Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BENCH:-
1. Hon’ble Y. V. Chandrachud, J.
2. Hon’ble P. K. Goswami, J.
3. Hon’ble N. L. Untwalia, J.
FACTS:-
In April 1956, the Respondent’s parents arranged her marriage with the
Appellant. The Respondent’s father sent letters to the Appellant before
finalising the marriage informing him regarding an incident where the
Respondent suffered from a bad attack of sunstroke which affected her mental
condition for some time which she recovered from and cited cerebral malaria as
another reason for the brief decline of her mental health. He further stated that
she was treated and cured at the Yeravada Meantal Hospital, and asked the
Appellant to discuss the matter with the doctors at the aforementioned hospital,
which the Appellant followed and upon the Doctor’s confirmation of the
Respondent’s father’s statement, he did not make any further inquiries at the
Yeravada Mental Hospital.
On March 1957, a daughter was born to the couple whom they named Shubha,
and on March 21, 1959, a second daughter Vibha was born.
During the Appellant’s stay in Delhi, he wrote to the Police asking for
protection as he feared his life was in danger from the Respondent’s parents and
relatives. They briefly interacted with each other which were another
opportunity where the parties spewed more venom at each other, and the
Respondent renewed his request for Police protection on a subsequent day.
On December 15, 1961, the Appellant informed the Respondent’s father that he
has moved the Court for seeking separation from the Respondent.
On February 19, 1962, proceedings were instituted in the Trial Court where the
Appellant asked for the annulment of his marriage under Sec 12 (1)(c), Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) on the ground that his consent was obtained by
fraud. The Appellant alleged that the Respondent was treated at Yeravada
Mental Hospital for Schizophrenia and the Respondent’s father fraudulently
represented the state of her mental health to him to obtain his consent.
Alternatively, he asked for divorce under Sec 13 (1)(iii), HMA, on the ground
that the Respondent was of unsound mind. Alternatively, the Appellant asked
for judicial separation under Sec 10(1)(b) on the ground that the Respondent
had treated him with a cruelty which created a reasonable apprehension in his
mind that his life is under threat if he lives with her.
Trial Court
The Trial Court held the wife guilty of cruelty but rejected the contentions
regarding fraud and unsoundness of mind, and subsequently passed a decree for
judicial separation.
District Court
Both parties appealed to the District Court which dismissed the appellant’s
appeal and allowed the respondent’s appeal.
Bombay High Court
The appellant filed a Second Appeal in the Bombay High Court, which was
dismissed by a single judge bench, but granted a special leave to appeal to the
appellant, strictly limited to the question of judicial separation on the ground of
cruelty, not concerned with how the appellant’s consent to marriage was
obtained or whether the respondent had been of unsound mind for the period
preceding the presentation of the petition. The Bombay High Court’s decision
on the questions regarding consent to marriage and Respondent’s unsound mind
were to be treated as final.
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was looked into and the Court stated
that the jurisdiction of the High Court in Second Appeal is restricted to
questions of law or to substantial errors or defects in the procedure which would
have produced an error in the decision of the case based on merits. The High
Court concluded that both the Trial Court and the District Court failed to apply
the correct principles of law for the determination of cruelty, and considered the
evidence for itself. This is an exception to the law of §100, CPC. Under §103,
CPC, the High Court can determine issues of fact if the evidence on record is
sufficient but if the Court takes this duty upon itself, it is subject to the same
restraining conditions which the power of any court of facts is subject to. While
appreciating evidence, an inference may be drawn but the Court has to remind
itself of the fine line that distinguishes an inference from guess work.
1. The alleged acts constituting cruelty should be proved according to the law of
evidence;
2. There should be an apprehension in the Petitioner’s mind of real injury or
harm from such conduct;
3. The apprehension should be reasonable having regard to the condition of the
parties;
4. The Petitioner should not have taken advantage of his position;
5. The Petitioner should not have condoned the acts of cruelty.
The Appellant proved the acts constituting the charge of cruelty as per the law
of evidence – the facts were established and proved by a preponderance of
probabilities. All the acts alleged and inferred to be conducted by the
Respondent did create a reasonable apprehension in the Appellant’s mind. The
Court determined that the Appellant’s demands of certain conduct from the
Respondent did not call for an attack of self-defence, and the plea in the written
statement submitted by the Respondent is a denial of conduct alleged and not of
provocation. As for the question of condonation (forgiveness of the matrimonial
offence and the restoration of an offending spouse to the same position as he or
she occupied before the offence was committed), both forgiveness and
restoration have to occur by the Appellant. The evidence of condonation
consists here in the fact that the spouses led a normal sexual life despite the
respondent’s Acts of cruelty. The intent to forgive and restore the offending
spouse to the original status may be reasonably inferred as the parties lead a life
of intimacy which represents a normal matrimonial relationship, uninfluenced
by the Respondent’s conduct.
Judgement
In the present case, the Appellant’s contention regarding his wife being of
unsound mind was fabricated by him. The contention regarding the Respondent
inflicting cruelty on the Appellant has been proven to exist, but the Appellant’s
act of engaging in sexual intercourse with the Respondent amounts to
condonation of cruelty in the eyes of law. After the acts of cruelty have been
condoned, for the Appellant’s claims regarding cruelty to have held ground, the
Respondent’s subsequent conduct had to be as grave or to the degree of her
previous acts of cruelty. The Respondent was willing to make amends and
return to the household shared by both parties and she realised her mistakes.
The Appellant condoned the Respondent after which she did not act in the
manner she did before the condonation. The Respondent will not be held liable
for cruelty.