TAÑADA vs CUEVA

146 SCRA 446

Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation
and administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has
no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official
Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for
their own effectivity dates.

Issue:
Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.

Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for
determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of
its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect.
Article 2 does not prevent the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares
that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect.

Page 1 of 76
 ROY vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80718

Facts:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to
private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were
found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court
finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in
HabulayasvsJapzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be
applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should
not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals
was promulgated.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: There is no law requiring the publication of

Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective.

Issue:

Whether Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

Page 2 of 76
Ruling:

No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.

Page 3 of 76
 RAVINA vs ABRILLE

G.R. NO. 160708

FACTS:

Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They had four children (herein
respondents). The properties involved in this case are: (1982) Lot 7 – acquired by the
spouses during their marriage; Lot 8 – acquired by Pedro when he was still single; House
built on lot 7 and 8 – built from their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP.

(1991) Pedro got a mistress. Pedro offered to sell the house and two lots to petitioners
Ravina. Mary Ann objected. Pedro still sold the properties without her consent. Pedro,
with the connivance Ravina and some Civilian Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all the
belongings from the house to an apartment and prevented Mary Ann and the kids from
entering the house.

Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance and Damages before RTC Davao. During the trial, Pedro declared that the
house was built with his own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they bought the house
and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.

RTC – The sale of: Lot 7 – void as to ½ representing share of Mary Ann; Lot 8 – void as
to ½ representing share of Mary Ann who did not consent; house – void as to ½; pay Mary
Ann the value of belongings that were lost; pay moral and exemplary damages and the
cost of suit.

CA – sale of Lot 8 – valid; sale of Lot 7 – null and void; ordered Pedro to return the value
of the consideration to Ravina; ordered Ravina to reconvey the house and Lot to spouses
Pedro and Mary Ann; ordered Pedro and Ravina to pay Mary Ann moral and exemplary
damages.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property.

(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s
consent.

Page 4 of 76
RULING:

(1) Presumed to be Conjugal property of spouses Pedro and Mary Ann.

(2) Annullable with five years

RATIO:

(1) Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of Pedro, it being acquired
by Pedro thru barter or exchange with his another exclusive property.

The Court is not persuaded. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property
was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. The fact is, Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary
Ann. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed
through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same
Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both
the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the
court.

Page 5 of 76
 AZNAR vs GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

Facts:

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law,
the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for
Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything under California law.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the

successional rights of his heirs.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must
be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Page 6 of 76
 FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a
teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost
ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as
engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave
up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming
from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to
which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their
child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic.
However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On
October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as
natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the
paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on
October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was,
on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. The judgment of the RTC is hereby
rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant,
and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through
plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner,
the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00,
respectively.

Page 7 of 76
Issue:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the
petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind"
"by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus
the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

Page 8 of 76
 MANANTAN vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

Facts:

In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch shrimps
at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him
that they should borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan
came to get Nicolas at the Manantan Technical School. When they arrived at the farm
they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M.,
Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home with a duck.
They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others to
go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather
decided to go to a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities. Manantan
drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and Ambrocio
sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they
met a jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid
the collision but was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided
with each other at the center of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but
unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio suffered minor injuries to his head and legs. The
parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled in
favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben
Nicolas now seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues
that he can be held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.

Ruling:

The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to
reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal,

Page 9 of 76
the first is acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no
crime while the second is the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal
and civil liability is extinguished while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one
extinguished since civil liability merely requires preponderance of evidence. The case
prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.

Page 10 of 76
 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Facts:

Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought
to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were “separated.” For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. After
an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to
pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea
for the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling:

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a

diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact,
in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would
have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before
him. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no

Page 11 of 76
one” has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED,with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.

Page 12 of 76
 ENRICO vs HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

Facts:

Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962.
They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august
26 2004, Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on February 10 2005. respondent filed
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness. Enrico contended that she has
been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a marriage license under
Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of his action on
the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in sec. 2
(a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely
by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.

Issue:

a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing
marriage license.

b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the
death of Eulogio.

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed. Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have
been living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from
securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the
second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3 months after
Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of
the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio. While it is true that Ninal
vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of the

Page 13 of 76
Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same rule cannot be applied
for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the family code. Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still
protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by
questioning the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate deceased father
filed in the regular courts.

Page 14 of 76
 NICANOR T. SANTOS vs COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T.
SANTOSGUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO

G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both
deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a
"Basic Agreement of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two
years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application

Ruling:

A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for
the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a
complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article
222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. Otherwise, the
complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly,
the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise
defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying
the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

Page 15 of 76
 CHI MING TSOI vs COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Facts:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their
marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to
the house of defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them,
since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she
did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for
her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return
but he never did. The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual
as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to
her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. In
open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated. "After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered

Page 16 of 76
declaring as void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity in asmuch as proof thereof
is totally absent.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit. The case has reached this
Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate

Page 17 of 76
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less."
This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself.
In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It
appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations,
can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

Page 18 of 76
 REPUBLIC vs DAGDAG

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

Facts:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag,
20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The
marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality
of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija
also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family
without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few
months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he
indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his
wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries
to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him.
Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from
jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in
the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation
of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating
prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he
intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda
and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside

Page 19 of 76
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given
until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The
Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision
on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since
the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible,
an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

Issue:

Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:

Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They
begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few
months. He was always drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse
and inflict physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and
was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was
imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be
located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia
Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered
a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The
Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

Page 20 of 76
 DEDEL vs DEDEL

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

Facts:

David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967
in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case
for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform
basic marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several
men including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command,
and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had
two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David
bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and
even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David
to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return
to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two
children of the Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family
are indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their marriage null and void on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential obligations
of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgment and ordered
the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Page 21 of 76
Issue:

Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.

Ruling:

No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a
party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the meaning
of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither
could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The
grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity,
include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition is
denied.

Page 22 of 76
 TE vs TE

GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the

Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close
friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena,
which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him
relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money
of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house
and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage
license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house,
and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but
Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage
to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

HELD:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent

Page 23 of 76
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be

personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where
to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the
rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her
tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail
and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

Page 24 of 76
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December
1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and
even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent
is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his
1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges
that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed
by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through
a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was
not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June
5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while
the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Page 25 of 76
Ruling:

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256
of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as
to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts
too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

Page 26 of 76
 ROBERTO DOMINGO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

Facts:

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged
among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License
No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz
sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the
present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties
with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he
had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is
not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage. On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.

Issues:

a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in

the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Page 27 of 76
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover
certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Ruling:

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with
the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties.” The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which
is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage
is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding
the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error
in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

Page 28 of 76
 BRIGIDO QUIOA vs RITA QUIAO

G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the
petitioner Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court
dated October 10, 2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal
partition on the personal and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net
profits earned from the conjugal properties in favor of the common children. Neither party
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within the required period for legal
separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and was later on
granted. Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the “net profit earned”. The Court defined
it as the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties
of each [of the] spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code.
Brigido filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was
after the required prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was
to clarify the meaning of the “net profit earned”. With that on November 8, 2006 the court
ordered that the “net profit earned” be based on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR)
praying for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR.
Brigido then filed a Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and
liquidation of the common properties, meaning of the “net profit earned”, and the law
governing the property relation between him and Rita.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.

Ruling:

No. Brigido wasn’t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005,
thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his
right to question. The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the

Page 29 of 76
time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this property relation, "the husband
and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common all the property
of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in
the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according
to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other law.

Page 30 of 76
 CHING vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

Facts:

On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million-

peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). Alfredo Ching together with two other
persons executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and
severally liable for the PBMCI obligations. The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million
pesos. PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of
interests, penalties and other bank charges.) Together with the writ of preliminary
attachment, the sheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation
stocks registered solely to Alfredo Ching. Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy
of the 100,000 common shares. According to her, the shares were purchased out of the
conjugal funds. She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership (or family).

Issue:

Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.

Ruling:

Yes. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to
the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Ching’s name
appeared as the sole registrant of the shares in the corporate books of City Corp, that
doesn’t mean that it is his exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership. As held
in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the
court said that “signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession.
It is not embarking in a business.” For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is
important to show that the family received benefits and advantages from the liability
incurred. There is no presumption that when a husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would be benefited. The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.

Page 31 of 76
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching’s common shares must not be levied because he is not the
sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership. Under Article
121 of the Family Code.

Page 32 of 76
 Relucio vs Lopez

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002

Facts:

On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition
for APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition
Imelda Relucio in RTC Makati. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime
in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned
the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the
same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and
their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.2. It was further alleged that
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976,
have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings,
cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are
in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies
and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of
money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if noting, actual
contribution from petitioner Relucio.3. In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as
a father and husband, he excluded the private respondent and their four children from
sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from. As
such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed,
transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal

property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of
action against petitioner.

Page 33 of 76
HELD:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal
right of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages. A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may
be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her
husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.
Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband. The first cause of action is
for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J.Lopez. Petitioner is a
complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to
spouses. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to
the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her
husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-
duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of
action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists. The second cause
of action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the
marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist
against petitioner on this ground. Respondent's alternative cause of action is for forfeiture
of Alberto J. Lopez' share in the co-owned property acquired during his illicit relationship
and cohabitation with [petitioner] and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the[respondent]. The third cause of action is
essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and
petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J.

Page 34 of 76
Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez'
share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner. Respondent's
asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J.
Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results
in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such
cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

Page 35 of 76
 ALIPIO vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 134100, September 29, 2000

FACTS:

(1) Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito,
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September
12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his
lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses.

(2) The sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
P50,600.00.

(3) Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio,
had passed away on December 1, 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed
by the conjugal partnership of gains, or

RULING:

Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear that
Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the
defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the
collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought
against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the
liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the
death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is
passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement
of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator
such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to

Page 36 of 76
the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void. the inventory of the
Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid.
Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.

Page 37 of 76
 ANTONIO VALDES vs REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the
custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family.

Page 38 of 76
 SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON

G.R. No. 125465 June 29,1999

Facts:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that
they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income
from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private
respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower
while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by
virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made,
it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

Issue:

Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

Ruling:

No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as
defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article
151. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband
and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters,
whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given
any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

Page 39 of 76
 ZAMORANOS vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 193902, June 1, 2011

FACTS:

Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two
wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
Quezon City.

A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmedy the Shari'a Circuit District Court, which
issued a Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her
first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i,
Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos
and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio
Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De
Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary
custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and
dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

Page 40 of 76
HELD:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De
Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of
Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have us pended the proceedings until Pacasum
had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a
Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the
divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by

an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman,
was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

Page 41 of 76
 VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

Facts:

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a
subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed
against the appellant Civil Case No. 99- 93582 for annulment of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in
toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated
March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void
ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their
decision.

Ruling:

Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first
and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage

Page 42 of 76
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. Petitioner’s
defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail. Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC
and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian
purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared
by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity,
by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.

Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment

from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Page 43 of 76
 AURELIO vs AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

Facts:

On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological
assessment revealed that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features as seen from her quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence,
intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the part of the petitioner, it has been
revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic)
Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of his working
wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward
his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November
8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial
Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and found that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity
of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend
upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the
Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On October
6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the
standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following
cited in the Molina

Page 44 of 76
Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c)
noncompliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity
was stated and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds,
as determined by a competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes
that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features
as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly,
the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition
for dismissal is denied.

Page 45 of 76
 OCHOSA vs ALANO

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011

Facts:

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young lieutenant in
the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that
culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the
Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however,
they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa. During their
marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an
officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one
(1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was
appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along
with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided
with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame. Even at the
onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, Bona had
illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever
Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught
by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin.
Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could
no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin
who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994, Ramona left Bona and
came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona. Jose
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential

Page 46 of 76
obligations of marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and nullified the parties’ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted
the appeal, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

Ruling:

No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” (sexual disloyalty with Jose,
sexual promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to,
the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence.” Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain
evaluated Bona’s psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from
the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance
evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for
Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. It is apparent from the above-
cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s assertion, had no manifest desire to
abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from
their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was

constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments
in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas
in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by
the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the
following decade. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to
the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

Page 47 of 76
 TORING vs TORING
G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt’s
house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was
conducting lessons at his aunt’s house. They became sweethearts after three months of
courtship and eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already
pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September
4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three
children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition
for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of,
and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in
evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert
witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran’s respective
testimonies. Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she
was very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas
seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and
their children’s tuition. However, not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other
living expenses, she also she incurred debts from other people and failed to remit
amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. Also, during
one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger. He
tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five
months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child
could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were
characterized by “withdrawals”; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife
transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with
Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to
others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around. Dr.
Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled
with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more,
does not constitute sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from

Page 48 of 76
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come
from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family
doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at
or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to
the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses’ eldest
son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have been expected to know
what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely recounted
isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations during
the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.

Page 49 of 76
 LIGERALDE vs PATALINGHUG
G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2012
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted
later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino’s
deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and
the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted
to reconcile with her. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when
Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched
for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May
confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. Silvino referred
the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist
certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest
after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22, 1999, the
RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that the
petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition
deserves outright dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as

Page 50 of 76
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious,
arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. These were not proven in the close scrutiny of
the records. No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage (Republic
v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as
a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to
psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.

Page 51 of 76
 JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs JEANICE PAVON

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010

Facts:
In 1996, Jordan and Jeanice met when Jeanice was 19 and Jordan was 27. They had
their civil wedding in 1997. They have one son, who was born on 1998. After a big fight,
Jeanice left their conjugal home on 1999.
Jeanice then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan alleging
that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage; manifested by Jordan's tendency to be self-preoccupied and violent.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with “Borderline
Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and
instability.”[5] Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their
marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of
reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
Jordan denied Jeanice allegations and denied any interview or psychological tests by
Gates.

Issue:
Whether Jordan is incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations.

Held:
Petition has merit. Jeanice failed to prove Jordan's incapacity. Saying that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability.

Page 52 of 76
 ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October
2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but
respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the
Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
arrival. Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed
that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent
arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of
reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist
diagnosed the respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied
petitioner’s complaint for annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Page 53 of 76
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
of incapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the
spouses to perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was
actually seeking was the declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half
later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not
with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all
since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondent’s psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner,
was hardly impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did
not describe the “pattern of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him
“truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Page 54 of 76
 AZCUETA vs REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They
separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no child.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties
of husband

Petitioner also complained of physical violence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

RULING:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’
marriage under Article 36.
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina
stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage;

Page 55 of 76
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

Page 56 of 76
 NAJERA vs NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for
Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but
respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married
on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the
celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only
after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial conference after the
parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s
psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established
organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain
brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent
with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses. Further, SPO1 Sonny
Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994,
he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that
respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Page 57 of 76
 SO vs VALERA
G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009

Facts:
Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the
benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship,
they had 3 children and established a communications business. In 1996, Renato filed
with RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged
that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He
also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Lorna failed and
refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain
faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and
support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter into
a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void due to psychological incapacity?

Held:
NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence
presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much credence to the
testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. The report of the psychologist was not
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that PI existed that
prevented Valera from complying with marital obligations. In the first place, the facts on
which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the
petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. Her reading may not at all
be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist
appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro
bono. The “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate with one
another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are
from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it
were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her
whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be
comprehensive enough to be reliable.

Page 58 of 76
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the
petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 –
developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of
intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and
joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all indicate an
irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict
with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very
revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship between
the petitioner and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was
not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.”
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder
was incurable. The psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the
respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as
established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder
was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence, psychological
incapacity was not proved:
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties
who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and
who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the
support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give
up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for
some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple
remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have
validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent
remedy.

Page 59 of 76
 ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October
2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but
respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the
Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
arrival. Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed
that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent
arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of
reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist
diagnosed the respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied
petitioner’s complaint for annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Page 60 of 76
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
of incapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the
spouses to perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was
actually seeking was the declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half
later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not
with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all
since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondent’s psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner,
was hardly impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did
not describe the “pattern of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him
“truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Page 61 of 76
 IMANI vs METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with
Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales,
Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of
P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory
notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans.
Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This
prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717. After due proceedings,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. The dispositive portion of the (1)
Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest,
penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully
paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the stipulated
interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and until the whole
amount is fully paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due
under the First and Second Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the
costs of suit and expenses of litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and
for canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners’ conjugal partnership.

Ruling:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in
seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of
sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by
the executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts
that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim.
We agree with petitioner. The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this
Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit,
can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ
by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor.
By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be

Page 62 of 76
answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent
“separate action,” the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a “separate action” is the
recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an
action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced,
even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies
are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other.
Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a “separate
action.” It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of “terceria”
authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he
is not a party to the case against petitioner. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to
file an urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and
certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the
ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim
is filed. It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession
of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party
claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly,
[petitioner’s] motion was already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit
of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.

Page 63 of 76
 Sps. Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa vs Anita B. De Leon
G.R. No. 185063; July 23, 2009

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the decision
of Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the judgment of Regional Trial
Court (RTC) that the parcel of land purchased in installment by the husband while still
single but fully paid during marriage is a conjugal property.
Bonifacio De Leon (Bonifacio), while still single, purchased from Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHCC) a parcel of land through a Conditional Contract to Sell. The
right of ownership over the subject parcel of land was transferred to Bonifacio two years
after his marriage to Respondent Anita De Leon (Anita) upon full payment. He then sold
the property to petitioners Sps. Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa (Sps. Tarrosa) without
the consent of Anita.
Anita and her children filed a reconveyance suit before RTC. RTC ruled in favor of
Anita and her children on the ground that Sps Tarrosa failed to overthrow the legal
presumption that the subject parcel of land was conjugal.

ISSUE:
Is the land purchased on installment before marriage, where some installments were
paid during the marriage, conjugal property?

HELD:
Yes, the land purchased on installment before marriage, where some installments were
paid during the marriage is conjugal property.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-
Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. A contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed
to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes
upon delivery of the thing sold.

Page 64 of 76
 TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs MANUEL DAVID SR.
G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,
1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976,
the spouses separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995,
Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction
Corporation (Titan) with which the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was
replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract against
Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without
his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the
property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in their names. Titan
claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property
on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the
signature purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority
to sell the property. Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint which was granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed
an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she was declared in default.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.

Ruling:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that “the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership”. Likewise, Article 172
of the Civil Code ordains that “the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law”. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family
Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the
written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.

Page 65 of 76
 NAVARRO vs ESCOBIDO
G.R. No 153788 November 27, 2009
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease
agreement. Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were
premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of
the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer. For a writ
of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond. The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some
other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure
or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value
of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to
the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of
such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. The SC held that there is
nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to make a prior demand
on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus,
prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Page 66 of 76
 EQUITABLE PCI BANK vs OJ- MARK TRADING
G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010
Facts:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As security for the
said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit
where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as
principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor,
respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their
outstanding loan obligation; thus, they offered to settle their indebtedness with the
assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot, which at that time, was not transferred in
their name. While petitioners officers held a meeting with respondent Martinez, the latter
however failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title and tax
declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via
dacion en pago. Consequently, petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage. On the other hand, respondents filed a civil case for TRO and annulment
of the extrajudicial sale. They alleged, among others, that the REM is void for having been
illegally notarized; that the petitioner acted in BAD FAITH because it did not officially
inform them of the denial or of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by dacion. The
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the TRO. The same was affirmed by the
CA, the latter holding that respondents have sufficiently shown their proprietary right over
the condominium unit sought to be foreclosed, entitling it to the questioned TRO. Thus,
petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 contending as follows: 1)
it has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage because the respondents failed to settle their
obligations; 2) there respondents have no right to an injunction because they have no
clear right to a dacion en pago.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure
and public auction of the third-party mortgagors property.

Held:
The Court REVERSED the decision of the CA. The Court held that respondent spouses
are NOT entitled to an injunctive writ because their rights are merely contingent and not
in esse. According to the Court: 1. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to
be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the
said right. On the face of their clear admission that they were unable to settle their
obligations which were secured by the mortgage, petitioner has a clear right to foreclose
the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of a
mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not

Page 67 of 76
paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the
property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the
obligation.
This Court has denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction that would enjoin
an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is proper when
the debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation. Where the parties stipulated
that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default
by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default,
making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. Therefore, the
allegations of denial of due process and prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat
the mortgagees unmistakable right to an extrajudicial foreclosure. 2. There was no bad
faith on the part of the petitioner. It bears stressing that the existing written contract
between petitioner and respondent was admittedly one of loan restructuring; there is no
mention whatsoever or even a slightest reference in that written contract to a supposed
agreement of dacion en pago. In fine, it is still necessary for petitioner to establish in the
main case its rights on the alleged dacion en pago before those rights become in esse or
actual and existing. Only then can the injunctive writ be properly issued. It cannot be the
other way around. Otherwise, it will be like putting the cart before the horse. The
respondents position, therefore, that petitioners act of initiating extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding while they negotiated for a dacion en pago was illegal and done in bad faith
is without merit.
As respondent-spouses themselves admitted, they failed to comply with the documentary
requirements imposed by the petitioner for proper evaluation of their proposal. In any
event, petitioner had found the subdivision lots offered for dacion as unacceptable, not
only because the lots were not owned by respondents as in fact, the lots were not yet
titled but also for the reason that respondent Oscar Martinezs claimed right therein was
doubtful or inchoate, and hence not in esse. Requests by debtors-mortgagors for
extensions to pay and proposals for restructuring of the loans, without acceptance by the
creditor-mortgagee, remain as that. Without more, those proposals neither novated the
parties mortgage contract nor suspended its execution. In the same vein, negotiations for
settlement of the mortgage debt by dacion en pago do not extinguish the same nor
forestall the creditor-mortgagees exercise of its right to foreclose as provided in the
mortgage contract.3. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the mortgaged
condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents averment that respondent
OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation.
However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported
right, whether as majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as
creditor-mortgagee. The rule requires that in order for a preliminary injunction to issue,
the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of
the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed
strictly against the pleader. 4. The contention that the family home is exempt from

Page 68 of 76
execution sale does not hold water. The contention that the family home is exempt from
execution is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM.
Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family
home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code
allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on
the premises before or after such constitution. Respondents thus failed to show an
ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ.

Page 69 of 76
 IMEON CABANG vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009

FACTS:
Simeon had established his family home over the property of registered owner Felix
Odong and he had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the
same parcel of land since 1956 up to present. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the
subject property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that Simeon was
actually occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for recovery of property.

ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home.

RULING:
NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given
fact that the family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged family home stands is owned by
the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix
Odong.

Page 70 of 76
 UY VS. CHUA
G.R. No. 183965

Facts:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She
alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship
with Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner
(Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed
that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name
of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. However,
respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided
employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in
the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s
wedding,respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and
Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter. Later,
Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was
his daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to
prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a
Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by
res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was made between the two parties prior where
petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship
or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and the respondent, in
exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled in favor of the
respondent hence this appeal
Issue:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreementon cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Ruling:
Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause. The requisites must alsoconcur: (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter

Page 71 of 76
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case.The compromise
agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico
v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. A
contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of
the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the Civil
Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future Legitime. The agreement
in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her
brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent
would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away
her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused
in the case of Advincula v. Advincula. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the
status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there
be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack
of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to
declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.

Page 72 of 76
 HEBRON VS. LOYOLA
GR No. 168960, July 5, 2010
FACTS:
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of
land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the
heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties
during Encarnacion’s administration thereof. With the latter’s death on 1969,
administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-
Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of
Conrado.
By the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded on November 4, 1990,
Candida was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The
rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants and children For
petitioner’s failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her co-heirs,
petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have
already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them
by her mother, Encarnacion.
Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance from
Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate recompense
had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the former’s rice mill and
household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo, when she subsequently
surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt.
The RTC ruled in favor of partition, ordering the partition of the disputed lands among the
7 heirs, disregarding the calim of defendant that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have
waived their share. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC, and denied the
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling that the defendant failed to prove base
on preponderance of evidence the waiver of Candida and the heirs of Conrado.

Page 73 of 76
HELD:
YES. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Section 1.Burden of Proof. – Burden of proof
is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
From the above provision, it is clear that the defendant, not only the plaintiff, also has a
burden of proof. The plaintiffs have the duty to establish their claims. And, it is the
defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses.
Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs of Remigia and
Januario;and that the two subject properties were left behind by Remigia and Januario.
“An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof.” Hence, we find no error committed by the CA when
it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on petitioner to establish her
affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado.

Page 74 of 76
 IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM
GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown
as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it
appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married
an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the
birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael
was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and
Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the
case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority.
The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to
adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec
7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring
and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Page 75 of 76
 NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS v. CA
G.R. No. 170645, July 9, 2010

Facts:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his
birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later
or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother
and Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on
the certificate of live birth. On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a complaint for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo’s
birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son.

Issue:
Whether the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.

Ruling:
In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is petitioner’s
son. Petitioner’s reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he did not live up to her
expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her and the oppositor. Bad
blood runs in the veins of the parties. But while oppositor may have done an act that
caused plaintiff to rue she gave him life, such acts however, are not justifications of what
she prays from this Court.
An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a reason to
strip a person of one’s filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance though. The
documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties’ relationship.

Page 76 of 76