Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
"#$"B%&$' C&"()*+,"-
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Preface
I
am
an
independent
consultant
specialized
in
Public
Private
Partnerships
commonly
referred
to
as
PPP.
I
believe
that
PPP
can
significantly
enhance
the
effec<veness
and
efficiency
of
public
service
provisions.
Provided
that
the
environment
for
PPP
is
enabling
and
that
projects
are
well
prepared
taking
into
considera<on
aspects
like
bankability,
affordability
and
value
for
money.
My
mission
is
to
support
the
public
and
private
sector
on
implemen<ng
PPP.
I
have
done
so
for
more
than
a
decade
throughout
the
world
and
want
to
con<nue
as
such
for
a
long
<me.
This
paper
outlines
my
view
on
the
concept
of
PPP
and
its
main
benefits
but
also
its
challenges
and
consequent
cri<cal
success
factors.
It
is
just
a
personal
perspec<ve
based
on
my
experiences,
which
cover
some
100
PPP
projects
in
over
30
countries,
and
corresponding
research,
reflec<ng
as
such
my
way
of
working.
It’s
part
of
a
series
of
my
views
which
aim
to
address
the
most
cri<cal
aspects
for
successful
development
of
PPP.
Just
for
inspira<on.
2
Contents
3
I. Defining
PPP
4
No
Common
Defini<on
for
PPP
Though
no
major
inconsistencies
in
the
universal
understanding
of
the
concept
PPPs
refer
to
arrangements
under
which
the
private
An
arrangement
between
two
or
more
en<<es
that
A
coopera<ve
venture
between
the
public
and
sector
supplies
infrastructure
assets
and
enables
them
to
public
service
work
coopera<vely
private
sectors,
built
on
the
exper<se
of
each
infrastructure
based
services
that
tradi<onally
have
towards
shared
or
compa<ble
objec<ves
and
in
partner,
that
best
meets
clearly
defined
public
been
provided
by
the
government
which
there
is
some
degree
of
shared
authority
and
needs
through
the
appropriate
alloca<on
of
IMF:
PPPs,
Government
Guarantees
and
Fiscal
responsibility,
joint
investment
of
resources,
shared
resources,
risks
and
rewards.
Risks
risk
taking
and
mutual
benefit
The
Canadian
Council
for
Public-‐Private
United
Kingdom
HM
Treasury,
1998
Partnerships
A
PPP
is
a
long-‐term
contract
between
the
public
PPP
is
a
contract
between
a
government
ins<tu<on
Public
Private
Partnership
(PPP)
Project
means
a
and
private
sectors
where
government
pays
the
and
a
private
party
where
the
laYer
performs
an
project
based
on
a
contract
or
concession
private
sector
to
deliver
infrastructure
and
related
ins<tu<onal
func<on
and/or
uses
state
property,
agreement,
between
a
Government
or
statutory
services
on
behalf,
or
in
support,
of
government’s
and
where
substan<al
project
risks
are
passed
to
en<ty
on
the
one
side
and
a
private
sector
broader
service
responsibili<es.
the
third
party.
company
on
the
other
side,
for
delivering
an
Australia:
NaJonal
Public
Private
Partnership
South
Africa
infrastructure
service
on
payment
of
user
charges.
Policy
and
Guidelines
2008
India
A
partnership
is
an
arrangement
between
two
or
PPPs
broadly
refer
to
long-‐term,
contractual
a
‘partnership’
style
approach
to
the
provision
of
more
par<es
who
have
agreed
to
work
partnerships
between
the
public
and
private
sector
infrastructure
as
opposed
to
an
arm’s
length
coopera<vely
toward
shared
and/or
compa<ble
agencies,
specifically
targeted
towards
financing,
‘supplier’
rela<onship.
PPP
involves
a
sharing
of
risk,
objec<ves
and
in
which
there
is
shared
authority
designing,
implemen<ng,
and
opera<ng
responsibility
and
reward,
and
is
undertaken
in
those
and
responsibility;
joint
investment
of
resources;
infrastructure
facili<es
and
services
that
were
circumstances
when
there
is
value
for
money
benefit
shared
liability
or
risk-‐taking;
and
ideally,
mutual
tradi<onally
provided
by
the
public
sector
to
the
taxpayers
benefits
Asian
Development
Bank,
2006
The
World
Bank,
2003
European
Commission,
2003
5
PPP
is
an
Alterna<ve
Delivery
Scheme
for
Public
Services
PPP
versus
Tradi<onal
Procurement
TradiJonal
Procurement
PPP
•
Public
sector
bears
all
risk
of
•
Risks
distributed
between
public
Risk
undertaking
project
sector
and
private
sector
Project
•
Public
sector
is
responsible
for
all
•
Private
sector
manages
overall
project
Management
project
management
roles
and
and
interfaces
interfaces
Performance
•
Public
sector
accountable
for
•
Private
sector
takes
responsibility
for
Management
performance
and
long
term
design,
construc<on,
maintenance
and
maintenance
possibly
even
opera<ons
•
All
project
related
costs
(capital
•
Users
pay
for
services
or
public
sector
Payments
and
opera<onal
paid
by
public
pays
for
service
subject
to
predefined
sector
performance
criteria
•
Public
sector
responsible
for
•
Private
sector
responsible
for
funding
Financing
securing
finance
through
arranging
debt
and
issuing
equity
6
Modes
of
PPP
Defined
by
nature
of
risk
alloca<on
Asset
Construc<on
Demand
Performance
7
Contractual
Structure
Structure
is
generic,
though
payment
mechanism
differs
per
mode
of
PPP
Investors
Providing
funds
for
investments
PPP
Company
(or
Special
1
Users
Purpose
Vehicle)
Paying
a
fee
for
the
Banks
service
provided
*It
is
also
possible
that
users
pay
a
fee
for
the
service
provided
to
the
public
sector
and
that
the
public
sector
uses
this
income
to
pay
an
availability
or
annuity
fee
to
the
PPP
Company
8
I. Defining
PPP
9
Infrastructure
Deficit
Many
countries
have
insufficient
infrastructure
spending
November
26,
2007
Canada’s
$123
billion
municipal
infrastructure
deficit
is
not
the
final
price
tag
for
all
its
infrastructure
needs,
says
a
construc<on
industry
official.
The
$123
billion
is
huge
number
but
that
is
just
part
of
the
story,”
says
Jeff
Morrison,
Canadian
Construc<on
Associa<on
“ That
just
looks
at
the
rehabilita<on
of
the
exis<ng
stock.
It
does
not
include
the
price
of
new
infrastructure
needed
to
add
capacity
and
expand
systems.”
7.5
-‐
9.0%
Federal
Finance
Minister
Lindsay
Tanner
has
warned
the
government
won't
be
spending
lavishly
to
address
a
huge
infrastructure
deficit
that
could
top
$750
billion
because
of
popula<on
growth.
But
the
government
was
5.5
-‐
7.0%
making
some
headway
with
a
$22
billion
investment
in
its
2009/10
budget,
he
told
an
infrastructure
conference
in
Sydney
on
Wednesday.
10
Fiscal
Constraints
Limit
possibility
to
increase
infrastructure
spending
Argen<na:
51%
$
294
billion
Public
Debt
as
percentage
of
GDP
2009
1.3%
Public
Deficit
as
percentage
of
GDP
2009
11
Private
Infrastructure
Finance
Significant
growth
in
the
developing
world
to
support
funding
of
infrastructure
deficit
160,000
Europe
and
Central
&
Investment
in
Physical
Assets
in
USD
million
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
East
Asia
and
Pacific
Europe
and
Central
Asia
La<n
America
and
the
Caribbean
Middle
East
and
North
Africa
South
Asia
Sub-‐Saharan
Africa
Sources:
PPIAF
database
12
Private
Infrastructure
Finance
…and
also
in
some
of
the
matured
economies
CAGR
CAGR
21%
17%
8.92
9.61
7.37
7.35
8.19
7.32
6.54
4.95
4.96
4.73
5.25
4.26
3.32
3.46
2.21
2.48
2.4
1.29
1.05
1.17
0.70
0.43
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
13
PPP
Leaders
Delivering
some
10-‐30%
of
their
infrastructure
services
through
PPP
100
900
100
800
Value
of
projects
in
billion
USD
700
60
450
55
500
50
400
50
400
40
32
300
215
200
20
126
100
100
19
0
0
UK
2008
India
2009
Korea
2010
Mainland
Europe
Australia
2005
Canada
2010
South
Africa
2001
-‐2008
2009
15
Infrastructure
Risks
Delivering
infrastructure
through
tradi<onal
procurement
imposes
severe
risks
on
the
public
sector
Cost
overruns
Delays
Less
demand
(e.g.
roads)
Percentage
of
Projects
Percentage
of
Projects
Actual
as
percentage
of
Forecast
*Research
results
are
presented
merely
for
the
purpose
of
stressing
the
risk
factors
of
infrastructure.
The
results
are
no
indicator
for
a
government’s
ability
to
deliver
infrastructure
as
the
underlying
methodology
and
assump<ons
for
the
different
studies
are
different
and
not
quite
comparable.
Sources:
Flyvbjerg
2003,
KMG
2010,
NAO
2005,
EIB
2005,
Vassallo
2007,
Standards
&
Poor
2005,
Li
&
Hensche
2009
16
Effec<ve
Delivery
PPPs
can
provide
Value
for
Money
by
delivering
infrastructure
more
on
<me
and
more
on
budget.
On
Time
Delivery
On
Budget
Delivery
Percentage
of
Projects
Percentage
of
Projects
85%
75%
Tradi<onal
Tradi<onal
53%
83%
99%
97%
PPP
PPP
99%
100%
Australia UK Australia UK
17
Cost
Savings
PPPs
can
reduce
life
cycle
costs
up
to
10-‐30%,
though
the
methodology
to
assess
this
is
subject
to
discussion
Average
Cost
Savings
of
PPP
versus
TradiJonal
Public
Sector
Comparator
into
PerspecJve
Public
Sector
Comparator
Outcome
Tool
to
assess
value
for
money
Pros
⊕ Ra<onalizes
use
of
PPP
Australia
28%
⊕ Helps
scoping
and
structuring
the
PPP
⊕ Supports
selec<ng
the
most
aYrac<ve
bid
UK
20%
Cons
⊖ Public
sector
alterna<ve
is
merely
hypothe<cal
given
absence
of
public
funds
e.g.
in
Electricity
and
Water
DistribuJon
or
in
availability
payment
based
PPPs
Review
of
301
u<li<es
with
PSP
and
926
state-‐owned
enterprises
(SOEs)
Review
of
151
projects
in
the
UK
and
41
projects
in
Scotland
over
more
than
a
decade
of
opera<on
in
71
developing
and
transi<on
economies.
• 96
percent
of
project
managers
considered
PPP
• 12
percent
increase
in
residen<al
connec<ons
sa<sfactory
or
beYer
with
73
percent
even
good
for
water
u<li<es
to
very
good
(UK)
• 29
percent
increase
for
electricity
distribu<on
• 92
percent
of
users
considered
infrastructure
companies
services
delivered
via
PPP
to
be
of
acceptable
• 19
percent
increase
in
residen<al
coverage
for
standards
(UK)
sanita<on
services
• 91
percent
of
authori<es
was
sa<sfied
with
the
• 18
percent
increase
in
water
sold
per
worker
availability
of
the
infrastructure
(Scotland)
(following
the
introduc<on
of
concession
• 56
percent
of
authori<es
believe
that
the
contracts)
and
a
32
percent
increase
in
contract
offers
good
or
excellent
value
for
electricity
sold
per
worker
money
(Scotland)
• 45
percent
increase
in
bill
collec<on
rates
in
electricity
• 11
percent
reduc<on
in
distribu<on
losses
for
electricity
(following
par<al
dives<tures)
and
• 41
percent
increase
in
the
number
of
hours
of
daily
water
service.
Sources:
PPIAF
2009,
Ipsos
Mori
2009,
Cambridge
Economic
Policy
Associates
2005
19
Transac<on
Costs
Cost
of
PPP
transac<on
are
more
than
10%
of
capital
costs
for
both
the
public
and
the
private
sector
and
tend
to
be
three
<mes
higher
than
in
the
tradi<onal
procurement
case
Total
TransacJon
costs
for
PPP
between
8
and
20%
Higher
than
for
tradiJonal
procurement
Average
transac<on
costs
as
percentage
of
capital
costs
based
on
Private
sector
transac<on
costs
as
percentage
of
project
costs
review
of
55
projects
in
the
UK
for
different
project
size
categories
0.61%
0.58%
0.48% 0.50%
4 – 7%
3
-‐
6%
0.13%
0.09%
0.06%
0.04%
1
-‐
7%
Public Sector Winning Bidder Failed Bidders GBP 0 -‐ 25 26-‐50 51 -‐ 100 101 -‐ 200
PPP Tradi<onal
20
Cost
of
Capital
Cost
of
public
finance
appear
to
be
lower
than
cost
of
private
finance,
but
are
they
really?
Public
Finance
Private
Finance
•
Cost
of
capital
is
defined
by
the
•
Cost
of
capital
is
defined
by
the
risk
At
first
sight
risk
free
interest
rate
free
rate
plus
a
risk
premium
investors
approximated
by
the
interest
rate
and
banks
require
for
the
risks
they
on
government
bonds
incur
Underlying
•
creditworthiness
of
the
respec<ve
•
risk
profile
of
the
project
driver
authority
•
All
project
risks
are
borne
by
the
•
All
project
risks
are
borne
by
the
Consequence
tax
payers
capital
providers
•
Cost
of
capital
in
case
of
public
•
cost
of
capital
in
case
of
private
Conclusion
finance
should
include
a
risk
finance
takes
project
risks
into
account
premium
*The
issue
of
cost
of
capital
and
related
discount
rates
for
the
purpose
of
value
for
money
analysis
is
ongoing
subject
of
discussion
among
PPP
prac<<oners
and
has
not
yet
lead
to
consensus
on
an
appropriate
viewpoint.
21
I. Defining
PPP
22
PPPs
can
Fail
In
transport
infrastructure
• Between
1987
and
1995,
52
projects
(25
• Hungary
M1/M15
was
the
first
toll
motorway
compe<<vely
tendered)
was
awarded
(largest
tendered
and
implemented
in
Central
and
PPP
toll
road
program
at
the
<me)
Eastern
Europe.
• Construc<on
cost
overruns
averaged
25%
and
• Traffic
volumes
were
about
40%
lower
than
average
actual
revenues
were
about
30%
an<cipated,
despite
the
forecasts
being
below
forecasts
(only
5
projects
met
or
prepared
by
independent
experts.
exceeded
targets)
• Because
of
the
presence
of
a
nearby
free
• Average
toll
road
fee
increased
from
US$
0.02/ alterna<ve.
km
to
US$
0.17
azer
concessioning
• As
a
result,
the
concessionaire
was
unable
to
• Government
took
over
23
projects
and
paid
service
its
debt
and
ul<mately
the
government
outstanding
debt
to
Mexican
Banks
(about
US$
had
to
take
over
the
concession
at
a
high
cost.
5
billion)
and
construc<on
companies
(about
US$
2.6
billion)
23
PPPs
can
Fail
In
social
infrastructure
• The
Victoria
government
contracted
with
• In
2008
the
AbboYsford
Regional
Hospital
and
consor<a
to
develop
three
major
PPP
hospitals
Cancer
Centre
was
delivered
as
a
PPP.
in
the
mid-‐90s.
• To
date
the
government
has
spent
over
$7
•
Under
the
terms
of
the
contract,
the
consor<a
million
in
administra<ve
costs
to
pursue
had
to
accept
public
medicare
pa<ents
without
projected
savings
that
were
ini<ally
es<mated
extra-‐billing.
The
consor<a
agreed
to
provide
at
$3
million
over
the
length
of
the
30+
year
services
at
96%
of
the
cost
for
public
hospitals.
contract.
• The
government
had
to
buy
back
the
hospital
• Construc<on
costs
have
increased
from
$210
from
Australian
Hospital
Care
in
October
2000
million
to
$355
million,
and
the
annual
azer
the
consor<um
lost
$10
million
on
the
La
opera<ng
lease
for
the
private
sector
Trobe
Hospital
and
announced
it
was
suing
the
contractor
has
doubled
from
$20
million
to
$41
government.
million.
• Legal
and
consultant
costs
for
this
deal
are
budgeted
at
$24.5
million
which
will
be
paid
by
the
public.
• In
1986,
the
Euro
tunnel
group
was
founded
to
• In
2003
the
London
Underground
began
carry
out
a
joint
project
between
the
United
opera<ng
as
a
PPP,
whereby
the
infrastructure
Kingdom
and
France
to
build
a
rail
tunnel
under
and
rolling
stock
were
upgraded,
maintained
the
English
Channel.
by
two
private
companies
(Metronet
and
Tube
• The
es<mated
cost
of
the
project
was
£4.9bn
Lines)
under
30-‐year
contracts
but
the
final
cost
to
complete
the
project
was
• The
£30
billion
scheme
was
put
in
jeopardy
around
£10bn
which
is
double
the
projected
when
Metronet,
went
into
administra<on
in
cost.
The
business
thereazer
failed
meets
its
2007
azer
costs
for
its
projects
spiralled
out
of
running
costs
by
genera<ng
adequate
passenger
control
leading
to
a
cost
overrun
of
2
billion
and
cargo
traffic
to
meet
its
forecasts.
There
• The
government
took
over
the
responsibili<es
were
many
reasons
for
this
failure.
of
Metronet
following
its
collapse.
• Consequently,
company
struggled
to
pay
its
financial
obliga<ons
and
the
debts
had
to
be
restructured
leading
to
high
write
offs
with
the
involved
banks
25
I. Defining
PPP
26
PPP
Policy
Ensure
a
cohesive,
coherent
and
comprehensive
policy
tailored
to
your
objec<ves
27
PPP
Life
Cycle
Ensure
bankable
and
affordable
PPPs
that
provide
value
for
money
and
apply
transparent
and
compe<<ve
bidding
procedures
and
adequate
monitoring
mechanisms
Ensure
that
the
scope
of
your
Ensure
that
your
project
is
Ensure
that
your
project
is
Iden<fy
your
PPP
project
is
clear
adequately
jus<fied
suitable
for
PPP
28
Disclaimer
The
informa<on
contained
herein
is
of
a
general
nature
and
is
not
intended
to
address
the
circumstances
of
any
par<cular
individual
or
en<ty.
Although
I
endeavour
to
provide
accurate
and
<mely
informa<on,
there
can
be
no
guarantee
that
such
informa<on
is
accurate
as
of
the
date
it
is
received
or
that
it
will
con<nue
to
be
accurate
in
the
future.
No
one
should
act
on
such
informa<on
without
appropriate
professional
advice
azer
a
thorough
examina<on
of
the
par<cular
situa<on.
©VandenBroek
Consul<ng,
May
2010
Hoogeinde
59
5142
GB
Waalwijk
The
Netherlands
T:
+31
6
22
45
21
89
E:
Marcel.vandenbroek.nl@gmail.com
W:
www.vandenbroekconsul<ng.nl
29
30