Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Elements:
1. Public uprising AND taking up arms against the gov’t.
2. Purpose of ^
a. Remove from allegiance to said gov’t or its laws:
i. Any part of PH territory
ii. Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or
b. Deprive the Chief Executive OR Congress, wholly or partially, ANY of their powers or prerogatives.
Penalty:
RP – person who promotes, maintains or heads rebellion or insurrection
RT – person merely participating or executing commands of others
Rebellion – used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing
government
Insurrection – used in reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance,
or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters or subject
1. Rebellion – levying of war during peace time for any of the purposes mentioned; Treason – performed
in aid of enemy during wartime
2. Rebellion always involves taking up arms against government; Treason may be committed by mere
adherence to the enemy, giving aid or comfort
Notes:
R.A. 6968
People v Lovedioro FACTS :
(Nepomuceno) That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Albay, Elias Lovedioro
together with Gilberto Longasa, and three(3) others whose true identities are at
present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring,confederating and
helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to
killand with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member
of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.The trial court
found the accused guilty. The accused appealed contesting the ruling of
himguilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion. He further claims that in the
testimony of the witness,he is a member of the NPA. Additionally, he contends
that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means toor in furtherance of subversive
ends,"said killing should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion
under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did
not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo,
he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the
commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of
Prison mayor by the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and not rebellion.
HELD: YES. The accused of guilty of murder.
RATIO:
The RTC was correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder
because overt act and purpose are essential components of the crime of
rebellion, which either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not
exist.Political motive should be established before a person charged with a
common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable
penalty-could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political
crimes. No political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, andmere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.In cases of rebellion,
motive relates to the act and mere membership in an organization dedicated to
the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.The killing of the
victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the
achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of
the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA
People v Dasig SUMMARY: Appellant and several others who were part of a sparrow unit killed
(Hernandez) a police officer performing traffic duties. Appellant was convicted of murder with
direct assault. He appealed that it was merely rebellion. Court ruled in his favor.
FACTS:
1. Pfc. Redempto Manatad and two other police officers, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and
Pfc. Rene Catamora, were tasked to man traffic. Pfc. Catamora noticed eight
persons, including Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously, one of whom gave
instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad.
2. Pfc. Catamora followed the, but they sensed it and proceeded to the middle of
the road and engaged him in a gunfight. He then heard a series of shots from the
other group and saw Pfc. Manatad on the ground. Pfc. Catamora sought refuge
at the BIR Office, from where he saw two persons take Pfc. Manatad’s gun and
again fired on him to assure he was dead before the group fled.
3. Nuñez and appellant Rodrigo Dasig were located in a safehouse, where they
were apprehended and disarmed. In the process, Dasig was shot in the arm. He
confessed that he and Nuñez’s group had killed Pfc. Manatad, and that he and
Nuñez, alias ‘Armand’ and ‘Mabi’ respectively, were members of a sparrow unit.
He was found guilty of murder with direct assault. Nuñez died while the trial was
still ongoing.
ISSUE: WoN the proper crime charged is rebellion, not murder with direct
assault - YES
RATIO:
1. Art 135, RPC: Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. Appellant voluntarily confessed his
membership in the sparrow unit and his participation and that of the group in
Pfc.Manatad’s killing. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the NPA’s
liquidation squad, with the objective of overthrowing the government.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes
or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crime.
Petitions are DISMISSED.
ISSUE:
W/N Rebellion is considered a complex crime with arson, murder or robbery
HELD: NO
Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for
“any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or
who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein”:
(1) “engaging in war against the forces of the government”,
(2) “destroying property”, or
(3) “committing serious violence”,
(4) “exacting contributions or”
(5) “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have
been appropriated”
-Elements of Penalty: Rebellion may be committed by engaging in war against
the forces government and committing serious violence in the prosecution of
said war
-The war connotes resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection
of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damages to property, etc
-The said act of resorting to arms, with resulting impairment or destruction of life
and property constitutes nether two or more offences or complex crimes but one
crime - rebellion only and punishable with only one single penalty
-Whether performed singly or collectively, these 5 classes of acts constitute only
one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty —
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Since all of the acts enumerated
in Art 135 constitute only ONE offense, Art 48 cannot be applied
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with
Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias
Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias
Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli
Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle,
Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr.
Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando
Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias
Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel
alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias
Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino
alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and
John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others,
were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as
the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Communist
Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to
commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and
confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue:
Held:
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information.
When the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the
permission of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was
allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal
recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the
accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating
circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty
imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the reason that in his
opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being
the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against
the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On October 18,
1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify
the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in the information, in the sum of
P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this
judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of
whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for
the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating
effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby
sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000,
(without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for
the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs
of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Dir Alfredo Lim,on
the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Salazar of RTC QC. The warrant was
issued on an information signed earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors,
charging Enrile and the Panlilio spouses with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, allegedly committed during the period of failed coup attempt.
Enrile was held overnight at the NBI HQ, then brought to Camp Karingal the
following morning.
On the same day, Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights, having been:
1. Held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in statute
books
Solicitor General: the case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the
information in the Hernandez ruling charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion.
Held:
It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan
by giving him food and comfort in his house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a
fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure of the petitioner that
prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction was allegedly a violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then,
Sen. Filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information
but then again was denied.
In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
respondent court on the following grounds:
a. the facts do not constitute an offense;
b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in
complexed rebellion;
c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion;
d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and
e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No.
1829.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Sen. Enrile and quashed the
information.
The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component
offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions. It is
Hernandez case that remains binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as
means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
The majority affirmed the declaration is legal because the President was only
exercising a wedding of the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
U.S. jurisprudence and commentators are cited discussing the awesome powers
exercised by the U.S. President during moments of crisis[1] and that these
powers are also available to the Philippine President.[2] Although the limits
cannot be precisely defined, the majority concluded that there are enough
residual powers to serve as the basis to support the Presidential declaration of a
state of rebellion.[3] The majority, however, emphasized that the declaration
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.[4] They affirmed the
legality of warrantless arrests of persons who participated in the rebellion, if
circumstances so warrant[5] with this clarification: [i]n other words, a person may
be subjected to a warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion whether or not the
President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid
warrantless arrest are present.[6]
If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still be present for an arrest to be
made, then the declaration is a superfluity. I therefore shudder when a blanket
affirmation is given to the President to issue declarations of a state of rebellion
which in fact may not be the truth or which may be in affect even after the
rebellion has ended.
Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 27, 2003, at the height of
the occupation of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati
City, by 323 junior officers and enlisted men (Oakwood Incident),[7] which began
in the early morning of July 27, 2003.[8] Shortly after, the President issued
General Order No. 4, ordering the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to use reasonable force, and pay due regard to
constitutional rights, in putting down the rebellion.[9] The Oakwood incident
ended peacefully that same evening when the militant soldiers surrendered after
negotiations.
On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group had surrendered peacefully, an
official spokesperson from the DOJ declared that the Presidents indefinite
imposition of the state of rebellion would make warrantless arrests a valid
exercise of executive power.
The Court can take judicial notice that the police authorities were releasing to
media evidence found purporting to link personalities in the political opposition,
the most prominent of whom was Senator Gringo Honasan. Even Senator Loi
Ejercito and Mayor JV Ejercitos names were being linked to the attempted
uprising.
On August 1, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 435, declaring that
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police had
effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion, and, accordingly, that the state
of rebellion had ceased on that date.
The majority discussed only the abstract nature of the powers exercised by the
Chief Executive, without considering if there was sufficient factual basis for the
Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion and when it ended. In taking this
position, the majority is returning, if not expanding, the doctrine enunciated in
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,[17] which overturned the landmark doctrine in Lansang
v. Garcia.[18] In Lansang, the Supreme Court upheld its authority to inquire into
the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and held that this inquiry raises a judicial rather than a political question. In
Garcia-Padilla, on the other hand, the ponencia held that Lansang was no longer
authoritative, and that the Presidents decision to suspend the privilege is final
and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons.
These two cases were decided prior to the 1987 Constitution, which requires this
Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.[19] This provision in the
1987 Constitution was precisely meant to check abuses of executive power.
Martial Law was still fresh in the minds of the delegates in 1987!
The majority ignored the fact that the state of rebellion declared by the President
was in effect five days after the peaceful surrender of the militant group.
The Presidents proclamation cites Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution as
the basis for the declaration of the state of rebellion..
Thus, the declaration of a state of rebellion does not have any legal meaning or
consequence. This declaration does not give the President any extra powers. It
does not have any good purpose.
If the declaration is used to justify warrantless arrests even after the rebellion
has ended, as in the case of Cardenas, such declaration or, at the least, the
warrantless arrests, must be struck down.
Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is the crime of rebellion
or insurrection, to wit:
ART. 134-A. Coup d etat. How committed. The crime of coup d etat is a swift
attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed
against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any
military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or
simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or
persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or
employment, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of
seizing or diminishing state power.
Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,[21] and the authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.[22] However, this doctrine
should be applied to its proper context i.e., relating to subversive armed
organizations, such as the New Peoples Army, the avowed purpose of which is
the armed overthrow of the organized and established government. Only in such
instance should rebellion be considered a continuing crime.
When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the evening of July 27, the rebellion
or the coup d etat ended. The President, however, did not lift the declaration of
the state of rebellion until 5 days later, on August 1, 2003.
After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of having conspired with the
soldiers or participated in the Oakwood incident could be arrested without a
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
governs arrest without warrant, provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
xxxxxxxxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court are exceptions to the
due process clause in the Constitution. Section 5, par. (a) relates to a situation
where a crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer.
Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the requirement of personal
knowledge, on the part of the arresting officer, of facts indicating that an offense
had just been committed, and that the person to be arrested had committed that
offense.
After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July 27, 2003, there was no crime
that was being attempted, being committed, or had just been committed. There
should, therefore, be no occasion to effect a valid warrantless arrest in
connection with the Oakwood Incident.
The purpose of the declaration and its duration as far as the overeager
authorities were concerned was only to give legal cover to effect warrantless
arrests even if the state of rebellion or the instances stated in Rule 113, Section
5 of the Rules are absent or no longer exist.
Our history had shown the dangers when too much power is concentrated in the
hands of one person. Unless specifically defined, it is risky to concede and
acknowledge the residual powers to justify the validity of the presidential
issuances. This can serve as a blank check for other issuances and open the
door to abuses. The majority cite the exercise of strong executive powers by
U.S. President Andrew Jackson. Was it not President Jackson who is said to
have cynically defied the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling (under Chief Justice
Marshall) against the forcible removal of the American Indians from the tribal
lands by saying: The Chief Justice has issued his Decision, now let him try to
enforce it? Others quote Madison as having gone further with: With what army
will the Chief Justice enforce his Decision?
WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, issued
on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to be
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All other orders issued and action taken based
on those issuances, especially after the Oakwood incident ended in the evening
of July 27, 2003, e.g., warrantless arrests, should also be declared null and void.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal. Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup
d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in
undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period.
Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or aids
in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person
who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as
performed similar acts, on behalf or the rebels shall be deemed a leader of such a rebellion, insurrection, or
coup d'etat. (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990).
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art 136)
(Ambray)
Article 136:
Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit coup d’etat, Rebellion or Insurrection - The conspiracy and proposal
commit coup d’erat shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed
eight thousand pesos (P8,000).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished respectively, by prision
correcional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000) and by
prision correcional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos (P2000)
Notes:
-No conspiracy when there is no agreement and no decision to commit rebellion
-Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and soliciting funds from the people for, the
organisation, show conspiracy to overthrow the Government
-Merely agreeing and deciding to rise publicly and take arms against the government for the purposes of
rebellion or merely proposing the commission of said acts is already subject to punishment
ART. 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection. - The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government, shall
incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end.
Elements:
1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government;
2. That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion;
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners, or other
representations tending to the same end.
Penalty: PM in minimum
Notes:
Inciting to Rebellion Distinguished from Proposal
a. in both, the offender induces another to commit rebellion
b. in proposal, person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion; in inciting, it is not required that offender
has decided to commit rebellion
c. in proposal, person who proposes uses secret motive; in inciting, the act is done publicly
ELEMENTS:
1. Offenders rise publicly AND tumultuously.
2. Offenders employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods.
3. Offender employs any of those means to attain any of the following objects:
a. Prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election;
b. Prevent the National Gov’t, or any provincial or municipal gov’t, or any public officer thereof
from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
c. Inflict any act of hate or revenge upon person or property of any public officer or employee.
d. Commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or
any social class; and
e. Despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National
Gov’t of all its property or any part thereof.
Penalty:
PM in minimum and a fine not exceeding P10,000 – for the leader of sedition
PC in maximum and a fine not exceeding P5,000 – for other persons participating therein
Notes:
1. Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state
2. Sedition Distinguished from Rebellion
1. In both, there must be public
uprising
2. In sedition, it is sufficient that public
uprising is tumultuous; in rebellion, there must be taking up of arms against the government
3. In sedition, the purpose of offenders may be political or social; in rebellion, it is always political
3. Sedition distinguished from treason – treason is the violation by a subject of allegiance to sovereign;
sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State
4. Public uprising and an object of sedition must concur
5. Common crimes are not absorbed in sedition
RATIO
(1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If
it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one
performing one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a
view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion
that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that object. It is
incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose,
which was to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common
feeling of resentment animated all.
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium period" and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
There must be an agreement and a decision to rise publicly and tumultuously to attain any of the objects of
sedition.
Thus, an agreement and a decision to attain an object of sedition without any agreement to rise publicly and
tumultuously is not conspiracy to commit sedition. Such an agreement and decision may constitute a conspiracy
to commit direct assault of the first form (Art. 148), which is not a felony.
Art. 141 punishes only conspiracy to commit sedition. Hence, proposal to commit sedition is not punishable.
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the
accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons
who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
(of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office,
or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal
such evil practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202
Uttering seditious words or speeches and writing, publishing or circulating scurrilous libels are punishable, when
—
-They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
- tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together
- suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
-lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
A theatrical play or drama where the words uttered or speeches delivered are seditious may be punished under
Art. 142.
Proposal to throw hand grenades in a public place, intended to cause commotion and disturbance, as an act of
hate and revenge against the police force, is inciting to sedition.
Knowingly concealing such evil practices
- ordinarily an act of the accessory after the fact,
- but under this provision, the act is treated and punished as that of the principal.
The use of words, emblems, etc., not performance of act, is punished in inciting to sedition
Disturbance or disorder, not necessary in inciting to sedition
- its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order.
US v Tolentino FACTS:
(Ambray) · On 14 May 1903, Aurelio Tolentino and others presented a theatrical
work written by the former entitled, “Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas” in Tagalog
language at the Teatro Libertad in Manila
· The piece contained seditious words and speeches, and scurrilous libels
against the Government of the US and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands which were uttered during the presentation as if tending to
obstruct the lawful officers in the execution of their offices, instigate others to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and riots and disturb the peace, safety and order of the
community.
HELD: YES.
· The theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition.
· The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time,
place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and
enmity against the American people and the Government of the United
States in the Philippines
· The Court was satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author
was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire
together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the
opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government and setting up another in its stead.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against
the Government of the Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written by the
accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade,
what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what
with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationale of free speech
cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not
only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government
obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of
legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally
directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people
to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in
order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
Umil v Ramos* Usual Facts of this case: (disregard if not needed) arrest w/o warrant thing
(Roque)
Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration.
In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reason to believe that an NPA
member(Rolando Dural, although using a fictitious name) was indeed being
treated at St. Agnes Hospital,QC for gunshot wounds. The information was from
the attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore came from reliable
sources.
In the case of
Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA courier.
In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live ammunition were
found at the timeof her arrest, and she admitted to owning such documents.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo &Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and found
subversive documents & loaded guns without permits.
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant.
Ammunition & subversive documents were found in her car.
In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the
latter’s companion in killing Romulo Bunye II
During this time, police authorities were present during the press conderence
held at the National Press Club (NPC) where Espiritu called for a nationwide
jeepny and bus driver strike.
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of
the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Held:
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the
merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered.
But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the
time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing.
Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies (Art 143)
(Nepomuceno)
1. There be a projected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or
board
2. The offender who may be any person prevents such meeting by force or fraud
Other Notes:
Chief of police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the municipal council are liable under Article 143, when
the defect of the meeting is not manifest and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined
Violation of parliamentary immunity - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall use force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or
subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or
casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof,
except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor.
Elements:
(1) That the offender is a public officer or employee
(2) That he arrests or searches any member of the National Assembly
(3) That the Assembly, at the time of arrest or search, is in regular or special session
(4) That the member arrested or searched has not committed a crime punishable under the Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor
Notes:
-Parliamentary immunity does not protect members of the National Assembly from responsibility before the
legislative body itself
The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the
constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an
exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a
provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would
be unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
HELD:
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is
likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression
of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in
seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable
under the Code.
Requisites:
a. There is a meeting, a gathering of a group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving;
b. Meeting is attended by armed persons.
c. Purpose is to commit any of the crimes punishable under the Code.
2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of
Treason, Rebellion OR Insurrection, Sedition, or Assault (TRISA) upon a person in authority or his agents.
Requisites:
a. There is a meeting, a gathering of a group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving;
b. The audience whether armed or not, is incited to te commission of the crime of TRISA..
Penalty: For:
Prision a. or
correcciona ga
l in its ni
maximum ze
period to rs
prision or
mayor in its le
medium ad
period er
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Arresto Persons
mayor merely
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such
meeting
Prision ^ if armed.
correcciona
l
"Public assembly" means "any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to
the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances."
PERMIT NEEDED: A public assembly is either with or without a permit. When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
While the holding of a public assembly without a permit where one is required is a violation by the leader(s) or
organizer(s), no other person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an
otherwise peaceful assembly.
If committed within 100 meters of the public assembly, these acts are violations of law:
1. The carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, a bladed
weapon and the like.
2. The malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares.
3. The carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit.
But even beyond 100 meters, the unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly is a crime.
Illegal Associations:
1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable
under the Code
2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals
Penalty:
PC in minimum and medium and a fine not exceeding P1,000 – founders, directors, and presidents
A Mayor – mere members of said association
Owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm company,
corporation or entity used by any person or persons found guilty violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs. Penalty = reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua
Any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor = prison
mayor
“The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed
by the person arrested.
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
“If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.
“The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of
any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed
firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
“The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor.”
SEC. 3. Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 5. Tampering of Firearm’s Serial Number. – The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm.”
Ratio: YES.
Sec. 1 of PD 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two
offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide
or murder”. It does not use the clause “as a result” or :on the occasion of” to
evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the
clause “with the use of”
People v Ringor Jr (Alejo) FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering
People’s Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table
where the victim was sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latter’s
throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused returned with a gun, entered the
kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from behind and shot
him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in
his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it
was found out that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was
not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he failed to prove Florida’s unlawful
aggression. He was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery and was
sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of possession of
an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.
ISSUE (1):
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime
occurred in 1994) is applicable
HELD (1):
No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm
was still not an aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to
Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as
it is unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.
2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession
of firearms and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20
years.
HELD (2):
ISSUE (2):
3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder
4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not
proven and that the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate
penalty for the offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the absence of an
aggravating circumstance.
Assault upon, and resistance and disobedience to persons in authority and their agents
Elements:
a. Offender employs force OR intimidation;
b. Aim is to attain any or the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects in the
crime of sedition;
c. There is NO public uprising.
2. W/o public uprising, by attacking, by employing force, OR seriously intimidating OR seriously resisting
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
the occasion of such performance.
Elements:
a. Offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes serious intimidation, or (d) makes
serious resistance.
b. Person assaulted = person in authority / his agent.
c. During assault, ^ (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, OR (b) assaulted
by reason of past performance of official duties.
They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought
Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told
the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there
was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor
also suffered injuries.
I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
ISSUE
WON, the accused is guilty assault upon a person in authority resulting to
murder?
HELD
When a Barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacify a person who was
making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the performance
of his duties. As the Barangay Captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
ordinances within the Barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the
enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed
is murder with assault upon a person in authority.
Penalty: A Mayor or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 – any person who having been summoned...
Same penalty – any person who shall induce disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any such
body
Notes:
-The court may take action not amounting to a release of a prisoner of the National Assembly
Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person (Art. 151)
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. — The penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in
the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of
such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties; When the disobedience to an agent of a
person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100
pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.
Penalty: A Mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 – any person shall resist or seriously disobey any person in
authority
Notes:
● The juridical conception of the crime of resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or his
agents consists in a failure to comply with orders directly issued by the authorities in the exercise of
their official duties
● The person in authority must be in the actual performance of his official duties
● The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct order from the
authority or his agent
● The accused must have knowledge that the person arresting him is a peace officer
● There is justified resistance when the accused had no right to make the search
Penalty: A Menor or a fine ranging from P10 to P100 – disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not
of a serious nature
Notes:
● The order must be lawful
● If the disobedience to an agent of a person
in authority is of a serious nature, the offender should be punished under par. 1 of Article 151
● When the attack or employment of force is not deliberate, the crime is only resistance or disobedience
Direct Resistance
Assault or Serious
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Public Disorders
Outcry - to shout subversive or provocative words tendency to stir up people to obtain by means of force or
violence any of the objects of rebellion or sedition
Qualifying if tumultuous in character: the disturbance or interruption shall be deemed as such if caused by more
than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence
Arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos In violation of the provisions contained in the last
clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body
of a person who has been legally executed
Notes:
1. Serious disturbance must be planned or intended
2. If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious ceremony is not committed by public
officers, or if committed by public officers they are participants therein, Article 153 should be applied
3. Inciting to Sedition or Rebellion distinguished from Public Disorder – It is necessary that offender
should have done the act with the idea aforethought of inducing his hearers or readers to commit the
crime of rebellion or sedition; if the outcry is more or less unconscious outburst, which, although
rebellious or seditious in nature, is not intentionally calculated to induce others to commit rebellion or
sedition, it is only public disorder
4. One who fired a submachine gun to cause disturbance, but inflicted serious physical injuries on
another, may be prosecuted for 2 crimes
Acts Punished:
1. Publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of
publication, as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the
interest or credit of the State
2. By encouraging disobedience to the law r to the constituted authorities or by praising, justifying or
extolling any act punished by law, by the same means or by words, utterances or speeches
3. By maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official resolution or document without proper
authority, or before they have been published officially
4. By printing, publishing or distributing (or causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets
which do not bear the real printer’s name, or which are classified as anonymous
Other Notes:
1. It is not necessary that the publication of the false news actually cased public disorder or caused
damage to the interest or credit of the State; the mere possibility of causing such danger or damage is
sufficient
2. The offender must know that the news is false
3. If there is no possibility of danger to the public order or of causing damage to the interest or credit of
the state by the publication of the false news
Qualifying: What constitutes the qualifying circumstance is the offender’s act of employing bribery as a “means”
of removing or delivering the prisoner from jail, and not the offender’s act of receiving or agreeing to receive a
bribe as a consideration fro committing the offense
Penalty: A Mayor in maximum to PC in minimum – any person who shall remove from any jail any person
confined therein or shall help escape of such person by means of violence, intimidation or bribery
Same Penalties in Minimum – if escape should take place outside of said establishment by taking guards by
surprise
Notes:
1. Person may be under detention only or by final judgment
2. Hospital or asylum considered as an extension of jail or prison
3. Offender is usually an outsider
4. The guard of the jail, who is off duty, may be
held liable for delivering prisoner from jail
5. Violence, intimidation or bribery is not necessary
Issue: W/N Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of
Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code
Ruling: NO.
· Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways:
(1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment;
and
(2) by helping such a person to escape.
· To remove means to take away a person from the place of his
confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person
released.
· To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal
institution means to furnished that person with the material means such as a
file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape.
· The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape.
· If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the
prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and
penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as
governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo
Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying Circumstances:
1. by means of unlawful entry (by scaling);
2. by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors;
3. by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence, or intimidation; or
4. thru connivance with other convicts or employees of penal institution
Penalty:
PC in medium and maximum – escape during term of imprisonment
PC in maximum – if it shall take with any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated
NOTES:
1. The sentence must be “by reason of final judgment”
2. This article is not applicable to sentence executed by deportation
3. Escape – flee from, to avoid, to get out of the way, as to flee to avoid arrest
4. Article 157 is applicable to sentence of destierro, since it consists in a deprivation of liberty
5. Unlawful entry – scaling or climbing the wall
SC declined to review on certiorari so the case went back to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that
execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed
upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty
and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
Held:
This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment."
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the
provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry,
by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks,
false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "Indeed, evasion of
sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".
Averting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to
imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter never placed in confinement.
Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service
of “destierro” - NO
RATIO:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or
erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly
admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his
sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of
sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that
during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein
he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution.
2. That there is disorder, resulting from —
a. Conflagration
b. Earthquake
c. Explosion
d. Similar Catastrophe
e. Mutiny in which he has not participated
3. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is
confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny.
4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief announcing the passing away of such calamity.
Penalty: Increase of 1/5 of time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall
exceed six months Deduction provided in Article 98 – if convict shall give himself up within 48 hours
Other notes:
1. Offender must be a convict by final judgment
2. The convict must leave the penal institution
3. What is punished is not the leaving of the penal institution, but the failure of the convict to give himself
up to the authorities within 48 hours after the proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity
4. If offender fails to give himself up, he gets an increased penalty
5. If offender gives himself up he is entitled to a deduction of 1/5th of his sentence
Conditional Pardon - a contract between the Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who
accepts it
Penalty:
PC in minimum period – if penalty remitted does not exceed 6 years
Unexpired Portion of Original Sentence – if penalty remitted is higher than 6 years
Notes:
1. The court cannot require the convict to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence if it does
not exceed 6 years
2. Violation of conditional pardon is not a substantive offense, because the penalty for such violation is
the unexpired portion of the punishment in the original sentence
3. Condition extends to special laws
4. Offender must be found guilty of subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under Article 159
5. Offender can be arrested and re-incarcerated without trial
6. The period when convict was at liberty, not deducted in case he is recommitted
7. Duration of the conditions subsequent is limited to the remaining period of the
RULING:
· In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options:
o (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or
o (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.
· Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
· Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed.
· In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, which is
a choice and exercise of the President’s executive prerogative, not subject
to judicial scrutiny.
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense (Art 160)
(Alejo)
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. -
Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of
seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after
reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such
clemency.
Elements:
1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense.
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same
Penalty: Besides the provisions of Rule 5 Article 62, Maximum of penalty prescribed by law for the new felony
Notes:
1. Second crime must be a felony; but the first crime for which the offender is serving sentence need not
be a felony (could be under a special law)
2. Quasi-Recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances
3. A quasi-recidivist, who is not a habitual criminal, may be pardoned at the age of 70 years if he has
already served out his original sentence or when he shall complete it after reaching said age
Doctrine: Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed by the Circuit Court of Rizal
upon Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca for the crime of murder.
When a crime is committed
while serving another The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal
sentence, maximum penalty where both accused were serving sentence, Abarca having been previously
will apply regardless of any convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery.
mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may or At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were members of the "Batang
may not be present. Mindanao" gang, while the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, also
prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, belonged to a group known as the "Happy
Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had been involved in intermittent, and
sometimes bloody, clashes, the latest of which resulted in the death of one
Balerio a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang
Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their gangmate,
the two accused set their Minds to avenge his death. They found the occasion to
execute their nefarious design when they learned that Reyno and Gomez were
sick and confined in the prison hospital.
At 6:15 in the 'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca, feigning illness, went to
the hospital to seek admission as a patient. He was accompanied by his co-
accused Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their intended victims:
Reyno was taking breakfast with Gomez was lying down on a "tarima" [wooden
bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno and spoke briefly to him,
while Abarca headed towards the "tarima".
Then, both accused suddenly drew out their improvised knives matalas Abarca
raised the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed Gomez, as Dioso, almost
simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And after the latter had fallen,
Dioso strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez.
When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they were met at the corridor by Prison
Guard Enriquito Aguilar Both gave themselves up and handed their weapons to
him.
Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the NBI, who performed the
autopsy, found that both accused died of massive bleeding due to multiple stab
wounds on the chest and abdomen.
Held:
They seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court by
invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
Suffice it to say that the accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime
charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such, the maximum
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony [murder] is death, regardless
of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance or
the complete absence thereof.