULING: No. Right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings. Appellants
fault the trial court: first, for appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be
assisted by counsel of their own choice and second, for refusing to suspend trial until they
shall have secured new counsels. There is, however, no denial of the right to counsel
where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de
parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the
continuous trial system. The appointment of counsel de oficio is not prohibited by the
Constitution. An examination Section 12(1), Article III, concerning the right to counsel
shows that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly to a person
under investigation rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution. And even if we are
to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would
enable him to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. Also,
an application for a continuance in order to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily
addressed to the discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not an infringement of
the accused's right to counsel. The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be
exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Right to confront and cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses. The trial court's imposed limitation on the length of
time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be labeled as a violation of
the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was
imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not
to waste time on repetitive questioning. If some of the prosecution witnesses were not
subjected to cross-examination at the trial court, it was not because appellants were not
given the opportunity to do so. The fact is that their new counsel de parte refused to
cross-examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross examine
the witnesses" against them.
Right to produce evidence. The trial court's exclusion of the testimonies is justified.
Larranaga's alibi to prove that he was not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the major
airlines flying from Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16, 1997 would not
prove the legal requirement of "physical impossibility" because he could have taken the
flight from Manila to Cebu prior to that date. Due process of law is not denied by the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for
certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for
offering it.
Right to impartial trial. As to their right to an impartial trial, the remarks made by trial
court judge Ocampo were mere remrks which manifest a desire to confine the
proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial and thus do not constitute a
rebuke of counsel. If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words against those defense witnesses,
it was because they made a mockery of the court's proceedings by their deliberate lies.
55. TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN /// The Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA TEVES of violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, committed as follows: That on or about February 4, 1992, , in Valencia, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Edgar
Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein
accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the
issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a
direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena
is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves. Contary to law.
Issue : Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to be charged with violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling: In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of
proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that
the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor.
 Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves was ordered.
The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then Municipal Mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, of causing, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official
functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife the issuance of the appropriate
business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of
one Daniel Teves. The last part of the dispositive portion of the information states that
said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein
considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves. A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted
last part thereof is merely an allegation of the second element of the crime, which is, that
he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction. Hence, the SC agreed with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful
intervention in the issuance of the license to operate the Valencia Cockpit.
56. ESTRADA V. PEOPLE /// FACTS: An Information charging Mary Helen Estrada with estafa
was filed with the RTC of Las Piñas City.Estrada signed an undertaking that in case of her
failure to appear during the trial despite due notice,her absence would constitute as an
express waiver of her right to be present during trial and promulgation of judgment and
the lower court would then proceedwith the hearing in absentia. When the schedule for
hearing and presentation for evidence came, counsel for petitioner failed to appear.
Estrada jumped bail and was considered to have waived her right to present evidence.
The RTC thus rendered judgment based only on prosecution evidence. She was convicted
of Estafa by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations by the RTC. The
CA denied her Petition for Certiorari, thus Estrada filed the present petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N There is a grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC judge and that due
process was not afforded to the accused
58. PP V. ACURAM /// Facts: Two separate informations were filed against appellant on
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that “after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.”In fact, in People vs. Tabag,104 the Court even admonished the
trial court for failing to proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from
preventive detention, to wit:They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the
last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against
them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against
them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course,both accused have died and the fact
of such death is sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas,
their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their
trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not
prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received
notice.From the foregoing pronouncement, it is quite clear that all of petitioner’s
protestations that she was denied due process because neither she nor her counsel
received notices of the trial court’s orders are all to naught, as by the mere fact that she
jumped bail and could no longer be found, petitioner is considered to have waived her
right to be present at the trial, and she and her counsel were to be deemed to have
received notice.
57. IGOT V. COMELEC /// Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of BP Blg. 51, 52 and
53 and seeks to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing certain provisions contained
therein. In relation to our topic, the focus is on the unconstitutionality of BP Blg. 52,
Section 4 as raised by petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Sec. 4. ... Any person who has
committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity
therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes
shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall
be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision is unconstitutional as it violates the person's
right to presumption of innocence
Ruling: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have
been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence,
and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to
be substituted for a judicial determination.
August 9, 1989. Although both informations referred to the same incident on June 20,
1989 in the municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, the first information charged
appellant with violation of Sec. 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 for alleged unlawful and felonious possession of one hundred
thirty-five point eight (135.8) grams of marijuana leaves .The second information charged
appellant with violation of Sec. 4 of the same law for willful, unlawful and felonious sale
and distribution of one gram of marijuana leaves. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charges against him. 2 At the joint trial of the two cases, the prosecution
presented only three witnesses: Philippine Constabulary (PC) members Sgt. Candelario
Lahaylahay, Lt. Salome Jose and CIC Manuel Peleño. In his defense, Acuram interposed
alibi and denial that he had possessed or sold marijuana. Acuram appealed to this Court.
The bottomline of this assignment of errors is the credibility of the witnesses presented
by both the prosecution and the defense.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in giving credence to the "hearsay testimonies" of the
PC members
Ruling: Appellant's allegation that the testimonies of Lahaylahay and Peleño are
"hearsay" is baseless. Both constabulary men were eyewitnesses to the "buy-bust"
operation and appellant had not refuted their respective testimonies, let alone
established that they were somewhere else when the buy-bust operation transpired such
that they could not have witnessed it. PC operatives had no evil motives to harass and
implicate the appellant is supported by their testimonies that the incident was the first
meeting between them and the appellant. 33 Said testimonies were affirmed in court by
the appellant who even added that he bore no grudges against or had a misunderstanding
with the PC men, Tonton and Parawan. 34 Moreover, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official functions has not been rebutted by the defense's evidence. Thus,
in this case, since it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of regularity of
 performance of official functions prevails over the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused.
59. ACEVEDO V. SARMIENTO
60. 5 any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his
61. 6 deposition’ The subpoena was not issued in connection with a criminal case or for any
62. GIMENEZ V. NAZARENO ///
63. PP V. TAMPAL /// Facts: In an information, Luis Tampal et. al., were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment
they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. On the date of hearing, the Provincial
Prosecutor moved for postponement on the ground that he failed to contact his material
witnesses, thereby the case was reset. When the case was again called, the prosecutor
was not present, which led to the dismissal of the judge for failure to prosecute
considering the unjustified absence of the prosecutor. He filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the Prosecutor’s Office was closed that time because it was
declared holiday for Muslims, but the same was denied. The Solicitor General filed a
petition for certiorari which contends that respondent judge acted without or in the
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion when he dismissed the case
despite the fact that the prosecutor’s absence was for a valid cause. He also claims that
the case may be reinstated. The judge answered claiming that the dismissal was justified
based on the rights of the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the judge on the basis of the right of the accused to
speedy trial was correct
Ruling: The SC ruled against the judge. In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of
the accused to speedy trial, courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending
each case. They should balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to
punish people who violate its laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due
process. It is apparent that the prosecutor’s failure to attend was due to his good faith and
belief that said date was a Muslim Legal Holiday. In determining the right of an accused to
speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of hearings. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are
“unjustified postponements” which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. The
subject case was only postponed twice and for a period of less than 2 months. The first
was w/o any objection, the second was due to a valid cause. The settled rule is that the
right to a speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution
of its day in court. Respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Three requisites for double jeopardy are: (1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second, (2) first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second
jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in the first. Petition for certiorari was
granted and the case was reinstated for further proceedings.
64. CALAMIC V. GALAPON /// Facts: Complainant charges respondent Judge with grave
coercion. In the affidavit, she states that she was served by police officer a subpoena
issued by the respondent commanding her to appear before him at 10:00 a.m. of 4 August
1993; she was surprised because she does not know of any pending case or any
complaint against her. When she appeared before the respondent at the time and on the
date designated in the subpoena, respondent threatened, berated, and coerced her to
produce and give him the amount of P8,000.00 which she received as her lawful share as
beneficiary in a life insurance policy obtained by her common-law husband, Edgardo
Sandagan, who had died; and as a consequence of the threats and coercion, she ‘suffered
sleepless nights, serious anxiety, mental anguish and similar moral pains’. In the affidavit
of Generosa Sandagan, she states that the subpoena was issued to the complainant upon
her request so that she can have a confrontation with the complainant before the
respondent Judge.
Issue: WoN the respondent judge issued the subpoena erroneously
Ruling: Under Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena ‘is a process directed to
a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at
other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct
pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. What Generosa wanted was for respondent
to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant,
which was, obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. In using the subpoena
form for criminal cases nothing could have been intended but to sow fear in the mind of
the complainant and compel her attendance, for her failure to do so would have subjected
her to ‘the penalty of law’. There was element of intimidation, oppression or abuse of
authority, which aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on issuance of subpoenas
(compulsory processes of the law). WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
respondent Judge Victorio Galapon, Jr. guilty of ignorance of law and oppression.
65. CARMELO V. PEOPLE /// Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated homicide after a
confrontation with the victim Benjamin Obillo. On the same day during the arraignment,
Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. An amended information was filed by the
prosecution - and the accused filed a motion to queash the same claiming that it was
double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N this consitutes Double Jeopardy
Ruling: No. Where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction
the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy.
66. PP V. WILLY OBSANIA /// The victim together with her family filed a complaint of rape
with robbery against the accused alleging the information stated above. The case was
then remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal
filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above
complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed with lewd
designs. Accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for
failure to allege 'lewd design' and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal
which averred 'lewd designs' did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo
granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that ‘the failure of the
complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused
were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case’. Hence, an
appeal was made.
Issue: WON the present appeal places the accused in double jeopardy?
Ruling: NO Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the
merits at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the defendant, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall be definite or a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition or with
the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the defendant's
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to
be prosecuted again for the same offense. The motion to dismiss is deemed as an express
consent or a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, hence, it bars him from
subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new
prosecution for the same offense. There was no double jeopardy since the termination of
 the first case is based on a dismissal for procedural matters and not based on the merit of
the issues of the case.
67. PP V. JUDGE VILLARAMA /// Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section
16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1997). During the
arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open
court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of “not guilty” to that
of “guilty” to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425. Respondent Judge
issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to
the change of plea. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense, alleging that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific
period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent
judge granted accused’s motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for
review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent’s change of
plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as
amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double
jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent
to the private respondent’s change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances: (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party; Under this
rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court’s
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
68. PP V. PILPA /// Accused was charged with frustrated murder. Fiscal moved in open court
for the dismissal of the case due to the lack of specific allegation of “intent to kill”. Defense
initially raised no objection but then wanted to avail of the defense of double jeopardy. He
nullified the objection.
Two days later, Fiscal filed the correct Information. Defense moved to quash new
information which the judge granted reasoning that the dismissal of the first information
was without the consent of the accused because of his manifestation opposing the
dismissal. Subsequently the prosecution appealed the quashal.
Issue: W/N the second information would place the accused twice in jeopardy.
Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked in
cases of (a) previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois convict) of the
same offense, or (c) when the case against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
REQUISITES: there is former jeopardy when in the first case there was a valid
COMPLAINT of information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and, after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or the case against
him was terminated without his express consent
The absence of an averment as to intent to kill was not a fatal defect because the intent to
kill may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused the death
of the victim.
The question is whether the termination of the case was without his express consent and
is a bar to his prosecution for frustrated murder under the second information.
We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused
that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of
conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning
of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court
had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent to
the dismissal
There was no jeopardy in such dismissal because the words "No objection" conveyed the
Idea of full concurrence with the dismissal and was equivalent to saying "I agree."
69. HERRERA V. SANDIGANBAYAN /// On December 28, 1989, Paranaque Police Officers
Edgardo Baltoribo and Redentor Mariano shot and killed Shi Shu Yang and George Go.
They pleaded not guilty at the Sandiganbayan and applied for bail. Soon after, they raised
the issue of lack of juridisdiction on teh grounds that the prosecution failed to allege in
the informations that the crimes were committed "in relation to their office".
Sandiganbayan ordered the ammendment of the information. Petitioners now contend
that Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them of murder under the ammended
information as they had already been arraigned for the original information. This was
now double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N There is Double Jeopardy.
Ruling. No. It does not apply.
No. Double jeopardy does not apply. Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the
informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the
case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically reproduced as
evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by
virtue of petitioner’s plea of not guilty under the amended information.
For a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
70. On July 19, 1991, public officers in GSIS Hermenegildo Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo Clave,
Roman Cruz, and Fabian Ver were charged of graft and corruption. They pleaded not
guilty. Dumlao assailed the charges, stating that the document used to commit the offense
was not approved by the board and therefore renders the trial moot and academic. The
Sandiganbayan agreed with the same and dismissed the case. Prosecutors filed for
certiorari. Petitioner (People) argues it was denied its right to due process when the
court a quo dismissed the case against respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it
could present its witnesses and formally offer its exhibits. In the case under
consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency
of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence.
In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived prosecution the
opportunity to prosecute and prove the accused’s culpability. In support of the dismissal
of the case against him, respondent Dumlao contends that to give due course to the
Ombudsmans petition would place him in double jeopardy, in violation of his
constitutional rights.

Issue: W/N this is a form of double jeopardy.

Sub-issue: W/N the dismissal was premature and violative of the right to due process.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first.

The first jeopardy attaches attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.

No fifth element yet. The dismissal was premature because any dismissal based on
insufficiency of evidence may only be made after the prosecution rests its case and not at
any time before then. Such dismissal of information deprives the State of opportunity to
prosecute and convict. It is void and cannot be the basis of double jeopardy.