JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. ERMITA

G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461 October 5, 2010

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the
Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE:
Should the petition prosper?

HELD:
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege
that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members
followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by
"men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State.
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points
out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the
implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondent's
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People‘s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioner‘s
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA
9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their
perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU
and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and
NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts
an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations
under RA 9372. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct
and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and
personal interest is key.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. Petitioner‘s obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as
"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable
controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are
merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. Before a charge for terrorism may be
filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government
to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out
or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech. Petitioner‘s notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism"
is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. Petition is DISMISSED.
 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792

FACTS:
This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The principal plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation
of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."

Consequently, petitioner sought the defendant to: (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements, and granting the plaintiffs ―such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.‖ They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for
the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on the following grounds; the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him, and the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the provisions (Sections 15 and 16, Article II) can be invoked as legal rights and are
self- executory
2) Whether or not the petitioner have the legal standing

HELD:
1) Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law. Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation —
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
 In 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on
the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

2) Yes. Petitioners instituted this as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class
suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. It was declared that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.

In this case, petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the
"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning
bidder, or the eventual ―strategic partner,‖ will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager‘s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Sec. 10, par 2., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing
the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means, qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

The Court agree.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It
also refers to Filipino‘s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

It is not premature. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.

To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.

Hence, respondents GSIS, MHC, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE

GOVERNMENT CORP. COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the MHC to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MHC to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the MHC at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
 TANADA V. ANGARA
Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO‘s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to
the ―Filipino First‖ policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a ―free market‖ espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could
not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would
not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues: Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

Whether or not the provisions of the ‗Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement‘ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section
19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‗in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization‘ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in
the Final Act.

Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither ―economic seclusion‖ nor ―mendicancy in the international
community.‖ The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies,
which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent
seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member‘s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can
protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations
with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of
practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the
WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to ―share in the growth
in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.‖

In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution ―adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to
Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.

The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate,
after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it ―a part of the law of the land‖ is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ―the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.‖
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals,
and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines ―adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.‖

The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members‘ deliberation on August 25,
1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
 KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA

Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract
of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with
the on-line lottery system, also known as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and
ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of
1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond
the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING:
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the
importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the
ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts,
decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one
of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of
the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul
of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared
contrary to law and invalid.

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

(G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995)

FACTS:

This petition is related to the case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona (G.R. No. 113375) where the
Supreme Court held the invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the
operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO
Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture.

On Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC
leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO, which was the reason for this suit to be filed.
The petitioner sought to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first case invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)].
Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with
none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior
case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the
exception provided in E.O. No. 301, §1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is
advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of
funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease
contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and
political agenda, using the Court as their forum.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.

Furthermore, the petitioners seek reconsideration of the SC decision in this case. They insist that the
decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue
and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line
lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the constitutional provisions (Sections 5, 12, 13, and 17, Article II) invoked by the
petitioners are self- executory
2) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing in this case just like in the previous case

HELD:
1) No. The constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis
for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official
actions which are inconsistent with them. Hence, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not
confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive
action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that
consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this
authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit."

2) No. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

Stare Decisis cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved.

Law of the case (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is
not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the ruling cannot be in any
sense be regarded as ―the law of this case‖. The parties are the same but the cases are not.

Rule on ―Conclusiveness of Judgment‖ cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the
same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least
when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument
or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.

Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner‘s standing. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‗real parties of interest‘.

Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound
either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.

Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public
contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
 FRANCISCO, ET AL VS HOUSE SPEAKER, ET AL.
(G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution "to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).‖

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has
not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

A day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the respondents contending that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the
second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition prayed for the declaration of the November 28,
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not this is subject to justiciable controversy
2) Whether or not there is a need for further interpretation of the constitutional provision (Section 3 (5),
Article XI)
3) Whether or not the second Impeachment complaint is unconstitutional

HELD:
1) Yes. Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This
Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
 The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution.

2) No. The provision in Section 3 (5), Article II is clear and not ambiguous. This Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. The members
of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection
2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.

3) Yes, it is unconstitutional. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
Armed with high-powered ammunition and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief
of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.
PROCLAMATION NO. 427-DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION – WHEREAS, under Section
18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4-DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION-NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion. I hereby direct the
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the
officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

Petitioners Contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of
a state of rebellion. They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses,
confounds and misleads because verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or
general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens. Petitioners also submit that
the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not proclamation 427 and General Order no. 4 was within the power of the President vested
upon her the by the Constitution.

RULING:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition
to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed
that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity
for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue
of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue
of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge
the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
 DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government,
issued (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said
issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. On the same day, she issued (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the
suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional
factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and
cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to
join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies .Members of the (KMU) and
the (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine,
were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party-list president
Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the
early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few
minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of
another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned
that it would take over any media organization that would not follow ―standards set by the government
during the state of national emergency.‖On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a
state of national emergency and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued
(PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

RULING:
All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issue involved. It
has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met: (a)the cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a claim
of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there
must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (d)for concerned
citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question
of proper exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. In view of the transcendental
importance of this issue, all the petitioners are declared to have locus standi.
 ALAN F. PAGUIA v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 176278
June 25, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo‘s nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations
(UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service
Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide‘s age at that time of his nomination in March
2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA
7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA
employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide‘s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:
Petitioner‘s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner‘s suspension from the
practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising
carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of
statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide
resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

PEOPLE VS VERA
(65 PHIL 56)
FACTS:
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221
of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter
alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that
he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch,
Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April
5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article
III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with
the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating
on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
ISSUE:

1) Whether Act No. 442 (Probation Law) is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power?

HELD:
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative
power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite
the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories
of the United States as it may select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to
the people at large. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself.
Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that ―The National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage
dues.‖ And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that ―In times of war or other
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy.‖
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards
in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in
their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been
pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary
power. What is granted is a ―roving commission‖ which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces
are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do
is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
 LUIS GENERAL VS URRO
GR NO 191560

FACTS:

On September 20, 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arro yo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C.
Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector. On 2006,
PGMA reappointed her to the same position. When Roces died in 2007, PGMA appointed petitioner on
July 2008 as Acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. On the sam e date, PGMA appointed Escueta as
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as Vice- Chairman.

Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in
place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro s appointment
paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated
March 8, 2010. On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office before Makati Regional Trial Court
Judge Alberico Umali.

After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010,the petitioner filed the
present petition for quo warranto, questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on
the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30,
2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino
III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments
Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight
Appointments." The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years years
counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004. Since she failed to
finish her six year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until October
(should be September) 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments were valid

HELD:

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Political Law- Nature of Appointments. The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his
appointment paper, the appointment extended to him was really a regular appointment; thus, he cannot
be removed from office except for cause. Appointments may be cl assified into two: first, as to its
nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made. Under the first classification, appointments
can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can
only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without
hearing or cause. Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A
regular appointment is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one
issued during the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly characterized as either a
regular or an ad interim appointment. Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes
the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the
Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office
involved. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of
official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a
permanent or another appointee. Political Law- requisites for judicial review When questions of
constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of
personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse
to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review is
simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-
equal branches of the government. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents
appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the
determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present
petition a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for
quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered
completely unnecessary. The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature
of the petitioner's appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and whether petitioner has a clear
right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that his separation from the office amounted to an
abuse of his temporary appointment that would entitle him to the incidental benefit of
reinstatement.60As we did in Pangilinan case,we point out that the petitioners appointment as Acting
Commissioner was time limited. His appointment ipso facto expired on July 21, 2009 when it was not
renewed either in an acting or a permanent capacity. With an expired appointment, he technically now
occupies no position on which to anchor his quo warranto petition. The petitioner's appointment paper is
dated July 21, 2008. From that time until he was apprised on March 22, 2010 of the appointment of
respondent Urro, the petitioner faithfully discharged the functions of his office without expressing any
misgivings on the character of his appointment. However, when called to relinquish his office in favor of
respondent Urro, the petitioner was quick on his feet to refute what appea red in his appointment papers.
Under these facts, the additional circumstance of estoppel clearly militates against the petitioner. A
person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity, extended and received without any protest or
reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment for a considerable time, cannot later on be heard
to say that the appointment was reall y a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for
cause. Remedial Law- Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not
have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its
temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a
quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must
fail. From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office
as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents appointments.
The petitioners failure in this regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely
unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass upon the validity of the respondents appointment. These latter
issues can be determined more appropriately in a proper case.
 LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse‘s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 ― The Death
Penalty Law‖, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with
the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of
execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the
rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to
prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain
status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until
resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading
citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty
and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection
is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE : WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an
undue delegation of legislative power
HELD: THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each department
has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In
Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.‖ (what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is ―
Delegation to Administrative Bodies ―

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task
of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
 KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA
G. R. NO. 177721

FACTS: On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the
President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major
daily publications.

On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S.
Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the
President.

On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that
the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the JBC."

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and
that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth
certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of
respondent Ong‘s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be
addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President
who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.

As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan,
born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese
citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which
Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan
Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen; 6 that respondent Ong‘s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the
daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927;
that, therefore, respondent‘s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a
Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers
and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.

Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and
an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.

ISSUE: W/N Gregory S. Ong is qualified to be appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court?
RULING: NO. Because in Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong‘s petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar. In his petition to be admitted to the bar, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be
admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino
citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he,
respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part
of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers
of his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy
Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father. Hence, he is not qualified to be appointed as the Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court.
 DE CASTRO VS JBC

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that ―vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof‖ from a ―list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy.‖ Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC ―automatically considered‖ for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President‘s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from ―political vicissitudes‖ and its ―insulation from political pressures,‖ such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within
which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the President‘s or Acting President‘s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

GONZALES VS NARVASA

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of
the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR)
was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No.
43) in order ―to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution,
and the manner of implementing the same.‖ Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based
on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 43?

HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of theallegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim
any ―injury‖ in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislature‘s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR‘s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in allegedcontravention of the law or the Constitution.
It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR
was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of
E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is ―appropriated‖ for its operational expenses ―to be sourced from
the funds of the Office of the President.‖ Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the
avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
 MACEDA VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order on whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge BonifacioSanzMaceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has
falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil
and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the
aforementioned cases.

Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
SC‘s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts or whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification and if it can whether or not
a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court?

HELD:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates
of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court‘s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges‘ and court personnel‘s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.

JAVELLANA vs. DILG

G.R. No. 102549, August 10, 1992

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari involving the right of a public official to engage in the practice
of his profession while employed in the Government

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On
October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against
Javellana for:
1. violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated
June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph
b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and
2. for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia‘s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglunsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the
practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department:
1. that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a
case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule:
2. that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without
prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No.
80-38

C. Practice of Profession
“The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter alia that
'members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep
regular office hours.' 'They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or the city or
municipal council' and that provincial board members are not even required 'to have an office in the
provincial building.' Consequently, they are not therefore required to report daily as other regular
government employees do, except when they are delegated to perform certain administrative functions in
the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason, they may,
therefore, be allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be
secured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 provided, however,
that no government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of their
professions.
“As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their professions shall always be
subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of
any profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the
provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30, Rollo.)”
On October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90
of which provides:
"SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. –
1. All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing, their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
2. Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members
of the Bar shall not:
(a) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(b) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office:
(c) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(d) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
3. Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, that the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom."

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the (DILG) in the
issuance of Memo. Cir. Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying Javellana‘s motion to dismiss the
administrative case against him.
2) Whether or not Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Section 5 Article VIII of the Constitution.

HELD: No. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG.
As a matter of policy, SC accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledge ability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction
(Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657).
Complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public
office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City
Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real
employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia, would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the
complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia,
the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice
would represent interests adverse to the government.
(a) No. Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 do not violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The
Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct
for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It
applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section
90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others
to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

PEOPLE vs. EBIO

G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004

FACTS: The appellant, GERRY EBIO, was charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The private complainant is his 11-year old daughter, DORY EBIO.

The undersigned Government Prosecutor, upon the complaint of DORY EBIO, accuses GERRY EBIO y
HERMIDA, a resident of Tughan, Juban, Sorsogon, of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE.
That sometime in (sic) April 21, 2000 at more or less (sic) 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Tughan, Municipality of Juban, Province of Sorsogon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, with lewd designs and taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy and the tender age of the child, did then and there, willfully/unlawfully and
feloniously, had (sic) carnal knowledge of DORY EBIO, his own 11-year old daughter, against her will
and without her valid consent, to her damage and prejudice. The offense is aggravated by relationship,
the accused being the natural ascendant of the private offended victim. The per curiam Decision
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping his eleven-year old daughter, and sentencing him to death. In his
motion for reconsideration, the accused calls the attention of the Court to the fact that only seven out of
the fourteen Justices sitting in the Court signed the Decision. The other seven Justices were on official
leave at the time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the votes of only seven Justices of the Court sitting en banc can validly
impose the death penalty and whether there is a need for a quorum when it sits en banc.

HELD: The Court resolves to RECALL the Decision dated October 14, 2002 and RESUBMIT the case
to the Court en banc for RE-DELIBERATION. The case at bar is now the subject of re-deliberation by
the Court.

There is no question that the Court‘s Decision in this case was concurred in by majority of the members
of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was in fact unanimously signed by the seven
Justices who were present during the deliberations. The issue now is whether the seven constitute a
quorum of the 14-member Court.

The term "quorum" has been defined as "that number of members of the body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words,
that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid
corporate act."3 The question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of business
by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the Constitution or statutory provisions creating and
regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the
transaction of business and the decision of cases.

The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There should be at least
three members present for the Division to conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3
of Section 4 Article VIII. There is no similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc.
The second paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the
number of Justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The deliberations
of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the Court is composed of
only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is
imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it wise to resubmit the
case to the Court en banc for re-deliberation.
 PEOPLE vs. LIZADA
G.R. No. 143468-71, January 23, 2003

TOPIC: Requirements as to Decisions │ Section 15, Article VIII; Section 18(3), Article VII; Sections
12-14, Article XVIII; all of the 1987 Constitution

DOCTRINE/CASE PRINCIPLE:

Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This
requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended x x x.

The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was
reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the
opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a
reading of the decision of the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial
and responsible judge

FACTS:
In August 1998, the petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, violence and intimidation Analia Orillosa, his stepdaughter, by embracing, kissing, and touching
her private parts. He then proceeded with carnal knowedge to remove her skirt and panty and placed
himself on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. This allegation was repeated four times
in a different occasions.

The testimony of Rossel, Analia‘s sister, also proved that no insertion of penis happened because the
petitioner stopped after he saw her.

Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of qualified rape under four separate information. RTC
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him and sentenced to Death
Penalty in each and every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.

However, [A]ccused-appellant averred that:

(a) the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped the
private complainant and that the medical findings of Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen
of the private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as to preclude complete
penetration by an average size adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any
genital injury. The physical evidence belies private complainant‘s claim of having been
deflowered by accused-appellant on four different occasions. The Office of the Solicitor General,
for its part, contends that the prosecution through the private complainant proved the guilt of
accused-appellant for the crime charged on both counts.

(b) that the decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings
of facts in its decision. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal
portion of said decision. The trial court even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal
basis for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on him

ISSUES: Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IN ITS
DECISION AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: GRAVE ERROR IN THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT MAKING A
FINDING OF FACT IN ITS DECISION

The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120,
Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it
was reached by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts,
of the opinion it has formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured
from a reading of the decision of the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an
impartial and responsible judge. More substantial reasons for the requirement are:

For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if
permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For
another, the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its
merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation
with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the
law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a
valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the
resolution of future controversies.

The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions
culled therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution.
Trial courts should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties
and come out with its decretal conclusion.

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of
accused-appellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary
evidence of the parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-
appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.

The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their
evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the
legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court
rendered judgment against accused-appellant with the curt declaration in the decretal portion of
its decision that it did so based on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook,
line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and
gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is
apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even
bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the supreme penalty of death on
accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of what a decision,
envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.

SECOND ISSUE: GRAVE ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private complainant testified
that since 1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998, for two times a week, accused-
appellant used to place himself on top of her and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs
and sex organ and inserted his finger and penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-
appellant threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Although private
complainant did not testify that she was raped on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998,
nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts of rape, in light of the testimony of
private complainant.

The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her
having been repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant being of
tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia.
Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on
accused-appellants commission of the crime. Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male
organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that
there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. X X X

We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified
rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the
mother of private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and
under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant,
concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victims mother, is a
special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. However, said
circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to
the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority
of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of
her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape. X X X.

The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accused-appellant
raped her two times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-
appellant is guilty only of simple rape.