G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty.
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
ISSUE: Does respondent posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years?
RULING: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience
as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
 R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as
that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication
of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking
of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant
charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll
of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not
yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC)
of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
(Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed
the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice
mayoralty candidate.
ISSUE: is respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar?
RULING: YES. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of
law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having
held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys
that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA
BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc
promulgated a Resolution in suspending Atty. Lozada for
violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's
motion for reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of
Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her husband and not a
client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave
injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus,
she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
issue: WHETHER Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is
engaged in an unauthorized practice of law.
Ruling: yes.

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with

The practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court,
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
writ of preliminary injunction where complainant was one of
knowledge, training and experience." It includes
the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
of the case. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted
skill.”14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated
June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty.
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based
Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as
on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty.
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for
Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination
and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
of the witnesses during the trial
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing
Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in
as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-
constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the
year suspension considering that she was suspended from
Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two
the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would
(2) years.
then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot
practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when
In her comment, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced
Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in
by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her
Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the
husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-
year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She
knew very well that at the time she represented her
husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did
she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she
can represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she
believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not
forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court
who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
THIRD DIVISION
[ CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995 ]
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation
Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija,
members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to
wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
complainant might obtain.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with
the following findings and recommendations:
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the
IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent
and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R.
No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Is Atty. Pablito Castillo guilty of unjust and unethical conduct?
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and
recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements
is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court.
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C.
Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8
September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea
was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of
his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed
to take the 1993 Bar Examinations He passed the Bar Examination.
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow
him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the
practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order.
Issue: Should Mr. Argosino be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath?
RULING: Yes.
the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency
in moral character referred to above good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at
the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but
also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination
and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of
the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up
for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the
contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him
the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency
of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
 friend of a part y litigant. The petitioner furt her more avers that
THIRD DIVISION his appearance was with the prior confor mit y of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointin g
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, G.R. No. 154207 hi m to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
Petitioner,
However , in an Order dated Februar y 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
Present:
per mission for petitioner to appear as privat e prosecutor on the
- versus - YNARES -SANT IAGO, J., ground that Circular No. 19 governing l imited law student
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, practice in conj unction with Rule 138 -A of the Rules of Court
CALLEJO, SR., (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the
ALBERTO MINA, CHICO -NAZARIO, and
HON. ELEUTERIO F NACHURA, JJ. ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
GUERRERO and HON. for continuation of trial. [ 3 ]
ZENAIDA Promul gated:
LAGUILLES,
ISSUE: whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before
Respondents. April 27, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
- x

D E C I S I O N RULING: YES. In a Resolution Bar Matter No. 730, the

Court En Banc clarified:
AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, J.:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is
FACTS: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace , a part y may
(petitioner) filed before the MeTC a for mal Entry of conduct his litigation in person, with
Appearance, as pri vate prosecutor, in a Cri mi nal Case for the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by hi m for t hat purpose, or
Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cr uz, is the
with the aid of an attorney. In an y
complaining witness. other court, a part y may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be
The petitioner, describing hi mself as a thir d year law student, either personal or by a dul y
j ustifies his appearance as private prosecut or on the bases of authorized member of the bar.
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of Thus, a law student may appear bef ore an
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr . [ 2 ] that a inf erior court as an agent or f riend of a party
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
 w ithout the supervision of a member of the
bar. [ 7 ]
which is the prevailing rule at the ti me the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25,
2000. There is really no problem as to the application of Section
34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138 -A. In the former, the appearance
of a non -lawyer , as an agent or friend of a part y litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions
when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a part y litigant,
may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Sect ion 34 of
Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact
that petitioner referred to hi mself as a law student in his entry
of appearance. Rule 138 -A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying per mission to act as pri vate prosec utor
against petitioner for the si mple reason that Rule 138 -A is not
the basis for the petitioners appearance.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, sought exemption from
payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked
in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.[2]
the IBP submitted its comment[3] maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated,
thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
In his reply, petitioner contends that the Policy of Non-Exemption
in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership
dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without
due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a
lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when
he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad
from 1986-2003?
Ruling: NO. The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in
the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that
the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while
tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or
the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Soliman Santos filed a complaint for misrepresentation and non-
payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.
In a letter-complaint, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member
of the bar, alleged that:
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated
the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already,
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section
10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and
until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999.
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here
for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for
three months.
Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later
revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as
RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut was
appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.
ISSUES: Did atty. Francisco Llamas misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his
actions?
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later,
is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Is Atty. Llamas exempt from paying his membership dues

owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen?

RULING:
EN BANC
Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor Petitioner,
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CASTRO, JJ.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months
shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment
covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for
removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys.
RESOLUTION
It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged
in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. CORONA, J.:
No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship
that year," the exemption however does not include payment to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved
of membershipor association dues. and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Issue: Did petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship?
Ruling: NO.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer
of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND
ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA
& PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Complainant, Cleo Dongga-as alleged that sometime
in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of respondents to
handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya
Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the
case would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00
payable immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable
after the final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start
working on the case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will
cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and filing fees;
and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be
around three (3) to four (4) months from filing. Accordingly,
complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which was duly
received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw

From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case

with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, despite his
constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not
present any petition and instead, offered excuses for the
delay, saying that: (a) they still had to look for a
psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for
a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were DIZON V. LAMBINO
still deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that FACTS: The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of
the petition would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the
but such date passed without any petition being filed. As an
chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew
excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed
since they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the
will favorably resolve complainant's petition.4chanrobleslaw National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon,

To the complainant's surprise, they responded by sending two (2)
billingstatements in the amounts of P258,000.00 and P324,000.00. together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of
Thus, he filed acomplaint. the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the respondents should be held administratively As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis
liable forviolating the CPR.
HELD Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of
. Yes. Despite the passage of more than five (5) months from the Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his
engagement,respondents failed to file the appropriate pleading to
initiate the case before theproper court. Such neglect of the legal custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman advised
matter entrusted to them by their clientconstitutes a flagrant violation against Atty. Dizons move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for
of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit: CANON18-A LAWYER
their arrest.
SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule18.03 -A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligencein connection therewith shall render him liable After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP
officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with
Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following
morning.
The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.
Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against
Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation
of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
docketed as CBD Case No. 346.
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against
Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-
Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which
makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule
8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.
The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino,
consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
ISSUES: is the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the
suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility.
2. is the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-
suspects constitutes violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
RULING: 1. No. Atty. Lambino acted within her official duties as she
safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the schools substitute
parental authority and within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no
warrants of arrest.
2. YES. By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students
without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of
violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994
ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.

MELO, J.:
FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag
charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and
notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in
connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein complainant
was the vendee.
In her letter-complaint, Nadayag alleged that Grageda prepared and
notarized the sale using a stolen Original Certificate of Land Title, as a
result of which she was swindled P108,000 because the land was
already sold ahead of her using the owner’s duplicate copy of the title.
Suspicious of the OCT’s appearance, she had brought the matter to
Grageda’s attention, to which he simply answered that the title was all
right told her not to worry as he is an attorney and knew very well
the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial
matter has been and in fact always handled by him. However, the OCT
was confiscated by the Iligan ROD, Atty. Baguio when the
complainant applied for registration of the pacto de retro. Nadayag
filed a complaint against the vendor-a-retro and accomplices,
including Grageda coursed through the local Brgy. Captain and city
fiscal, but the information did not include Grageda, hence this report.
In his counter-affidavit, Grageda claimed that he notarization was
based on the documents presented.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Grageda should be disciplined.
RULING: Yes. Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
(Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in
seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for
which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed
duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained
the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as
would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such
responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he
must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization
of a private document converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose
A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
EN BA NC
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, A.C. No. 7136
Complainant,
versus
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL
EALA,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Facts: on March 4, 2002 Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed a
Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee
Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married
to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three
children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed
that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you,
or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go
home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she
slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family
and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and
hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained
a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly
parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
ISSUE: Is responedent guilty of gross immoral conduct and in
violation of the lawyer’s oath?
RULING: YES. Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not
his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly
immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who
is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not
deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults
is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
 sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before
admission to practice law which states that he will support the Constitution
and obey the laws
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of
the Constitution.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).1
Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of
agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Hence, Judge
Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of
fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice.
Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication
and other expenses. Atty. Glenn Gaccot offered the parcels to
prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from Tabang the
TCTs.
Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the
TCTs of the seven parcels and caused the publication of notices where
he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced
that these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He
received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.
Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit filed a case before the IBP.
Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and
petitioners only demanded a balato of 20% from the proceeds which
in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of
Governors.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in
illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or
even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the
contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to
the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and
torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action,
he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated
it. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts: An administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent,
a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful
violation of his oath as an attorney.
On March 30, 1971 complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by
respondent, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by
complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given
respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three
other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00
A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the
latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the
NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons
doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty
minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the
latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent
replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to
respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket.
The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the
NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's
hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied
earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the
Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was
photographed, fingerprinted and record checked.
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two
other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely,
Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel
Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as
charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970,
which was pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that
complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket
without his knowledge and consent.
Issue: Did respondent violated his oath of attorney?
Ruling:Yes. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante
delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant
during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in
his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases
against him.
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a
public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18;
People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a
source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution
be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and spread on the personal records of respondent.

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Facts:
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that
respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the
roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be
recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to
lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an
opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro
reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a
resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift
the order of suspension. 8
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte
motion praying for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was
denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer
in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise
denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated
March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro
with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant
violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to
this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief
Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed
his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The
corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this
Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its
report, with the following findings and recommendation:
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as
respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the
complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative
Case No. 2148 are:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the
names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient
grounds for suspension or disbarment.
RULING:
& Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917,
which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970
of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he
asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal
services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in
Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the
proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No.
1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a
consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the
properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a
decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz
decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and
remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a
decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles
emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the
Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor
General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November 3, 1973
decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May
25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are
concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed
to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was,
however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and
executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were
remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch
XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision
rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which
dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the
clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision
categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that
until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or
set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven
defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they
occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become
premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of
September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion
to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly
predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court
that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and
void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The
Court opined that until said decision is reversed the
actual occupants had better be maintained in their
possessions of the land. 21
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set
aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial
and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on
November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all
titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign
ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the
March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients
who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite
thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke
the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership
rights over the Ortigas properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II
ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the
name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor
of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal
services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated
September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that
the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered
insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also
adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the
certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of
GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide
tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders
of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to
affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only
affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the
order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two
grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now
 being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because
it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not
even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21,
1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26,
1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
(Emphasis supplied) 22
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set
aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title
to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent
Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere
transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of
the above properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services
executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as
another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered
by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was
executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent
Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700
square meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned
rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually
occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by
titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document
evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their
lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that
respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land
covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact
or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he was not
aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on
the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the
law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal
profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years
of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of
support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the
social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and
attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an
officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life
may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it
ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On
the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that
its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion,
ought to be exercised with great moderation and
judgment, but it must be exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that
the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an
attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with
his client and to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney. 26
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the
court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27
Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. 29
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these
two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and
unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose
the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal
services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-
two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this
discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches
of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of
ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge
Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants,
clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been
in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their respective parcels
dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must
be maintained and respected. 30
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal
dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was
thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor
of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to
the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance
with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set
aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which
is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26,
1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the
defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the
land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon,
and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants' right of
possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the subject
lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration to that
effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any
ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we
have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was finally
settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of
June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier
order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the title
of said partnership from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the
defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties
may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the
attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing
awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the
nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That respondent
acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly
derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro,
dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to
herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a
party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that his act
of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile
theory that his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that
the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on
the award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since there
was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an
unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land
involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares
whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares
of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling,
up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425
32
pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null
and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro
recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final
outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified
Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge
Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the
reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by
setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the
defendants. He could not properly rule on the ownership rights of
defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said
decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of
possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify
the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name
of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier
discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and
set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No.
1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership
vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for
sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen
that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16,
1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the
validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas
and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However,
respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant
disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by
respondent himself during the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the
pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that
respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the
Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from
continuing with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge
Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of
titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed
and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the
Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas &
Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew
that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First
Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the
certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all
these pronouncements and his awareness thereof,
respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties
titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the
Madrigals. 34
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is
hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the
charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his
suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated
June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating
among other things that the complaint against
respondent could not prosper if respondent's
manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-
42709 and his request for certification by the Chief
Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-
42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec.
11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are
NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's
typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated
September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981
repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in
clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining
the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-
78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a
Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private
respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro's
personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to
which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had
allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December
2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also
appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied
since the same was prepared, signed and verified by respondent
Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his
expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court
directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the
same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated
January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent
for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on
February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent
Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein,
viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided on
December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed
on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No.
81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January
30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases
show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court
of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records were not
forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also
appeared before the different courts a quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful
orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency
for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself
unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this
Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the
court.
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
Facts: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks
this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon
her by a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A.
Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold
items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days
after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements
with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant
Herminia Marquez. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty.
Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the practice of law
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not
a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the
 offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.
Issue: Whether the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis,
deceased.
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA ABESAMIS),
executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL.,
oppositors-appellees.

Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant.

HELD: NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied. the crimes of Angel Cecilio for appellees.
which respondent was convicted import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In
Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she

shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law. 5

Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until

further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-47431 December 19, 1940

 last will and testament of her deceased natural father,

Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of

land, one share of stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par
Facts: On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia
for probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis,
Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in
the manner and under the conditions stated
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five
others entered their opposition to the distribution of the
properties described in the will, for the reason that "a que
dichos bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui
opositores y la testamentaria," and simultaneously informed
the court that they had commenced an action for the partition
of said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and
Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of
P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors
did institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis,
Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis
for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the
first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante,
who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the
understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as
the minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico
Abesamis, were living with the Crescenciano. A demurrer
interposed by the defendants on the ground that there was
another pending action involving the same subject matter was
sustained after which the plaintiffs were required to amend
their complaint, the amendment consisting simply in
eliminating therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis
and leaving as party defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco
Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis. As these defendants failed to
answer the amended complaint, they were declared in default
and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered adjudicating
seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs
and the other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. On February
7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of partition to
declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of
Francisco and Isaias Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their
report, upon which the court declared that "no hay lugar a
aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados partidores
hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha
testamentaria en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer
valer los derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en
cuestion." A motion for reconsideration having been denied on
September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved
for the approval of the project of partition filed by the
commissioners . On February 26, 1934, the court ordered the
suspension of the approval of the partition of the properties
until the termination of the testamentary
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the
probate court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and
the two carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will.
This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not
in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision
in civil case No. 4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix
submitted an amended inventory and later another project of
partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance
with the terms of the will, which were objected by the
defendants, because these included their legitimate shares
under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was
upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the
dispositive part of which is quoted in the beginning of this
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case
No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled
only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is
a nullity and can not bind the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of
partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, and
in not distributing the estate of the deceased Crescenciano
Abesamis according to the provision of the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as
a probate court to decide the question of ownership of the
property involved in these proceedings part of which is claimed
by the oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but
by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no
personality to object to the project of partition presented by
the executrix on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in
accordance with the provision of the will of the deceased
Crescenciano Abesamis.
virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the
testate estate. The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of death(article 657, Civil
Code), and where, as in this case the heir is of legal age and
the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir
immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominio n,
ownership and possession of the properties of his predecessor,
and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of
First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In the absence of a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no
necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or
heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et
al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes
likewise of the second assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A.C. No. 190 September 26, 1964
MARCOS MEDINA, complainant,
vs.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the

validity of the decision of the lower court in civil case No. 4816
declaring that the legatees here, defendants in that action, are
entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that
the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said
proceeding. It should be noted that all the coheirs, except
Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and that by
order of the court, in its instructions to the partition
commissioners dated February 7, 1931, the herein executrix-
appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased.
As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be
sure, bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion
that the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its

Facts: In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954,
Marcos Medina charged respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista
with the commission of certain acts constituting malpractice
and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel
filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against complainant
Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant
Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the
case. Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista,
respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his
office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as
a consideration for the amicable settlement, and as
complainant had no ready cash then, he asked to be allowed
to pay the same in small installments paying on that occasion
the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon
prepared a motion for an extension of time to file his answer
in the case. Complainant returned to his hometown.
One month later, complainant received an order
declaring him in default and so he went to respondent to ask
him why in spite of their agreement he was declared in default.
Respondent assured him that he had nothing to worry about,
and on that occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which
then and there complainant gave. Before complainant left
respondent told him to look for more money.
It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion
for an extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof,
he filed a motion to declare complainant in default.
Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to
complainant since the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the
property in litigation for the sum of P1,200.00.
 On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office
of respondent in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the
purpose of having the papers for the amicable settlement of
the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared
two documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it
was made to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property
to complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and,
on the other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the
former for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were
witnessed by respondent. Both documents were also found to
be fictitious in the sense that the considerations mentioned
therein were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked
by respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its contents
upon the assurance that it was necessary in order that she
could recover the land.
Sometime later, complainant received a letter from
Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil
case, requesting him to bring the title of the property pursuant
to the decision of the court, and complying with this request
complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing
the title he showed him the document which he was made to
sign purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in
his favor of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00.
Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount
mentioned therein, which she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told
Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to be
deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent
would raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of
P1,200.00 which was fixed by the court as the consideration
of the reconveyance of the property. After inquiry, Atty.
Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in
court, and in order to correct the wrong generated by the two
fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez prepared another
document embodying the terms of the amicable settlement
which they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This
settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the
controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to
respondent the sum of
P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
From the foregoing narration, the following facts are
deemed to have been established: (1) respondent after
agreeing with complainant to settle the case amicably
prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but
instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2)
being fully aware of the decision rendered in the civil case,
respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense
that the consideration in either was never in fact received; (3)
pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case,
respondent received on different occasions from complainant
several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking
advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel,
ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to appear
that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did
not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from
his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the
understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court
for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it
he misappropriated the money. These facts constitute
malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
virtual law library
In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No.
18560-R, respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto
mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the
accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in
the sum of P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals
made the following derogatory comment against respondent:
A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and
client need not be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer
should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and
good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm.
Case No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein
respondent Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to
deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it
to his own use and benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed,
he was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The confidence
reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he
lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be
spurious. Upon these documents, appellant - for nothing - lost
the land already won in court. She had to compromise with
the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the
bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court
for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public policy bar
the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count and
bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for
services in procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the
Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363;
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
There is no question that the crime of estafa is one
which involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section
27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby
disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken
off from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 350 August 7, 1959
In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FaCTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of
attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day
of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in
case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule
128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he
should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of
this Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest
being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma
of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made
manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him,
it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and
sincerely deplores.
ISSUE: Whether Dalmacio De Los Angeles should be disbarred
Ruling: yes. Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be
removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the
continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition
for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the
result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel
vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery
is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am.
Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by
section 25 of Rule 127.
It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as
attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys.
So ordered.
 FACTS: The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954
successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On
or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love
with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured
the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank
document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the
document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant,
signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San
Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and
the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the
complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on
July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by
the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the
production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract
shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to
Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The
complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously
married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a
violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this
court..

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of an immoral conduct

EULING: YES. Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513

and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is
immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case
involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.

VILLASANTA April 30, 1957 Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, the bar. So ordered.
vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.

PARAS, C. J.:

A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978
FELIX LEYNES, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar,
Quezon, respondent.
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978
BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar,
Quezon, respondent.
AQUINO, J:
FACTS: For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous
circumstances in a house located at the poblacion of General Nakar,
Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that town, was
charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office.
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish
church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the
date (one day after his 46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries
in a vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought by plane to
Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the
evening.
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already
begotten three children. The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-
year old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged housemaid) is his mistress.
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality
charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named
Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage,
as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. The respondent also
presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March 5, 1976
of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for
immorality (on the condition that he would not incur any liability)
because he was convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's
mistress to take care of him (Exh. A).
Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument
scheduled before the Court en banc made the preposterous contention
that the respondent should be exonerated because there was no
evidence presented against him since the complainant did not appear
at the hearing.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT should be disbarred for grossly
IMMORAL CONDUCT

RULING: YES. Respondent and his counsel should know that since he
had admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is
conclusively established and it does not have to be proven anymore.
His admission is a confession.We hold that Judge Veloso should be
dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral delinquency
renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his
removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be
disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).
Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality,
erroneously confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability
with his moral fitness to occupy the position of town magistrate. While
the moral stigma connected with concubinage may be tolerated in a
private person by those who are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the
concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the
judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule
in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012,
January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270,
272-3).
assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case No. 872), adopted
the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey.
According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine
in a house just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a
rhetorical question: how can the inhabitants of a town have confidence
in the administration of justice by an immoral judge who himself violates
the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ).
In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to
make any adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was
guilty of partiality in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the
other charges of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious delay in
the administration of justice, misconduct in office, neglect of duty and
failure to hear, try and decide Election Case No. 8.
WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as
municipal judge. His application for disability retirement is disapproved.
SO ORDERED.

A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality

in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a
judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores
and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability
does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly
unconventional and censurable behavior.

Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the
administrative case moot. This Court may motu proprio investigate a
judge for his continuing, grossly immoral conduct.

Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting

Ricardo Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having
A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967

IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent.

J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.

ANGELES, J.:

Facts: On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution

as follows:
EN BANC

[December 7, 1928.]

In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

Felipe del Rosario, in his own behalf.

City Fiscal Guevara, for the Government.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW;
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. — The practice of the law is not
an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but
is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a
sound discretion.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Acquittal upon a criminal charge is not a bar

to proceedings intended to determine if a candidate is worthy
to be admitted to the bar.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The standards of the legal profession are

not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of the criminal law.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:
In Re: Carlos S. Basa
December 7,

1920Facts:
Carlos S. Basa, 29 years of age, a member of bars in California,
USA and in the Philippines. He wasconvicted by the Court of First
Instance the crime of abduction with consent and sentenced for
twoyears, eleven months and eleven days of prison correctional.
Attorney-General Feria
asks for the
disbarment from the Phil. Bar of Atty. Basa as a consequence of the court’s
conviction to the latter.
TheCode of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member
of the bar may be removed or suspendedfrom his office of lawyer
by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moralturpitude .
Issue:
WON the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article
446 of the Penal Code, involvesmoral turpitude.
Held: No.
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is
done contrary to justice,honesty, modesty, or good morals."
Although no decision can be found which has decided the
exactquestion, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this
character involve moral turpitude. The inherentnature of the act
is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of
 right conduct. ( Magdalena. Magdalena went to Davao to contat Segundino. Segundino
In re told her that they could not get married for lack of money.
Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard  In December 1975 Magdalena followed Segundino in Bukidnon only
vs to find out that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang.
. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46,
 Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao and inflicted physical
185;decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30,
injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
1876 and June 15, 1895.) Erlinda Ang.
 Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment case on the ground of
grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of
marriage to her.
Magdalena T. Arciga vs. Segundino D. Maniwang
Issue:
AC No. 1608, 106 SCRA 651, August 14, 1981  Whether or not Segundino Maniwang should be disbarred on the
ground of grossly immoral conduct.
Facts:

 Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October 1970

Ruling:
in Cebu City. Magdalena was a medical technology student while
Segundino was a law student.  No, Segundino Maniwang shouldn’t be disbarred. The Supreme Court
 On March 1971, Magdalena and Segundino had sexual found that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was not so
congress. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. The complaint for
cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
and Magdalena were secretly married.
 In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del
Sur. He continued his studies to Dava City.
 Magdalena discovered in January 1973 that she was pregnant. The
two went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz to apprise Magdalena’s
parents that they were married although they were not. The respondent
convinced Magdalena’s father to have the church wedding deferred
until after he had passed the bar examinations where he secured his
birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
 Segundino reassured Magdalena that he would marry once he passed
the bar examinations. The latter gave birth to their child on September
4, 1973.
 Segundino passed the bar examinations that was released April 25,
1975. After the oathtaking, Segundino stopped corresponding with